GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

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Lecture Series

2017 - 2018

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Dr. Michael Spindelegger and Lord Lothian

Mr. Trita Parsi and Lord Hannay of Chiswick



Lord Lothian and Mr. Frank Gardner



Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Lord Lothian

Rt Hon Jack Straw, Sir John Sawers and Lord Lothian

Sir John Jenkins and Lord Lothian

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President

Johan Eliasch is the President of Global Strategy Forum and the former Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. He is Chairman and CEO of HEAD (the global sporting goods group), Chairman of Aman Resorts, Equity Partners, London Films and Co-Chairman of Cool Earth. He is an advisory board member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Polar Regions, Brasilinvest, Societe du Louvre, Capstar, the Centre for Social Justice, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Foundation for Renewable Energy and Environment and a member of the Mayor of Rome's and Jerusalem's International Business Advisory Councils. He is a Patron of Stockholm University. He is the Founder of the Rainforest Trust which is conserving 400,000 acres of rainforest in the Amazonas. He was part of the Conservative Shadow Foreign Office team as Special Advisor on European Affairs (1999-2003) and responsible for foreign relations (2003-2005). He was Conservative Party Deputy Treasurer (2003-2007). He was a member of the Austrian President's delegation of State for Trade and Industry (1996-2006). He was chairman of the Young Conservatives Party in Djursholm, Sweden (1979–1982). He did military service in Sweden in a specialist unit, the Royal Life Guard (K1).

Chairman

The Most Hon the Marquis of Lothian PC QC DL is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum. Lord Lothian was first elected to Parliament as Michael Ancram in 1974. His political career included four years as the Political Minister in Northern Ireland responsible for the opening engagements with the IRA which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement, Chairman of the Conservative Party for three years, and four years as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Opposition. He continues to be involved in international conflict resolution. He co-founded Global Strategy Forum in 2006 and is its Chairman. He was appointed to the House of Lords as a life peer in October 2010. He was first appointed a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament in 2005 and re-appointed in 2010, 2015 and 2017.

Director

Jacqueline Jinks is the Director of Global Strategy Forum. She joined GSF as Research Director in June 2006 and became the Director in February 2008. From 1997-2005, she was Political Secretary and speechwriter to Lord Moynihan, a former Conservative Senior Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords. She worked for the Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP and the Rt Hon Francis Maude MP, during their respective tenures as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Prior to that, she worked for the Democratic National Committee (1996-1997) and CMA Consultants (1994-1996).

Treasurer

Adrian de Ferranti was the founder of Ferranti, an investment vehicle for engineering and technology companies. He was also a founder and/or Chairman of Tantus PLC, Cambridge Computer Graphics, Chelford PLC, and PTG. He had an early career at European Banking Company, Murray Johnstone, followed by Montgomery Securities. He is currently the Chairman, Director or investor in NEST, Same Wave, SMB, Updata, Ziani's, Como Lario, Ferranti Farming, and Small Business Bureau. He was the Chairman and Trustee of the Royal Institution of Great Britain from 2007-2010. From 2007-2013 he was Chairman of the Foundation at Heriot Watt University. He was also a Treasurer of the Conservative Party from 1991-2004.

Assistant Editor

Phoebe Wilkins was born and educated in Newfoundland, Canada where her main interests were in arts, music and athletics. She now studies Philosophy and Politics at the University of Birmingham.

PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

I am delighted to write the foreword to GSF's annual compendium of lectures. This is the twelfth such publication and as always, it provides a comprehensive record of the impressive events programme which we have undertaken in the course of the past twelve months. This year's edition also clearly shows that, despite the absorption with Brexit, debate about the UK's role in the world ranges widely, with no sign that our members want any reduction in the UK's engagement in global events.

That having been said, what parent today would advise his son or daughter to embark on a foreign affairs career, certainly in view of the seeming collapse in the intellectual consensus about how nation states should conduct their relationships with each other and how they should face the great transnational challenges of the day like terrorism, cybercrime and climate change? Rather than a commitment to the legacy institutions around which international order has revolved for some seventy years, powerful voices can be heard, not the least of them from our closest ally in Washington, seeming to argue for the abandonment of these institutions with nothing to replace them except an unbridled pursuit of the narrowest definition of national interest.

The impact on the UK seems especially challenging. We are managing a disengagement from our geographical neighbours and embarking on a journey to a new destination for Britain and our global role, but it is as yet uncharted and uncertain. A vision for an outward-looking, confident and globalist Britain post-Brexit – and a compelling government strategy to achieve it - is essential and it is presently lacking. No one imagines that this is a simple undertaking, but there are opportunities to be seized and it is critical that we now step up to the challenge.

This certainly would have been an easier task had the world been a settled place and prosperity guaranteed. But almost the exact opposite is the case. From Washington, Moscow and Beijing it is hardly an exaggeration to say that policymakers seem to be embracing a new era of great power rivalry with relish. Peace between the great powers can no longer be taken for granted. At the sub-strategic level, the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, the South China Sea are just some examples of countries or regions where the wheels could come off. And, as noted above, the international organisations like the UN and NATO, which might have been the prime respondents on these issues, are under attack.

The bad news continues on the trade front. The G7 and G20 forums are no longer venues for comity. The international trading system, as encapsulated by the WTO, is showing signs of stress. Given that this system has distributed its rewards very unevenly and has been abused by the WTO's own members, there is a strong case for reform. The trouble is that there is little evidence that the world's leading nations share a sense of partnership or of being 'in this together'. There is little mood of shared endeavour which makes it all the

more likely that the threats to global prosperity will increase, no doubt riding the wave of cyber and social media-born disinformation, lies and distortions.

The one consolation for a parent offering career advice might be that, exactly when the day looks darkest, the moment of opportunity may be there. With inherited assumptions breaking down, the need for new ideas has never been more urgent. Rewards lie ahead for anyone - be it someone at the start of their career or an emerging leader - who can plot new answers for the UK's most pressing issues: the relationship with the US, the interaction with the EU, the British defence posture and how to fund it, the deployment of British influence in the international institutions, the UK's positioning in the global commerce system to ensure the prosperity of all our citizens. It is not going too far, I think, that failure to answer these questions may put the welfare, security and integrity of the UK in danger.

However, there is one point of continuity, namely my steadfast confidence in GSF's mission to ensure that these issues find a forum where they can be discussed without fear or favour. Never has the need been more urgent for innovative thinking that goes beyond an orthodoxy whose shortcomings are under so much attack. Many proposals for change are, I fear, under-informed, or based on special interests or, at worst, ill-intentioned. These have no place at GSF where our commitment is to open exchanges, with opinion and expertise from all quarters welcome. The answers will not be easy to come by, but I am confident that they will receive an airing in GSF's events over the next year and beyond.

I would like to conclude with my grateful thanks to all those who contribute to GSF: our distinguished and expert speakers, without whose generosity in freely sharing their immeasurable knowledge and experience, GSF simply could not exist in its present form; our dedicated (and growing) membership, without whom we could not claim to be a dynamic and interactive forum; and finally, our Advisory Board members, a list of whom can be found at the back of this publication. As I have said before, our enduring success rests in large part on their invaluable advice, sage guidance and clear foresight.

I look forward to the 2018-2019 events programme, during which I am certain that we will continue to build on our reputation for discursive discourse encompassing the pressing foreign policy, defence and security issues of the day, as we convene afresh the unique network of policymakers, practitioners and international affairs experts who meet under our auspices, and I hope to see many of you at GSF over the coming year.

Johan Eliasch
President, Global Strategy Forum
October 2018

ABOUT GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM was founded by **Lord Lothian** (then the Rt Hon Michael Ancram MP) and **Johan Eliasch** in 2006 to generate open debate and discussion on key foreign affairs, defence and international security issues. As an independent, non-party political, non-ideological organisation, GSF provides a platform to explore some of the more challenging and contentious aspects of UK foreign policy and to stimulate imaginative ideas and innovative thinking in a rapidly changing global landscape.

In accordance with our founding remit, we aim to bring together those with a deep interest in international affairs and to offer them the opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas, and to engage in informed debate. Through our publications and our website, we enable their expertise to be widely disseminated.

GSF's core activity consists of a regular lunchtime lecture and debate series on topical issues. For more in-depth discussion of specific topics, we host half-day seminars. We also hold small roundtable lunches and dinners on key issues of the day. Separately, alongside our annual compendium of lectures and the publication of the proceedings of our seminars, we publish an occasional series of monographs as well as collections of essays and articles by distinguished experts.

We are very fortunate to be supported by an active and committed Advisory Board comprising of foreign and defence policy practitioners of the highest calibre. We are delighted that this year, the Advisory Board has been joined by **General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, Sir John Chilcot GCB PC** and the **Rt Hon Gisela Stuart**.

In 2017-2018, we hosted a total of 25 lunchtime events and seminars, comprising twelve lunchtime lectures, eight debates and five seminars.

The following speakers addressed our lecture series: **Dr. Michael Spindelegger**, Director General of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development; Vice-Chancellor of the Republic of Austria (2011-2014) and Austrian Federal Minister of European and International Affairs (2008-2013); **Mr. Trita Parsi**, Author and President of the National Iranian American Council; **Mr. Frank Gardner OBE**, BBC Security Correspondent; **The Most Hon the Marquis of Lothian PC QC DL**, Chairman, Global Strategy Forum; **Sir John Sawers GCMG**, Chairman and Partner of Macro Advisory Partners; Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service – MI6 (2009-2014); **Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO**, Executive and then Corresponding Director (Middle East), International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015-2017), British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (2012-2015), Iraq (2009-2011) and Syria (2006-2007); **Sir Christopher Meyer KCMG**, British Ambassador to the United States (1997-2003); **General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE**, Commander Joint Forces Command (2013-2016); **Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO**, Political Director, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2012-2016), and British Ambassador to Iran (2009-2011); **Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVO**, British Ambassador

to France (2012-2016), and UK National Security Adviser (2010-2012); **Sir Adam Thomson KCMG**, Director, European Leadership Network (ELN); UK Permanent Representative to NATO (2014-2016); and **His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan**, GSF Advisory Board member.

We have held eight debates over the past year on a number of topics including the North Korea crisis; the legacy of the Balfour Declaration; the Russian economy; the UK and the Western Balkans; the conflict in Syria; democracy and elections; relations between Turkey and the West; and relations between Russia and the West.

Additionally, we have co-hosted five seminars, as follows:

- A seminar entitled *'Crisis In The Gulf: Local, Regional And Global Implications'* which took place in the Church House Conference Centre (Bishop Partridge Hall) on 25th October 2017 in collaboration with the Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum (OxGAPS) at St Antony's College, University of Oxford and was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Mr. Adel Hamaizia**, Committee Vice Chairman, Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum (OxGAPS).
- A seminar entitled *'Influence Warfare: Has Social Media And Fake News Become The New Battleground?'* which took place in One Great George Street (The Palmer Room) on Tuesday 28th November 2017 in collaboration with the Oxford Media Network and was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian** and **Ms. Deborah Pout**, Founder of the Oxford Media Network.
- A conference entitled *'Africa: Balancing Financial Inclusion, Stability & Security'* which took place in the National Liberal Club (David Lloyd George Room) on Tuesday 15th May 2018 in collaboration with the Political Economy of Financial Markets (PEFM) Programme at St Antony's College, University of Oxford and was chaired by **Lord Lothian**.
- A seminar entitled *'The Berlin Process On Its Way To The London Summit: A Bridge Between The Western Balkans And The EU?'* which took place in the National Liberal Club (David Lloyd George Room) on Tuesday 5th June 2018 in collaboration with South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St. Antony's College, University of Oxford and was chaired by **Lord Lothian**.
- A conference entitled *'Brexit And Europe: Two Years On - Are We Any The Wiser?'* which took place in the National Liberal Club (David Lloyd George Room) on Tuesday 26th June 2018 in collaboration with the Political Economy of Financial Markets (PEFM) Programme at St Antony's College, University of Oxford and was chaired by **Lord Lothian**.

A full list of all our events during 2017-2018 can be found at page 115.

Further information on all our activities and events, including audio transcripts, as well as pdfs of all our publications can be found at our website, www.globalstrategyforum.org.

THE LECTURES

Immigration And Europe: Current Trends And Future Options
Dr. Michael Spindelegger

Losing An Enemy - Obama, Iran And The Triumph of Diplomacy
Mr. Trita Parsi

From Fact to Fiction - The BBC's Frank Gardner On The Challenge Of A News Journalist Becoming A Novelist
Mr. Frank Gardner OBE

Time For A World Order That Works
The Most Hon the Marquis of Lothian PC QC DL

Politics And Security In A Turbulent World
Sir John Sawers GCMG

Change And Uncertainty In The Middle East: Where Are We Heading?
Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO

The Special Relationship Is Dead. Long Live The Special Relationship!
Sir Christopher Meyer KCMG

The Innovation Imperative: Transforming Western Defence
General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE

Iran And The West: Deal Or No Deal?
Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO

The National Security Implications Of Brexit
Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVO

NATO: The US And Europe – A Parting Of The Ways?
Sir Adam Thomson KCMG

A New Architecture For The Middle East
His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan

IMMIGRATION AND EUROPE: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE OPTIONS

Transcript of a lecture given by Dr. Michael Spindelegger

17th October 2017

Dr. Michael Spindelegger *was appointed Director General of the ICMPD as of 1st January 2016. He has extensive experience in international relations through his work in the Federal Government of the Republic of Austria. In 2000, he was elected as representative of Austria to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe where he led the Austrian delegation from 2002 to 2006. As Minister for European and International Affairs, Dr. Spindelegger worked closely with international organisations in the field of migration and contributed to the policy debate during the Third EU-Africa Summit in Tripoli. After Dr. Spindelegger was appointed Vice-Chancellor of the Republic of Austria in 2011, he created a State Secretariat for Integration within the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior. At this time, he worked closely with the Ministry of Interior on asylum and labour migration issues while also negotiating a readmission agreement with the Afghan Government.*

Thank you very much, dear Lord Lothian, my Lords, honourable Members of the House of Commons, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentleman. It is a great pleasure to be invited and to talk in front of this Forum and I would really like to thank you, Lord Lothian, for inviting me. We were in contact some months ago and today I am very happy to come and talk to you about this issue.

But let me start with another thing. You mentioned in my CV that in 2011, when I became Vice Chancellor of Austria, I created the State Secretariat for Integration and Migration and I chose a young person to be responsible for that. His name was Sebastian Kurz! I think after the elections in Austria last Sunday, he will form a new government.

This is also the context to the topic that I would like to talk about. During the election campaign in Austria, migration was one of the main issues, because so many people feel that this is the most important challenge for the next few years, maybe decades, in Europe. For that reason, I think it is worth thinking about what the situation is at the moment, what the expectations are and what are the solutions. This is most important.

But first, I would like to tell you what we are doing. My organisation, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development has been doing this job for more than 25 years. It was created at a time when, after the Balkan wars and the fall of the Iron Curtain, we had a lot of people coming from different places, especially from the Balkan area and Austria

was affected at that time, so this Centre was created to provide support for governments. It is a state organisation and we now have fifteen Member States. Two are coming in this year - the new ones are Malta and Turkey.

And of course the main issue for this Institute is first to do research work. We are doing a lot of research work, especially along these migration routes. We have done a very good investigation on the smugglers along these routes, how they are organised, how to influence them and how to fight against them.

The second issue is capacity-building. On behalf of Great Britain, we are doing work in Turkey. This is to support the DGMM, the Directorate General for Management Migration there, and Great Britain is financing this work on how to come up with good governance in migration, which is most important. We are also doing this work in Lebanon. All those in Lebanon on the border side – the army and the police – are going through our training.

The third pillar is migration dialogues. There are migration dialogues between Europe and Africa, the Khartoum Process as well as the Rabat Process, but also with the eastern part of this world, the Budapest Process, so we are very involved in that. We are the Secretariat for these dialogues. This is also one of the main issues that I will come back to: partnership. It is one of the key issues for the future.

If we have a look at the trends, I would like to give you some fact and figures. When I was starting in school, long ago, I learnt that there were 3.4 billion people around the world. Today, we have 7.6 billion people and it is expected that by 2050, we will have 9.6 billion people living in this world. This is a trend we have to recognise, because if you are talking about migration, 2%-3% of the world's population has always been migratory.

During my lifetime, this is an astonishing story: the number has doubled. At the moment, we have 244 million people described as migrants all over the world, and if you have a look at the hot spots, of course, you have to get a deeper look at the African continent. At the moment, there are 1.2 billion people living there and by 2050, it is expected that this will have doubled in size to 2.4 billion people. Where should they go? What kind of work will they have? What about climate change there and the consequences? This is, of course, one of the challenges we have to face and if you have a look at one group of migrants, refugees, those who are fleeing from war and conflict, of course this size has increased more and more.

At the beginning of this century, we had about 23 million refugees. Today we have 67 million refugees. So the number has tripled in size since the beginning of this century. This is also an astonishing figure and we have to find more ideas for how to deal with it. So this is a growing factor, this is a real challenge. If I think of my boys, aged 15 and 17, this will be one of the main issues that they will have to deal with during their lives. For that reason, I think, we are all affected.

If we have a look now more to Europe, we are not as affected as other continents. Of the migrants within the African continent, there are millions every year going for example from Nigeria to South Africa or from the different regions in Africa to other countries. Especially in the east of Africa, Somalia, Eritrea, these are the countries which people are going through Sudan to Libya and they try to come to Europe. What we see at the moment is that with all that the Italian government is doing, together with the European side in cooperation with Libyan coastguards, there is nearly a closure of this Mediterranean route. But there are people coming still, from Niger over to Libya, from Sudan to Libya. It is more or less a bottleneck at the moment and if you have a bottleneck, sometimes it explodes, and people will try to find new routes to come to Europe.

So, the conclusion is very easy: of course we have to be prepared. It is only a question of time until the next flow arrives. For that reason, we not only have to be prepared, we have to find solutions for the future. We will never have a satisfying solution for migration issues, but you can manage it in a better way than we do now. For that reason, I have brought with me some thoughts about this, and what we are doing in our Institute to get better management of migration in the future.

These three thoughts all begin with a 'P'. The first 'P' stands for **Protection**. I would like to explain to you what we have at the moment. People who arrive in Europe asking for asylum get the proper procedure across all European countries. This is the rule of law in our countries. So they get the procedure where the authorities will find out if they need protection or not. But what is happening to all the others who are not arriving on the European continent? Not setting a step in European countries? They are lost. So of course this is not a very good system, even if some of the NGOs - I will talk very frankly to you – tell us this every day.

So just to access the procedure for somebody arriving on the European continent, is problematic from my point of view. Because many of them do not access it and if you look at why, it is always combined with the help of smugglers. You pay a lot of money to get to the European continent, because you cannot come to European countries in a normal way. So of course this way of irregular migration and the system we have today is a very costly one, because we have acceptance rate, which is different to other European countries, but you do not have more than 50% recognised as refugees in any country. All the others are not recognised as such and they have to return.

Is this happening? This is one of the next problems we have. Many who are not accepted as refugees stay in the countries of destination and then they have to be returned. This is very costly. To give a concrete example from Austria, at the moment we have so many refugees from Afghanistan, the first group of people coming to our country. The acceptance rate is about 40%, so 60% are not recognised as refugees. They have to be returned. How to manage that? To charter an airplane from Vienna to Kabul costs 300,000 euros. You will find 25 Afghan people in the aeroplane who have to be returned and

for every single one of these returnees, you have two policemen, because it is in the legislation, you have to have two policemen for every single one. You have a team of doctors, you have a monitoring team on board, so the plane is full and you have spent 300,000 euros for 25 Afghan people sent back to Kabul.

I think this is not what we need for the future. So what I am, together with my Institute, thinking about is how to find a new system of protection. Protection where you do not need to come to a European country, where you have a safe zone somewhere, where you can really start with a procedure to protect those people who need protection and of course organise it on a level, not from country to country, but from the United Nations. I think this would be worth developing as a global compact and to have a decision next year in the General Assembly of United Nations. I hope that we will succeed with that, because we need to have different types of protection in the future.

The second 'P' stands for **Prosperity**. I think we all have to recognise that in the countries of origin, something has to change and we have to change our politics about that. So I am very sure that this plan must also come from the European side. There is now an external investment plan which is the right way to proceed in the future. This plan says, very simply, that if you as company are willing to invest in a country of origin of migration, you will get, not money, but you will get a guarantee, a guarantee for the political risk that you are dealing with if you invest in countries like Nigeria or another country, where so many people come from.

And that is right because we have to involve the private sector. We will not succeed if we just do development aid. I was a Minister for development aid for five years, I know very well what I am talking about. This is all very nice and all necessary, but it is not enough. If this does not involve the private sector, and if it is not a business to invest in countries of migration origin, it will never succeed. And I think it is a business, because if you have a look at this development in the African continent, to have 2.4 billion people in 2050 - this is a big market. A big market, of interest to business people of course, but they need some guarantees for their investments there.

So, I think to involve the private sector, to start with businesses, to start also with the diaspora of those countries in our respective European countries - this is the right way to change something on the ground.

It will take quite a period of time. From our experience at the ICMPD, we expect it will take at least ten years. During these ten years, you will initially have more people who will leave, because if you have more prosperity and more income for people, they will be in a position to finance migration. What we can see at the moment on the African continent is that this increase in living standards and increase in income leads to more migration in the moment, because people do not think it will change immediately, but if they are in the position to spend the money for a smuggler, they will try to go to Europe

and this will remain the case for at least ten years. But afterwards the situation will change dramatically and I think we have to invest for the future, so that this situation will change on the ground. And so the second 'P' is for prosperity.

The third 'P' is for **Partnership**. When we as an organisation are together with our partners from African countries and from Eastern countries, we always get the impression that they do not think they are real partners for European countries. They think that European countries just want to get rid of the refugees and return them, but they do not think that they are respected as equals, to talk about their problems and to find common solutions. So I think that there is a strong need for real partnership with those countries.

Let me give you an example: Jordan, which has been greatly affected by the crisis of Syria. So many refugees went to this small country and they have had a lot of problems dealing with that. Creating something like the following is a very good solution. The European Union said, *'Okay, if you in Jordan deal as entrepreneurs with refugees and you give them the right to work, all the goods you are producing can be brought to Europe without any regulations.'* Of course, this was a big incentive and so Jordanian enterprises did this, they followed this way and they employed 200,000 Syrian refugees because of it. And it is still a good business for them – they do well with the products they are producing with the help of refugees, bringing these products to the European Union without customs.

So this is a way that we can create partnership, with an advantage, with a benefit for every partner and I think this is worth thinking more about, because if we do not have real partnership, we will not really get co-operation with the countries of migration origin.

So, let me end with a very concrete example of what we are doing at the moment, which combines all of this. We have started a very special project in Austria, called Reverse Migration and this project works as follows: we have identified Nigeria as one of the main issues and one of the main countries of origin for many refugees in Austria at the moment and most of them are not recognised as refugees, so they have to go back.

So we brought together the enterprises ready to invest in Nigeria with the refugees and the companies in Austria are taking those who have to be returned to Nigeria into their enterprises. They teach them the right skills and with these skills they are then voluntarily returning to Nigeria with a work place, because they are trained by the companies and they know what to do. We have a very concrete example of a power plant that is going to be built in Nigeria. Their situation with power plants is not the best, they have serious problems for energy delivery. For this reason, they will take some of these refugees. We have another company that is doing agriculture. So we are talking with the Nigerian government to get the right kind of land for them and refugees in Austria are trained how to work on this and they are going back with a new work place to do the necessary work for agricultural products. And so on and so on.

So let's try to see if this works, because it brings a benefit to everybody. Those who are refugees and not accepted, and who are going back, they do not come home empty-handed. They get a work place and they learn some skills. The Austrian state is very much in favour of that, because they do not have to forcibly deport these refugees. As I told you, it is very costly and it is not very pleasant. And the Nigerian state gets a power plant investment and they get back workers who are trained and have some skills. So I think this is a new idea on how to deal with this problem. It is not for everybody, that is very clear, but it could be a model of how we deal with this situation in the future.

This is what I have to say, because we need some solutions for the future that are different from the current situation as we have it now. I think we have to work together, because a single country like Austria or a small or medium-sized country in Europe is not in a position to negotiate with all those others to find a good solution. We need to do it together. I think even if Great Britain is now leaving the European Union, you should join my organisation, ICMPD, and we will solve the problems together. Thank you very much for your attention.

LOSING AN ENEMY - OBAMA, IRAN AND THE TRIUMPH OF DIPLOMACY

Transcript of a lecture given by Mr. Trita Parsi and chaired by Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG

30th November 2017

Trita Parsi *is an award-winning author and president of the National Iranian American Council. He advised the Obama White House on the nuclear talks with Iran and subsequently wrote the authoritative book on the negotiations based on interviews with all key actors involved, including John Kerry, Javad Zarif and Federica Mogherini, 'Losing An Enemy - Obama, Iran And The Triumph of Diplomacy'. His previous books include 'Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings Of Iran, Israel And The United States' and 'A Single Roll Of The Dice: Obama's Diplomacy With Iran', which was named Best Book on the Middle East by Foreign Affairs in 2012. Parsi was awarded the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order in 2010. He writes and comments regularly on foreign policy for the Wall Street Journal, Guardian, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, FT, The Nation, The American Conservative, the Jerusalem Post, The Forward, BBC, CNN and others.*

Thank you so much, it is a great pleasure to be here. Thank you to Global Strategy Forum for inviting me. What I am here to talk about is the nuclear deal with Iran, as well as its future. I wanted to focus my actual comments on its past and how it came about and particularly on the geopolitical context that gave birth to this deal, because I think it is very important to understand that in order to understand why there is such a strong opposition to it, particularly from some of the regional allies of the West.

I have written several books on the geopolitics of the Middle East and the previous ones dealt with the US, Iran and Israel to a very large extent. But I was hoping this one would be different because the previous ones showed how systematically opportunities for diplomacy were either missed or rejected. And with this one, we actually had in my view, a triumph of diplomacy. But after I wrote the book, a certain TV reality star won the elections in the United States and I ended up having to re-write the last chapter.

I had a conversation with one of the people here in the room earlier on and they asked why it is called 'The Triumph of Diplomacy' and 'Losing An Enemy'. And the reason is because in my view, it was a triumph of diplomacy because very few people expected this deal to be able to be struck in the first place. The chances of it were very, very slim. 'Losing An Enemy' was because it gave us an opportunity to be able to pursue this path further in order to resolve the other very important remaining conflicts that exist with Iran,

which eventually could have led to the situation, at least for the United States, not to have Iran as an enemy - not necessarily as a friend - but not necessarily any longer an enemy. That opportunity clearly has now been reversed. I believe it is possible to resurrect it if we understand what went right in these negotiations. To do that I want to go to go back a little bit in history and look at the geopolitical context.

I am going to take you first to April 2012, at a time when the United States and its Western allies, the UK and the Europeans, were imposing massive sanctions on the Iranians. The Iranians were aggressively going forward with their nuclear programme, the Israelis were making weekly threats of taking military action against Iran. A most unusual meeting was held in a very small country here in Europe with very unusual attendees. You had several Iranian diplomats, including two members of the Iranian nuclear negotiating team. You had several American and European officials, including a very senior American general. But perhaps most surprisingly was the five Israelis who were attending this meeting and interacting with the Iranians, and even more surprising what actually was said.

Let me give you a quote: *'This is not about enrichment, this was never about enrichment.'* The Israeli official, a very senior one, was looking straight into the eyes of the Iranians as he was saying this. It was quite a stunning statement because for more than two decades we had heard that the nuclear programme with Iran and particularly its enrichment of uranium constituted an existential threat to Israel. But here instead, the Israeli was actually telling it straight to the Iranians, that it actually was not about enrichment. Instead he proceeded to tell them that from Israel's perspective, what Israel wanted to see from Iran was what he called a *'sweeping attitude change.'*

Israel could not accept that Iran did not accept Israel's right to exist and questioned its right to exist, and it could not accept the United States coming to terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran through any form of a deal, without Iran coming to terms and accepting Israel.

If that were to happen, the Israelis believed, Israel would essentially be abandoned because even if the United States managed to reduce its tensions with Iran, it would not be followed by a proportionate reduction in Israeli-Iranian tensions. Israel would be abandoned, facing a hostile Iran in the region, but now without the full backing of the United States.

And as a result, the Israelis made clear in no uncertain terms that Israel would do everything it could in its power to prevent the United States from striking any form of a deal that would lead to a recognition by the United States of Iran that was not coupled with an Iranian recognition of Israel. It was not just a moment of honesty, it was a moment of utmost clarity on what some of the driving forces of this conflict actually were.

To better understand, I want to take you back a little bit further in history, back to the

early 90s, to understand how the geopolitical shifts in the Middle East had given birth to some of these strong views from the Israeli side.

1991: the United States is now the sole superpower with the Soviet Union collapsing. It defeats Iraq together with the UN coalition and suddenly you have a completely new geopolitical constellation in the region. Geopolitically of course, the US is the sole superpower in the region. The old balance of power has now been destroyed, but it is not entirely clear what the new balance will be. It is not clear what the new order in the region will be.

Israel and Iran had of course in the 1980s, officially a very bad relationship, but behind the scenes it was a very different reality. A reality that was born out of the fact that Iran and Israel, from the 1950s and onwards, shared geostrategic imperatives, common threats, that brought them closer together. The first one was the Soviet Union. The other one was connected to the Soviet Union, which were strong Arab nationalist countries, such as Egypt under Nasser or Iraq under Saddam Hussein. These factors did not change in 1979 just because Iran changed and it was something that led the Israelis to persistently seek to retain that relationship with Iran, which to a large extent they did. It was a very different situation in Washington back in the 1980s, because it was the Israelis who were lobbying Washington to talk to Iran, to sell arms to Iran and not to take Iranian rhetoric particularly seriously, because it was a different reality behind the scenes.

All of this then changes in the 1990s because now Iraq is defeated, the Soviet Union is gone and the common threats are gone. Now, instead, you have an embryonic bipolar situation emerging in the Middle East in which Iran and Israel increasingly emerge as two of the more powerful states in the region, without an Iraq in the middle to be able to balance or cushion them. Whenever you have a scenario in which a balance has been destroyed and a new one is being formed, it forces powerful states into a rivalry to be able to define what will be the new order in the region. And of course they would define that order to be to their own benefit.

This brought the Iranians and the Israelis into a zero-sum competition and the Israelis moved first, very cleverly. They went to Washington and they convinced the United States that Iran was now the new threat to the region and that it needed to be sanctioned and isolated, particularly if the United States wanted the Israelis to take this risk for peace with the Palestinians, it needed to ensure that Israel was safe from the Iranian threat.

This was a massive shift from the message that the Israelis were giving the United States only five or six years earlier in the height of the Iran-Contra scandal. The Clinton administration adopted this line and established a policy that was called dual containment. The idea of a new balance in the region centred on Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel and focused on the isolation and containment of Iraq and Iran at the same time: dual containment.

The Israelis and the Saudis of course loved this, this was a tremendous benefit to their security, and gave them maximum manoeuvrability in the region. The Iranians absolutely hated it and they did everything they could to destroy it, including turning massively in the direction of terror and extremism, supporting groups such as Islamic Jihad and Hamas, calculating that the weakest link in the American strategy was the peace process. If the peace process collapsed, none of the other major strategic objectives of the United States could be achieved in the region.

But, despite everything they did to try to destroy that order and to destroy Pax Americana in the Middle East, it was not the Iranians who managed to do so, it was the Americans. It was George W. Bush, because by invading Iraq in 2003 with the objective of actually enhancing America's military dominance in the region, the United States managed to destroy that previous order without building a new one. In the process, the United States weakened itself to the point in which it no longer had the capacity to impose on the region a new equilibrium.

Ever since, particularly after 2005, when it was quite clear that the United States had failed in Iraq, the region has been order-less. There has not been a clear hegemon in the Middle East. There has not been a clear constellation of powers that can establish hegemony in the region and part of the reason why we are seeing so much instability is precisely because of this absence of any hegemony or any order that could be brought about by the powerful states.

I wanted to mention this, because I want to get back to this at the end. This is very critical. There is a strong desire from the Saudi and the Israeli side for the United States to go back to the pre-2003 order, one in which they did enjoy much greater manoeuvrability and Iran was checked in a very, very small box.

Now, the George W. Bush strategy for dealing with Iran (and the fact that Iran was now unleashed as a result of Iraq being defeated) was to not pursue any diplomacy, to reject diplomacy altogether, pursue sanctions and other forms of pressure. The track record of this policy is quite clear. In 2003, the Iranians had roughly 150 centrifuges. By 2008, when Bush left office, Iran had 8,000 centrifuges. Bush had gone from zero stockpile of low-enriched uranium to roughly 1,500 kilos by the time he left office. Clearly, a different approach was needed and this is part of what Obama's platform was. It was not just diplomacy with Iran, but the very idea of bringing back diplomacy at the very centre of American statecraft.

But talking about diplomacy with Iran as a state senator from Illinois is very different from actually conducting diplomacy. The first year of attempts from Obama's side ended up a failure, mainly because of problems on the Iranian side, not necessarily on the American side. But nevertheless, within a year of his presidency, he ended up finding himself with the same instruments and the same tools as George W. Bush: sanctions, coercion, sabotage, cyber warfare.

This created then, a scenario in which a three-clock type of competition began. The US and its European allies imposed massive sanctions on the Iranians and - precisely because Obama had tried diplomacy - had far greater credibility and ability to be able to bring the world to its side. The Iranian response to the sanctions was to actually double down on their nuclear programme. Then, of course, you had the Israeli clock of this constant fear on the American side that the Israelis might take military action that would force the US into it.

The Iranians completely underestimated Obama. They never thought that he was going to be able to get such a massive buy-in for the sanctions regime. Getting the UK, the Europeans and everyone else to completely cut off all of their oil imports from Iran. 40% of Iran's oil was being sold to Europe, which went down to zero. The US also managed to impose sanctions on Iran's central bank which essentially effectively cut Iran off from the international financial system. The week that that happened, riots broke out into Iran. That week, Iran's currency fell roughly 30%. There were people in the White House who were actually hoping that this was the beginning of what they called the 'Tunisia moment', that it eventually would lead to the complete collapse of the regime.

Without a doubt, the Iranians had underestimated Obama, but Obama had also underestimated the Iranians. They were hurting, but they were not breaking, nor were they without a response. The Iranian response to sanctions and the calculation on the US side, which essentially was *'we're going to cripple Iran's economy, we're going to force the Iranians to recognise that the cost of sanctions are so immense that it is not worth pursuing the nuclear programme and get them to a point where they essentially have to choose between having an economy and having a nuclear programme'* was exactly the same - a mirror image of the American calculation of changing Iran's cost-benefit analysis. By doubling down on the nuclear programme, building more centrifuges, expanding the stockpile, the strategy on the Iranian side was to signal to the West that the cost of pursuing sanctions is too high, because you are actually getting more of a nuclear programme than otherwise.

This was the big challenge for the United States. How do you prevent the Iranians from being able to get a nuclear weapons path without going to war, without allowing the Israelis to start a war, and without allowing the Iranians to find themselves in a position to be able to define the new balance of power in the region, if you go and seek a diplomatic solution?

As these clocks were ticking and the Iranians were doubling down on their nuclear programme, a very important senator in the US Senate, who later on became Secretary of State, helped to convince the Obama administration that these official P5+1 negotiations were not going to go anywhere. The Iranians would never capitulate in that forum. As a result, you needed a secret channel of negotiations with the Iranians in which there was a higher chance that they actually would be able to give in on some of these key issues, such as giving in to the zero enrichment demand. That was, of course, John Kerry.

John Kerry had worked with the government of Oman to win the release of three Americans, who had been wrongfully imprisoned in Iran. The Omanis had shown themselves to be quite capable of manoeuvring the Iranian political landscape in a way that very few other countries could. The President was convinced that it was important to go there and see if there actually was a better way of negotiating with the Iranians, far away from the cameras that were following the P5+1 negotiations.

In July 2012, the first meeting was held outside Muscat in Oman. The Americans went there with two mid-level officials, quite unknown at the time, and with only two objectives. First, to see: is this an authoritative channel, does this group of Iranians actually have the blessing and the authority given to them by the Iran's Supreme Leader or is this just another wild goose chase? The second objective was to see how close are the Iranians to capitulating, how much has the economy hurt them and how much longer will it take before they actually capitulate on the key issue of enrichment?

The Iranians showed up for a completely different reason. They showed up to see: how close is the United States to capitulating? As you can imagine, that one day meeting was not particularly successful. The Iranians peppered the Americans with more than a hundred versions of how they should be able to accept enrichment; the US side was not even allowed to discuss that issue. They left disappointed and it was a feeling of failure. Then, of course, you had the elections in the United States in 2012, so this background diplomacy was taking a little bit of a back seat.

By January 2013, a completely new sense of urgency dawned on the White House. Exactly a year earlier, in January 2012, then Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, had publicly stated that Iran's breakout capability, the amount of time it would take for them to make a political decision to build a nuclear weapon to having the material ready for a nuclear weapon, was 12 months. By January 2013, the estimation of the US intelligence services was that the Iranian breakout capability had shrunk to 8-12 weeks. Clearly the nuclear clock was ticking faster than the sanctions clock. This was a direct result of the Iranians doubling down on the nuclear programme.

The President came to the realisation that unless something changed, the United States would be faced with only two options very soon. Either acquiescing to an Iranian nuclear fait accompli or going to war, unless something changed. That is why a decision was made to go back to Oman in March 2013. But this time around, instead of sending two mid-level officials, the US sent a full-scale delegation led by Ambassador Bill Burns, who was the number 2 at the State Department, several senior American non-proliferation experts accompanied on that trip as well, and the Iranians sent their Deputy Foreign Minister.

But, most importantly, for the first time, the President allowed the American diplomats to be equipped with a tool that they had not been allowed to even touch before. A

very carefully worded statement on how the United States would be willing to accept enrichment, under what circumstances and what limitations the US would be willing to accept enrichment on Iranian soil. This was exactly what the Iranians had been looking for. This was their absolute bottom line. They were willing to endure almost any type of economic pain, but they could not compromise on this issue.

It was supposed to be a breakthrough, but it did not end up being that breakthrough. Despite the fact that the two sides actually had moved so much closer on the issue of substance, the distrust between the two sides was so deep that there were still plenty of question marks. The Iranians could not go back to Tehran with a promise that the Americans would accept enrichment. They needed it in writing. The Americans absolutely could not put this in writing because of a fear that it could leak and because they were doing this behind the backs of Europe. Accepting enrichment in Iran, which the Europeans had pushed the US to do for quite some time, was supposed to be the main concession the West could give Iran. It was supposed to be given at the end of a negotiation, it was supposed to be given in tandem with the Europeans, not behind the backs of Europe in secret negotiations. So it was critical that this was not put in writing.

So, despite them moving closer together on substance, this issue of trust was still a major problem. The question was: is there a person, someone who has the capacity of being trusted both by the Supreme Leader of Iran and by the President of the United States. Do they have a shared Facebook friend that could step in and resolve some of this?

There was essentially only one person who came to mind and that was the Sultan of Oman, who has had strong relations with Iranians for quite some time of course historically, and who is a very strong and trusted American ally. The idea came that if the Americans could not send the Iranians a letter and put this in writing, perhaps they could send a letter to the Sultan. The Sultan would then fly to Tehran, in-between his chemotherapy, meet face to face with the Supreme Leader of Iran, not show him the letter, but convey to him the contents of the letter. And if the Iranians then rejected it, it would not be because of them mistrusting the United States, they would be expressing mistrust against the Sultan of Oman, who they of course hold in very high regard.

This is what resolved the issue and that is how this key issue of enrichment was actually resolved. All of this incidentally taking place while Ahmadinejad is still President. This is before Rouhani came in.

I wanted to mention that part about the critical role that the Omanis played in this, not just because I find it interesting to look at some of the diplomatic tricks that were needed to be used to get this issue resolved, but also because we live in an era in which we hear so much about Arab-Persian tensions and Sunni-Shia divides, and it was actually an Arab country that brought the United States and Iran closer together.

Now after this of course the entire world got lucky, because Rouhani won the elections and Iran changed the team entirely, got a much more professional team and negotiations sped up immensely. By November 2013, an interim deal was struck, 15 months later or so you had the final deal in July 2015.

In its simplest form, this deal took two very bad outcomes off the table. The outcome of Iran having a path to a nuclear weapon and the outcome of the United States and the West going to war with Iran. Of course, if this deal is killed by Donald Trump, which I am sure we will discuss a little bit more, those two bad outcomes come back onto the table.

I want to close by saying two more things. The first concerns the Israeli Prime Minister, Bibi Netanyahu, who really did his utmost to position himself as the foremost opponent of this nuclear deal, he went to great lengths trying to kill it. Some of those lengths were quite unprecedented, including going and speaking in Congress against the sitting President of the United States, quite an unusual step that cost him a lot. He called this the *'worst deal ever'* and at every moment, he was criticising it. But with everything he did to a certain extent, this deal actually came about not in spite of Netanyahu, but because of Netanyahu.

By him defining Iran's nuclear issue as an existential threat, combined with completely unrealistic demands, the demand that there could only be zero enrichment in Iran, he deliberately tried to take the 'kick the can down the road' option, the status quo option off the table, with the hope that if the status quo option were off the table, the United States would be forced to take action. The action of course that he wanted the United States to take was military.

Instead, what he miscalculated was that Obama actually would give diplomacy a real chance and try the diplomatic path. Had he not eliminated the status quo option, I am personally convinced that the likelihood that the Obama administration would have made this investment in diplomacy probably would not have taken place. It was only because they knew that that option did not exist that they were forced to make a choice and they chose diplomacy.

But of everything that Netanyahu did to kill the deal, there was something that he could have done that was so much easier than all of these efforts. Instead of going in front of the cameras and saying that '*this is the worst deal ever and that this is the deal of the century for the Iranians'*, he should have done the opposite. He should have gone in front of the cameras and said, *'We in Israel love this deal. This is a fantastic deal. This is Iran's capitulation and the West's triumph'*. If he had done that, Zarif himself in one of the interviews that I had with him, told me that the Iranians would have had been forced to walk out, because Zarif had no problem handling Netanyahu saying that this is a fantastic deal for Iran. But if he had said that this is actually Iran's defeat, the criticism and the problems he would have faced internally in Tehran would have been so much greater

that he would actually have been forced to walk out of the deal. But in everything that Netanyahu did, he failed to recognise how simple it actually could have been for him to put a stop to this thing that he so vehemently opposed.

The other thing that I wanted to mention is perhaps a more controversial point, which is that there is this narrative, both in Washington and in Europe, that it is thanks to sanctions that this deal came about and if we just had pursued sanctions a little bit longer, we would have got a better deal. This is now very commonly heard in Washington DC, by the Trump administration saying that we actually made (or Obama made) a huge mistake by striking that deal, the sanctions pressure was so great and as a result, if we could have just kept it, we could have got a better deal.

I actually think there was a better deal that we could have got, but it did not exist in 2015. It existed much earlier. In 2003, the Iranians, who had roughly only 150 centrifuges, sent a proposal to the United States, in which they offered to open up the nuclear programme for full transparency, collaborate with the United States against al-Qaeda and a whole set of other issues. The proposal was sent to the US through the Swiss Ambassador in Tehran, who had been tasked by the US to be the go-between and the Bush administration's response was to send no response at all to Iran and to reprimand the Swiss Ambassador for having delivered the proposal in the first place. That was a missed opportunity.

In 2005, the last proposal the Iranians sent to the Europeans prior to Ahmadinejad getting elected was actually written by Zarif. It is public, you can look it up. The Iranians offered to cap their nuclear programme at 3,000 centrifuges. The Europeans never bothered to send that proposal to the Bush administration, knowing that Bush would reject anything above zero.

In one of the meetings at the White House, we were trying to figure out where the US thought it would end up on the centrifuge issue. Someone raised the issue of this 2005 proposal by the Iranians saying, *'Do you think you'll be able to get to that type of a proposal?'* and one of the leading American negotiators laughed a little bit and said, *'We would jump on that proposal if it was made today, but that ship has sailed, we are constantly chasing the deals we could have gotten two years earlier'*.

A couple weeks later, I am in Lausanne, interviewing Zarif, trying to do the same thing, trying figure out 'where do you think you're going to end up?' and I mention the 2005 proposal and said, *'Do you think you're going to get more or less than that?'* And he chuckled and said*,'3,000? That was just an opening bid, we were going to settle for 1,000 centrifuges.'*

By the time the 2015 deal was struck, the Iranians had 22,000 centrifuges, 19,000 of them operational. As a result of the deal, we got them back to 5,000 centrifuges, 2,000 more than their opening bid in 2005, a decade before all of these sanctions. It is not to

say that sanctions did not hurt, they clearly did hurt. But the combination of just course of policy with unrealistic expectations caused time to be on Iran's side and them being able to get a better deal than what we could have achieved much earlier, had we had a much more realistic position on the issue of enrichment – at least from the American perspective, I know Europe already had a more realistic expectation.

I will stop there, I will take your questions and perhaps we can talk a little more about what the future of the JCPOA is. Thank you so much.

FROM FACT TO FICTION - THE BBC'S FRANK GARDNER ON THE CHALLENGE OF A NEWS JOURNALIST BECOMING A NOVELIST

Transcript of a lecture by Mr. Frank Gardner OBE

12th December 2017

Frank Gardner *is the BBC's Security Correspondent, reporting for television and radio on issues of domestic and international security. A fluent Arabist, with a degree in Arabic and Islamic Studies from Exeter University, he was previously the BBC's Middle East Correspondent based in Cairo and before that the BBC's Gulf Correspondent in Dubai from 1997-2000. He was awarded the OBE by HM The Queen in 2005 for services to journalism, Honorary Doctorates of Laws from six British universities, the McWhirter Award for Bravery, Spain's El Mundo Prize for International Journalism, the UAE's Zayed Medal for Journalism, voted Person of the Year by the UK Press Gazette and appointed Distinguished Visiting Professor of 2015 by the University of Southern California. In June 2004, while reporting in Riyadh, Frank and his cameraman, Simon Cumbers, were ambushed by Islamist gunmen. Simon was killed outright, Frank was shot multiple times and left for dead. Against all expectations, he survived and in 2006, published his bestselling memoir, 'Blood and Sand'. In 2009 he published 'Far Horizons', an account of his life as an inveterate traveller and explorer. His debut novel, the thriller 'Crisis', published in June 2016, was a No.1 bestseller and the sequel, 'Ultimatum', will be published next year.*

Thanks very much. Well, an early Happy Christmas, everybody. It is lovely to see you all here and it is a huge honour to be here. So many times, I have sat way at the back and listened to people far more erudite than myself on the top table here and scribbled notes frantically, so it is great that I am able to sing for my supper and repay some of the hospitality here.

As Michael says, this is a bit of a departure because normally I am covering Middle East matters or what is going on in the Gulf, or Yemen or al-Qaeda or Daesh, and this is very different. My publishers had said to me, *'You know, Frank, it's been a couple years, how about another book? How about you write the definitive account of ISIS?'* My reply was, *'How about I don't?'* because honestly - all of that is the day job and there are people who can delve into it far more than I have and I also cannot ignore the elephant in the room: I am in a wheelchair, so for me to get around the backstreets of Raqqa or Mosul is probably a challenge too far. So I thought, *'No, I'll have far more fun, actually, if I write a novel.'* My advice to a lot of people in news journalism is: don't get completely sucked into it so that you live it 24/7. I leave my job at work when I go home.

I guess it was about three or four years ago and we were (myself, my producer and cameraman) on a flight to Los Angeles, about to do a story and I thought, *'Right, there isn't actually any film that I particularly want to see in flight, I know, I'll start the novel.'* I literally opened up the laptop on the plane and I thought, *'It's an 11-hour flight, I reckon I can bang out a few chapters'* and it was really as spontaneous as that. I did not have some great big chapter plan or treatment worked out. I thought, *'Right, I need to care about this, I need to actually bury my mind back in Colombia.'*

I have been lucky enough to go Colombia five times, four of which were in a wheelchair and it is a fabulous country. Obviously, inevitably, after a Netflix series like 'Narcos', people tend to associate it with that, and my book is probably not helping. I gave a copy of this book to the President, President Santos, who politely said 'thanks', but probably thought 'not helpful'.

That is just a bit of graffiti on the streets of Bogotá.

Let's not ignore it, but the violence has come down massively in Colombia. It is a success story. It is very far from perfect, but given where it has come from, it has done fantastically well. Kidnapping, for example, especially for ransom, has come down by 90% in the last ten years. There is a peace deal of sorts with the FARC which was negotiated over several years in Havana with the help of the Norwegians, and for that, the President, Juan Manuel Santos, got the Nobel Peace Prize. The risk, of course, is that the disarming of the political guerrillas of the FARC and eventually of the ELN will fragment into what is called las Bacrim, *las bandas criminales*, criminal bands, because the drug industry continues. Colombia is still the biggest producer of cocaine in the world (and in all its forms - in paste, in powder, in blocks) and for that it is an ongoing fight.

This was the view from a little plane.

This was before I started writing the book, but it was one of these trips which was immensely useful for me in writing it, because we went down to Tumaco, right down in the southwest corner of Colombia. It is a big country. It has got mountains, rivers, marshes, it is very diverse, part of it is the Amazon, but its cities are very sophisticated. If anyone has been to Medellín or Bogotá or Cartagena, you will know that you can have an absolutely first-class meal there in great comfort and safety.

But there are other parts, the *barrios*, which are just simply no-go areas. At the other end of the scale is a place called Buenaventura, down on the Pacific coast, where I learnt on one of my trips of something absolutely terrible. Those of you who have read the book, *Crisis*, will be thinking, *'My God, what kind of imagination dreamt up that place?'* But it exists. They have these places called chophouses, *casas de pique*, where the rival drug gangs kidnap each other's members and lop their limbs off while they are still alive and put them in plastic bags and chuck them in the sea for the sharks, which is pretty horrendous. Now, I did not go to Buenaventura, I met people who did, but I went to other parts. I went to Nariño province with the Comandos Jungla, which is the Colombian Special Forces.

This is the flight crew here, not out of central casting at all!

This is the Jungla which is the Colombian police, paramilitaries, they basically look like soldiers.

They were set up by Britain's Special Air Service in the 1980s, initially trained by the Brits with the help of the SAS, and then the Americans, the Green Berets, the CIA, the DEA took over.

The United States is a massive consumer of Colombian cocaine - they are part of the problem, so they are trying to be part of the solution. I know that this is controversial because there are many people who would say, *'Well, why don't we simply legalise cocaine, just make it legal, why not?'* But the cocaine industry in Colombia is incredibly destructive. It is abusive and destructive to the farmers and ordinary people, the *campesinos*, who have to live under its shadow. It is not just about exporting drugs, it is about extortion and prostitution and criminality and abuse and kidnapping. It carries with it a whole great big tail of criminality. So it was interesting that Alex James, who used to be the drummer for Blur and is now on Classic FM, when he went to Colombia with the government, he came back saying, *'My God, my eyes are opened after what I've seen.'*

We were very lucky to do this trip and what I have tried to do in *Crisis* is to blend together my own experiences, but rather than making it a factual account of them, I turned it into a novel. I can tell you that it is massively liberating as a news journalist to be able to write fiction. You have to completely jump out of your skin to do it, because it goes against everything that is ingrained in our DNA as BBC journalists. I have been with the BBC for 22 years and it is in our soul to be as objective and fair and balanced as possible. So in my reports, I will include the opinions of people I cannot stand or people whose views are absolutely anathema to mine, ISIS being an obvious example. But I think that the public need to be able to make their own minds up - don't make me make your mind up, you are the public, you are the audience, you decide - so I will always try and be objective. Writing fiction is a big jump and it is a huge learning curve - the jump from writing a 1½ minute report for BBC World Service for example to writing a book is pretty big.

The first book I did, *Blood and Sand*, was relatively easy. It was a walk in the park - I wrote it in Carluccio's in the evenings. It really was not too hard because I knew what I

was saying and I had diaries to refer from. But the jump from writing a non-fiction book to writing fiction is very steep indeed, but it is enjoyable. The first manuscript, the 1.0 that you send to the publisher, is not going to be the last.

The way it works is that you think you are done, you send this thing in, all 100,000 words of it, and then there is a silence for about three weeks. Then eventually, you get a text saying, *'Brace yourself'* and it arrives, a great big fat wodge of papers, at least 70-80 pages of edits by the publisher, the managing editor. If they are a good publisher, this is what they will do. I am very lucky because my publishers are Penguin Random House/ Transworld and they have done a brilliant job with this and they are doing an equally brilliant job with the next one, saying, *'Hang on Frank, that doesn't really make sense because surely she was already back in Bogotá by then?'* or *'What did the place smell like? What did it feel like? Sorry Frank, this needs revisiting.'*

They are tough taskmasters, publishers, because when you go in there and you make your pitch to them: *'Please commission me to write this novel'*, they are taking a hard commercial decision on you, especially if it is fiction, because they have only got a limited number of writers that they are going to back and with me they had to take a chance. They knew I could write a book because I had done *Blood and Sand*, but *'Hang on, he's a news journalist, he works at the BBC. Can this guy write fiction? Can he make things up and make it sounds interesting?'*

It is a big gamble for them and you go in there and there are ten people around the table and do not be fooled for a minute by the kind of chat, *'Coffee? Bourbon biscuits? What would you like? Sugar? One, two?'* No, no, this is a hard, commercial decision they are taking, and they are looking at you, and then they are going to discuss it afterwards: do we make this guy an offer or not? I have got a very good literary agent, Julian Alexander, and one of the first things he said before we went in to see the publishers, was, *'They're going to ask you, "Does your hero, does he have legs?"'* and I thought, *'That's a bit ironic in my case'*, but he meant: is this a book that can translate into a sequel and could we perhaps have a trilogy? Is there a series in this? I did not even have to think about it, I said, *'Yes, absolutely, of course he's going to survive, he's going to go on and he is going to have other adventures in other parts of the world'.*

I, for one, am massively encouraged and inspired by the fact that Freddie Forsyth and John le Carré are still churning out gems in their 80s. Somewhere I have seen a picture of John le Carré peering out of a window of a plane in Sudan, doing a recce for his next book. I have seen another one of Frederick Forsyth going to Mogadishu - admittedly he took a small army with him for protection, but he made the effort.

In this book, I have tried to draw on my experiences of travel journalism as well, because I have wanted right from the beginning to put the reader into that place. I want them to imagine what it is like for a Colombian police patrol in this hot, dank, sweaty, malarial jungle to come across a dead body and to turn it over and find that it is a *gringo*, it is an

extranjero, it is a foreigner. They search him and he has got this curious purple-coloured document, quite stiff, and the captain reads it and it says, *'Her Britannic Majesty's Government requests and requires.....'* What is this? Of course, it is a British passport. And it turns out that - this is fiction now - that this is the station chief for MI6, the Secret Intelligence Service and he has been murdered, he is missing an ear. So the mystery begins - how could have happened? - and the calls start coming into Vauxhall Cross.

By the way, I had no help whatsoever from anyone in government on this book, not that they offered and not that they would have agreed if I had asked, but I just wanted it to be completely independent. But I spoke to a lot of people, who are recently ex-military, ex-Special Forces, ex-specialists in certain areas, so I did a lot of research for this book.

For those of you who have not read it, I am not going to spoil what the core threat is in this, because this is not just about Colombia, the threat comes home here to Britain, to Whitehall. I am not going to say what the threat is, but I interviewed about six different people from six different organisations: how would it work if such a weapon got into Britain? Who would have primacy? Who would be the lead on this? Would it be MI5? Would it be the Cabinet Office? Would it be Gold Command of the Met? Would it be the Army? The police? Who would it be? And I got six different answers which is a little worrying, so let's hope the scenario never happens!

Just to prove - this is called RI (reporter involvement) - I did actually go to these places. I got dragged through this jungle by ordinary Colombian police, not Special Forces. At one point they said, *'We have really bad mosquitoes here, you need to protect yourself'*. They gave me what looked like a bar of Lux soap and I had to slather this stuff all over me to get rid of the mosquitoes because they have daylight, daytime biting mosquitoes down there, which of course transmit dengue. We had this Australian cameraman, really nice guy, and I said, *'John, you've got to put this stuff on,'* and he said, *'Mate, I'm far too busy filming.'* Two days after we finished filming he went down with dengue fever and he was off work for weeks and weeks, so not to be taken lightly.

This is a Colombia coca drug lab that they found. This is down in Tumaco and they blew it up spectacularly. They allowed us to film it. So, this stuff is pretty real.

We went right into Putumayo to a place called Puerto Leguízamo. The Colombian Embassy in the UK were fantastically helpful. I had spotted that there was a firm down in Southampton in Hampshire that was building and exporting assault hovercraft. I looked down their list of clients and it included Colombia, so I contacted the Colombian Embassy, the Defence Attaché there, and I said, *'Look, will you let me know when these things go operational because I am not interested in filming them running circles training round in Cartagena harbour. When they go to the swamps in the Amazon, that will make a great film, we'll come and do it'*, and they were brilliant. They said, *'No problem, we'll do that'*.

When the time came, we flew to Bogotá, hooked up with a navy plane and we flew down to this tiny little place, Puerto Leguízamo, right on the triple border of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. This is narco-central territory. Gunrunning, people-running, smuggling, everything, you name it. I remember interviewing some of the people in the town and I said, *'How do you feel here, in this town?'* They were very honest about it and said *'Aquí in Puerto Leguízamo no hay problemas, pero afuera es muy peligroso'* – *'outside, it is very dangerous'*. It is true - outside the cities, outside the towns, it is very dangerous and there is not a lot of government control down there.

When we flew to one place along the border, as you can see – a fully-armed Minigun helicopter gunship there and sure enough, the hovercraft had been deployed, so it made a great News at Ten film.

I did not think at the time, *'Aha! I will gather all of this for my book.'* It was actually a couple of years later that I did this. But it was amazing to see it. The hovercraft are making a big difference for them, because they are enabling the police and military to pursue the gunrunners across the mudbanks in the dry season, the low season. Previously they only had boats, so they were not able to get across the mudbanks and so the dry season was easy for them.

These things make a massive racket. Subtle, they are not. They have got a .50 calibre Browning mounted on the top and I know what you are thinking, *'Well, hang on, a couple of good, well-placed AK47 rounds in that skirt in the apron and the whole thing will just deflate like a balloon'*. It does not. They have what are like independent cells of air in the skirt, so they are resistant to gunshot wounds. That of course translated into this book.

Now, it is funny the different reactions from people I get at BBC: *'You're writing fiction! Okay. Odd, but interesting.'* A lot of people - John Humphrys included - gave it a lovely endorsement, and a lot of people said, *'Ah, my God, I've always wanted to do that. How do you do it? How do you go about it?'*.

I would say that while I have never been on a fiction-writing course, there are certain things that you need. You need a beginning, a middle and an end, as in any book. The reader wants a story. They want to know how it will end. For it to be a page-turner, they have got to give a damn about what happens in the next chapter. So I tried to leave certain cliffhangers: at the end of a chapter, *'She turned to him, but it wasn't him.'* Or something like that. Okay, it was not quite as clichéd as that!

It is lovely that most days on Twitter someone is saying, *'Just finished it, couldn't put it down,'* which is great, but it is also scaring the hell out of me about the second one because the biggest risk is second book-itis, or second album-itis. If you have a successful first novel (and I am glad to say this has been), which is going to be part of a trilogy, there is some pressure. I have got two more to write. I have almost finished the next one. It is very late. It was supposed to be out this year, but I simply cannot work Monday to Friday, five days a week, sometimes the weekends at the day job, and then come home and write interestingly in the evening. I tried to do it earlier in the year and I wrote badly, and I have torn up what I wrote because I just thought, *'I'm writing this when I'm tired, I'm being lazy, I am cutting corners. No, I need to start again'*. So certain chapters I have started again and it is better for it. I think when it hits the shelves - *Ultimatum*, which is based in Iran and the Gulf, will be out in May - and I hope by then it is a polished thing.

The other question some of you might be thinking is, *'Well, okay, what about movies?'* These days it is all about series, it is about box sets, Netflix, Amazon, BBC iPlayer. That is not to say you cannot make a film as well, but I will just say that there is more chance that this is going to be in a series than in a big stand-alone two-hour film. I do not want to say anything more at the moment, because I do not want to jinx the discussions that are underway. That is probably enough from me, but I am really hoping that you have some piercing questions. Thank you, Michael.

TIME FOR A WORLD ORDER THAT WORKS

Text of a lecture given by the Most Hon the Marquis of Lothian PC QC DL and chaired by the Rt Hon Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC

17th January 2018

The Most Hon the Marquis of Lothian PC QC DL *was first elected to Parliament in 1974 and served as a Conservative Member of Parliament until his retirement at the May 2010 General Election. He was subsequently appointed to the House of Lords as a Life Peer. He has held the posts of Chairman of the Conservative Party, Deputy Leader, Shadow Foreign Secretary and Shadow Secretary of State for Defence. On stepping down from the Front Bench in 2005, Lord Lothian was appointed to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to which he was reappointed in 2010, in 2015 and again in 2017. In 1993, he was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office, and in January 1994 was appointed Minister of State at the same office. As such, he was responsible for the negotiations leading to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, and was the first British minister to meet with Sinn Fein and the IRA for 25 years. He continues to study peace processes and the practice of talking to terrorists today, with particular reference to the Middle East peace process. He has been Vice President of the Anglo-Jordanian Society since 2016. He maintains a keen interest in international affairs and he is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum, an independent, non-party political forum for active debate on foreign affairs, defence and international security issues, which he founded in May 2006.*

It seems that every political generation proclaims the need and often the authorship of a New World Order. Each in turn berates the evil disorder which confronts it and seeks to offer a shining if distant alternative. Frequently it has turned out to be an extremist manifesto – Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and Mao's *Little Red Book* spring to mind – which has only served to give the concept a bad name. The effect of this too often has been unnecessarily, and in my view damagingly, to frighten people away from the very idea of a New World Order. As the world today teeters on the brink of chaos it is time to think again.

We can take pointers and lessons from the past. Not all proclaimed New World Orders were either dangerously extreme or romantically wishful thinking. Some were fired by realistic idealism. Franklin D. Roosevelt's vision not only helped to salvage the US from the Depression. Its philosophy spawned the Marshall Plan which at least in Europe swept

away the vestiges of dark totalitarianism and helped to rebuild the social and structural ruins of war. It encouraged the return of pluralist democracy. It laid the basic foundations for the birth of European Economic Cooperation which in turn provided the bases of much needed economic stability. Indeed, the final tendrils of it can still be felt today.

Not all were so effective. John Kennedy's vision of what you can do for your country which momentarily excited his generation, was buried posthumously in the chilling winds of the Cold War and ultimately in the poisonous quicksands of the Vietnam conflict.

Tony Blair, ever the political fantasist, made dramatic pronouncements which then blew away in the disorderly blast of his own creation. Along with his fellow fantasist George W. Bush they destructively pursued their neo-con obsession of delivering western-style democracy to a world which, where it did not already exist, did not want it. Cameron in Libya followed suit. The result: division and disorder.

Barack Obama in his inspiring Cairo New Beginning speech of June 2009 gave great hope to many, collected his Nobel Peace Prize and then apparently lost interest.

So is there a New World Order or even a World Order today? If there is, it is hard to see it. In the Far East we almost certainly face a new member of a Nuclear Club which should under the Non-Proliferation Treaty be shrinking rather than expanding. In the Philippines and Venezuela, we are witnessing the growth from different polarisations of the political spectrum of brutal and oppressive dictatorships where once democracy to an extent prevailed.

In the Middle East and North Africa, in the name of establishing order Western intervention helped to remove albeit distasteful yet stable dictatorships creating consequent civil strife and causing as much, if not far more suffering and death than ever the old dictators did.

While we continue to preach order, we cannot avoid our own responsibility for undermining it. We opened windows to Islamist extremism in the Middle East region. Some which we deliberately recruited to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan subsequently turned on us spreading disorder in its wake. In Iraq we fired up the Sunni/Shia conflict which is still burning brightly. We encouraged the Kurds to seek their own destiny creating even further tension and division not only in Iraq but in Turkey and Syria as well.

In Libya we fought from a great height and then, dictatorship overthrown, we patted ourselves on the back and went home leaving the Libyan people to fight each other for what we had left behind. And yet we now wring our hands at the refugee and slave trading nightmare which has followed. Libyans can surely be forgiven their hollow laugh, not least because our original justification for intervention was ironically a recently prized new pillar of World Order, the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P).

Questionable there, but even more so given the failure even to consider it in relation to the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Yemen or even more specifically the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar. World Order to them in the hands of the West, if it exists at all, must appear to be extremely selective and nothing much to do with any moral high ground.

These facts suggest that at this time effective elements of world order are at best in short supply. In the past proclaimed 'world orders' were at least based primarily on the world as it was albeit including propagandist tints designed to colour it. Propaganda was by and large understood for what it was, and most people aimed off to take account of it.

Fake news has created a new dimension in a communications arena which is anyway no longer controllable. The era of vertical communications has largely given way to horizontal communications using mass social media frequently to convey misinformation. The old adage of the lie winging its way around the world before the truth has got its boots on is no longer adequate. Like some malignant virus, the lie will have mutated and multiplied and will be continuing to do so millions of times before any attempts at correction can be made; and it will have been disseminated almost universally. While this is dangerous in itself, it is particularly so in relation to international affairs.

We saw a still unresolved example of this at last autumn's UN general assembly with the US and North Korean leaders distorting reality in a series of schoolboy level insults directed at each other. Big Rocket Man against Little Rocket Man. The most concerning was Trump's threat to 'destroy' North Korea; not punish or degrade or disarm or defeat, but destroy. This set a new and frightening standard. While until then we might have thought we were observing some virtual wargame, this apparent willingness to wipe out of existence a country of millions of citizens, let alone the collateral effect on neighbouring countries not least China, dragged it into sinister reality. Sinister because it suddenly had the capacity, Dr Strangelove-like, to reach a stage where it suddenly became irreversible. Thankfully on this occasion it cooled of its own accord, but the game it appears is still in play with nothing new to check it.

The Middle East is also an arena of fake news and counter news. Through claim and counterclaim the chaos continues. In Syria, Assad is still there. For all our denials, the Russians are winning. The local Syrian militias are more interested in their own territorial agendas than in peace; the Western coalition partners are now only concerned about saving face whatever spin they have to put on it. The neighbouring states are pursuing their own hegemonic ambitions, Sunni against Shia, Saudi against Iran, each's proxy against the other's; Turkey seeking the main chance, even buying Russian missiles while remaining part of NATO; Kurds going for what they can get. Altogether a growing cauldron of turmoil and hatred with no end in sight. And all awash with fake news. Russia has cleared a potential way forward, but it will require facts and not fiction to take advantage of it. And the facts are not there.

The real world is in a state of chaos such as I don't recall in my political lifetime where a spark could lead to an uncontrollable conflagration. So much for World Order. Quasi genocide in Myanmar, growing Islamist extremism across the Sahel; Central African lawlessness and anarchy; renewed tensions between India and Pakistan; mounting corruption in South Africa; South America politically volatile; and Europe struggling to retain its cohesion in the face of a rising tide of nationalism, regionalism and political polarisation.

And on top of all this, a myriad of natural disasters in turn exacerbating international poverty and humanitarian suffering. This litany may sound hyperbolic, but it matches closely the scene set in UN Secretary-General Guterres' New Year message. It proclaims beyond doubt that the old order in that it ever really existed has failed and it calls for a new one. But what?

Rhetoric and good intentions will not be enough, nor simply tinkering with what is there at the moment. Any workable new order will need to be based on reality. This may sound like stating the obvious, but in today's world it is anything but simple and yet absolutely vital.

Last week a technician in Hawaii was closing down for the night and we are told he inadvertently touched a button on his computer. The result was effectively a nuclear war alert: 'Incoming ballistic missile. Take cover'. By most accounts it took up to 30 minutes to rectify during which immense fear was generated. This false news could in certain circumstances given the geography, the tensions in the region and the rhetoric which has been deployed have caused a retaliatory nuclear strike against North Korea. Not, I'm told, impossible. On this occasion this was false news. On the next it might be fake news deliberately deployed to create a casus belli. Is it possible with modern technology to identify what is fake and what is real, and quickly enough to make the right decisions? And given the nature of the dissemination of such information across the social media can it ever be retrieved or corrected in time?

What is certain is that well-deployed fake news makes international resolutions of conflicts between nations certainly more tortuous if not impossible particularly if those nations are anyway instinctively hostile and suspicious. And failure to resolve such conflicts can have global consequences. Technology has overtaken the failsafe mechanism of old. There are no simple answers to this rapidly emerging problem except to suggest that the assessment should not be left to the combatants themselves but must however swiftly be carried out more widely. It will not be easily carried out nor the necessary trust be created, but in the coming world it will have to be done and the mechanisms to deliver it created.

I am looking more basically at the mechanisms for delivering a workable new world order. I am coming to the conclusion that the new answer may ultimately be found in the ruins

of the old. One fascinating aspect of the recent UN Assembly was the number of world leaders from the US President and our own PM down, who declared in one way or another that the UN was no longer fit for purpose, that it was overblown and underachieving, in short that it had lost its way. Some of us have long felt that the old structures, particularly the Security Council in its present configuration, are systemically incapable of resolving global issues; in short that the whole organisation needs fundamental reform.

Any such reform could only be achieved with maximum consensus. Its clearly stated aim should be to devise the mechanisms and capability to deliver a new world order with the strength and authority to see it operate effectively. No easy task.

It will not be achieved by tinkering with the present structures. It needs root and branch reform. I am no expert in the intricacies of the UN so what I will suggest will of necessity be broad brush. We should start by agreeing that the primary purpose of the United Nations is the establishment and preservation of global peace. It is arguable that this has always been so in which case it has not been very successful. The challenges facing it in the future will be even greater; hence the accepted need for change.

What we are seeing today in terms of international events is a 21st century version of the Great Game, major powers manoeuvring to secure maximum influence and hegemony, minor powers seeking to thwart them, and all being waged either directly or by proxy. The game is not new, but the speed with which it is now being required to be played has increased out of all recognition. Hence the relevance of horizontal or social media communication, of instant communication penetration. No longer the luxury of a gentle game of chess. Increasingly more an international version of racing demon with instant reaction the main skill and less and less time for strategy and diplomacy. The scope for misjudgements increases exponentially and the characters of the players become crucial.

That is why the current situation in relation to North Korea is so tense. It is also why the present heat of the Middle East cauldron and US involvement in it is of such concern. And the same can be said of Russia in Eastern Europe, China in the South China Sea, and general unrest in the continent of Africa. Leaving the resolution of all these to the good sense and judgement of those involved is an act of faith that I for one find less and less easy to make.

That is why we need to look for something which can with authority stand above them all; and that for me is where a reformed United Nations can and should come in. Change will need to be radical. The current one state one vote within the UN, while an admirable liberal concept, simply does not work in an expanding world. To reflect reality there will need to be voting weighting and ranking based on size, military strength, economic performance and in UN terms reliability. Cherished liberal values must take second place to the ability to deliver.

Major reform should begin with the ultimate UN powerhouse, the Security Council. We need to jettison the totally outdated concept of permanent members which by and large merely reflect global power structures at the end of a war over seventy years ago. It should now be appointed to reflect say the fourteen militarily and economically pre-eminent nations at the time of its selection as assessed by relevant international bodies. It should not be elected, which would put it in thrall to its electors. It should be reselected every ten years to reflect the realities of the time. There should be no more permanent members as such, although it is likely that the criteria will see certain countries reselected.

The veto, for too long the Achilles heel of the UN, should be ended. Instead qualified majority voting should apply, say ten out of the fourteen needed to reach a decision. The Security Council as indeed the General Assembly should be led by a major international political figure chosen by the Security Council with the vision to create a new world order and the authority to deliver it.

The UN should predominantly be financed by Security Council members based on their economic strengths – and this should be rigorously applied. Military contributions for peace-making, peacekeeping and other programmes should be provided on the basis of military strength, but with a strict application of the doctrine of horses for courses.

There will need to be a clear restatement of the role, purpose and responsibility of the UN. Firstly, conflict resolution which should be far more proactive than current peacekeeping, although there may well be a continuing role for the latter. Conflict resolution will require an increasingly sophisticated mixture of applied or applicable military strength and sensitive and skilled diplomacy.

Secondly, humanitarian aid must remain a core activity, but a more focused one based on genuine need and better targeting – and this would apply to the health and education programmes as well. One of the great crises facing the world today is that of refugees. It is increasingly obvious that it will need global resolution and this should become a prime responsibility of the reformed UN.

However, the most crucial role will be the ability will be to become effectively involved in defusing if not completely resolving major international crises. Where international peace and security are at risk, and I would put North Korea in this category, it must have the authority to intervene. It must have the skills to mediate between both sides, the powers to introduce effective sanctions and where necessary the military clout to enforce agreements and decisions. To command international respect and support in doing so, it will need to demonstrate the obtaining of reliable assessments upon which to take necessary action, and that what it does is fair, necessary and proportionate for the good and security of the international community as a whole.

And to get all this off the ground the present UNSC should appoint an international panel

of relevant academics to produce an initial blueprint for discussion.

I am in no doubt that what I am proposing will meet with massive and traditional opposition from many, particularly those UNSC members for whom the veto has been a defining power and those who rely on them to use it.

The task of those who support reform will be to persuade that in the present environment both actual and technological failure to reform could be catastrophic. The world today is in a very perilous state. If ever there has been a time for vision on a grand scale it is now. Instead of talking endlessly about New World orders the time has come to create one which can work.

This is the challenge facing us all. The question is whether the world possesses the quality of leadership to rise to the occasion. If it does not, I fear the future.

POLITICS AND SECURITY IN A TURBULENT WORLD

Transcript of a lecture given by Sir John Sawers GCMG

24th January 2018

Sir John Sawers GCMG *is Chairman and Partner of Macro Advisory Partners, which he joined in 2015 after completing his five-year tenure as Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). As Chief of MI6 he modernised the way the Service works and created a more open approach to public accountability, as well as leading the organisation through a period of high terrorist threat and international political upheaval. Prior to leading MI6, John was the UK's Ambassador to the United Nations (2007-2009), Political Director of the Foreign Office (2003-2007), Special Representative in Iraq (2003), Ambassador to Cairo (2001-2003), and Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Tony Blair (1999-2001). John studied at the universities of Nottingham, St Andrews, Witwatersrand and Harvard. John is a Non-Executive Director of BP, a Visiting Professor at King's College London, a Senior Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute, and a Governor of the Ditchley Foundation.*

Thank you very much, Michael and thank you again, everyone, for coming. A particular thanks, actually, to Michael. I do not think Michael gets enough credit for what he has done in his political career as a Northern Ireland minister. He laid the basis for the progress that was made in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. As Shadow Foreign Secretary, you visited me not only in Cairo, but you were also one of my first political visitors in Baghdad and you did an outstanding job there in a difficult period post 9/11; and your quiet and engaging style brings a lot of people to lunches like this. A big tribute to you, Michael, for everything that you have done.

It is nice to come to an audience and not be introduced as 'M'. It makes a pleasant change. But just thinking about that, I do have actually have a proposal for the next Bond movie. I have a vision of the next Bond villain. I see him as a rather large man with an unlikely hair construction and a possible orange tan, living in gilded palaces, glamorous women everywhere, and he wants to sweep away the international systems we have known here for the last seventy years. He casually shuts down the American government and he has got his finger on a larger-than-life nuclear button. Yes, the Bond villain is now President of the United States!

It is an image which I am afraid is all too compelling, but it is also very easy to engage in Trump bashing. I thoroughly enjoyed Michael Wolff's book - engaging, humorous, but very alarming as well - on the character of the President. Of course, he has been to some

extent a lucky president. The global economy is surging, coinciding with his first year as president. We might find that his tax reforms are an unnecessary stimulus to an already hot economy, but it is the right sort of problem for a president of the United States to have. I think the benefits will flow through to Trump's supporters around the country, many of whom remain ardent and committed to him.

I do not think we, here in our more liberally-minded surroundings of the Liberal Club, believe that the chances of him being re-elected in 2020 are exceptionally low. I do not think they are - there is a real chance that he might be president for eight years if he survives the Mueller investigation and his health remains in reasonable shape.

So, how do we think about Trump's impact on the world? Well, I think what is happening is his 'America First' approach. He is leading major players around the world to think again about how they behave and how they protect their interests, especially America's traditional friends and allies. That withdrawal of America's stabilising role, his reduced emphasis on friends and allies, is likely to see others seeking to find advantage and gain benefits where they can.

We are seeing that it is not just Trump who is a 'big man' leader in the modern world, we are seeing many others as well. Obviously Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, but also Erdoğan in Turkey, Modi in India, Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, Shinzō Abe in Japan, Duterte in the Philippines and others. It is very interesting that Trump has actually developed quite a good personal relationship with most of these. This trend of 'big man' leaders in significant countries is accelerating the move towards what you might call 'Great Power politics' and away from multilateralism and the international institutions which have been the feature of the world in which most of us have operated recently.

Now of course the defining relationship in the modern world is the one between the United States and China and it is going to go through some pretty torrid weeks in the next month or two, particularly on trade. We have seen some early measures on second order things, like washing machines and solar panels from the Trump administration, but I understand that next week, around the time of the State of Union address, the Americans are going to come out with an assessment of the damage caused by Chinese intellectual property theft at around $1 trillion. Now that is a big, juicy, round number which you could probably make up in a number of ways, but it would be the basis for some US countermeasures against China, which could be quite far reaching.

Just because it is the Trump administration does not mean that there is not some basis for some of their grievances. I think some of the practices that China has pursued do require some challenge. But if we are getting into a cycle whereby the international trade system is used at a means beyond settling trade disputes in a normal way, we will have wider political repercussions. So that is my first concern.

My second concern is that I do not think that Washington is yet ready for the Chinese response to the trade measures they are going to take. The Chinese are bound to retaliate in some form and then we could get into an escalating cycle of measures and countermeasures. The international trading system is not as resilient as it used to be. I am not sure it is as tough as it needs to be to deal with the sort of challenge that a major US-China trade confrontation will cause. Already the WTO disputes process is being blocked by the Americans deliberately in order to weaken the WTO settlement process. So the first thing we should think about in the coming weeks is a crisis that is quite possible on trade.

The wider context for US-China relations is more set by the crisis in North Korea and we have some great experts on North Korea in the audience here today. I think it will be a defining test of whether the United States and China can cooperate on security. We are going through slightly calmer waters now because of a bit of outreach, a bit of diplomacy going on between Pyongyang and Seoul, the Olympics coming up, various visits by potential emissaries to North Korea.

But I do not think we should be deceived. The fundamentals are still of very great concern. The North Koreans are set on a path of developing not just a small number but an arsenal of nuclear weapons that they can deliver to the United States. The Americans have ruled that out as an unacceptable position. The National Security Advisor has made it clear that containment is not a satisfactory policy because it would just be a licence for the North Koreans to continue developing their capability.

I think that the chances of an American strike on North Korea are considerably higher than most Europeans believe. When I talk to my friends in Washington, a figure of a 30% chance of a US strike in the next year or so is quite commonly put out. In the last six months or so, the US military have refined their plans for a strike on North Korea, how they would achieve it and how they would minimise the North Korean retaliation which of course would be still quite significant.

I think the Chinese are thinking through their own position on this. They do not want to implore the Americans not to do something - that would make them look weak and I do not think the Chinese are prepared to do that. I think they may also look at how they might take advantage of an American strike on North Korea. If we remember when the US, Britain and others were invading Iraq, none of us conceived that the major beneficiary of that conflict 14 years ago was going to be Iran. Well, maybe the biggest beneficiary of a US strike on North Korea could in the end be China, because China would be in a position to reforge the Korean Peninsula in terms of Chinese interests.

We should exclude Taiwan as a factor in this equation. I understand that privately, President Xi Jinping's main criticism of Mao Zedong was allowing Kim Il-sung to launch an attack on the south. Why was that a major mistake? Because it prevented China from reunifying Taiwan with the mainland in 1950, when the Americans would not have been in a position to stop it or would not have had the will to stop it.

There are a number of elements here where the Chinese could respond to an American strike. And as I say, I think the American strike is a more likely scenario than most of us on this side of the Atlantic consider and which markets have not fully taken into account. But like trade - even more so than trade - it will define that longer-term US-China relationship.

The last thing I would say on China is keep your eye out on the Belt and Road initiative. It sounds a bit vague - what does it actually consist of? But it is the one strategic initiative that Xi Jinping has announced and it is very interesting that whereas we talk about the Pacific, the Americans talk about the relationship across seas, the Chinese are actually more interested in Eurasia as a land mass. They are interested in investing in the connections across Eurasia and clearly that will bring huge economic benefits to all the countries that are involved, including ultimately to Europe. But it will also have a strategic plan that is lying behind it, which is about Eurasia as an entity where China is a dominant player. We need to think about the pluses and minuses of all that as well.

Enough on East Asia. Let me say a few words about the Middle East because this is another area where the withdrawal of a calming American hand is leading to individuals and countries behaving in a rather different way from how they would in the context of a traditional American foreign policy.

The most important, most interesting new player in the Middle East is Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. He has set himself some hugely important goals, both for Saudi Arabia's interests and for all those countries like Britain, which are friends of Saudi Arabia. He is trying to rebalance the economy, away from oil. He is trying to strengthen the private sector and make the country less dependent on the public sector. He is trying to move forward on social issues. He is trying to respond to the demands of younger Saudis for a more interesting and fulfilling life, and he is trying to reshape the role of religion in society and make it in a place which is more comfortable for the rest of us and to play down the Saudi support for a more fundamentalist approach.

So those goals are really important and he is a young man in a hurry. But in concentrating power in Saudi Arabia, he has made enemies for himself and he has weakened some of the pillars of Saudi stability. The unity of the Royal Family used to be a bedrock of Saudi stability - he has now swept that away. The accommodation of the religious leaders whatever the compromises involved – without that, he does not have that reliable support from religious leaders that previous Saudi monarchs have had. There is even the question, although I am not an expert on this, as to whether he is paying due attention to the tribal structures and traditional leaders in parts of Saudi Arabia. He has made himself more dependent on popular support.

Of course, when you attack the corruption of the rich and senior in society, you do gain a lot of popular backing. But an anti-corruption campaign also leads to making quite a few enemies in society (there are still a few hundred people locked up in the Ritz-Carlton

in Riyadh) and if you are dependent upon a popular base of support, it makes it more difficult to take tough measures in terms of reducing the size of the public sector, reducing people's dependence on the state. He has also made some mistakes in the region - Yemen, Qatar, Lebanon - and he is putting too much emphasis on Iran and I think we are all familiar with the difficulties that this generates.

It is not all negative. He has got very strong ties with the UAE, he has repaired the rift with Egypt and he is reaching out to Iraq as well. But it is an inconsistent record and the real question for us - and we do not know the answer to this – is: will he learn from the mistakes of his first three years in power and is Saudi Arabia going to be able to move forward? The signs, I am afraid, are not as encouraging as we want them to be, but we will not know for a while.

Meanwhile, across the water, across the Gulf in Iran, we are seeing some very interesting developments there as well. I was talking to Jack Straw - very good to see you here, Jack - Jack and I worked on Iran together for four years when Jack was Foreign Secretary. We are both fascinated by a country which is much more complex, much richer in many ways than some of its Arab neighbours. But those demonstrations around the turn of year came as a serious shock to the regime. They did not expect them. It was poorer people in small towns around the country who were rising up in anger against the regime, not just Rouhani's policies or the Supreme Leader's policies, but the whole damn lot, a plague on all their houses, because the social conditions, especially outside the big cities in Iran, are becoming more difficult.

I would say that Iran was a country that we wanted to have as part of our friendship group in the longer term, part of our structure of partners around the world. It has a richer culture, it has a more entrepreneurial instinct, it has a deeper sense of its own history and a more varied economy. I would like to see Iran move down that path of reform and opening, but we cannot yet say that it is certain to do so and we need to take an approach which encourages that, and I have to say that this is another area where the policy of the Trump administration is frankly not helping.

We could talk about many other parts of the Middle East and maybe you want to ask about Turkey or Egypt or Syria, but let's move on to issues closer to home. I am conscious that I want to leave time for questions.

What about the situation here in Europe? Well, most people, when they talk about Europe, focus on the politics of Europe. One of the most encouraging signs of 2017 was the emergence of Emmanuel Macron as President of France. Quite remarkable - I do not think that twelve months ago to this day many people would have put money on Macron coming through the presidential process, and still less on him being able to forge a new party that took a majority in the National Assembly. Now, he is not yet proven, he has still got a long way to go, but his initial steps, both at home in terms of reforming the

labour code, have been very positive, and he has shown a certain adeptness overseas. His dealings with Mohammed bin Salman over the Hariri sacking is one example, the way he is managing the Chinese, the Russians and the Americans is another example.

He is a French President who many of us on this side of the water rather envy. I was talking to one of the senior business people on Tuesday, who the previous evening had been in Versailles at the summit, the pre-Davos gathering of business leaders that Macron convened, and who was hugely impressed, not just by the splendour of the surroundings and the occasion, but by the coherence between the President, the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, the Foreign Minister, the business ministers and so on - through the system, a level of discipline and commonality of message which was deeply impressive. And the fact that Macron spoke for about forty minutes and then answered questions for well over another hour, all in fluent English, to this international audience. Now that is an impressive performance and when you look elsewhere around Europe, including this country, we can envy the political leaders that France has now at its disposal. But as I say, we will see how that evolves.

We are seeing weaknesses in Germany. We think Merkel will survive, but not with the same authority that she had before. We have got a very messy politics emerging in Italy and we will not quite know how that is going to go forward. So Europe is going to continue to be focused on some of its internal difficulties. I am sure many of us have concern about Brexit, I will come on to that, briefly in a minute.

But looking more widely at the threats that Europe faces, the three most often cited are terrorism, migration and cyber. Let's take them in that order.

On terrorism, I think the big question we face is what will happen to the dispersal of Daesh fighters, Islamic State fighters, in Syria and Iraq. Where will they now go, how organised will they be, what will their intentions be? I am not in touch with my former colleagues in MI6, I do not see briefings on these things. But I do understand that some are going to Yemen, some are going to Afghanistan, perhaps the bulk are going back to Afghanistan, but some will come home to their original countries, whether it is around the Arab world or around Europe.

The key question is how do we keep tabs on this dispersal of the fighters with Daesh and how can we manage the threat that they may pose when they come back to their home capitals? I believe that we can stay on top of the terrorist threat, but we should expect continuing attacks. We saw several last year here in the UK and we should not imagine that this issue is settled. It is not going to pose an existential threat to us, but it is something that is going to carry on being an irritant - more than that, a corrosive - and will take peoples' lives. The only way to deal with it is through sustained intelligence/security/law enforcement cooperation.

On migration, we went through that peak in 2015 when a million people from the Middle East ended up in Germany, and absorbing that great mouthful of migrants is going to take many years for the German system, although they are coping remarkably well so far.

The real worry on migration is that there are still pent-up pressures. Libya, a country of seven million people, is acting as a funnel for migrants from the rest of Africa and that is being contained to a certain extent. My biggest concern is that you have got two very populous countries, 40 million Algerians, over 90 million Egyptians now, being governed in states which you cannot put your hand on your heart and say you can expect stability there for the next twenty years. And if there is instability, there will be more of a surge to come north across the Mediterranean and threaten the stability of southern Europe and Europe as a whole. Managing those pressures, managing the relationship with North African countries and the countries to the south of them is going to be a fundamental task for Europe in the years ahead.

But my most serious concern is on the cyber front, because there, first of all, the threat is hard to quantify. It is impossible to know where the next threat is going to emerge. There is a mix of state actors and we have seen the Russians involved in this extensively, but it is not just the Russians. And it is in politics, in business, and in organised crime as well. We saw the impact of the WannaCry attack early last year, which exposed vulnerabilities in organisations like the NHS that did not keep their systems up-to-date and modern and thoroughly patched.

The bigger problem was the Petya attack last summer in Ukraine, which went viral and attacked a whole range of western companies incidentally, and brought several of them to their knees, at least for a period. The quality of that Petya attack was very high. They used tools which had been extracted from the National Security Agency, the NSA, in America and are now in the hands of criminal groups who call themselves the Shadow Brokers.

You have now got this cooperation now between independent hackers with very powerful tools at their disposal, working with both organised crime and with hostile states. Managing that threat, using the most sophisticated tools from the NSA - I should say in passing that the leaks from the NSA of those tools have been much more damaging to western interests than anything that Edward Snowden achieved. I think the scale of the threat that those capabilities propose is very high indeed.

We should expect more in the way of cyber threats around Europe as well. What do we do about it?

Well, I still think – I have been arguing this for ten years and made not much progress on it, I am afraid, even when I was Chief of MI6 – that we need to start building up a set of principles, a code of conduct, of what a cyberattack is, what a proportionate response is, what the red lines should be.

We do not have any doctrine yet, really, on cyber. That needs to be developed either between the major international powers involving Russia and China as well as western countries, or maybe that is impossible and we have to do it amongst ourselves and say: this is what we do - like human rights, we will protect these rights and we will deal with people who infringe them. Cyber is still that ungoverned territory of crime and hostility, to which we need to bring some governance, some order, some structure, and we have not really in international politics managed to achieve that. I think there is a role for Europe in this, but it is not going to work without the Americans being on board. There is an interest in America in these subjects, but also a great reluctance to engage with Beijing and Moscow on issues where, with some reason, the Americans believe that the western countries will adhere to new norms and new standards, whilst others may cheat. But this is a problem too big to not try to address in the period ahead.

What about Britain - where does Britain fit into all this? I do not want to reopen the whole Brexit issue. Brexit is going to happen in 14 months' time, I would be very surprised if it did not happen, frankly. But we need to think about what role we, as Britain, are going to play in a post-Brexit world. It is part a level of ambition. I do not believe the people in this country voted for a role in the world which is, say, that of Spain or Italy or Canada. We still see ourselves alongside France and Germany and other major powers as able to shape and influence and determine what happens in the world.

There are some basics in here. First of all, in order to exercise power and influence, you need three elements. You need a successful economy at home. If you have a declining economy, no one is going to respect you. You need to have inspiring and confident leaders at the political level and you need to invest in the tools of power, whether that is the Armed Forces, the Intelligence Services, diplomacy, or development. You have to have all three of those.

I believe from 1980 to 2010, we basically had those elements in place in the UK. We did shape - not always for the best, but usually for the better - events around the world. We need to try and aspire to do that and not to repeat some of the either absences of a British role, as we saw over Ukraine, or flat mistakes, such as our failure to address the problems in Syria.

I also think we need a core alignment of Britain. We tried during that period, 1980 to 2010, to be a bridge across the Atlantic, in Tony Blair's words. Being a friend in Washington, partners in Europe, and being able to bring the whole thing together. I am not sure if we can do that now. In Europe, we would have a partnership of equals. We have, I think, closer values with our European partners than we have across the Atlantic. But we have turned our backs on Europe. Can we retain and rebuild that involvement, that engagement with our European partners, above all France and Germany, but the European Union as an entity as well, as we move forward?

If we cannot do that, then I think we have to throw our lot in with America and we have to build a new Anglosphere across the Atlantic. Now we have a firm basis for that in the intelligence and defence ties, we have closer historical ties, and in some ways a closer popular culture as well. It is not as if it is a bad second best, it is a pretty good alternative. But I do think at some stage we are going to have to choose. My preference would be to remain committed with our European partners in a partnership of equals as Europe. But if we cannot do that, we cannot just be Britain adrift. We have to find a new partnership and the obvious one is with our partners across the Atlantic.

I think that is probably enough on what is happening around the world. I will just conclude by saying that we are in a very rapidly changing world. Some countries are finding a new sense of direction and energy in this world. I look around and you look at what is happening in Argentina, you look at what is happening in India, you look at what is happening in the last month or so in South Africa, you find real excitement and opportunity coming through, which shows a lead to other countries who are still slightly fumbling their way forward, whether it is Turkey or Brazil or Mexico or Indonesia, trying to work out what their role is in a world where some of the assumptions that they have made in the past, both domestically and internationally, are no longer valid.

And of course, we are seeing technology as a huge driver of change, both in our personal lives and in our business lives, and in state-to-state relations and in politics. That is not going to change. I think that one of the big challenges we are going to face is how we regulate technology, how we control technology, not just the cyber world, but the opportunities, the taxation questions, accessibility issues, how you deal with data, how you preserve privacy as well. These are huge issues that we have to address in the years ahead.

But despite these challenges for governments, I still think that power in the next few decades is going to rest fundamentally with governments and is not going to seep elsewhere. If anything, the emergence of Trump and Trump-style politics is reasserting the power of governments and moving away from the dispersal, if you like, or the deconstruction, of power that we saw over some of the last few decades. How these governments interact, how they cooperate with one another, how they confront one another - that is going to determine the extent to which we enjoy peace and prosperity in the decades ahead as we have in the last seventy years.

CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: WHERE ARE WE HEADING?

Text of a lecture given by Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO

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First of all I should apologise for the dull title of this talk. The truth is I was asked some months ago for a description of what I proposed to discuss today. Given that everything constantly changes and nothing ever really changes in the Middle East and North Africa (which is really the full title of the region that interests me - I intend to abbreviate it as I speak on) I thought I would play it safe and see what was most topical on the day itself.

What I thought I would do today is draw out two or three key themes which seem to me to provide the structural underpinning for a lot of what looks on the surface like pointless or perplexing turbulence and then say what I think they mean for our future interests – by which I mean British, US and European interests – in the region and what we might do in response.

The two broad themes I want to discuss are:

- Iran, Islamism and the so-called Gulf crisis
- The Arab/Israel conflict

Now Islamisms of all kinds have had a massive impact on the modern Middle East, its conflicts and its cohesion as a political space – leaving the Gulf, with all its tensions, as almost the last surviving functional sub-state system in the Arab Middle East. We tend to focus on Sunni Islamisms. But Islamisms are not simply Sunni. Radical Shia Islamisms have undergone a similar process of globalisation and deculturation to their Sunni counterparts.

There is a fascinating process of simultaneous attraction and repulsion between the Sunni and Shia Islamist poles. The first mobilised Shia Islamist movement in the region, Al Da'wa in Iraq, arose after 1958 out of clerical opposition to Iraqi leftist nationalism from the same milieu as the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. More generally links between the MB and the Khomeinist trend in Iran go back as far as the 1950s.

Of course, the claims of the Islamic Republic of Iran are based in a specific form of ethno-nationalist and cultural exceptionalism as well as in religious identity. The ideological ferment of the last sixty years has produced different currents, as with Sunni Islamism. Some strands are clerical, others anti-clerical. But all are revolutionary. Together these strands represent as powerful a challenge to national loyalties as that represented by the MB and its analogues. And they have been backed by an aggressive militia-led Iranian activism across the region for the last 38 years.

This strategy is in practice the model that Khomeini and his heirs first adopted within Iran. They were a vanguardist and highly authoritarian movement, espousing a heterodox Imamism – Velayat-e-Faqih. The Iranian revolution – like Egypt's in 2011 – was produced by students, leftists, bazaaris, people whose children had been educated into an economy with not enough jobs and wild inflation. But it was hijacked by part of the clerical class, which had always had an awkward relationship with constitutionalism and representational norms. To sustain this new system, it created its shock troops, the Basij and the IRGC. Their doctrinal rigidity and repressive practices have helped drive a sustained and damaging drain of talent from Iran over the years.

If you look at opinion polling in Iran recently you will see significant and often majority support for normalising relations with the US and for greater social and political freedoms. These also seem to have been some of the factors behind the unrest in December. In 1997 over 70% of the IRGC may have voted for the reformist Ayatollah Khatami. The response of the conservatives was to increase the indoctrination of IRGC recruits and existing cadres and create a new ability in this and other pillars of the clerical state to reproduce themselves – as an elite instrument, a nomenklatura, of repressive Islamism in spite of currents in the wider society.

In parallel with this we have seen what I call the sacralised satrapisation of the Levant. The 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended the Lebanese Civil War, sought to take militias out of politics. But it only succeeded in ceding power to one of them – the most powerful, Hizbollah, which operates as a state within a state, with its leader Hassan Nasrallah, effectively Iran's resident proconsul in Southern Beirut.

In the last two decades, we have seen the same thing happen progressively in Iraq, where the three most powerful men today are probably: Hadi al Ameri of the Badr organisation, the effective commander of al Hashd al Sha'abi; Abu Mahdi al Muhandis of Kata'ib Hizbollah and the effective deputy of the Hashd; and Qais al Khaz'ali, the leader

of Asa'ib Ahl al Haq (The Leagues of the Righteous). All three are ideologically Islamist, all are revolutionary, and all are backed by Iran and fighting on its behalf not just in Iraq – most recently over Kirkuk and other areas in the north – but also in Syria.

This should tell us something important; so too, should the expressed desire of Iran, with its subalterns, to control a swathe of territory from the Iraq/Iran border to the Mediterranean and down to the Golan Heights. None of this is a secret. Iranian and Iraqi Shia commanders tell us openly this is what they want. They make a display of meeting and greeting each other on the Iraqi/Syrian border. Qassim Soleimani, Mohammad-Reza Naghdi, the then Commander of the Basij, and Hajj Hashem, the Hizbollah Commander in Southern Lebanon, have all had themselves photographed over the last year or so near Quneitra, sometimes observing Israeli positions through field glasses. Qais al Khazali has most recently appeared on the Lebanese/Israeli border in company with the senior Hizbollah commander in the area.

In parallel Hizbollah has undermined the Lebanese Armed Forces, struck prisoner exchange deals with Da'esh as if they represented the Lebanese State, infringed Iraqi sovereignty and national security by seeking to transport freed Da'esh fighters back to Iraq, and proclaimed its intent to continue to act as both the principal guardians and recoverers of Lebanese territory and as one of the key guarantors of the Assad regime in Syria – on behalf of Iran.

And I believe it is this Iranian-backed drive for Shia Islamist hegemony that underpins the sectarianisation of political conflict in the wider Gulf and in Syria.

It is not, as some would have it, simply about Saudi Arabia. Saudi Salafism is certainly part of the dialectic from which sectarianism and other extremisms spring. Without question, the Saudi state has worked with some highly questionable sectarian actors in Syria, notably the late Zahran al Alloush. And over the last fifty years its promotion even of loyalist Salafism has had a damaging impact on the social fabric of traditionally more tolerant societies. But the Saudi government sees domestic sectarian division as a major national security concern. And internationally it tends to back secular politics where it can – including the Shia, Ayad Allawi, in Iraq and the secular and at least socially liberal – if robustly Sunni - Hariris in Lebanon.

Nor is sectarianism the inevitable result of age-old enmities. There is undoubtedly deep anti-Shia prejudice among many Sunni communities. The Shia have been disadvantaged and oppressed in many Sunni-majority states. But the most important inflection point for the region was the dramatic mobilisation of the 1979 Iranian revolution which for the first time since the Fatimids made Arab Shia identity politically consequential. Its impact was magnified by the fact it coincided with the assault by Juhaiman al Otaibi and his group on the Grand Mosque in Mecca and the subsequent conflict with Saddam's Iraq, which gave life to a thousand forms of adversarial, transnational and often violent Shia activism.

And this brings me to the current dispute between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt on one side, and Qatar on the other, which illustrates for me some other important and often neglected structural features of the region as it currently stands.

Most analysts seem to believe that the fundamental reason for this dispute – as with more recent events in Saudi Arabia – is a clash of egos. This seems to me both patronising and misconceived. The crisis arises out of the logic of five decades of Gulf socio-economic development, the evolution of different, politically legitimating discourses and the urgent challenge of all varieties of political Islamism. It reflects important emerging differences in the political sociology of the Gulf. And it poses fundamental questions – not just about the GCC, but about the future of the wider region. This matters to all of us but not necessarily in the way we think.

As many have pointed out, it is perhaps surprising that the Muslim Brotherhood in itself should have found itself at the heart of this dispute. Links between the Gulf and political Islamism go back to the 1920s. The Saudi state in particular gave huge material and moral support to the Muslim Brotherhood and related groups down to the 1980s.

But the driving impulse was largely raison d'état, not ideological convergence. The Saudis wished to harness the Brotherhood as an instrument of statecraft, in the battle against other more immediate and obviously revolutionary threats. If they were short-sighted, they were not alone. Certainly, it came back to haunt them. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, welcomed by the Muslim Brotherhood internationally, exposed the deep fault lines in the Arab world between republicans, monarchists, pro-Palestinians, nationalists, Islamists, rich and poor. It suggested that the pan-Islamist aims of the MB, and other more extreme groups which sprang from it, might be irreconcilable with the increasingly worldly and national ambitions of prosperous Gulf states.

In addition, in some places the presence of committed proselytising and increasingly Salafised Muslim Brothers and the support provided to the MB and its offshoots by Saudi religious institutions produced an ideological ferment, combining MB political activism and emerging takfirism with an intense Salafi focus on issues of doctrine and personal conduct. From the 1960s this produced a regional movement – known as the Islamic Sahwa ('Awakening') – which came in the 1990s to pose a powerful ideological challenge to existing political dispensations. In the eyes of some, this helped set the scene for the al Qaeda-related terror campaigns of the early 2000s.

In reality, the connections were complex and often indirect, fuelled as much by ideological fissures as by agreement. But this is characteristic of all Islamist movements. And the perception of threat was heightened by the involvement of Sahwa scholars in the petitions movement fuelled by the US presence in the Kingdom after 1990. This eventually led to a decisive parting of ways between the Saudis and the Brotherhood.

This complex experience forms the background to the current situation. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE it combined in 2012/13 with a cacophony of events arising out of the Arab Spring: the rise of MB-inflected politics in Tunisia, backed by Qatar and Turkey; the Brotherhood victory in Egypt; a new MB assertiveness in Jordan and indeed the Gulf (notably Kuwait); and the appearance of MB-associated movements in Libya, alongside and sometimes in alliance with violent Takfiris, again supported by Qatar. This sense of Islamism on the march helped provoke the regional counter reaction.

And all of this brought into sharp focus a fundamental difference of approach in the Arab states of the region that has profound implications for its future. This divergence rests upon differing interpretations not only of the precise trajectory of events in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia and Syria, but of their political significance and likely consequences.

For Qatar and Turkey, the key to the future prosperity and stability of all Arab and perhaps Muslim states seems to be to domesticate political Islamism and harness it as the motor of a modified version of pious authoritarianism in religiously modernist disguise.

The Saudis, Emiratis, Bahrainis and Egyptians profoundly disagree, as do many on the receiving end of external interventions in favour of the MB and other Islamisms – for example in Libya (and now perhaps also in Syria – a policy challenge for those, myself included, that see Assad as the core of the problem). For them, the behaviour of the Brotherhood, from the beginning of the Revolution in Egypt and most egregiously once they secured power, confirmed beyond a shadow of doubt that the ultimate goal of the Egyptian Brothers and indeed the MB as a whole, was to gain control of the Arab world's most populous and culturally resonant state, remake it as a Brotherhood stronghold, arrange matters in such a way that they remained in power indefinitely and use that platform to promote Brotherhood ideology across a region prepared for it by eighty years of sustained effort. They believe the activities of the MB and its associates in Libya, Tunis and Yemen were part of this plan. They believe the MB would not have stopped at the Red Sea. Nasser, of course, saw the same countries as the key to his own very different hegemonic ambitions: many in the Gulf fear this was the Islamist reboot.

The Saudis now believe that the shape-shifting nature of radical and politically mobilised Islamist thought in general is a direct threat to national cohesion and identity, at a time when such things are more important than ever.

Both the UAE and Saudi Arabia believe the MB – in all its guises - is dedicated to a self-defined purification of Islam and the establishment of a transnational Islamic state, through incremental but ultimately revolutionary political activism, using tactical violence if necessary. To this end, it mimics some central features of a state, through its hierarchical structure and the requirement for members to swear an exclusive oath of loyalty to the Murshid. But it repudiates national identity and any loyalty other than that to the Murshid and God.

The rulers of at least three Gulf states have concluded that this represents a dangerously and deliberately radical misreading of Islamic history in the service of anarchy (their term). Islam needs no purification. For the Saudi elite, the Kingdom is already a perfectly satisfactory Islamic state, whose ruler is religiously. All Saudis owe absolute loyalty to him. Anyone who acknowledges fealty to another is therefore disloyal by definition.

This is analogous to their problem with those Shia who acknowledge the temporal and spiritual sovereignty of an external Shia religious authority. It is not principally for the governing elite a question of being Shia. It is a question of territorial allegiance and loyalty to a sovereign individual. The new Crown Prince is clearly bent on modernising, not just the business structures of the Kingdom, but also its social and educational acquis in the service of a new and more open economic model. This is high risk and perhaps of necessity highly disruptive: talk of robot cities and the recent wave of arrests may simply be cover for a massively ambitious attempt to remake the Kingdom without losing its foundational legitimacy.

This can look high-handed. But change in the Middle East tends to come from above not below. Political Islamism – itself highly authoritarian - is an unwelcome competitor in this project.

In a similar way, the Emiratis, in particular the leadership of Abu Dhabi, who acknowledge a more diverse religious tradition than the Saudis, see the Brotherhood not just as subversive but as reactionary and intolerant. To their minds it is opposed to everything they stand for in terms of a neo-patrimonial Arab and Islamic, highly securitised and segmented, but also socially permissive modernity. They reject the argument that political Islamism is an irresistibly rising tide. They see it as a real threat to the prosperity and cohesion of the UAE, based as that prosperity is on an acceptance that cultures can meet, acknowledge each other, celebrate difference, prosper and still remain intact in a small, rich country with strongly conservative social traditions and major global ambitions in the southern Gulf at the hub of continents. For them the choice is a controlled aggiornamento – a modern mirror of the centuries when the multicultural trading cities of the Gulf flourished in the interstices of the Ottoman, Persian and British empires – or a religious closure.

And Emirati leaders are acutely aware of their vulnerability – unsurprising when you have the sort of highly successful, but demographically lop-sided and materially vulnerable socio-economic structure of the UAE.

That is why the Emiratis are angered by the licence over the last decade given to Qaradawi and others, on Al Jazeera and elsewhere, publicly to question their Islamic credentials and therefore their political legitimacy. With at most some one million nationals in a total population of around 10 million, they feel the challenge – in a way larger states might not – of maintaining harmony among large, diverse and prosperous expatriate

populations and solidarity among still highly conservative nationals. They think the MB have instrumentalised the Gulf once before and would do so again. And they are wary of a residual underlying fragility of relations among the constituent parts of the Federation – particularly the northern and largely Hanbali Qawasim emirates – and with some powerful neighbours. Some may dispute this. But if you speak to senior Emiratis there is no escaping the depth of feeling. And the fact is, they have a point.

In the Gulf as a whole the memory of a powerful Muslim Brotherhood presence in the education, health and government systems since the 1950s remains vivid. When I asked the late Saud al Faisal in 2014 why the Saudi state – under his father – had supported the MB so strongly, he replied: *'our big mistake was to hand the education of our children over to them'*.

I have had professionally successful Emiratis vividly describe to me, from their own experience, the psychological pressure to conform to pious and reactionary MB norms exerted by Al Islah on students at Al Ain University in the 1980s and 1990s – something I also glimpsed at the time myself. They recall the xenophobic, reactionary, socially intolerant and often inflammatory tone of Al Islah's monthly magazine, Al Mujtama'.

Above all the rulers know for themselves the attractions of an essentialist, absolutist and self-contained ideology. Some very senior figures will say in private that they only narrowly avoided becoming Brothers themselves. They now see themselves as escapees from a cult (a term they regularly use). They do not intend to be recaptured.

And in all of this, the centrality of Egypt cannot be exaggerated. In the view of the Saudis and others, if Egypt had fallen to the Brotherhood, the whole of North Africa would have eventually become a bastion of political Islamism. This would have been a disaster, exacerbated by: first, the apparently unchecked spread of Iranian power through Iraq and Syria into Lebanon and now Yemen; second, the emergence of a new, battle-hardened, effective and coordinated transnational Shia gendarmerie in these areas, made up of the IRGC, Hizbollah, Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani Shia militias, Syrian Allawites and Houthis; and third, the rise of ISIL.

Taken together, this would have amounted to the worst external security challenge the Gulf as a whole had ever faced – at a time when the US and the UK were in their eyes showing both a declining interest in the region and a willingness to accommodate the MB and other Islamists in an apparent belief that this represented a vote for pluralism. That is why both countries attach so much importance now to binding Egypt rather than their Gulf neighbours into any serious new security dispensation in the region.

This is not to say that the states of the region believe they can simply crush political Islamism. The issue is fundamentally not about its existence, but about who is allowed to instrumentalise it and whether it will ever genuinely accept subordination to national

goals (as both the Kuwaiti and Bahraini affiliates have at various times done). Saudi and Emirati hostility to activist MB triumphalism after 2011 was not new, nor limited to the late King Abdullah or to Shaikh Muhammad bin Zaid. Furthermore, the proscription of the MB by the Saudis and Emiratis was never likely to lead them to sanction all their other neighbours where the MB has been allowed, within clear bounds, to organise under the supervision of the state.

The key point is this: as long as Islamists, including the MB, serve the interests of their host state and its allies, everything is fine. When they become a perceived instrument of fitna – sedition – whether under the direction of external actors or independently – it is not. This is the real quarrel the Saudis and the UAE have with Qatar. They believe that Qatar and Turkey have consistently and in a sustained manner instrumentalised the MB internationally to serve their unilateral visions of a region where political Islamism becomes an instrument of their own national security interests – as defined by AKP ideologues and a small circle of decision makers in Doha.

Some, of course, will still dismiss the crisis as frivolous and state that it has simply empowered Iran, while hampering US and European policy in the region.

This latter claim seems to me nonsense on stilts. What has empowered Iran has been fourteen years of permissive US and European policies in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, where we have collectively made an impressive military effort from time to time, but without any clear policy goal.

We let the Iranians colonise the Iraqi state. We have let Hizbollah – one of the major potential beneficiaries of the Qatari ransom deal in Iraq last year – transform itself from a regional defence force with a criminal wing into a formidable and mobile transnational praetorian force (still with a global criminal wing), whose leaders regularly ignore the Lebanese government and threaten Saudi Arabia with partition. We let Nouri al Maliki, not an Iranian puppet but someone whose interests coincided with theirs and who is now a cheerleader for them inside Iraq – tweeting recently that Kurdish independence would weaken the 'Shia axis' - al mihwar al shi'i - steal the 2010 elections.

We throw the Iraqi Kurds under a bus because of their foolishness over the recent referendum, but in the absence of any wider policy response other than sanctimonious sermonizing leave the field clear for Iran to exploit.

We claim that Haider al Abadi is the answer to all these problems and then watch with bemusement as he gets into bed – even if only for 48 hours – with the very Iran-linked Shia militias whom most disinterested observers see as the major obstacle to the emergence of a non-sectarian democratic and accountable state we all claim to want in Iraq.

And as a consequence we are no nearer finding a sustainable policy response to a decade of Iranian advances through the institutions, territories and command structures of the greater Levant, plus a campaign of destabilisation on the cheap in Bahrain and Yemen.

The Saudis in particular have not helped themselves: I do not deny that for a moment. Their policies can at times seem clumsy – most recently over Lebanon. But the fact is that, on the wider canvas, the Saudis and the UAE have been consistent about all these issues for years – a policy continuity more hostile observers claim does not exist in MbS's brave new world.

Moreover, we now say that the big problem is a split in a GCC that was never united, whose members have never fully trusted each other, who all have border disputes with their neighbours, who do not want to subordinate their defence postures to each other and who have run divergent foreign policies for years. In our own imaginings, we were meant to be the adults in the room. But who are we kidding?

And this brings me to my second theme, the Arab-Israel dispute. Last week in Tel Aviv I was asked what would be a game changer in the region.

I said there were three.

One was ending the war in Yemen – it was a complete distraction and a humanitarian disaster and was leading to strains between Emirati and Saudi clients, as we have seen again recently in Aden.

A second was a genuine and sustained effort to choke off Hizbollah's illicit sources of finance. Given the difficulty of confronting Iran directly in Iraq or Syria, this, together with a real focus on Iran's ballistic missile programme and its activities in the Gulf, would be the most practical effective way of seeking to contain Iranian adventurism.

But the most important would be normalisation between Israel and KSA. This has always been the ultimate prize. It would enable a relationship that had lurked in the shadows to declare itself in broad daylight. It would formalise the coalition of interests between Israel and the major Sunni-led states of the Gulf. It would complete the security realignment that we have seen struggling to emerge over the last 25 years. It would enable a significant boost to regional trade. It would suit the West. It would suit Israel, which is more threatened now by Iran and its proxies, including a Hizbollah, re-equipped with more accurate and longer range missiles and newly confident after its successes in Syria.

But the price was a Palestinian state. If you look at polling conducted by reputable Israeli experts, there is a surge of support on the Palestinian side for the one-state solution. But this – like the hopeful claims by Israeli politicians that the Saudis are about to declare their recognition of Israel – is a delusion. Palestinians – if they think a state is in the offing

– support it overwhelmingly. They just do not think it is at the moment – with a hopeless and in their eyes, corrupt, PA unable to act effectively. And no Saudi leader – or Emirati or Bahraini – is going to hand Iran or the IS a weapon by surrendering what most Arabs still regard as the historic rights of the Palestinians.

And this – at a time when the US is ambiguous about its role in the region – seems to me to offer an opening for creative British and European diplomacy. In 2008, I and others in the FCO came up with the idea of a larger scale repeat of the Rabin Deposit of 1993. The idea was to get the key Arab states which did not have a peace treaty with Israel to define what their offer to Israel would be if a Palestinian state was really created. It was important this offer was kept confidential by the most trusted intermediary – at that time, the US. Its key features would not be realised immediately: it was a description of a future deal, not a current set of concessions.

In the event the idea was too crudely executed to work. But perhaps its time has come again – this time with European rather than US leadership. This would not be an attempt to substitute for the US. They remain the only irreplaceable country if in the end Israel is to have the long term and robust security guarantees it needs. But since we live in a world where the balance of power – offensive and defensive – in the Middle East as elsewhere in the world is changing perhaps irrevocably and where Iran and its satraps seem likely to need to garrison Syria for the foreseeable future, perhaps now is the time to seek genuinely collective action which would have a much broader impact, with the Europeans and Arabs combining their forces to make an offer to Israel and the Palestinians of mostly carrots and perhaps one or two sticks which would form the essential underpinning of a renewed negotiating process led by the US. Am I optimistic? Of course not. But as Gramsci wrote, in times like this we need pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will.

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IS DEAD. LONG LIVE THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP!

Text of a lecture given by Sir Christopher Meyer KCMG

27th February 2018

Sir Christopher Meyer *spent almost 40 years in the British Diplomatic Service. His career culminated as Ambassador to the United States during the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies between 1997-2003. His five-and-a-half years in Washington, which made him the longest-serving ambassador to the USA since the Second World War, coincided with 9/11, the wars in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, and the preparation for war in Iraq. Before then he was Ambassador to Germany and had postings to the former Soviet Union, Spain and the European Union in Brussels. He was also press secretary to Prime Minister Sir John Major, press secretary to Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey, later Lord, Howe, and speech writer to three Foreign Secretaries, James Callaghan, Anthony Crosland and David Owen. Sir Christopher was knighted by Her Majesty The Queen in 1998. After his retirement from the Diplomatic Service in 2003, he chaired the Press Complaints Commission for six years until March 2009. Sir Christopher is now a regular television, radio and newspaper commentator on international affairs and the media. In 2005 he published 'DC Confidential', a memoir of his time in the Diplomatic Service. His next book, 'Getting Our Way: 500 Years Of Adventure And Intrigue: The Inside Story Of British Diplomacy', was published in 2009 and accompanied a three-part TV series for BBC4. In 2012 he presented and co-wrote a six-part TV documentary series for Sky Atlantic, Networks of Power. Sir Christopher is an honorary fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge, and a visiting professor at the University of North Carolina.*

When, as last week, a leading international commentator and former Marshall scholar, Tom Friedman, opens his New York Times column with the dramatic words:

> *'Our democracy is in serious danger. President Trump is either totally compromised by the Russians or is a towering fool, or both'.*

by comparison, relations between Britain and the United States, special or otherwise, strike me as something of a second order issue.

This is not, of course, the first time that events have invited us to consider that there may be some kind of malfeasance linking the President of the United States to the Kremlin. It has been a running sore in Mr Trump's presidency. But when he attributes on Twitter the

failure to prevent the Florida school killings to the FBI's focus on the Russia investigation, in my book anyway, a Rubicon has been crossed.

I almost called Michael to say that, in the circumstances, we should be talking about something larger than the so-called Special Relationship. But then I thought again. If ever there were a time to consider our relationship with America dispassionately and without sentiment, it was now - in times so extraordinary that they challenge almost all of our inherited assumptions.

I have at home a book of essays, published in 1986, which is the collective result of work done over a year by scholars and experts under the auspices of the Ditchley Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington DC. The theme is the British-American relationship – its condition and its prospects. Its title is *The Special Relationship*.

The original intention of the project had never been to put the so-called Special Relationship front and centre. No less a person than Dean Acheson, Harry Truman's secretary of state and the son of an English-born priest, had been rude about the concept, warning his American colleagues to suppress their *'sentimental'* impulses; while the late David Watt, a key contributor to the project - director of Chatham House and a very august journalist indeed - called it rhetorical nonsense.

Yet, as the American editor, Professor Roger Louis, noted in his preface,

> *'The idea ...of a 'Special Relationship' would not go away. Indeed it haunted the discussions. Eventually it was referred to as the ghost, ever present yet elusive, derided by some but acknowledged by all.'*

In the end the assembled academics and experts capitulated to the ghost and decided to address the notion of a Special Relationship head on. They asked themselves, in their various areas of expertise, why was it special? Was it a good thing? What had become of it? Had it run its course? The answers were assembled in their book and by and large the ghost got positive reviews.

The extraordinary thing is that another thirty or so years later, the ghost is still with us. It haunts British-American relations to this day. It poses the same questions as in 1986.

Attempts have been made to exorcise it. Harold Wilson replaced it with the simple *'close relationship'.* Edward Heath preferred the *'natural'* relationship. David Cameron, when President Obama first came to Britain in 2011, talked of the *'essential'* relationship. None of these adjectives has endured, leaving Professor Louis' ghost undisputed sovereign of its spectral realm. Have not Theresa May and Donald Trump once again affirmed the Special Relationship?

This is all the more striking, since, until the Second World War, there had been nothing in British and American history after independence to suggest a special intimacy.

To the contrary. In the 19th century, after the War of 1812, there were various alarums and excursions along the border with Canada and in South America, where Britain and the US almost came to blows. In the last century the moment of comity during the First World War soon vanished. The negotiations in the 1920s to limit naval armaments became so acrimonious that the Americans drew up plans for war with Britain. Strong anti-British forces were at work to keep the US out of the Second World War on Britain's side.

Even during the war, as the great historian, Sir Michael Howard, points out in his contribution to The Special Relationship, the military leadership was for long marked by *'suspicious dislike on the American side and patronising contempt on the British.'*

I remember my parents, both of whom were in the RAF during the war, talking about American servicemen as *'Russians with creases in their trousers'*.

Howard is very clear that the spirit of friendly cooperation that became more the norm by the end of the war flowed from the personal intimacy between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill. I am always astonished by the fact that in 1943 Roosevelt left Churchill to his own devices in the White House, holding meetings with American officials and generals, while he, Roosevelt, visited his family at Hyde Park on the Hudson River.

Howard is also pretty clear that the relationship, as he put it, *'never quite recovered'* from Roosevelt's death and Churchill's loss of office even before the war ended. Harry Truman and Clement Attlee, their respective successors, were very different personalities and politicians. Neither particularly wanted to know the other. Their relationship was from the outset blighted by the mutual recrimination surrounding the negotiation of an American loan to Britain immediately after the war's end.

The point of reminding you of this piece of potted history is this. When Churchill promulgated the notion of a special relationship with the US in his 1946 speech at Fulton, Missouri, it was neither the most propitious moment nor did it go with the grain of history.

He had told the Commons not long before the Fulton speech,

> *'We should not abandon our special relationship with the United States and Canada about the atomic bomb...'*

What he had in mind was a relationship of equals, brought intimately together by the common stewardship of nuclear weapons *'as a sacred trust for the maintenance of peace.'*

The United States - rich, victorious and all-powerful - was having none of that from a bankrupt European power, whose empire they had for long wished to see dismantled. Truman had already approved in 1946 the McMahon Act, which had forbidden US cooperation on nuclear technology with even the closest allies. That was seen in London as scant reward for our contribution to the Manhattan Project. It was, if you like, America First with a vengeance.

The tone was set by the unsentimental Dean Acheson, who opined that

> *'a unique relation existed between Britain and America...but unique did not mean affectionate. We had fought England as our enemy as often as we had fought by her side as an ally.'*

It took fifteen years after the end of the second world war before John F. Kennedy and Harold Macmillan, another Anglo-American prime minister worried about nuclear weapons, were able to restore much of the warmth and intimacy of Roosevelt and Churchill. But in that intervening decade and a half, Britain had had to learn the brutal lesson that Churchill's grand vision of a partnership of equals was a delusion. It bore no relation to the actual balance of power between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Paradoxically this was made plain beyond doubt by both a low point and a high point in the relationship: the low being the Suez debacle of 1956 when the US had forced us, with France and Israel, to abandon military operations against Egypt; and the high, the deal struck by Kennedy and Macmillan in the Bahamas in 1962 for Britain to buy the Polaris missile, so guaranteeing an independent, sort of, British nuclear deterrent – an agreement which survives to this day.

After Nassau, the Special Relationship rose like Lazarus from the tomb. But it was not what Churchill had envisaged. It was something else. To the über-realist Sir Michael Howard it was a Faustian bargain. He commented drily,

> *'Britain's role was now that of loyal and subordinate ally, or it was nothing.'*

There are lessons to be drawn from this history.

The first is that since the war at the level of high politics the relationship between Britain and America has been marked more by its volatility than its stability. Seen as a line on a graph, it has to be drawn as a sequence of peaks and troughs.

After the closeness of Macmillan and JFK, there were the lean years of Edward Heath and Gerald Ford, of Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson, when the light of the Special Relationship was well-nigh extinguished. This had nothing to do with party affiliation either in London or Washington. Heath was a Tory, Ford a Republican; Wilson was Labour,

Johnson a Democrat. You might have expected each pair of leaders to have a mutual political sympathy. But there was none. Heath preferred Europe to America. Wilson turned down Johnson's request to send troops to Vietnam. He also insisted on smoking a pipe in the Oval Office, which Johnson, a cigar smoker, abhorred. I am told that Wilson actually preferred a cigar, but thought that a pipe better suited his man-of-the-people image.

And so we go on. Margaret Thatcher enjoyed a relationship with Ronald Reagan of unusual personal and political intimacy, which merited the epithet special. She got on less well George Bush '41, who found her over-bearing. John Major was far more to '41's taste and they had a close relationship. Major and Clinton enjoyed each other far less. Blair/Clinton and Blair/Bush '43 were marriages made in heaven, when the Special Relationship blazed forth in neon lights.

Obama, not renowned for the warm embrace of any foreign leader and suspected of anti-British feelings, threw Gordon Brown and David Cameron the occasional bone of a mention of the Special Relationship, but with no great enthusiasm. Stories emerged last year of Obama's staff mocking us for our pretensions to such a relationship.

As for Donald Trump, he talks the talk from time to time, and has held Theresa May's hand, though probably to keep his balance. We will not really know what, if anything, the Special Relationship means to him unless and until Britain negotiates a free trade agreement with the US.

What matters in a relationship – and this is my second lesson – is interests not sentiment, realpolitik not rhetoric.

It is fine for British and American politicians to deploy 'Special Relationship' as a rhetorical device to embellish speeches. But it becomes a problem if, as has been the case on the British side, you start to believe your own propaganda. It becomes an end in itself. It can raise unrealistic expectations and exaggerate the identity of interest between the two countries. We British do our relationship with the US no favours if we look at it through the rose-tinted glasses of Churchillian nostalgia.

When I was ambassador in Washington, I banned the use of the phrase 'Special Relationship' by embassy staff.

I was once shown by Colin Powell, Secretary of State under George W. Bush, a short speech of welcome that he was going to give for the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, who was visiting DC. Powell had scrawled across the top of the page in black felt-tip pen, *'Don't forget the Special Relationship!'* I pointed to it quizzically. Powell replied, *'You Brits will go ape-shit if I don't mention it.'*

Not only does this kind of thing make us look unnecessarily needy. But the US has learnt how to weaponise the Special Relationship to its own advantage.

I once found myself in a very tough negotiation on air services across the Atlantic. Every time I said 'no' to American demands I was either accused of not caring about the Special Relationship; or threatened with its imminent demise unless we gave the US what it wanted.

Now, in case anyone detects, wrongly, a whiff of anti-Americanism in my remarks, let me say this.

I lived and worked as a diplomat for eleven years in Washington DC, longer than anywhere but for London itself. I love America and would happily live there if I had to. I believe the US to be our most important ally and partner among nations. I believe also that the natural condition of our relationship is warm and friendly. How could it be otherwise, given the vast concentration of British and American interests invested in the relationship: economic, defence, intelligence, to name but three, often invisible to the naked eye?

These things are not there because of some misty nostalgia. They are there because the hard national interests of each side demand that they should be.

It is not just in the British-American relationship that one finds today this gap between rhetoric and reality. There is something similar afoot in the European Union, where in place of Churchill and the Special Relationship we have the founding fathers of Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi and the notion of 'Ever Closer Union'.

In today's febrile atmosphere I cannot mention Europe without making a declaration of interest. I voted to Remain. I lost. Now I want the best possible outcome for the negotiations consistent with the referendum result. Though I am now both attacked and claimed by Remainers and Leavers, I belong to neither tribe. I am what I call a Pragmateer.

Of course, the high priests of the European Commission remain the guardians of the sacred flame of 'Ever Closer Union.' But the member states march to the beat of national interest. This is why the EU's future will be overwhelmingly decided by the reconciliation, if possible, of the German and French national interest.

This struck me forcefully when, as ambassador to Germany in 1997, I went to hear Chancellor Kohl address a CDU meeting in the Rhineland town of Bad Godesberg. It was supposed to be a private occasion; but with the name 'Meyer' and reasonable German it was not difficult to get in.

At the time Kohl was anxious about selling to the German people the replacement of the cherished deutschmark by the euro. He told his audience that European integration and the adoption of the euro were the price that Germany had to pay for dominating Europe without frightening its neighbours - an expression of the purest realpolitik.

Later in 1997, when I was leaving Germany to become ambassador to the US, I went to say goodbye to someone very senior in the Finance ministry. He asked me if Britain would adopt the euro. I replied that I thought it unlikely. He said: *'That's a pity. We don't want to be left alone with the French.'*

On my way back to London, I stopped in Paris at the invitation of our ambassador. He took me down to the Quai d'Orsay to see someone very senior, who asked me if Britain would adopt the euro. I said that I thought it unlikely. He replied: *'Oh no, we don't want to be left alone with the Germans.'*

There you have it. The reality of *'ever closer union'*.

Let us be similarly pragmatic about the Special Relationship in the age of Trump, or as American academics might put it, let us take a rigorously realist approach.

When we were discussing titles for my talk, Michael suggested *'Does Trump Have A Coherent Foreign Policy?'* The answer is, no he does not. But he does not have an incoherent one either. There is simply no strategic there, there.

Russia is identified as a major threat in the 2017 National Security Strategy, but is treated with kid gloves by the President. China likewise is seen as a dangerous competitor; but Trump refused to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which could have been a useful bulwark against the spread of Chinese influence.

The problem is that he has competing and contradictory foreign policies that emerge from different sources. I can think of four:

First, his family, where his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, has been put in charge of the Middle East peace process, a task that can only be undermined by Trump's decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem.

Second, Trump's own instincts and prejudices, made manifest on Twitter, often ill-informed and impetuous.

Third, the Alt-Right, now diminished since Steven Bannon's departure from the White House, but still a force for mercantilism, the dismantling of international obligations and the pursuit of an aggressive America First doctrine (Stephen Miller, a Bannonite, is still an influential White House adviser, reportedly the author of *'Rocket Man'*, Trump's nickname for Kim Jong-Un.)

Last, and <u>maybe</u> not least, there are the senior members of the administration – the so-called grown-ups - who more or less uphold the banner of a Reaganite Republican foreign policy: Defence Secretary Mattis, National Security Adviser McMaster and Secretary of

State Tillerson. Until recently, I would have included the chief of staff, General John Kelly, in this group, but he appears to be developing into the thinking man's Trump.

The National Security Strategy, published at the end of last year, is effectively the work of this last group. It repays reading.

It upholds four pillars of national security, which for any other president would have been boiler-plate. If there is any organising principle, which goes beyond America, First, it is a rather Hobbesian vision of the world in which the old 19th century ideas of spheres of influence and balance of power re-assert themselves. The authors call it *'principled realism'*. The fact that Trump himself announced it in a major speech gives it credibility.

Years ago, when I was speech-writer to the Labour foreign secretary, Jim Callaghan, who later became prime minister, he used to say when confronted by a complex problem, *'Play it with a straight bat'*, a cricketing metaphor you do not hear much nowadays.

And that is how to respond to Trump and his multiple foreign policies. We must play him with a straight bat, the straight bat of our national interest and not the chimera of the Special Relationship.

This argues for constantly holding the US to the *'principled realism'* of its own National Security Strategy. It means also standing forcefully for free trade, for NATO and its Article 5, for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - the four-power agreement with Iran on nuclear weapons, for the five-eyes intelligence alliance, for a rules-based international order.

If any of this provokes a row with the White House, so be it. As Margaret Thatcher, unlike some of her successors, always understood, the British-American relationship is plenty strong enough to withstand disagreement.

And if and when Mr Trump visits the UK, it means following the Macron model: lots of pomp, lots of military parades, lots of Her Majesty The Queen, a little golf and no demonstrators.

If we can accomplish all that, you know what will happen? The two governments will proclaim the Special Relationship to be alive and well; the media will sigh with relief that they will continue to have this lazy, misleading way of taking the temperature of the relationship; and the ghost will be laughing at me, saying *'I told you so.'*

THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE: TRANSFORMING WESTERN DEFENCE

Transcript of a lecture given by General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE

20th March 2018

General Sir Richard Barrons *served as Commander Joint Forces Command, one of the six 'Chiefs of Staff' leading the UK Armed Forces until April 2016. He was responsible for 23,000 people worldwide and a budget of £4.3bn, delivering intelligence, Special Forces, operational command and control, all surveillance, reconnaissance and information systems and communications, operational logistics, medical support, and advanced education and training across the Armed Forces. An artillery officer, his military career included leadership from Captain to General on military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan - often as part of US-led coalitions and in NATO. He is President and Colonel Commandant of the Honourable Artillery Company, a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS.*

Good afternoon. Thank you all for turning out. As a general in the afterlife, you would expect me to start with some sort of reference to Clausewitz (it is compulsory!) and I am happy to do that, because if there is an underlying theme to what I am going to say to you briefly this afternoon, it is around that Clausewitzian theme that the nature of war does not change - that mixture of emotion, chance and reason. But its character does change in the way that it is conducted, in terms of ideas and technology.

What I aim to do in the next 25-30 minutes or so is to try and explain to you why Western defence – I am going to talk about Western defence because it is the thing I know most about – why it must now change. I am going to describe to you how it is going to change - whether we choose to lead that path or not - through innovation. I am going to put to you some principles which I argue should stimulate and bound the discussion about innovation that we need to have. I am frankly making an appeal to you all to get your heads into this debate and in the broadest possible way to agitate, cogitate or influence, to get this business going, before we get left further behind.

Now, I am going to have to indulge in some preamble to create a level playing field. I think we really know where we are, even if we choose to exist in some denial about it. I need to start in the 20th century. It was characterised by confrontation and conflict from 1914 through two World Wars, through to the end of the Cold War in 1990. We were familiar with what was then the superpower confrontation of the Cold War and there were many other conflicts - in our case, the withdrawal from empire, troubles from Northern

Ireland, and many other things. The point is, it left a legacy in all our minds of big standing nuclear and conventional forces. It is the yardstick that we all adopt when we think about defence. It is the wrong yardstick for this century.

After the end of the Cold War in 1990, we have had, frankly, a relatively fabulous time. We felt no existential peril, at least not here in the UK, and I think in much of Europe. Some of us even declared the end of history. Our living standards have vastly improved, even if we now struggle to pay for all the things we would like to offer ourselves here in the UK. The world has got better by any standards. There is less poverty. If you take the yardstick of the poverty baseline being an income of $1.90 a day: in 1990, 37% of the world's population lived below that level, today, roughly 9% of the population do. That is a 74% decrease in global poverty in 25 years and we have indulged ourselves in other ways. We created the Internet on which there are now 6.5 billion pictures of cats as an illustration of how human nature can take you in all sorts of directions.

But seriously, from a military perspective, we have to acknowledge that a number of things have happened since the end of the Cold War.

We have gone through a process that has been iterative - characterised by denial, but constant - of demobilisation. And so has NATO, even as it has enlarged. If over a generation, you put in real terms less money in defence, but the people, the equipment, the training and the support that you buy increases at a rate of inflation above the general rate every year for 25 years, over time you will do exactly what we have done. You will hire fewer people, you will buy less kit, you will train less, you will take stuff off your shelves, you will become less ready and you will be comfortable with that, because you do not feel any existential peril. Of course, even within that, you are still going to hire some excellent people and you are still going to buy some excellent equipment. It is just that there is going to be less of it and it will be less ready. Some of this is quite a complex capability formula.

We should also acknowledge that in the post-Cold War period, we have engaged in wars of a particular type. I am talking frankly about much of my career. The Balkans - Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, the interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria. These are characterised by things we have to acknowledge that are an historical aberration.

First of all, they are all discretionary. If we had not done those things, our lives here would have not been enriched by that, but our lives would have continued. So they were not the wars of existential national peril that characterised much of the 20th century. They were all conducted abroad and at no time in those operations was there a risk to the homeland. We have stopped being able to think about a risk to our homeland.

They never required either the mobilisation of all the armed forces at once, let alone the reserve, let alone the mobilisation of society that was common during the Second World

War. At the height of the Second World War, roughly 43% of UK GDP was committed to the war effort. They were conducted against enemies of a limited capability, they did not really have air forces or ballistic missiles or manoeuvre in the air, in space or at sea. Yes, they were dangerous. Yes, there were casualties. But these were limited wars of discretion. Still hard, but not existential.

Some – still - have fooled themselves that that is the only form of conventional conflict which we need to be prepared for. We have done a couple of things that have amplified that sense. We have a terrorism challenge which is important and urgent. But for some it has become an obsession and others foolishly have misconstrued terrorism as some exclusive form of conflict in the 21st century, as the only thing we need to worry about, the only thing we need to spend our money on.

Others have obsessed over the cyber challenge. Yes, of course, it is an essential feature of our life today, but some have fallen to the seduction of the cyber template and are busy still assuring us that in this century, the only way that states will conflict will be in cyberspace. That is a massive failure of history, understanding and judgment, but it is still seductive.

While we have been engaged in wars of discretion, regulated by what I will call the rules of cricket, the world has changed and it continues to change. The world is now clearly multipolar. You can see this in the China-US Thucydides moment, I will try not to use the 'trap' word, but the rising China and the declining US bumping into each other over the next generation or so will have some uncomfortable moments.

With the greatest respect, we are in a hard place with Russia. Potentially a great power and a good neighbour to Europe, but now rather wilfully patrolling, if you like, the edge of civilization, waving its knife at us and pointing at its genitals in a way I think that is just disconcerting and unnecessary.

Iran prosecuting the Shia agenda in the Gulf successfully, now in competition with new Saudi leadership, so there is real tension in there. The reality of North Korea about to acquire an intercontinental range ballistic nuclear weapon, and the challenge from non-state actors: AQ, ISIS, and let's acknowledge it, the Mexican drug cartels in the way that they regulate life in that part of the world.

So while we have been busy doing other things, there is now clearly a challenge to western interests and influence in the post-Cold War era. The institutions which have protected our security and our prosperity are being challenged. The rules-based international order by which we thrive is being disrupted and competed with and there are states, particularly Russia and China, that have completely different views of how the world will work. They are challenging us and challenging our assertion about the inevitable triumph of liberal market democracy and all it entails.

We have to acknowledge that there are now risks to our place in the world and our interests and we are losing the initiative as this world changes. Perhaps more technically, while we have been occupied doing other things, military method and capability has already changed and is continuing to change. I mentioned cyber standing part of the daily interaction in intelligence, in disruption and possibly destruction. We choose to see cyber in a sort of episodic way that we perhaps are dealing with cyber events. We are not yet very good at looking at cyber as something that is just a common feature of everyday strategy and campaigning.

We have seen the rediscovery of hybrid or grey space warfare - the use of all the levers of power, short of conventional conflict, especially information activities, to progress the influence of an interest of a particular state. This is about permanent confrontation. The old peace/war paradigm does not work at all well in the hybrid space and it requires a constant response steered by statesmanship, not by political event management. We are still grappling with the thought that democracies struggle to execute hybrid confrontation as successfully as monolithic states are able to in the way they can bring public and private sectors together.

We have also seen in this time an evolution in hard power, which is completely unlike the sorts of things that we have been engaged in in Iraq and Afghanistan. So the unbridled, unfettered application of high explosive against habitat and humanity as seen in Aleppo, Mosul and Eastern Ghouta. That is war in the war. It is not the sort of war that we have taken part in in the last generation or arguably are preparing for now.

We have seen the rebirth of proxy military capability and my particular vote here goes to General Qasem Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps - four campaigns, four wins out of four in my view, in the way he has developed the proxy art. Saudi, Russia (not least in Crimea and Ukraine), Pakistan, India, the US and to some degree in the UK, are in this proxy together.

The West, the UK in particular, stumbles on the business of proxy war and if I can put this simply to you, we like other people to fight their wars for us, that is a good thought. We want to train them, we want to advise them, we want to assist them, but then we want to wave them off at the camp gate when they go into battle. We do not do the accompany. Successful proxy forces all do train, advise, assist and accompany, and it costs.

We have seen the balance of power in the jargon 'anti-access/area denial capability' changing away from what was once a standing NATO advantage, set aside the United States. I suppose the defining capability that we are interested in here - I will use the Russian S-400 air defence and ballistic missile system: a range of 400 kilometres, it can take targets moving at 11,000 miles an hour, so its influence over the airspace over the Baltics, over Syria and other places is profound. It is a major challenge to European air forces. The same would apply in the way Iran is able to dominate access to the Strait of Hormuz with the plethora of anti-ship systems in particular on its coastline and the way

China is challenging for control over the East and South China Sea.

An important part of that is our collective failure to acknowledge that war in our time is increasingly dominated by the missile, the Long-Range Precision Fires, and the surveillance and target acquisition that goes with it, whether that is ballistic or cruise. This is not new in military technology, it happens all the time and we should not have been surprised by it, but we have not kept up with it. So just as the aircraft carrier was the defining iconic vehicle for military power projection from about the Battle of Midway onwards (and I would say a little bit before that) right up to the current day, it is being surpassed by the ability of the long-range precision ballistic and cruise missile to destroy a platform that ranges in excess of 2,000 kilometres. Similarly, we are used to having conventional forces that mass in the air and on land, and at sea. Long-Range Precision Fires find that an attractive and a simple target.

We have seen other countries developing military strategies which are not about confronting conventional forces, they are about breaking the will of your opponent by the long-range precision assault on their critical national infrastructure. This is an entire respectable strategy. If you like, it is the blitzkrieg of the 21st century and a combination of cyber and long-range precision ballistic and cruise missiles is a really powerful way of bending an opposing nation to your will. It absolutely replaces the need to consider territorial invasion, which is arguably how you brought that effect in the past.

Then, of course, nuclear proliferation to North Korea, potentially in the future to Iran and if to Iran, I think to Saudi Arabia. But, also in the nuclear context, a renewed discussion about the usability of small nuclear weapons. I thought that had gone with the end of the Cold War, but it is back again in the eyes of some, as a way of de-escalating a problem.

If you bundle all of those things together, the West has lost and is losing some crucial military advantage. And we have to acknowledge simply in terms of military capability, that our homeland can be held at risk, as could our interests abroad. Here I am talking as a military guy, about capability. This capability exists today. It is not imminent and I am pressed to point at an intent that this thing would arrive. But the point is, if the moment occurs in the future where these things are pointed at us, we have no answer.

Now things are going to change more in the 21st century. This is the Asian century. As I have described, by 2050, China's and India's economies will have surpassed the United States and with that goes - inevitably - a swing in military power and influence. Our world will change. In the growth in population, in urbanisation, in water scarcity, in resource competition, in climate change, there are seeds of instability, terrorism and conflict. Conflict as a matter of necessity. We have to think about conflict in our time and looking ahead as a matter of necessity, not as wars of discretion that have characterised the recent period.

Then we have to think about technology. We all live in the foothills of the fourth industrial revolution or the digital age, whichever expression you want to use. So we know about data. We know that by 2025, there will be something like 160 trillion gigabytes of data produced. We know about processing power. We have seen it increase a trillion-fold in sixty years. We know about connectivity, the Internet of things. By 2020, 20 billion things connected to the Internet. We can see how machine learning and artificial intelligence is already shaping how we live, work and play and the enterprises and institutions that we live our lives through. We can see the growth in autonomy, we can see new materials like graphene, we can see the potential of synthetic biology. This is shaping our lives now and we know whether it is in single technologies or combinations of these technologies, they will define our lives in the future. The crucial point is if it is going to shape how we live, work and play, it is going to shape how we confront and conflict.

So my proposition to you is: we are at the bottom now of a capability and mobilisation decline or downward slope, which we can fully understand, articulate and can recognise that for many years it made absolute sense. Why would you spend more money on defence when you had no existential peril?

But now the world has changed and there are risks to our security and our prosperity and our homeland. These are military risks that we cannot currently deter or defeat and they are going to get worse. So the current model of western defence does not now work and it will not work. Just having more of the same will not work. You have to do something different. I think it is implicit in that, that twenty-odd years or so of serial political denial that this mattered has run its course. I applaud Gavin Williamson and others for beginning to say so publicly. That is essential.

There is a way out of this. It is not a new argument and there are some things I am not really going to talk about, which are common to outcomes. First of all, you have to stop the slide and I would argue that means you have to pay for SDSR 2015 at £1.5 billion a year in order to stabilise defence in its current state.

Then we need a new full-spectrum deterrence strategy that spans hybrid, conventional, nuclear and terrorism. We need to reset national resilience - we do not give a moment's thought to the homeland as a target, either as our institutions or individuals or our military headquarters. That has all gone. We need to rejuvenate our military alliances in a small way and at the heart of this will be innovation. This is where I think we can now be clearer about where life takes us.

So I think the first four big military capability bets are clear and I think the leading militaries in the world will be programming this in their long-term capability programmes in about two years from now onwards.

The first of those is the transformation of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

away from closed military systems to being built around the power of unstructured, open source, big data, with an artificial engine driving the visualisation of a complex world. It will turn intelligence from answering questions into effectively a newsroom push. The CIA are doing a pretty good job on this front. Most other people are not spending enough money to catch up.

Secondly, the transformation of military command and control in a way that is the most profound for 200 years. If you take a combination of data, connectivity and artificial intelligence, in my view, you could halve the number of military headquarters in the tiers that they exist. You could halve the size of those that remain and you could double their effectiveness. That is a huge bet. Uncomfortable, because the current system that has been refined for at least twice my lifetime would have to be junked. But the fact is, that potential is there. It is exactly what is going to happen in law, accountancy and many other professions. In logistics and medical support, what Amazon, Google, DHL and others are doing with connected data, with artificial intelligence, with autonomy and robotics, there is the opportunity for militaries to actually know where their stuff is, to move it more precisely with less risk and to evacuate casualties in a way that will be much more efficient and stop taking soldiers and others out of the fight. This is simply a question of capturing best civil practice.

My third one, which is the latest addition to the party, is the power of giant synthetic environments. You are aware of simulation, but we are almost at the point where a simulation can exist at pretty much a global level, where you could have 50,000 users in the same simulation, infinitely scalable through the cloud. Where militaries can train from a single person or vehicle, right up to an entire joint force, at the levels of hundreds of thousands of people. Where you can train, experiment, so concept development, force development, you could do planning, you would rehearse your missions, you would support your missions.

Over time, you will link that simulation to real time intelligence feeds in your own force locations. If you want a reference point here (and I do not work for them), if you look at Improbable, a London-based unicorn, their SpatialOS system is showing where the future is going. Unfortunately (fortunately for Improbable, I suppose), they are focused on the 32 year-old Chinese gamer and his mobile phone, that is where they make their money. But the potential they have will transform many aspects of how governments and militaries operate by producing a giant synthetic environment.

But the final one, which I think is the biggest bet, because we have to talk about the manned/unmanned mix of capability, sea, land, air, and in space. Above all, around Long-Range Precision Fires and move the debate on from unmanned aerial vehicles.

To give you an example, the US Marine Corps is considering how a tank troop of four tanks, all of whom have people in, can become a tank troop of four tanks with maybe one

or two with people in and the other two being entirely robotic followers, but intelligent followers. This means we could stop talking about the numbers of people in the armed forces because it would not be relevant. The size of the force, the manned/unmanned mix, would be relevant. We can take people out of harm's way. We can reduce the costs of people. We can increase effectiveness. We can increase mass and endurance and we can exploit the potential of autonomy.

There is some crucial bad news in here if you are a platform obsessive in that now you do not need to spend a billion pounds on a big floating platform to launch an air defence missile or any other forms of missile. The missile, courtesy of firms like MBDA in this country, will come in a box and you can put it on anything and therefore, you can network it. There are completely different ways of how you produce a manned/unmanned mix of military capability - and more affordably.

So we are talking about nothing less than the potential for the transformation of Western defence. It is limited by our imagination, it is limited by our massive capacity for institutional fudge and it is limited by our willingness to invest. It is a competition. Nothing I have said to you is lost on people around the world who seem not to have our best interests at heart and there are many of them around. They are ahead of us in thinking about technology in a strategic way.

If we get it right, we can fix defence at an affordable price in a way our allies will rejoice in, our enemies will be disappointed by, and our industry should find value in. The appointment of Philip Dunne last week by the Secretary of State for Defence to look at the contribution of defence to prosperity is, I hope, a recognition that transforming defence on the back of digital age technology means you can fix defence and contribute to whatever the Brexit era prosperity agenda looks like. That penny needs to drop a little faster and a little heavier than it has so far.

Now to close, we need a discussion. We need to recognise that nobody has the answers to this mix I am talking about. So the discussion needs to be led by government, it needs to have the armed forces contributing, but not controlling, because in many ways the armed forces will act as a brake on this sort of debate in trying to digitise the analogue. We need to talk to pure tech, the people in civil society who understand technology, and of course defence industry, finance, research and academia. And we need some principles to regulate the discussion and that is what I am going to close on.

The first thing is: this military transformation, unlike its predecessor, will be led by civil technology. Much of the stuff I am talking about exists in the commercial arena, developed by people who either do not have a military thought in their head or who are allergic to a military thought. This is about adoption and adaption. It is not about an *ab initio* creation. Again, disappointing news to some military research establishments.

Secondly, this has to be about transformation, not evolution. Yes, yes, we could do comfortable small things, digitise the analogue, but the winners in this competition will be the people who are big enough and bold enough to say: in order to deliver the military outcomes I want, what could I do with technology? And then absolutely break apart current organisations and ways of operating and rebuild something that is better and cheaper.

Thirdly, this has to be about a joint and combined force by design. This has to mark the point at which we break with the idea that a joint force is something that armies, navies and air forces in their own sweet way build capability and then they bung it together and declare it joint. What we need now are ministries of defence and departments of defence that design a transformed force and impose it on their armed forces to get the synergies in enablers and capability. That will not come naturally, it will have to be led by politics. The military will struggle to do it to themselves.

Next, it is about effects before platforms. It is no good saying we will always have ships, tanks and aircraft, all with people on, what can we do with it in this age that will be better? It is about what effect do you want and then designing with technology how you deliver that effect. It will mean armed forces that look fundamentally different. It will be hugely disappointing to those people who have committed their working lives to a particular platform or way of doing business, and I am sorry, the choices are simple: you either change or you become second rate and there are really no prizes for second place in this business.

Next point: it is a process, not an event. So this is going to run, I think, for at least a generation. We are not going to go through some great cycle of reissuing equipment to the armed forces. This is something that I think will run as far as the digital age goes. It will mean militaries getting used to having inventories that change the whole time and software that is updated regularly. It will be more like Google with a two-year planning horizon and less like buying a submarine with a thirty-year horizon. So of course, it means fundamental change to acquisition, a subject in itself.

It will mean military commanders worry about the control of the electromagnetic spectrum before they worry about control of land, sea and air. That is a profound doctrinal challenge, but unless you can actually dominate the spectrum in a way that allows you to communicate and move data, then everything else you might do in land, sea and air frankly becomes irrelevant. I would cite here because I think it is disappointing, in the case of the Joint Strike Fighter project, the fact that we in the UK have bought an extremely powerful aircraft, stealthy as it is, but have yet to buy the full information exchange capability, and it shows our thinking has some way to go yet.

It will be about cyber protection in all things, cyber defence and offence are just a familiar part of day-to-day activity. How the military integrate this into platforms, processes and

organisation still has some way to go. So cyber protection will migrate from being a sort of afterthought in a process or an accessory, to being core to all outcomes.
Finally and most difficult, it means seeing autonomy is an opportunity, not a demon. I was talking to some folks before lunch about the YouTube video, Slaughterbots, which I encourage you to look at, produced by the Stop Killer Robots movement. We are in a pickle over autonomy. We have a view here in the West that under international humanitarian law, a weapons system that kills on the basis of its algorithm without a man in, on, or outside the loop, is illegal. In terms of that law, that is so - actually, we already have defensive autonomous systems.

But many people in the world with whom we may fall out in the future, do not share this view and we will have to confront lethal autonomous weapons systems that are pointing at us. So we will have to deal with them and we need a sensible discussion about how if we use autonomy, we can be more effective and we can reduce the risk to our people. And which of you will choose to send a 19-year old as the first thing through the breach in the compound wall from which he or she may not come back, rather than a machine operating in an autonomous way? Some lawyers will argue that if you have the machine, you would have to use it.

To conclude, Western defence is not now fit for the challenges of the 21st century. We can understand why that is so and we now have to admit it <u>really</u> matters. Second, the opportunity exists to restore the security of our homeland (which I would have thought would matter) and the protection of our vital interests in this connected world, by transforming defence through digital age innovation. This needs a discussion, it needs to be led by government and I hope Philip Dunne is going to be an important part of that and it requires Whitehall, the Armed Forces, pure tech, the defence industry, academia and research, and that to be emulated in NATO. And finally it is a competition. It has started. The stakes are really high. Could we please get going? Thank you very much.

IRAN AND THE WEST: DEAL OR NO DEAL?

Transcript of a lecture given by Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO

Wednesday 9th May 2018

Sir Simon Gass *had a long career as a British diplomat. As the Foreign Office's Political Director, from 2012 to 2015, Simon was responsible for policy on the Middle East, Russia, Africa, South and Central Asia, the United Nations and other international institutions. Simon was recognised as the British Government's most senior expert on Iran: he was British Ambassador to Tehran (2009-11), he led the UK team at the prolonged E3+3 negotiations which resulted in the successful Iran Nuclear Agreement in July 2016 and he was the architect of the restoration of full diplomatic relations between the UK and Iran in 2016. Simon also worked extensively on Middle East issues, leading teams working on a series of high profile policy challenges including Syria, ISIL, Libya, the Gulf and Yemen. In addition, he managed a series of crises including the conflicts in Ukraine and Afghanistan. In addition to Ambassador to Iran and Political Director, Simon's positions included Ambassador to Greece (2004-2009) and NATO's Senior Civilian Representative to Afghanistan (2011-12). He was also the Foreign Office's Finance Director (2001-04) and a member of its Management Board for seven years. Simon is currently the Chair of FCO Services, the Foreign Office's commercial arm which provides a range of integrated, secure services worldwide to the UK government and other governments and organisations closely linked to the UK. He also leads the International Civil Service Effectiveness project. He is a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute.*

Thank you, Lord Lothian. Thank you to Global Strategy Forum for the invitation to come and speak today. I would also like to thank President Trump for ensuring a good turnout for today's talk - I should say that this is the last time that I will thank President Trump during this speech, so it is good to get it on the table rather early! When I accepted the invitation to speak and I agreed a date, I was feeling pretty comfortable because the US decision was expected on or about the 15th May, so I thought that I would be able to come along and make a few rather vague, but incredibly perceptive estimates of what the US position might turn out to be and then leave the room before I could be proven either correct or incorrect!

Sadly, today I have to actually speak about the US decision, President Trump's decision, that the United States is withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, which was announced

yesterday, and I have to say that it is a sad day. The agreement was a very good deal that did what it said on the tin.

It is worth remembering back to September 2012, when Prime Minister Netanyahu stood in front of the United Nations and he held up a picture of an Iranian bomb with a red line on it and he said, *'Iran is nearly at the point where we will not be able to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon and this is an existential threat to Israel'*. Those of us who heard that and felt some sympathy with it, continued to work on an Iran nuclear deal, which few people thought would be achievable. And yet, by the middle of 2015, we did have such an agreement in place and it did what it was supposed to do. Under that agreement, Iran removed 19,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium. It removed and exported eight tonnes of enriched uranium and 250 kilos of more highly enriched uranium, it removed and destroyed the core of its plutonium reactor at Arak and it agreed to an inspection regime which was of absolutely unprecedented intrusiveness.

You can therefore see why we thought that that was a good agreement. If we had not had that agreement, I think it likely that we would have faced conflict either sooner or later around Iran's nuclear programme. It was moving forwards. It was getting faster. More capable centrifuges were coming on stream and the risks in late 2012-2013 were very great. I suspect that most of us in this room would agree that the last thing which the Middle East needed at that point (or indeed at this point) was another conflict with lasting destabilising consequences for the region. It was quite moving at the final ceremony when John Kerry spoke and he said that as a young man he had seen the effects of war and how destructive and stupid it could be and that today, the day when we reached the final agreement, was a triumph for negotiation over conflict and I believe that he was absolutely right to say that.

So why, against this background, has President Trump decided to withdraw the United States from this agreement? Well, I think you can look at it in three different baskets.

First, there is no doubt that President Trump disliked the agreement because it was an Obama agreement. He was deeply opposed to it at the time of the negotiation and he appears to have an interest in undermining that legacy.

Second, President Trump has some specific criticisms of the deal. I have to say, I do not think that they are well founded. The most compelling of them is that the deal does not last forever. What happens is that a series of provisions lapse over quite a long period of time, but none of those provisions would elapse in a way which would significantly improve Iran's ability to push forward its nuclear programme at pace until about 2028. We are a long way from that. It is rather counter-intuitive to think that if what you want to do is to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, you withdraw from the agreement now because you are not sure what will happen in ten years' time. It does not really make a lot of sense.

A third reason, which I think is more compelling, was put to me by a US Senator when we had reached the agreement and I was asked to brief him. He was a Republican Senator, still is, and I explained to him why I felt that the agreement was a good one. At the end of it he said, *'Well, you've got a lot of good points, but there's one big difference between you and me and that is that you believe in win-win solutions.'* That is really the essence of what we are seeing here - if you believe in win-lose solutions, then you can see a reason why you might choose to withdraw from the nuclear agreement on the basis that you hope that you can bring Iran effectively to its knees through economic pressure. I have to say that I do not think that the history of the Middle East over the last fifty or sixty years gives a lot of comfort to those who think that win-lose solutions are durable or bring security or bring prosperity or peace.

What is going to happen next? Well, at the risk of slightly ducking question, there is a spectrum of possibilities. We have a lot of people out in the media at the moment predicting dire consequences and those could materialise, but the truth is that there is a spectrum of possibilities which is quite hard to predict just the day after the announcement.

But if we think of the interests of the main players, firstly the United States. Ostensibly what President Trump wants to do (this is what he has said, this is what the Secretary of the Treasury has said, this is what Senator Corker has said) is to kick-start another negotiation in which Iran will concede more than it has conceded so far. I have to say I find that a little far-fetched. From an Iranian perspective, the idea that you would negotiate again an agreement which was exhaustively negotiated, particularly when the United States has just withdrawn from its commitments under the agreement, is pretty implausible.

It is made even more implausible by the fact that if we are honest about it, if there is one party who was not in compliance with its obligations under the Iran nuclear deal, it was not Iran. There is a provision in the agreement which requires the Europeans and the United States to refrain from any policy specifically intended to adversely affect normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran. I think it would be pretty difficult to argue that the United States has complied with that term since the agreement was introduced. So, if the US objective is to have a further negotiation, that seems to me to be implausible. Not impossible, but implausible.

If we think about European objectives, then I think the E3 have responded firmly to President Trump's decision and I applaud that. The aim is clearly to maintain the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for as long as it can be maintained, even without US participation in it. I think that is going to be challenging. It is exactly the right thing to try to do and I will come to the Iranian perspective in a moment. But there is no doubt that the reimposition of US extraterritorial sanctions will have a chilling effect on business and economic links with Iran. It does not mean that they will stop entirely, but they will certainly become far more difficult. If countries have to choose between doing business

with Iran or facing potential swingeing fines from the US Treasury Department, I do not think there is much doubt how most big businesses will assess their interests.

Of course, the European Union has considered various measures which it could take in response and I am sure that consideration will continue. There has been discussion of a blocking regulation to try to block the effects of the US decision or setting up substantial credit lines for Iran. Any of those things might happen, but I do not think that they will have a very significant effect on the trade links with Iran.

Of course, there are other countries. There is Russia. There is China. There are countries that are not parties to the JCPOA: Turkey, the UAE, these are all countries who have had substantial trade links with Iran and it will be very interesting to see how they respond in trade terms.

There is no doubt that under the sanctions regime, which lasted up until the Joint Plan of Action was agreed, even countries like China were to a substantial effect deterred from doing business with Iran. But that of course was when you had an international sanctions regime supported at least in part by the United Nations and backed by the European Union and a range of other countries. That will not be the case when we are facing a US unilateral sanctions regime.

The second point to make about the Europeans, of course, is that this places the allies of the United States in an extraordinarily uncomfortable position, in which we find ourselves in the same corner metaphorically as Russia and China and contrary to the United States. And although I think that on the whole, Russia will probably regret the US withdrawal from the JCPOA - after all, they made a major investment in trying to make the agreement happen - I do not doubt that there will be a considerable amount of wedge-driving that now takes place to try to further divide the allies from the United States.

I think there will be a damaging effect on transatlantic confidence. It is not the first time that has happened and it will not be the last, but it is damaging. It is worth remembering also that the Joint Plan of Action is about European security. This is not simply about the Middle East or the United States or Israel. This is a matter of our security too, because if there is conflict in the Middle East and you see yet more refugees and all of the instability that flows from there, the effects on oil, all the dislocation of trade and economic links and so forth, that is a matter of concern to us.

Now in terms of how Iran will respond, the President has of course already spoken. He has revealed the possibility that Iran might resume enrichment of uranium at any moment. I think that is not likely to happen or at least not likely to happen very quickly or on a substantial scale, largely because it does not actually help Iran. There is nothing they can do with enriched uranium at the moment that makes any sense at all.

Secondly, they will want to try to salvage whatever economic benefit they can from an agreement, even if the United States reimposes as it will secondary sanctions. I think they will want to take the moral high ground and point the finger at the United States as the party that has walked away from this agreement. And lastly, perhaps they will be thinking that in 2020 there will be another presidential election in the United States and who knows. Elections, as we found out last time, are unpredictable things. So I think Iran will try to stick with the agreement for as long as it possibly can.

But - and there is a but - firstly, Iranian politics. There is no doubt that this is a huge defeat for the moderates in Iran. They sold the hardliners on the idea that it was worth entering into a deal despite the deep mistrust of the United States that has always existed in Iran. They persuaded the hardliners to give up all of the things that I have referred to: the centrifuges, the Arak plutonium reactor and so forth. Now, the hardliners will turn around and say, *'You see, we told you. You made a huge mistake. The United States could not be trusted'*. Despite that, at least initially, the regime will want to show a unified face to the world. They will think that this is not the time to wash their dirty laundry in public and that disputes should be kept within the family as much as possible. How that will pan out, we will have to see.

Secondly, the economy. As I have said, even if the other parties remain in the nuclear agreement, the economic benefit to Iran is going to be quite small. Even if they can continue to make oil sales (and of course they were selling some oil whilst the sanctions regime was in place), the problem comes much more in actually repatriating the funds from overseas back into Iran and that will be very tricky. We have already seen a pretty precipitous fall in the value of the rial, which threatens to raise inflation in Iran once more. So it will be quite difficult to sell continuation of Iran's participation in the JCPOA if the economic benefits do not accrue.

Thirdly, Iran's national security. Now we can disagree - I do disagree, deeply - with Iran's security policy in many areas, including Syria and Yemen. But if you are in the Iranian government, there is a logic to why Iran responds as it does. It feels that it lives in a hostile world, that it is constantly at risk of coming under attack and therefore I think it is pretty unlikely that Iran's behaviour in the region is s going to alter substantially as a result of the US decision.

Then lastly, perhaps there is the element of national pride which makes it very hard to judge. If the United States really thinks that they can bring Iran to their knees (and I have to say that was always the view of Prime Minister Netanyahu - he always used to say that if we had held on for longer, the economic pressure would have got greater and in the end, Iran would have given in), I find that very implausible. It is particularly curious because countries sometimes have a habit of ascribing to other countries behaviours which they would not even consider to be legitimate in their own case. You cannot see the United States changing a substantial element of its policy because of a bit of economic

pressure. You certainly cannot see Israel giving up its security interests because it comes under pressure. So why you would think that Iran would behave differently is not entirely easy to see.

I would like to conclude by thinking about some of the longer-term effects of the US decision. The first point is that this will be read in the region as confirmation if it were needed, that the United States has absolutely taken sides in the Middle East. It has taken the Sunni side, it has not taken the Shia side, it has taken the side of Israel and that is no great surprise in the region, of course.

But this sort of polarisation and shifting of the US position in one direction is pretty unhelpful in terms of achieving longer-term stability in the region. As I say, no matter how much you may deplore Iran's behaviour, you cannot write them out of the Middle East equation. They will always have influence in Syria, in Iraq, in a range of other countries as well, just as many other countries in the region aspire to have influence of that sort, and a policy simply of confrontation is unlikely to resolve that.

Secondly, in Iranian terms, this simply adds and reinforces the deep Iranian mistrust of the United States, which goes back many years and if I was an Iranian official, I would be able to reel off (indeed I probably could even as a former British official) a range of reasons as to why Iran mistrusts the United States. I fear though that this sense of victimisation that Iran has about its treatment by the West and the United States will only be reinforced and will make it harder in the longer term to come back to some sort of middle ground in the future.

Thirdly, there is a risk that this could embolden Saudi Arabia and Israel. If they come to believe that in the event of a punch-up, they could draw the United States in on their side, that would be a dangerous development for Middle East. I have already spoken about the crack in the partnership between the United States and its European partners. As I have said, it has happened before. I am not saying we cannot recover from it, but it is a pretty spectacular example of the United States simply sweeping aside European security and other concerns, and it is not a great thing in retrospect to have seen the leaders of our countries all trooping to Washington, making clear that they are there to lobby the United States and then simply being dismissed in the way that they have been.

My very last point is that we have talked a lot in the United Kingdom and in other places about the importance of a rules-based international order. We do that partly, indeed largely, out of self-interest. We need a rules-based system because that is what supports our security, it is what supports our economy and our trading links, it is what protects our citizens when they travel overseas.

A fundamental understanding that firstly, an international architecture which was built up largely by the United States and its partners has been hugely beneficial to our interests

over a period of time and that secondly, a way of behaving internationally in which agreements are by large kept to, is also an important part of that. That rules-based international order is under threat anyway, from emerging countries who have a rather different view about their interests in the world. It is therefore somewhat dismaying to see the main architect of that international order behaving in a way which pays scant regard to the observance of agreements and gives little confidence in the reliability of our key ally in terms of complying with undertakings that have been made. I will finish at that point. I look forward to questions and observations. Thank you.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT

Transcript of a lecture given by Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVO

Tuesday 22nd May 2018

Lord Peter Ricketts *was a British diplomat for 40 years. Defence and security affairs were a major strand of his career. He worked in various capacities on the military interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, was Permanent Representative to NATO (2003-2006), Permanent Under-Secretary at the FCO (2006-2010) and the UK's first National Security Adviser (2010-2012). His final post was Ambassador to France, from which he retired in 2016. Since then he has taken up a range of activities, including as a strategic adviser to Lockheed Martin UK, a Visiting Professor in the War Studies Department of King's College, and a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI. He was appointed a cross-bench member of the House of Lords in 2016.*

Thank you very much indeed, Michael, and thank you all for coming this lunchtime. I have got three texts to start my discussion and they will serve, I hope, as 'signposts' through what I am going to say, which will not be – Michael, let me reassure you – all the exquisite detail of Brexit, but will be more about the implications of Brexit for the agenda that I know, the national security agenda, particularly for the UK.

The first one I am sure will be familiar to very many people in this room. It is what Secretary Mattis said a few months ago in presenting the US National Defense Strategy. He said: *'Great Power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of US national security'*.

The second one you may have missed. It was a statement by the Head of the French Navy recently, who said that China has built the equivalent of the entire French Navy in the last four years, and indeed at one point recently China had more warships in the Mediterranean than did the French.

My third text is again a familiar one that you will remember from Chancellor Merkel at the G7 Summit last year, where she said in a moment of frustration: *'We Europeans really must take our future into our own hands, to some extent'*. I like the *'to some extent'*, that is very Chancellor Merkel, but the point is important.

I am not the first to notice that the international system that Britain was so influential in establishing in the post-war period is eroding fast under some of the pressures that are implicit in those three statements. Let me just do a little anatomy of how I see those pressures, starting with America.

Now you may have noticed that President Trump has brought a shift of style to the American presidency. Subtle, but detectable, if you listen carefully! But in substance, a muscular, brash, 'America First' foreign policy is not exactly new. If you think of President Theodore Roosevelt, he would have recognised it. What maybe more unusual is the seventy year period since the post-war settlement, during which the US has been willing to commit its huge military might to support its allies around the world and to promote open markets and democracy. The results have been mixed, of course, and sometimes, as in the years after 9/11, it has felt more like Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy than Woodrow Wilson's. But strategically, it has been a remarkably settled period for all of America's allies – we have not faced any major strategic choices in that time. Indeed, I think we have largely come to take for granted this 'Pax Americana', if I can call it that.

The Trump administration is also not the first to recognise that the overriding issue for US national security in the next generation is going to be the competition with China and therefore the defence of America's interests in Asia. I do not know how many of you have read Graham Allison's book about the Thucydides Trap.[1] I thought he was overly gloomy in predicting the probability of a military conflict between the US and China, but certainly the centre of gravity of US foreign policy has been moving for some time towards the Pacific. If you think back to President Obama, not just his pivot to Asia, but his policy in handling the Libya crisis and the early stages of the Syria crisis were harbingers of that.

That process is absolutely certain to continue, that is where the geopolitical forces are pushing. Secretary Mattis in the statement I quoted at the start in effect translates that into what scholars would call a grand strategic statement. It is one that America's allies should pay close attention to, particularly those in Europe. It may also mark the point where the Western national security community begins to shift its focus from the overriding preoccupation with fighting terrorism that has been so much of a feature of the last fifteen years. When Sir Iain Lobban, who is here today, and I were working together on the National Security Council, certainly counterterrorism was a huge issue. The Secretary Mattis statement may be a signpost that times are changing.

The second text that I took from the French Admiral is one of any number of examples that one could choose to show how military as well as economic power is shifting towards China and the other fast-growing economies. Not surprisingly, China is impatient with the international rules that were laid down by other countries in the late 1940s and the constraints of the post-war system. And they are responding in two ways. First of all, they are where necessary setting up their own institutions, as they did with the Asian Investment Bank a few years ago. And secondly, they are co-opting some of the existing ones where the Americans are walking back from multilateral engagement. The Chinese leadership on climate change is an example of that. In the WTO as well, China is able to present itself as in favour of the rule book, rather than against it.

[1] *Destined For War: Can America And China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* Graham Allison, Scribe UK (13th July 2017).

China is also creating its own facts – that is what superpowers do - most obviously in the South China Sea and with its Belt and Road policy, this huge infrastructure policy set to take shape over several decades. It is striking how the reaction in London, for example, to the Belt and Road policy is to see it as an infrastructure project, opportunities for Western companies, rather than as a long-term strategic play of the kind that Britain's Committee of Imperial Defence might have decided in 1904 and which past colonial powers like Britain should certainly recognise. Surely one of the main purposes of the Belt and Road strategy is to ensure that the US cannot blockade China from the sea in any future confrontation.

The assertive nationalism of China is based on a long-term view and a growing economy. The nationalism that I would attribute to Russia – and I know I speak in the presence of a member of the Russian Embassy here who is very welcome – I would say is neither of those things. I accept that President Putin is a master of the tactical opportunity and he has shown that repeatedly in recent years. His risk-taking opportunism masks a failing economy, but in its way, it is another feature of the eroding international order.

To me, it feels like Russia has not quite decided: is it going to aim to be a major power in the system or frankly, a rogue element outside the system? There have been a series of moves which, looked at from the West, feel very aggressive over the last few years. I think there was a mounting international exasperation at that aspect of Russian policy, at which point we had the Skripal poisoning, and I think Britain was able to channel that wider international exasperation over Russian behaviour into a strong and effective reaction to what was a completely unacceptable assault, not just on Britain, but on the rules that we have all recognised for so long.

My third text, from Angela Merkel, is a way of getting into the issues of what these shifts in international power alignments mean for Europe. It translates a loss of confidence among Europeans in the American commitment to NATO, as a result of President Trump's hesitations about committing to the Article 5 collective defence guarantee and his highly transactional approach to NATO more widely. I cannot think of any German Federal Chancellor who would have spoken like that about the existential guarantee to Germany's security which the US has provided since the Second World War and therefore again I think it is an important marker of shifting attitudes in Europe.

Brexit means that the EU will lose one of its two globally-focused powers. And the EU is going to have to make some choices as a result. It will need to come back to the old question of whether it really aspires to carrying a global political and security weight in the world at the same level as its economic weight. Or is it going to settle for managing the internal tensions which are only getting worse inside the EU and sorting out the immediate neighbourhood issues, in particular, the question of immigration? I think there are deep divisions within Europe on that question.

There are some very interesting issues about how far the Europeans are going to be willing to push a different agenda from the US, while continuing to rely on the ultimate US guarantee of European security. Of course, Chancellor Merkel made her comments in a moment of frustration. In reality, the EU is a million miles from being able to take its fate into its own hands, if that means to provide a credible deterrent against Russian adventurism and all the various threats that could come about. Frankly, President Putin is doing a very good job of keeping European members' support for NATO strong at the moment. But with Britain out of the EU, I think the temptation in Paris, in Berlin, in the Commission in Brussels, to put their security energies into European defence mechanisms will get stronger.

Of all the Western countries facing choices, Britain has got the most serious and urgent things to think about in terms of its national security priorities. We are going to emerge blinking into the sunlight after our 45-year membership in the EU and facing this world in rapid transformation. Caricaturing slightly, the national mood seems to be that we should pull up the drawbridge after fifteen years of very difficult foreign policy engagement, that we should leave other people to sort out the world's problems and we should spend our evenings watching endless films about Churchill. Or to put in a slightly more serious way, I think we have a conundrum in the UK, which is as follows:

- We are a country which is international by its DNA, we have an unrivalled set of networks around the world and global economic interests; we have world-class Armed Forces, intelligence services; diplomacy – you would expect me to say that, wouldn't you; an excellent international development programme; the soft power of our universities and think tanks; and the BBC.
- But the public mood feels to me less supportive of the kind of active international role for which those assets were developed than at any time since perhaps the 1930s. I would be interested if people want to challenge me on that.

Yet in this world of 21st century threats where we have got blurring distinctions between the old boundaries of peace and war - we have got 21st century countries and at the same time we have still got countries who are pursuing a distinctly 19th century nationalism - Britain is going to be an independent country outside the main economic blocs and it seems to me to have a huge national interest in a functioning set of international rules and a set of partnerships to help us prosper in this new guise as an independent, global Britain.

I would argue that the Government needs to be going out <u>now</u> to make the case for Britain to be seriously engaged in international peace and security work after Brexit. I do not see them doing that, but I will just end with three points which I think ought to be in that debate .

First – obviously, Britain's strategic relationship with the US will remain vital to our

national security. We have built up this remarkably close partnership over decades. It is based on some very deeply-rooted relationships in the areas of intelligence, defence and particularly nuclear cooperation where we are closer to the US than any other country in the world. But it is not a monogamous partnership, it is not a partnership where there is only one other partner and President Macron's visit to Washington recently showed us that very clearly.

The hard fact is that Brexit will diminish Britain's overall weight in the world and will affect the way that the US looks at Britain as an ally over time. The Americans are not sentimental and nostalgic about their national security relations and they will judge us by the effort we are prepared to put in to sustain influence in the world. And we are going to have to work harder. We will no longer have that place at the European Council table which allowed British Prime Ministers to persuade, influence and sometimes convince other European colleagues to follow a path that Britain had set out. That means that Britain has got to work with the US to play a larger role in NATO, more of a leadership role as America's interests diversify; more engagement in Asia, I hope, where we have friends and alliances that go back decades, but which frankly we have neglected in recent times; and we need to be working with those in Washington who think like us that the multilateralism of the last seventy years is very much in all our interests and to keep that torch burning in Washington.

We have got to factor into our national security policy the possibility that President Trump will win a second term. I know there are quite a lot of people in London and in Europe who are hoping that after four years there will be a different President and things will change. That is not a given at all in my view. And if President Trump does win a second term, Britain may well face some uncomfortable choices as to whether we are going to put the weight of our policy more with the Americans, even where we do not always agree, or with the Europeans. It is quite striking that in the major foreign policy issues that have come up since we decided to leave the European Union, we have tended to side with the Europeans more often than the Americans. On trade, obviously, on climate change, now on Iran, on the Israel-Palestine issue and on others. So we will have to think quite seriously about how our relationship with the US is going to be expressed in our foreign policy choices.

Second point. We do need to pin down now quite urgently what our national security relationship is going to be with the European Union after Brexit. Britain has suggested a new treaty for all the domestic security, law enforcement, judicial cooperation areas, which will cover the entire spectrum of all those different instruments in one document and which will continue as far as possible the very close relationship that obviously we have as a member state.

And it is an enormously close relationship. I was struck the other day by a figure that in 2017, the British police consulted the Schengen Information System, the database-sharing

reports among the Schengen countries and other EU members, 539 million times in one year. We are intensely engaged across Europol, across using the European Arrest Warrant, all the different instruments that allow early warning, that allow exchange of data, of DNA, of fingerprints, of alerts.

There is no precedent for a country outside the EU to be closely associated with all those different instruments on a range of highly sensitive areas. Of course, the EU has a shared interest in facilitating that and in maintaining close cooperation, but there are also some pretty difficult issues for the European side to grapple with, both in terms of precedent and in terms of legal issues, data privacy issues and others and we are not making it easy with some of the red lines that the British government have laid down, for example on the role of the European Court of Justice.

I discovered last week that the total amount of time spent by the British and European negotiators on thinking about this EU-UK security treaty so far has been one hour, so we are just at the bottom of a quite large mountain that we need to climb, ideally to be in operation and effective by the end of the transition period at the end of 2020. That feels to me like a remarkably difficult thing to do, so I would not be at all surprised if our national security interests and those of the Europeans pointed towards a longer transition in the area of security, perhaps alongside a longer transition in other areas,

So there are some big issues there. It should be more straightforward in the area of defence and foreign policy. I have already talked about the fact that as a European country with a European perspective on the world, it is natural that in many foreign policy issues, Britain should feel instinctively closer to a European approach than, for example, to an American one.

Defence and foreign policy in the EU is more intergovernmental than the internal security side. Britain has made a good offer of unconditional security cooperation and a wish to stay pragmatically involved in EU military missions, shared foreign policy initiatives and in EU defence industrial cooperation. The EU now has to decide: does it go with pragmatic solutions like that to preserve this close relationship with what is still Europe's largest military power, Britain, or is it going to go down a procedural route to give prominence to maintaining the autonomy of the EU without third parties too close and to wrap up some of their policies in a mantle of principle masking protectionist intentions? In the defence industrial area, there are some worrying signs of which the most important is, as you will have seen in the newspapers, the Galileo satellite project. I think if the European Union continue to handle Galileo in the way they are doing at the moment, it will give a very, very cold shower to aspirations to stay close with the European Union on defence and security. So, choices there for the EU as well.

I am coming to my third and last area, where I think we need to be doing some serious national security thinking. My last point is this, and it is a simple one: if Britain wants to

go on being an influential national security player in the world, we are going to have to earn that and not just rest on the entitlements that come from the past – our membership of the UN Security Council, our membership of many other clubs and our reputation. As I have tried to say, we are going to have to find a new balance - it is an old issue – between working closely with the changing America and sticking with our geographical hinterland of a European nation.

We ought to be, it seems to me, championing reform of this international system, rather than watching it wither away, so that it stays as viable and relevant as possible. As an independent global trading country, we are going to need a functioning rule book. We ought to be contributing ideas and energy to resolving the international crises that pose national security threats for us and others.

Given our expertise, we ought to be at the forefront of thinking about how we are going to design some rules for the road in handling cyber issues, where it feels a bit like the early days of nuclear weapons in that there is an enormously powerful weapon here that can potentially do enormous damage to all countries and we need to find somehow, internationally, some set of constraints and limitations. Britain ought surely to be in the forefront of that, there are others in the room much more expert than me, and there is also the impact of artificial intelligence on the security of all countries. These are developing national security threats, where Britain has the expertise and the intellectual qualities to lead and I hope that we will.

I think we should be giving more time to Asian security, given how vital that will be for the next generation, as I have said. So there are a lot of issues that the National Security Council that we established in 2010 needs to be tackling. It needs to show that it can do more than repackage things using the phrase *'a fusion doctrine'*, and that it can do not just crisis management, but real strategic thinking. And, last point, we need a Foreign Office that is fully funded for the job and led by a Foreign Secretary commanding real respect around the world.

NATO: THE US AND EUROPE – A PARTING OF THE WAYS?

Text of a lecture given by Sir Adam Thomson KCMG

Wednesday 4th July 2018

Sir Adam Thomson KCMG *has been the Director of the European Leadership Network since November 2016. Before joining the ELN, Sir Adam had a 38-year diplomatic career in the British Diplomatic Service, preceded by short spells at the World Bank and at Harvard. His final diplomatic posting was as the UK Permanent Representative to NATO between 2014 and 2016. Prior to that, from 2010 Sir Adam served as British High Commissioner to Pakistan and between 2002 and 2006 he was British Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. Earlier postings included Moscow, NATO, Washington DC and New Delhi. Sir Adam has also worked in London on Israel/Lebanon, in the Cabinet Office as the Soviet analyst for the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee (1989–91), as the Head of the FCO's Security Policy Department and as FCO Director for South Asia and Afghanistan.*

The cause of this talk is the NATO summit in Brussels next week on 11th-12th July.

And I will indeed say a bit about NATO summit business in general.

But, following the G7 train crash, we agreed that I would concentrate on the only questions anyone is talking about – how nasty is Trump going to be towards European Allies at the NATO summit and does this herald the disintegration of NATO?

These questions are given added spice for a London audience by the fact that – on the back of whatever he perpetrates in Brussels – President Trump will sweep through here on his way to Finland for his summit with President Putin. And 4th July seems a spicily appropriate day on which to ask whether the United States is, once again, declaring independence from the Old Continent – or whether, possibly more accurately, the insolent political, tax and tariff demands of the US superpower will provoke insurgents in the European colonies to greater independence.

So my remarks are in three parts:

- First, where NATO now stands;
- Second, what Trump might do;
- Third, whether we really are witnessing a transatlantic parting of the ways.

The first is merely context. The second can only be speculation – perhaps not even Trump knows what he is going to tweet next week.

So I aim to concentrate my thoughts on the third: how bad is this? What is to be done?

So, First, Where Does NATO Now Stand?

It is important for our analysis of how bad transatlantic relations have become to observe that NATO is faring really quite well, in very difficult circumstances.

By the end of 2013, NATO's long Edwardian summer was coming to an end. Russia's annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014 transformed NATO business from top to bottom, setting up the Alliance's first strategic challenge since 1989. Then, as NATO leaders met that September, the Arab Spring was unravelling, ISIS was racing across Iraq and Syria and the 2015 and 2016 migrant surge across the Mediterranean was building, all contributing to the arc of instability around NATO's south that is now a second strategic challenge.

And now there is a third, internal strategic challenge: Donald Trump and to a lesser extent President Erdoğan; populist scepticism about the value of being in alliance or at least in this particular Alliance. Three strategic challenges, not just the one that NATO once faced from the USSR.

In response, you will see from the summit communiqué that NATO will issue on 12th July that the Alliance is getting on with its comparatively swift and effective responses. Strengthened deterrence (principally facing Russia); a package of measures for stabilisation around NATO's south; strengthened military presence and extended funding in Afghanistan; a possible membership invitation to Macedonia and Membership Action Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina; a further NATO-EU Joint Declaration advancing that all-important institutional relationship still further. The steps on deterrence will focus on new Atlantic and Support Commands, on a new cyber operations centre and framework for cyber effects; and on readiness, reinforcement, mobility and resilience.

In answer to Trump's pressure for greater European performance, Allies will point to increases in overall non-US defence spending for a fourth year running, an increased number of Allies meeting the 2% GDP target, and an increasing number of Allies publishing their budget plans for getting to 2%. The headline initiative from the Summit will be the new goal of being able by 2020 to field 30 battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels within 30 days.

So far so good. But will it be enough for the Donald?

So, Second, What Might Trump Do?

We are already in Trump Phase 2. Phase 1 was his surprise to find himself in the Presidency and the spreading disarray as advisers tried to steer him. In Phase 2, since roughly March, Trump is following his own instincts, untrammelled. He finds it works

with his base. It makes sense to him in office to hew closer to his winning rhetoric in the campaign.

What might this look like at NATO? In Phase 1, at the 25th May 2017 NATO Special Meeting, Trump merely failed to follow the inter-agency prepared script and pledge standard US allegiance to NATO's Article 5 security guarantee. It is reasonable to assume that, partly because he IS getting results, he will shake the tree harder this time.

This shaking might still just be words. There will certainly be harsh words towards Germany – given its spending plans that would at most get it to 1.5% of GDP. But even words matter, because they are an essential part of credible NATO deterrence.

And there is a fair chance that it will be not just words but sticks and stones:

- With his looming meeting with Putin probably much more on his mind, Trump might repeat his Singapore/Korea performance – cessation of US exercising in Europe.
- Or he could wake up to the fact that on his watch US military spending under America's European Reassurance Initiative has gone up 40% to $4.8 billion and cap or reverse that.
- Or he could persist in willfully misunderstanding NATO budgets and – following US precedents with the UN - refuse to pay the already low 25% or so that the US contributes to NATO's collective civil and military budgets.
- Or, to punish Germany, he could announce the redeployment of US infrastructure and forces to Poland or overturn the agreement of General Mattis and the US Administration to establish the new NATO Support/Logistics command in Ulm.
- Or he could observe that by 2013 the US troop presence in Europe had fallen to one brigade and that therefore the two extra rotating brigades that the US has re-inserted since 2014 are unnecessary and will be withdrawn.

Exactly what he does will matter, but perhaps less than the signal of diminished US commitment to NATO that any of these steps would send.

It is possible, but implausibly diplomatic, that to sweeten the pill he would repeat the Article 5 guarantee and stress US readiness to reinforce Europe in a crisis. But on the campaign trail, he described NATO as *'obsolete'*. When he met Baltic Heads of Government in Washington in April his first question was what they saw in NATO.

He is manifestly indifferent to, or perhaps actually hostile towards, alliances, international institutions and multilateral diplomacy.

So it is prudent to assume that this NATO summit is going to hurt. It is certainly prudent at least to plan for this. The Pentagon is sufficiently alarmed – or well informed – about Trump's intentions that it is reportedly already working out the cost and impact of a large-scale withdrawal or transfer of American troops stationed in Germany.

So Will The NATO Summit Mark A Transatlantic Parting Of The Ways? And If So, What Should Be Done About This?

If future historians come to see 2018 as the year in which the US and Europe started to part ways over their collective security, I think they will date the split not to the NATO Summit on 12th July, but to 8th May when Trump torpedoed the Iran nuclear deal.

Whereas Iraq 2003 caused fractures across Europe, 8th May drove a fault line down the middle of the Atlantic. It struck not just at Europe's regional security but at its win-win foreign policy philosophy. And it seeks to coerce America's closest Allies out of an agreement that they conceived for their own security. The division could not be more fundamental.

On NATO, Trump so far has seemed focused on getting Allies to perform better rather than pulling the US out. We are, if you like, at the equivalent of the *'supplemental agreement'* stage in the Iran deal, where from January this year Trump was seeking to extract more from Allies in return for preserving the deal.

Moreover, NATO as an institution has greater resilience than the JCPOA and more support in the United States. And the US has huge sunk costs in Europe's defence and security. So I do not see this summit as terminal for the Alliance.

Nevertheless, NATO is THE paramount mechanism through which US and European defence and security solidarity is expressed. It is not just more totemic than the JCPOA, but far more fundamental. If Trump does it serious damage next week, it is easy to imagine a cycle of transatlantic action and reaction that fairly quickly makes things immeasurably worse and that becomes in meaningful senses a parting of the ways.

I want to make three main points about the way forward:

1. The first is a conventional one. But it bears elaboration. It is that what we are witnessing is not just Trump and it will not just pass.

There are deep forces pulling the Euro-Atlantic community together, such as its military interoperability and its close economic integration and mutual economic dependence. There are deep forces pulling the community apart, such as military technology, the rising costs of defence, demographic change, and changing values. But the most powerful divisive force is political philosophy and political will.

More than 500 days into his Presidency, despite everything he has done, Trump has a 42% approval rating. This is a geostrategic fact: a large plurality of Americans like his approach. Possibly enough to secure a second term. At any rate the kind of support that is likely to grow, not diminish, if he kicks ungrateful Europeans around at NATO. Starting

a trade war with the EU, pulling out of the Paris climate change agreement, moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, torpedoing the Iran nuclear deal – these things are at least tolerable to a politically significant proportion of the US electorate. There is no particular reason to think that even US withdrawal from NATO would be much different or that 42% of the US electorate will quickly change its mind. Arguably, US commitment to NATO has never been as visceral as that of the Europeans who depend on it.

Certainly, partisan polarisation and paralysis look set to diminish US leadership for many years to come. But diminished US leadership in the Euro-Atlantic area has been bi-partisan and far from confined to the Republican party. While George W. Bush's leadership was divisive, Obama's in NATO was definitely selective – think of the US initial response to Libya or to the migrant crisis. It was not a Republican President but again Obama who commented that Russia was merely a regional power, signalling diminished US interest in the European theatre as compared to Asia.

Against this backdrop, the debate over Europe's share of the defence burden is an obvious lightning rod. Americans on both sides of the aisle find it very hard to explain why, more than seventy years after the end of the Second World War, the richest societies on the planet should still depend for their security on the United States – 3,000 miles away. These Americans are right. And this feeling will go on influencing US politics and decision making for as long as Europeans do not do a great deal more.

2. My second point is more controversial. It is that Europeans cannot cope militarily on their own without America.

Trump is more right than he realises. It is not so much that Europeans struggle to muster the political will to spend an arbitrary 2% GDP on defence. It is that even if they did raise the money, they would still struggle to avoid military dependence on the United States.

Trump may be satisfied with simply being paid to stay in Europe. But ultimately, the United States is going to want Europeans not just to spend more but to be less needy.

Federica Mogherini's July 2016 EU Global Strategy speaks of the ambition for *'European strategic autonomy'*. But this is, so far, just hot air. Even with a determined, sustained and expensive effort, Europe would not cope militarily without the US for decades to come:

- Think of Europe's two largest military powers - Britain and France – attempting a medium-sized, unchallenged air campaign over Libya in 2011. That lasted two weeks before the US had to step in, help out and transfer the operation to NATO.
- Think about the procurement time for major military equipment.
- Bear in mind that European defence spending buys proportionately much less capability than the US because that spending is so fragmented: the European Allies

have six times as many major equipment types as the United States.
- Consider that in all 21 of NATO's capability shortfalls – everything from command and control and aerial surveillance, to air-to-air refuelling and stores, to high readiness forces and strategic airlift, to precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defence - it is the Europeans who are most deficient.
- Consider that NATO reckons that even if (a big if) the European Allies provide all that NATO currently asks of them, the US would still be delivering over 30% of NATO's required capability into the mid-2030s.

It is clear that for high-end crisis management and NATO's collective defence Europeans will need to be able to collaborate with Mr. Trump and his successors for at least a couple more decades while they work their way - if they work their way - towards greater autonomy.

This is surely a huge geostrategic consideration in how Europe chooses to respond to Trump's threats.

3. My third and last point is that whether there is a parting of the ways is up to us Europeans.

Future US administrations may be more or less reasonable than Trump but, for reasons I have described, Washington's concern to see Europeans carry more of the burden for their own security seems certain to endure and, if anything, intensify. So it is above all Europe's choice what to do about it.

After Trump's performance at NATO last year Chancellor Merkel famously said words to the effect that *'We Europeans must take our fate more into our own hands'*. She undoubtedly meant it in the sense of greater autonomy from the United States. But Europe's choice about its security fate in fact needs to be re-framed to ask how to make Europe a better military partner for the United States.

More hot air about European strategic autonomy will just do damage in Washington. Actual planning for strategic autonomy would get US attention. Done provocatively, this would accelerate a parting of the ways. But done collaboratively such planning would boost European credibility, European utility and European effectiveness.

And I believe that meaningfully greater European military autonomy can, paradoxically, only be done in collaboration with the United States.

Greater autonomy would inevitably be a long-haul, multi-year effort that would have to be meshed with NATO planning. The EU and NATO would have to collaborate even better. Choices would have to be made whether Europeans prioritised absolute NATO capability shortfalls, relative ones where the US at present covers the gap, or soft-end EU Common

Security and Defence Policy.

What European weaknesses is the US prepared to cover for longest? European defence industrial autarky looks unrealistic: tough negotiation is unavoidable about the terms of transatlantic defence industry business.

So what is the solution to avoid a parting of the ways? Europeans must stop talking and start planning a road map to greater autonomy. Not so much - or not just - to spend more but to spend much, much better. I do not expect the NATO Summit to say this crisply. But it should make a start.

And a final coda. Any long-haul European defence project cannot be just EU-led and must be state-driven. The two obvious states to drive this are France and Britain. I well understand that the thought is too much for UK pol-mil orthodoxy to bear, but when Theresa May hosts Donald Trump for talks on Friday next week, she should tell him that HMG intends to put itself at the head of a serious drive for greater European defence autonomy.

Why? To make Europeans better military partners with the United States. To ensure that Trump's wish for Europeans to do more for their own defence and not sponge off America is a collaborative partnership with Washington, not just more EU institution building. To demonstrate in practical blood and treasure ways that all Europeans can understand that although the UK is leaving the EU it is not leaving Europe. To make Britain great again. It is a no-brainer.

A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EASTS

Text of a lecture given by His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan

Wednesday 11th July 2018

His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal *is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan's Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. A pluralist and staunch campaigner for the rights of all to live in peace and dignity, HRH is a pioneer of Interfaith dialogue and understanding. Prince Hassan's international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prince Hassan has long had an active engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute.*

Any peace, in all forms, must be precipitated by war. It is one of the cruellest facts of life that in order to have peace, there must first have come a war. The Treaties of the past are seared across our global memory: Versailles, Brest-Litovsk, Portsmouth, Ghent. For better or for worse, these Treaties ended conflicts that caused the shedding of innumerable lives and ultimately brought peace, for whatever amount of time, to those belligerent countries. Territories exchanged, sovereignty assured, wounds mended; the fog of war rolls back and peace settles.

The processes taken to ensure peace are in a way more important than the actual peace itself. Processes such as the Helsinki Process which culminated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, laid out the basic rule of law with regards to sovereignty, territorial integrity and co-operation between states. This embodiment of the noble art of conversation, culminating in a universal accord of understanding, is what I envisage for the Levant. A new emergence of a second Helsinki Process – a Levantine Initiative.

It is the purpose of this lecture to lay out a suggested Architecture of the Levant, a new future for the Middle East. Of the great Treaties of the past, the Peace of Westphalia is paramount with relation to the Levant. Coming at the end of the greatest upheavals that Europe would know until the slaughter of the Somme, the Peace of Westphalia laid down

a blueprint for a divided continent that had been ravaged by war. Political disagreements, religious divisions, conflicting territorial claims – Europe was in a state of disrepair and in dire need of a solution.

It does not take a great leap of the imagination to draw the parallels between 17th century Europe and the modern day Levant. It takes even less of a leap to imagine a similar blueprint for change in the Levant, based on the Helsinki Process – a process dedicated to peace, followed by a cessation of hostilities within the framework of a modern day Helsinki/Westphalian Process and Treaty.

War has been a constant companion to the countries of the Middle East, and there has not been a decade where the region has not known some kind of conflagration erupt in one sphere or the other.

And yet, with the exceptions of the Camp David Accords and the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, and a smattering of ceasefires and understandings, there has been no solid and lasting understanding within the region. It is a sad fact that a region, so rooted in a common cultural heritage should be unable to come to an accord along the lines of the Peace of Westphalia.

Westphalia ended the combined machinations of the Eighty and Thirty Years war. If those conflicts were laid end to end, you would amount to the length of the turmoil that has been felt in the Levant. From the Arab Revolt to the Six Day War, right through to the current Syrian Crisis; the region has been torn apart by conflict. The region is still living in a second Hundred Years War.

It is now time to start to work towards a second Peace of Westphalia. A grassroots, home grown, Levant-led initiative that, in the spirit of Münster and Osnabrück, will end the strife that has become commonplace in the Middle East.

The virtue of an initiative based upon the Peace of Westphalia is threefold:

1. It initiated a system of limited sovereignty for the numerous states that were involved in the crisis of the wars. These states were granted sovereignty whilst maintaining their position on the Holy Roman Empire as a regional entity.
2. It created a legal mechanism for the settling of disputes and the general capability for individual states to bring their disputes to the fore.
3. And finally, it offered mutual guarantees for the upholding of the Treaty's terms.

These three cores allowed for the signatories to this Treaty to feel a part of a system of collective security and gave the collective states a reason to adhere to the Peace of Westphalia and not descend once again into a state of warfare.

Combine the above three outcomes of the Treaty of Westphalia with the Decalogue's agreement to the ten points to come out of Helsinki, and one can see the framework for a modern day Levant Initiative, and a blueprint for a New Architecture for the Levant:

- Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
- Refraining from the threat or use of force
- Inviolability of frontiers
- Territorial integrity of States
- Peaceful settlement of disputes
- Non-intervention in internal affairs
- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
- Co-operation among States
- Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law

The aim of the Levant Initiative is enshrined in the ultimate aim of the Helsinki Process – the greater good for the greatest number.

Another major point of the Treaty of Westphalia is that it encouraged the incorporation of outside guarantors to help ensure that the Treaty held. This policy of a guarantor system ensured that the respect and integrity of the peace would be upheld by the signatories and allowed the guarantors to impart advice, instruction and assistance should they be called upon to do so.

These elements must be adopted and turned into a Levantine Process in order to ensure the stabilisation and the prosperity of the region. It is also important to start the discussions of peace whilst the conflicts continue. Otherwise, one waits for the 'pie-in-the-sky' moment for when the stars align and the moment is 'right'. By starting the dialogue during periods of upheaval, the peace process changes and evolves to the most current and necessary need.

By starting the process of creating a New Architecture for the Levant whilst these divisions and conflicts are still relevant, it allows the process to get under way as soon as possible rather than awaiting an opportune moment that may not arise. It also allows the delegation or the collective to assess the needs most prevalent to the moment in time. The primary concern of a process such as this, should be the preservation of human dignity and a shared commitment to a humanitarian solution first and foremost.

Whilst the growth of economies and the strengthening of ties are a helpful by-product of a process such as this, the advancement and security of the people of the Levant is the primary concern for any process such as this. Protection of individual religious identities, cultural norms and the basic wellness of mankind is integral to any peace process.

Westphalia, in its primary function, was to seal the breach between the Protestant and Catholic peoples in the divided Holy Roman Empire. The division in the Levantine region go much deeper than those of 17th century Europe, however.

Divisions between Sunni and Shia Muslims, between refugees and the host nation's populations, extremism on the rise and nationalism are all component parts of the current state of the region. How do we address these issues? How does a process of creating a New Architecture for the Levant work towards a universal healing of these deep-seated wounds?

It comes by putting the region first; by the creation of a united, regional identity and a recognition of each individual's right to be. This New Architecture must take on aspects of other regional power blocks. The Visegrad Four, the Benelux Model and their ilk all recognise the right of the individual and that recognition is reciprocated. By reaching this unity, further institutions that must be born out of the region itself would come into being.

The instigation of a regional Zakat Fund and Arab Social Charter and the foundation of an Arab Court of Human Rights, to better the situation for the peoples of the region could be instigated to go some way to building up a stronger and more united society. From this New Westphalian process, a Levant-style North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) could be created with a charter focussed on the advancement of the region and at the core a dedication to regional security. The Middle Eastern Treaty Organisation (or METO) could become an overarching umbrella organisation to focus energy in conflict prevention, and maintaining the new status quo of peace and security.

All of this must come after the instigation of this New Architecture Initiative for the Levant. But it does us good to look forward and question what comes next. The aim of this initiative is to ensure that long lasting and beneficial change should come from within the region and not be helicoptered in the form of similar Western or Eastern policies. The Levant is the birthing cradle of humanity and it houses some of the oldest civilizations on the planet. Any change should come from grassroots programmes; bottom up, not top down policies of change.

There has often been talk of a 'mini-Marshall Plan' for the Levant. Sadly, this is neither appropriate nor possible at this time. The European Recovery Plan, to give it its true name, was a plan that relied upon bolstering the countries of Europe ravaged by war, by building on pre-existing industrial powers in Europe. However, the countries of the Levant do not have that capability nor does it have the industrial base strong enough to make such a plan effective. It would be the equivalent of trying to build a house by starting with the roof. Any architecture must start from the ground upwards – the New Architecture for the Levant is no different.

The first step in any attempt to stabilise the Levant should start from the ground up and

at the local level. It is people, not pipelines and power that should be the starting point of all change within the region. The settling of the refugee crisis, the rebuilding of Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and the pacification of the region for the benefit of the marginalised and the disaffected must be at the atomic centre for this New Westphalian Process, just as it was with the old.

'Peace comes from within, do not seek it without'. The capability to advance and save the Levant exists within the hearts and minds of the people that call the region home. Great opportunities for change exists in the Levant and it is the duty of all who desire peace to nurture those opportunities. The New Architecture for the Levant Initiative is a process that will put the region first, and use the combined national, regional and international collective knowledge base to end the sufferings that are rampant at this time.

The only positive that can be drawn from a region that is on its knees at the hands of conflict, is that it shall rise again through focused and concerted effort. It is time to end this Second Hundred Years War with a Second Peace of Westphalia.

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM EVENTS IN 2017-2018

17th October 2017 — Lecture on *'Immigration And Europe: Current Trends And Future Options'* by **Dr. Michael Spindelegger**, Director General of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development; Vice-Chancellor of the Republic of Austria (2011-2014), and Austrian Federal Minister of European and International Affairs (2008-2013).

25th October 2017 — Seminar on *'Crisis In The Gulf: Local, Regional And Global Implications'*. The seminar took place in the Church House Conference Centre (Bishop Partridge Hall) in collaboration with the Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum (OxGAPS) at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. The conference was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Mr. Adel Hamaizia**, Committee Vice Chairman, Oxford Gulf & Arabian Peninsula Studies Forum (OxGAPS). The following speakers took part: **Commodore Neil Brown**, Geopolitical Strategist, CQS, formerly Director of Naval Staff, Ministry of Defence; **Ms. Jane Kinninmont**, Deputy Head and Senior Research Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House; **Mr. Bill Law**, Journalist, Director, The Gulf Matters; **Mr. Michael Stephens**, Research Fellow for Middle East Studies and Head of RUSI Qatar. The closing remarks were given by the **Rt Hon Sir Hugo Swire KCMG MP**, Chairman, Conservative Middle East Council (CMEC).

1st November 2017 — Debate on *'The North Korean Crisis: A New Paradigm Or Unfinished Business?'* with **Mr. Gideon Rachman**, chief foreign affairs commentator for the Financial Times; and GSF Advisory Board member, the **Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC**, Foreign Secretary (1995-1997) and Defence Secretary (1990-1992).

7th November 2017 — Debate on *'The 1917 Balfour Declaration And Its Legacy In The Middle East Today'* with **Sir Vincent Fean KCVO**, Consul-General, Jerusalem (2010-14); **Professor Eugene Rogan**, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at the University of Oxford and Director of the Middle East Centre at St Antony's College, Oxford; and **Lord Turnberg**, author of *'Beyond the Balfour Declaration: The 100-Year Quest For Israeli-Palestinian Peace'*.

21st November 2017 — Debate on *'The Russian Economy: The Weak Link In Moscow's Strategic Ambitions?'* with **Professor Christopher M. Davis**, Reader in Command and Transition Economies, University of Oxford, Fellow, Wolfson College and Professorial Research Fellow, Oxford Institute of Population Ageing; **Mr. Roger Munnings CBE**, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Russo-British Chamber of Commerce; and **Ms. Alina Slyusarchuk**, Executive Director, CEEMEA Economics, Morgan Stanley.

28th November 2017	Seminar on *'Influence Warfare: Have Social Media And Fake News Become The New Battleground?'*. The seminar took place in One Great George Street (The Palmer Room) in collaboration with the Oxford Media Network. The conference took place and was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Ms. Deborah Pout**, Founder of the Oxford Media Network. The following speakers took part: **Ms. Christiane Amanpour CBE**, CNN's Chief International Correspondent; anchor of 'Amanpour', CNN's flagship global affairs programme; **Ms. Mevan Babakar**, Digital Product Manager, Full Fact; **Professor Michael Clarke**, Director General of the Royal United Service Institute (2007-2015); **Mr. Matthew d'Ancona**, *Evening Standard* and *Guardian* Columnist, Author of *'Post Truth - The New War On Truth And How To Fight Back'*; **General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux GCB CBE DSO DL**, Chief of the Defence Staff (2010-2013); and **Professor Richard Sambrook**, Professor of Journalism and Director of the Centre for Journalism, Cardiff University, former Director of Global News at the BBC.
30th November 2017	Lecture on *'Losing An Enemy - Obama, Iran And The Triumph of Diplomacy'* by **Mr. Trita Parsi**, author and President of the National Iranian American Council, chaired by **Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG**.
12th December 2017	Christmas Drinks and Lecture on *'From Fact to Fiction - The BBC's Frank Gardner On The Challenge Of A News Journalist Becoming A Novelist'* by **Mr. Frank Gardner OBE**.
17th January 2018	Lecture on *'Time For A World Order That Works'* by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**, chaired by GSF Advisory Board member, the **Rt Hon Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC**.
24th January 2018	Lecture on *'Politics And Security In A Turbulent World'* by **Sir John Sawers GCMG**, Chairman and Partner of Macro Advisory Partners; and Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service – MI6 (2009-2014).
30th January 2018	Discussion on *'The UK And The Future Of The Western Balkans'*, the third report of the House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations, with two members of the Committee: **The Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford** (Chairman) and **Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG CH**, and chaired by **Sir David Madden KCMG**.
6th February 2018	Lecture on *'Change And Uncertainty In The Middle East: Where Are We Heading?'* by **Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO**, Executive and then Corresponding Director (Middle East), International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015-2017), British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia (2012-2015), Iraq (2009-2011) and Syria (2006-2007).

20th February 2018	Debate on *'The Battle For Syria: A New Front Line With Turkey?'* with **Mr. Jonathan Paris**, Political & Security analyst; and **Dr. Christopher Phillips**, Reader in the International Relations of the Middle East at Queen Mary, University of London and author of *'The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry In The New Middle East'*.
27th February 2018	Lecture on *'The Special Relationship Is Dead. Long Live The Special Relationship!'* by **Sir Christopher Meyer KCMG**, British Ambassador to the United States (1997-2003).
20th March 2018	Lecture on *'The Innovation Imperative: Transforming Western Defence'* by **General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE**, Commander Joint Forces Command (2013-2016).
2nd May 2018	Discussion on *'How To Rig An Election'* with **Professor Nic Cheeseman**, Professor of Democracy and International Development at the University of Birmingham; and **Dr. Brian Klaas**, Fellow in Comparative Politics in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics.
9th May 2018	Lecture on *'Iran And The West: Deal Or No Deal'* by **Sir Simon Gass KCMG CVO**, Political Director at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2012-2016), and British Ambassador to Iran (2009-2011).
15th May 2018	Conference on *'Africa: Balancing Financial Inclusion, Stability & Security'*. The conference took place in the National Liberal Club in collaboration with the Political Economy of Financial Markets (PEFM) Programme at St Antony's College, University of Oxford and was co-convened by **Mr. Adam Bennett**, Deputy Director, Political Economy of Financial Markets Programme (PEFM), St Antony's College, University of Oxford and **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**. Lord Lothian was in the chair and the following speakers took part: **Dr. Charles Enoch**, Director, Political Economy of Financial Markets Programme (PEFM), St Antony's College, University of Oxford; Deputy Director, Western Hemisphere Department of the International Monetary Fund (2014-16); **Mr. Samuel Munzele Maimbo**, Head, Finance for Development Unit & Senior Adviser to the Managing Director & Chief Financial Officer, World Bank Group; **Rt Hon Sir Stephen O'Brien KBE**, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs & Emergency Relief Coordinator, United Nations (2015-2017), Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Development (2010-2012) and Prime Minister's Special Envoy to the Sahel (2012-2015); and **Dr. Antoinette Monsio Sayeh**, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Center for Global Development; Director, African Department of the International Monetary Fund (2008-2016) and Minister of Finance, Liberia (2006-2008). Lunch remarks were delivered by the **Rt Hon the Lord Bates**, Minister of State for International Development, Department for International Development.
22nd May 2018	Lecture on *'The National Security Implications Of Brexit'* by **Lord Ricketts GCMG GCVO**, British Ambassador to France (2012-2016), and UK National Security Adviser (2010-2012).

5th June 2018	Seminar on *'The Berlin Process On Its Way To The London Summit: A Bridge Between The Western Balkans And The EU?'*. The seminar took place in the National Liberal Club in collaboration with South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony's College, University of Oxford and was chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**. The following speakers took part: **Dr. Othon Anastasakis**, Director of South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), St Antony's College, University of Oxford; **Dr. Jessie Hronešová**, Manager for the Western Balkans at Aktis Strategy Ltd and SEESOX Associate; **Sir David Madden KCMG**, Former Ambassador; Senior Member and Distinguished Friend of St Antony's College, University of Oxford; and **Dr. Adis Merdzanovic**, Former Junior Research Fellow at South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), St Antony's College, University of Oxford.
19th June 2018	Debate on *'What Lies Ahead For Turkey And The West?'* with **Sir David Logan KCMG**, British Ambassador to Turkey (1997-2001); and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw**, Foreign Secretary (2001-2006) and co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum.
26th June 2018	Conference on *'Brexit And Europe: Two Years On - Are We Any The Wiser?'* in collaboration with the Political Economy of Financial Markets (PEFM) Programme at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. The conference took place at the National Liberal Club and was chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**. The following speakers took part: **Professor Vernon Bogdanor CBE**, Professor of Government, Institute of Contemporary British History, King's College, London; **Sir Simon Jenkins**, Author and Journalist, *The Guardian*; **Professor Kalypso Nicolaïdis**, Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford and the **Rt Hon Gisela Stuart**, Chair, Change Britain. The opening keynote remarks were given by **Mr. José Manuel Barroso**, Chairman and non-executive Director of Goldman Sachs International and former President of the European Commission (2004-2014). Lunch remarks were delivered by **Mr. Barroso** and **Mr. Jacek Rostowski**, Minister of Finance (2007-2013) and Former Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland.
27th June 2018	Debate on *'Russia And The West: Collision Course Or Simply Sparring?'* with **Mr. Mathieu Boulègue**, Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House; **Sir Tony Brenton KCMG**, British Ambassador to Russia (2004-2008); and **Professor Christopher M. Davis**, Reader in Command and Transition Economies, University of Oxford, Fellow, Wolfson College and Professorial Research Fellow, Oxford Institute of Population Ageing.
4th July 2018	Lecture on '*NATO: The US And Europe – A Parting Of The Ways?'* by **Sir Adam Thomson KCMG**, Director, European Leadership Network (ELN); and UK Permanent Representative to NATO (2014-2016).
11th July 2018	Lecture on *'A New Architecture For The Middle East'* by **His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan**.

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General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE served as Commander Joint Forces Command, one of the six 'Chiefs of Staff' leading the UK Armed Forces until April 2016. He was responsible for 23,000 people worldwide and a budget of £4.3bn, delivering intelligence, Special Forces, operational command and control, all surveillance, reconnaissance and information systems and communications, operational logistics, medical support, and advanced education and training across the Armed Forces. An artillery officer, his military career included leadership from Captain to General on military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan – often as part of US-led coalitions and in NATO. He is President and Colonel Commandant of the Honourable Artillery Company, a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. His ambitions now are to be at forefront of applying disruptive technology as it revolutionises business, society, government and defence, to find a leading part in addressing the causes of instability, tension and conflict in a rapidly changing world, and to contribute to the continuing evolution of defence and security thinking worldwide. He provides board-level geo-strategic insight, advice and influence, and supports senior corporate leadership development programmes. He advises and lectures regularly on defence and security policy, cyber risk and security to City, academic, parliament, military and commercial fora. In promoting the rapid development of combinations of the digital age technologies in the 4th Industrial Revolution, he is developing the principles and major capability bets that should guide the transformation of Western defence in particular.

The Rt Hon Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC is one of the most respected and successful politicians of his generation. He grew up in Glasgow, was educated at Hillhead High School and went on to the University of Glasgow. As a successful university level athlete Ming ran the 200m for the GB team at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and became captain of the UK Athletics Team 1965-66. He held the British 100m record from 1967 to 1974. He was called to the Scottish Bar as an Advocate in 1968 and appointed Queens Counsel in 1982. He became MP for North East Fife in 1987. In Parliament he was the Liberal Democrats Foreign Affairs Spokesman from 1997–2006. He has served on the Members' Interests (1987–1990), Trade and Industry (1990-1992) and Defence (1992-1999) Select Committees. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 2003 and elected Leader in March 2006–October 2007. He was a Member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and of the Intelligence & Security Committee. He is a Vice President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. In 2001 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate by the University of Glasgow and was given a Knighthood in the 2004 New Years Honours List. He became Chancellor of St Andrews University in April 2006. He was made a Companion of Honour in 2013. He retired from the House of Commons at the May 2015 general election and was subsequently appointed to the House of Lords.

The Rt Hon Sir John Chilcot GCB was educated at Brighton College (Lyon scholar) and Pembroke College, Cambridge (open scholar and research and teaching scholar, 1957-

63). He joined the Home Office in 1963, and worked for the Head of the Civil Service, William Armstrong, and several Home Secretaries (Roy Jenkins, Merlyn Rees and Willie Whitelaw) as private secretary. Postings to the Cabinet Office, and as head of policing and national security policy at the Home Office followed. He then served as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office from 1990 to the end of 1997. On retiring from Whitehall, he was appointed by the Prime Minister as Staff Counsellor to the Security and Intelligence Agencies, and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Sir John led or chaired a number of government Inquiries and reviews including Royal and VIP security, the IRA penetration of the RUC's Special Branch HQ, the use of intercept evidence in criminal trials, the Butler Review of the intelligence on Iraq, and finally he chaired the Iraq War Inquiry from 2009 to 2016. Aside from government-related service, he was at various times a non-executive director of RTZ's industrial group, a seconded director at Schroders, Chair of the construction industry's pensions and benefit schemes, and Chair (now President) of the Police Foundation think tank.

Professor Michael Clarke was Director General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) from 2007 to 2015 when he retired from that role. Until 2001 he was Deputy Vice-Principal and Director for Research Development at King's College London, where he remains a Visiting Professor of Defence Studies. From 1990 to 2001 he was the founding Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King's. He was appointed Professor in 1995. He is now a Fellow of King's College London and of the Universities of Aberystwyth and of Exeter, where he is also Associate Director of the Strategic Studies Institute. He has previously taught at the Universities of Aberystwyth, Manchester and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and also at the University of New Brunswick and the Open University. He has been a Guest Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, and a Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. He has been a specialist adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee since 1997, having served previously with the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 1995-6, and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Bribery in 2009. In 2004 he was appointed as the UK's member of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. In 2009 he was appointed to the Prime Minister's National Security Forum and in 2010 to the Chief of Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Group. He also served on the Strategic Advisory Panel on Defence for UK Trade and Industry and in 2014 was Chairman of the Defence Communications Advisory panel for the Ministry of Defence. In March 2014 he was appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister to chair an Independent Surveillance Review at RUSI which reported in 2015. That report, *A Democratic Licence To Operate: The Report Of The Independent Surveillance Review*, was published as part of the public discussion around the Interception of Communications Bill, enacted into law in December 2016. In January 2016 he was appointed a specialist adviser to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy. In October 2016 he was also appointed to Chair the independent inquiry into drone warfare on behalf of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones.

Secretary William S. Cohen is Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a business

consulting firm based in Washington, DC which provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board of CBS, and on the advisory boards of the US–India Business Council, the US-China Business Council and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the weekly World Affairs Contributor for CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organisation in the US with a budget of $300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as Secretary of Defense marked the first time in modern US history that a President chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the US Senate and three terms in the US House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine and received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College, and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or co-authored ten books – four non-fiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

Sir Evelyn de Rothschild is currently Chairman of E.L. Rothschild, a private investment company. He is Chairman of the ERANDA Foundation, a family foundation he founded in 1967 to support charities working in the fields of medical research, health and welfare, education and the arts. In addition, Sir Evelyn currently serves as a Governor Emeritus of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow of Imperial College London and is an Honorary Life President of Norwood and Ravenswood Children's Charity. From 1976 until 2003, Sir Evelyn was Chairman and CEO of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd, the international investment bank. From 1972 until 1989, Sir Evelyn also served as Chairman of the Economist Group, from 1977 to 1994 Chairman of United Racecourses Ltd and previously he served on the Board of Directors of De Beers and IBM UK as well as serving as Deputy Chairman of Milton Keynes Development Corporation, Chairman of St Mary's Hospital Medical School, Member of the Council of the Shakespeare Globe Trust and President of The Evelina Children's Hospital Appeal. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1989 for services to banking and finance.

Susan Eisenhower is the CEO and Chairman of The Eisenhower Group, Inc. (EGI), a Washington DC based consulting company founded in 1985. For thirty years the company has provided strategic counsel on business development, public affairs and communications projects. EGI has advised Fortune 500 companies, on projects in the United States and Europe, but also in China, Russia, and Central Asia. In addition to her work through EGI, Susan Eisenhower has also had a distinguished career as a policy analyst. She is Chairman Emeritus of The Eisenhower Institute, where she served as president twice. At Gettysburg College, Eisenhower holds a yearlong seminar, *Strategy and Leadership in*

Transformational Times (SALTT), for competitively selected students at the Eisenhower Institute. She has also been a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics and a Distinguished Fellow at the Nixon Center, now called the Center for National Interest. Over the years, she has served as a member of three blue ribbon commissions for the Department of Energy for three different secretaries: The Baker-Cutler Commission on US Funded Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia; The Sununu-Meserve Commission on Nuclear Energy; and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which released its findings on a comprehensive program for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the winter of 2012. She was also appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control, where she served eight years. After as many years on the NASA Advisory Council, she served as a commissioner on the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. She is currently a member of MIT's Energy Initiative Advisory Board and co-chairman of NEAC, the Secretary of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Board. In June 2016, she received the *Legion d'honneur* from the French Government, in recognition of her years of policy work, especially in US-Russian Relations. In addition, she has spoken in many corporate venues, as well as at such distinguished institutions as the United States Military Academy at West Point; the Foreign Policy Association of New York; the Army War College, Carlisle; Sandia National Laboratory, MIT and Australia's Science and Technology Organization, which is part of the Australian Ministry of Defence. Eisenhower has authored hundreds of op-eds for newspapers such as the *Washington Post* and the *LA Times*, appeared frequently on national television and radio, and her articles have appeared in such journals as the National Academy of Sciences' *Issues in Science and Technology* and the Naval Institutes' *Proceedings*. She has written four trade press books, two of which were on regional best seller lists, and she co-authored or co-edited four other books on international security issues.

The Rt Hon Frank Field DL MP worked as Director of the Child Poverty Action Group from 1969-1979 during which time it became one of the premier pressure groups in the country. In 1974 he also became Director of the Low Pay Unit until 1980. In 1979, he was elected Member of Parliament for Birkenhead. Between 1980 and 1981 he served as Shadow Education and Social Security spokesman under the leadership of Michael Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Social Security Select Committee and continued in this role up to 1997. From 1997-1998 he accepted the position of Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair's first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a member of the Public Accounts Committee between 2002 and 2005. Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy and committed. In 1999 he helped set up the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. The group has acted as an important independent think tank for the cause of a long-term, investment led reform to the pension system. Since 2001 he has also chaired the Church Conservation Trust and has helped develop the trust from being one primarily concerned with conserving the best architectural gems of the Church to one which tries to open up such places for alternative use. From 2005, he has also been chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics Commission which is the planning authority for English cathedrals.

Andrew Fraser, Baron Fraser of Corriegarth is the son of Ian Fraser, Baron Fraser of Tullybelton, a prominent Scottish lawyer who later became a Law Lord. He was educated at Eton College and St John's College, Oxford where he read Philosophy, Politics and Economics. He has worked in the City for most of his life. Major jobs included: CEO of Baring Securities in the UK; Director of Barings Bank; Chairman of EPL, a Bangladeshi investment bank; Chairman of Bridge Securities, a quoted Korean bank and lastly, Director of Asia Frontier Capital, a fund management company based in Hong Kong focusing on equity investments in Asia. More recently, Lord Fraser was Treasurer of the Better Together Campaign which was the main focus for the 'No' vote and kept Scotland as part of the United Kingdom. He was Treasurer of the Conservative Party from 2015–2016 and made Life Peer in 2016 as part of David Cameron's resignation honours. Lord Fraser is a Member of the Queen's Bodyguard for Scotland (The Archers).

Secretary Chuck Hagel was the 24th Secretary of Defense, serving from February 2013 to February 2015. He is the only Vietnam veteran and the first enlisted combat veteran to serve as Secretary of Defense. Hagel also served two terms in the United States Senate (1997-2009) representing the state of Nebraska. Some of Hagel's current commitments include serving on the Board of Trustees of RAND; Advisory Boards of Deutsche Bank America and Corsair Capital; Senior Advisor to Gallup and to the McCarthy Group; Distinguished Executive in Residence at Georgetown University; Distinguished Statesman at the Atlantic Council; and Board of Directors of the American Security Project. Previously, Secretary Hagel served on the Board of the Chevron Corporation and the Zurich Holding Company of America, was a Distinguished Professor at Georgetown University, Co-Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, Chairman of the Atlantic Council, Chairman of the United States of America Vietnam War Commemoration Advisory Committee, and Co-Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Corporate Council. He served as a member of the Secretary of Defense's Policy Board, Secretary of Energy's Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of Nuclear Power, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Board of Directors and the Systemic Risk Council. Prior to his election to the US Senate, Hagel was president of McCarthy & Company, an investment banking firm in Omaha, Nebraska. In the mid-1980s, Hagel co-founded VANGUARD Cellular Systems, Inc., a publicly traded corporation. He was President and CEO of the World USO, Private Sector Council (PSC), and Chief Operating Officer of the 1990 Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations (G-7 Summit). Hagel also served as Deputy Administrator of the Veterans Administration under President Ronald Reagan and Deputy Commissioner General of the 1982 World's Fair. He is the author of the book, *America: Our Next Chapter* and was the subject of a 2006 book by Charlyne Berens entitled, *Chuck Hagel: Moving Forward*. A graduate of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, Hagel and his wife, Lilibet, have a daughter (Allyn) and son (Ziller).

The Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield is a British historian of government. Since 1992, he has been Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London. Prior to that, he was a journalist for twenty years with spells on *The Times* as a leader writer and Whitehall Correspondent, *The Financial Times* as its Lobby Correspondent

at Westminster and *The Economist*. He was a regular presenter of the BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme from 1987 to 1992. In 1986 he was a co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary British History and he was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2003. In 2008, Lord Hennessy won *The Times* Higher Education's Lifetime Achievement Award. On 5th October 2010, the House of Lords Appointments Commission announced that he was to be appointed a non-political cross-bench Peer. He is a Member of the Chief of the Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Panel. He is an Honorary Captain in the Royal Naval Reserve. Lord Hennessy is author of several books, including *Cabinets And The Bomb* (2007), *The Secret State* (2010) and *The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service Since 1945* with James Jinks (2015).

The Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford acted as policy adviser to Edward Heath in the 1960s and was Director of the Conservative Political Centre. In the late 1970s he became head of Margaret Thatcher's speech-writing team. He served as Minister of State in Northern Ireland, under William Whitelaw, from 1972 to 1974, at the height of the troubles, before going on to serve as Secretary of State for Energy & Secretary of State for Transport in the first Thatcher Cabinet. In 2010 he was enrolled as Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office with special responsibilities for the Commonwealth and for international energy issues. This made him not only the only person to have served in the three administrations of Heath, Thatcher and Cameron, but also the only Minister on record to have 'come back' after a 27-year break. Until 2002 he was Chairman of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group (the high level bilateral forum between leading UK & Japanese politicians, industrialists & academics), which was first set up by Margaret Thatcher & Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1984. Along with a multitude of other roles, he is currently President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Chairman of the Windsor Energy Group and most recently, chairman of the newly set-up House of Lords Committee for International Relations. David Howell has something of a track record in forecasting developments long in advance and helping to pioneer thinking on the major issues of our times. Thus, in the Heath era he was the first to call for a 'New Style of Government', which would begin to unwind the UK's swollen state activities and liberalise the corporatist state. In the emerging Thatcher era he introduced the privatisation concept to the UK political scene (as chronicled by both the late Lord Howe and by Lord Lawson in their memoirs). In the later 1990s and early 21st century he one of the first to draw political attention to what he called 'Easternisation' and the fast-rising role of Asia, as well as to importance to the UK of the new Commonwealth network. He has all along championed the importance of the UK-Japan relationship. In 2013 he chaired the ground-breaking Lords Report on soft power, called *Persuasion And Power In The Modern World*, seeking a new mindset amongst the UK's foreign policymakers. He is now persistently drawing attention to tomorrow's central significance in international affairs of platform, blockchain and big date technologies and their huge implications for the UK's whole future. He is the author of numerous political pamphlets with notable impact and six books, on energy, politics, innovation and the Internet: *Freedom & Capital* (Blackwell 1982); *Blind Victory* (Hamish Hamilton 1986); *The Edge of Now* (Macmillan 2001); *Out of the Energy Labyrinth*, co-written with Carole Nakhle

(I B Tauris 2008); *Old Links & New Ties: Power & Persuasion in an Age of Networks* (I B Tauris 2014); *Empires in Collision: The Green Versus Black Struggle For Our Energy Future* (Gilgamesh 2016). David Howell was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge.

William Kerr was educated at Ampleforth College and Oxford University. His career was spent in financial services initially in the City of London. He moved to Hong Kong in 1992 to establish Lloyd George Management, an investment advisory company specialising in investment in Asian and global Emerging Markets. He returned to the United Kingdom at the end of 2013 and remains on the boards of a number of investment companies, as well as serving as Trustee for charitable and other organisations.

The Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990–1993 and Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Margaret Thatcher. He was a member of the House of Commons for 25 years. He was also a Minister in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector, several with Middle East involvement. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, President of the Economic Research Council and a former Chairman of Le Cercle (a foreign affairs think tank). He was made a Life Peer in July 1998. He is an Honorary Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.

Sir Iain Lobban KCMG CB was the Director of the British security and intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters, from 2008 to 2014, having previously served as its Director General for Operations. He pioneered an integrated service of intelligence and security in domains as varied as cyber defence; counterterrorism; military campaigns overseas; and the prevention and detection of serious crime. Cyber Security, both nationally and internationally, has been at the heart of his role in recent years: he set new direction for innovative government partnering with the private sector and with academia. As the GCHQ Director he attended the UK's National Security Council on a weekly basis from its very first meeting in May 2010 and was a Principal member of the Joint Intelligence Committee for over six years. Sir Iain is now engaged in three fields: the advocacy and demystification of Cyber Security, providing strategic advice and personal perspective, nationally and internationally, to governments and businesses; sharing lessons and insights on strategic and institutional leadership; and entrepreneurship, in the broadest sense of the word.

Sir David Manning GCMG KCVO was educated at Oriel College, Oxford and the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University before joining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1972. He served in Warsaw, New Delhi, Paris and Moscow. From 1994-1995 he was Head of Policy Planning; from 1995-1998 Ambassador to Israel; and from 1998-2000 he was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence and Intelligence and a member of the Foreign Office Board. He was the UK Permanent Representative at NATO (Brussels) from 2000-2001 before returning to London as Foreign Policy Adviser to

the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (2001-2003). He was then Ambassador to the United States for four years from 2003-2007. Sir David is a Director of Gatehouse Advisory Partners. He is also a Member of the Council of Lloyd's of London.

The Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind KCMG QC was elected as MP for Pentlands in 1974, which he represented until 1997. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992, Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service. Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a MP in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea and he was elected as MP for Kensington in May 2010 until his retirement at the 2015 general election. He was UK representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (2010-2011); and Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2010-2015). He was appointed in 2015 by the OSCE as member of their Eminent Persons Panel examining Russia-West relations and the crisis in Ukraine. He is a member of the Board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in Washington DC, chaired by Senator Sam Nunn, and a Member of Madeleine Albright's Aspen Ministerial Forum. He was appointed by the Government as the British Co-Chairman of the Belvedere British-Polish Forum in 2017. He is currently a Visiting Professor at the Department of War Studies at King's College, London and a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI).

Marshal Of The Royal Air Force The Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC was born in London, and educated at Merchant Taylors' School and the Royal Air Force College Cranwell. He was commissioned into the Royal Air Force in 1970, and after pilot training completed a number of tours in the instructor and fighter reconnaissance roles. This included two years on loan service with the Sultan of Oman's Air Force during the Dhofar War, and three years on exchange with the United States Air Force in Texas. In the 1980s Lord Stirrup commanded No II (AC) Squadron, flying Jaguar aircraft from RAF Laarbruch in Germany, and from 1990 to 1992 he was Officer Commanding RAF Marham in Norfolk, a period that covered the first Gulf War. After attending the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Higher Command and Staff Course, Lord Stirrup served as the Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes in the Ministry of Defence before becoming Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group in 1997. He was Assistant Chief of the Air Staff from 1998 to 2000, and then took up the post of Deputy Commander in Chief Royal Air Force Strike Command. In 2001 he was deployed to United States Central Command immediately following 9/11, and commanded British forces during Operation Veritas, the UK's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Following a tour as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Equipment, he became Chief of the Air Staff in 2003, and was appointed as Chief of the Defence staff in 2006. Following retirement from the military, he was appointed to the House of Lords in 2011, where he is particularly involved in the areas of defence, security, foreign relations and the arts. He lives in Marylebone, is married with one son, a practising cardiologist, and maintains a keen interest in history, music and the theatre.

The Rt Hon Jack Straw was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice. He has served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. His autobiography, *Last Man Standing: Memoirs Of A Political Survivor* was published in September 2012. He retired as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election. He continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. He is co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum; takes a close interest in Iran; is a member of the Independent Commission on the Freedom of Information Act; and Chairman of the Blackburn Youth Zone.

The Rt Hon Gisela Stuart served as Labour MP for Birmingham Edgbaston from 1997-2017, when she decided to step down from Parliament. She was a health minister in the first Blair Government. From 2002 to 2003 she was the parliamentary representative on the Presidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe. One of her fellow Presidium members was the then French Commissioner Michael Barnier. The experience led her to question the direction of the European project. Her Fabian pamphlet *The Making of Europe's Constitution* summarises her concerns then and ultimately led her to Chair the successful Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 referendum. In parliament she served on the Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committees. In 2015 the Prime Minister appointed her to the Intelligence and Security Committee. Gisela is a founding member of the Henry Jackson Society and still one of its Directors. She is a trustee of Reading Force, a charity devoted to helping service families stay in touch by sharing books. For more than 10 years she edited the political weekly magazine *The House*. Since leaving parliament she chairs Change Britain, a cross party organisation committed to achieving a Brexit deal which is in the best interest of the UK and the EU. She also chairs the Legatum Effective Government Commission and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office announced her appointment as the new Chair of Wilton Park, effective from 1st October 2018.

His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan's Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. A pluralist and staunch campaigner for the rights of all to live in peace and dignity, HRH is a pioneer of Interfaith dialogue and understanding. Prince Hassan's international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prince Hassan has long had an active engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific

Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute.

Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG was Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence from 1998-2005, following a short period as Director of GCHQ. His initial career was with the Ministry of Defence and subsequently, from 1979, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His diplomatic postings overseas were: First Secretary, UK Delegation to NATO; Head of Chancery in the British Embassy at Ankara; Director of Cabinet to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington; and Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington DC. Appointments at home covered defence policy and programmes, international economic relations and resource management. Sir Kevin is now engaged in business and academia. He is Senior Independent Director of Smiths Group Plc; Executive Vice President, Government and Defence, for AECOM UK; Chairman of RISC (the UK security industries' trade association); Visiting Professor at King's College London; Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Association; and serves on other advisory boards and charitable trusts.

Admiral the Rt Hon Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC DUniv joined the Navy in 1965. He spent most of his naval career at sea, serving in 14 different ships and commanding three of them. In 1980 he took command of the frigate HMS ARDENT taking her south to the Falkland Islands in 1982 where she was sunk in their successful recapture. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action. He was Chief of Defence from 1997-2000. He was promoted to Admiral in November 2000 when he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet, NATO Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic and NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces North. He became First Sea Lord in September 2002 and the First and Principal Aide-de-Camp to HM The Queen. He retired as First Sea Lord on 7th February 2006 becoming Chairman of the QinetiQ Defence Advisory Board. He advised both Conservatives and Labour on defence and foreign policy before, in July 2007, being asked by Gordon Brown to join the Government as one of the GOATs (Government of All The Talents) responsible for national security and counterterrorism as well as cyber and Olympic security. He produced the United Kingdom's first ever National Security Strategy and Cyber Security strategy. He was Chairman of The National Security Forum. He left government in May 2010 and is currently a strategic advisor to a number of small companies, a motivational speaker, plus a number of other appointments. Lord West was made a Knight Commander of the Order of The Bath in 2000, Knight Grand Cross in 2004, Baron in 2007 and a Privy Councillor in 2010.

Christopher Wilkins is chairman of North British Windpower, a privately-owned company developing renewable energy in Scotland; he is also on the board of a Canadian distillery and an internet venture. Previously he was the architect and first chairman of Hakluyt & Co, an information gathering company. Before that he established and ran his own company in the paper industry, which he then sold. He was a member of the Scottish Economic Council for ten years. He has also worked in the newspaper industry and prior to that he served in the army for eight years - including some active service in the Middle East.

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

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

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

Lord Lothian, HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan and Sir Malcolm Rifkind

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