GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

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Lecture Series

2018 - 2019

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

Lord Lothian, Mr. Radek Sikorski and Sir Malcolm Rifkind

Sir John Chilcot and Lord Lothian

Mr. James Barr and Lord Lothian

Professor Charles Garraway and Lord Lothian

Lord Lothian and Mr. Ben Macintyre

Dr. Kori Schake and Lord Lothian

Mr. Matthew Rycroft and Lord Lothian

Lord Lothian and Mr. Gordon Corera

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NOTES

PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure to introduce this, the thirteenth edition of GSF's annual lecture publication. In these pages you will once again find a full record of the extensive events programme which we delivered during the course of our 2018-2019 series.

Topics and regions predictably included Brexit, China, Russia, the Middle East and the US, as well the big global issues of the day: climate change, terrorism, globalisation, cybersecurity. But the breadth and range of countries, region and topics covered was striking, from Brazil to Yemen, and from international development and the Commonwealth to the return of great power rivalry, attracting record audiences along the way.

Unsurprisingly, much focus and political capital has continued to lie with the Brexit process, which has dominated the public discourse. But in GSF debates throughout the year on the UK's role in the world, I observed a clear desire – demand, even - for substance to be given to the concept of 'Global Britain' and a firm eschewal of any reduction in our engagement in world events.

During this period of change and uncertainty in the UK and beyond, the answers to the many complicated questions of policy and strategy facing us remain elusive, but GSF's mandate requires us to continue to strive to seek them. We remain committed to the principle of frank and open exchanges. Opinion and expertise from all quarters is welcome at GSF, where the policymaking value of fresh thinking and cognitive diversity combined with seasoned expertise and accumulated wisdom has long been recognised.

Our *modus operandi* is the rigorous pursuit of discussion, debate and analysis in a process which looks far beyond knee-jerk or hasty responses to events. Our goal is to contribute to the articulation of a clear vision for Britain which defines and strengthens our place in the world, a vision grounded in reality and underpinned by a coherent strategy able to anticipate and address future challenges. Never has this need been more urgent, I believe, and it will underlie our events programme over the next year. One of the key themes will be to re-examine the meaning of 'Global Britain' in the totally changed political landscape.

As ever, I am keen to convey my sincere thanks to all those who contribute to GSF in so many ways: our annual cohort of eminent and highly knowledgeable speakers, whose willingness, year on year, to share their expertise never fails to amaze me; our loyal and active membership, whose thoughtful and engaged participation is essential to the success of our events; and finally, our Advisory Board members, a list of whom can be found at the back of this publication. GSF's debt of gratitude to them is immense: our achievements and success simply would not be possible without their steadfast commitment, unfaltering support and unparalleled leadership.

I eagerly anticipate our 2019-2020 events programme, and I am confident we will equal, indeed surpass, the successes of this year and that GSF will remain an indispensable part of the foreign, defence, and security policy conversation in London and beyond. I look forward both to what the coming months will bring and to meeting GSF members, old and new, during the course of the year.

Johan Eliasch
President, Global Strategy Forum
October 2019

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM LEADERSHIP

President

Johan Eliasch is the President of Global Strategy Forum and the former Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. He is Chairman and CEO of HEAD (the global sporting goods group), Chairman of Aman Resorts, Equity Partners, London Films and Co-Chairman of Cool Earth. He is an advisory board member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Polar Regions, Brasilinvest, Societe du Louvre, Capstar, the Centre for Social Justice, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Foundation for Renewable Energy and Environment and a member of the Mayor of Rome's and Jerusalem's International Business Advisory Councils. He is a Patron of Stockholm University. He is the Founder of the Rainforest Trust which is conserving 400,000 acres of rainforest in the Amazonas. He was part of the Conservative Shadow Foreign Office team as Special Advisor on European Affairs (1999-2003) and responsible for foreign relations (2003-2005). He was Conservative Party Deputy Treasurer (2003-2007). He was a member of the Austrian President's delegation of State for Trade and Industry (1996-2006). He was chairman of the Young Conservatives Party in Djursholm, Sweden (1979–1982). He did military service in Sweden in a specialist unit, the Royal Life Guard (K1).

Chairman

The Most Hon the Marquis of Lothian PC QC DL is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum. Lord Lothian was first elected to Parliament as Michael Ancram in 1974. His political career included four years as the Political Minister in Northern Ireland responsible for the opening engagements with the IRA which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement, Chairman of the Conservative Party for three years, and four years as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Opposition. He continues to be involved in international conflict resolution. He co-founded Global Strategy Forum in 2006 and is its Chairman. He was appointed to the House of Lords as a life peer in October 2010. He was first appointed a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament in 2005 and re-appointed in 2010, 2015 and 2017.

Director

Jacqueline Jinks is the Director of Global Strategy Forum. She joined GSF as Research Director in June 2006 and became the Director in February 2008. From 1997-2005, she was Political Secretary and speechwriter to Lord Moynihan, a former Conservative Senior Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords. She worked for the Rt Hon. Michael Howard QC MP and the Rt Hon. Francis Maude MP, during their respective tenures as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Prior to that, she worked for the Democratic National Committee (1996-1997) and CMA Consultants (1994-1996).

Treasurer

Adrian de Ferranti was the founder of Ferranti, an investment vehicle for engineering and technology companies. He was the founder and/or chairman of Tantus PLC, Cambridge Computer Graphics, Chelford PLC, and PTG. He had an early career at European Banking Company, Murray Johnstone, followed by Montgomery Securities in the US. He is currently the chairman, director or investor in NEST, SameWave, SMB, Updata, Ziani's, Terrascope Ltd, Ferranti Farming, and Small Business Bureau. He was the chairman and a trustee of the Royal Institution of Great Britain from 2007-2010. From 2007-2013 he was chairman of the Foundation at Heriot Watt University. He was also a treasurer of the Conservative Party from 1991-2004.

ABOUT GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM was founded by **Lord Lothian** (then The Rt Hon. Michael Ancram MP) and **Johan Eliasch** in 2006 to generate open debate and discussion on key foreign affairs, defence and international security issues. As an independent, non-party political, non-ideological organisation, GSF provides a platform to explore some of the more challenging and contentious aspects of UK foreign policy and to stimulate imaginative ideas and innovative thinking in a rapidly changing global landscape.

In accordance with our founding remit, we aim to bring together those with a deep interest in international affairs and to offer them the opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas, and to engage in informed debate. Through our publications and our website, we enable their expertise to be widely disseminated.

GSF's core activity consists of a regular lunchtime lecture and debate series on topical issues. For more in-depth discussion of specific topics, we host half-day seminars. We also hold small roundtable lunches and dinners on key issues of the day. Separately, alongside our annual compendium of lectures and the publication of the proceedings of our seminars, we publish an occasional series of monographs as well as collections of essays and articles by distinguished experts.

We are very fortunate to be supported by an active and committed Advisory Board comprising of foreign and defence policy practitioners of the highest calibre.

In 2018-2019, we hosted a total of 26 events, comprising seventeen lectures, five debates, three seminars, and one research launch.

The following speakers addressed our lecture series: **Mr. Radosław Sikorski**, Poland's Minister of Defence (2005-2007), Foreign Minister (2007-2014), and Speaker of Parliament (2014-2015); **The Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB PC Hon FBA**, Chairman, The Iraq Inquiry (2009-2016), Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (1990-1997), and GSF Advisory Board member; **Mr. James Barr**, Visiting Fellow, King's College London, and author of *Lords Of The Desert*; **Professor Charles Garraway CBE**, Fellow at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, and Member of the UN Group of Eminent Experts for Yemen; **Mr. Ben Macintyre**, Columnist and Associate Editor, *The Times*, and author of *The Spy And The Traitor*; **Professor Yoon Young-kwan**, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea (2003-2004); **Dr. Kori Schake**, Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; **Mr. Matthew Rycroft CBE**, Permanent Secretary at the Department for International Development; **Mr. Gordon Corera**, BBC Security Correspondent, and author of *Secret Pigeon Service*; **Ms. Chen Wen**, Minister and First Staff Member in the Embassy of China in the UK; **The Rt Rev. and the Rt Hon. Lord Chartres KCVO**, Bishop of London (1995-2017); **The Rt Hon. Patricia Scotland**

QC, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth; **Mr. Alastair Crooke**, Director of Conflicts Forum; **Professor Michael Mandelbaum**, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; **Professor Mark Galeotti**, Principal Director, Mayak Intelligence, Honorary Professor, UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies, and Senior Associate Fellow, RUSI; **Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE**, Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (2004-2009); and **The Rt Hon. Alistair Burt MP**, Minister of State for the Middle East at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Minister of State at the Department for International Development (2017-2019).

We have held five lunchtime debates over the past year on a range of topics including American foreign policy at the mid-term elections; governance and politics in Brazil; Brexit and the trajectory of UK foreign policy; UK foreign policy in the context of a shifting global order; and the current terrorist threat.

Additionally, we have co-hosted two seminars, a conference and a research launch as follows:

- A seminar entitled *"Global Britain': Implications For Defence & Security?'*, which took place in One Whitehall Place (The Whitehall Suite) on 30th October 2018 and which was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and GSF Advisory Board member, **Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**.
- A conference entitled *'Radicalisation And Violent Extremism In The Western Balkans'* which took place in the National Liberal Club (David Lloyd George Room) on Tuesday 29th January 2019 in collaboration with the British Council and which was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Ms. Mia Marzouk**, Regional Conflict Advisor, Western Balkans, Foreign & Commonwealth Office.
- A seminar entitled *'The Diasporas Of South East Europe And Their Role In International Relations'* which took place in the National Liberal Club (David Lloyd George Room) on Wednesday 12th June 2019 in collaboration with South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony's College, University of Oxford and which was chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**.
- A Research Launch entitled *'Building A Lasting Peace: New Approaches To Conflict And Recovery'* which took place in the National Liberal Club (David Lloyd George Room) on Wednesday 3rd July 2019 in collaboration with the British Council and which was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Mr. Dan Shah**, Director, Research at the British Council.

A full list of all our events during 2018-2019 can be found at page 159.

Further information on all our activities and events, including audio transcripts, as well as pdfs of all our publications can be found at our website, www.globalstrategyforum.org.

THE LECTURES

EU Foreign Policy, Security And Defence After Brexit: The View From Europe
Mr. Radosław (Radek) Sikorski

'Global Britain': The Implications For Foreign Policy?
The Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB PC Hon FBA

Britain's Struggle With America To Dominate The Post-War Middle East
Mr. James Barr

Is There Hope For Yemen?
Professor Charles Garraway CBE

The Spy And The Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story Of The Cold War
Mr. Ben Macintyre

Western Defence And The Global Order: Where Now?
Dr. Kori Schake

International Development In An Age Of Global Britain
Mr. Matthew Rycroft CBE

The Secrets Of MI14(d), Operation Columba And Britain's Wartime Pigeon Service
Mr. Gordon Corera

Seize Opportunities, Tackle Challenges And Promote The Steady And Sustained Development Of The China-UK 'Golden Era'
Ms. Chen Wen

Moscow: The Third Rome?
The Rt Rev. and the Rt Hon. Lord Chartres KCVO

The Commonwealth@70: A Beacon For Multilateral Connection And Collaboration
The Rt Hon. Patricia Scotland QC

Is There A Way Out Of Middle East And Great Power Escalation?
Mr. Alastair Crooke

The Rise And Fall Of Peace On Earth
Professor Michael Mandelbaum

Putin: How The West Gets Him Wrong
Professor Mark Galeotti

Global Instabilities: What Is Most On My Mind And What Should We Be Worried About?
Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE

The Accidental Arabist Reflects….Again!
The Rt Hon. Alistair Burt MP

EU FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY AND DEFENCE AFTER BREXIT: THE VIEW FROM EUROPE

Transcript of a lecture given by Mr. Radosław Sikorski

Wednesday 17th October 2018

Radosław (Radek) Sikorski *is Senior Fellow at Harvard, Distinguished Statesman at CSIS and principal of Sikorski Global. He was Poland's Minister of Defence (2005-2007), Foreign Minister (2007-2014) and Speaker of Parliament (2014-2015). He served as a war reporter in Afghanistan and Angola. 2001-2005 he was Resident Scholar at AEI and director of its New Atlantic Initiative. Together with Carl Bildt, he launched EU's Eastern Partnership. He proposed and helped to set up the European Endowment for Democracy. In 2014 he led the EU mission to Kiev, which stopped the bloodshed on the Maidan. Foreign Policy magazine named him one of 100 global policy intellectuals 'for speaking the truth even when it's not diplomatic'. Radek Sikorski graduated from Oxford University with a BA in Politics, Philosophy and Economics. He is married to the writer Anne Applebaum*

Thank you, Malcolm, for that generous introduction, but I would like to say that if I am anything by comparison with British politics, I am Poland's Sir Malcolm Rifkind, having been defence minister and foreign minister. It is a very exclusive club of people who have held both Great Offices of State and I would be very proud to be known as that.

Let me plunge in by saying that the state of Europe's foreign policy and Europe's defence policy is not good. I put to you that this is for a fundamental constitutional reason. Namely, as I see it, the European Union is the world's only existing confederation with some federal features. I will explain my terms.

I understand a confederation to be an arrangement in which members stick together for certain purposes, they make treaties, they make rules, but the ultimate sovereignty lies in the member states. In a federation, ultimate sovereignty lies at the centre and the centre can actually enforce the obeying of the rules.

And so, when you look at the various crises that the European Union is grappling with, I put to you that the problem is with the Constitution, but it is exactly the opposite of what British Eurosceptics think: it is not that the centre has too much control, but too little.

Look at the euro crisis: it is because member states broke the Stability and Growth Pact.

Look at the Schengen crisis: it is because some member states proved unable to enforce the external perimeter of the border of the zone.

And it is the same with foreign and security policy. Members agree rules and then they cheat. We established the Office of Europe's High Representative for Foreign Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon, and as we know, the first Commissioner, Vice President of the Commission and High Representative, was a British politician, Baroness Ashton, and she created Europe's diplomatic service.

But the idea in the Lisbon Treaty was that member states would come together in the Foreign Affairs Council, agree their joint positions on the big issues of the day - policy towards Russia, towards China, whatever it might be - and then the High Representative would carry it out. On those issues where the member states agreed to have a joint policy, member states would let the High Representative carry out the policy. But you know what happened - the High Representative is trying to do that, another capable lady, but member states have not given up their foreign policy in those areas.

For example, if you go to the Middle East, Israel or elsewhere, leaders are astonished by the fact that they are having to deal with the representative of the EU and then national ministers as well. So we have not aggregated our foreign policy, we have just added another player whom we are not empowering to be effective. As a result, despite the best efforts of Baroness Ashton and Federica Mogherini, the EU is not in the lead on any important policy, even in its neighbourhood, be it Ukraine where we now have a Minsk Process where Germany and France (who are not even neighbours of either Russia or Ukraine) are in the lead. Whether on Iran or whether on Libya, the EU is playing a supportive rather than a leading role.

It is quite similar in defence policy. It was actually an excellent British idea to have the EU organise battle groups to specialise. We have had British officials running Europe's Defence Agency, which was heroically trying to coordinate some of member states' procurement policies, so that the considerable amount of money that member states spend on defence is spent more rationally.

But in the end on those matters, member states are very jealous of their sovereignty and the policy is honoured in breach rather than as a matter of course. And this, I think, is a great pity, because on defence in particular, Britain could have led the EU.

Britain has been - and still is - the most serious country in defence capabilities and therefore if Britain chose to lead EU efforts, normally member states would defer. But just as in diplomacy, you have spurned the leadership role. In fact, when I was proposing to fulfil the Permanent Structured Cooperation that is contained in the Lisbon Treaty, Britain was the country that vetoed it time and again. Britain vetoed the creation of a joint headquarters and I was told very pointedly by British officials, *'Britain will never serve,*

British units will never ever serve, under an EU flag,' despite the fact of course that British soldiers do serve under the EU flag. Just not as units.

Britain's history of involvement in the EU mission is long and distinguished. There have been some successes and not only on soft missions, quasi-policing missions, all over Africa. For example, during Operation ATALANTA, Baroness Ashton went down to the Joint Operations Centre and gave the order to the EU Task Force (which included Britain's component and was actually operationally commanded from Northwood, I think) to strike kinetically at the Somali pirates off the coast of the Horn of Africa and the strike was a big success. The incidence of piracy dropped by about 70% for a couple of years. But you see, we did not even advertise it. Most people do not know that it ever happened. We do not have the pictures of Cathy Ashton doing that, like we have the pictures of Obama and Clinton watching in real time the strike on Osama bin Laden, which is a pity because I think successful military operations build a sense of pride.

Now, the reason I think why Britain has been so reluctant to embrace the EU's foreign and particularly defence policy is that Britain has consistently felt that it could be at the expense of NATO, that it would duplicate NATO capabilities, and that by excluding the Americans, it might actually do more harm than good.

That may have been the case once, but I would argue that today we have a new situation. My view from the continent is a Polish view from the continent and as we see it, NATO and the continent has two strategic directions or dimensions, if you like.

The Eastern flank where, after President Putin unfortunately broke the post-war taboo and changed borders by force on the pretext of protecting compatriots abroad, we have a revisionist Russia. Russia is a serious military power, for example, in anti-aircraft capability. Any conflict with Russia would not be like a conflict in the Middle East. Russia is a nuclear power and therefore deterring Russia is a serious, traditional, territorial defence issue that only NATO can deal with. I am very glad that since then, first under President Obama (but only after ten years of our membership in NATO), we got the contingency plans to defend the Eastern flank and now we have a rotational presence which I feel is sufficient to reassure us, but not so big as to alarm Russia. We have two brigades on rotation most of the time. You cannot invade Russia with two brigades, so Russia has no reason to feel alarmed (Russia dealt with a hundred divisions rather successfully). And that contribution in the Baltic States, including by Britain, is hugely appreciated.

Then we have the southern dimension where I think we agree all over the continent that preventing mass migration is an existential issue for the European Union, because if the southern perimeter of the EU, of the Schengen zone, is not protected, then via the political system, the EU will actually be torn apart by populists. We have staved off the crisis - migration is down to a pre-crisis level - but we now know that it is a huge task and it is a task in whose fulfilment I think is reasonable to say we cannot count on the United

States, for very good reasons. Just as the United States would not call on us to help them police their border with Mexico (why should we?), so they think, *'You are the richest, biggest economy on earth, you need to protect your own border from at least your near neighbourhood.'* And I think they are right.

Protecting the Mediterranean is something that the EU should be capable of, because it is a not just a military task, it is also of course border guards, it is developmental, it is humanitarian, it has all these dimensions, in some of which Europe has considerable capability and assets. So I am very glad that the new multi-annual budget of the European Union has increased funding for Europe's border guards tenfold. Tenfold. We are taking this extremely seriously and it seems to me that it makes sense for member states to serve in Frontex, both on the southern maritime border and the eastern land border of the EU.

In the south, we are helping Italy, Spain and Greece in particular. In the east, we are sending the message to our eastern neighbours, *'Look, this is not just the border of Poland, of Lithuania, of Latvia, this is the border of the EU and don't even think about breaching it.'* And so there is a mutual interest. We now know from the experience of the exodus from Turkey to Greece that it is actually very difficult to intercept people-smuggling boats at sea. That in order to really prevent piracy or people-smuggling, you need to have effective control of the other side of the water.

And that, I could imagine, could be a mission for the EU if, for example, Libya continued to be unstable. Or if Mr. Putin tried to destabilise another country after Syria and perhaps use the issue of migration against us, as he has done before, I am convinced.

But I despair of the EU's current defence arrangements being efficient. The battle groups have not yet been used. For a reason. In most countries, unlike in Poland and unlike in the UK, the use of armed force abroad is strictly controlled by parliaments, particularly in Germany, for good historical reasons. As successive defence ministers in Poland, we resisted putting it under parliamentary control, because if you put it under democratic control, the truth of the matter is you could probably never use it, because using force is always expensive, dangerous and unpopular.

Our argument is: when we are threatened, we do not want them to have votes in their parliaments whether to help us, we want them to send tanks. But because of this, the battle groups are difficult to use. This is why, when I proposed Permanent Structured Cooperation in the EU, my idea was to have a serious club of countries that really wanted to fight and to have a vehicle that would not just be usable, but that would actually overcome some of the difficulties we have in NATO. And the difficulties, as I see it, that we have in NATO are:

1. The incentives are wrong. Costs fall where they lie, which means that if there is an operation and you participate, you put your soldiers in harm's way, but you are also

out of pocket. If you do not participate, you are sitting pretty and you save money. So under my idea of PESCO (and I proposed this officially, during the Polish presidency) was no. 1, operations should be financed from the common fund.

2. The problem we have in NATO is that every country has different rules of engagement. So when you are running an operation as a commander, it is almost impossible to know which contingents to use in what circumstance. This was our experience in Iraq when we were just north of the British sector and we were in command of the Division Central-South with 26 nations and every one of them had different rules of engagement. It is not a way to run a war.

3. It should be the club of countries that can actually send troops at short notice, which of course means that some EU member states could not do it, because some are neutral and some have constitutional brakes on the use of military force. But the idea was that it should first be exclusive, and if it proves popular, then we broaden it. What the EU has done is the opposite. Invited everyone. But hopefully there will be some kind of avant-garde group as usual in European integration that will set practical standards.

Let me now move to the third and final section of what I want to tell you: how Britain can fit in, in future.

First of all, Brexit is many things, but at one level - and it is one of the pleasures of being out of office, that one can veer towards dangerous - to my mind, Brexit proves that recent empires that have not been defeated at war (and it is not just Britain, it is also Russia, it is also Turkey) are psychologically incapable of living under rules over which they do not exercise national control. France, of course, is the exception because she was defeated in war. We all got defeated in some kind of war on the continent in the 20th century and France compensates by trying to run the European Union.

So, Britain wants to run its own shop, which is understandable for historical reasons and now the question is, to what extent it will be able to do that after Brexit? Here I think it is going to be tough, because I think the relationship between the continent and post-Brexit Britain will be governed by the rules of Newtonian physics. Namely, mass matters. And the attraction and the pulling power depends on your mass and Britain is 15% of the EU economy. And, you know, it is the moon that goes around the earth and not the other way around and we both go round the sun and the question is, for this century, whether the sun will continue to be the United States or whether it will be China, but that is another issue.

To prove what I mean, you only need to look at the state of Brexit negotiations. I am sorry, I will do it with an anaesthetic! If you look at the EU's agreed joint position and you look at the UK's red lines, the EU's position has not shifted an inch and it will not. The UK is

having to move its red lines for the agreement to be possible. And that, I put to you, will be the story of the relationship.

It is firstly because of the differences of potential, but also - and here I think there was a failure of statesmanship - it is because in the EU we have possibly lost the ability to change our Treaties. If you remember, the Free Trade Agreement with Canada almost stumbled because of a vote in a regional Belgian parliament. So when Britain says (and is sometimes right) that the EU should change its Treaties for the new circumstances, it is actually almost impossible. Therefore, Britain will mostly have to adjust to what the EU does and by not having a vote, will lose some influence over, for example, CSDP missions which hitherto have benefited from Britain's participation.

Now, Britain has some advantages that it could still deploy. It is a major power in finance, but I think you will find that if you do not clean up London as regards money laundering, eventually the EU will legislate against you.

The second advantage is of course the British Armed Forces. Do not overplay it, because you have reduced your military very substantially. Poland has more fighting men than you. We have four times the number of tanks. I am told (there are military men here, so please correct me) that on a mission longer than six months, i.e. if you need a rotation, you could deploy one brigade to the continent; without a rotation, two brigades. Poland has ten and we are much closer to the potential area of conflict.

I think air power is difficult to deploy against a potential adversary, as I mentioned already and therefore we are left with the nuclear deterrent which is pretty unusable, and last, the Navy.

Now my working assumption (I am speaking purely for myself) is that, just as there has not been in history a deployment of a British carrier to the Baltic Sea, so there will not be in future. We have lost and won our wars on land, so I am speaking without expertise, but I am told by people who know that the Baltic is simply too small and too shallow and your carrier would be too vulnerable. So you are not going to deploy it.

A carrier in the North Sea does not make much sense because you can fly those aircraft from the island. So you can deploy your future aircraft carriers either in the North Atlantic (but who is the adversary?) or in the Mediterranean. And here, your two carriers are double the combined carrier force of the rest of the European Union. Here, you would be incredibly valuable, if it came to those kinds of operations that would be needed to secure North Africa. And so I think Britain should become the leader of Europe's defence efforts, because you have the reputation, you have the capabilities and you have other members' inclination to follow your lead. My argument was before the referendum and whatever the outcome of the referendum, but I think it has gained force since then.

That would be my recommendation, which would be somewhat what Poland is doing. You know, as members we were not (and still are not) members of the currency union, but we were compensating for it and burnishing our European credentials by being enthusiastic supporters of another important area of EU integration, and that was defence. You could do that too, but of course it is going to be much harder from the position of a third country.

It seems like the die is cast. The best thing as far as I am concerned would be for Britain, having examined what the consequences are, to change its mind. I recognise how unlikely it is. But I would still recommend that a strong role in facing up to the dangers that we have in common would be an honourable and influential role for Britain after Brexit.

Thank you.

'GLOBAL BRITAIN': THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY?

Text of a lecture given by the Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB PC Hon FBA

Wednesday 24th October 2018

The Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot *was educated at Brighton College (Lyon scholar), and Pembroke College, Cambridge (open scholar and research and teaching scholar, 1957-63). He joined the Home Office in 1963, and worked for the Head of the Civil Service, William Armstrong, and several Home Secretaries (Roy Jenkins, Merlyn Rees and Willie Whitelaw) as private secretary. Postings to the Cabinet Office, and as head of policing and national security policy at the Home Office followed. He then served as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office from 1990 to the end of 1997. On retiring from Whitehall, he was appointed by the Prime Minister as Staff Counsellor to the Security and Intelligence Agencies, and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Sir John led or chaired a number of government Inquiries and reviews including Royal and VIP security, the IRA penetration of the RUC's Special Branch HQ, the use of intercept evidence in criminal trials, the Butler Review of the intelligence on Iraq, and finally he chaired the Iraq War Inquiry from 2009 to 2016. Aside from government-related service, he was at various times a non-executive director of RTZ's industrial group, a seconded director at Schroders, Chair of the construction industry's pensions and benefit schemes, and Chair (now President) of the Police Foundation think tank. Sir John was elected as an Honorary Fellow of the British Academy in 2019.*

The reflections and questions I propose to offer this distinguished company today are not those of a professional diplomat, nor those of a politician with wide experience in foreign affairs. GSF's Chairman, former colleagues of mine including Sir John Holmes, Sir David Manning and Sir Peter Westmacott, as well as distinguished economists and commentators, have all addressed this Forum on global issues.

I come with fewer claims to expert knowledge or experience on this global topic, but I have half a century of working life in Whitehall, much of it about crises and conflicts, both domestic and overseas. My main interest outside that is history, but the only historical reference I want to make today occurred in 1782. The evolving office of Secretary of State in our constitution was, for the first time, divided into two. They started off as the Northern and Southern Departments of State and became in time the Home Office and the Foreign Office.

I put them in that order not only out of filial loyalty to my old Department, but also because the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department was Charles James Fox; while the incumbent for the North was the Earl of Shelburne, less well known I think, though he did eventually go on to become Prime Minister. But he had the huge advantage at the time of being a peer and poor Charles James Fox was only a commoner. So permanent precedence was established for the rest of time for the Home Office over the Foreign Office! But it raises in my mind the perhaps fanciful thought that Shelburne's territory - the Americas and northern Europe - was, however troublesome, largely anglophone or protestant, whereas Fox had to deal with real foreigners in all their diversity, requiring a very different mindset, not least with the long struggles with France already *en marche*, to borrow a contemporary phrase. There is a slight pre-echo there of what may be faced by this country today. To close on this, it was of course Shelburne who as Prime Minister later that year succeeded in making peace with America, a notable political and indeed diplomatic achievement.

I want to begin with a few lay assumptions about this country's situation in the world of today (and perhaps the near tomorrow); then consider possible lines of development and change, whether the skies turn out to be variably blue or more likely grey, and finally to suggest at least one possible strategic choice in our foreign, and also defence and security policy, though I will not dwell on the latter.

To restate the obvious, today's global context for the United Kingdom seems to me to be comprised both of our international relations generally, and specifically of our economic affairs, including trade, finance and investment, our defence and security policy crucially, our role in international development (which I want to dwell on just a little), peacekeeping and reconstruction, and by no means least, our cultural, social and educational relations with the wider world. I would add too from a global perspective, our contribution to technological development and its associated social and business effects, and crucially, shifts in the complex global positioning of nations, blocs and other institutional arrangements.

Whether the United Kingdom leaves the European Union and on what terms is not a topic I propose to examine today, but self-evidently the uncertainty that we face currently is just one instance of the profound changes taking place in the configuration of today's and tomorrow's world.

So to globalisation and its impact for Britain, acknowledging there is both opportunity as well as risk for us and our friends. Key favourable factors plainly include our geographic location, our time zone and perhaps more important than anything, our language as the world's commercial and general lingua franca. Add to that, our values and reputation in some fields, not least the rule of law and relative freedom from the scourge of endemic corruption. All these are assets of real value.

But threats are no less real. Physical realities such our geography may be fixed, but less

tangible things are potentially reversible; likewise the asymmetric distribution of potential gains and losses, nationally, by socio-economic class, by local geography, and through time ahead. There will be unpredictable strains on our society at home. From my Home Office days, I think that we shall be able to manage them, but they are likely to be significant.

Taking up the implications for our foreign policy, even a superficial sector analysis yields variable results both economically and otherwise. SWOT analysis as always applies differentially. So what are some of our strongest sectors from a global perspective? Clearly higher and private secondary education (including especially the English language); financial services and fintech; scientific research (including health and medical) generally; our defence capability and equipment industries; security and intelligence expertise and capability; our trusted rule of law especially in commercial and trade matters; energy technology to some degree; automobile manufacturing (surprisingly, though we do not own the manufacturers, lots of it takes place here); and the service sector at least in part.

Then we can add the cultural sector as an asset of very substantial economic as well as reputational value: theatre, cinema, music, the creative arts generally, and our world class acquis of the contents of our free-to-access museums and galleries, not to mention the created landscape and architecture of these islands.

What then of our weaknesses and their significance, looking at this country in the globalised world?

I hesitate to begin with our agriculture, but its increasingly challenged recent lines of development - ever more intensive land use and dependency on agrichemicals - illustrate our growing reliance on external food supplies, as a densely populated country with a limited land area. The global competition for the world's food supplies seems to me to be highly likely to intensify. At least we have plenty of water, which with the demise of fossil fuels may be our last valuable commodity, unless wind and wave power produce sufficient and eventually exportable energy. I fear we have at least for now allowed our civil nuclear expertise to decline. Then there is our relative weakness in general (as opposed to specialised) engineering, and volume manufacturing in many sub sectors. Too long a listing of relative weaknesses would be dispiriting, so I will stop there.

What are the implications of all this for our foreign policy and how the rest of the world relates to us, and us to it? To begin with a mechanic's approach, I spent some years working on changes to the machinery of government under two Prime Ministers. Harold Wilson saw it mainly as a means of allocating political power and closely managing troublesome colleagues. The other was Ted Heath, whose temperamental coolness was matched by a misplaced enthusiasm for structural and institutional tinkering.

There are however, despite that experience, some machinery of government changes

which seem to me worth revisiting in today's circumstances.

Development aid and its delivery, as well as the policy issues involved, surely need a fresh look, particularly as we leave the EU. The ideologically-based segregation of development aid from foreign policy seems to me outdated, not least in the light of experience in Iraq. I am particularly struck by the fact of Alistair Burt's dual role (which I become very conscious of recently at Global Strategy Forum) as a minister simultaneously in both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in the Department for International Trade. That seems to me to speak to the need for some form of closer reintegration.

That is emphatically not the same as simply abandoning the GDP target, by the way. It is not about that, it is about coordinating the rest of foreign policy with the use of development aid and reconstruction and peacekeeping, to lead to a partial or even complete reunification of policymaking in that sphere. That is one illustration of useful machinery of government changes.

A benign change to the machinery of government arising from the Iraq experience was the formation of the National Security Council, forcing both a more open culture (within government, at least) and a better coordinated effort right across Whitehall. A fundamental critique of our contribution to the Iraq experience was the failure of government as a whole to come together to agree on its priority and to work together as opposed to separately.

The National Security Council as a piece of machinery has the potential (and this is a more general point of relevance) for both requiring truth to be told to power because of those who attend the Council, and more important still, for requiring power to listen to the truth expressed. And why will they do that there? Because the exchanges lie on the written record, and however chastely the secretariat may record it, that written record will become public at some point. But it, or an analogue, could also form the core of a more widely-based piece of machinery within the Cabinet system to oversee the policy and practical issues thrown up by globalisation right across the scene, whether we are in retreat or advance in specific fields.

A third and related example is admittedly a bee in my bonnet. I increasingly believe, not least from the Iraq experience, that a senior non-departmental Cabinet Minister, probably based in the Cabinet Office, would be better placed than either an overworked Prime Minister or an often travelling Foreign Secretary to oversee Britain's 'whole of government' response to significant globalisation developments.

Gordon Brown spoke to me recently in advance of the publication of his memoirs and he said how difficult it was to combine the serious work of a Prime Minister in understanding, comprehending, analysing and judging the multitude of issues that come along every day with executive decision-making. I think such a position with a non-department minister

spared the strains and burdens of running a big department may be open to challenge and I can only offer one good example in my own experience, and that was Willie Whitelaw, who as we all know led Margaret Thatcher to observe that every Prime Minister needs a Willie. She had one, but you cannot expect such a paragon of experience, standing and scope to be available in all political circumstances.

Although less relevant to global matters, as I leave the machinery of government theme, I cannot help drawing attention to the catastrophic results of dividing the criminal justice array of functions between the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office at exactly the wrong point. Its relevance is simply that unthought through tinkering can produce worse results even than inaction.

I want to turn now to a question that Iraq threw into high relief for me, that of temporary international coalitions (as opposed to standing treaty-based and institutionalised alliances).

The power balance in any such ad hoc coalition is crucial, and assuming that for most practical purposes any operational coalition on a substantial scale will include the USA, the UK will be the smaller partner, albeit often the largest even with our diminished conventional defence capability.

In the Iraq case, a determined effort was made by the British government to reach a memorandum of understanding with the USA on post-invasion questions. The USA flatly refused. The consequences (not all on the American side, but nonetheless) included excessive deBaathification, which disabled Iraq's whole civilian administrative capability, from teaching to health, across the whole of civil government. A second was the disbanding the Iraqi army without pay and the creation thereby of a huge pool of disaffected and armed people. Finally - and I think with the longer view, this was the worst - it led to the passive acceptance by the UK of responsibility as post-invasion occupier for four provinces in the south east of Iraq.

Our pre-invasion strategy was based on contributing a large (a full division, perhaps up to 40,000 strong) force for the campaign itself. It was at one time as much as 35-40 per cent of the total armoured capability of the coalition. It was to be followed by a rapid rundown and its replacement by other contributors, who did not turn up in any great numbers, though I do want in parenthesis to say a brief word about two particular contributions that I thought were of signal capability and significance: the Italian Carabinieri, and Japanese combat engineers.

But ours was a one-shot operation, and we simply did not have capability or strength to prolong our military involvement above a much-reduced post-invasion force level. That produced very rapidly a serious security problem, which in turn led to a no less serious strategic falling-out with our American ally. They surged, we cut.

Henry Kissinger described in his book on world order, as recently as 2014, the general American policy tension as a contest between idealism and realism, and its special character as one that proclaims war not only to punish its enemies, but to improve the lives of their people. If that were set aside, he argued, it would no longer reassure America's friends in the world (thereby silently acknowledging America is not uniquely aspirational). But Kissinger wrote in the period A T - ante Trump. Has the UK a choice to make now in choosing to treat the USA as its chief and essential ally, if that special character no longer prevails? That seems to me an unavoidable question, and one prefigured to some degree in the way that the USA behaved to the UK in our Iraq Coalition. I take the conventional and I believe the correct view that the links between our two countries are so strong and so deep-rooted that the answer must lie in some shift of emphasis rather than an historic change. But it is one to address gradually rather than hurriedly. But not to ignore. Future events and circumstances though, could make such gradual pragmatism as I would advocate harder to sustain.

I suggest part of the response could be (though it goes against much experience in this room and outside) to articulate more explicitly, both generally as well as in advance of joining such coalitions in future, the terms and values to which we attach importance as conditions for taking part. Easy to say in general terms, I acknowledge; much harder to achieve in specific circumstances.

A last thought on this issue, which also reflects a machinery of government dimension. In the Iraq case, our allocation of senior political responsibilities was in one significant respect a mismatch vis-à-vis the US. Tony Blair and George W. Bush were on good terms, though that relationship was asked on our side to carry far too much of the intergovernmental load. Jack Straw and Colin Powell also had a good relationship, but Powell's and hence the State Department's star was in decline as against Rumsfeld and the Department of Defense, while Geoff Hoon as our Secretary of State for Defence did not have anything like the political heft in London, let alone in Washington, to command Rumsfeld's serious attention. Mirror-imaging is not necessarily possible, but balancing the political relationship in a coalition arrangement needs fairly close and careful judgement.

I would add from personal experience that any across-the-sea relationship carries its own risk of mutual misunderstandings, even when it is just the Irish Sea. Anyone who has conducted serious business by video-conference will recognise the distorting effect on mutual understanding. I, like my predecessors, not infrequently crossed the Irish Sea between Belfast and London both ways on the same day addressing the same crisis (sometimes even a double crossing in a single day). Events and the best response to them would look very different between one location and the other, even to the same person and to the same mind, and all the more so when it is two or more peoples and nations, in different locations.

I have no solution except to stress the importance of awareness, and the development

of good personal relations. Perhaps most important of all, ensuring that both or the multiplicity of key partners take the same view of what is happening in reality on the ground - getting at the same ground truth by seeing the ground in person. The only way to achieve that is to go there.

In conclusion, I have one other question to raise, but without offering an answer. It arises particularly in the economic and trade sphere, but seems to me of wider application as well.

Put simply, do we concentrate and focus our national resources and efforts on a limited selection of key countries, sectors and groupings, or do we follow success wherever we can, however small at first? A lesson from our extraordinary and very recent successes in Olympic sports such as cycling, or in motor sport, is that the rigorous pursuit of marginal gains wherever they can be found significantly outdoes other approaches. Success attracts strong public approval and consequent political support.

But why not combine both approaches? Do our human and financial resources allow that? Peter Ricketts and others spoke for many in a recent London Times article lamenting the diminution of our Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service, admittedly in the current context of the Brexit negotiations, *'the most important foreign policy challenge in decades'* as he put it.

My own view, unaffected by the centuries-old rivalry between the Home Office and the Foreign Office which I referred to at the outset, is that the resource cost of our system for conducting foreign affairs is so small, even minuscule, compared with most domestic Departments, not to speak of say Defence or Social Security, as to render the answer to the question, *'Can we afford to spend more on foreign relations?'* as obvious in a globalising world involving fundamental shifts of where our national interests lie.

But how to bring it about? Ultimately it is of course a political question. But the official world of Whitehall matters too, as do opinion formers and well-informed wielders of influence. The Treasury needs to be brought to face a determined and persistent argument that measured success over time - and I emphasise 'measured' - not only deserves recognition in the allocation of the nation's scarce resources, but contributes to the growth of those resources for the greater good of all. Successful foreign policy, as with defence and security policy, relies ultimately on economic foundations. Whitehall, academia, think tanks all need to invest in serious work to demonstrate that vital nexus. But also, its reflection in the reliance of our future economic success in the global world depends in good part on successful external relations.

Thank you.

BRITAIN'S STRUGGLE WITH AMERICA TO DOMINATE THE POST-WAR MIDDLE EAST

Transcript of a lecture by Mr. James Barr

Wednesday 14th November 2018

James Barr *is a leading historian of the modern Middle East and author of four books, including the widely-acclaimed 'A Line In The Sand', a history of the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement and its consequences. His latest book, 'Lords Of The Desert', tells the forgotten story of the struggle between Britain and America to dominate the post-war Middle East. James read modern history at Oxford University and was more recently a visiting fellow at St Antony's College. He has worked in politics, at the Daily Telegraph, in the City, at the British Embassy in Paris, and run his own research business. He is a political adviser to Tom Tugendhat MP, chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. He is also a visiting fellow at King's College London.*

Michael, thank you very much for that very warm introduction. Thank you Jacqueline as well for inviting me.

Thanks to the Mosaddeq coup in 1953, we tend to think of Britain and America as being hand in glove in the Middle East. That is the takeaway from that great and infamous event. And of course it has been reinforced by things that have happened since then: if you think of the 1991 Gulf War and then what happened after 2003, again that gives us the sense that Britain and America are always arm in arm in that part of the world. But if you go back before recent history, back into the 1940s and the 1950s in particular, you find a very, very different story and that is what I wrote about in *Lords Of The Desert* and that is what I am going to talk about today.

It is one in which you find that Britain and America are invariably competing, perhaps even in the 1953 coup, and are often outright rivals with each other. That, in a sense, is the thread that runs through the story that I am going to talk about.

You get a glimpse of this in a really odd and interesting anecdote that I start the book with, which happened at some point at the end of the 1940s. The Conservatives were out of government and Anthony Eden was writing a wide-ranging speech, and he needed some advice on the question of housing which was of course a huge issue after the war. The man he turned to was Enoch Powell who was then the Conservative go-to big brain in the days before he became better known for other things. In his retirement, Eden recounts the conversation that he had with Powell. They talked a bit about housing and then at the end, Powell fixed him with that chilly stare of his and he said, *'And I want to talk to you*

about something, I want to tell you that in the Middle East our great enemies are the Americans.' Now Eden recounted this long after he had retired and he said, *'You know, I had no idea what he meant. I do now.'*

I am not convinced that Eden did not know, because in fact there is plenty of evidence that what Powell was talking about then was pretty uncontroversial. You see it in a book written by Richard Crossman, so across the other side of the House. Crossman had served on the Anglo-American Committee trying to resolve the question of Palestine after the war and he wrote in his book that the Americans represented *'the greatest danger to British rule in the Middle East today*.' And then in 1949, across the Atlantic, a book was published called *Arabs, Oil And History* by a then very little known journalist, whose name was Kermit Roosevelt (of course he was not just a journalist) and, having looked at what had happened around the region, he wrote in his book, *'Actually, Americans and British in the Middle East get along rather badly.'*

So there is plenty of evidence and if you go into the Archives, as I did with the book, you find more and more to back up this idea. Indeed in July 1943, Eden himself wrote an entire memorandum on the subject of the growing complexities in the Anglo-American relationship in the Middle East and how this was a problem. And the reason it was a problem, as far as he was concerned, was because the Americans were now backing the Zionists.

He talked about a revival of Arabism and Zionism and this was a problem, because, in a sense, Britain had tried to harness both these forces before, during the First World War, and had managed to do so relatively successfully up to that point. But then, come 1943, they were no longer in control of events. There was a likelihood of a renewed outbreak of violence in Palestine and crucially the American Zionists were backing the Zionists, and suddenly Britain had to contend with a whole new situation.

So the story starts in 1942 with the Battle of El Alamein essentially, and ends up in 1967 with Britain's rather rapid departure from Aden. It really turns on three issues and an irony. I will come back to the irony at the end of the talk, but the three issues are:

- An ideology - empire
- A commodity - oil
- A personality - Gamal Abdel Nasser

And those three things were the key things that Britain and America could not see eye to eye on in the Middle East.

Let's start with empire. In 1942, Britain was the undisputed power in the Middle East. Although she faced rivalry with the French that I described in *A Line In The Sand*, there was no question that Britain was top dog. The British were essentially pulling the strings in Egypt where the High Commissioner was effectively running the country. He worked

out of an office on 10 Sharia Tolumbat which was just known by everybody as 'Number Ten', and there was about an 800,000 ration strength of people there in 1942, who, as far as Churchill was concerned, needed to be ready to fight and die in that country's defence to stop Rommel from breaking through.

Moving further eastwards, obviously the British had got hold of Palestine, or had taken the mandate (perhaps a rather more polite way of putting it) for Palestine after the First World War, and were again the power behind the throne in Jordan and Iraq which were nominally independent, but still essentially British colonies, for want of a better word. And the British were now also in Syria and Lebanon following the 1941 invasion with De Gaulle's Free French. And in 1941, the British and the Russians had jumped in in Iran as well, so the British were occupying that country too.

So Britain was there. Britain was absolutely running this part of this world. And the British plan was essentially to hang onto that part of the world for as long as possible and the way they were going to do this was to create the thing that Lawrence of Arabia had first thought about in the 1910s: a 'Greater Syria', a grand Arab state that was going to essentially protect Britain's position on the Suez Canal.

So that was Britain's strategy in the mid-1940s and it was a reasonably fair assumption that this could happen. Obviously the question of whether the Arabs could unite was a moot point, but they thought they would get American acquiescence to this because, after all, after the First World War, the Americans had receded, they had disappeared off again and isolationism had returned. As Churchill said in a Cabinet meeting, *'We don't need US help in this area, and aren't likely to see many of them there from now on.'* That came from some of the Cabinet Secretary's minutes. It is one of the key sources I used in the book, the minute books that the Cabinet Secretary actually writes in during the meeting and from which you get real snatches of verbatim conversation, not the rather bland minutes that are printed after the meetings.

So Britain hoped that they would get American acquiescence, but that was misjudged and it was misjudged for two reasons, or at least it provoked two contrasting American reactions. One was a very visceral anti-imperialism, but there was also a fairly cold calculation about commercial issues as well. I am going to talk about two people who encapsulate these issues.

The first of them is Wendell Willkie. Now he is someone who nowadays most people will barely have heard of, but in 1942 he was very, very famous indeed. His story is rather resonant because he was a businessman who had come from nowhere to seize the Republican Party nomination in 1940, but unlike the current incumbent of the White House, he lost the 1940 election against Roosevelt. But he was still a very popular man – he had not become unpopular as a result of the defeat – and Roosevelt in 1942, facing the prospect of mid-term elections, decided he would send Willkie off on a round the world tour to get him out the way.

Willkie's first stop, the first point where he really touched down as he made this circumnavigation of the world, was Cairo. The two things that really struck him in the Middle East, I think, were the squalor that he saw which appalled him, and also the attitude of the British and French officials that he met.

There were two good examples of this: he had dinner with British officials in Alexandria as he came back from the front (he went to meet Monty at the front where Monty was getting ready to fight the Battle of El Alamein) and he asked them about the Atlantic Charter. Now that was the document that Churchill had been coerced into signing by Roosevelt the previous year, and it pledged Britain to recognise self-determination for all peoples and free trade, two concepts that were really going to erode the British Empire. And he found that these officials who he spoke to had really no idea what the Charter was and certainly had no particular view that it was going to affect their careers in any way.

And secondly, he had a conversation with de Gaulle in Beirut, and rather wonderfully he describes this. I have not put the best description in the book, but I can tell it to you now. He went into a room in Beirut in the embassy. De Gaulle was there and there was a table and chairs, but it was otherwise empty - apart from seven statues and paintings of Napoleon on the walls. De Gaulle explained that his basic struggle of the moment was whether Britain or France was going to rule that part of the world, and that confounded Willkie, who thought that the aim of what was going on was to fight the war and then found that essentially what was going on was this struggle between the two imperial powers for who was going to run Syria and Lebanon afterwards.

So he came away and he came back to America. He did a radio broadcast. He had won 22 million votes in 1940, but 36 million people listened to him speak. He never mentioned the British Empire, but the broadcast was clearly an indirect attack on the British Empire. And then a few days later, just before the mid-terms, he decided it was the right moment to say something that might encourage Jewish voters to go out and vote for the Republicans, and on the 25th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, he called for the opening of the *'gates of Palestine'* - essentially unrestricted immigration, and for the creation of a Jewish state.

So that was one reaction to this. It is actually to Willkie that Churchill is responding, when Churchill then gives his famous *'It is not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning'* speech at Mansion House just after El Alamein. In the second half of the speech he goes on to say that he has not *'become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire,'* and that is a rebuttal of Willkie. It is not an attack on Roosevelt, it is a reply to what Willkie had said on the radio just a few days earlier.

That was one response and that got the Americans interested in what was going on in the Middle East to a degree that they had never been before. The American presence

before that was minimal in the Middle East and really confined to missionary activity and a few oil men and a few archaeologists. But the oil was not, at that point, a big concern.

But if Willkie is relatively little known, the man who then arrived has been completely forgotten. But James Landis is a very interesting character and there is a fabulous picture of him in the book. He arrived to become the director of economic operations in the Middle East which sounds like a rather bland title, but he was a regulator. He had worked under FDR in the New Deal in the 1930s, and he regarded the British Empire like one of those big companies that the New Deal had been involved in trying to break up in the 1930s and he decided he was going to make it his job to unpick the strategy that the British were going to try and use to hang on after the war.

That strategy - very, very briefly - was to try and keep controls over imports going for as long as possible after the war, to stop the Americans breaking into that market and to basically create a market for British goods. And of course the Americans on the other side could see that when the war ended, they were going to have an awful lot of spare industrial capacity and if they did not want to have another depression, then they needed to find somewhere to export to, so Landis decided that what he would do was break this open and he managed to do that.

So that was the wartime story and by the time that Landis was in the process of destroying the British scheme, oil was becoming an issue. Here again, Britain was the dominant force. The Americans were nowhere in the Middle East at that time. Perhaps not nowhere, but they were a very small presence and in a way, the cards were all against them, because the British government owned the major oil producer, the major company, Anglo-Iranian, that was drilling in Iran and producing 750,000 barrels a day which were then being refined at Abadan on the Shatt-al-Arab.

Not only that, it was just minting Britain money, because I think every ton of oil cost a shilling to get out the ground, but was being sold for twenty shillings, a pound, in Europe, so it was a huge cash cow for the British government. It made Britain money in various different ways. Not only did it contribute to £100 million of foreign exchange, but then the company paid taxes and dividends and the British government was the major shareholder, so the government was getting £40-odd million a year from Anglo-Iranian.

This was something that looked set to continue, because through Anglo-Iranian, the British government had a share in IPC, the Iraq Petroleum Company, which was the other major producer at that time. IPC was crucial because that did actually have some American involvement, but the Red Line Agreement which dated from 1928 stopped any of the members of that Company from doing anything else in the Middle East without all the shareholders' agreement, so Anglo-Iranian effectively had a blocking vote on any American attempt to invest elsewhere in the Middle East and that was going to affect the fortunes of the company that dominates the middle of the book, which is Aramco. Aramco

needed to break out of the situation it was in. It was producing two thirds (or maybe less than that) of what Anglo-Iranian was and crucially, it was at a massive competitive disadvantage, because it had to ship the oil round the Horn of Arabia to sell it to the European market – and the cost of doing so put it at a significant disadvantage.

And so the Americans came up with this idea of the TAPLINE – a pipeline that would take Saudi oil direct to the Mediterranean where it could then be sold in Europe. I talk about this in the book and I will not go into it in great detail now, but crucially the TAPLINE was what drew the Americans into the Levantine politics in a big way, because it crossed Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

Up to that point, the American interest in the politics in those countries was quite limited, but when they needed to start negotiating way leaves to get the pipeline to run through the countries so that Saudi oil could compete with British oil at a fair rate, suddenly they became interested. And that leads to a very, very interesting episode and it is actually described by Kim Roosevelt in his book, *Arabs, Oil And History*, in very camouflaged ways. It is a fascinating book because he describes how he personally wrecked the British scheme by playing off the Iraqis and the Jordanians against each other.

The Americans saw the Greater Syria scheme as a threat to TAPLINE but when they asked the British if they supported it, the British always denied that they were. Roosevelt posed as a journalist for Harper's Magazine in 1947, and went out to the Middle East to see if he could get more information. In Jordan he met the British Ambassador who said rather more than he should have done, information Roosevelt then gave to the Iraqis. And what the British Ambassador told him was that Britain was indeed surreptitiously backing the ambitions of King Abdullah of Jordan and so Roosevelt said, *'Thank you very much, I'll take that,'* and he went to Baghdad and he said, *'Oh, did you know that the British are backing this?'*, and that blew apart the Greater Syria plan very effectively.

At the other end of the peninsula, Aramco was also trying to extend the influence of Ibn Saud, then the King of Saudi Arabia, into the Rub al Khali, the Empty Quarter. At that point, the frontiers had not been demarcated at all, and that drew in a man called Wilfred Thesiger, who most people have heard of, but necessarily in this context, because Thesiger, of course, was a keen explorer. He was keen to explore that part of the world, but having crossed the Empty Quarter a couple of times, he then had a conversation with a man from the Iraq Petroleum Company which had drilling rights in Oman, and he admitted during that conversation that he had been approached by Aramco to work for them and at that point IPC jumped in and grabbed him and hired him.

If you look at the pattern of Thesiger's travels that he describes in *Arabian Sands*, you will see that he makes a couple of journeys across the desert and then he uses the extensive oasis of Buraimi as this point to complete a series of petal-like - they look like the petals of a flower - journeys towards Saudi territory. And his job there was essentially to look

for oil, but also to look for evidence of American incursions into that area. So it is quite interesting that although we think of Thesiger as an explorer from an era of exploration that included say, the ascent of Everest, Anglo-American rivalry lurks as one of the motor forces in that particular episode.

Oil also lubricates the hinge of the story, which is the 'fifty-fifty' deal in 1950. Now, Aramco had managed to get a rather good arrangement, or rather too good an arrangement with the Saudis, which the Saudis were regretting by the late 1940s, and in 1949, Ibn Saud decided he was going to put pressure on the company. He had already got Aramco to improve its offer, but he had not managed to change the whole terms of the deal. The problem was that he got a royalty for every barrel produced, but he needed something tied to the company's profit because whenever output dropped (and in 1949 it did go down because demand went down) of course then the Saudi revenues dropped as well, so he needed something tied to the company's profitability.

The Saudis were very good, they had an extraordinary finance minister called Abdullah Suleiman who one British diplomat described as *'the only finance minister I ever met who drank methylated spirit.'* But Suleiman was definitely a functioning alcoholic, because he had understood the US tax code and understood a very, very important thing, which was that Aramco, as an American-domiciled company, would be able to offset any foreign taxes it paid against its American tax bill. So the Saudis came up with the idea of taxing Aramco rather than getting a royalty out of it, knowing that that would not actually affect the company's ability to invest, because all they would do is set that tax bill against the US tax bill, so ultimately it was going to be the US taxpayer picking up the tab, because they did not want to kill the goose that laid the golden egg.

So that is what happened in 1950 and that created immense difficulties for the British, because if you remember back, the point was that Anglo-Iranian was just a money-making machine, a cash machine, for the British government. The last thing the British government wanted to do was to produce some sort of similar deal for the Iranians who were also asking for a better deal, because that was going to reduce the receipts that the Exchequer received, so the British fended them off and tried to do so for as long as possible.

They made a better deal called the Supplemental Agreement and I suspect (I have no evidence to prove this, except that when I read the 1979 report on the fall of the Shah, and see what was going on then) that BP, or Anglo-Iranian as it was, was probably paying the Shah and that is why the Shah supported the deal. But it was not enough for his increasingly volatile Parliament, the Majlis, and they opposed it, thanks to the increasing influence of Mosaddeq who of course became Prime Minister in 1951.

Now the British were hoping that they could get the Americans on side and manage to either get rid of Mosaddeq or to get him to rein his demands in, but Dean Acheson

was having none of that. In fact when Dean Acheson discovered that MI6 was trying to talk to the tribesmen of southern Iran to persuade them perhaps to declare UDI from Tehran, he stepped in and he said that this was not on and the Americans acted as a referee and that really destroyed any hopes that the Attlee government had of pushing Mosaddeq into a corner.

Of course, eventually the Americans and the British did combine to overthrow him, and the reason they did so is either communism or oil. I tend to think it is oil and the evidence that supports this is a conversation that happened very early in 1953 between Eisenhower and his advisors. Up to that point, the British had strangled the Iranian economy quite effectively with an oil boycott, but there were signs that that was about to change, because tanker charter rates were dropping away. The problem was that the Iranians had no tankers of their own, so they could not ship the oil out anyway, but the charter rates were dropping and when Mosaddeq then threatened to dump his oil on the market in 1953 (he had vast amounts of oil building up), the Americans took that very seriously because of the effect it would have on Aramco and that is the moment that changed America's attitude towards Mosaddeq and persuaded them to get involved in the coup.

Now, the British hoped the coup would have a salutary lesson for another man, Nasser, who was by then already in power and in short, it did not really. Again, they were hoping that they could persuade the Americans to come in on their side in their dispute with Nasser over the Suez base which was now a big issue, and the Americans refused to do so at the time because they saw Nasser as this bright hope. They had hoped that they could bring democracy to the Middle East in the 1940s, but that had not worked and they tried in Syria and they ended up rigging elections there because they realised that if they did not do that, somebody else would and everyone was paying somebody in those kinds of elections. So they started to think more about strong men and in 1952, that led them to back the Free Officers and the Free Officers got into power.

The British were completely unaware of what had happened. One of the most interesting sources I came across in the book was the diary of a man called John Slade-Baker. Slade-Baker was a journalist for *The Sunday Times*, but he was also working for MI6 at the same time. What becomes absolutely clear, judging from the kind of questions or information that he was being asked to find, was that at that point, the British government was more interested in connections between the ex-German army officers who were involved in training the Egyptian army than they were in Nasser's relationship with Moscow.

They thought that these Germans who had come in to train the Egyptian army might be some sort of vanguard, some sort of Nazi plot in fact, and that was the thing that MI6 was trying to find out in the autumn of 1952. We know that thanks to this wonderful diary which is not in the British government archives, but is in the Middle East Centre in Oxford.

I need to crack on, my time is running out and the questions are always more fun than the speech.

Suez itself is like one tine of a three-pronged plan, and I am going to talk a bit about that plan before I finish.

By 1955, the British and the Americans had both realised that perhaps Nasser was not such a good bet. At the end of 1955, in October, Nasser bought weapons from the Russians because he was so fed up with dealing with the Americans who had promised him arms. Dulles, the Secretary of State, had gone to Cairo and given Neguib, the then Egyptian Prime Minister, a pistol in 1953 on his visit, and this moment was captured on film, rather unfortunately. The Americans said it was never supposed to happen, but the picture of a grinning Dulles presenting an equally cheerful Neguib with this pistol was beamed round the world and that was supposed to be a sign of what was coming, but they could never agree on how these arms would be delivered and what the Egyptians would do in exchange and so by the end of 1955 the relationship was bad.

But the British were worried about something else as well. They were worried about the Saudis, because by now Saudi oil was flowing strongly and they were worried about the corrupting influence of the Saudis, because they could see Saudi money pouring into other parts of the Middle East, notably Jordan and Syria. The Saudis were trying to disrupt another British plan, which was to create a sort of defensive construct called the Baghdad Pact, which was going to link Jordan and Iraq together and form a new post-Suez base for Britain in the region, and the Saudis could see this. They were worried about being locked into the Arabian Peninsula by the British who they regarded as a hostile power, and were doing their utmost to bribe people to stop this from happening.

So Britain's first concern was the Saudis, and they did their utmost through a mixture of information warfare and making noises to the Iraqis about the possibility of Iraq invading Saudi Arabia to push back against this, and they were hoping that they might get the Americans involved too. The Saudis were financing both Nasser and the Syrians at that time, so they were the other two prongs of the plan. So the three-pronged plan in 1956 involved getting rid of King Saud, Ibn Saud's successor; Quwatly of Syria; and also Nasser at the same time.

The Americans thought they had pruned this plan back so that it only targeted the Syrians. They thought that what was going to happen at the end of 1956 would be an attempt to overthrow the Syrian government, which suited them as well because Syria had become increasingly left wing, but of course, in the background, the British were also thinking about Suez and thinking about Nasser. Once Nasser had seemed to be involved in the removal of Glubb Pasha in 1956 (which was not the case, but it looked the case just because of the coincidence of the timing), Eden in particular decided that Nasser risked being his nemesis and he was determined to get rid of him.

He thought he could get rid of him for an interesting reason. In a way, I do not have much to add in the book to the story that we know about Suez as a whole, but there is

interesting intelligence through this man, Slade-Baker, which I think explains why Britain pursued this scheme. Slade-Baker, the correspondent who was also sending other reports back to London, had very good relations both with Nasser and other members of the RCC, the Free Officers, and in particular, Amer, the Minister of Defence. In one of the conversations that he has with Amer, once the Suez crisis has started, he says to Amer, *'What do you think's going to happen?'* and Amer says to him, *'Don't worry. You will win!'* and this is something he records in his diary.

I assume that his diaries were a way of recording information in the most benign way possible, which he could then write up and send back to London. There were mixed messages, certainly, coming from Egypt, but I think one of the messages coming back was actually a sort of Egyptian fatalism about the outcome of this crisis if it ever came to violence and that helped to encourage Britain to get in the mess they did at the end of 1956.

Suez had enormous ripples back and I think that the beginning of the end of British rule in the Middle East started with the oil deal in 1950 and with the fact that Britain could not match what the Americans had done. But Suez capped it, because that had effects most importantly in Iraq, where the Iraqi government was well aware they had a problem in that they needed to do something to react to the propaganda that Nasser was putting out. They had begun an attempt at big public works, but the projects tended to splurge money at the wrong kind of things and they were not seeing the sort of uplift that they expected. So the question was when the Hashemite regime was going to be overthrown rather than if, and of course that happened finally in the summer of 1958.

That left the British essentially back where they had started in south Arabia. They had begun there at the turn of the 19th century. When Napoleon invaded Egypt, the first person the British turned to in order to protect India was the sultan of Muscat and they forged a deal with him, and they found themselves back there with him at the end of the 1950s.

A great source in the book is David Smiley, the colonel who had gone off to become the sultan of Oman's advisor. The sultan told him about all the things that Britain had done wrong and Smiley gingerly suggested the idea of actually promoting some of the Arabs out of the ranks and making them officers and the sultan said, *'All revolutions in the Middle East are led by colonels, Colonel Smiley. I am having no Arab colonels in my army,'* which is slightly ironic given that eventually it was British colonels who did for him in 1970.

But the British waged a war there, and I think the secrecy of that war and the fact that the SAS was involved was partly because of the military politics and finding a job for the SAS, but it was also to hide their role from the public eye so that the Americans were not going to be brought in and the Americans were not going to criticise what was going

on. I think that was a very important aspect of why those troops in particular and not a larger force were used.

The British tried to get their revenge and I will just finish with the story of what happened in Aden, around north of Aden in Yemen, given that it is rather topical. In 1962, after the republican coup in Yemen, in Sanaa, there was a great question between Washington and London about whether to recognise the new regime, because after all, the old regime, the Imam, was an incredibly reactionary man. I will not tell you some of the stories about what he was like, they are not really suitable for general conversation, but you will find them in the book. So the Americans under Kennedy were absolutely determined that they should recognise the new republican regime.

At this point enter a man called Billy McLean, Conservative MP for Inverness at that time. He was very interesting, he had fought with Julian Amery in Special Operations Executive during the war, and he was a man who really just did not have enough to do. In fact, he had just been charged with drink driving - he had had a rather bibulous evening round St. James's and then was stopped by the police and charged. This was before the breathalyser, so when he came to court, it was going to be a question of his word versus the policeman's and he got off in the end, but between this happening and the court case, someone thought it might be best if he made himself scarce.

He went to Yemen and he performed the role that Lawrence of Arabia had performed fifty years before, because Lawrence was sent in to provide a kind of on-the-spot view of what was going on that was going to outweigh any kind of theoretical idea about whether Britain should send troops to support the Arab revolt in 1916. Again, British information and intelligence about what was going on in Yemen at that time was incredibly sketchy and so McLean goes in and his report is in the National Archives. It is the most extraordinary thing, complete with lots of pictures of dead Egyptian soldiers that he had seen and photographed, but he goes there and explains how the rebellion being mounted by the royalist forces, the people who supported the Imam, was going much better than he thought. Best of all, he had met an Egyptian soldier, who had been captured by the royalists and the tribesmen, and this man told him that before they had gone out, they had a parade at which Nasser addressed them and told them that their job was to boot the British out of Aden.

McLean came back and he saw Amery, by then Secretary for Air, and of course Macmillan, Amery's father-in-law, and put to them the idea of not recognising the government. And after that the British pumped in weapons to try and tie Nasser down, which indeed they succeeded in doing. It was rather a pyrrhic victory though, because the end aim of it was to try and keep the British in Aden, but of course they failed to do that.

I will just finish with the irony. The Americans had spent the entire period of this story trying to get the British out of the Middle East. If you think back to Willkie, Willkie had a

conversation with the British Ambassador at the end of 1942, and the British Ambassador quoted him saying *'the sooner that we got out the better.'*

But come 1964-1965, Labour are in power and facing rather strained economics and financial circumstances, and are wondering what to do. By that point, the Americans are desperate to keep them there, because Aden served as the base from which it was possible to protect places like Kuwait and the Gulf States as well, so it was actually a very, very important piece of imperial real estate.

But by that time, the British government had really decided that they were going to sacrifice empire for welfare, and they decided that given they had not got the money, they were going to have to retreat, and so that is what they did. I will finish just with the words of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State at that time. George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary at that time, came to see him to explain the decision that the British government had come to, and Rusk told him, *'For God's sake, act like Britain.'*

And I will stop there.

IS THERE HOPE FOR YEMEN?

Text of a lecture given by Professor Charles Garraway CBE

Tuesday 27th November 2018

Professor Charles Garraway *is a Fellow at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex. He served for thirty years in Army Legal Services, reaching the rank of Colonel. He specialised in international and operational law, deploying with 1st Armoured Division in the 1991 Gulf War. On retirement in 2003, he worked in Baghdad for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office before accepting the Stockton Chair in International Law at the United States Naval War College. Since returning to the UK, he has lectured and written extensively on international humanitarian law, human rights law and international criminal law. He was a Member (Vice-President 2012-2015) of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission between 2007 and 2017 and is currently a Member of the Group of Eminent Experts for Yemen, appointed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.*

First, it is necessary to say a few words about Yemen itself. It is a country with a long and rich history. Sitting on the mouth of the Red Sea, it has for centuries been a centre for trade. Indeed its origins as a State were in trade with its power extending across the Red Sea into modern day Ethiopia and Eritrea. Sana'a, the capital, is one of the oldest inhabited cities of the world and contains, in the Old City, a World Heritage site.

Time does not permit an excursion into the depth of history contained in Yemen, but its location led to it becoming an inevitable battleground between the Ottoman Empire and the trading interests of the British Empire. The advent of coal as a fuel for shipping required the British to look for a coaling station for the India trade. The choice was Aden and in 1839, the port came into British hands after the usual mixture of local agreements and military might. The port and the surrounding areas became a British Protectorate and grew in size to include much of the territory now outside Houthi control. This lasted until 1967 with the withdrawal of British Forces from Aden and the establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, an avowedly Marxist state.

In the meantime, the rest of Yemen, primarily those areas now under Houthi control, although nominally under Ottoman control until 1918, had been an autonomous area under a Zaydi Imam. The Zaydis are a Muslim sect which emerged in the 8th century from Shia Islam. There were inevitable tensions with their northern Sunni neighbours although alliances fluctuated wildly depending on the political situation. For example, a civil war in the early 1960s found the Saudis and the British allied with the Zaydi royalists against a

Nasser-inspired military uprising, an uprising which eventually was successful, leading to the formation of the Yemen Arab Republic.

Relations between the two States in Yemen were never easy and there were a number of conflicts as well as attempts to unite them into a single State. In 1990, unification finally took place with the Northern leader Ali Abdallah Saleh, as President. However, relations between the two entities remained uneasy and a further civil war in 1994 led to the final victory of the northern forces under Saleh. He was to remain President until well into this century.

Modern history is complicated and there are many versions. I will try to be factual to avoid controversy but am unlikely to succeed! The Zaydis were now a minority in the country, but were never content under Saleh's rule. An insurgency can be traced back to the early years of this century, but in 2006 Saleh won an impressive majority in an election. However, other factors were coming into play. Al-Qaeda militants, some released from Guantanamo, were becoming increasingly active in the hinterland, attracting US attention. It will be recalled that the USS Cole had been attacked in Aden harbour in 2000, an attack subsequently attributed to Al-Qaeda.

The Arab Spring also affected the region. In 2011, a popular revolution arose against the 33-year rule of Saleh. A deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council granted Saleh immunity and transferred power to Vice-President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Yemenites conducted a National Dialogue Conference, accompanied by a constitution-making process.

However, in 2014, a conflict escalated between the government forces led by President Hadi, the Houthis and other armed groups over power-sharing arrangements and the draft constitution. In September, the Houthis and those armed forces aligned to former President Saleh seized and consolidated control over the capital, Sana'a, and other parts of the country.

In March 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition with a number of other Arab States and launched an extensive air campaign linked with ground operations in order to restore the internationally recognised government of President Hadi, who now resides in Riyadh. This forced the Houthi/Saleh forces back to Sana'a and the surrounding areas, including the port of Hudaydah and districts contiguous with the Saudi border. However, it is not as simple as a binary conflict between the government and the Houthi/Saleh forces as loyalties have shifted, armed groups proliferated and factions fragmented.

In December 2017, tensions between the Houthis and Saleh erupted into violence culminating in the killing of former President Saleh. In the south, there have been clashes in Aden involving the Southern Transitional Council, a secessionist group, formed in May 2017 and supported by the United Arab Emirates, a member of the Saudi-led Coalition. Forces under their command now control large swathes of southern Yemen including major cities.

The United Nations, as a body, has approached this crisis in a three-tiered manner. In a series of Resolutions, in particular SCR 2216 of 14th April 2015, the Security Council supported the legitimacy of the Hadi government, condemned the Houthi activities as undermining the political settlement, imposed sanctions on individuals and an arms embargo on supplies to the Houthis. To support this embargo, it authorised an inspection regime, established a Sanctions Committee and also a Panel of Experts to monitor the implementation of the inspection regime.

Already in existence since 2011 was the post of Special Envoy for Yemen, appointed by the Secretary-General to oversee the political process following the resignation of President Saleh. The current Special Envoy is Martin Griffiths from the United Kingdom who has been trying to bring the various parties together in Geneva and elsewhere.

It is the third strand in which I have been involved. The Human Rights Council, based in Geneva, had been concerned about the situation in Yemen for some time but there was no consensus as to what steps could be taken by the Council. Some wanted an independent inquiry into alleged violations of human rights and other branches of international law, along the lines of those for Syria and Libya, whilst others preferred to rely on assistance to domestic bodies such as the Yemeni National Independent Commission of Inquiry, operating out of Aden. In September 2017, at the 36th Session of the Council, a compromise resolution, 36/31, was adopted. This, *inter alia*, required the High Commissioner to establish a group of eminent international and regional experts for a period of one year for the following purposes, and I quote:

> *'(a) To monitor and report on the situation of human rights, to carry out a comprehensive examination of all alleged violations and abuses of international human rights and other appropriate and applicable fields of international law committed by all parties to the conflict since September 2014, including the possible gender dimensions of such violations, and to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged violations and abuses and, where possible, to identify those responsible.*
>
> *(b) To make general recommendations on improving respect for and the protection and fulfilment of human rights, and to provide guidance on access to justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing, as appropriate.*
>
> *(c) To engage with Yemeni authorities and all stakeholders, in particular relevant United Nations agencies, the field presence of the Office of the High Commissioner in Yemen, the authorities of the Gulf States and the League of Arab States, with a view to exchanging information and providing support for national, regional and international efforts to promote accountability for human rights violations and abuses in Yemen.'*

This Group was to report back to the High Commissioner in time for the 39th Session in September 2018.

The three experts appointed by the High Commissioner were Kamel Jendoubi of Tunisia who served as the President of the Independent Higher Electoral Commission (ISIE), which organised the first free and democratic elections in Tunisia in October 2011 and who was to act as Chair; Melissa Parke of Australia, who was a federal member of parliament from 2007 to 2016 and was appointed as Minister for International Development in 2013; and myself.

Our task was not easy and we had time, resource and security constraints. We were not appointed until mid-December, could not deploy until the end of February after we had completed security training in Jordan and our Secretariat was not complete until the end of March. Our report had to be submitted in early July to the High Commissioner and was to be released in mid-August to give States time to prepare for the September Council Session. Resources were tight and not helped by UN budget reductions. For example, we were denied a full-time media consultant and the final appointee for the Council Session took up his post two days before we arrived in Geneva for the launch of the Report!

On security, I have already said that even the Principals had to do full security training. Access to Yemen itself is difficult and requires extensive logistic coordination with various bodies. We, the Experts, were limited to a single visit to Aden and Sana'a, though our teams managed to range further afield into other areas such as Hudaydah. None of us were able to access Taizz where some of the most severe ground fighting is taking place.

Our mandate was wide and we had to prioritise. We concentrated on a number of themes, first the conduct of hostilities on land, sea and in the air; secondly, detention practices across the country; and thirdly, the effects of the access restrictions imposed by the Coalition, ostensibly in support of UNSCR 2216. We also looked at violations of freedom of expression, particularly in relation to journalists and practitioners of the Baha'i faith, sexual violence and child recruitment. As will be apparent from this list, there are a number of key issues which we did not look at in order to avoid too much overlap with the work already carried out by the Panel of Experts appointed under UNSCR 2216.

On the conduct of hostilities, we faced a number of problems. Under the law of armed conflict, there is a major philosophical difference between the law on the conduct of hostilities, sometimes known as Hague law, and that dealing with the protection of victims, sometimes known as Geneva law.

In order to establish violations under Hague law, it is often necessary to approach the matter from the side of the attacker. Thus the proportionality analysis to be applied in dealing with attacks depends on the expected collateral damage, set against the anticipated military advantage. Thus the fact that a building has been struck does not tell

you whether it was the target, what was the anticipated military advantage or what was the expected collateral damage.

We examined a number of air strike sites and these caused us serious concerns as to the various stages of the targeting process that appeared to be being operated by the Coalition. These included the identification of military objectives, the carrying out of collateral damage (proportionality) assessments and the nature of further precautions taken to minimise civilian casualties. However, we could not identify where any flaws were without examining that process in detail. Discussions with the Coalition failed to achieve the necessary access and though we did receive answers to written questions, these were received after the Report had been completed and were insufficiently detailed to negate the indications that we had noted from the results on the ground

It was even harder to examine ground operations. We were not able to access Taizz where the majority of allegations of violations came from. We were therefore reliant on second-hand information. This was insufficient to enable us to draw firm conclusions but we were able to state that, as with the air campaign, this was an area that required further investigation in particular in relation to the possible indiscriminate use by the Houthis of weapons with a wide area impact in an urban environment.

The assault on Hudaydah took place after our Report was completed but will obviously need to feature in any subsequent report.

Detention practices on all sides caused serious concern. We outlined numerous cases of arbitrary detention and ill treatment including torture in some facilities. In the south, it was difficult to ascertain who controlled some facilities with the Yemeni authorities claiming little authority and the United Arab Emirates, often through surrogate forces and supporters, calling the shots. Orders for release by Yemeni judicial authorities were routinely ignored. Most of the sexual violence cases identified came about in detention settings. Access was understandably difficult on both sides, but we were able to meet with families and, in some cases with former detainees. In the north, detention was routinely used for individuals perceived to be opposed to the *de facto* authorities, including journalists, human rights defenders and, in particular, members of the Baha'i faith.

An area of major concern was the embargo imposed by the Coalition on imports into Yemen. This particularly affected the north where a sizeable part of the Yemeni population lives and has been exacerbated by the collapse of the Yemeni currency and the failure to pay salaries to State employees following the transfer of the Central Bank to Aden. This has put basic essentials out of the financial reach of most of the population and led to the description of Yemen as *'the largest humanitarian crisis in the world.'* I need not go into the figures which are well known.

The justification for these restrictions on access is given as enforcing the arms embargo

imposed under UNSCR 2216. However, the UN has set up its own verification machinery and the Coalition actions appear to be wider. Under the law of armed conflict, starvation as a method of warfare is prohibited both in international and non-international armed conflict. It should be noted, however, that the prohibition in non-international armed conflict is expressed in much more general terms (Art 14, AP II, contra Art.54, AP I). In either case though, it requires proof that the intention was to conduct warfare through a policy of starvation. It is much more difficult to show a violation if starvation is simply an incidental result of conduct carried out for a different purpose. However, we decided to approach the matter from a different angle.

The principle of proportionality as expressed in LOAC applies as a matter of treaty law to 'attacks'. However, in recent years, there has been a growing view that 'attacks' extend beyond the traditional view of 'acts of violence' to other methods of warfare that, though not involving kinetic violence, have similar effects. This is particularly true in relation to cyberattacks. We considered that the proportionality rule, on that basis, should apply to embargos or blockades which had similar effects to those of kinetic attacks, such as death or injury. There is no doubt that the embargo is in fact the major cause of death and suffering in Yemen, even more than the direct number of casualties caused by hostilities. We were supported in our view of the law by the San Remo Manual on International Law applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea which as long ago as 1995 had suggested that:

'102 The declaration or establishment of a blockade is prohibited if:

> *(a) it has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other objects essential for its survival; or*
>
> *(b) the damage to the civilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the blockade.'*

The lifting of the embargo and the opening of airports, particularly Sana'a, to allow for the evacuation of sick Yemenis who cannot obtain medical treatment within Yemen would probably be the biggest single requirement in this tragic story.

We also found clear evidence of child recruitment, particularly amongst the Houthi/Saleh forces, but also amongst government and coalition forces, though here children were usually used in support roles.

We were also asked to look at accountability under international criminal law and, where we could identify individuals, we submitted a confidential list of possible perpetrators to the High Commissioner. However, we were not a court of law, nor a criminal investigative body and so it would have been inappropriate for us, then or now, to comment publicly on the list.

The Report was published in August and debated at the Human Rights Council in September. It is inevitably inconclusive in many areas and we have recommended further examination should be made. However, our Report, also inevitably, met criticism, particularly from the governments of Yemen, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates who felt that we had not paid sufficient attention to the Houthis, particularly as they are rebels in breach of UNSCR 2216. However, this criticism tends to overlook the fact that the law of armed conflict is blind to the causes of the conflict, applying to all parties equally. Here it differs from human rights law, which applies principally to States. It is perhaps ironic that we were criticised for describing the Houthis as carrying out quasi-governmental functions, when our purpose was to be able to provide some legal basis for imposing some human rights standards on them.

What of the future? The first point is that there can be no military solution. Four years of conflict have shown that. Martin Griffiths is doing everything he can to bring the Yemeni parties together for talks and this is to be fully supported. I am encouraged too by recent calls, particularly by the US and UK, for a ceasefire. There can be no resolution without that but it means that both the Coalition and the Houthis must abide by it.

Yet that is only half the answer. There will then be a requirement for a massive aid operation to try to restore some semblance of normality. This will not only need to be in the provision of physical items, but also finding a way to restore an economy which is in freefall. It is the lack of funds that cripples Yemen probably more than the lack of resources. Food is available – it is just too expensive for people with no access to funds.

There does currently seem to be a glimmer of hope. However, it requires a degree of goodwill on all sides – something that is always difficult to engender amongst warring parties. However, the solutions must be Yemeni, based on the consent of the Yemeni people, north and south. Whether that will be a unitary or federal State remains to be seen, but I wish Martin Griffiths every success.

THE SPY AND THE TRAITOR: THE GREATEST ESPIONAGE STORY OF THE COLD WAR

Transcript of a lecture given by Mr. Ben Macintyre

Tuesday 11th December 2018

Ben Macintyre *is a columnist and Associate Editor on The Times. He has worked as the newspaper's correspondent in New York, Paris and Washington. He is the multimillion-copy bestselling author of nine previous books including 'Agent Zigzag', shortlisted for the Costa Biography Award and the Galaxy British Book Award for Biography of the Year 2008, and the no. 1 bestsellers, 'A Spy Among Friends'; 'Operation Mincemeat'; 'Double Cross'; and 'SAS: Rogue Heroes'. He regularly presents BBC series based on his acclaimed books. His most recent book, 'The Spy and the Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story Of The Cold War', was published in September 2018.*

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you very much for having me.

It is a slightly daunting audience, this, not just because of the distinguished attendees, but because some people in this audience know a great deal more about this story than I do. You can probably work them out for yourselves, I am certainly not going to out them here. Without them, it would have been impossible to write this book. This has been a very different book for me: I have never written a book before about somebody who is alive, very much alive. And that had its own peculiar difficulties in some ways, but without the help of people who actually took part in the operation, I could never even have started to write this.

I first met Oleg Gordievsky nearly five years ago now, in the safe house where he has lived for most of the last three decades. It is a very strange life that Oleg Gordievsky lives. In many ways he is a captive of history, particularly since the events of last March in Salisbury. He does not go out alone. He is under very, very tight security and he lives a fairly solitary life. He is much visited by his old friends from the Service, but nonetheless he is a lonely figure in some ways.

I first began to interview him, as I say, about five years ago and as the project accelerated, there was a period when I was going there roughly once a month. Among Oleg's many qualities is an absolutely prodigious memory. Until very recently, he was able not just to tell you what had happened 35 years ago, but to give you a very vivid sense of what it felt like, and for a narrative non-fiction writer, that is gold dust.

Spies on the whole (and this is a fairly controversial statement to say, given who I know

are in this audience), and intelligence do not always make a huge amount of difference. Intelligence can oil the wheels of traditional diplomacy, it can make us all safer. When it goes wrong it can make us markedly more unsafe, but it does not often or usually change strategic thinking in government.

There are exceptions and it seems to me that Oleg Gordievsky is one of those. His intelligence over a long period was of such high quality that it was materially affecting and changing the way that policy was being made in Downing Street and in the Oval Office. That does not happen very often.

And it is particularly odd in a way, given where Oleg came from. Oleg was a very unlikely spy for the West. He was brought up in the KGB. His father was a KGB officer, so enthusiastic that he wore his uniform at weekends. Oleg was brought up in the family of the KGB. He ate KGB food, he lived in a KGB compound. Really he never considered being anything other than a KGB officer.

His father, Anton Gordievsky, was a long-term, utterly dedicated, completely unquestioning servant of the communist regime. Oleg himself would refer to him as *Homo Sovieticus*. And while a rebellion against his father is part of the story of Oleg's development, it is not all of it.

Oleg was a very talented student. He graduated with extremely good marks. He proved himself to be a supremely good linguist. He learnt German fluently, he then went on to learn other European languages, including English. He attended the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations, often referred to as the 'Harvard' of Russia. There again, he excelled.

One of the things about being at that Institute was that you had access to western newspapers. So with some discretion, you could read up about what was really happening in the West, and I suspect that was really one of the earliest moments when Oleg began to question the propaganda with which he had been raised.

Oleg also took up long distance running, and the motif of long distance running is one of the ways to try to understand Gordievsky, because I think the loneliness of the long distance runner is part of what informed him. The decisions that Oleg would take over the course of his double life were ones that he took alone. He did not really need to refer to other people, he had a strong sense (and he still does) of his own moral rectitude, of a clear path, and that was done very much on his own.

More practically, while he was in the running team, he met a man who played an important part: Stanislaw Kaplan, who was a Czech trainee intelligence officer and became a very close friend of Oleg. And while Stanislaw was not a dissident in any sense of the word, he was a questioner. He and Oleg began to have long intense discussions

late at night, when they began to discuss the future of communism and the nature of the regime. Stanislaw would play an important part in what happened subsequently, but this again was the beginnings of a kind of questioning by Oleg.

Another pivotal moment came when he was still at the Institute, when he was sent to East Germany to work as a translator effectively. He had already been pretty much tapped up by the KGB. His brother was already inside the KGB and so was his father. There was an office in the Institute that was dedicated to recruiting KGB officers. But the day after he arrived in East Berlin, he was staying in Karlshorst in the KGB enclave there, he looked out the window and saw hundreds of bulldozers and thousands of East German military coming in to build the Berlin Wall and that was one of the key turning points for Oleg. It was a symbolic moment when he began to realise that the regime he was serving was not what it appeared to be. Of course, East Germans referred to the Berlin Wall as the 'Anti-Fascist Protection Wall'. Everybody with a brain - and Oleg had a considerable brain - knew that in fact it was a prison wall. It was there to keep the East Germans inside and stop them fleeing to the West, which they were doing in ever-increasing numbers.

So you see a sort of disillusionment beginning to kick in here. It did not, however, stop Oleg from joining the KGB. We think of the KGB as being a vast monolithic machinery of repression, which it was, but it was also an elite, and joining the KGB was to join an elite force. In fact it was Kim Philby who said years ago, long before this happened, in the 1930s, *'You do not hesitate to join an elite force.'*

Oleg was trained in the 'Red Banner' academy, also known as School 101 which I have always rather liked, which was the spy school outside Moscow. There he was introduced to all the complex techniques and methods of Soviet espionage. Dead drops, dead-letter boxes, and particularly what the Russians refer to as *proverka*, which literally means 'dry-cleaning', and that is surveillance and surveillance evasion. Oleg turned out to be extremely good at evading surveillance. He is a champion 'dry-cleaner' and that also plays an important part in what follows.

The Lubyanka is the rather beautiful and very sinister headquarters of Russian and Soviet intelligence and Oleg began work on the 5th floor where he was in Directorate S. Now Directorate S implanted 'illegals' around the globe. Those are what we would call the 'NOCs' in British intelligence parlance. They are posing as civilians, they are under deep cover, they usually have false identities. Oleg's job really was to create people who did not exist, which he found rather frustrating in fact, because he wanted to be an illegal himself, like his brother. His brother was already working as an illegal in Western Europe.

Oleg's big break came in 1967 when he was sent to Copenhagen, officially as a 'legal', as a formal member of the Soviet diplomatic staff. In fact he was running the illegals network. Life in Copenhagen was another extraordinary eye-opener for Oleg. He was absolutely stunned by the freedom, by the fact that he could read any book he wanted,

that he could listen to any classical music he liked. Oleg was, and is, a person of very high culture and the cultural freedom he experienced in Denmark was astonishing for him.

He had only been there a year when another critical world event took place, which was the crushing of the Prague Spring. In the book, I have a photograph of a lone demonstrator in the centre of Prague standing against the tanks which were sent in to crush the liberalising reform movement of Alexander Dubček. Now Oleg was stunned by this and furious. He almost took it as a sort of personal affront that the Soviet Union had moved in to destroy what he and many other young Russians believed might be the future of the communist regime, a sort of socialism with a human face.

And he did something very interesting. In retrospect, probably also quite dangerous and possibly quite foolish, which was that he went to a telephone inside the Soviet Embassy that he knew was bugged by Danish intelligence and he delivered a harangue to his then wife, chastising the Soviet Union for what he considered to be an act of barbarism. Now he did this because he believed that Danish intelligence would pick it up and that it would be a hint. He was not ready yet to come over, but it was a hint that he was not like the other KGB officers.

The odd thing about this signal sent to the West was that it was completely missed, for reasons that I have never been able to work out. The Danes were definitely listening to this telephone, but in the miles and the acres of transcripts of overheard messages, this little hint was missed. However, they were already onto Oleg.

The Danish Intelligence Service, known as PET (it has a completely unpronounceable Danish name which I will not attempt, but it is shortened to PET), very small, very efficient and a close ally of MI6, were already watching Oleg. They already had him flagged as a KGB officer and there is a set of surveillance photographs that we discovered in Oleg's attic just a few years ago. They were taken long before he was ready to turn over and they have a sort of grainy quality which I rather love. In one, Oleg is looking rather concerned and there is another which I think must have been taken by a fixed camera somewhere on one of the main streets in Copenhagen, so they were keeping a close eye on Oleg.

Another critical moment took place when Stanislaw Kaplan, the Czech intelligence officer I referred to at the beginning, defected. He defected after the Prague Spring and he wound up in London where he was debriefed by MI6. Routinely when defectors came over to the West, they were asked, *'Who else is there in your experience, who else is there in your acquaintance who might think in a similar way to you?'* and one of the things Kaplan told MI6 was that, *'Oleg Gordievsky is someone who is open to other ideas.'* I do not think he put it much more strongly than that, but the combination of PET keeping an eye on Oleg when he was in Copenhagen and this little hint meant that for the first time, Oleg was flagged up in SIS files.

He returned to Moscow. He spent three years in Moscow. He was then redeployed back to Denmark where he was now in the political section, so he was attempting to recruit people in Denmark and around Scandinavia who would spy for the Soviet Union.

By this point, MI6 was watching as well, and a particular MI6 officer who I identify in the book as Richard Bromhead approached Oleg on the badminton court where he was known to play every morning and began to signal that there was a possibility that business could be done. A very long courtship took place after this - he was not reeled in immediately. It took a very long time and there were hiccups along the way. In fact, the courtship was so subtle that at one point Richard Bromhead sent a message to MI6 headquarters saying, *'Help, I think Oleg Gordievsky is trying to recruit me!'*

Eventually, after about a year and a half, a deal was struck. It became clear that Oleg was prepared to start spying for the West and he began to produce an extraordinary amount of material. Really of the highest grade. I think I am right in saying probably more important than any other agent - these things are always comparative, but this stuff was high grade. What Oleg was doing was he was raiding the diplomatic bag, which every week would bring in microfilm instructions for the KGB in Copenhagen. He would extract the microfilm, he would take them to his MI6 contact who would copy them using a special machine made in Hanslope Park, and then return them to the files. It was extremely dangerous. Had he been caught doing it, he would have been in serious trouble. But a routine developed, and as with quite a lot of intelligence work, it is quite routine. While it was always perilous and always dangerous, nonetheless a pattern began to emerge and some of the material that Oleg was producing was extraordinary.

I will just give you one example. In the 1970s, Arne Treholt was a rising star of the Norwegian Labour Party. A lot of people thought he might become the next Prime Minister of Norway. He was very highly thought of, but he was also a long-term KGB agent. Gennadi Titov, nicknamed 'the Crocodile', was his case officer. Over a very long period, Arne Treholt had been paid a great deal of money by the KGB. Now, the reason I tell you this is that one of the issues with really high grade intelligence is that if it is really good, you cannot necessarily use it, because had Arne Treholt simply been arrested, that would have tipped off to the KGB that there was somebody in the system who was leaking information. So instead of simply catching him and winding him up, they watched him, which is also what intelligence services do on this side as well, and again that will play an important part as we move on.

Towards the end of his time in Copenhagen, Oleg fell in love with Leila Aliyeva. Leila was the daughter of very senior KGB officers. She, like Oleg, had come from the KGB family, if you like. Oleg was already married at this point and in order to divorce his wife and remarry Leila, he knew there was going to be a problem, because the KGB, while being an almost entirely amoral organisation, was extraordinary moralistic about things like divorce and adultery and remarrying and Oleg sensed that his career was likely to go through a

major dip when this happened. So before leaving Copenhagen, about a year before he left, he said to his MI6 case officer, *'I need an escape plan. I need some way to get out of Moscow if I get into trouble.'*

This was an extremely difficult problem, because MI6 had never smuggled anybody out of the Soviet Union, let alone a KGB officer, let alone a KGB officer who was likely, if he was in trouble, to be under close KGB surveillance.

The job of attempting to work out a way to get Gordievsky out fell to an extremely talented woman officer in MI6 who, over a long period, worked out there was one potential way to get somebody out of the Soviet Union and that was by using diplomatic immunity. By convention - not law - diplomatic cars crossing borders are not searched. Now this convention was routinely violated by Soviet border guards - if they suspected there was any reason to search a car, they would simply do it anyway. But it was possible, she worked out, that if Oleg could be got to a particular rendezvous point south of the Finnish border, if he could throw off surveillance for long enough and if MI6 could drive a car or cars up to that point with diplomatic plates, they might be able to get him into the boot, they might be able to wrap him in a special heat reflective blanket that would prevent the infrared cameras from picking him up as he went across the border and they might be able to smuggle him across the border into Finland, where he might still get away, so long as the Finns did not realise he was there. They would have to get him up to the Norwegian border and then get him out that way.

There are a lot of conditionals in this, because it was extremely unlikely to work. It was codenamed 'Operation PIMLICO'. Obviously in order to activate Operation PIMLICO, there had to be a signal. Oleg had to be able to tell MI6 in Moscow that he needed to get out. And the signal for Operation PIMLICO unbelievably went like this: if Oleg was seen on a particular corner of a particular street on Kutuzovsky Prospekt outside a bread shop (the reason this was chosen was because the MI6 flats were here, it was a main western diplomatic compound, used by Germans as well), if he was seen standing there at 7.30pm on a Tuesday night, holding a Safeway bag, with a big red 'S' on it, that would be the signal that he needed to get out.

The acceptance signal that MI6 had seen him was that an MI6 officer would walk towards him holding a Harrods bag and eating a Mars bar. Or a KitKat. It had to be one or the other. It had to be a British Mars bar, and the Safeway bag which sounds completely bonkers in some ways, was actually quite clever because Oleg was known to have been in the West, western carrier bags were prized in the Soviet Union, and it would stand out as distinctive but not illogical for Oleg to be holding such a thing. Ditto, I suppose, the idea of a British diplomat holding a Harrods bag would not be so odd either. The extraordinary thing about Operation PIMLICO is that for seven years, *seven years*, this signal site was policed. It was watched every Tuesday night. In fact one of the officers involved told me they ate so many KitKats that by the end of the posting, they just could not face another one.

Oleg returned to Moscow from Copenhagen under instructions that he was to try to get himself into the British section, because then of course he would have access to what MI6 regarded as the crown jewels, and then with luck, he might get himself redeployed to London. I realise I am running out of time so I will quickly run through what happened then.

He was indeed redeployed to London. Before going, he went through the British archive in the KGB headquarters, everything that the Soviets had been aiming to do in Britain over the previous period and some of what he discovered was extraordinary, including evidence that Jack Jones, the great trade union leader, had for many years been a highly paid Soviet agent codenamed DRIM.

But the most important file that he came across was identified as 'Agent BOOT'. Agent BOOT was Michael Foot. I love the idea of Major Petrov drawing up his file for the first time and thinking *'Ah, his name is Foot, we will call him Boot. A very funny British joke!'* What the BOOT files revealed was that for a very long period, from 1949 until 1968, Michael Foot had had many meetings with the KGB. Not just one or two, but dozens. He had also been paid a considerable amount of money, the equivalent today of about £37,500.

Now, what was Michael Foot? He was not a spy, because he did not have access to the sort of information that would have classified him as that. What was he doing for the Soviet Union? Well, he was providing useful information, gossip about what was going on inside the Labour Party, evidence about what was happening in the trade union movement. The Soviet Union, these officers, were giving him information that they thought ought to be produced in either journalistic form or in speeches, so what does this make Michael Foot?

When we serialised the book in *The Times* a few months ago, it created an explosion and on the left, there were people saying, *'This is disgraceful, a dead man is being smeared, who can't fight back,'* and the right said, *'This is the evidence that he was a traitor.'* Well, neither of those things is true. Because Michael Foot sits somewhere in the middle of that spectrum. There is a very good Russian term which literally translates as 'useful idiot', and it was coined by Lenin in fact, and it is usually used to refer to people who are used, either advertently or inadvertently, for propaganda purposes. Michael Foot was very useful to the Soviet Union, but he was also, I would argue, completely idiotic to have allowed himself to be used in this way.

Oleg came to London with his family. He now had two young children and his wife Leila. They settled into London life. They absolutely loved living here, but all the time - and Leila remained completely ignorant of this - Oleg was producing whatever information was coming into the KGB station and passing it on to MI6. They would meet regularly at the MI6 safe house in Bayswater and he was producing information of world-changing importance.

I will just quickly give you two examples of this. I include in the book a photograph of a demonstration that took place after the downing of KAL flight 007, the Korean airliner. This was a time of intense tension between East and West in the early 1980s. And one of the things that Oleg produced and presented to MI6 was evidence that the Kremlin genuinely believed the West was planning a first strike. That, so far from being the aggressors in some ways, Andropov and his regime genuinely believed that the West was going to pull the trigger and Operation RYAN was an order that went out to all the KGB stations in the West, instructing them to find evidence of a looming first strike.

Now on the whole, if you ask spies and intelligence officers to find something you already believe, that is what they will find. Some of the instructions were ludicrous, including *'Try and find out if blood is being stockpiled in blood banks because there is about to be a nuclear attack.'* I think the Soviets were still under the impression that blood banks were actually banks, where the price went up and down depending on supply. But actually this was materially important. When this information landed on Ronald Reagan's desk, it materially changed the rhetoric. They began to tone down the oratory about the evil empire and so on and you can see a sea change that happens.

Another one is that when Gorbachev famously came to visit to the UK, he came and met Thatcher towards the end of 1984, one of the tasks of the KGB, including Oleg, was to produce briefing notes for Gorbachev on what he might say to Thatcher when they met. He was not yet the leader of the Communist Party, but he was clearly the rising star and so Oleg was one of the key figures who was producing briefing notes for Gorbachev. But of course those briefing notes were actually dictated by MI6, so you have got a unique situation here where one spy is effectively briefing both sides. He is telling Gorbachev what to say to Thatcher at the same time he is advising MI6 what Thatcher might like to say to Gorbachev, so when Thatcher emerged from those meetings saying, *'Here is someone we can do business with,'* that was partly because Gordievsky was rigging the business.

I said that the information was landing on Ronald Reagan's desk. It was obviously getting there from the CIA. In the course of the early 1980s, MI6 made an entirely sensible decision to begin sharing the information it was getting from Gordievsky with the Americans. Under convention and traditionally, you do not have to reveal where this comes from, so while MI6 were being very generous with its information, it was not revealing where it came from. It was disguising the origin, it was passing it up.

Now the CIA does not really like not to know where the information comes from. It is not a very good look if you are the CIA Chief and you are going into the Oval Office and saying, *'Mr. President, we have some very good information here, but we don't really know where it comes from.'* And so the CIA secretly and without telling MI6, set up its own task force to try to identify who the Brits had, where this information was coming from. And they worked it out. It took them quite a long time and it was in some ways a

very clever piece of sleuthing. They worked out where the little gobbets of information were coming from, from Britain, which officers this might tally with and eventually they worked it out. They worked out that Gordievsky had to be this undercover agent and they gave him a codename, TICKLE, and they simply tucked this piece of information away, with some satisfaction, I think.

However, what they did not know was that the chief of Soviet counter-intelligence in the CIA, Aldrich Ames, was about to go over to the KGB. So you have an almost perfect circle here, where the KGB is spying on the CIA, the CIA is secretly investigating MI6, MI6 is spying on the KGB, and so it goes round in a circle. Very soon after, in fact the day that Aldrich Ames first approached the KGB in Washington and offered to spy for them, within 24 hours a cable arrived instructing Oleg to return to Moscow to be anointed effectively as head or *rezident* of the KGB in London. He had already been appointed, this was going to be a formal moment. It triggered an intense debate about whether Oleg should go back or not. In the end, that choice was made by Oleg himself. He was told that he could, with complete honour, down tools, go into retirement, take a new identity and live in Britain for the rest of his life. He himself - and it was an act of staggering bravery - decided that he would fly back to Moscow.

The minute he got back to Moscow, he knew he was in deep, deep trouble. He went to his apartment, he opened the top lock, he opened the second lock, but he could not open the door, because the third lock had been locked. But Gordievsky never had the key to the third lock, in fact he had never locked that lock. And that could only mean that the KGB, which had keys to everywhere, had been inside his apartment, accidentally locking all three locks on the way out, thus indicating they had been inside and from that moment he knew he was in real trouble.

The person in charge of investigating and catching Oleg in the act was Viktor Budanov who was Head of K Directorate, which was the KGB's counter-intelligence, mole-hunting team. It is one of the enigmas of this story is why Budanov did not simply arrest Gordievsky the minute he arrived back in Moscow and I think the answer to that is twofold.

One - complacency. No one had ever escaped from the Soviet Union. Oleg Gordievsky was going to be under incredibly tight surveillance, so they just did not believe he could get out. And the second was that again, the KGB was quite a legalistic organisation. Oleg was by now a KGB colonel. You could not arrest a KGB colonel and just lock him up, they needed evidence. So they wanted to catch him, it seems pretty clear. They wanted to catch Oleg *in flagrante*, they wanted to catch him in contact with MI6 to create an enormous diplomatic firestorm that would then rebound to the Soviet Union's credit.

So they watched him. Much in the same way as the West watched the spies that Oleg had identified in Scandinavia, so the KGB put a tail on Oleg and began to watch him. So Oleg knew that he was in deep trouble, he knew that they were on to him and he now

had to make a really difficult decision, and to this day, I think it haunts him. He had to decide whether to go alone to activate Operation PIMLICO or whether to take his family with him. There was provision in Operation PIMLICO for all four members of the family to escape. They would go in two cars, one child and one adult would be secreted in the boot in each of the cars, and they would try to get them out. So it was potentially do-able. Of course he would have to tell Leila. He would have to explain to his wife that, so far from being a loyal Soviet intelligence officer, he had been playing for the other side the whole way along and he decided that he could not do it, that he would have to go alone.

On 15th July 1985, sure enough he got to the corner, the signal site on Kutuzovsky Prospekt, and he was just about to leave, thinking that the signal was not going to be picked up, when a young intelligence officer walked towards him holding a Harrods bag and eating a Mars bar, so Operation PIMLICO was on.

As I said, the plan was that they had to get to this rendezvous point about 30 miles south of the Finnish border. Oleg would have to hide himself in a ditch up there, having got there by train and bus and then on foot. The two MI6 cars would come this way, they would also have to throw off KGB surveillance in order to get there, then they would try and get in there, quickly wrap him in a blanket and the rest of the family if they were also brought along (and of course, the officers did not know until the moment that they arrived there whether or not Oleg was going to be on his own or whether he was going to be with the family), get him into the car and get him out of there and then try and get across the border.

Now, if you want to know what happened then, you will have to buy the book! But, four hours later, beyond the rendezvous moment, on the Saturday after the Tuesday, Oleg Gordievsky was cramped in the boot of a car, sweating, half-tranquillised, I think probably sick with fear at this point, not knowing whether he had got across the border, when he heard a sound he knew. He heard the strains of Sibelius' *Finlandia* played at full volume by the driver of the car, to indicate that Oleg was in Finland and he was free.

Thank you very much.

WESTERN DEFENCE AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: WHERE NOW?

Transcript of a lecture given by Dr. Kori Schake

Wednesday 23rd January 2019

Dr. Kori Schake *is the Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. She is the author of 'Safe Passage: The Transition From British To American Hegemony' (Harvard, 2017) and editor with Jim Mattis of 'Warriors And Citizens: American Views Of Our Military' (Hoover Institution, 2016). She has worked for the National Security Council staff, the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and both the military and civilian staffs in the Pentagon. In 2008 she was senior policy advisor on the McCain presidential campaign. She taught Thinking About War at Stanford University, and also in the faculties of the United States Military Academy, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the University of Maryland.*

Thank you very much for having me. It is a great joy to be here and also intimidating to see so many friends here who could do this better than I could: Lord Ricketts, Baroness Neville-Jones, Dr. Edwina Morton, Sir Kevin Tebbit. Being amidst sharpshooters like that will require me to remain honest, which will not give you the ability to see the real expanse of my talents as an extraordinarily accomplished liar!

What I am going talk to you about today, though, is the challenges of defence right now, and I think there are three.

The first is a **retrenching United States**; the second is a **rising China**; and the third is the **middle powers of the liberal order convincing themselves of their defence incapacity**. And of those three challenges, I actually think the third is the most worrisome.

Let me start with the rising China. Any of you who have not read the journalist James Fallows' article from 2010 on *How America Can Rise Again*, I really commend it to you. It is my favourite piece written on how the global order is changing. Fallows had just returned from being *The Atlantic* correspondent for three years in Beijing, and so he came back to the United States looking at America through the eyes of someone who had been away and who had been watching China's transformation up close.

I love the article because we in the West have a tendency when we focus on a problem, particularly in my country, to make it of outsized proportions and also to ascribe to what we are worried about, all of the advantages of our system and none of its problems, and all of the advantages of their system and none of its problems.

What I love about this Fallows' argument is that he looks at the role of the 'jeremiad' in American foreign policy. You will recall the prophet Jeremiah from the Torah who always believed he was failing God and that is why he was beloved of God, and he uses that as a metaphor for the way that the United States actually solves problems when it gets really worried that it is failing. So if you look at the covers of *TIME* magazine from the 1950s, they are all about the German *Wirtschaftsbund* and how shocking it is that ten years after the end of World War II, Germany is going to overtake the United States economically and politically. And then in the 1970s, you see Japan Inc. and American business can never figure out how to do things as well.

And what Fallows argues about China is that we are now seeing all of China's potential and none of China's problems. I think that is true. To ground your thinking about a rising China, I would remind you that per capita GDP is about $8,800 in China right now. That is roughly the equivalent of Kazakhstan or Romania or Dominica. So we are looking at China's potential, not its actuality.

The second thing to think about a rising China is that they have succeeded brilliantly at mastering manufacturing and now they have the hard part of navigating the middle income trap, of developing a creative economy that places them in the value chain in the way western economies have thrived, and that is actually really hard to do in societies that are not free. In fact, we have only one example of a country that could be sustainably growing, prosperous, without also politically liberalising - and that is China since 1970.

So the question you have to ask yourself is: will the law of gravity that has hit every other society, hit China as they have to deal with the challenges of robotic replacement of manufacturing, of moving up the value chain, of low-end competition from Vietnam, Indonesia and other labour markets beginning to crowd them? And whether they can manage the magic trick of having a go-go Silicon Valley innovative tech scene without the tiresome, socially demanding value-signallers of actual Silicon Valley? That is a lot harder to do than most people looking at the rise of China suggest.

What is China's strategy for managing that? One big element of it is the Belt and Road Initiative. A trillion dollar effort to position China back in the middle of the world's trade patterns and to position itself in prejudicially positive ways in the value chains of important industries.

We at the IISS are doing a big study on this, looking at three trajectories for the Belt and Road Initiative.

The first is if it works as advertised: that they become the lender of first resort for countries that cannot qualify for infrastructure loans from the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) or from major western governments. So if they succeed at that, they do re-position themselves, both in trade and in value chains.

The second trajectory we are looking at is: what if this is a gigantic debt-for-equity swap? And that in fact, they are going to be repossessing and using for military purposes, infrastructure that countries cannot afford to sustain? How does that change the security map and the security relationships, not just in Asia, but for countries that are doing business there?

The third is the most hopeful one, the most liberal one, which is: what if the Chinese government proves agile enough to learn from the early mistakes, the nationalist backlash that they are getting for nationalising ports and the infrastructure, and it actually becomes a means for cajoling China into the rules-based liberal order that Britain, the United States and other countries built out of the ashes of World War II?

Let me just suggest to you – I am an American so I come by optimism as my birthright - but I think you also begin to see data to indicate this as a genuine possibility, and let me suggest two ways.

The first is that the Chinese have run out of money to fund it, so they are looking now to partner with the Gulf States and others, including the Norwegian sovereign investment fund, and so we countries who value transparency and the rules-based order, we have the potential to influence future projects, because we have the potential to weigh on the funding. The second is that the quality of the infrastructure that predominantly Chinese companies are building in these places is also coming in for backlash criticism, and so they are looking to partner in particular with Japanese construction firms to learn best practices.

The real fundamental question about China, though, is: why are they activating the antibodies against their continued rise so early? Right? $8,800 per capita GDP. They have not won the race for artificial intelligence and 'tech 2020', and all that good stuff. They are antagonising their neighbours and thereby reinforcing the United States and other countries' alliance relationships in the region.

If the Chinese are brilliant 100-year strategists as people like to say, that is a terribly clumsy mistake to make at this point in time. And so my sense is that the rise of China is the least of these three big challenges, because they have already activated the antibodies that are going to complicate their strategy for continued, unhindered rise and that the law of gravity is already starting to apply to China in ways that are likely to trap it as a middle income power, rather than a superpower.

The second challenge for defence and global order is the retrenchment of the United States and it pre-dates President Trump. As an unrepentant signatory of all those Republican letters about the candidate Trump's unfitness, I will cede you every argument about his recklessness and wilful damage, yet it is important to remember that Britain and the United States are both living in the long shadow of the mistakes that we made after September 11th, when a problem that was the size of the table or the size of the broom,

but not the size of the building or the size of the city was responded to as though it were that overwhelming, because our risk tolerance went down so quickly.

Now we are reaping as a result, publics really unpersuaded that the use of military force can solve problems, that the investments in continued defence and continued sustainment of the international order and our defence arrangements are worthwhile or even meaningful. If you strip away the crudeness of President Trump's commentary, a lot of his criticisms of allies, of America's engagement in the world, of the burden-sharing by which liberal countries sustain the order are not that different from what President Obama argued. And so it is going to be a while before we get out from under the mistakes made.

In the American case, it has resulted in reckless restraints on defence spending, by which I do not mean the overall size of our defence topline, which is astronomical - in the neighbourhood of $700 billion for the coming year. I think the manifestation of American disinterest was the willingness to pass the sequestration legislation, the Budget Control Act, that if the President submitted budgets in excess of the Budget Control Act restraints, it triggered automatic 10 per cent cuts across every department, including the Department of Defense, and it removed the managerial ability to balance programmes as best you could under a topline. We are almost certain to have that go back into effect next year, because as you may have noticed, the President and the Congress have not been able to agree on terms for re-opening the American government. So, budgets are where the fight is, defence is where the money is, as sequestration is likely to go back into effect in the United States and that is going to have really damaging effects.

There is at least a 30% probability that the President of the United States is going to try and make a dramatic announcement that the United States will withdraw from NATO. The House of Representatives yesterday passed legislation denying the President any money for the execution of any such policy and the Senate is sure to enact the same. So the bad news is that the President is going to alarm everybody and actually create uncertainties, with the result that our adversaries may attempt to test our common resolve among NATO allies.

But the good news is, the rest of the country is not yet as crazy as the President is, and it is the Congress that actually runs American foreign and defence policy and Congress will not permit that to be enacted, no matter what the President does.

The other near-term danger in American defence policy is that the President wants so much to have big spectacles that he is going to have a second summit with North Korea's leadership and the President and his Secretary of State and his National Security Advisor keep insisting that complete and verifiable denuclearisation is progressing. What the North Koreans mean by 'complete and verifiable' is that they will give up their nuclear weapons when we in the United States give up ours. So there is not any actual real progress and that is likely to incite the President into wanting to find something big and splashy to

detract from that - I personally worry that the policy proposal to fill that space will be the President announcing the drawdown of American troops stationed in South Korea, which will set all boats rocking in the Pacific theatre. The challenge for the United States on defence is not our actual power, it is our willingness to remain a stabilising, rule-setting and rule-enforcing power in the international order right now.

And then the third challenge, which is the middle countries convincing themselves that they are too weak to sustain the order and I am talking about you folks.

Let me put it this way: four countries, the EU-3 and United States negotiated an arms control agreement with Iran and we proceeded on the basis that the United States would not attack the Iranian nuclear weapons programme if the Iranians came into this deal and the Europeans were on board for that trade-off. And yet, Britain, France or Germany, any one of those three countries acting independently could fight and win a war against Iran, any one of those three countries could prevent the Iranian nuclear programme from proceeding. Not one of those three countries would imagine themselves in that light or would take the initiative to do so. This follows 70 years or so of the NATO allies arguing about burden-sharing. If you think this is the new argument, let me assure you that there are National Security Council records from 1956 of Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles resigning themselves to the NATO idea having lost its pull and having to come up with something else, because Europeans just will not spend the money to defend themselves.

So this is not a new argument. It is a constant argument we have. It ebbs and flows, based on how worried we are about other things. That is, the burden-sharing argument tends to be an argument we have in times of luxury, which now still continues to be. But if China continues to rise and countries who are also challenging the rules-based order like Russia continue to be aggressive, at least in their immediate neighbourhoods, that is a time of genuine challenge to the liberal international order. The rise of China and those who do not want the order to be sustained at the same time as the United States retrenches - that leaves an awful lot of space for conflict, for misunderstanding, for predatory behaviour by those who see that the United States is not reliable in deterring that kind of action, even if it may be reliable in countering it in a crisis.

The liberal middle states are actually the states that have the most to lose by the existing order changing and therefore have both the opportunity and the responsibility to step forward in this time and sustain their rules-based order.

The good news is, I think I see a fair amount of this. Even with the solipsism that Brexit is creating here in London, Britain remains a major military power. In fact, Britain could fight and win a war against any country except the United States and you guys ought to take that a lot more seriously - I will be glad to entertain objections, and I see Nick Childs from the IISS defence and military analysis team in the back row, so I have got a naval expert

who can do the numbers with me if I get into trouble here!

But as the former Foreign Minister of Norway, Espen Barth Eide, has said - China is not just rising for the United States, it is also rising for Europe. And I think there is increasing realisation by European countries that they have an enormous stake in helping bring China into the rules-based order and that the fights across the Atlantic will look like the *'narcissism of small differences'* to use Freud's term, once all of us start to think about how damaging it will be to our economies if the rule of law is not sustained or if China's predatory private agreements that are being negotiated for the Belt and Road undercut the ability of international institutions to adjudicate differences between states.

The second thing that I think I see European and non-European middle states begin to do, is to cooperate with each other. The British and French patrols of the South China Sea, the French and Australian cooperation on military exercises, the way Japan and India (which is a middle state, not by size, but by throw-weight at the moment) are cooperating, as competitors to the Belt and Road Initiative and Australia beginning to fold into that as well, offering investment by transparent standards.

Granted you did not ask for my advice, but if I had any advice to offer to my British allies, it would be to move forward fast and explain to people what you mean by 'Global Britain'. Whether you remain in the European Union or you leave it, there is a lot Britain can do, as the country that taught my country how to be a responsible Great Power, in terms of strengthening international institutions, in terms of making trade agreements or joining existing agreements that reinforce the rules-based order and that embolden and empower international institutions like the International Maritime Organization, which is hugely important in dealing with the rising China.

Think your way through how you want to be positioned - whether it is joining NAFTA or whatever President Trump now calls it, or any other way in which you can stabilise this order, either unilaterally or in conjunction with others or in conjunction with making institutions work. Because to an American, it looks to us like that is what you are really good at and I wish you would return to it with verve and gusto, because the international order needs it of you now.

I am done.

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN AN AGE OF GLOBAL BRITAIN

Transcript of a lecture given by Mr. Matthew Rycroft CBE

Tuesday 5th February 2019

Matthew Rycroft CBE *has been the Permanent Secretary at the Department for International Development since 22nd January 2018. He was previously the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations from April 2015 to January 2018. From March 2011, Matthew was the FCO's Chief Operating Officer. In that role he oversaw the running of the FCO and its network of 270 posts around the world. Matthew has a degree in Maths and Philosophy from Merton College, Oxford. He joined the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1989. After a few months at the UN in Geneva and then on the NATO desk in London, he spent four years in the British Embassy in Paris. In 1995-96 Matthew was head of the political section of Eastern Adriatic Department in the FCO. In this role he was a member of the British delegation to the Dayton peace talks on Bosnia. After two years in the FCO's Policy Planning Staff covering European and trans-Atlantic issues and brief secondments to the US State Department and US Congress, he joined the British Embassy in Washington, following US domestic politics from 1998-2002. From 2002-2004, Matthew was Private Secretary to the Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, covering all foreign, European, Northern Ireland and defence issues in No10. He received a CBE for this work. He was British Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina from 2005 and the FCO Europe Director from 2008. Matthew is married to Alison and they have three daughters. He speaks French and Bosnian, plays the double bass, and enjoys soccer and other sports.*

Thank you very much, Lord Lothian, thank you to GSF for inviting me and thank you to all of you for coming along. I tend to prefer the Q&A session rather than the opening lecture, so I thought I would keep my initial remarks relatively brief to maximise the chance for discussion. But to start things off, I thought I would try to do three things.

First of all, to say a little bit about the world of international development.

Secondly, to say how the UK and DFID are responding to the changes in that world.

And thirdly, to do a bit of looking ahead.

So first of all. The world of international development.

The starting point with anything to do with development is think, 'What is the purpose?', and unlike diplomacy, it is actually quite easy to define the purpose of international development. The purpose is to reduce poverty, and as part of that purpose of reducing poverty, we seek to end extreme poverty. Extreme poverty counts as living on less than $1.90 a day.

I have three questions that I would like to pose.

Firstly, what do people think is happening to the rate of extreme poverty in the world, what proportion of the people in the world are living on less than $1.90 a day? Has that proportion over the last 20 years halved, stayed the same, or doubled? In fact it has halved. It is actually one of the great unsung issues of our day that over the last twenty years, the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen so dramatically.

Secondly, a big part of international development is education. If I told you that the British government's policy is that every child around the world should have 12 years of quality education, and if I told you that the average boy has 10 years of quality education, how many years do you think the average girl has: nine years, six years or three years? It is actually nine years. There is still a gap and of course any gap is unacceptable, but the number of girls going into some form of education - whether it is quality or not is a different question - has risen dramatically again over the last twenty years. Now on average, a girl gets nine years. I think that is one of the signs that international development works.

Finally, health is another big thing that we do. If you take all of the one-year olds around the world, what proportion of them do you think have been vaccinated against one disease or against multiple diseases: 20% of them, 50% of them or 80% of them?

As it turns out, the answer to all three of those questions, including that last one, is the most optimistic answer that it could be, and I think that if you put those three things together, they are just three examples of the power of international development.

International development is not the only thing that has created those three optimistic scenarios, but it is a contributory factor. And the fact that poverty eradication is working should drive us on to complete the job, because although there are those positive ways of looking at it, you could also turn things round and look at the job that remains to be done.

The proportion of people living in extreme poverty has halved, as I said, but in round numbers, there are 800 million people - 10% of the world's population of 8 billion - still living on only $1.90 maximum per day. As time goes on, our projections show that that number will carry on coming down, but it will not get below 400 million any time soon, and an increasing proportion of that 400 million of extremely poor people in the world will be living in sub-Saharan Africa.

Another way to put that: the economic rise of China has lifted not just a billion people in China out of poverty, but increasingly billions of people in Asia out of poverty as well. We do not have a rising power like that anywhere on the continent of Africa and as a result, this number of 400 million Africans living in extreme poverty is going to remain stubborn at that sort of level at least to 2030.

So there is a job to do to carry on ending extreme poverty and a large part of that job is what I would deem quite traditional activity (partly funded by the UK government through DFID, but with lots of other funders as well) to provide or to help provide the basic services that keep people alive and allow them to have some sort of livelihood.

But the other big shift that is happening in international development globally, which we need to be at the forefront of as a country, is the challenge of finding different and more sustainable ways of shifting those final 800 million people out of extreme poverty. Ways that do not rely on handouts, but do rely on increasing their capacity-building, giving them training, giving them livelihoods, giving them hope, giving them jobs and so on.

The part of DFID's work which is increasing in importance is what we call 'economic development'. So this is not just aid, although aid still remains very important in very poor countries and when there are crises, whether it is a human crisis like a civil war, or an earthquake or a tsunami. But increasingly, if you want a country's growth to be lifted out of poverty, economic development is where you have got to be putting your effort.

Increasingly, we are helping countries to invest in their own job creation schemes in order to provide livelihoods that then allow a country organically to grow itself out of poverty, because we judge that that is the most sustainable way to do it, so that eventually, we, DFID, can be put out of business. That is what we are seeking to do - we are seeking to, as they say, 'graduate out' of each country that we are in, which means closing down the DFID office and handing off to other parts of the British government which will have, if you like, a more normal, more mature partnership/relationship with that country, rather than the aid-giving, aid-receiving partnership of the past.

I am moving onto my second point here, which is that against that backdrop of what is changing in the world, how are the UK and the British government and DFID changing to reflect that?

I think the most important phrase is one which the Prime Minister *[then Theresa May]* used in her speech in Cape Town in August 2018, when she said that she wanted international development to be at the heart of our international agenda.

Another thing I talk a lot about in DFID is the need for everything that we do, every single programme, not just to be about reducing poverty in some way, but also about promoting the British national interest. When I came into the Department, I thought that

was fairly obvious - it is British taxpayers' money, we are a part of the British government, and so it is obvious that everything that we do has got to be about promoting and/or protecting the British national interest. I am absolutely convinced that it is the right thing to do, not least given the scepticism amongst the British people about the very generous commitment that the UK has given to this effort of international development. The fact that we, and successive governments, have re-emphasised and now legislated for this 0.7% commitment (0.7% of our gross national income each year is spent on international development) and the fact that that is controversial means that we have got to get smarter in explaining what we are doing, as well as actually working in a smarter way and I will come back to both of those things in a moment.

But just on the 0.7%, there are not that many countries who have met that target, even though it is the UN target for all developed countries. The UK is the only G20 country to have met that target (Germany met it last year, but has not met it this year), so I think that puts us in an extremely strong position as a country, provided we can make the 0.7% more acceptable to the British people than it currently is.

One thing that I have been struck by, moving from New York back to the UK, is the difference in reputation that the British aid and development work has in those different fora. In the UN, you can hardly walk ten metres down a corridor without someone telling you how amazing DFID is or telling you something positive about British development work in general overseas. It is a really important part of our international reputation, broadly as big and as helpful for us as a country as our permanent seat on the Security Council.

There is something about the narrative there that people are missing, which is that actually the world is getting better and better and better, international development is a big part of that and we, the UK, are really good at it and really big at it. But we need to get better at explaining that everything that we do on international development is both about ending extreme poverty and about pursuing the British national interest.

Let me say a little bit more about that national interest point because I think it is important to understand it. When we sit round the National Security Council table, we have three ways of defining the national interest, three factors which make up the national interest. There is our security as a country, our prosperity as a country, and our influence as a country.

When I first heard those three things, I thought, *'Well, that's all fine, but where's number 4, development?'*, but of course what I now realise is that development needs to be seen through all three of those things.

International development can promote our **security** as a country, for instance, through the work that we are doing to tackle modern slavery at its source. That is obviously good

for the country in which we are operating, very good for the individuals who are being prevented from going into modern slavery, but it is also good for the safety and the security on the streets of this country. That is just one example, there are many others.

Prosperity. Slightly controversial because there is something called tied aid which is illegal in this country and we are not talking about tied aid, but we are talking about spending British aid in ways which in the future will have some benefit for the UK. This goes back to what I was saying earlier about economic development, making sure that we create jobs and growth which will disproportionately help British companies trade in the future. That will be an example of doing some international development work that does have a benefit on our prosperity as a country without being tied aid. Tied aid, by the way, is where you only give the aid provided that the country spends that aid on a British company and that is what is illegal.

The **influence** point is also important and particularly as we think about our so-called 'Global Britain', our role in the world post-Brexit. We need, in my view, to double down on the things that we are really good at and as I have said, we are really good at international development. We should be making more of the international development work that we do and a part of that is understanding how it can be of benefit in terms of our influence around the world.

Again, there is perhaps almost a parallel with the tied aid argument: what we are not talking about is giving aid to a country in exchange for them voting in the same way as us in the UN General Assembly. I am not advocating that. Some countries try that. It does not work, either in terms of development or in terms of voting records.

I am talking about our standing in the world, our values as a country, our reputation or our brand as a country, going through a very significant shift of our own, but ensuring that as we do that, we hold on to things that we are really good at and that give us that positive reputation in the world, our soft power, if you like.

A huge part of our soft power comes from this international development spending. Both the fact that we are a 0.7% player - I would say a superpower - in the world of international development and the specific things that we do with that money. I do not pretend for a moment that every single thing that we do is as good as the best thing that we do, either in terms of security or prosperity or influence or indeed eradicating poverty, but the best stuff that we do under each of those lenses is brilliant and we are on a programme to get all of it up to the level of the best.

I do not know if that sounds like common sense or radical, but it feels to be quite a radical shift of UK development spending, which we will need to hone and talk more about as we leave the EU. There are lots of other things we could say about that, but I will leave that for questions. Let me just tell you one thing about the future and how DFID will seek to carry on responding to the challenge.

One thing we are trying to do is actually to listen to how the rest of the British government thinks we should be spending our money, where we should be and what we should be spending it on. And there are three ways you can think about that.

One is about how our geography is changing, one is our functions and the third is our instruments.

On our **geography**, DFID in the past has traditionally chosen to narrow and deepen rather than to broaden and thin out and for very good reasons. If you have got a finite budget and you want to be transformative, then spending a very large amount of money on a very small number of things is a reasonable thing to do. It is a good thing to do and it makes a big difference. But if you are trying to join up a bit more with what everyone else wants us to be doing, then I think we will need to be present in more places and probably doing - not lots of very small programmes, because quite rightly there is a culture against that in the Department – but a bit more of putting development and development people into the heart of these bilateral relationships, exactly as the Prime Minister said in her Cape Town speech. So, seeing a few more DFID staff in Embassies and High Commissions around the world, for instance, not running little pockets of programmes, because that is not usually value for money, but putting the development dialogue at the heart of our relationships.

So that is a little bit about our geography spreading out - finishing the job in sub-Saharan Africa, but being more of a presence in Asia, and also in the Gulf.

On the **functions** or the sectors - the content of what we spend on - this is a really tricky one and I have not yet found anyone who can say which sector gives you the best bang for your buck. Should we be moving out of health and into education or vice versa or doing something else altogether? It is very, very hard to tell, so I think probably we will carry on in the sectors that we are currently in, which broadly are: health, education, governance, inclusion, agriculture (where we have a lot of research).

But in addition, we ought to be thinking not just about tackling the symptoms of poverty, so the basic services that people need, but also tackling the underlying causes of poverty. Things like climate change, because that causes poverty. Things like conflicts, because conflict is a huge driver of poverty and vice versa. Things like poor governance, because if a country is governed poorly, that too increases the chances of both poverty and conflict.

So trying to see the interlinkages between things and spreading ourselves so that for instance, we are able to tackle the flow of illicit finances around the world. That is not something that you traditionally associate with DFID, but I think in the future, there might be value in spending a bit of the aid budget (and it would not have to be DFID doing it, but whoever is best placed to spend that bit of the aid budget) on preventing or reducing the amount of flows of illicit money into and out of the poorest countries in the world.

So a bit of a spread in our function as well.

Then on our **instruments** - this is how we do it. We do a lot multilaterally. Obviously the EU bits of that will end at some point after Brexit, but not immediately by the way, because we will carry on putting money into the EU programmes for some years on current projections, if the Prime Minister's deal or a version of it is agreed, but we have some choices ahead about whether we want, for instance, to create our own development bank, whether we want to do more in terms of investing, whether we want to shift the balance between what we do in terms of grants versus loans, all those sorts of questions are up for grabs as we leave the EU, so I think you will see quite a change in the model of how we do development.

And one final point, which is about who we do it with. Our biggest partners are going to be the private sector, the big tech companies. I was in Seattle last week talking to Microsoft, Gates and people like that, about the future of technology, how that will have an impact on development, and there are lots of things we could talk about which relate to that. But we are not doing any of this on our own - that is the big point. We never have done. We have always been active through the NGOs, through charities and so on, and that will continue. But in addition and on top of that, we need to be operating in multiple different ways: through international organisations, directly with governments, and increasingly with the private sector. It is really that spirit of partnership which is the point I want to conclude on, which is to think about what countries around the world actually want from the UK.

Some of them of course want our money, but actually quite a lot of them, they want our institutions. They want to feel as though they have a partnership with our universities, our museums, our football clubs, our music industry, all the things that we have to offer as a country and it is possible if we are clever and innovative about it, to harness all of those good things and create what Penny Mordaunt *[then the Secretary of State for International Development]* would call a great partnership by using the aid budget effectively to those ends.

I hope that has given a flavour of how the world is changing, how the UK is seeking to adapt to those changes through different ways of thinking about the aid budget and a little bit of a prediction about what is going to happen in the years ahead.

Thank you very much.

NB. This lecture was delivered under a previous Government, during the second May Ministry of 2017-2019.

THE SECRETS OF MI14(d), OPERATION COLUMBA AND BRITAIN'S WARTIME PIGEON SERVICE

Transcript of a lecture given by Mr. Gordon Corera

Tuesday 26th February 2019

Gordon Corera *is a Security Correspondent for BBC News. Prior to taking that post in 2004, he was a foreign reporter for the Today Programme on Radio 4. He has presented a number of documentary series for the BBC and is the author of 'Intercept –The Secret History Of Computers And Spies'; 'MI6: Life And Death In The British Secret Service'; and 'Secret Pigeon Service', the paperback version of which was released in February 2019.*

Thank you all for coming on a gloriously sunny day - amidst Brexit - to hear about pigeons. I am impressed, and grateful to you for being here, and I hope I can give you a talk and take some questions which will give you some understanding of a slightly lost bit of Second World War and intelligence history.

Now people do occasionally come up and say to me, *'How on earth did you end up writing about pigeons and wartime resistance?'* and I often say, *'I'm not entirely sure,'* but it actually came about through a news story I was covering about six years ago now. There was a story about a dead pigeon's leg found in a chimney in Surrey with a secret message attached and no one could decode the message. It was written in clearly some kind of wartime code and even GCHQ's codebreakers could not break the secret of this message and I, slightly ambitiously, thought, *'Well, I'll have a go.'* I thought it was a curious fact that there were even these wartime messages being sent.

So I went to the National Archives at Kew and thought I would pull up files on the wartime pigeons and see what there was. Most of them were pretty uninteresting to me, but then I came across one file which immediately caught my imagination. It did not look like a normal file in the National Archives. Having 'secret' on it, it was interesting (and it was only declassified about eight years ago, I discovered - within the last decade).

WO208: that means it is a War Office file and military intelligence, but I had never seen a file before in which there is a picture of a pigeon doing its business - it looks like - on Hitler, causing him to fall down, and I remember thinking to myself, *'Now what kind of strange wartime operation would have this as its cover for the file? What kind of people would create a file like this and have a secret operation?'*

At the bottom, it is just possible to make out there is Winston Churchill flying in an RAF

plane doing the 'V for Victory' sign and there is what looks like another Hitler, running away with flags in his back, and it was clearly called 'Operation Columba.'

I was curious as to what this was, because I had never heard of it, there was not much record of it, and I discovered that it was a file from a little known branch of British military intelligence. You have heard of MI5, MI6 (some of you might even have worked for them, I do not know, I will not ask for hands!), but this, it turned out, was a very, very obscure branch of military intelligence called MI14(d).

At the start of the war it consisted of just two officers. One of them was a guy called Brian Melland, and he was a really interesting chap. He had actually been an actor in the 1930s and then joined up, and because he spoke brilliant German, he was put into this tiny section called MI14(d). Now MI14 was a military intelligence department under the War Office whose job was incredibly big, which was to understand the German military and its work and to gather forms of military intelligence, broken up into subsections. MI14(d)'s job was to understand the occupation of western Europe and the work of the German secret services in western Europe.

Quite interestingly, it was actually based about 100 yards away *[from the National Liberal Club]* for part of the war; it moved around a bit, but at one point it was just around the corner from here. They would gather all kinds of intelligence to understand what was going on in occupied Europe, which was a black hole for British intelligence at the time. MI6 had almost no networks - whatever networks it had in Western Europe had largely been blown at the start of the war - so no one really knew what was going on at the start of the Second World War in occupied Europe, and they used various methods to try and gather intelligence.

But when I opened that file, I realised that there was one particularly interesting intelligence-gathering operation from MI14(d), because inside this file were these pink slips, marked 'secret.' One said, '*Sent from Cambridge, returned to Ipswich, message in Flemish, 5/7/1941, message number 32'* and what it actually says in full is:

> *'There is no news from this district of any importance which I can give you, and so we are sending you back the pigeon, as at least can be of use to you. Our one wish is that you come to free us.'*

No signature. And inside this file in the Archives were just hundreds of these pink slips, and I realised that these were the translations of messages from occupied Europe that had come back to Britain via homing pigeon, because at the top it said 'carrier pigeon service.'

Now this relies on a bizarre superpower that some pigeons have, which is the ability to return home and to find their home wherever you drop them. It is a very strange phenomenon which scientists still cannot quite understand, but you can take a trained

homing pigeon and you can drop it somewhere where it has never been before, hundreds of miles from home, and it will fly back to its home loft. They realised at the start of the war that this could be an intelligence-gathering tool, because if you could get these pigeons behind enemy lines, they would fly back to Britain, back from this kind of black hole where there was no intelligence in occupied Europe. They had done something similar in World War One, where they had actually dropped them by hot air balloons over enemy lines to villages on the other side of the front, asking villagers for information and then the pigeons would fly back.

Of course in World War Two, it was a far bigger challenge, because you had to drop them over the Channel or over the North Sea and occupied Europe. How do you get a pigeon into occupied Europe? Well, the answer in the files was that you would fly them. They were flown by the RAF Special Duties Squadron, whose normal job was to drop agents behind enemy lines. They would be flying incredibly risky flights over into occupied Europe, parachuting or landing MI6 and SOE agents behind enemy lines, and yet they also had the job of dropping pigeons behind enemy lines, and you can imagine the pilots in the planes thought this was a bizarre thing that they had to do, but they just got on with it.

How do you drop a pigeon behind enemy lines? You give it a parachute. You put the pigeon in a container and then you drop the container with a parachute behind enemy lines, and then attached to the container is a message saying, *'This is a pigeon from British intelligence and please send us back information about what is happening in your area.'* The idea was that the intelligence would be written on a tiny piece of paper which was enclosed, then put back in the capsule, it would then be attached to the pigeon's leg, and the pigeon would be released and it would fly home. Crazy plan, but bizarrely it worked. A lot of people basically said, *'This is never going to work, but we'll give it a try, it's cheap, it's easy as an intelligence-gathering tool.'* But they did it and it worked and they started to get these messages back.

There is one particular message which I, when I was going through this file in the National Archives, was astonished by, because most of them were those pink slips, but there was one message which was completely different and this was pigeon message number 37, which contained a huge amount of detail and was actually written on both sides. Now the thing I want you to imagine is how small that message was, so it fit into a canister, which in turn could fit around a pigeon's leg. But it actually produced a 6,000 word intelligence report, which was taken from MI14(d) in the summer of 1941 directly to Churchill to see it.

Now in terms of what is in it, it comes from Belgium and actually a lot of it is quite tactical intelligence. It tells you where a hidden German aerodrome was, for instance. It tells you where there was a base that the German military were using for a possible invasion of England and exactly where the defences were, when the guards would patrol - everything

you would need to sabotage it. It gave you details of local morale, it gave battle damage assessments of recent British RAF bombing raids. It was just filled with really valuable, precise intelligence from the area.

But why was it shown to Churchill? He did not necessarily need to see that level of tactical intelligence. But what I realised, looking at it, beyond the practical level of what the details were, it was shown to Churchill, not just because Churchill himself of course loved intelligence, but because it symbolised something. In those dark days early on in the war, when no one really knew what was going on in occupied Europe, no one knew what it would take to liberate it or if it could even be done, what the message showed was something that Churchill believed in, which was a spirit of resistance, that there were people in occupied Europe who were willing to take great risks to send back valuable intelligence and were capable of sending back valuable, useful military intelligence, therefore people who Britain could work with and who could potentially help in terms of beginning a resistance. That is why I think it was shown to Churchill.

It is a remarkable message. Strange thing to it, there is no name of the person it comes from. The closest thing is a symbol at the bottom, which is an 'LV.' It just says *'Leopold Vindictive'* and that is all it said, *'We're a small group and we call ourselves Leopold Vindictive.'*

Now I found that in the Archives and I was fascinated by it, because I thought, *'I've never seen anything like that,'* especially the level of detail and the importance of it. It was clear in the Archives just how important it was seen as, so I set myself up a mission to try and find out where it came from, because it did not say in the Archives who had sent it. Eventually (it took me quite a while and I had to look on the Belgian side as well), it turned out that Leopold Vindictive was a tiny resistance network led by a man, Joseph Raskin, who was actually a Catholic priest. He was the key figure in this tiny little resistance network which had sent back that intelligence.

He was a remarkable figure who had worked in World War One and had been an artist. He had been used, because they could see his artistic skill, to draw maps of the front lines and so he had learned about intelligence then. Then he had been a missionary in China in the 1920s and 1930s and had learned calligraphy, which is why the writing is so precise. And also, because of his role as a priest, quite a charismatic priest, he had an amazing network of contacts across Belgium who could supply intelligence.

The pigeon had not actually landed with him, it had landed, as these pigeons did, in a field. Rather remarkably, there is a picture of the pigeon itself which brought back message 37, in the hands of a pigeon fancier. It fell in a Belgian field, a farmer found it, read the message saying, *'This is a British pigeon, please pass it to someone who can supply information,'* and he passed it to the family called the Debaillie family and they gave it to Michel Debaillie partly because he was a pigeon fancier.

Now, amazingly, he was a part of a family of three brothers and two sisters and there is another rather remarkable picture, which comes from the family themselves who I tracked down: in it, the family are actually holding the evidence of the pigeon. So Michel has the pigeon in his hands, Marie on the far right has a white sheet (actually the parachute), there is a resistance newspaper on the other side which was used to identify that it had come from the Resistance, there is questionnaire, a pencil is in Gabriel's hand, and then on the chalkboard it just says *'VVV'* (which was 'Victory') *arrives 6/7/41, departing 12/7/41 via Engeland,'* and up on the side you can see *'NURP'* and then the pigeon's number.

Now there is something which you may be wondering, which is: isn't it slightly crazy to have pictures? This is in occupied Europe, these are people taking highly incriminating pictures of themselves being spies. It is crazy on the one hand to do this, because if you got discovered with it, you would be shot, no doubt about it. So why did they do it?

Well, talking to some of the family, the descendants, the answer is simple: they were proud of it. They were proud of their work as part of the Resistance. That is what is wonderful about these pigeons - in some ways they offered ordinary people a chance to resist and to be part of the Resistance, and they were so proud, they took these pictures, including one of Michel up on the roof, releasing the pigeon. That was the special nature, I think, of Operation Columba.

And here is an interesting fact when it comes to the intelligence flow. If you wanted to get back intelligence from occupied Belgium at the start to the middle of the war, radios on the whole did not work at that point, they were very temperamental and hard to get hold of, you could not send back maps or the kind of detailed intelligence here by radio. So the other option would be a human courier, in which you give the intelligence to someone you might know in the Resistance who would pass it to someone else and then you would wait for someone who was leaving the country perhaps, and then they would trek into France, then down through France and then perhaps across the Pyrenees, maybe Spain, Portugal, Gibraltar and then eventually get to England and it would take three to four months on average for a message to get back by human courier in the war.

By pigeon, it took about 12 hours to get back. That message was released on the 12th and it was in the hands of British intelligence the next day. So the speed and the freshness of the intelligence brought back by pigeons was amazing.

The 'Leopold Vindictive' was an interesting name for the network and the priest was an interesting person because on the message he says:

> *'Identify me as follows – I am the bearded military chaplain who shook hands with Admiral Keyes on the morning of May 27th 1940 at 7.30am. Ask the Admiral please where he was exactly at that moment with my most respectful greetings.'*

And there is a photograph of Admiral Keyes, who was Churchill's special representative to the King of Belgium, and he is on the right with the King's aide-de-camp. The King of Belgium is also in the photograph, the young King who was called Leopold, and next to him in military uniform is our priest. It turns out he was acting chaplain to the King of Belgium at this point in the war, and so he was clearly a very well-connected priest indeed and knew a lot of interesting people. 'Leopold' comes from the King, and the *Vindictive* was the name of a ship which Admiral Keyes sank in World War I to block a port as part of an operation which he was famous for and so the name 'Leopold Vindictive' was actually a tribute to these people.

British intelligence took this message incredibly seriously and there is an RAF aerial reconnaissance photo which I found in some papers at King's College, which was taken of a field where Leopold Vindictive said *'Please drop us more pigeons, we have more intelligence, we're a resistance network, we want to get intelligence back to Britain,'* and they specified a field and a drop time and the RAF actually took an aerial reconnaissance photo to identify a field they could send more pigeons to.

The problem was that getting pigeons to people was hard. You could drop them at random, which is what Columba effectively did, just drop them in occupied Europe and see what happened, but getting them to specific people at specific times was much harder.

The Germans were on to it. They could see the pigeons falling. They would find them. They offered rewards for people who handed in pigeons, and they threatened and did kill people who were caught with pigeons. They even had snipers. And there was another hazard for the plucky pigeons coming back, and that was the hawks and the falcons. What is fascinating is that the Germans weaponised hawks and actually trained them to catch British pigeons, because they were so conscious of them coming across with messages. And, even worse, even if a pigeon got across, there were wild hawks on the British coast which could then catch and kill the pigeons, and did so.

So they decided they needed to do something about that and so they created a special team. And so - as far as I know - the only MI5 team with a licence to kill was created, and that was the Falcon Destruction Unit of MI5 during the war, which was licensed to kill falcons on the British coast in certain territories. There may be other groups of MI5 that are licensed to kill, but not that I am aware of! Their job during the war was to catch wild peregrine falcons on the coast and kill them, so that the British pigeons could get through.

Now, in a wonderful piece of irony, in the middle of the war, MI5 found a little pigeon capsule in London with a message in German and they suddenly realised, actually, what if the Germans are sending pigeons from Britain with messages back to occupied Europe? So in other words, what if there were German spies in Britain who were using pigeons? There is evidence that the Germans were trying to do this and that this message may have dropped from a pigeon in flight. So in one of those brilliant reverses of British policy,

they then created a falcon unit to hunt pigeons. So having first of all created the Falcon Destruction Unit, they then reversed a full 180 degrees to create a special unit to train peregrine falcons to kill pigeons.

One team, again from MI5, went out to the Scilly Isles and they sat on the Scilly Isles in August on a golf course (there are worse things to have to do) for a few weeks, with a falcon on their wrist, ready to release them to kill the pigeons as they came over, because there had been pigeons spotted flying over towards France. I think they killed five and they discovered they were all British pigeons. Because sadly there was no friend-or-foe identification system for the falcons to know the difference between a British and a German pigeon and so the only ones that were killed were British pigeons. So it was not the most successful of wartime operations, I am afraid.

And in the meantime, the Belgian group, Leopold Vindictive, was still operating. One of the things that I found interesting during the war and that comes out from the files, was the scale of bureaucratic rivalries in British intelligence in World War II and I think sometimes this has been slightly underplayed. One of the problems was that the Pigeon Service and Leopold Vindictive got caught up in the bureaucratic rivalries between different branches of British intelligence and I was quite shocked at how bitter those rivalries were.

The head of the Belgian intelligence service in London, Fernand Lepage, and the head of MI6's Belgian section, Major Page (whose real name was Frederick Jempson) were very tight and worked together, and they feuded bitterly with the SOE Belgian section which was headed by Hardy Amies, who later on becomes the dress designer for the Queen. He ran the Belgian section of the Special Operations Executive quite ruthlessly during World War II, and actually got in trouble at the end of the war for going on a Vogue photo shoot in Belgium just after it had been liberated, so he was a bit of a character.

But the rivalries were actually incredibly bitter in a way that I did not appreciate before, and certainly stymied the ability to work together, because MI14(d) came under the War Office, MI6 did not trust the War Office, and they did not share information with SOE. People would be dropped by MI6 and SOE into Belgium without the two sides telling each other, penetrated by the Germans, not sharing information. These were really bitter rivalries which stymied the ability to contact some of these resistance groups and work with them.

Meantime, the Leopold Vindictive group was still collecting intelligence. They produced a remarkable map of the coastal defences on the Belgian coast. And they were able to collect amazingly detailed intelligence: details of troop movements, bunkers, everything that was happening. The tragedy is that this map never made it back to Britain. Copies were kept with the family of one of the members of the network, but never made it back. They prepared these, they wanted to send them back by pigeon and they were waiting for pigeons to get them back and they could not.

Eventually MI6 actually find out about this network and they parachute in two agents who were Belgians working with MI6 and sadly they do not tell the Pigeon Service and they do not take pigeons with them, they take radios. The radios do not work. They very soon get - well, I will not give away the story – you can read the book. It is not always happy, but it is interesting and gives you a sense of the rivalries.

Before I finish, just a few more points about pigeons during the war, because sometimes it can seem like, *'Well, did all of this really matter that much, what did it contribute?'*

One of the other things that I found interesting were the ways in which pigeons actually did save lives, and the papers of R. V. Jones in World War II provide an example. R.V. Jones was one of the chief scientific intelligence officers, he worked between MI6 and the Air Ministry mainly. One of his main focuses was to find German air defences which were shooting down RAF planes at an alarming rate and he realised that they had developed some kind of radar to do that and he realised that the challenge was finding the radar sites, and that Operation Columba could be very useful, precisely because it involved ordinary people. They added a question to the questionnaire that was dropped with the pigeons to say, *'Do you see any strange metal structures in your area?'* and people started to send back messages saying, *'Yes, there's a strange metal structure with a cable and which rotates.'* They had no idea these were radar stations, but they could identify them and so thanks to these pigeon messages, a number of German radar sites were spotted which were otherwise not known to Britain and then attacked and taken out, allowing RAF planes to fly through. So it was an example of where the kinds of intelligence that ordinary people could collect, if you could tap into it and get it back, was really valuable.

Another use for the pigeons was that RAF crews would take them with them on flights, particularly Coastal Command and some Bomber Command. If they were shot down and if their radio did not work, they could release a pigeon with the message with their coordinates and a few of these did actually save the lives of RAF crew who were shot down or who crashed for mechanical failure, and so they would carry the pigeons. There was one point in the war, when they said, *'Do we really need to do this?'* and the crews actually said, *'We really like having these pigeons.'* Now that is interesting, because it was almost the sense of a creature that they could release and that they felt an emotional attachment to as much as anything else, compared to the coldness of a radio, and so they valued having them on the flights.

There were other ways in which they used pigeons. MI6 or SOE agents would be parachuted in sometimes wearing these pigeons, and the idea was that when you landed, you could release the pigeons, saying *'I've landed safely'* or you could send back some initial intelligence. Again, if you had to keep radio silence perhaps or if there was not a radio available, you would be able to send back that message via pigeon. They were used more by SOE than MI6 who were a bit sniffy about pigeons during the war.

The Americans came and they brought with them their pigeons and they bred with our pigeons and the combined pigeons were used around D-Day. They were not sure on D-Day how well the radios worked, so they trained thousands of pigeons to bring back messages on D-Day in case the radios did not work. The best pigeons got medals. One of them is Gustav and one of them is Paddy, I can never remember which way round - and one was the first pigeon and one was the fastest pigeon to bring back a message on D-Day, although in the end they were not as important as they thought.

Operation Columba itself, that tapping into the Resistance, by the time you got to after D-Day, it became less valuable for obvious reasons, although they did realise the Germans had 'stay-behind' pigeon units to pass intelligence back as the Allied troops marched on.

There were also pigeons used in other parts of the world. They were in the Middle East, in Burma, and the Americans used them quite extensively as well in the East.

One of the interesting things that I discovered was that there was this big debate at the end of the war about whether we should keep a pigeon service. Again in the Archives, I found out there was a Joint Intelligence Committee Sub-Committee on Pigeons which met regularly to discuss the intelligence requirements surrounding pigeons. The notes still exist and they took this very seriously and the problem was they all thought, *'Well, will we need them in the Cold War? Will we need them in the next war? Could they have some value?'* They even did some tests to see whether pigeons could fly through radioactive clouds, because they wondered in some kind of post-apocalyptic future whether perhaps the only means of communication might be the pigeon.

For a while they kept this going, for about five or six years after the war and in the end, they decided not to have a military loft, because no one wanted to pay for it. If you look in the papers, there was a real battle (as ever) about who would pay for it and MI6 was, *'No, we don't want to pay for it,'* and the War Office was, *'Well, we don't want to pay for it,'* it was the classic problem. In the end, to keep an eye on pigeon development, they had a pigeon fancier, who was also part of MI5, effectively go under cover in the pigeon racing community and his job was to report on any developments which might be of national security interest from the pigeon racing community, which I think is probably an unusual MI5 assignment even to this day. But by about 1951 or so, the Pigeon Committee is wrapped up and that looks like the end of the days of the spy pigeon.

Or was it?

I leave you with that question because last year when I was in the CIA's Museum at Langley, because I was doing an interview there with Mike Pompeo who was then CIA Director, I got a tour of the Museum and to my pleasure, one of the exhibits in amidst all the other things was a CIA spy pigeon from the 1970s. Attached to it is a camera on its front which is set on an automatic timer, so you drop it - quite how is not clear

- somewhere where you are interested and it would fly back and just snap pictures constantly as it returned home and act as a form of photographic reconnaissance. One of the amusing things is that in the Museum, it says, *'Details of spy pigeon missions are still classified.'* So whatever these pigeons did, I am afraid it is still unknown. It looks like they actually flew them through to the 1970s, so that is the end of the spy or military pigeon.

Or is it?

A recent headline reads: *'China trains army of messenger pigeons.'* You thought this was a history talk, but I bring this right up to date. This is 2011, China is training 10,000 messenger pigeons to deliver vital military communications in the event of the country's communications systems breaking down. This was a few years ago and I found a report that they have completed this, so that in the event of some kind of massive cyberattack or other form of communications knock-out blow against China, its remote military bases can communicate via pigeons.

Now, the question I leave you with is: as a country, are we pigeon-prepared? In the 1930s, there were these voices in the wilderness saying, *'We must be training pigeons,'* and no one listened, and then in the war they had to start Operation Columba very quickly and frankly they were behind the Germans in doing so.

In this modern world, in the kind of 'Global Britain' that we are facing, the question I leave you with is - should we be once again training our own army of messenger pigeons? Is it too late? I like to think that somewhere, deep in the MOD around the corner, there is someone. Or maybe there is a loft on the roof. I have yet to be able to discover if that is true. If there is anyone here who knows the truth, perhaps it is a subject that one of the oversight committees could look into, as to whether we have that capability, but I just leave you with the thought that perhaps, as a country, we need to think about having that pigeon capability. Just in case.

Thank you very much for listening.

SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES, TACKLE CHALLENGES AND PROMOTE THE STEADY AND SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINA-UK 'GOLDEN ERA'

Text of a lecture given by Ms. Chen Wen

Tuesday 2nd April 2019

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It is a real delight to join you at Global Strategy Forum.

The Global Strategy Forum is an important platform for exchange of views. I look forward to an in-depth discussion with all of you present today who have been working on or have long had an interest in international relations.

In the past 13 years, the Forum has hosted many speech events which have contributed to its growing influence, including a number of China-related speeches delivered by prominent diplomats, legislators and scholars from the UK and the US. They have offered various perspectives and understandings on China and China-UK relations.

The wise man listens to all sides of the story. As a representative from the Chinese Embassy in the UK and a diplomat working directly on China-UK relations, I hope I can give you a new perspective on China-UK relations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Friends:

This year marks the 65th anniversary of the establishment of the China-UK diplomatic relationship at the level of chargé d'affaires. In the past 65 years, despite all the twists

and turns, the China-UK relationship has made many great leaps, including:

- establishing diplomatic relationship at the level of chargé d'affaires in 1954;
- upgrading the bilateral ties to ambassadorial level in 1972;
- signing the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong in 1984;
- establishing comprehensive partnership in 1998;
- upgrading to comprehensive strategic partnership in 2004;
- and moving up further to global comprehensive strategic partnership for the 21st century and ushering in the China-UK 'Golden Era' in 2015.

'The grand edifice is not built with just one tree; and the vast ocean takes in the water of more than just one river.' The remarkable achievements in China-UK relations embody the wisdom and hard work of people from all walks of life in our two countries.

This relationship not only delivers tangible benefits to our two countries and two peoples. It also serves as an anchor for security and driver for growth in our constantly changing world.

There have always been opportunities and challenges in the development of China-UK relations. Whether this relationship moves forward or backward depends upon whether our two sides can seize the opportunities and properly address the challenges.

Now I would like to start by sharing three opportunities which I believe we should seize in developing China-UK relations.

The first opportunity lies in whether we could make good use of our 'assets', namely our deeply integrated interests and bonds, which have ensured the sound growth of China-UK relations despite twists and turns.

Let me begin with our shared interests.

The economic interests between China and the UK are more closely integrated than ever before.

China is the second largest trading partner of the UK outside the EU; and the UK is the third largest trading partner of China among EU members. In 2018, China-UK trade in goods exceeded $80 billion for the first time. British exports to China increased by 6.9% over the previous year. According to British statistics, the increase was 30% and much higher than the GDP growth rate of the UK.

In 2018, with its direct investment in China totalling $3.89 billion, the UK is China's fifth largest international investor and number one source of FDI in Europe. Chinese investment in the UK stood at $1.71 billion, increasing by 14% over the previous year. Chinese companies have invested more in the UK in the past five years than they did in the

previous 30 years. Now the accumulated investment from China totals more than $20 billion.

Seven Chinese banks have opened branches or subsidiaries in London. London is now the world's largest RMB offshore market outside Asia. The UK is the first Western country in the world that has issued RMB sovereign bond. And our two countries have issued the China-UK Strategic Plan for Financial Services to enhance our cooperation on financial supervision and business partnership.

Last month, Heng An Standard Life, jointly invested by Chinese and British companies, became the first joint venture to have received permission to establish a pensions insurance company in China. As of today, there are more than 500 Chinese companies in the UK. They have not only worked with their British partners to make the economic pie bigger, but also cooperated with the City of London and other partners on charity work.

The people of our two countries are also building closer bonds than ever before.

Both China and the UK have created time-honoured civilisations and splendid culture. The cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation between our countries have become deeper and cover more areas, such as education, culture, science, technology, tourism, youth and sub-national exchanges.

Britain has hosted more Chinese students, opened more Confucius Institutes and engaged in more extensive cooperation with Chinese schools than any other European country. As of today, there are 190,000 Chinese students, 29 Confucius Institutes and 161 Confucius Classrooms with 191,000 students here in Britain.

Our two countries have also seen closer people-to-people exchanges. Facilitated by 168 flights every week between our cities, mutual visits totalled 1.5 million last year.

I hope that China and the UK will use these 'assets' well and encourage more friendly exchanges and mutually-beneficial cooperation. This will consolidate the foundation of the China-UK relationship and continue to drive it forward.

The second opportunity is the Belt and Road Initiative.

It has been six years since President Xi Jinping proposed BRI. Although it was proposed by China, the opportunities and fruits of BRI belong to the whole world. Now BRI has become a public goods and a cooperation platform that can deliver benefits to the whole world.

- 124 countries and 29 international organisations have signed 172 agreements with China on BRI cooperation. The latest one was signed between China and Italy a week ago.

- The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has increased its members from 57 at the beginning of its establishment to 93. It has approved projects worth more than $7.5 billion and leveraged close to $40 billion funds in the capital market.
- In 2018, trade in goods between China and countries along the BRI routes stood at $1.3 trillion, increasing by 16.3% year on year and accounting for 27.4% of the total foreign trade of China.
- China has established 82 economic and trade cooperation zones in countries along the BRI routes with a total investment of $28.9 billion. These zones have paid $2.2 billion in tax to host countries and created more than 200,000 jobs for the local communities.

BRI has created many miracles. Thanks to this platform:
- East Africa has its first expressway.
- The Maldives has its first cross-sea bridge.
- Belarus has its own car manufacturing industry for the first time.
- High-speed rails are being built in Southeast Asia.
- The Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, which connects Ethiopia and Djibouti, has reduced travel time between the two cities from ten days to nine hours.
- The Mombasa–Nairobi railway is expected to boost Kenya's GDP growth by 1.5 percentage points.

According to a recent report, BRI will add $117 billion to global trade this year, including $61 billion worth of imports to China from about 80 countries.

The UK is a 'natural partner' of China in advancing BRI. It was the first major Western country to apply to join the AIIB and to contribute to the AIIB special fund. It was also the first to appoint a BRI special envoy and set up an Expert Board. Last year, China-UK cooperation on BRI went deeper. The two countries jointly announced the Green Investment Principles for the Belt and Road. And the All-Party Parliamentary Group on the Belt and Road Initiative and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was set up. Later this month, China will host the second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. We look forward to working with British friends on more high-standard, high-quality and sustainable BRI projects.

The third opportunity lies in the rapid development of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.

China's economy is still growing within the anticipated range. Its GDP reached $13.6 trillion in 2018, and the growth rate was 6.6%. Some people point to the slowdown of China's economy, but the fact is:
- this growth rate is higher than the 6.5% target;
- it is the highest of the five biggest economies in the world;
- and given the size of China's economy, that is, nearly $14 trillion, achieving 6.5%

growth rate on such a large base figure is indeed amazing.

Two weeks ago, the 'Two Sessions', namely sessions of the National People's Congress of China and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, were concluded in Beijing. This was a major annual event where the Chinese people participate in the administration and discussion of state affairs.

At the 'Two Sessions', Premier Li Keqiang announced that China's growth target for 2019 would be 6% to 6.5%. This target is both proactive and prudent:

- it conforms to the development reality of China;
- it reflects the aspiration for high-quality development;
- and it is aligned with the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects.

I am confident that in the long run, China's economy will continue to grow within the anticipated range.

At the same time, China is opening its door wider to the world. Last year when China celebrated the 40th anniversary of reform and opening up, average tariff was brought down from 9.8% of the previous year to 7.5%.

According to World Bank report *Doing Business 2019*, China ranks the 46th out of 190 economies in terms of the ease of doing business, moving up 32 places from the previous year.

With a population of close to 1.4 billion, including 400 million middle-income earners, China will become a source of tremendous spending power as its people's income continues to grow and consumption continues to be encouraged. This will create more opportunities for China-UK economic cooperation.

Later this year, China will host the second China International Import Expo. British companies are welcomed to take part in the Expo and bring their products and services to the Chinese market.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends:

As we recognise these opportunities, we cannot ignore the challenges to China-UK relations. I think there are three major challenges.

The first challenge is whether we can respect the bottom line of mutual respect.

It is natural that differences and disagreements exist in state-to-state relations. The key is to never cross the bottom line. This means that we should:

- respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- respect each other's core interests and major concerns;
- and refrain from undermining each other's core interests or strategic mutual trust.

This is the only way to ensure that:
- differences are managed and addressed in a practical and constructive way;
- the political foundation of bilateral relations is consolidated;
- and bilateral relations will remain on the right track.

This applies to China-UK relations.

I hope that our two countries will:
- keep the larger picture and major trend in mind;
- view each other's development as an opportunity, rather than a challenge, still less a threat;
- respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- and enhance strategic consensus and mutual trust.

Only through this can our relations go deeper and become more substantial.

The second challenge is whether we can strengthen the bond of mutual understanding and trust.

China and the UK are located at the two ends of the Eurasian Continent. We differ greatly in history, culture, political system and development stage. So how to understand and trust each other is a big challenge.

I think the key to addressing this challenge lies in harmonious coexistence and win-win cooperation, which is an ideal valued by generations of Chinese people. This ideal is followed by Chinese people in handling relations between individuals, between man and nature, and between states.

Recently a Chinese company, Huawei, has hit media headlines in the West. I think Huawei is a perfect example of win-win cooperation. Let me explain.

In recent years, the global industrial chain, supply chain, value chain and innovation chain in the area of science and technology have been highly integrated. This has enabled Chinese companies such as Huawei to learn from cutting-edge technologies and enhance their independent research, development and innovation. As a result, they have taken the lead in some areas, and have been working to promote the progress of the relevant technology and industries in the world.

For nearly 20 years, Huawei has benefited from its presence in the British market. At the

same time, it has created job opportunities, paid tax and contributed to the development of UK's telecommunications industry. In the past five years, Huawei brought £2 billion to Britain through investment and procurement and created over 7,500 jobs. Huawei has also pledged a further £3 billion in investment and procurement in the UK by the year of 2023. This will boost the economic and social progress and IT application in this country.

The UK has been noted in the world for its openness, innovation and inclusiveness. I hope that the UK will resist the tide of protectionism and hegemony, continue to promote interconnected development and support open cooperation. We are glad to see British officials make objective comments on the Huawei issue recently. We hope that the British government will continue to foster a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory business environment for Chinese companies including Huawei. This will win more respect and cheers for a 'Global Britain'.

The third challenge to China-UK relations is whether we can shoulder the great responsibility of our times.

As a Chinese adage goes,

'All good principles should adapt to changing times to remain relevant.'

The development of relations between two major countries often epitomises the historic changes in the world.

The world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century. Peace and development remain the theme of our times, but instabilities and uncertainties keep increasing.

- In the world economy, downward pressure is mounting due to weakening driving forces for international trade and increasing turbulence in the global financial market.
- Anti-globalisation keeps surging, which is reflected in rising protectionism, unilateralism and populism.
- Severe problems such as terrorism, climate change and major pandemics are still haunting mankind.
- People in some countries and regions are still living in the shadow of war, conflict or poverty.

Under such circumstances, China and the UK must have a right understanding of the major trend of our times. We must use our wisdom to foster sound, stable, mutually reinforcing and mutually-beneficial China-UK relations, which will be a positive contribution to world peace and development. This is the great responsibility that our time bestows on our two countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends:

As we take China-UK relations forward, we must seize the opportunities and tackle the challenges. To achieve this, it is important to follow three principles.

First, time has moved on and we must all keep up.

The Cold War was over several decades ago. But still, media stories show that some people refuse to wake up. Their habit of drawing a line along ideology and social system seems to die hard. The ghost of Cold War mentality constantly interrupts the growth of state-to-state relations.

In his book *Hit Refresh*, Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella advocates a positive mind and the awareness to learn and transform oneself. He wrote, *'Every person, organisation, and even a society reaches a point at which they owe it to themselves to hit refresh – to re-energise, renew, reframe, and rethink their purpose.'*

In my opinion, in viewing and dealing with international relations, we should hit refresh from time to time, in order to catch up with the trend of times and replace outdated mindsets. It is important that we understand the new situation and new trend in the 21st century so as to build a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind. Anyone who refuses to make progress will be abandoned by history.

Second, people are at the centre of our work.

At the 'Two Sessions' concluded last month, President Xi Jinping reiterated that:
- all our achievements are attributable to the people;
- all the glory belongs to our people;
- we must make people the centre of all our work;
- and we should deliver the best results to our people.

In developing China-UK relations, we should make it our goal to deliver benefits to the people of our two countries. This is key to keeping to the right direction of China-UK relations.

The new round of scientific and technological revolution brings transformation to mankind in all aspects, including production model, lifestyle and value. To keep up with this trend and serve our people, China and the UK should expand cooperation on new industries and new business models based on artificial intelligence, big data, clean energy and digital economy. This will ensure that our two countries and our people are better prepared for the new challenges.

We are glad that the UK will take part in the 17th China International Talent Exchange Conference to be held in Shenzhen later this month as the only country of honour. Also

this month, the Pitch@Palace China 3.0, which was initiated by HRH The Duke of York, will be held in Shenzhen. These events will provide strong impetus for China-UK cooperation on innovation and talent exchange. And this will deliver tangible benefits to the people of our two countries.

Third, we should keep the larger picture in mind.

As permanent members of the UN Security Council, major economies and responsible countries in the world, China and the UK shoulder special responsibilities for world peace, security and development.

Therefore, it is important that our two countries take up the historic responsibilities of big countries. This requires us to approach and advance our bilateral relations from a global perspective and strategic height.

We should enhance cooperation in the UN, G20 and WTO. In particular, we should:

- uphold the rule-based international order and the multilateral system;
- support free trade and open economy;
- oppose unilateralism and protectionism;
- promote reform in the global governance system, tackle climate change, combat terrorism, safeguard cyber security and protect wildlife;
- and enhance exchanges and mutual learning between different civilisations and build a community with a shared future for mankind.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Friends:

As a Chinese adage goes,

> *'A bird cannot fly high on one wing; a horse cannot run fast on one foot.'*

I hope that we will join hands to seize the opportunities, tackle the challenges so that China and the UK can 'fly high together', and promote the steady and sustained development of the China-UK 'Golden Era'.

Thank you! Now I would like to take your questions.

MOSCOW: THE THIRD ROME?

Transcript of a lecture by the Rt Rev. and the Rt Hon. Lord Chartres KCVO

Wednesday 1st May 2019

Richard Chartres *was Bishop of London for over twenty years, from March 1995 to November 2017, and responsible for liaison with the Orthodox Churches. After his retirement in 2017, he was recycled as a Life Peer and serves on the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee.*

Michael, the Filioque of course is an absolutely vital matter and I am sorry not to have the opportunity of going into that in greater detail, but it really is an extremely significant issue and perhaps, if you can bear it, you might have me back and we will have a look.

I am very conscious that there are a very large number of people in the room with profound expertise in various aspects of Russian history and culture and I cannot claim to be a great scholarly expert, but I have been going to Russia since the middle of the 1970s. In particular, I remember something which is very relevant to today, a visit I made supporting Archbishop Robert Runcie in 1988. Of course, 1988 was regarded as the millennium of the baptism of Rus'. It had been one of those terrible weeks, with journalists buzzing around like bluebottles in a jam jar. It was one of those weeks which was the most serious crisis for the Church of England since the Reformation and at that particular period of history, those weeks happened most weeks!

And so the poor Archbishop, his head surrounded by journalistic wasps and hornets, with relief got onto the aeroplane. We flew to Moscow, got out of the aeroplane, and there was again a huge body of journalists waiting at the entrance to the airport building and he groaned. The first question was from the correspondent of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* and she said, *'Archbishop, do you think that the influence of Hegel on European philosophy is finally extinguished?'* And the Archbishop, as he always did in tight spots, smoothed down his hair and said, *'I'm very glad you asked me that question.'*

But of course, it was an important piece of code. In 1988, nobody was quite sure where and how things were going to pan out and in particular the Church, which had been allowed a rather limited scope to celebrate the one thousand years since the baptism of St. Vladimir, the ruler of Kiev, Kievan Rus'. People were very nervous. Was there going to be a reversion to the pressure which the Church suffered under Khrushchev? Khrushchev was particularly hard on the Church, closing at least 10,000 churches during his period, a programme which was largely unnoticed in the West, although not by the admirable Michael Bourdeaux, the head of the Keston Institute, who got it right when so many experts on Russia had been deceived.

Anyway, nobody was very clear in 1988 how things were going to work out, but I had been to Russia enough to know that our elegant quadrilles, our approach slantwise, which is of course what Bishops always do on the chess-board, really did not work with Russians. You could not hint that you might like to do one or two things, you had to be very forthright. In planning the visit, I said that the Archbishop wanted to go and see the handover of the cradle of Russian Orthodox Christianity, the great Kiev Monastery of the Caves, from the state authorities to the keeping of the Church. And of course they all said, *'It's impossible, it's too late in the day, we can't possibly make the arrangements.'* I said, *'The Archbishop is going to be very angry.'* And a carriage was provided on the train and we headed south with the Archbishop saying to me, *'Why are we going to Kiev?'*

Anyway, we got there and our host was Metropolitan Filaret, the Exarch of the Ukraine, who as we shall see, still lives and dines a prosperous gentleman. So we went off to this scene.

In the middle of the 10th century, there had been a flirtation between the ruling family of Kievan Rus' there in the south. The ruling family was Varangian, the Rurikids. They were Scandinavian in origin, they were really Vikings. The Great Olga, who also has the title, like her grandson Vladimir, equal-to-the-Apostles, *isapóstolos*, was baptised, probably in Constantinople sometime in the middle of the 10th century. But that did not persuade her grandson to follow in her footsteps and Vladimir appeared in Kiev with his war band, determined to re-establish the primacy of pagan worship. As you probably know, the principal god of the pagans in that part of Russia was Perun, the god of thunder, with great golden moustaches, and Vladimir set up this huge statue of Perun overlooking the City and then started to reign after a rather sanguinary beginning.

I suppose the Russian Primary Chronicle, which recounts all these events, wanted to heighten the miracle of Vladimir's conversion, but they certainly painted his pre-Christian life in the blackest possible colours. Bishop Theitmar of Merseburg for instance, a contemporary German chronicler, described Vladimir as *'fornicator immensus et crudelis'* which, even if our Latin is a little frail, I think communicates the message. He had 800 concubines among other things.

He was visited by all sorts of representatives of religious bodies in the environs. The Roman Catholics came from Germany, the Bulgars at that point were Muslims, so they had an embassy (this is all described in the Russian Primary Chronicle) and Jews came and I think that one of the motives of the Russian Primary Chronicle was to show how smart the answers of the ruler of Kiev, Vladimir, were. For instance, when the Muslim delegation arrived, he discovered that if he embraced Islam, he would not be able to drink alcohol and he put up his hands and said, *'Impossible – drink is the joy of all the Rus', we can't embrace this religion at all.'*

And then he sent off embassies, a sort of *'Which?'* report on local religions, and the rest

is history. They came back from Constantinople, having participated in a great liturgy in the Church of Hagia Sophia, which still exists (and you know there are proposals just at the moment from Mr. Erdogan, that he is going to turn what Atatürk turned into a museum back into a mosque), but that great church of Hagia Sophia still survives. That was the place where the Russian ambassadors remarked that, *'When we were a part of the liturgy there, we knew not whether we were in heaven or on earth.'* And so Vladimir was baptised in the Crimea, in a city, Korsun, in the Crimea. He was probably helping out the Byzantine Emperor at the time in a civil war, and he was baptised there. He returned to Kiev and instantly had the statue of Perun with his golden moustaches flogged and thrown into the river where it promptly snagged on a sandbank, which is still known by the name of Perun's Sandbank.

Vladimir married the sister of the Emperor and became the hero of - well, to whose history does he belong? The present ruler of Kiev, the new President, Volodymyr Zelensky has exactly the same name as the ruler of Russia, Vladimir Putin. So whose history is represented by the great new statue of St. Vladimir-equal-to-the-Apostles which dominates the road system in the heart of Moscow? Of course, the truth was that there was a close trading relationship with Tsargrad, with Constantinople and the alliance with the Eastern Empire made sense politically as well.

The 11th and 12th centuries were the Golden Age of Kiev and it was when the great Kiev Monastery of the Caves (which the Archbishop and I went to visit in 1988 and actually saw the moment when the state authorities handed over the keeping of the Monastery to the Church) was founded, in 1051.

It became the model for monasticism in the Kievan Rus' lands and lots of dependent monasteries were created. Monasticism in the Eastern Church is of particular significance because, although priests have to be married (and I can tell you the scene in a Russian theological college just before ordination is really quite frantic because you are supposed to get married before being ordained, so there is real pressure), bishops must not be married. They can be widowers, but they are supposed to be monks, and so the spread of monasticism in that part of the Kiev realm was very significant indeed. It is associated with a very great man, the founding Abbot, Theodosius, and he set up something which was very much on the model of the great Monastery in Constantinople, the *Stoudion*. It was a monastic settlement which had soup kitchens, hospitals, and it was a centre of social service in the Golden Age of Kiev which, as I say, was the 11th and 12th centuries.

Then, 1240 - and this is something which has been repeated throughout European history, the incursion, the folk wandering, the new flood of population from the steppe - the Mongols arrived, they sacked Kiev and they set up their own state, centred on Sarai on the Volga. Relations and communications between the Kievan realm in the south and the surviving small, frail Russian principalities in the forest zone really became very attenuated and very frail, and the fight back against the Tartars was of course launched from Moscow.

The Prince of Moscow, Prince Dmitry, who, blessed by the great saint of Russian monasticism, St. Sergius of Radonezh - and here in a very parliamentary way, I have to declare an interest: I am a member of the Order of St. Sergius of Radonezh. St. Sergius blessed the young Prince Dmitry of Moscow and he went out and he inflicted the first significant defeat on Tartar armies in the year 1380 at the battle of Kulikovo on the River Don. It was not the decisive breakthrough. The Tartars counter-attacked and burnt the city of Moscow to the ground, but nevertheless, it played its part in rallying the morale of the surviving small Russian states.

Sergius established a new monastic centre from which Russian lands were converted and evangelised, the Monastery of the Holy Trinity at Sergiyev Posad, which still exists and which is about 60 or 70 kilometres from Moscow itself. He turned his back on the Constantinopolitan model of monastic life. He turned his back on western scholasticism and embraced a very new vigorous and dynamic spiritual movement in the 14th century: Hesychasm. The Hesychasts believe that mystics could have direct experience of the energies of God and indeed see the light which shone on Mount Tabor at the Transfiguration, when Christ was transfigured before his friends and Apostles. It was also a tradition of spirituality which believed in the imminence of the Second Coming, and it was also a form of spiritual life which was open to a belief that a Christian empire was really possible as an element in the conversion of the whole world. The practice of the ascetical disciplines of the Hesychastic tradition was meant to bring you into living contact with the energies of God.

Augustine here in the West had a rather gloomy view of the potential of the earthly city as we know from his book, *The City Of God*. The *'*city of the earth*'* is founded, he said, on *'blood taken'* - think of Romulus killing his brother Remus. A 'city of God' is based on blood given. But in the East, with the much closer relationship between the surviving part of the Roman Empire based in Constantinople, the Church had a rather more positive view of the capacity of human empires to be conveyors of divine enlightenment.

So, Holy Trinity became the centre of a new energy in Russian Orthodox life. I went there quite recently. It is extraordinarily vigorous. Its spiritual life is exemplified by two humble heaps of earth, under one of which lies Kirill and under the other, Archimandrite Naum. These are two spiritual fathers, *startsy*, who are still (they have only recently died) immensely influential in the lives of individuals and the institution. This kind of ethos spread through the 150 monasteries or so founded from the Holy Trinity Lavra.

The Donskoy Monastery was built to celebrate the victory of Prince Dmitry of the Don. It is the monastery where Solzhenitsyn asked that he should be buried in 2008. He is there behind the altar of the main church. And astonishingly, it is a place where some of the heroes of the White Russian armies have been reinterred and are regarded with considerable honour.

One of the monasteries founded from the Holy Trinity Lavra is the Andronikov, founded by one of St. Sergius' disciples and this is where the great icon painter, Andrei Rublev, worked, although we do not entirely know where he is buried. Rublev was responsible for an icon which almost sums up this spirit of Russian spirituality. The three figures are contained within a circle. They are not touching one another. You must not confuse the persons, but they are totally united because of the regard they cast on one another. They are leaving a space at the table and we are invited to walk up to that space and to participate, as St. Peter says in his Epistle, in the Divine life. To be partaker of the Divine life. So depicts the great icon of St. Andrei Rublev, which is very early 15th century.

Well, things continue to go bad with the advance of the Turks into Europe and eventually they surround Constantinople. Appeals are sent out for assistance from the West and in 1439, there is the great Council of Florence which proposes some terms of union.

The Metropolitan and up to this point the head of the Russian Church have always been appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, by the Greeks, and they were often Greeks themselves. The head of the Russian Church, Isidore, attended the Council of Florence and he signed the agreement which meant that when he got back to Moscow, he was arrested and exiled.

After an interregnum, in 1448, a very significant period, the Bishop of Ryazan was elected Metropolitan of the Russian Church without reference to Constantinople and without its blessing. Very soon after, the great city, Tsargrad, the capital of the Eastern Christian empire, fell to the Turks. This is the historical point at which the doctrine of the Third Rome is elaborated by this man, Philotheus of Pskov, and he, writing to the Tsar, said this:

> *'Ancient Rome fell into heresy. The second Rome has been hewn by the axes of the Hagarenes. But this third new Rome...under thy mighty rule....radiates forth.... thou art the only Tsar of Christians....Hear me, pious Tsar. All Christian kingdoms have converged in thine alone. Two Romes have fallen. A third Rome stands. A fourth there shall not be.'*

Clearly this is inspired by the prophecy of Daniel in the Bible, and although I have received this doctrine of the Third Rome quite directly from Russian friends, it is perhaps not so plainly stated. But if you read Timothy Snyder's excellent new book - everybody here will know his *Bloodlands* – well, just last year he published a very remarkable book which bears particularly on Ukraine and the Russian idea of itself and it is called *The Road To Unfreedom*. It discusses Vladimir Putin's great respect for and dependence on the work of a White Russian ideologue called Ivan Ilyin, who was himself actually re-buried in the Donskoy Monastery under Putin's precise instructions. Putin presided at his reburial with his friend and confessor, the newly-made Metropolitan Tikhon of Pskov. And if you read Timothy Snyder's excellent book, you will discover how this sense of the universal mission of Russia, the way in which it has been left as the only hope of orthodox Christianity, reverberates even in our own day.

After the modest triumph of 1380, the Russian state advanced towards the south and Ukraine after a rising by Cossacks against the great Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which, you will remember, stretched from the North Sea to the Black Sea, and in 1686, Ukraine was annexed by the Russian Tsar under the Treaty of Perpetual Peace.

At this point, a rather fascinating thing happened, because Ukraine is clearly intellectually and culturally more advanced. It had been part of the great Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and as the Russian state and the Russian Church incorporate the Ukrainian realm by their conquests in 1686, they are in touch with something that is much more open to western influence.

When I was in Russia just before Christmas, I was very fascinated to discover an insistence on a new line, a new view of history, with regard to the reforms in the Russian Church which happened in the latter part of the 17th century and which led to the *Raskol*, the schism, where a very large part of the most conservative Christian Russian population seceded from the official church and became 'Old Believers'. This, my informants told me, was because when Ukraine was taken over, all sorts of Western ideas came into a realm which had previously been dominated by the traditions of the great Holy Trinity Lavra in Moscow, and the changes which the Patriarch at the time, Nikon, sought to bring about in church life were deeply resisted by conservative Christians, native Russians - the Old Believers. It is an extraordinary thing that for the whole period of imperial Russia, the most conservative, most religious parts of the population were in secession from the imperial Church.

The imperial Church which, particularly under Peter the Great, also suffered a very great deal. In his attempt to get total control of the Church's intellectual life (do you know that monks even had to get a licence to have an inkpot in their cells?), the attention to control by the imperial regime was pretty intense. Peter the Great abolished the Patriarchate and instead introduced a Lutheran system (basically a holy synod with a layman - the Procurator - at the head of the Church) and that was the situation until the First World War. People do not realise that in many ways the Church, although it is portrayed as one of the pillars of the regime, felt itself to be one of the victims of the regime. During the Revolution, an appeal went out in the dying months of the Tsarist government that the Church was to rally to the defence of the old regime. They were in conference at a great *sobor*, a great assembly, in Moscow and they refused. Because they saw their share in the captivity of society which had been elaborated by Peter the Great. Increasingly, people are now saying that it was this contact with Ukraine which actually caused this great *caesura*, this great breach in Russian Orthodox culture, as all sorts of western-inspired changes were brought in by Nikon.

One of the fathers of the *Raskol*, the Old Believers, was the archpriest, Avvakum, whose autobiography (a masterwork, by the way) is one of the first works in vernacular Russian, and he was immolated. I suppose many of you have seen the great opera by Mussorgsky,

Khovanshchina, which is all about the persecution of the Old Believers and how in the end, many of them preferred to burn themselves to death, rather than submit to a church which they regarded as an agent of the Antichrist.

And they still exist. In huge numbers. Until the Revolution, some of the most prosperous people, the great merchants of Moscow, they were all Old Believers. Indeed, Vladimir Putin looks back to these events, the event of 988 and all the other events I have been talking about, as very much part of the narrative of contemporary Russia.

Russia, since I have known it, has always been a much more spiritually religious country than our own. I was there in St. Petersburg when the remains of the popular thaumaturgical saint of the 19th century, St. Seraphim of Sarov, were discovered. And where were they discovered? In the basement of a museum of atheism.

I have been watching this museum for many, many years, since the 1970s. It was in the Cathedral of Our Lady of Kazan on the Nevsky Prospekt and at the beginning, it was all very crude stuff. Then it became much more understanding and refined. Lots of talk about Voltaire and I thought to myself, *´Ah ha, the atheists are losing faith in their own atheism, it´s perfectly obvious.´* And then the city authorities removed the grant from the Museum of Atheism, they chucked out the exhibits and there, in a shoebox in the basement, they found a hand with an embroidered glove which said, *´This is the wonder-working hand of St. Seraphim of Sarov.'*

The saint had been dug up in the early years of the Revolution, he had been carved up and sent to the Institute of Chemistry to test whether the bones of wonder-working saints were different from your bones or my bones, and surprise, surprise, they were not. So they lost interest. He was in bits and pieces and he was consigned to the basement of the Museum of Atheism. And he came out in the early 1990s and was pieced together and I was there in St. Petersburg as he was laid out in the Cathedral of Alexander Nevsky and then he was taken round Moscow in a glass coach and then the whole country before he was finally returned to his resting place in Arzamas, once again the centre of a great pilgrimage.

I think that every country has the saints it can tolerate. In this country, our saints in the 19th century were Shaftesbury, Wilberforce, people who were active in Parliament. I suspect that if St. Seraphim of Sarov had lived in the home counties in the 1820s, he would have been in an asylum. But, in fact, it is a very different kind of sanctity. Extraordinary. Influential.

Now what has been happening in the Ukraine? 1686, the Russians annex it and so the Moscow Patriarch becomes responsible for the Church in the Ukraine. But in 2018, the top man, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, said - and you remember how Russian Church leadership always came from Constantinople, always at least with the blessing of

the Patriarch - *'The authority over the Ukraine was only lent in 1686, not given.'* He was under enormous pressure from Poroshenko. Poroshenko's poll ratings, as everybody here will know, were very poor in advance of the election (and indeed Zelensky got 73% of the vote in the event) and he realised he had to do something to rally and shore up the patriotic vote. So he went off to the Patriarch in Constantinople and said, *'We want an autocephalous, an entirely independent, Ukrainian Orthodox Church.'*

There were, at the time, four competitors for this role. There were the Greek Catholics, loyal to the Pope, but using traditional Eastern liturgies. There were the many parishes, about 12,000, loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate. There was 1,000 parishes for the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and then the man we met in 1988 - still alive - Metropolitan Filaret, who had departed from the Moscow obedience. He has about 5,000 parishes.

So there is a four-way split and the Patriarch was prevailed upon by Mr. Poroshenko to issue what is called a *tomos*, a *tomos* of autocephaly – to set up an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church to try and bring together at least the two fragments, the autonomous Orthodox and the Filaret people. That is where we are at the moment.

Poroshenko went to see Bartholomew at the end of last year and indeed the tome was issued. It was issued to Metropolitan Epiphanius, who is at the moment at the head of an autocephalous Ukrainian church which is gradually bringing together two of the four fragments that I have been talking about. The largest part of the Church is still responsive to Moscow, although they have an autonomy of their own and they are under somebody called Metropolitan Onufriy.

In the last couple of days, Zelensky has taken care to see both Metropolitan Epiphanius and Metropolitan Onufriy, and he has already been much criticised for not appearing in church on Easter Sunday - he is partly Jewish. He said something which I think is actually very, very hopeful. He said, *'Don't look for me in church, look to God instead.'* So he is not playing the game that Poroshenko, who is the great hero still of the people to whom the *tomos* was delivered, played. He is not playing that ethnic religious game because it is extremely dangerous. There are all sorts of moves to take over the churches of other parts of the Christian ecumene in the Ukraine and it could lead, very easily (it has not yet, thank God) to violence and an excuse for further intervention.

So he said, *'Don't look for me in church, just look to God.'* But unfortunately he is a comedian and so he made a rather ill-judged joke, I am afraid. I have described the *tomos*. Well, Zelensky said, *'Tomos, thermos, what's the difference?'* You and I might think that it is perhaps a bit of a storm in a teacup, but it hit the headlines in Ukraine and people were properly indignant about it. But I think it is very hopeful that the new ruler of Ukraine is not playing any particular faction off against the others - he has been to see both the major players and he has also taken care to include the Greek Catholics as well.

Now I have many things to say to you but you cannot bear them now, and I am very mindful of Michael's injunction that we should leave at least twenty minutes for conversation. So I will, without more ado, draw my remarks to a conclusion. Unlike the adversarial relations in the West throughout history, the Church in the East has always taught symphony and the tradition of Eastern Christianity is encapsulated in the hope for a godly imperial regime.

Thank you very much.

THE COMMONWEALTH@70: A BEACON FOR MULTILATERAL CONNECTION AND COLLABORATION

Text of a lecture by The Rt Hon. Patricia Scotland QC

Wednesday 15th May 2019

The Rt Hon. Patricia Scotland QC *took office as Secretary-General of the Commonwealth in April 2016. The Commonwealth is a family of 53 independent sovereign states, and home to 2.4 billion people. In a career of firsts, Patricia Scotland is the first woman to hold the post of Secretary-General. Born in Dominica, she moved to the UK at an early age and was brought up in a large close-knit Caribbean family where she was taught the importance of hard work, education, pride in her heritage and the obligation to give back to the region of her birth and to the society in which she was raised. This ethos has guided her throughout her dynamic career in law, politics and public service. A lawyer by profession, she became the first black and youngest woman ever to be appointed Queen's Counsel. She is the only woman since the post was created in 1315 to be Attorney General for England and Wales. She was also Attorney General for Northern Ireland. Appointed to the House of Lords as Baroness Scotland of Asthal, she is Alderman for Bishopsgate Ward in the City of London and Chancellor of the University of Greenwich.*

Firstly, a very warm thank you to Michael, for his kind introduction and invitation. And may I say how gratifying it is to see such an eminent gathering assembled to consider the continuing and developing role of the Commonwealth.

Commonwealth@70

A few days ago we marked the 70th anniversary of the London Declaration, by which our founding eight nations came together in 1949 to declare that we would *'remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely cooperating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress.'*

In the seventy years since the London Declaration, which brought into being the Commonwealth we know today, many more nations have grown to maturity.

As independence has been achieved and celebrated, awareness of our interdependence has also grown, and it is by recognising and building on this that our cooperation continues to flourish and our connections to develop.

We draw together with countries at almost every stage of social, economic and political development, some of the smallest and poorest together with five of the G20 members. This brings great depth of understanding and appreciation of our convening power.

Multilateralism

So, at this time when multilateralism is under threat - and I think it has never been so under threat as it is today - and nationalism and narrow self-interest are on the rise, the Commonwealth shines as a beacon of hope and promise.

By demonstrating the practical benefits of international collaboration and combined purpose, Commonwealth connection and collaboration deepen understanding of how as countries, as communities and as individuals we are interdependent and mutually supporting.

So, as we mark the seventieth anniversary of the London Declaration, the weight of expectation rests on the shoulders of we who carry forward today the realisation of the tremendous vision it represents. We build on foundations laid by pioneering men and women who saw new ways of conducting international affairs, and who, by creating the modern Commonwealth, committed to an idea and enterprise unprecedented in human history.

I know that many of you have had, and indeed still have, the duty of delivering in innovative and inventive ways the outcomes that we seek; because those inventive ways produce the realities of multilateral connection and collaboration.

Collaboration, based on the needs and perspectives of all members of our diverse family of nations, lies at the heart of all that the Commonwealth brings to our world. Uniting in a spirit of goodwill and mutual support, the similarities of our systems and institutions enable lessons learnt in one setting to be shared, adapted and applied elsewhere. This makes the benefits of successful experimentation and progress available to be enjoyed more swiftly by others and for the good of all.

So where some of our members may lead on interventions that reduce negative human impacts on the environment, others may show the way on measures to advance social inclusiveness or gender equality, while others pioneer pathways towards greater political or economic development.

By sharing knowledge of what has worked, as well as what has not worked so well, any one may encourage the others to move in positive directions. By offering practical guidance and support, all can help hasten beneficial change.

Trade

A vitally important factor in building multilateral connection and strengthening it is trade. Movement of goods and services enables our nations to prosper and enables the benefits of prosperity to raise standards of living for all.

A Commonwealth focus is to ensure that none are left behind, and that the poorest and the most vulnerable are well catered for, so that the marginalised nations and communities gain from increased commerce and investment.

Yet the rules-based global trading system, which has helped to lift millions of people out of poverty, is at risk from rising protectionism and unilateralism. As indeed it has been for decades, the Commonwealth Secretariat continues to be at the forefront of advocacy on behalf of our least developed member countries for more inclusive and responsive international support measures, especially on trade.

Remember 31 of the 39 smallest countries in our world belong to our Commonwealth. So, we are supporting our least developed member states in several ways.

First, we are helping them to expand and diversify their trade. In 2018, the Heads of Government adopted the Commonwealth Connectivity Agenda for Trade and Investment. They set the goal of expanding investment and boosting intra-Commonwealth trade to US$2 trillion by 2030. We hope to get to $700 billion by next year.

Second, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the WTO Enhanced Integrated Framework (EIF) are working together to deliver more effective and targeted Aid for Trade to least developed countries to build their productive and trading capacity, with priority attached to women's economic empowerment.

Third, the Commonwealth has called for rules-based global trade to be strengthened, and protectionism to be resisted.

Climate Change

Countries in all our regions also face a myriad of other external and internal challenges.

There was the powerful cyclone which tore through countries of Southern Africa, killing hundreds of people, destroying roads, bridges and homes and leaving tens of thousands displaced across the affected area. Full recovery from this level of devastation is likely to take years and slow down economic growth, as we have seen elsewhere, especially in the Caribbean.

2017 we saw countries such as Antigua and Barbuda – Barbuda was devastated, and

the whole population had to be evacuated. Dominica had 226 per cent of their GDP demolished within six hours, and Grenada has faced years of disruption and an uphill struggle as they gradually recover from the devastating effects of the recent hurricanes.

And for those who do not believe in climate change, you only have to visit those countries to see the reality of its impact. One picture remains very vividly in my mind, and that is of a mother who was holding her five-year-old son by the hand. When Hurricane Maria came it took her son. Even today, that unfortunate woman is seen going from place to place saying to people, *'Have you seen my son?'* She cannot believe that the hurricane took him. These are the realities of climatic change.

And disaster recovery is a costly undertaking; it means taking away resources earmarked for other pressing public service needs and commitments, but it means also finding a way to pay for the debt that the country still has for the infrastructure that was destroyed in the disaster.

Anti-corruption

We are also witnessing an exponential rise in international migration, largely fuelled by increased conflicts, religious intolerance, unemployment, insecurity and other factors in a number of regions. These factors are all in turn fuelled or exacerbated by corruption, and so tackling corruption in all its forms is an important Commonwealth priority.

If you look at the money we need to deliver the sustainable development goals and the money we have, the sum equivalent between those two figures is exactly the amount which is syphoned off by corruption. That is why, when I became Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, I set to work immediately to carry forward the anti-corruption work already underway within a Commonwealth context.

Many of you will know that I probably spent about 10 years as a Minister in the Government of the United Kingdom, and then as Attorney General of England, Wales and Northern Ireland, to try to create the new Bribery Act; and we struggled over those 10 years. In the end we got there. And through those experiences, I absolutely understood how critical it was, not only for me as I had been the Attorney General for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, but for all of my Commonwealth colleagues with the same aspirations, whom I had met in 2009 at the Commonwealth meeting in Edinburgh.

I saw opportunities to add to the ambition and impact of what we achieve in tackling corruption through the Commonwealth collaboration.

Six weeks after taking up my responsibilities as Secretary-General I convened a 'Tackling Corruption Together' Conference. At that gathering, the absence of a Commonwealth-wide tool to strengthen anti-corruption efforts and the desire to have one became very

apparent. So too did a political will to bring new energy and new ideas to this fight.

The result is that we are now at an advanced stage of developing an agreed set of Commonwealth Anti-Corruption Benchmarks. In fact, I have come today from a meeting of experts from right across the Commonwealth, who are honing those benchmarks as we speak. They are designed to help create optimal conditions for resisting and rooting out corruption in both the public and the private sectors.

We want to create an environment in the Commonwealth which is antipathetic, hostile, resilient in every way we can, to corruption and corrupt practices.

Our Commonwealth way always is to draw together the willing and to move forward by consensus. And so our ambition is for these to be presented at our Commonwealth Law Ministers Meeting in Sri Lanka in November. We hope that ministers will then feel able to recommend the Benchmarks for consideration by Heads of Government themselves at CHOGM in Rwanda next year.

And I am so pleased to see Her Excellency the High Commissioner of Rwanda here with us, because we know how many hopes and aspirations are going to rest on her very able shoulders.

OCCJR

The Benchmarks were developed within the Office of Civil and Criminal Justice reform which I have established within the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Its function is to support Commonwealth countries in delivering access to justice and sustainable development through the creation of fair and effective national laws. It does so by making available good legislative practice from across the Commonwealth, with model laws, standards, templates, and access to technical assistance and legal networks. Our view is that if one of us is going to spend a penny or pound, then no other member state needs to spend the same penny or pound.

A particular area of focus for the office is that relating to contracts governing foreign investment. A resource is being created to assist government officials with negotiating durable, effective and fair investment contracts with private investors. The project is a response to the capacity constraints faced by the governments of developing countries in the Commonwealth when negotiating complex investment agreements with well-resourced and sophisticated foreign investors and other foreign countries.

With a shared legal heritage in the Common Law system, many developing Commonwealth countries adopt similar approaches to contract negotiation and have similar government legal office structures and challenges. So a Commonwealth resource in this area should

prove especially beneficial. Alignment with Commonwealth good contractual practice for equitable foreign investment could provide developing countries with valuable leverage in negotiation processes.

The office is also currently conducting a comprehensive, Commonwealth-wide survey of lawyers, judges, arbitrators, businesses and academics to identify the problems and potential of international commercial arbitration.

Once the results of this survey are processed and analysed, the Commonwealth Secretariat will consider the most valuable ways in which support can be offered. It may, for example, include publishing a guide to international arbitration, arranging deployments to train arbitrators in-country, or even establishing a Commonwealth arbitration centre.

The operation of the court systems also remains of fundamental importance to the Rule of Law considerations, and the OCCJR carries forward the long and impressive Commonwealth Secretariat record of working in this area, including through providing support for civil procedure law reform in Commonwealth jurisdictions.

Alongside this, our Commonwealth Legal Knowledge Exchange Portal is making it easier for our member countries to collaborate on legislation, and to share and have access to legal information and resources. It provides templates for legislation and model laws together with schemes for legal guidelines.

As well as being a resource for Commonwealth statutes and other legal materials, the portal is a community for users working in government departments. Country focal points within Offices of Attorneys-General are able to share new legislation, and also to discuss questions about legislative issues.

Cooperation towards swifter progress on legislative reform is a vital factor in supporting our member states development and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

Sustainable Development Goals

The 2030 Agenda now defines the global development priorities for developed and developing countries alike. So our Commonwealth strategies are now aligned to this agenda, particularly towards those areas which have caused the most difficulty and presented the most challenges to our member states.

We have a comparative advantage, because if we can come together, if we can distil all the best from our diverse countries, we are likely to create pathways which will not only suit ourselves but will also be of real benefit to others. Our strategies are placing great emphasis on collaboration and partnerships, and the ease of doing business, as we have the same language, we have the same laws and we have the same principles.

Tool Kits

We have also looked at how we could make these things practical. So we have turned all of our guidelines into tool kits. We now have over forty implementation tool kits. And the way in which that came about is when I was speaking to a number of our countries, they were delighted that we had these guidelines, but were basically saying 'what to do with them?'

Because if we do not have the money, if we do not have the people, if we do not have the acuity, locally; if I am left with a country where I have 50,000 people, then how exactly do I do this? So what we have done is to convert everything into implementation tool kits. This means we are able to help our member states know how to do it. But, much more importantly, they are helping each other to know how to do it.

CHOGM 2018 Outcomes

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) last year was quite a remarkable occasion. We had a very challenging agenda, covering a range of issues:

- What are we going to do about the Blue Charter - the new construct for the ocean?
- What about connectivity?
- What about crime?
- What about climate change?
- What about our young people?
- What about health?

We had a whole plethora of things, and yet something remarkable happened - 53 leaders came to London, Windsor and 53 leaders agreed on everything. Absolutely everything, and that comity was something I found quite breath-taking. I just want to touch on some of the things they said in that statement, because the communiqué and declaration which was issued really bear quite a great deal of depth of scrutiny and the titles really resound with promise.

There was the CHOGM Leaders' Statement and the CHOGM Communiqué entitled *'Towards A Common Future'*.

The Commonwealth Blue Charter was adopted, by which all 53 Commonwealth countries agreed to cooperate to solve ocean-related problems and meet commitments for sustainable ocean development. I was told, when we started to look at this in June of 2017, that it was madness to think that you could have an international charter, started in June and agreed by 53 countries by April the next year, but we were able to make it happen.

The Commonwealth Cyber Declaration was issued, with leaders committing to work closely

together to evaluate and strengthen cybersecurity frameworks and response mechanisms. And we hear today what Prime Minister Ardern, together with the Prime Minister of this country and France and others are seeking to do in fulfilment of that agenda.

Heads also made an important Declaration on the Commonwealth Connectivity Agenda for Trade and Investment.

Revised Commonwealth Guidelines for the Conduct of Election Observation in Member Countries were adopted.

There were also statements and other outcomes from the associated gatherings for business, youth, women and civil society.

We had a Small States meeting in order for us to concentrate on what we were going to do for our small states.

These initiatives and interventions add to the dynamic record of Commonwealth contributions towards positive change in the modern era, which complement and contribute to the vitally important work of the United Nations. Increasingly, at UNGA, at the UN Human Rights Council and at other UN gatherings, collective Commonwealth positions are presented – by me as Commonwealth Secretary-General, by the representative of the country serving as Commonwealth Chair-in-Office, and by others of our member nations in their interventions.

By understanding that all have something to contribute and recognising the richness that each can bring, we have learnt together that it is by consensus rather than by confrontation that more will be achieved. So the Commonwealth continues to pioneer and to find ways of working together that are innovative, collaborative, inclusive and connected.

'A Connected Commonwealth'

Indeed, our Commonwealth theme this year is *'A Connected Commonwealth'*, and we bring this to bear in the way we work together on the rule of law, democracy, and the many aspects of development needed if all our citizens are to enjoy the benefits of fair and sustainable social and economic progress; and in so many areas of life which are of vital importance. Through the mutual support and encouragement of Commonwealth connection, and its distinctive strength as a 'network of networks', valuable knowledge is shared in order for more to be achieved.

Each jurisdiction is different, and has specific local needs and context, yet deep affinities and close connections flourish among our peoples and the institutions which serve them.

The opportunity for members to greet each other as brother or sisters, for us, has real

meaning and depth. And it has enabled us to look at the peace-building that we want to make in our world, as well as the need to counter violent extremism, the need to bind our young people together and the need to learn to be the agents of inclusion and cognisant engagement.

And we have seen the need for the Commonwealth in this way, quite dramatically, first, in New Zealand and then most recently in Sri Lanka. And they were painful and difficult occasions, but I was actually incredibly proud of our Commonwealth, because the Commonwealth response was, *'You will not divide us! We stand together, we stand together as one and we will not allow terrorism and extremism to erode our friendship and our commitment.'* Out of that came the nine days of peace and understanding that we called for with prayer and contemplation; and out of that came the Peace at the Crease initiative which is using cricket to bring healing to our countries.

We are also using Faith in the Commonwealth, which is an initiative that we created for people of all faiths and those of none. It brings together young people under the age of 30, so they can get to know each other, work together, deliver projects together, and heal together. This approach is having a wonderful impact.

We are remaining resilient, and what has been remarkable in the last few months is everything that was supposed to tear us apart has brought us closer.

Conclusion

Those of us who have the privilege of being a member of this very special global family can help realise more fully the immense potential of the Commonwealth.

And it is not just the Commonwealth, it is the Commonwealth and all its friends. Because if you look at our Commonwealth, as we represent one third of world, the other two thirds from which we come, look just like us. Therefore, if we can come together, if we can heal, if we can work out a pathway which is good for us, it is likely to be an equally good pathway for everyone else as well.

It is a huge privilege to be asked to be the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth because, during the last three years in particular, I have seen so much open up, broadening our opportunities, creating inclusivity, deepening the foundations of friendship and affinity on seventy years of equal partnership in pursuit of peace and progress towards a more secure, a more inclusive, and a more sustainable future for all.

The Commonwealth@70 is truly a beacon for multilateral connection and collaboration towards health, hope and harmony for all our citizens. And I suppose I can say for those of us who have reached a certain age, seventy does seem remarkably young. So we look forward to the next seventy years of the Commonwealth and we look forward to the engagement of all Commonwealth citizens and their friends.

IS THERE A WAY OUT OF MIDDLE EAST AND GREAT POWER ESCALATION?

Transcript of a lecture given by Mr. Alastair Crooke

Wednesday 22nd May 2019

Alastair Crooke *is Director of Conflicts Forum, a small geopolitical and geo-financial consultancy, and adviser to a number of larger geo-financial entities. He was formerly advisor on Middle East issues to Javier Solana, the EU Foreign Policy Chief. He was also a staff member of Senator George Mitchell's Fact Finding Committee that inquired into the causes of the Intifada (2000-2001) and an adviser to the International Quartet. He initiated a number of ceasefires in the Occupied Territories on behalf of the European Union and has 35 years of experience of working with Islamist movements. He is the author of 'Resistance: The Essence Of The Islamist Revolution' (2009) and a forthcoming book addressing the metaphysics to our present global anguish. He is a regular media commentator on politics and geo-financial issues.*

What I would like to do today is actually rise up a little bit from the details and look at the bigger dynamics and what perhaps they mean and why we are seeing things happening, and I think that might tell us a little bit about where we are going.

I think we have all been told that the United States President, Mr. Trump, really does not do foreign policy. It is not his thing. It is true that the President does not have a conceptual foreign policy, I think, but there are themes and one of the themes is his aversion to multilateralism.

Another theme is global energy dominance as a negotiating tool. And a third thing is the tactical maximum pressure as a negotiator.

All of those are really contingent on his domestic policy, which is about returning manufacturing jobs to the rust belt of the United States, and to that end most of that policy is dedicated.

What I would suggest to you, though, is that whilst I am sure it is true that Trump really has neither moral or emotional investment in Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq per se, maybe Iran is different. I want to talk therefore about the ways in which Iran might be different and why that will be important.

The first reason it might quite different is because of Trump's base. One in every four Americans, 25% of the population, say clearly that they are evangelical. And of that

evangelical base, 70% all voted for Trump and probably more than 70% are likely to vote for him in 2020. They are the most loyal and stalwart members, even more so than some of the 'deplorables' who have drifted away because they do not care so much for some of his foreign policy.

These are completely loyal: the Mueller Report, the tales of play girls - water off their back, they take no interest in that. They see him in a different light. What is that light and what is their interest? This is where there is very clearly a real foreign policy interest.

The evangelical group - and let me be clear who we are talking about, more directly. We are talking about Pompeo, who is a very strong evangelical, Vice President Pence, and others who are representatives of that community inside the administration. The evangelicals were the force pushing for the move of the US embassy to Jerusalem. The evangelicals were pushing for the recognition of Golan. The evangelicals were also pushing very strongly for the annexation of the settlements and the evangelicals too made it a priority to get America out of the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement. Why?

Very simply, this is a group which is committed to seeing the advance of, if you like, 'Greater Israel', because only with Greater Israel being actuated in the region will we see the return of the Messiah and redemption. I know that in this secular world, these things may seem somewhat strange, but this is a very deep and powerful element. Those evangelicals now feel now more empowered (and they say that very clearly) by their success in moving the embassy and their success in moving across to creating a Greater Israel (in the biblical sense of Greater Israel).

Underneath that is an architecture, which is a very strong architecture. At its centre, its pivot, is the billionaire Sheldon Adelson, a former friend of Netanyahu, a very rich man from the casinos in Las Vegas. His project, which has been very successful, has been to put Mr. Bolton into the team of Mr. Trump and to marry that up with Pompeo as a representative of the evangelicals, and then to connect Mr. Bolton and that team to the Israeli right, and to mount that entire architecture on the evangelical support base in the United States.

So this is where we are. I just want to make clear one thing about this, again looking at the larger picture, that when we talk about Greater Israel, it is something that has a biblical resonance that the evangelicals support. Zionism is not just another nationalism in that sense, because it has resonance of Israel's destiny as described in the Prophets and in the Bible for the evangelicals. So what we are talking about is not just simply a new nationalism, we are talking about a geopolitical project, an identity, it even has some overtones of empire in it, as was described very clearly in the destiny that Yahweh said for Israel.

This is really the project that we are talking about. It is important to understand that

when you look at the project through the eyes of the evangelicals, including Trump's family and others, we are talking about a major project, the actuation of a Greater Israel, which has always been a biblical project. It may be secular in origin: you have people like Ben-Gurion who was very secular, he was not pious at all, he ate pork every day for breakfast, but he always described the condition of Israel in terms of the biblical destiny, and the Six Day War as the metaphysical redemption of the world, the human race. Then in 2003, we had the Jerusalem Declaration which echoed it, and which was signed by Richard Perle and Netanyahu.

So what we are seeing is that when you talk about the actuation of this project, it is not simply an expansion of Israel in terms of arranging the borders and perhaps moving some Palestinians across into Egypt or elsewhere, it is more than just frontiers. It is also about other things.

To secure this project, the Palestinian political project has to be withered and reduced to an economic and a real estate matter. But also, in order to stabilise this project, part of this requires the weakening of those great pillars of the Middle East: Iran, Mesopotamia and Syria. And that is done.

There is a long history to this architecture going back to Bernard Lewis who, as a great guru of American Middle East foreign policymaking, always suggested that Iran was so vulnerable, Iran had these ethnic divisions within it, the Azeris, the Arabs, the Kurds and the Baluchis, and that it should be broken up.

And so part of this project then clearly is about empowering the Kurds to a greater autonomy, about encouraging secessionism in Iran. By the way, that has been going on for some years, by the United States and the CIA. They had a presidential order empowering this effect. And also, dividing Syria. Syria is going to be divided. One part of it is going to stay under American control and Turkey is going to have a Kurdish project inserted into that, to create the geopolitical space to expand, as well as a project of change of frontiers.

This is as big an intent as the Sykes-Picot reorganisation of the Middle East. Sykes-Picot 2 is really what is being attempted in this context. And of course, the ramifications of that: we all know what the consequences of Sykes-Picot 1 were and it is possible that the consequences of this are going to be as serious.

For some years now, the Americans have been looking at how to take advantage of these ethnic divisions, particularly in Iran. And what we have seen in this period is this recent element of tensions rising. People ask, *'Well, what was the aim of the tension on Iran, what does America really want? Does it just want to push it back to the agreement, is it just trying to contain Iran? Does it really think Iran is going to pick up the phone and call Trump?'*

The answer, I think, is actually very clear: there is a smoking gun in this. Everyone is focused on the waivers for those eight states that were importing Iranian oil and seeing that as the start of the process. But the significant thing which happened has been almost ignored: when Pompeo refused to give two other waivers which had nothing to do with oil whatsoever.

Under the JCPOA agreement, Iran may not stockpile enriched uranium. I am talking about 3.67% enrichment, 300 kg is the limit. Beyond that, the JCPOA provided for a mechanism by which, as agreed by the signatories, the balance would be exported to Russia, who would give in return yellowcake. Then for the heavy water from Arak, over 300 litres would not be held in Iran, but would be removed to Oman and held in the storage there.

This was all about European and American desire for non-proliferation. This had no economic impact for Iran at all. Well, by cancelling the waivers that allowed those exports to take place, by stopping them, it means that Iran automatically will go into breach of the JCPOA. There is no alternative, because it is still permitted to and does enrich, low enrich, uranium, so it will be in breach of the JCPOA for sure.

This is what Pompeo and Bolton put in the system. I say to you that it seems to me fairly obvious that this is not just a further pressure, or to try and change it. I think it really is the smoking gun - you can see that the real intent is to push Iran into breach of the JCPOA. It is going to happen. It was going to happen inevitably with the withdrawal of those waivers. You see already that it is actually working quite well, because when I read the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, suddenly all that is forgotten and all the arguments switch and say, *'Oh well now, we're back to the question of breakout capacity and we need to deter Iran from breakout capacity, and we are in a completely different policy paradigm in which Iran is now a dangerous proliferator.'*

Well, it is only proliferating because those two waivers were not given, but this is not particularly widely known in this context. Iran now will move to enrichment, I think first of all 20%, but it is quite likely that they will go beyond that level, to put pressure on the Europeans.

There is another reason for saying that I think that Iran is different.

I am saying Iran is different because firstly to recap: when the elections come up in 2020, Iran is a domestic issue, Trump needs the evangelical vote in 2020. At the moment things look fairly straightforward for re-election for Trump and his team thinks so, but who can tell how things may change? And that vote needs to be reassured and that vote is going to push him further on the question of Iran, especially if they have now changed the narrative back to the language of enrichment and the move towards breakout capacity by Iran, to attempt to reunite the Europeans against such a move.

But there is another reason for thinking that Iran may be different and maybe we are in a particularly dangerous situation. The second reason is because of false intelligence. I was speaking to someone quite close to the Trump team a couple of weeks ago and they said to me, *'Ah, Iran's about to implode, it's going to implode, it can implode any moment, it's imminent, it's going to happen, we're going to see it implode.'* I was surprised and I said, *'Why do you think that?'* To cut it short, it turns out that there is a huge network operating in the United States connected with this, who are former intelligence officers, former diplomats and they are all working with the exiled community of Iran, the Azeris, the Kurds, the Arabs, the Baluchis, and these communities are passing back the message that they have had enough, that they are not being properly treated, that there is discrimination, they have no position in Tehran, they have no money, and the regime is about to collapse.

Look, clearly this is a fantasy. I mean when you say to the interlocutor and you say to him, *'Okay, so they're not representative, but you do know that the Supreme Leader is an Azeri and he is not Persian at all, the Defence Minister is actually a Sunni Arab, I mean, you can't say that the system locks everyone out,'* it does not register, the language. Now that intelligence is being stovepiped into the FDD, Dubowitz and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and into the White House, bypassing the CIA and the professional agencies.

Why do I say this is important? I think this is important because now we see in the last few days or even today, Washington suddenly backtracking and saying, *'Well, we're not really after war, we don't want war with Iran, we are just going to keep up the pressure and it's not really what we intended.'*

I think first of all, that shift has been because there has been a furious argument in Washington about the nature of intelligence. It is very clear from reading the Hebrew press out of Israel that all of their senior correspondents are very blunt in reporting that the Mossad has been saying for some time that Iran is on the cusp of falling over a cliff and imploding, and presumably that is going directly through Kushner to the President, so we have the effect of that.

So when people say, *'Oh well, he says there is not going to be any military exercise against Iran, that Trump won't allow it,'* perhaps (and I don't know) it is motivated because Trump buys into that intelligence that Iran is about to fall anyway and if that is the case, then, *'Okay, we don't need a war if it's going to implode, we can just keep the pressure on.'*

So Iran is pushing back. It has sent three clear messages to the world. The first message was from the Islamic Jihad in Gaza who used missiles which have not been seen and not known by Israel before. Five Israelis were killed and it was something of a shock to the Israelis that they had not known of them and also because it disclosed a certain

ineffectiveness of the Iron Dome missile protection system.

The second one was Fujairah, the port where the tankers were damaged and the third one of course was the Yemenis firing a hugely accurate drone 500 kilometres to destroy a Saudi oil pumping station, exposing just how vulnerable Gulf oil pipelines and oil supplies are. Nothing through the Straits of Hormuz you notice, but strategically positioned to show that other places are just as vulnerable too.

This is like what Hezbollah does with Israel: setting its red lines, showing Israel how far you can go. Why is Iran doing this? Why doesn't it just stay in the JCPOA and earn more European support?

Well, firstly because they do not think Europe has a spine. Secondly, the Iranians say to me quite clearly, *'Look, you know, as things stand, the United States can simply increase the pressure on us and bears no costs, it is costless to the United States. We cannot allow that to continue, because this could go on forever. They can just go on with this, because there is no cost to the United States. Of course what we are doing carries a risk.'* Trump can retaliate, like he did in Syria, with a 'Tomahawk' tweet to the Iranians to say, *'This is too far,'* and then who knows what will happen. But really that is the Iranian view, that it is better to take the short-term risk than a long-term passivity and the dangers that would create internally, and I think that is fairly clear.

I was in Moscow about a month ago, talking to the deputy Defence Minister and he said to me, *'You know what's happening here - all the lines of communication with the United States are being slowly severed by Bolton.'* Areas of cooperation that have built up over decades have gone. Treaties that limited and controlled security aspects have been overturned. We have only one channel that operates reasonably effectively, which is a video channel linking the Russian military headquarters with the Pentagon, but it is not geostrategic one, it is a technical one to avoid military mishaps.

In a sense, Bolton has been closing off, narrowing down, the channels of communication with Iran and with other areas too, playing a very careful and slow game. I know Michael knows him quite well and so can offer some further comment on this, but we could not have set up a better system for accidental war if we tried, because look what happened last week. Over the weekend, somebody fired some rocket near Baghdad and Trump erupts on Twitter about how Iran is coming to the end of its days and will not exist again as a nation if anything more is done.

There are lots and lots of people in the Middle East who detest Iran and the Iranians and would love to pull the pillars down on their temple and let it crash to the ground. So we are really setting up the chances of an accidental war.

Or the situation which I think Bolton really has been manoeuvring: he has been wanting

to bomb Iran for 20 years, he has been saying the same thing. He is at least explicit. Everyone knows where he stands. Narrowing and narrowing the room for manoeuvre, so that the next thing that happens, false flag, something happens somewhere, blamed on Iran, then Trump will feel he has no alternative but to show some muscularity and send off a few Tomahawks. Maybe not at strategic targets, but as a demonstration of American resolve and strength.

Finally, the last two points that I really wanted to make about this: we are facing something which I think is strategic, which is more than just the Middle East. I think we are coming to the end of the natural life of this policy of maximum pressure, because we have been using maximum pressure or at least Trump has been using maximum pressure, but look at the results.

It has not worked in China. In fact it seems to be creating a strong belligerency. Europe, it is coming, it has been postponed for six months, but it is also going to be messy because of the conditions being set by America. It is not going to be a pleasant encounter. Japan: no result. TPP: they walked out without even trying. The NAFTA process: still nowhere, still stuck in Congress, probably will not pass through Congress.

So we do not have any of these processes showing a clear result yet. None of these maximum pressures across the globe have shown a result, but when people begin to think *'Well, you know, he's not going to go to war, you know, he said he doesn't want to do that,'* what do you do? Either you have to back out completely, humiliatingly, or you increase the threat and you increase it substantially and you double down and that is where I think Mr. Bolton stands in the shadows and why I think, even if we have a little respite now, he will be quietly sitting there plotting for the moment for the next escalation and when there is a chance to persuade Trump perhaps to double down.

And I would just finally like to say, because I want to make it clear that when I talk about Greater Israel as a project, I do think that if he is committed to anything, Trump is actually emotionally committed to this. It is mainly because of family, I think, more than anything else, but he is committed, and all the people he has chosen for his envoys are all Greater Israel proponents - I will not say fanatics - but they are very strongly committed to that concept. So he is going at least to try to go down the route to probably a Sykes-Picot.

I think he sees this as his legacy in terms of foreign policy, his only one. China is not a legacy, it is more about jobs and moving jobs back to the United States.

What it risks, of course, is a regional war, because there is a fundamental doctrine in Israel and has been at least since I was involved there during the 2006 war, that if there is a threat of conflict with Iran, then Israel must as a priority destroy Hezbollah before they are able to fire missiles into the civilian population of Israel.

So if this goes on, it will likely end up in a regional war and Israel will be at risk. Israel is now encountering a critical shift in the balance of power to the northern states, and is losing its strategic air command across most of the northern tiers. It is now no longer free to fly when it wants, it sometimes may be free to fly when Putin permits it, but it has not got the freedom of the airs that it had.

Yes, there is a strong debate in Washington, but I think there also must be quite a vigorous debate taking place in Israel about whether Netanyahu's and Kushner's plans are really in the long-term interest of Israel too.

Thank you very much.

THE RISE AND FALL OF PEACE ON EARTH

Transcript of a lecture by Professor Michael Mandelbaum

Tuesday 28th May 2019

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Well, thank you very much, Michael, for that most generous introduction and thank you all for coming.

I had the privilege of addressing Global Strategy Forum three years ago upon the publication of my previous book called *Mission Failure: America And The World In The Post-Cold War Era* and that book concerned American foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. This book is about what was happening in the rest of the world and *The Rise And Fall Of Peace On Earth* is organised around a particular question and that question is: what are the prospects for peace?

Always a timely question and I will give my answer in the course of my remarks, but it begs a previous question, not often asked, but which I do address in the *Rise And Fall Of Peace On Earth* and which informs my analysis. That question is: what is peace? How do we define peace? Well, the obvious answer is peace is the absence of war, and that is always a good thing. But by that definition, the world has been an extremely peaceful place in the sense that, for most countries for most of their histories, they

have been peaceful because as we know, war is episodic, not constant. And although a common-sense definition, it does not seem to me to fully capture an important reality of international politics.

So I have a different and somewhat more rigorous definition with which I work in this book, and that is: peace is the absence not only of war, but of the imminent prospect of war, of urgent and expensive preparations for war, of conducting foreign policy under the looming shadow of war. It is the absence of what political scientists call 'security competition'. And while war has not been constant in history, security competition has been. There have been no or very few periods where it was not a central feature of the foreign policies of virtually every country.

What I mean by peace or one might call it deep peace is captured by a *'No Parking'* sign I once saw, that said *'Don't even think of parking here.'* Well, peace as I am defining it is when the major powers do not seriously think about war in the way that they usually do, when war has fallen to the bottom of their national agendas, if not off them entirely.

By this definition there has, in my judgement, been only one period of deep peace and that period was the 25 years following the opening of the Berlin Wall which is a convenient point for dating the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the post-Cold War era.

Now you might think there is something perhaps eccentric about deeming this period one of deep peace and say after all there was plenty of violence: in Central Africa, in the Balkans, in Syria. But I designate it a period of uniquely deep peace because the death and destruction which came about was caused mainly by governments oppressing their own people or by warring militias and not - and this is crucial - through pitched battles between and among powerful states using the most advanced weapons, which is historically the cause of the greatest death and destruction. Not only did the strongest states not fight with one another, they did not think at least as seriously as they usually think about going to war. I would not say war disappeared from their agendas, but it was seriously demoted.

Now why was this? I do not think this was accidental. Rather, I argue in *The Rise And Fall of Peace On Earth* that it was due to the robust presence of three peace-promoting features of international relations.

The first was the benign hegemony of the United States. Even governments that did not like American primacy were not disposed to challenge it for most of these 25 years.

The second peace-promoting feature was economic interdependence. This was, after all, one of the great ages of globalisation and we know that countries which trade with and invest in one another on a large scale are very reluctant to go to war because it costs them money.

The third major peace-promoting feature of the post-Cold War era was democracy. This was also the great age of democracy. It was the era in which, to take the subtitle of my 2004 book about democracy *(Democracy's Good Name: The Rise And Risks Of The World's Most Popular Form Of Government)*, for the very first time, democracy became the most popular form of government in the world. Democracies indeed outnumbered non-democracies, although not by a great margin.

Now I should say that by democracy here I mean what I regard, and what I explain in *Democracy's Good Name*, as a hybrid system. The merger of two traditions which, for most of modern history were regarded as incompatible. Democracy entails popular sovereignty - free, fair, regular elections. But it also crucially includes liberty. You do not have democracy without genuine liberty, at least democracy as we understand it in the West. And liberty comes in three varieties. There is economic liberty which happens to be the oldest, dating back to ancient Rome, which means private property. There is religious liberty - that is freedom of worship. And then there is political liberty: freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly.

Democracy promotes peace, as I argue in *Democracy's Good Name* and I re-argue in this book, in a variety of ways. Democracy gives the people some purchase, some control, over their sometimes bellicose rulers and leaders. Moreover, democracy is, among other things and perhaps pre-eminently, a political system for resolving conflicts and disputes (which are inevitable in any society) peacefully without recourse to violence. And the habit of the peaceful resolution of conflict, when transposed to the international sphere when practised in relations with other countries, leads to peace.

So, these three forces made the world in my judgement uniquely peaceful.

Now I am not arguing that these three peace-promoting forces, singly or even together, can guarantee peace. The reason for that is nothing can guarantee peace. In the political sphere, nothing can guarantee anything. There are no iron laws of politics, like the laws of physics.

So think of these three peace-promoting features as modular blocks that, when stacked one on top of the other, create a formidable barrier against war. That is what happened in the post-Cold War era.

The golden age of peace as I see it is, however, over. It is in the past. Security competition has returned and so has the prospect (although not so far, thankfully, the reality) of war between and among the most powerful states.

It returned because one country in each of three important regions undertook policies designed to achieve dominance in that region through the use of force.

In Europe, Russia invaded and occupied Ukraine. In East Asia, China laid claim contrary to international law to most of the western Pacific ocean, built artificial islands there and contrary to the promises of the Chinese leadership, put military installations on those islands. In the Middle East, Iran extended its influence by organising and sustaining paramilitary groups that have worked to undermine the governments of several of those regions and Iran also pursued, and I think in some sense is still pursuing, nuclear weapons.

The three major chapters that are at the heart of *The Rise And Fall Of Peace On Earth* describe and explain how peace turned back to security competition over 25 years in each of these three regions. So this book is, in some sense, an international history of the three major, crucial regions over 25 years. In each case, the story is a complicated one, otherwise this book would have been much shorter. There are multiple reasons in all three cases for the return to an aggressive foreign policy, but the three have, I argue, one feature in common.

In each of them, the aggressive foreign policy that ended peace had a particular domestic cause. Each of the governments of the disturbers of the peace was, and is, a dictatorship and its rule in each case rests ultimately on coercion. But for a variety of reasons, each of these dictatorships sought and still seeks as much genuine popular support and political legitimacy as it can get. There is real popular support in all three countries, perhaps not majority support and we do not really know how broad it is, because the regimes will never put it to the test. But nonetheless, each of them is concerned about popular support.

In each case, especially in the Chinese and Russian cases, the familiar, reliable source of political support began to appear a wasting asset. Both Russia and China, both dictatorial regimes, benefited from economic growth, but the prospects for economic growth turned grim in the second decade of this century.

In Russia, economic growth depends very heavily on the price of energy on global markets. Russia is really a one-crop economy, it has only one thing that anybody else wants to buy and that is energy.

During Vladimir Putin's first spell as President, the price of oil went from about $24 a barrel on the global market to $132 a barrel. It skyrocketed. Money poured in. Now Putin kept a large share of it for himself and his cronies, but there was enough to spread around to the Russian people - living standards rose, incomes increased, Putin was very popular. But when he returned to office, the price of oil had fallen by half and shows no signs of rising to its former great height, leaving him with the need to find some alternative source of popular support.

Similarly in China, the Chinese Communist Party presided over a remarkable, indeed probably historically unprecedented period of economic growth, three full decades in

which the Chinese economy achieved double digit increases every year.

That remarkable performance was due to three things:

- first, the large-scale movement of Chinese people from the countryside into the city where they are far more productive;
- second, heavy investment, especially in infrastructure;
- and third, ever-increasing exports.

But by the second decade of this century, that formula was becoming rather threadbare and indeed, the best information we have is that in recent years the Chinese growth rate has fallen by half (we are not quite sure, because Chinese economics statistics are not particularly reliable) but nonetheless, that China is now averaging 4% or 5% growth a year. Now, for an advanced industrial society, 4% or 5% growth a year would be wonderful, marvellous, but it is not what the Chinese people have become accustomed to enjoying and that puts pressure on the regime to attract popular support in some other way.

As for Iran, it is a different case because the mullahs who took power in 1979 have never presided over a creditable economic performance. Iran has endured four decades of stagnation, but that means that the search for some alternative source of popular legitimacy becomes all the more important.

So all three needed a new source of popular legitimacy and all three turned in order to achieve it to aggressive nationalism. Each of the regimes portrayed what it was doing in its neighbourhood and at the expense of its neighbours to its target audience (namely the people it governed) as necessary to defend the homeland, the mother country, against the predatory designs of the democracies led by the United States, which each government argued to its own people was bent on subverting, weakening and even destroying the country. In addition, each of these three regimes has portrayed its aggressive policies as steps to restore the country to its rightful place as the dominant power in the region. That is to say, each dictatorship ended peace as a strategy for preserving its own rule and that is what put an end to what I see as the golden quarter century of peace as I have defined it.

This raises an obvious question - how, if at all, can we restore peace? And I do have an answer in *The Rise And Fall Of Peace On Earth*, although it is not a particularly satisfactory one.

In my view of the three bulwarks of peace, democracy is by far the most potent and there have been many studies over the last three decades that show that fully-fledged democracies have a powerful tendency not to go to war (at least against one another) at least since the second half of the 20th century.

So, in order to restore peace, what is necessary is for Russia, China and Iran to become full-fledged democracies incorporating both popular sovereignty and the protection of liberty. Now, as you will all recognise, that is far more easily said than done. In fact, one of the things we have learned (and the United States has learned to its own cost) over the last three decades is that democracy cannot be imposed from without, it cannot be imported from another country. It has to have indigenous roots and the hard job of building a democracy has to be done by the people of the country in question.

So the implementation of fully fledged democracy in Russia, China and Iran is the business and the responsibility of the Russian, the Chinese and the Iranian people. And when, and indeed whether, they will be able to undertake that task, we have no idea.

Thus the central message of *The Rise And Fall of Peace On Earth* (and here I hope I live up to our Chairman's description as a rational, hard-headed optimist) is both optimistic and pessimistic. There is good news and bad news. The good news is, we have a formula for peace, what could be better than that? The bad news is, we do not know how to implement it.

Which raises one final question that I will address here and that is: we cannot instil democracy in the revisionist countries, but are there things that we can do to make peace at least marginally more likely? Or if we cannot do that, to keep the world from getting worse, even if we cannot make it better? And I have three suggestions.

The first, which I outline in more detail in an article in the March/April issue of the journal *Foreign Affairs*, is to restore, refurbish and reconstruct the Cold War policy of containment. In the Cold War, the democracies successfully contained the political ambitions and resisted the military initiatives of the Soviet Union. A 21st century version of containment would do the same for Russia, China and Iran. Now, a refurbished policy of containment would not and could not be a carbon copy of Cold War containment. There are several fundamental differences.

First, containment during the Cold War was directed at a country and a movement that posed a global threat. In this case, there are three regional threats. None of these three revisionists really operates outside its own region.

Second, the Cold War, as those of us old enough to remember it know, was an ideological contest. The Soviet Union's creed of Marxism/Leninism was a plan for organising society, politics and the economy that the Communist bloc sought to impose wherever it could. There is no equivalent now. Russia and China, although they seek greater influence for themselves, do not have a model that they are trying to impose. The Islamic Republic of Iran has one, but its version, the Shia version of Islamic fundamentalism, has no purchase outside the Islamic world and not all that much among Sunni Muslims.

Third and very important: during the Cold War, the two antagonists had almost nothing to do with each other in economic terms. Now in the post-Cold War era, all three challengers to the regional status quo are part of the global economy. Russia and Iran depend very heavily on the global economy, the global economy does not depend on them. But that is not true for China - China is a very important part of the global economy, important for others as well as for itself.

Now these three differences, in my view, make a new version of containment somewhat less parlous, somewhat less dangerous, but also more complicated. And it is unclear to me that, and to what extent, the democracies will be willing to undertake a new version of containment.

Well, a new containment is the first suggestion. The second is to take whatever modest steps are possible to weaken these three regimes at the margin, which the democracies did vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

And the third, and in a way the most important, because, as I argue in *Democracy's Good Name*, democracy really spreads by example, it is important that the democracies maintain themselves as attractive examples of their form of government for the rest of the world.

Now, none of these three suggestions nor all of them together can ensure democracy in Russia, China and Iran and therefore the return of deep peace. As I have said, the installation of democracy in these three countries has to be the work of the people of those countries, but these three things are what, in my judgement, the democracies can do to help to create the circumstances in which peace, having risen and fallen, can rise again.

Thank you.

PUTIN: HOW THE WEST GETS HIM WRONG

Transcript of a lecture given by Professor Mark Galeotti

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Mark Galeotti *is an expert in modern Russia, especially its security politics, intelligence services and criminality. Educated at Cambridge University and the LSE, he is an Honorary Professor at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, as well as a senior non-resident fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague, having previously headed its Centre for European Security. He is a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute for 2018-2019. He is also the Director of the consultancy firm Mayak Intelligence. Previously he has been Professor of Global Affairs at New York University, head of the History department at Keele University in the UK, an adviser at the British Foreign Office and a visiting professor at MGIMO (Moscow), Charles University (Prague) and Rutgers (Newark), as well as a visiting fellow with the ECFR. A prolific author on Russia and security affairs, he frequently acts as consultant to various government, commercial and law-enforcement agencies. His books include 'Spetsnaz: Russia's Special Forces' (Osprey) and 'The Vory: Russia's Super Mafia' (YUP) and the edited collections 'The Politics of Security in Modern Russia' (Ashgate) and 'Russian & Soviet Organized Crime' (Ashgate). He is a regular contributor to Jane's Intelligence Review, Oxford Analytica and many other outlets. He is a columnist for Raam op Rusland and the Moscow Times.*

Thank you very much. I am delighted and indeed honoured to be here, especially as I only returned to the UK in January, so I am still finding my way with the British discourse, shall we say, on Russia.

Now, my book (which is a very, very fine book, of course, and available at the back!) is essentially an extended rant about how everyone else gets Putin wrong and only I get him right. I exaggerate, but I do feel that we have fallen prey to some tremendous myth-making about Putin. In part, this is our fault because we have created certain stereotypes, and he also makes a very fine scapegoat indeed for all kinds of things, whether it is Brexit, or Trump, or populism, or football hooliganism - at some point or another, he has been mobilised to explain all of them.

But it also reflects the fact that the Russians themselves have been involved in a deliberate process of myth-making. I have been playing with the concept of what I am calling

'dark power'. We are used to the concepts of hard power and soft power. Hard power, which is military force, getting other countries to do what you want them to do by that instrument. Then there is soft power, the power of example and of friendship, whereby other countries do what you want, because they want to be your friends and because they are convinced by the rightness of your perspective.

Well I think that Putin has probably quite rightly worked out that he is not likely to be making many new friends at the moment. Ironically - I say ironically, but tragically - Russia has no friends at the moment. At best it has pragmatic frenemies, whether we are talking about China, whether we are talking about Iran or whether we are talking about Viktor Orbán.

So instead, there is a sense of well, if you are going to be perceived as the bully in the school ground, best to be the biggest, baddest, most dangerous and unpredictable bully there, so that no one will question whether they give you their lunch money, because they do not want to challenge you and I think this is actually part of the process.

So in this very brief period (to ask an academic to talk for 25 minutes is a sin and almost a human rights violation, but I will try and keep it snappy!), let's try to scrape below the surface of some of this very deliberate myth-making that has been taking place over the last twenty years.

First of all, let's look at Putin himself. There is sometimes this notion of Putin as the chess grandmaster. That is one of the classic Russian clichés. If it is not vodka, bears and balalaikas, chess tends to play a part. We are often befuddled, because we cannot work out the grand plan. We have a very clear idea of what Russia wants and I will come onto that in a moment, but the sense of a plan, a strategy, something which actually has clear steps and that one will lead to the next, we really have trouble with that.

And there is a good reason for that: there is no strategy.

If we want to play the analogies game, let's remember that it is not chess, but judo that is Putin's thing. When you go into the ring, yes, you have a sense of your opponent, what his signature strikes may be and how you will respond, but essentially you go into the ring, you circle the opponent and when you see the opportunity, you do not stop and think, you act.

What we must realise is the extent to which Putin is thoroughly opportunistic. He has a sense of the destination, but he has no sense of the road map to get there. So he will take whatever moves and his state will take whatever moves that he thinks might get him there.

What is that? What is that goal? It is - if I can coin a phrase - to make Russia great again.

Again, a lot is made about his apparently inexhaustible desire to loot his own country and make lots of money. Again, I think that is a mistake. Early Putin, before he was president, when he was deputy mayor in St. Petersburg and so forth, absolutely along with everyone else, he was stealing with both hands. And in his early presidential term, he probably did the same. But I think what we have now seen is that Putin has changed. We must remember, politicians change in office and especially authoritarian ones. The interesting thing is the authoritarian ones tend to become caricatures of themselves, as they shrink their circle, as they are less and less willing to listen to alternative perspectives, as indeed people around them are less and less willing to give them the hard truths. And I think we have very much seen this with Putin.

I would say that, by his return to the presidency in 2011/2012 after a brief period as 'fake' prime minister to satisfy constitutional requirements, certainly by that point, we had seen a different Putin, one motivated not by just simply the opportunity for more money. He has all of Russia as his piggybank - if he wants a palace, he does not build it, he gets the state to build it or as has happened, he gets the oligarchs to divvy up money, a portion of which gets diverted to his tame construction project.

No, I think he is thinking about his historic legacy. It is a fascinating point. I was talking to a colleague, a friend who works at Moscow State University, a historian. We know that Putin reads history, from the very few things he does read. There are all kinds of different presidential awards and grants and so forth and usually the actual handing over of the medal is something that Putin staffs out. But not with historians. Historians he tends to do himself and apparently every time he asks the same question, *'In a hundred years' time, how will they be writing about me?'*

Now. Point one: what an awkward question to be asked by the effective despot of your own country. But point two, I think it does give us a sense of where his head is at. This is a man who regards himself as having some kind of historic role: to make Russia a Great Power again or rather to assert Russia's Great Power status. Time and time again when he talks about this, he does not say Russia is a Great Power because of its economy or anything like that, he says Russia is a Great Power because it is Russia. He regards that as Russia's birthright and in that respect, we must remember this is a *Homo Sovieticus*. This is a man who, as an adult experienced that crushing psychological moment where literally overnight he went from being citizen of one of the two global superpowers to citizen of a smaller, ramshackle country that for the next decade would be considered to be a global problem rather than a global player.

This is Russia's immediate post-imperial moment and Putin's response is very much to try and assert that no, Russia is something greater. But he does so cautiously. This is a pragmatic man. Take away all the macho theatricals, the bare-chested antics. For me one of the best metaphors is the famous occasion where Putin took part in tranquillising a rare Siberian tiger so that it could be checked out by vets and so on. All very dramatic. Except

of course that there was no way his security detail were actually going to let him do that. So the tiger was taken from a zoo and was already so heavily dosed with sedatives that the tranquilliser dart that Putin on camera fired at the tiger actually ended up killing it. It is a sad story, but this is the thing: it is all about the appearance of risk-taking daring, but in fact it is carefully planned. I think we need to be aware of this point. The extent to which the Russians under Putin have carefully manufactured this image of themselves as the unpredictable mavericks, even while they very, very carefully have an awareness of the limits of what is safe behaviour.

This is one of the reasons why I never felt that the Russians were trying to get Trump elected. What the Russians were trying to do was basically impede Hillary Clinton who terrified them, and Trump was just one of many, many instruments they were using. It was also encouraging the Bernie Sanders supporters to feel that they had been marginalised, the NRA people to think that Hillary Clinton was coming for their guns. Basically they were just trying to stir up as many fires as possible, so that a President Hillary Clinton would be so busy putting them out that she would not really have time or political capital for anything else.

And then they got Trump. They had always loved America being the predictable one, they had always wanted to have a very clear sense of exactly where the red lines were, because then they know precisely how far they can go. However much they affected to despise Barack Obama, and he certainly did annoy them on all kinds of levels, nonetheless they always appreciated the fact that he was absolutely, rationally predictable. Trump - not so much. Today's red lines are probably not tomorrow's red lines and they have been drawn in crayon anyway.

So there is a sense that they find themselves in a world where they have to be much more careful. Even when we do see adventures that seem daring, they have been very, very carefully plotted out and although the Russians might get it wrong, they think they know what the answer is going to be.

Syria. Syria was a very, very small military commitment that they could frankly have easily pulled out, if need be. Even the Donbas, this war in which they have become mired in south-eastern Ukraine. I was actually in Moscow for the first seven months of 2014, so before the Sochi Winter Olympics and those lovefest moments, then through Crimea and Donbas. A very depressing time to be there as you could feel the shutters coming down and a lot of old attitudes coming back. But the thing that really struck me, as it became clear that they were moving into the Donbas, everyone I spoke to in Moscow who was connected with the foreign policy and national security establishment was absolutely certain this was going to be a six month operation. Within six months, Kiev would have realised that actually it was part of Russia's sphere of influence and would have capitulated and realised that no, there was no way it was going to have closer links with the European Union or whatever. The boys would have been brought home and the West would have forgotten all about it.

Splendid plan, except for the minor detail that it did not work out. The point is, if everyone is telling you that it is a safe thing, it is not an adventure, it is not a piece of daring, it is just a piece of bad calculation. I think we have to realise the extent to which Putin is a highly rational actor, but often misinformed. And one of the reasons for this again links to another one of these classic myths about Putin, that he is the master spy because he was in the KGB. But you must remember how deeply mediocre a KGB officer he was. He was in the First Chief Directorate, generally regarded as the elite element, the foreign espionage element, but he never actually went truly abroad - he was in East Germany. Essentially most of his work there was debriefing, taking notes, distributing documents to the East Germans, taking documents from the East Germans and sending it back to Moscow. Not so much James Bond, a little bit more Miss Moneypenny.

He served, he did not really cover himself with glory - he was okay, he was fine, but no more. Then he left the KGB. Later on he would come back for one year, he would be Director of the Federal Security Service, which is a successor to the KGB's domestic security services. The interesting thing is, he never actually served in the centre in a managerial position. Again, talking largely to retired people from that realm, the thing they say is that even when he was Director, he clearly did not really understand how the institution worked. He was fine. No one is saying he was disastrous or anything like that, but he was largely insulated, he did not know how the streets went in Moscow when it came to that. And I think this is something we have seen now. Putin is not a spy grandmaster. If anything, I would describe him as a spook fanboy. He loves the Services, he listens to them more than anyone else. They are the people who paint his picture of the world and they are increasingly competing, it seems, to tell him what he wants to hear. This is a rational figure making rational decisions on the basis of often a very, very questionable perspective of the world.

So this is Putin and this reflects his state, Putin's Russia, which again we sometimes think of as this monolithic, disciplined, lockstep enemy. Well, anyone who knows Russians and Russia knows it is not like that. This is in many ways a ramshackle place, in which Putin is absolutely the unquestioned master, but we should not think that everything comes down from the Kremlin and everyone follows their orders.

For me, the term I have been playing around with to try and understand how Russia works is 'adhocracy'. This is a system in which essentially what you do or what you are expected to do may well have relatively little to do with your formal job title, the formal remit of your institution, what is on your business card or your identity card, whether you are formally part of the state apparatus or not.

A classic example would be the man, Yevgeny Prigozhin, sometimes described as Putin's chef, which implies that he cooked Putin dinner. He did not, but he ran hotels that Putin used back in St. Petersburg, he built up a catering empire, he ended up getting the contract to provide food for the Russian armed forces, then later on he moved into

the infamous troll farms and now he is in charge of the company that runs Wagner, a mercenary organisation that the Russians have deployed in Syria, in Venezuela, in the Central African Republic and elsewhere.

Now, either he is some extraordinary poly-competent individual or, what is actually his real job? His real job is to do whatever the Kremlin requires today. Once, that was feed the troops, then it was run some troll farms, at the moment it is keep some tabs on Wagner. Who knows what it might be tomorrow? This is a political system which is best analogised as being a court, wherein a whole variety of individuals and favourites seek to win the true currency of this system which is not the rouble, it is not the euro, it is not the dollar, it is Putin's favour. That can be instantly and massively monetised in a way that money itself cannot be converted to political power.

So everyone is competing to give Putin and give the state what they think he wants. And I will stress that 'think'. Sometimes there are things that are clearly mandated from the Kremlin. Interestingly enough, often those things fail or get ignored. But also a lot of the initiatives that we in the West face are actually not generated by the Kremlin, they are generated by a whole variety of other political entrepreneurs, who come up with ideas that they think will push the boss's agenda, and sometimes they basically pitch it. It is the 'Dragons' Den' model of geopolitics: you have a whole bunch of would-be geopoliticians hoping that theirs will be the project that the boss picks. But also, sometimes they are just carried out on their own account, hoping that if they are successful, retrospectively the Kremlin will bless them and will reward them. This is actually a very chaotic system.

Now, what does this actually mean for us? The last bit I want to talk about is: well, so what? How does this really change the challenge? And I really want to stress one key point. I am not for a moment saying that Russia does not pose a challenge to us, but I think we have to be more sharply aware of what sort. This is a country with an economy the size of Italy's and speaking as a half-Italian myself I mean no disrespect to that side of my legacy, but no one is really thinking that Italy is one of the great world geopolitical players. But Russia wants to be. Now the only way you can do that in those circumstances is precisely by not playing by the rules, by considering yourself an insurgent, a guerrilla. Guerrillas never win by taking on a conventional force on its own terms. Instead, they wish to shift the battlefield to where they are at their most effective.

Well, first of all, I think we need to get the threat right. I see no evidence of Putin gaining territorial ambitions in the West. Crimea was an exception. Crimea was a little chunk of land that pretty much every Russian, regardless of whether they are a hard-line Putinite or whether in fact they are a member of the liberal opposition, thought was rightfully Russia's. To universalise from that is very dangerous.

Beyond that, what he wants is precise: he wants Russia to be considered a Great Power. But his is a very 19th century notion of what a Great Power is. As far as Putin is concerned,

a Great Power is nothing to do with soft power and economic dynamism. A Great Power has a sphere of influence, so from his point of view, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, the other post-Soviet States (with, I would say, the exception of the Baltics State), their sovereignty is actually only partial. They have to realise that basically they are part of Russia's sphere of influence.

Secondly, no great global issue can be resolved without a Great Power like Russia being there, whether or not Russia's direct interests are at stake.

And thirdly, he does not want to break the international system totally. No country which has a long land border with a rapidly modernising and above all militarising China wants to see the world devolve into geopolitical anarchy. But on the other hand, a great power has a 'get out of jail free card' and from time to time it can say, *'Yes, this broke international laws and norms, but we felt it was necessary for our interests.'*

That is what he wants for Russia, because that is what he thinks that America has. Now obviously we cannot allow that. Therefore his challenge is not military, it is political. Think George Kennan's notion of political war, one which uses every means short of military conflict. Legal/illegal, overt/covert, economic/political. That I think best explains what the Russians are launching against us. They are trying to divide us, to distract us and to demoralise us, so that we are not in a position to prevent Putin from asserting his claims, because politics is about perception.

If we accept his notion of Russia as a Great Power, then Russia becomes a Great Power. But he has to get us to do it for him. And let's be honest, we shape the threat. Russia has no magic mind control powers, Russia does not have the kind of weight, for example, of China. The fact that the Russians are able to use disinformation, to use corruption, to use a whole variety of other means to subvert us and influence us is essentially because of our failings.

People are willing to listen to Russian disinformation because they feel that their mainstream media (awful term) or their leadership do not tell them the truth. People are able to be corrupted because they are corrupt, not because the Russians force it upon them. But on the other hand, we are insufficiently good, for example, at controlling the flow of dirty money, dark money shall we say, which gives them the wherewithal to do so. We must realise actually how strong we are: we get to define the threat surface on which the Russians operate.

Very final point now. Putin is just one guy. He rules through an elite who at the moment see no alternative to him and therefore essentially do what he wants when they have to.

However, I think it is worth noting that Putin is many ways out of step with most of the Russian elite in my opinion. Most of the Russian elite are the products of the earlier Putin.

They basically are pragmatic kleptocrats. They loved the old order: when they got to steal at home and bank abroad, rely on the rule of law and send their kids and their families to the West and buy agreeable penthouses, while safely stealing at home.

They did not sign up for some kind of semi-ideological crusade with the West. They had no alternative because one thing Putin does understand is power and there is no question about his grip on it. But in many ways, people are waiting him out and I am really struck by this – I have been to Moscow three times this year so far and even just in that very short time span, it is noticeable how much more people are willing to think and talk about a post-Putin Russia. They do not know when it is going to be, they do not expect it to be next Wednesday or even next year, but something which for many was unthinkable not too long ago has now become all too thinkable. For the very first time I actually heard him referred as 'старик' – the 'old man', which for someone whose political capital is based on this macho virile persona, that is an interesting sign of the times.

We also need to be thinking about how we prepare. We have been caught out by Russia too many times. We were caught out by Russia in 1991, we were caught out by Russian in 1999 when Putin was picked. Russia will no doubt give us more surprises, but we have to think about it and also we have to think about how we make sure we do not play into Putin's own legitimating narrative. Putin tells his people that the reason they have to be living in this beleaguered fortress is because the world hates Russians and the world hates Russia. We have to work out how we can find policies that on the one hand can genuinely deter and punish the Kremlin, but at the same time realise that in fact there will be a post-Putin Russia and we do not want to do anything to drive that into the hands of, you might say, anti-Western forces.

I will stop there and throw it open to questions and furious rebuttals!

GLOBAL INSTABILITIES: WHAT IS MOST ON MY MIND AND WHAT SHOULD WE BE WORRIED ABOUT?

Transcript of a lecture given by Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE

Wednesday 10th July 2019

Sir John McLeod Scarlett KCMG OBE *was born in 1948 in London and educated at Magdalen College, Oxford, where, in 1970, he was awarded First Class Honours in Modern History. Sir John served as Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) from 2004 to 2009. Sir John joined SIS in 1971 and over the next 20 years served in Nairobi, Paris and twice in Moscow as well as several assignments in London. He was appointed Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in September 2001. On 1st August 2004 Sir John rejoined SIS as its Chief. Sir John's current roles include Senior Advisor at Morgan Stanley; Chairman, International Advisory Group, Equinor; Advisor, Swiss Re; Chairman, SC Strategy Ltd; Director, Times Newspaper Holdings; Vice Chairman, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and Co-Chair of the Global Advisory Council, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC. Sir John is a member of the State Honours Committee; Vice-President of the UK Association de la Legion d'Honneur and a Trustee of the Friends of the French Institute in the United Kingdom.*

Michael, thank you. I am very conscious of the fact that I am now nearly ten years out of government service. That is a long time. I am also conscious of the fact that I joined my Service in 1971. I am always having to tell people that I was a very young officer when I joined. I have been in the private sector, I do have various roles, and if there is a common thread through all the roles, it is that of being an international affairs adviser - not a risk manager, so I have to think about these issues all the time.

What I want to do is talk about immediate instabilities and immediate crises and things one has to worry about day by day at the moment. I will then follow with some brief commentary on underlying issues:

- The return of great power rivalry: Russia-China, China-US;
- The continuing role of non-state actors;
- Terrorism;
- And perhaps a few comments on the data dimension.

So, immediate issues and then underlying issues.

Immediate issues – the obvious one to start with the Gulf and confrontation in the Gulf around the JCPOA and the US/Iran. This has the potential to have wider global impact. Recent events and developments are well known to all of you and I am not going to list them all, tankers and drones and so on. But I do want to highlight some key points which I think we have to keep in mind and now need to watch, and you will have your own thoughts and comments on this.

Saudi Arabia and Iran. Everybody needs to understand - and I was clear about this when I finished in my previous job – that they have a long history of tension. Ethnic, territorial, sectarian, it goes back hundreds of years. And of course, there is role of Yemen. If you talk to any Saudi colleague, you hear about that, it is a key feature.

US policy and politics. The JCPOA, which was the outstanding achievement for President Obama. Obviously that makes it potentially toxic for the present administration, and there are all sorts of issues around that. Did the Obama administration have a realistic understanding of Iran's position and behaviour in the region?

The continuing factor of Israeli policy and behaviour and influence on US policy. For the moment this is complicated by Israeli politics and the prospects for the next election.

On this issue generally, it has become clear that the US, in particular the White House, does not want to provoke a military conflict with Iran. They are relying on severe economic and financial pressure to force significant concessions from Tehran or to undermine the regime as a whole.

So a key question: how resilient is Iran, the regime and the Iranian population? How will they react to this pressure? I could go through a lot of statistics here, but the pressure is real, it is severe. GDP in Iran over the past year declined at nearly 5% - that is the Iranian government acknowledgement, and the IMF expects it to decline by 6% this year. Inflation is at 35%, and the currency, the rial, declined by approximately 70% since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of US sanctions.

And critically, there has been a massive decline in crude oil exports, down from about 2.5 million barrels/day to roughly 250,000 million barrels/day (the government budget is set at an assumption of 1.5 million barrels/day). I could go on, but what I am really saying is that the pressure on Iran may be unsustainable. It cannot carry on as if nothing was happening. Something has to happen.

It could be more threats to shipping movements in the Gulf. We were talking about threats to British tankers at the moment. But more critically in the longer term, it may be the further testing of the limits on stocks of enriched uranium and the breaking of the limits on enrichment levels beyond 3.67%, which is now underway. This is obviously meant to be putting pressure on Europe to deliver on promises of assistance to Iran under JCPOA

terms, clearly before very long, it becomes an existential threat to the JCPOA itself.

The next step in a situation like this would normally be some form of mediation or discussion between the parties involved, but what sort of mediation? By whom? The obvious underlying question is: what is the longer term US strategy, and does it have a strategy? Again, we can discuss that.

There are various other issues that I could talk about in the Middle East, there may be questions, but I have not got time to go into the detail here. Syria continues to be very complicated and riven with risks of all kinds, and the situation in Libya in particular needs watching for obvious reasons and I will happily take any questions on that.

Moving away from the Middle East and North Africa, the other area is east Asia. A year or plus ago, we would have been talking about North Korea all the time. Now North Korea has become a bit of a TV show. Of course we had the cross border meeting last week, and after Hanoi, this restores some of the personal atmospherics. But the reality is that when you look at it, the detail of discussions, concessions or strategy or whatever it might be between the US and North Korea, there so far has not been significant detailed progress.

We are moving towards a step-by-step approach, even though the US has said they do not want that, they want the wholesale renunciation of nuclear weapons capability by North Korea. North Korea is not going to offer that, and that has become obvious after Hanoi. It is quite easy to list all the things which are not going to work. It is quite easy to list in theory what might happen, compromises on each side, which might lead to an easing of sanctions by the US side and then some concessions on the nuclear weapons side by North Korea. The fact is, if that is what happens, then we are going to be effectively recognising (or the US is) North Korea as a real, acknowledged, nuclear weapons power.

A particular point to watch is the economic pressure on North Korea. I have talked about the economic pressure on Iran, but North Korea has had one of the worst harvests in recent years, which is ongoing, and the worst drought in forty years, more than 10 million people - that is 40% of the population – facing severe food shortages.

It is also worth just mentioning, because I talked about the data dynamics, that although we talk about North Korea and cyberattacks a lot, particularly in the context of the financial theft from the Bank of Bangladesh a couple of years ago, the reality is of course that less than 1% of North Koreans have access to the Internet. Their citizens can use a regulated, domestic-only intranet, with a select list of websites. In fact I even have got the name here, the *Kwangmyong* website, in case you are interested, but I do not think you will find it very informative. I will come back to that rather interesting subject of domestic intranets.

So the conclusion in reality, there is very limited progress. We have stepped back from

the immediate fire-and-fury crisis, but actually while it may be less immediately dramatic than Iran, this situation is unsustainable as well. How is the North Korean economy going to develop and maybe even integrate more widely, whilst retaining absolute control such as presently exists for the regime? From my background, I am bound to question whether that is actually realistic. If you are a regime like this, you are either completely clamped down in control and if you are, you cannot run a globally-integrated economy.

Quick lines on other issues. I will mention briefly (and of course, again I could go into a lot more detail) the situation in Ukraine. That tends to get less attention these days. We just have to remember than in addition to the 13,000+ who have been killed since 2014 (and remember, this is in central Europe), there are 1.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and critically, more than 500,000 people today are living within 5 kms of the contact line with the shelling, gunfire, land mines, and exposure to physical injury. That is today. 500,000. Last November, we had the incident in the Sea of Azov, three ships, 23 crew members seized, and they are still in detention in Moscow.

The Minsk Accords, everybody was so optimistic in February 2015, but there has been no effective progress. We have a new Ukrainian President, but it is not yet clear which direction he is going to follow. There is some talk about appealing to the US and to Russia to intervene and work together on this. We will see. I must say personally, I have been struck by the decree signed by President Putin on 1st May 2019, fast-tracking Russian citizenship for Ukrainian nationals and in particular, how applicants from eastern Ukraine can now pretty well automatically get Russian citizenship.

Those are the immediate issues. I could talk about others. Venezuela is another one, which does need watching.

I would like to move quickly into the matter of deeper issues and underlying issues and I am going to start, and linger on, the return of great power rivalry.

This, I remind you, has been highlighted by US policymakers and statements as the key driver now for US security, defence, and foreign policy, as opposed to the previous emphasis on the threat from non-state actors. It was actually quite noticeable at the Aspen Security Forum – great power rivalry.

And of course, by great powers, what do I mean? I mean Russia, above all China and the US.

But just picking up Russia, one of the advantages of having started in the Service in 1971 is that I actually lived and worked in the Soviet Union, which increasingly one finds unusual.

I read with great interest the interview that President Putin gave to the *Financial Times*

the other day. In particular I picked out the policy on Syria, a successful activity for Russia. The sense of successful reassertion, I would say, is fundamental in the formulation of Russian policy. Recovery from the 1990s, the impact of the 1990s, on the thinking of the current Russian leadership, in particular Putin, but others as well of course, is really fundamental. Unless you really understand that, you are not going to get the mindset of the Russian leadership.

It does face big challenges. One obvious one is the economy. In the interview Putin was anxious to stress the stable macroeconomic situation in Russia. Real wages are not in decline in Russia. On the contrary, they are starting to pick up. It is real household disposable income that is falling. These are reasonable statements. The economy has stabilised. Even under the undeniable pressure of EU and US sanctions, it has been quite sensibly managed. The growth rate last year was quite reasonable. It has declined since then. The underlying growth rate is just over 1%, obviously is not enough in the medium to longer term.

And opinion poll ratings. Even a Kremlin-friendly poll recently has shown trust in Putin at 31%, which is the lowest since 2006.

Nervousness is shown in the proposals for Internet control legislation, new legislation coming in before the end of the year, which will authorise the establishment of a Russia-only Internet, separate from the World Wide Web. That is the whole issue there of data localisation, of authoritarian states imposing increasing control on information flows, a very interesting and significant subject which does not get enough discussion.

Another key challenge: demographics. A UN report projects that by 2050, the population in the Russian Federation will go from 146 million to 135 million. The pessimistic forecast is for it to go to 125 million from 146 million, and by 2100, the pessimistic forecast has it at 84 million.

So Putin has had significant success: he is widely respected, he is not internationally isolated. He may be near the limits of his success, one year into his final term. Assertion of Russian power will continue in former Soviet states, the Arctic, within liberal democracies through elections interference, and promoting the Russian position across the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa.

Managing future relations with the Russian Federation is going to be a real challenge, especially for the UK.

Relations with the US are a fundamental issue. The impact of sanctions is explicit and it is definitely there, Alexei Kudrin has confirmed that. And of course, there is the huge issue of the future of nuclear weapons arms control as well, as the Cold War treaties fall away and are not being replaced.

Right, quickly moving on to China. There is no question that China and the future of relationships with China - our own, the US - is the big fundamental issue for our future.

Why is that?

Well, of course, its position in the global economy. And just a reminder: in 2018, gross domestic product was $13.6 trillion, second behind the US, but in fact when adjusted for relative purchasing power, the economy in China is already the largest in the world. It has trebled since 2008, which was when I last visited in an official capacity. China has a dynamic private sector, high integration with the global economy and of course remarkable technological success. Currently they are the second largest investor into AI enterprises after the US and a world leader at fusing AI with fintech, for example.

All that said, China is an authoritarian state. It has a wholly different form of governance from liberal democracies. There is no rule of law in the sense that we understand it. This of course presents a huge challenge when it is linked to such a successful economy. How is the radical transformation that I am talking about over the last forty years, how is it going to be managed? There is no immediate answer that I can make, but I would just list the following points.

We have the US-China trade tensions, very much in play since July last year. Now since the G20 summit, Presidents Xi and Trump have agreed to restart trade talks, but there is no commitment to return to where they were in early May, no deadlines have been set.

Why did the negotiations collapse in early May? Because the Chinese negotiators withdrew previous offers to amend laws to reduce favouritism towards Chinese business. Now this issue goes to the very heart of China economic policy, the intricate relationship between state-owned enterprises and private business. And when you look at the detail as to how this operates in deal after deal and joint venture after joint venture, you see how intricate it is. It does seem to be the case that both China and the US find it difficult to reach good judgements about each other's behaviour, each other's objectives, each other's strong and weak points - that comes through pretty clearly from the trade talks, I would say, but again, there may be questions.

On the diplomatic and military front, of course, it has been marked assertion since 2012. The Belt and Road Initiative has become very complicated, there is quite a lot of pushback on it, and it raises very interesting questions about the relationship with Russia, despite the big friendly talk at the top.

The activity of Beijing in the South Pacific and Vanuatu (there are stories about that in today's news), what is happening in Hong Kong and then of course the tensions in the South China Sea – I could go into details about how those tensions work out, but just simply to say it is going to be very difficult to counter the establishment of Chinese

military control there through freedom of navigation operations. Of course Taiwan, which is possibly an even bigger subject and risky area than the South China Sea, given how emotional it is for Beijing itself.

The US reaction to all this since 2013 - we have to put it into context - is markedly changed. A much higher emphasis on pushback against Chinese intellectual property theft since 2013 has been a major national security issue in the US.

We did have this concept at one point that with its integration into the global economy, China would become increasingly like us. By last year, that had really effectively fallen away and certainly within the US, China is seen and is openly stated by everyone across the political spectrum as being a challenge to US global leadership, including, surprisingly, in the area of technology.

Just one other point to make about China before I conclude. It seems to be irresistible and irrepressible push forward, but we have to remember they have demographic issues too. The working age population nearly doubled between 1975 and 2010, but since the mid-90s, the fertility rate has been below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman (it is currently 1.6), the population is expected to peak in 2027, the working age population to decrease by at least 100 million people between 2015 and 2040. No country's population has ever aged at a faster rate. Again, that is not often understood or commented upon.

If there is a trade deal between the US and China, what can we read into it? Is it a short-term thing or does it have long-term significance? I will take some persuading that it is other than a short-term deal. The long-term issues continue. Huawei – immediate issue, of course, for us as a Five Eyes Partner. What is the reality of Huawei's links to the Chinese state security? Why is there a divergence of analysis on that critical issue within the Five Eyes?

Finally, just briefly, the United States. Commentary or questions regarding US policy run through all my comments above. People talk about the US being in decline. If so, why does everybody talk about it? The reality is that every country, everywhere in the world, is affected by US policy and US power. That being the case, how do people outside the US react to what is going on with US policy? Whatever the rights and wrongs of US policy and decisions, there is a general disorientation about the direction. Amongst my American colleagues the extent of that disorientation internationally is not fully understood.

What does Trump really want out of China? Does he actually see China as some kind of strategic national threat or does he see it as *'getting the trade balance right'*?

Two final points to conclude. I said I would mention non-state actors, I have not got much time to go into that in any kind of detail. But you can see me pushing back a bit on the

idea that somehow or another, the threat has receded. The reality is that great power rivalry certainly has become an issue (we have probably been a bit slow to recognise this). But the non-state issue has not gone away.

The UK threat level for international terrorism is at severe, which means an attack is highly likely. It was at critical, which means that an attack is imminent, twice during 2017. There were 36 deaths in the UK from terrorist activity in 2017. We have in the UK 3,000 people under 'close observation', whatever that exactly means, and 700 live counter-terrorism investigations. And in France, 'fiche S' which is people of high priority, the ones you really have to worry about, is at 12,000 as a minimum.

The reality is that spotting your likely terrorist in the current circumstances of online radicalisation is more difficult than it was ten or fifteen years ago. We have defeated the caliphate on the ground, but the UN report back in February estimated IS fighters in Syria and Iraq still to be between 14,000 to 18,000, including 3,000 foreign fighters.

Finally, I said I would just comment on the data dimension. I have mentioned it briefly as we have gone through these different subjects. I am talking about big data, data exploitation and data explosion. I am avoiding the use of the word 'cyber', which I do not find it very helpful. In my experience, it is data, data, data. It is intricately linked with great power competition and rivalry. The particular point to bring out is the way in which technology is a great leveller. We have seen that before, but it can mean that one of the poorest countries in the world, North Korea, can be a material threat to the richest country in the world, the United States. Of course, to some extent the same applies with Iran and the United States.

Secondly, the aggressive use of technology by authoritarian states, which has unpredictable consequences, as we have seen in the US. But in reality, it is authoritarian states, again in my experience, who most fear the free flow of information and the World Wide Web. We are always hearing about aggressive use of data by, for example, the Russian Federation within liberal democracies. But if you want to see people really worried about data and communications flow, it is the leadership of authoritarian states, and of course, that is why we are looking data localisation and Internet control, particularly in Russia and in China.

I will stop there. Thank you very much.

THE ACCIDENTAL ARABIST REFLECTS….AGAIN!

Text of a lecture given by The Rt Hon. Alistair Burt MP

Wednesday 17th July 2019

The Rt Hon. Alistair Burt MP *has been the Member of Parliament for North East Bedfordshire since 2001. He first entered Parliament in 1983, serving as MP for Bury North until 1997. Alistair was educated at Bury Grammar School, and studied at St John's College, Oxford where he was President of the University law society. His lengthy and varied front bench career in both Government and Opposition has included: Minister of State at the Department of Social Security; Shadow Minister for Communities and Local Government; Opposition Assistant Chief Whip; Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (May 2010 to October 2013); Minister of State for Community & Social Care, Department of Health (May 2015 to July 2016); Minister of State for the FCO and Minister of State for DFID with responsibility for the Middle East and North Africa (June 2017 to March 2019). He is a Member of Her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council and UK Commissioner for the International Commission for Missing Persons. Alistair is married to Eve Burt, has two grown up children and a granddaughter. He has run ten London Marathons, and watches football whenever possible.*

I left the Foreign & Commonwealth Office in October 2013 after three and a half of the best years of my professional life, as the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, scarcely expecting to return, or to ever have a better job. I was thus rather shocked when in June 2017 Prime Minister Theresa May offered me both, with a return to the FCO and a role at the Department for International Development, a career interest I had had thwarted a number of times in the past.

It was with enormous regret that I parted from these at the end of March, this time of my own volition, caught up in the vortex which is Brexit, the all-consuming monster of our times, when, as a lifelong and deeply convicted pro-European I faced a dilemma of a vote I could not rationalise with remaining in government. Whilst I knew that no one can possibly be a permanent minister for MENA, and that I would rightly have left in due course, I would not have wanted to leave in such a manner and apologise to the Prime Minister and all my friends for its abruptness.

It has, however, given me the opportunity both to reflect on where we are and to consider what might come next. The extra years confirmed where, apart from NE Bedfordshire, my heart is in modern politics, and perhaps some of that might emerge in the next few

minutes, and in time to come. I hope I and the region are far from done with each other!

2010-2013 will forever be associated with the upheavals in the Arab world, which for shorthand I will refer to as the Arab Spring, though I am well aware that much is disputed about such a title. It had been the busiest period in the FCO since the end of the Second World War, and its echoes were all around as I returned.

The overall scene as I recall it was unprepossessing, the dominant sense of a lot of unresolved issues throughout.

One was on the way to resolution, the recovery of physical territory from the fake caliphate of Daesh. An international coalition was building on the brave work achieved on the ground by regional forces, though a campaign of terror across continents was at its height. The destruction of history and heritage, the enslavement of victims and the brutal, televised murder of captives had brought a new low to man's inhumanity to man and reminded all of us that out of unresolved embers of past conflicts, new horrors could be fanned. But the pushback physically, steady and sure, was clearly underway.

Other unresolved conflicts were not in such a good place. Libya teetered on the brink, the failure of politicians and militias to come to understandings which would unlock the prosperity promised through its natural resources were in contrast to the patient efforts of UN Envoy Ghassan Salamé. A solution certainly seemed possible, however.

Less good was Yemen, a conflict which had flared since I had left in 2013. This was of significant interest to the UK Parliament and public due to the UK holding the pen at the UNSC, and also being in support of the Saudi-led coalition which had intervened to reverse the insurgency which had overtaken the legitimate government of Yemen. The continuing crisis was unresolved by the intervention, and the impact of the war on the civilian population was understandably a source of deep distress and concern.

Even worse was Syria. The failure, in my view, of the United States and others including the UK Parliament to respond to the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in 2013 had opened the door to intervention by others, notably Russia and Iran, in support of the regime against an opposition which had gradually transformed from solely the Syrian people themselves demonstrating for peaceful change and then being ruthlessly cut down by the regime, to one filled with numerous actors including dangerous extremists who attracted no one's sympathy.

The result was not only the loss of life of some half a million people and further breaches of international conventions, but also the mass movement of people fleeing conflict, to Lebanon and Jordan, Turkey and Europe with a variety of consequences. The migration and refugee crisis of the Mediterranean ultimately played a part in the weakening of Angela Merkel, and Europe itself, and perhaps the Brexit result in the UK. On a more positive

note, it provided an opportunity, particularly for Jordan and Lebanon, to demonstrate the extraordinary generosity of everyday people, who had to receive huge numbers of refugees, and whose states have been left politically affected by such actions.

In the midst of this was Staffan de Mistura, trying to find a pathway, in the misery.

Away from active conflict other unresolved issues loomed large. Iran's relationship with its neighbours continued to be a source of concern, as it took advantage of circumstances. The Iraq war had removed a foe, now Syria provided an opportunity to secure its position in support of Assad, and Yemen was taken advantage of in support of the Houthi insurgency allowing, one way or another, for material of Iranian origin to be used directly against the Saudi-led coalition. It continued its support of proxy forces and seemed unaware or unconcerned that actions it deemed to be forward defence were actually threatening to others. Thankfully, Iran's nuclear ambitions had been thwarted by the JCPOA, an opening, with all its flaws, at least for conversations about the future of its relationship within and beyond the region and perhaps to find an accommodation between various parties.

The MEPP, stalled for so long, had been given an apparent new lease of life by a first term President of the US, declaring that he was up for the *'deal of the century'*. Reservations about the choice of envoys were put to one side in Whitehall as once again, it was the only game in town, and a process of engagement with the envoys began.

A new and unexpected rift in the region opened up as I arrived back, within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as a number of states and Egypt broke off relationships with Qatar. This was a matter of profound regret in the UK, as although we understood the background to concerns, the unity of the GCC was valuable in an area affected by so many fractures. The UK, friend and partner to all Gulf States, was particularly concerned by the implications and we welcomed the efforts of HH the Emir of Kuwait to seek to help.

And as a background to all this lay the wider echoes of the Arab Spring. Many emissaries here will be aware of my repeated view that the fundamentals of the Arab Spring are deep and long lasting and need to be distinguished from short-term effects. The Arab Spring may have been opportunistically seized upon by some actors with little genuine interest in the welfare of the people to peddle violence, unrest or a false ideology, but in its origins concerns over the economy, jobs, employment, education and governance are pretty well basic staples of national existence.

In North Africa, a number of states were handling the after-effects of Mohammed Bouazizi's actions. Tunisia continued, despite appalling attacks from terrorists, to build peacefully a broad democratic coalition; Morocco's executive monarchy skilfully worked with elected politicians to move the country forward; Algeria watched events carefully, still mindful of the pain of its previous civil strife to risk anything which might unwittingly lead to a Libya; and after tumultuous events and elections, Egypt worked to stabilise under President Sisi, again despite terrorist attacks.

So where was the UK's policy to go with all this, and what was I to do? I still possess my instructions from Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson!

The FCO's priorities in the region, working to our strategic objectives of protecting our people, projecting our global influence and promoting our prosperity, included: succeeding in the physical and ideological combatting of Daesh; securing a broad-based government in Libya; supporting efforts to reduce the tensions between Iran and its proxies and regional neighbours; support the US MEPP initiative 'if it happens'; to help resolve the crisis in Yemen with constructive UK support; and be an effective humanitarian contributor in Syria, encouraging a political transition there. So let me examine these.

The reversal of Daesh physically can only be seen as welcome, despite continuing challenges and complications. The horror of Daesh rule, the murders, the abuse of women, has been steadily uncovered as territory has been restored.

Iraq has grown through the response of its forces after earlier reverses and the UK welcomes a number of developments. The elections and the new government offer a chance to ensure that all in Iraq, of whatever community, will benefit as corruption is tackled and forces steadily return to government control. The people of Iraq, after enduring what President Barham Salih described as forty years of indignity, deserve this chance to pilot their own destiny without external interference - and I emphasise that is any external interference, which I fully acknowledge is easier said than achieved. That Kuwait, after what happened between them, held the investment conference for Iraq in February 2018 was an all too rare example of states moving on from their recent past, and the handling of the referendum issue between Baghdad and Erbil, which could have gone terribly wrong, has led to an opportunity being grasped by both as opposed to a new cause for unrest being created. The UK celebrates such actions.

But there are other challenging residues from Daesh. There is, as will be the case in Syria, a need for justice for those who were victims. The UK supports the efforts of those under international auspices, like UNITAD, IIIM in Syria and ICMP to uncover and bring to trial those guilty. But it will not be an easy process. The world has not truly worked out how to deal with foreign fighters for Daesh, let alone the human misery of innocent children born to them and their rather less innocent for the most part mothers. Whether it is to be trials in the states from which they came or the construction of international facilities, people cannot be left to rot and become the raw material for more terror.

Combatting the evil ideology is a cause that rightly an international coalition of 74 remains committed to, and I am proud that the UK hosts the communications cell. The sophistication of cyberattack and the production of seductive internet material requires a vigilance that I suspect is unending as far as one can see, in that any sense that this struggle for the hearts and minds of the vulnerable is over would be foolish. Whatever may be the differences between states, this would threaten all, and working together is vital.

Libya has proved a frustrating pursuit. I valued my return to stay over in Tripoli last year, the first British Minister to do so since Alistair Burt in 2013, but met a weary Ghassan Salamé. Despite his efforts, it has proved impossible to ensure that the interests of some do not destroy the chances of the Libyan people to recover from the miseries of Gaddafi and the present day. Successive Foreign Secretaries gave full support to UN efforts and the small group process, but at present it is hard to see an answer. The intervention of FM Haftar in Tripoli at a vital stage of UN negotiations again underlined how difficult the competing interests on the ground are to resolve, each attracting external support to combat perceived threats beyond boundaries. The reality is that the civil war now raging prevents the deal that ultimately must be done.

Iran. In pursuit of our policy, I journeyed three times to Iran in eighteen months and met counterparts elsewhere also. The visits were not easy, but essential and personal relationships really matter. We have significant bilateral differences, not least our dual nationals, but also the larger strategic concerns. The JCPOA dominated the latter. My early months were spent supporting Boris Johnson as we tried to deal with the threat to the JCPOA of the US pulling out. I stood in for him at a tense meeting of the E3+3 and Iran at the UN in September 2017, listening to a fascinating exchange between Secretary of State Tillerson and Foreign Minister Zarif. Despite all efforts of other partners, the US withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018.

In his book, *The Back Channel*, William Burns says of this:

> *'Trump's abrogation was another reminder of how much easier it is to tear down diplomacy than to build it. Pulling out of the deal alienated allies who had joined us in the effort for many years. It also betrayed an obsession with Iran that exaggerated its strategic weight and undermined larger priorities like rebuilding alliances or managing great power rivals.'*

I agree with every word.

This brings me to some discussion of US policy and my bewilderment with elements of it. No one doubts that Iran's behaviour in the region has been destabilising in many ways and the UK feels elements of it extremely keenly. We have no dispute with our friends in the region on this.

The question is: what to do? Having received our Embassy staff at London Airport in 2011 with only the clothes they stood up in, following the attack and fire at the Embassy there, I now found myself with a new opportunity. I sought only to understand how Iran sees the world, with no compromise as to whether I agreed with its perception. I felt it right that our door to Iran remains open, which I judge to be useful when others are shut. And we persist with trying ourselves to stick to the JCPOA, working on economic measures with EU partners, which puts us in a better position to require Iran to adhere to its elements of the deal.

But US policy undermines this, having withdrawn from an agreement which, however flawed as we all recognise, was the best that could be negotiated and at least had Iran in a non-nuclear box, which must be better than the alternative. Of course there was more to do, but at least it was a base to build on, with presumably as much credibility as what the US administration is attempting to do in North Korea. 'Maximum pressure' on a state which endured a war with Iraq in which perhaps a million of its people died seems at present unlikely to work on its own.

Travelling regularly to Jerusalem and the Gulf, I am not unaware that the UK's position is not universally agreed with. But what success is there to show so far for maximum pressure? And equally fairly, what success have we to show for an alternative? Not much, for Iran fails stubbornly to accept that all the perceived ills against it will not be satisfied to their divided leadership's content before it needs to take some action of its own, a case I suspect the Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt made again to Iran in Brussels this week. I will return to this before I conclude.

My next task was to stay engaged with the US on the **MEPP**. I met with Jason Greenblatt a number of times, and found him gracious, thoughtful, but on the topic in hand, mute. Like everyone else we worked out why: that the team had had enough of failures in the past and wanted to keep everyone in the dark to prevent sabotage of elements of the plan. My advice was regular and unswerving - let us into the plan at some stage before you release it, allow your friends the opportunity to help; we may only get one further chance of this.

So, three things: do not humiliate the Palestinians; there must be some reward in terms of statehood for two decades of acceptance of Israel and security cooperation; and a large cheque is not an alternative to the first two.

Meanwhile any attempt to maintain the US position of honest broker on the MEPP was being shredded by a series of pronouncements from the administration. The status of Jerusalem, the status of refugees, the withdrawal of funding to UNWRA, and the position of the Golan, amongst others. It was hard to rebut the claims from many that we were seeing US policy being spelled out before us.

I am pleased the UK continued its independent line, rejecting these breaches in international consensus in the face of an administration which appears to care little for it, or indeed any international agreements not to its liking, from climate change to the JCPOA. This does not make our greatest ally easy to work with, currently.

Finally in terms of my brief, I had to do all I could re the humanitarian position in Syria. As in Yemen, the benefit of a Minister working across DFID and the FCO was seen at its maximum in conflict situations. The atmospherics were different.

On **Yemen**, there was a hostile Commons. No matter how I sought to explain the position

of the Saudi-led coalition, with the UAE and Bahrain, in terms of legitimacy or that both Saudi and the UAE faced missile and other attacks from the Houthi insurgency with external material or that Houthi-controlled areas were guilty of chronic abuses of aid and actively prevented aid getting through, many in the Commons believed that Saudi Arabia and the UAE were solely to blame for the situation in Yemen and all would come to a stop benevolently if only the UK stopped supplying arms.

If only life was so simple. I did all I could to support the efforts of successive UN Envoys, as the UK was clear in the light of evidence that a military solution, as opposed to pressure, would not achieve a long-term successful outcome and that at the same time as understanding the legitimacy of the coalition action, to explain to it the impact of its military campaign in terms of public opinion, access to aid, and the condition of the Yemeni people and the need for all its military procedures to adhere strictly to IHL. Our financial support to aid Yemen has reached over £770m, working with remarkable partners in the UN like WFP, but it has been hard to have this acknowledged as any more than what we give with one hand is countered by arms sales with the other.

Whilst this has been personally agonising, as I admitted to the International Development Select Committee, I do not believe we could have done otherwise in the circumstances and strongly support the efforts being made by Martin Griffiths, who finally engineered the Stockholm Agreement. Again, more to say in my conclusions.

In **Syria**, there are no such agonising conflicts of interest. We supported the efforts of Staffan de Mistura, but recognise the realities of modern life, which mean if you have no military skin in the game, your presence at the decision-making table is a bit optional for other parties. So whilst supporting and maintaining regular contact with legitimate Syrian opposition figures, my principal interest became the refugee and migrant issue. The UK's support has been its greatest ever to a conflict - some £2.8bn. But, as with so many other things in life, traditional support to those fleeing conflict is being affected by modern pressures.

True, aid agencies are doing amazing work. I visited camps and communities in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, saw the efforts being made not just for food, water and shelter, but for double shift education from enlightened host governments and hard pressed local communities. In the UK we have absolutely no understanding whatsoever of the true impact of refugees and migrants, reaching the proportion of a quarter of the population of Lebanon.

But a couple of matters of note. Conflicts last longer, so refugees stay in host countries longer. This increases pressure, as we see particularly in Lebanon. Every community has an identity - the addition of hundreds of thousands to carefully balanced populations cannot go unremarked for long.

And what if states do not want their refugees back, as Assad's regime suggests? What is the international community's response to the needs of host states then? Of course, continue with the effort for a peaceful solution to the conflict, but if conditions are not safe and an original state does not want to see certain returns, where do respective rights lie? International law is clear on refoulement, but is that an answer to acute political pressures? What if neighbours no longer accept refugees from the outset if they fear they will not leave?

You read my brief. If therefore these have been my major tasks over the past couple of years, where next for UK policy and what are any conclusions I may have as inevitably I have left the FCO for the last time - as Minister.

I should hold back no longer on the cloud which has hung over my time since 2017, Brexit, and must be addressed in terms of UK policy going forward. I hold the result of the Brexit referendum of 2016 as a deep disappointment. I accept the result as a democratic politician, who voted for the process which led to the referendum, even though I voted to remain in the EU, and hold elements of the vote to be highly questionable.

Brexit has tainted everything in its path for the past thirty years, from the gradual takeover of the Conservative Party with its historic European emphasis, forged by the wartime experiences of political figures who knew the dangers of nationalism, unrestrained European competition, and political enmity, to the pollution of elements of the media, with a steady drip-drip of poison over the years. The nation's politics are divided as never before and the building blocks of a certain kind of stability are shaken, with uncertain consequences, not least for the Union of the UK. According to certain opinion polls, many people would seem to have lost their senses in terms of trade-offs to leave the EU, such is the obsession surrounding it.

The impact of leaving the EU in terms of our global political relationships and the mechanisms to develop shared positions was one of the least considered areas of the debate in the UK. I deeply regret the loss of access to the FAC, and equally importantly the many side conversations and bilaterals at numerous scheduled get-togethers, for which we must now somehow work out alternatives. I value my own relationships with counterparts, particularly, though not exclusively my friends in Paris and Berlin, and they remain on speed dial!

But overall, the impact must risk a lessening of the UK's common ground with the EU in confronting perceived shared risk. This can only be of comfort to those who might wish to see such a fracture, which we must now recognise are no longer solely certain states with which we have differences, but more sinister global business and right-wing political networks of those whose self-interests are not to be limited by conventional state boundaries and partnerships. There are long-standing political drivers urging the UK to move the UK closer to the US, but it is currently a different US, which lacks the character of previous administrations in how it sees itself in terms of its relationship to the world.

A characteristic shared by some in London and Washington is that we are both held hostage in some way by the international order we have created and been part of, that agreements have been designed to constrain us, that somehow we have been victims of all this, and now need either to put ourselves first or become 'independent' again, one of the Leave movement's biggest lies in the UK. This nonsense must be rejected.

The threat to multilateralism has been a cause spearheaded in recent times by Angela Merkel in a series of speeches in many countries, most notably her address at Harvard, where she stressed multilateralism instead of unilateralism, and in a deliberate echo of President Reagan urged us to:

> *'Tear down the walls of ignorance and narrowmindedness, for nothing has to stay as it is.'*

Her story, and that of her country, is a reminder not only of the triumph of the human spirit against oppression, which she visibly represents, but also that we have seen nationalism, victimhood and aggressive rhetoric before, and we know where it ends. It seems to me sometimes, as one who began life in Parliament with giants like Willie Whitelaw and Denis Healey, men who had seen the ruins of Europe at first hand as soldiers and were determined to build anew something which would truly ensure 'never again', that a second generation has forgotten the lessons of the past and become complacent for what we have without realising how fragile it all is. The world order post-1945 did not spring from political idealism, but from tragedy worldwide. History is not some sort of wallpaper decoration to have in the background and admire fondly - if we do not learn from it, we will fail again.

This is especially true when we think of new challenges to the Middle East and North Africa. The recent successful summit between the League of Arab States and the EU had as a new priority migration and climate change issues. Both have the capacity to radically change the politics of the region and overlaying these challenges on a fractured region does not bode well. As the recent global compact efforts by the UN demonstrated, it is inconceivable that these issues can be met by states working alone. The UN has a vital role to play, which is why its reform needs to continue, for none other at present seem able to take its place.

The figures of population growth in the Arab world are startling enough; it has nearly tripled since 1970, from 128 million to 359 million. The Arab region is expected to reach 600 million by 2050, a two thirds increase from 2010.

Coupled with population growth in sub-Saharan Africa, a whole new box of issues emerges, which could well dwarf existing political threats, though they will exacerbate them. Thirst and desertification affect all faiths and ethnicities alike, but scarcity without collaboration will inflame existing tensions.

So what needs resolution if we are to confront these challenges?

Firstly, all these new issues provide an opportunity for new dialogue amongst existing allies and rivals alike. They cannot be compartmentalised. Climate change knows no boundaries, and the movements of people driven by conflict, chaos, or climate cannot be met by walls alone without risking some dramatic confrontation or tragedy. We should be setting up such mechanisms for talks now. They can build on what are already successful steps towards technological change which have world wide applications and benefits, as science and ingenuity from the Maghreb to the Gulf provide hope for the future. Politics needs to both follow and inspire. The Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees are a start, but need to be built on. It would be good if all responsible states took part.

Secondly, long-standing, unresolved issues will not remain stable but get worse and all will be exacerbated by the new issues. There needs to be urgent efforts to resolve existing kinetic wars, but others, including lesser discussed such as Western Sahara, must not drift.

The MEPP must not be allowed to wither. It seems unclear what, if anything, can now spring from the US envoy's work. Elements of the economic package were revealed in Bahrain, but we await the political suggestions now with some trepidation. The tinder of the West Bank and Gaza is exceptionally dry and new sparks stemming from increased religious extremism on all sides, coupled with uncertain political outcomes from Ramallah to Jerusalem, are threatening. I have little doubt that the UK Parliament will hold to two states, a shared capital of Jerusalem and a just political resolution for other issues including settlements and Israel's security, but will be open to new ideas if they have the backing of those principally involved. Once a proposal is out there, I hope that the UK government will feel emboldened, with others, to take a role as the US, which will remain vital, is compromised in its position as broker for obvious reasons.

We should not give up on Iran either. The current stalemate is constantly threatening to morph into worse, from a miscalculation in the Gulf to a missile from Yemen striking a disastrous target in either the UAE or Saudi Arabia, changing the picture in an instant. The one-club tactic of the US will not work and it is essential that regional partners are now backed by the UK when they remind the US that this issue is more about them and their region than the US.

We should continue our efforts to hold Iran to the JCPOA, but use all opportunities, including some of the new threats which will challenge all states, as the basis for some exploratory talks about matters of mutual concern. We should also step up efforts to encourage the US to use a return to the JCPOA for the wider discussion of threat in the region we all need to have.

I suppose my most serious conclusion, from the years I have spent engaged in the region as Minister, and from the years beforehand as an MP since 1983, a Parliamentarian when

various decisions were taken, is that wars between states in the Middle East, with or without external involvement, just do not work and will not do so in future. They cannot be 'won' in any meaningful sense. The economic costs are frightful enough – trillions lost in GDP, years of repair. The current estimates to repair Syria are $250 billion - who will pay that? But the impact on populations, from immediate effects of famine, death and injury to longer-term displacement, lack of fulfilled potential and impact on a future generation who will not forget and who are more than ever prey to those who threaten all.

Do not mistake me. Taking up arms against terror remains right, from the Sahel to the plains of Nineveh, from Paris and Manchester to the Bardo and Basra, but for states to contemplate war against each other in the 21st century, knowing all we know and avoiding escape routes must be counted as almost insane.

Iran is a case in immediate point. The risk of a nuclear-armed Iran was dealt with, after intense effort, by the JCPOA. And do not neglect Russia's contribution to that effort, nor that with increasing activity in the area for one reason or another comes increasing responsibility. I welcome the PM's recent meeting with President Putin - there is much to be done, but I regret that my most recent time in office coincided with such a difficult time between us, when I knew from experience that engagement with Russia in the area is vital.

To be returning to threats of war with Iran, as whatever mutual relationship - I shall not say trust - has been so badly damaged seems like a massive diplomatic failure, which must not be allowed to turn into anything worse. Iran will not go away and a regional accommodation is ultimately essential, and the region should be the prime movers of this, not external players.

William Burn's conclusion is worth a listen:

> *'As part of a long-term strategy, we should reassure our traditional Arab partners against the treats they face whether from Sunni extremist groups or a predatory Iran. But we should insist in return that Sunni Arab leadership recognise that regional order will ultimately require some modus vivendi with Iran that will remain a substantial power even if it tempers its revolutionary overreach. We should also insist that they address the profound crisis of governance that was at the heart of the Arab Spring. Genuine friendship with Israel should impel us to push for a two-state solution with Palestinians that is already past its expiration date, but without which Israel's future as a Jewish, democratic state will be in peril.'*

So we must invest even more in diplomacy and I hope a new prime minister in the UK will boost the diplomatic reach of the FCO and maintain our remarkable DFID record. We must invest more, bilaterally and multi-laterally, in peace-building as well as conflict resolution. Too many conflicts reignite in areas which had seen others come to an end, which

are then not effectively dealt with. Women must be engaged more in peace resolution and state re-building throughout the region - it was lamentable that at the Palermo Conference on Libya last year, women specifically invited were kept away from the table. There are excellent women ministers and representatives emerging, confounding critics of the Arab World. More please!

Finally, and to a bit of uplift, let us think of the young. The underlying causes of the Arab Spring will continue to be tested by demographic change. Overlay a growing young population seeking better, more focused education, new jobs, being better connected through modern technology to those living elsewhere, wanting more of a say over their lives, and challenging those authorities, religious and civil to which they have looked in the past, with a failure to confront corruption, bad governance, old economies, sectarian separations and we have a bad recipe. But it need not be so. With enlightened leadership from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, opportunities will abound. We will support Algeria, for a recent example, as it responds peacefully and thoughtfully to current pressures, having learned so much from others, in the belief that it will find its own pathway forward.

The UK's encouragement of the good things in the Arab world will certainly continue. The Chevening Scholarships, the British Council and English language, our mutual work on developing new trade, especially important post-Brexit, with new tech industries appealing to younger, enterprising communities we note everywhere - all this provides much hope for the future.

Resolution of long-standing issues will feed into this also. One of the reasons I am so passionate about the MEPP is that to plug Israel's thriving, energetic economy into that of the Arab world as a full partner, surely only possible after a political resolution, would transform the region's economies, and job prospects for these millions looking for a future. On this the envoys are right, but we all knew that anyway.

Finding ways to release the ingenuity of Iran's people must also offer a better future for them, than allowing a tune of the world being against Iran to be endlessly played by its government.

I have said more than enough. I always regret that there is not more time to talk of other things in the Arab world and region I am so fond of and which has been so good to me in terms of lifelong friendships and memories. Mauritania, which has new economic prospects now, where I inaugurated our presence, Oman, with our 'unshook' relationship, which plays a vital role of intermediary in many issues in the Gulf, I think are the only two I have not referred to during my remarks.

But each of those I have already mentioned have many other sides beyond politics: the magic of Marrakesh, which I finally got to see 50 years after Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young; our 120 years of friendship with Kuwait, marked by the presence of our joint national

treasure, the Dean of the Court; Dubai 2020 in the capable hands of an exceptional Minister, and the remarkable visit of the Pope to the UAE giving living testimony to the need for religious tolerance everywhere; Bahrain with our new naval facility for Gulf security; Qatar 22 (if only it was cricket!); Baalbek in Lebanon set to rival Roman heritage anywhere; the relationship of the British Museum with trainee archaeologists in Iraq; the patience of HH the Emir in Kuwait; Algeria through to the Nations Cup Final – don't let it go to penalties!

Enough. I have spent 32 years in the House of Commons. I do not know when it comes to an end. But I do hope, whatever happens, there may be a final chapter for me and North Africa and the Middle East in some capacity, and I will remain forever grateful for the warmth of the welcome of its representatives and the patience with which they have helped the accidental Arabist they found in 2010.

GSF Seminar: *"Global Britain': Implications For Defence And Security'*

Dr. Brian Klaas, Lord Lothian and Dr. Karin von Hippel



Professor Yoon Young-kwan and Mr. John Everard

British Council/GSF Conference: *'Radicalisation And Violent Extremism In The Western Balkans'*



Mr. Alan Charlton, Mr. John Everard and Professor Timothy Power

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM EVENTS IN 2018-2019

17th October 2018	Lecture on *'EU Foreign Policy, Security And Defence After Brexit: The View From Europe'* by **Mr. Radosław (Radek) Sikorski**, Poland's Minister of Defence (2005-2007), Foreign Minister (2007-2014), and Speaker of Parliament (2014-2015); and chaired by GSF Advisory Board member, **The Rt Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC**.
24th October 2018	Lecture on *''Global Britain': The Implications For Foreign Policy?'* by **The Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB PC Hon FBA**, Chairman, The Iraq Inquiry (2009-2016), Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (1990-1997), and GSF Advisory Board member.
30th October 2018	Seminar on *''Global Britain': Implications For Defence & Security?'*. The seminar took place in One Whitehall Place (The Whitehall Suite). The conference was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and GSF Advisory Board member, **Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**, and the following speakers took part: **Mr. Con Coughlin**, Defence and Foreign Affairs Editor, *The Daily Telegraph*; **General The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL**, Constable of The Tower of London, and Chief of the Defence Staff (2013-2016); **Mr. Tom McKane**, Senior Associate Fellow, RUSI and Senior Visiting Fellow, LSE Ideas; **Mrs Madeleine Moon MP**, Member, House of Commons Defence Committee; **The Rt Hon. the Lord Robertson of Port Ellen KT GCMG PC**, Secretary General of NATO (1999-2004), and Secretary of State for Defence (1997-1999); and **Sir Peter Westmacott GCMG LVO**, Distinguished Ambassadorial Fellow, Atlantic Council, and Former UK Ambassador to Turkey, France and the US.
14th November 2018	Lecture on *'Britain's Struggle With America To Dominate The Post-War Middle East'* by **Mr. James Barr**, Visiting Fellow, King's College London, and Author of *Lords Of The Desert*.
20th November 2018	Debate on *'Two Years' In: Trump And The Global Order – The Trajectory Of American Foreign Policy?'*, with **Dr. Brian Klaas**, Assistant Professor of Global Politics at University College London, and a weekly columnist for *The Washington Post*; and **Dr. Karin von Hippel**, Director-General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

27th November 2018	Lecture on *'Is There Hope For Yemen?'* by **Professor Charles Garraway CBE**, Fellow at the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, and Member of the UN Group of Eminent Experts for Yemen.
11th December 2018	Christmas Drinks and Lecture on *'The Spy And The Traitor: The Greatest Espionage Story Of The Cold War'* by **Mr. Ben Macintyre**, Columnist and Associate Editor, *The Times*.
22nd January 2019	Lecture on *'Denuclearization And Peace-Building On The Korean Peninsula'* by **Professor Yoon Young-kwan**, Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University, and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea (2003-2004); and chaired by **Mr. John Everard**, British Ambassador to North Korea (2006–2008).
23rd January 2019	Lecture on *'Western Defence And The Global Order: Where Now?'* by **Dr. Kori Schake**, Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
29th January 2019	Conference on *'Radicalisation And Violent Extremism In The Western Balkans'*. The conference took place in the National Liberal Club in collaboration with the British Council and was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Ms. Mia Marzouk**, Regional Conflict Advisor, Western Balkans, Foreign & Commonwealth Office. The following speakers took part: **Dr. Vlado Azinović**, Lead Senior Researcher, Western Balkans; **Mr. Gjergji Vurmo**, Senior Researcher for Albania; **Dr. Edina Bećirević**, Senior Researcher for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro; **Mr. Shpend Kursani**, Senior Researcher for Kosovo; **Ms. Natasia Kalajdziovski**, Junior Researcher and co-author of the ERF report for Macedonia; and **Mr. Predrag Petrović**, Senior Researcher for Serbia. **Ms. Clare Sears**, Director, Western Balkans, British Council also gave welcoming remarks.
5th February 2019	Lecture on *'International Development In An Age Of Global Britain'* by **Mr. Matthew Rycroft CBE**, Permanent Secretary at the Department for International Development.
26th February 2019	Lecture on *'The Secrets Of MI14 (d), Operation Columba And Britain's Wartime Pigeon Service'* by **Mr. Gordon Corera**, BBC Security Correspondent, and Author of *Secret Pigeon Service*.

12th March 2019	Debate on *'Bolsonaro's Brazil - Break With Failed Governance Or Dangerous Lurch To The Right?'* with **Mr. Alan Charlton CMG CVO**, British Ambassador to Brazil (2008-2013); and **Professor Timothy Power**, Professor of Latin American Politics at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, and Head of School at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies; and chaired by **Mr. John Everard**, British Ambassador to North Korea (2006–2008).
19th March 2019	Debate on *'Where Does UK Foreign Policy Go From Here?'* with GSF Advisory Board members, **The Rt Hon. the Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC**; **The Rt Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC**; and **The Rt Hon. Jack Straw**.
26th March 2019	Discussion on *'UK Foreign Policy In A Shifting World Order',* the fifth report of the House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations (published on 18th December 2018), with four members of the Committee: **The Rt Hon. the Lord Howell of Guildford** (Chair); **Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG CH**; **Baroness Smith of Newnham**; and **Lord Wood of Anfield**.
2nd April 2019	Lecture on *'Seize Opportunities, Tackle Challenges And Promote The Steady And Sustained Development Of The China-UK 'Golden Era'* by **Ms. Chen Wen**, Minister and First Staff Member in the Embassy of China in the UK.
1st May 2019	Lecture on *'Moscow: The Third Rome?'* by **The Rt Rev. and the Rt Hon. Lord Chartres KCVO**, Bishop of London (1995-2017).
15th May 2019	Lecture on *'The Commonwealth@70: A Beacon For Multilateral Connection And Collaboration'* by **The Rt Hon. Patricia Scotland QC**, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.
22nd May 2019	Lecture on *'Is There A Way Out Of Middle East And Great Power Escalation?'* by **Mr. Alastair Crooke**, Director of Conflicts Forum.
28th May 2019	Lecture on *'The Rise And Fall Of Peace on Earth'* by **Professor Michael Mandelbaum**, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; and chaired by GSF Advisory Board member, **Professor Michael Clarke**, Director General, RUSI (2007-2015).

12th June 2019	Seminar on '*The Diasporas Of South East Europe And Their Role In International Relations'*. The seminar took place in the National Liberal Club in collaboration with South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony's College, University of Oxford and was chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**. The following speakers took part: **Dr. Othon Anastasakis**, Director of SEESOX, St Antony's College, University of Oxford; **Dr. Foteini Kalantzi**, A.G. Leventis Research Officer for the Greek Diaspora Project at SEESOX, St Antony's College, University of Oxford; **Sir David Madden**, Chair of the SEESOX Steering Committee and Distinguished Friend at St Antony's College, University of Oxford; and **Dr. Manolis Pratsinakis**, Onassis Research Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford and Deputy Coordinator of the Diaspora Project at SEESOX.
18th June 2019	Debate on *'From 9/11 To Today: Is The Face Of Terrorism Changing?'* with **Dr. Shakira Hussein**, writer and researcher based at the National Institute for Excellence in Islamic Studies at the University of Melbourne; and **Professor Peter Neumann**, Professor of Security Studies at the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and founder of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR).
25th June 2019	Lecture on *'Putin: How The West Gets Him Wrong'* with **Professor Mark Galeotti**, Principal Director, Mayak Intelligence, Honorary Professor, UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies, and Senior Associate Fellow, RUSI.
3rd July 2019	Research Launch co-hosted with the British Council entitled *'Building A Lasting Peace: New Approaches To Conflict And Recovery'* with **Professor Gayle McPherson** of the University of the West of Scotland; and **Professor Joanne Hughes** of the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice at Queen's University Belfast. The event was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Mr. Dan Shah**, Director, Research at the British Council.
10th July 2019	Lecture on *'Global Instabilities: What Is Most On My Mind And What Should We Be Worried About?'* by **Sir John Scarlett KCMG OBE**, Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (2004-2009).

17th July 2019	Lecture on *'The Accidental Arabist Reflects....Again!'* by **The Rt Hon. Alistair Burt MP**, Minister of State for the Middle East at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Minister of State at the Department for International Development (2017-2019).



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General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE served as Commander Joint Forces Command, one of the six 'Chiefs of Staff' leading the UK Armed Forces until April 2016. He was responsible for 23,000 people worldwide and a budget of £4.3bn, delivering intelligence, Special Forces, operational command and control, all surveillance, reconnaissance and information systems and communications, operational logistics, medical support, and advanced education and training across the Armed Forces. An artillery officer, his military career included leadership from Captain to General on military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan – often as part of US-led coalitions and in NATO. He is President and Colonel Commandant of the Honourable Artillery Company, a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. His ambitions now are to be at forefront of applying disruptive technology as it revolutionises business, society, government and defence, to find a leading part in addressing the causes of instability, tension and conflict in a rapidly changing world, and to contribute to the continuing evolution of defence and security thinking worldwide. He provides board-level geo-strategic insight, advice and influence, and supports senior corporate leadership development programmes. He advises and lectures regularly on defence and security policy, cyber risk and security to City, academic, parliament, military and commercial fora. In promoting the rapid development of combinations of the digital age technologies in the 4th Industrial Revolution, he is developing the principles and major capability bets that should guide the transformation of Western defence in particular.

The Rt Hon. the Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC is one of the most respected and successful politicians of his generation. He was educated at Hillhead High School and the University of Glasgow where he graduated MA and LLB and was President of the Union, and Stanford University, California, where he undertook post-graduate studies in international law. He competed in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and was captain of the UK Athletics Team in 1965 and 1966. He held the British 100m record from 1967 to 1974. He was called to the Scottish Bar as an advocate in 1968 and appointed Queens Counsel in 1982. He was elected MP for North East Fife in 1987. In Parliament, his particular interests were foreign affairs and defence and he was his Party's principal spokesman on both. He has been a member of the Foreign Affairs, Defence, Members Interests, Trade and Industry, and Intelligence Committees. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 2003 and was the Leader of the Party between March 2006 and October 2007. He led the UK delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly between 2010 and 2015 and was later elected a Vice President of the Assembly. He was awarded the CBE in 1987, became a Privy Councillor in 1999, knighted in 2004 and appointed a Companion of Honour in 2013. He holds honorary degrees from three Scottish Universities, including St Andrews where he became Chancellor in 2006. He stood down from the House of Commons in 2015 and the same year was appointed to the House of Lords.

The Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB PC Hon FBA was educated at Brighton College (Lyon scholar) and Pembroke College, Cambridge (open scholar and research and teaching scholar, 1957-63). He joined the Home Office in 1963, and worked for the Head of the Civil Service, William Armstrong, and several Home Secretaries (Roy Jenkins, Merlyn Rees and Willie Whitelaw) as private secretary. Postings to the Cabinet Office, and as head of policing and national security policy at the Home Office followed. He then served as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office from 1990 to the end of 1997. On retiring from Whitehall, he was appointed by the Prime Minister as Staff Counsellor to the Security and Intelligence Agencies, and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Sir John led or chaired a number of government Inquiries and reviews including Royal and VIP security, the IRA penetration of the RUC's Special Branch HQ, the use of intercept evidence in criminal trials, the Butler Review of the intelligence on Iraq, and finally he chaired the Iraq War Inquiry from 2009 to 2016. Aside from government-related service, he was at various times a non-executive director of RTZ's industrial group, a seconded director at Schroders, Chair of the construction industry's pensions and benefit schemes, and Chair (now President) of the Police Foundation think tank. Sir John was elected as an Honorary Fellow of the British Academy in 2019.

Professor Michael Clarke was Director General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) from 2007 to 2015. Until 2001 he was Deputy Vice-Principal and Director for Research Development at King's College London, where he remains a Visiting Professor of Defence Studies. From 1990 to 2001 he was the founding Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King's. He was appointed Professor in 1995. He is now a Fellow of King's College London and of the Universities of Aberystwyth and of Exeter, where he is also Associate Director of the Strategic Studies Institute. He has previously taught at the Universities of Aberystwyth, Manchester and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and also at the University of New Brunswick and the Open University. He has been a Guest Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, and a Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at Chatham House in London. He has been a specialist adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee since 1997, having served previously with the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 1995-6, and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Bribery in 2009. In 2004 he was appointed as the UK's member of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. In 2009 he was appointed to the Prime Minister's National Security Forum and in 2010 to the Chief of Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Group. He also served on the Strategic Advisory Panel on Defence for UK Trade and Industry and in 2014 was Chairman of the Defence Communications Advisory panel for the Ministry of Defence. In March 2014 he was appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister to chair an Independent Surveillance Review at RUSI which reported in 2015. That report, *A Democratic Licence To Operate: The Report Of The Independent Surveillance Review*, was published as part of the public discussion around the Interception of Communications Bill, enacted into law in December 2016. In January 2016 he was appointed a specialist adviser to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy. In October 2016 he was also appointed to Chair the independent inquiry into drone warfare on behalf of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones.

Secretary William S. Cohen is Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a business consulting firm based in Washington, DC which provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board of CBS, and on the advisory boards of the US–India Business Council, the US-China Business Council and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the weekly World Affairs Contributor for CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organisation in the US with a budget of $300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as Secretary of Defense marked the first time in modern US history that a President chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the US Senate and three terms in the US House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine and received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College, and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or co-authored ten books – four non-fiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

Sir Evelyn de Rothschild is currently Chairman of E.L. Rothschild, a private investment company. He is Chairman of the ERANDA Foundation, a family foundation he founded in 1967 to support charities working in the fields of medical research, health and welfare, education and the arts. In addition, Sir Evelyn currently serves as a Governor Emeritus of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow of Imperial College London and is an Honorary Life President of Norwood and Ravenswood Children's Charity. From 1976 until 2003, Sir Evelyn was Chairman and CEO of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd, the international investment bank. From 1972 until 1989, Sir Evelyn also served as Chairman of the Economist Group, from 1977 to 1994 Chairman of United Racecourses Ltd and previously he served on the Board of Directors of De Beers and IBM UK as well as serving as Deputy Chairman of Milton Keynes Development Corporation, Chairman of St Mary's Hospital Medical School, Member of the Council of the Shakespeare Globe Trust and President of The Evelina Children's Hospital Appeal. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1989 for services to banking and finance.

Susan Eisenhower is the CEO and Chairman of The Eisenhower Group, Inc. (EGI), a Washington DC based consulting company founded in 1985. For thirty years the company has provided strategic counsel on business development, public affairs and communications projects. EGI has advised Fortune 500 companies, on projects in the United States and Europe, but also in China, Russia, and Central Asia. In addition to her work through EGI, Susan Eisenhower has also had a distinguished career as a policy analyst. She is Chairman Emeritus of The Eisenhower Institute, where she served as president twice. At Gettysburg College, Eisenhower holds a yearlong seminar, *Strategy and Leadership in*

Transformational Times (SALTT), for competitively selected students at the Eisenhower Institute. She has also been a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics and a Distinguished Fellow at the Nixon Center, now called the Center for National Interest. Over the years, she has served as a member of three blue ribbon commissions for the Department of Energy for three different secretaries: The Baker-Cutler Commission on US Funded Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia; The Sununu-Meserve Commission on Nuclear Energy; and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which released its findings on a comprehensive program for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the winter of 2012. She was also appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control, where she served eight years. After as many years on the NASA Advisory Council, she served as a commissioner on the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. She is currently a member of MIT's Energy Initiative Advisory Board and co-chairman of NEAC, the Secretary of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Board. In June 2016, she received the Legion d'honneur from the French Government, in recognition of her years of policy work, especially in US-Russian Relations. In addition, she has spoken in many corporate venues, as well as at such distinguished institutions as the United States Military Academy at West Point; the Foreign Policy Association of New York; the Army War College, Carlisle; Sandia National Laboratory, MIT and Australia's Science and Technology Organization, which is part of the Australian Ministry of Defence. Eisenhower has authored hundreds of op-eds for newspapers such as the *Washington Post* and the *LA Times*, appeared frequently on national television and radio, and her articles have appeared in such journals as the National Academy of Sciences' Issues in Science and Technology and the Naval Institutes' Proceedings. She has written four trade press books, two of which were on regional best seller lists, and she co-authored or co-edited four other books on international security issues.

The Rt Hon. Frank Field MP DL worked as Director of the Child Poverty Action Group from 1969-1979 during which time it became one of the premier pressure groups in the country. In 1974 he also became Director of the Low Pay Unit until 1980. In 1979, he was elected Member of Parliament for Birkenhead. Between 1980 and 1981 he served as Shadow Education and Social Security spokesman under the leadership of Michael Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Social Security Select Committee and continued in this role up to 1997. From 1997-1998 he accepted the position of Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair's first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a member of the Public Accounts Committee between 2002 and 2005. Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy and committed. In 1999 he helped set up the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. The group has acted as an important independent think tank for the cause of a long-term, investment led reform to the pension system. Since 2001 he has also chaired the Church Conservation Trust and has helped develop the trust from being one primarily concerned with conserving the best architectural gems of the Church to one which tries to open up such places for alternative use. From 2005, he has also been chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics Commission which is the planning authority for English cathedrals.

The Lord Fraser of Corriegarth is the son of Ian Fraser, Baron Fraser of Tullybelton, a prominent Scottish lawyer who later became a Law Lord. He was educated at Eton College and St John's College, Oxford where he read Philosophy, Politics and Economics. He has worked in the City for most of his life. Major jobs included: CEO of Baring Securities in the UK; Director of Barings Bank; Chairman of EPL, a Bangladeshi investment bank; Chairman of Bridge Securities, a quoted Korean bank and lastly, Director of Asia Frontier Capital, a fund management company based in Hong Kong focusing on equity investments in Asia. More recently, Lord Fraser was Treasurer of the Better Together Campaign which was the main focus for the 'No' vote and kept Scotland as part of the United Kingdom. He was Treasurer of the Conservative Party from 2015–2016 and made Life Peer in 2016 as part of David Cameron's resignation honours. Lord Fraser is a Member of the Queen's Bodyguard for Scotland (The Archers).

Secretary Chuck Hagel was the 24th Secretary of Defense, serving from February 2013 to February 2015. He is the only Vietnam veteran and the first enlisted combat veteran to serve as Secretary of Defense. Hagel also served two terms in the United States Senate (1997-2009) representing the state of Nebraska. Some of Hagel's current commitments include serving on the Board of Trustees of RAND; Advisory Boards of Deutsche Bank America and Corsair Capital; Senior Advisor to Gallup and to the McCarthy Group; Distinguished Executive in Residence at Georgetown University; Distinguished Statesman at the Atlantic Council; and Board of Directors of the American Security Project. Previously, Secretary Hagel served on the Board of the Chevron Corporation and the Zurich Holding Company of America, was a Distinguished Professor at Georgetown University, Co-Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, Chairman of the Atlantic Council, Chairman of the United States of America Vietnam War Commemoration Advisory Committee, and Co-Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Corporate Council. He served as a member of the Secretary of Defense's Policy Board, Secretary of Energy's Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of Nuclear Power, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Board of Directors and the Systemic Risk Council. Prior to his election to the US Senate, Hagel was president of McCarthy & Company, an investment banking firm in Omaha, Nebraska. In the mid-1980s, Hagel co-founded VANGUARD Cellular Systems, Inc., a publicly traded corporation. He was President and CEO of the World USO, Private Sector Council (PSC), and Chief Operating Officer of the 1990 Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations (G-7 Summit). Hagel also served as Deputy Administrator of the Veterans Administration under President Ronald Reagan and Deputy Commissioner General of the 1982 World's Fair. He is the author of the book, *America: Our Next Chapter* and was the subject of a 2006 book by Charlyne Berens entitled, *Chuck Hagel: Moving Forward*. A graduate of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, Hagel and his wife, Lilibet, have a daughter (Allyn) and son (Ziller).

The Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield is a British historian of government. Since 1992, he has been Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London. Prior to that, he was a journalist for twenty years with spells on *The Times* as a leader writer and Whitehall Correspondent, *The Financial Times* as its Lobby Correspondent

at Westminster and The Economist. He was a regular presenter of the BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme from 1987 to 1992. In 1986 he was a co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary British History and he was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2003. In 2008, Lord Hennessy won The Times Higher Education's Lifetime Achievement Award. On 5th October 2010, the House of Lords Appointments Commission announced that he was to be appointed a non-political cross-bench Peer. He is a Member of the Chief of the Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Panel. He is an Honorary Captain in the Royal Naval Reserve. Lord Hennessy is author of several books, including *Cabinets And The Bomb* (2007), *The Secret State* (2010) and *The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service Since 1945* with James Jinks (2015).

The Rt Hon. the Lord Howell of Guildford acted as policy adviser to Edward Heath in the 1960s and was Director of the Conservative Political Centre. In the late 1970s he became head of Margaret Thatcher's speech-writing team. He served as Minister of State in Northern Ireland, under William Whitelaw, from 1972 to 1974, at the height of the troubles, before going on to serve as Secretary of State for Energy & Secretary of State for Transport in the first Thatcher Cabinet. In 2010 he was enrolled as Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office with special responsibilities for the Commonwealth and for international energy issues. This made him not only the only person to have served in the three administrations of Heath, Thatcher and Cameron, but also the only Minister on record to have 'come back' after a 27-year break. Until 2002 he was Chairman of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group (the high level bilateral forum between leading UK & Japanese politicians, industrialists & academics), which was first set up by Margaret Thatcher & Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1984. Along with a multitude of other roles, he is currently President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Chairman of the Windsor Energy Group and most recently, chairman of the newly set-up House of Lords Committee for International Relations. David Howell has something of a track record in forecasting developments long in advance and helping to pioneer thinking on the major issues of our times. Thus, in the Heath era he was the first to call for a 'New Style of Government', which would begin to unwind the UK's swollen state activities and liberalise the corporatist state. In the emerging Thatcher era he introduced the privatisation concept to the UK political scene (as chronicled by both the late Lord Howe and by Lord Lawson in their memoirs). In the later 1990s and early 21st century he one of the first to draw political attention to what he called 'Easternisation' and the fast-rising role of Asia, as well as to importance to the UK of the new Commonwealth network. He has all along championed the importance of the UK-Japan relationship. In 2013 he chaired the ground-breaking Lords Report on soft power, called *Persuasion And Power In The Modern World*, seeking a new mindset amongst the UK's foreign policymakers. He is now persistently drawing attention to tomorrow's central significance in international affairs of platform, blockchain and big date technologies and their huge implications for the UK's whole future. He is the author of numerous political pamphlets with notable impact and six books, on energy, politics, innovation and the Internet: *Freedom & Capital* (Blackwell 1982); *Blind Victory* (Hamish Hamilton 1986); *The Edge of Now* (Macmillan 2001); *Out of the Energy Labyrinth*, co-written with Carole Nakhle

(I B Tauris 2008); *Old Links & New Ties: Power & Persuasion In An Age of Networks* (I B Tauris 2014); *Empires In Collision: The Green Versus Black Struggle For Our Energy Future* (Gilgamesh 2016). David Howell was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge.

William Kerr was educated at Ampleforth College and Oxford University. His career was spent in financial services initially in the City of London. He moved to Hong Kong in 1992 to establish Lloyd George Management, an investment advisory company specialising in investment in Asian and global Emerging Markets. He returned to the United Kingdom at the end of 2013 and remains on the boards of a number of investment companies, as well as serving as Trustee for charitable and other organisations.

The Rt Hon. the Lord Lamont of Lerwick was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990–93 and Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Margaret Thatcher. He was a member of the House of Commons for 25 years. He was also a Minister in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector, several with Middle East involvement. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, President of the Economic Research Council and a former Chairman of Le Cercle (a foreign affairs think tank). He was made a Life Peer in July 1998. He is an Honorary Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.

Sir Iain Lobban KCMG CB was the Director of the British security and intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters, from 2008 to 2014, having previously served as its Director General for Operations. He pioneered an integrated service of intelligence and security in domains as varied as cyber defence; counterterrorism; military campaigns overseas; and the prevention and detection of serious crime. Cyber Security, both nationally and internationally, has been at the heart of his role in recent years: he set new direction for innovative government partnering with the private sector and with academia. As the GCHQ Director he attended the UK's National Security Council on a weekly basis from its very first meeting in May 2010 and was a Principal member of the Joint Intelligence Committee for over six years. Sir Iain is now engaged in three fields: the advocacy and demystification of Cyber Security, providing strategic advice and personal perspective, nationally and internationally, to governments and businesses; sharing lessons and insights on strategic and institutional leadership; and entrepreneurship, in the broadest sense of the word.

Sir David Manning GCMG KCVO was educated at Oriel College, Oxford and the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University before joining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1972. He served in Warsaw, New Delhi, Paris and Moscow. From 1994-5 he was Head of Policy Planning; from 1995-8 Ambassador to Israel; and from 1998-2000 he was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence and Intelligence and a member of the Foreign Office Board. He was the UK Permanent Representative at NATO (Brussels) from 2000-2001 before returning to London as Foreign Policy Adviser to

the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (2001-2003). He was then Ambassador to the United States for four years from 2003-2007. Sir David is a Director of Gatehouse Advisory Partners. He is also a Member of the Council of Lloyd's of London.

The Rt Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC was elected as MP for Pentlands in 1974, which he represented until 1997. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992, Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service. Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a MP in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea and he was elected as MP for Kensington in May 2010 until his retirement at the 2015 general election. He was UK representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (2010-2011); and Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2010-2015). He was appointed in 2015 by the OSCE as member of their Eminent Persons Panel examining Russia-West relations and the crisis in Ukraine. He is a member of the Board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in Washington DC, chaired by Senator Sam Nunn, and a Member of Madeleine Albright's Aspen Ministerial Forum. He was appointed by the Government as the British Co-Chairman of the Belvedere British-Polish Forum in 2017. He is currently a Visiting Professor at the Department of War Studies at King's College, London and a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI).

Marshal Of The Royal Air Force The Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC was born in London, and educated at Merchant Taylors' School and the Royal Air Force College Cranwell. He was commissioned into the Royal Air Force in 1970, and after pilot training completed a number of tours in the instructor and fighter reconnaissance roles. This included two years on loan service with the Sultan of Oman's Air Force during the Dhofar War, and three years on exchange with the United States Air Force in Texas. In the 1980s Lord Stirrup commanded No II (AC) Squadron, flying Jaguar aircraft from RAF Laarbruch in Germany, and from 1990 to 1992 he was Officer Commanding RAF Marham in Norfolk, a period that covered the first Gulf War. After attending the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Higher Command and Staff Course, Lord Stirrup served as the Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes in the Ministry of Defence before becoming Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group in 1997. He was Assistant Chief of the Air Staff from 1998 to 2000, and then took up the post of Deputy Commander in Chief Royal Air Force Strike Command. In 2001 he was deployed to United States Central Command immediately following 9/11, and commanded British forces during Operation Veritas, the UK's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Following a tour as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Equipment, he became Chief of the Air Staff in 2003, and was appointed as Chief of the Defence staff in 2006. Following retirement from the military, he was appointed to the House of Lords in 2011, where he is particularly involved in the areas of defence, security, foreign relations and the arts. He lives in Marylebone, is married with one son, a practising cardiologist, and maintains a keen interest in history, music and the theatre.

The Rt Hon. Jack Straw was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice. He has served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. His autobiography, *Last Man Standing: Memoirs Of A Political Survivor*, was published in September 2012. He retired as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election. He continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. He is co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum; takes a close interest in Iran; is a member of the Independent Commission on the Freedom of Information Act; and Chairman of the Blackburn Youth Zone.

The Rt Hon. Gisela Stuart served as Labour MP for Birmingham Edgbaston from 1997-2017, when she decided to step down from Parliament. She was a health minister in the first Blair Government. From 2002 to 2003 she was the parliamentary representative on the Presidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe. One of her fellow Presidium members was the then French Commissioner Michael Barnier. The experience led her to question the direction of the European project. Her Fabian pamphlet The Making of Europe's Constitution summarises her concerns then and ultimately led her to Chair the successful Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 referendum. In parliament she served on the Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committees. In 2015 the Prime Minister appointed her to the Intelligence and Security Committee. Gisela is a founding member of the Henry Jackson Society and still one of its Directors. She is a trustee of Reading Force, a charity devoted to helping service families stay in touch by sharing books. For more than 10 years she edited the political weekly magazine *The House*. Since leaving parliament she chairs Change Britain, a cross party organisation committed to achieving a Brexit deal which is in the best interest of the UK and the EU. She also chairs the Legatum Effective Government Commission and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office announced her appointment as the new Chair of Wilton Park, effective from 1st October 2018.

His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan's Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. A pluralist and staunch campaigner for the rights of all to live in peace and dignity, HRH is a pioneer of Interfaith dialogue and understanding. Prince Hassan's international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prince Hassan has long had an active engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute.

Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG was Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence from 1998-2005, following a short period as Director of GCHQ. His initial career was with the Ministry of Defence and subsequently, from 1979, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His diplomatic postings overseas were: First Secretary, UK Delegation to NATO; Head of Chancery in the British Embassy at Ankara; Director of Cabinet to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington; and Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington DC. Appointments at home covered defence policy and programmes, international economic relations and resource management. Sir Kevin is now engaged in business and academia. He is Senior Independent Director of Smiths Group Plc; Executive Vice President, Government and Defence, for AECOM UK; Chairman of RISC (the UK security industries' trade association); Visiting Professor at King's College London; Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Association; and serves on other advisory boards and charitable trusts.

Admiral the Rt Hon. Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC DUniv joined the Navy in 1965. He spent most of his naval career at sea, serving in 14 different ships and commanding three of them. In 1980 he took command of the frigate HMS ARDENT taking her south to the Falkland Islands in 1982 where she was sunk in their successful recapture. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action. He was Chief of Defence from 1997-2000. He was promoted to Admiral in November 2000 when he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet, NATO Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic and NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces North. He became First Sea Lord in September 2002 and the First and Principal Aide-de-Camp to HM The Queen. He retired as First Sea Lord on 7th February 2006 becoming Chairman of the QinetiQ Defence Advisory Board. He advised both Conservatives and Labour on defence and foreign policy before, in July 2007, being asked by Gordon Brown to join the Government as one of the GOATs (Government of All The Talents) responsible for national security and counterterrorism as well as cyber and Olympic security. He produced the United Kingdom's first ever National Security Strategy and Cyber Security strategy. He was Chairman of The National Security Forum. He left government in May 2010 and is currently a strategic advisor to a number of small companies, a motivational speaker, plus a number of other appointments. Lord West was made a Knight Commander of the Order of The Bath in 2000, Knight Grand Cross in 2004, Baron in 2007 and a Privy Councillor in 2010.

Christopher Wilkins is chairman of North British Windpower, a privately-owned company developing renewable energy in Scotland; he is also on the board of a Canadian distillery and an internet venture. Previously he was the architect and first chairman of Hakluyt & Co, an information gathering company. Before that he established and ran his own company in the paper industry, which he then sold. He was a member of the Scottish Economic Council for ten years. He has also worked in the newspaper industry and prior to that he served in the army for eight years - including some active service in the Middle East.

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