

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM



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
Lecture Series

2014 - 2015

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General Sir Richard Shirreff and Lord Lothian



Professor Jeremy Farrar and Lord Lothian



Lord Lothian and Martin Wolf



Baroness Warsi



Major General Noel I. Khokhar and Lord Lothian



Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon

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President

Johan Eliasch is the President of Global Strategy Forum. He is Chairman and CEO of HEAD (the global sporting goods group), Chairman of Aman Resorts, Equity Partners, London Films, Co-Chairman of Cool Earth, non-executive Chairman of Investcorp Europe, non-executive director of CV Starr Underwriting Agents. He is an advisory board member of Brasilinvest, Societe du Louvre, Capstar, the Centre for Social Justice, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Foundation for Renewable Energy and Environment and a member of the Mayor of London's, Rome's and Jerusalem's International Business Advisory Councils. He is Patron of Stockholm University and a trustee of the Kew Foundation. He is the Chair of the Food, Energy and Water Security programme at RUSI. He is the Founder of the Rainforest Trust which is conserving 400,000 acres of rainforest in the Amazonas. He was part of the Conservative Shadow Foreign Office team as Special Advisor on European Affairs (1999-2003) and responsible for foreign relations (2003-2005). He was Conservative Party Deputy Treasurer (2003-2007). He is the former Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the UK for Deforestation and Clean Energy (2007-2010).

Chairman

Lord Lothian is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum. Michael Lothian was first elected to Parliament as Michael Ancram in 1974. His political career included four years as the Political Minister in Northern Ireland responsible for the opening engagements with the IRA which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement, Chairman of the Conservative Party for three years, and four years as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Opposition. He continues to be involved in international conflict resolution. He co-founded Global Strategy Forum in 2006 and serves as its Chairman. He was appointed to the House of Lords as a life peer in October 2010. He is a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

Director

Jacqueline Jinks is the Director of Global Strategy Forum. She joined GSF as Research Director in June 2006 and became the Director in February 2008. From 1997-2005, she was Political Secretary and speechwriter to Lord Moynihan, a former Conservative Senior Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords. She worked for the Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP and the Rt Hon Francis Maude MP, during their respective tenures as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Prior to that, she worked for the Democratic National Committee (1996-1997) and CMA Consultants (1994-1996).

Treasurer

Adrian de Ferranti was the founder of Ferranti, an early stage venture capital business. He was also a founder and/or Chairman of Tantus PLC, Cambridge Computer Graphics, Chelford PLC, and PTG. He had an early career at European Banking Company, Murray Johnstone, followed by Montgomery Securities. He is currently the Chairman, Director or investor in NEST, Same Wave, SMB, Ampair, Plasmanet, Udata, Ziani's, Como Lario, Ferranti Farming, and Small Business Bureau. He was the Chairman and Trustee of the Royal Institution of Great Britain from 2007-2010. From 2007-13 he was Chairman of the Foundation at Heriot Watt University. He was also a Treasurer of the Conservative Party from 1991-2004.

PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

As Global Strategy Forum approaches the tenth anniversary of its foundation, the global landscape in which British foreign policy must operate remains as challenging as ever.

Before moving on to note the many international problems with which UK ministers and officials have struggled with limited success, it is only fair to start by highlighting one conspicuous success – albeit one that remains both not fully realised and extremely controversial. This is the nuclear agreement with Iran. If – and this is a big if – this delivers on its stated objective of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and succeeds in its implied objective of transforming Iran's overall interactions with the West so that Iran becomes a more normal participant in regional and global affairs, this will be an achievement in keeping with the finest standards of British diplomacy.

Sadly, but more realistically, successes of this order have been very much the exception. As the UK ponders yet another Strategic Defence and Security Review, there is little reason to believe that it will be either conceptually more illuminating or that it will provide clearer operational guidance than its predecessor in 2010. The crushing tragedy of Syria, the continuing rise of the so-called Islamic State – with its eerie attractiveness to British youth – the waves of refugees, determined Russian assertiveness: none of these finds British officials with ready, let alone convincing explanations of how British policy can make things better.

All too often, despite the increasingly clouded assessments of the British military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, the answer seems to boil down to more of the same. The debate about vital future decisions like defence procurement and diplomatic spending seems to be on autopilot. The run-up to a future referendum on the British membership of the European Union is marked more by dramatic claims of deepest catastrophe or millennial bliss depending on the outcome than on a sober assessment of British interests. It gives no pleasure to note that we seem little closer to a pragmatic reconciliation between British aspirations and resources than ten years ago.

In case this appears an over-harsh indictment of the British foreign policy team, it must be recorded that it is not easy to find evidence of greater accomplishment among our allies and partners. In the US, President Obama has achieved success with Iran and Cuba, but otherwise is struggling mightily with IS, the Middle East, Russia, and Afghanistan. On the vital issue of the relationship with Beijing, Washington is still deeply unsure whether China is a partner or a competitor, shading into an adversary. The unfolding presidential campaign seems unlikely to shed much light on these problems. In Paris, Berlin and other European capitals, foreign policy leaders are contending with many of the same problems as in London – and with little more success. In some NATO allies such as Turkey, which were once lauded as models, foreign policy is in total disarray.

This is a sombre background for this ninth annual collection of GSF lectures. Taken together, they present a broad overview of the areas where the UK faces its most difficult choices. The Middle East and terrorism continue to feature disproportionately. This is as it should be given the impact of these issues on the UK's security and well-being. The lectures also cover the wider ground of Russia and Afghanistan, global health and global economic threats to security, the role of soft power, the EU's record of foreign policymaking, as well as an assessment of British foreign policy performance from across the party political spectrum. The questions they ask are both tactical: What is the best way forward in Syria? Is the Iran deal a good one? A deeper theme that runs through many of the

lectures is whether, and if so how, the UK should reassess its foreign and security policy in a more fundamental way.

These are precisely the hard questions which GSF wants to have out in the open, with all the options on the table for consideration, not just today's conventional wisdom or bureaucratic convenience. GSF sets out to widen the parameters of the debate and of democratic accountability. This is where I see Global Strategy Forum's essential contribution. As I said last year, our aim is to act as a stress test to legacy opinions by providing a forum to actively encourage truly fresh ideas, which can then help to forge a new consensus on how the UK engages with the world beyond our shores. I am the first to acknowledge that this is an ambitious agenda, but I think these lectures and our growing membership show that we are succeeding. I very much hope that the next decade will be easier for British foreign policy but I can assure our members that, if not, GSF will be present at the debate to ask the tough questions without fear or favour.

As always, I wish to take this opportunity to convey my enormous gratitude to all our contributors. Without the overwhelming generosity of our speakers in their willingness to share their expertise, knowledge and understanding, GSF could not continue in its current form. Our membership has increased significantly year on year, demonstrating the high demand for the trademark discursive and open forum which we offer. Central to our success too is the unfailing interest, commitment and support of our members. I would also like to thank our Advisory Board members, a list of whom can be found at the back of this publication, under whose expert guidance, wise direction and astute leadership GSF continues to flourish.

Our 2015-2016 events programme promises to be as exciting, challenging and provocative as ever, as we once again bring together the unique network of policymakers, practitioners and international affairs experts who meet under our auspices and upon which GSF's reputation is built. I look forward to seeing many of our members, both old and new, at our events over the coming year.

Johan Eliasch
President, Global Strategy Forum
October 2015

ABOUT GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM was founded by Lord Lothian (then the Rt Hon Michael Ancram MP) and Johan Eliasch in 2006 to generate open debate and discussion on key foreign affairs, defence and international security issues. As an independent, non-party political, non-ideological organisation, GSF provides a platform to explore some of the more challenging and contentious aspects of UK foreign policy and to stimulate imaginative ideas and innovative thinking in a rapidly changing global landscape.

In accordance with our founding remit, we aim to bring together those with a strong interest in international affairs and to offer them the opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas, and to engage in informed debate. Through our publications and our website, we enable their expertise to be disseminated widely.

GSF's core activity consists of a regular lunchtime lecture and debate series on topical issues. For more in-depth discussion of specific topics, we host seminars in the House of Lords. We also hold small roundtable lunches and dinners on key issues of the day. Separately, as well as our annual compendium of lectures and the publication of the proceedings of our seminars, we publish an occasional series of monographs as well as collections of essays and articles by distinguished experts.

We are supported by a strong and active Advisory Board of MPs, Peers and experienced foreign and defence policy practitioners. We are delighted that the Advisory Board has been joined this year by **Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield** and **Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**.

In 2014-2015, we hosted a total of 23 lunchtime events and seminars, comprising of twelve lectures, seven debates and four seminars.

The following speakers addressed our lecture series: **General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE**, NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (2011-2014); **Professor Jeremy Farrar OBE**, Director of the Wellcome Trust; **Martin Wolf CBE**, Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator, The Financial Times; the **Rt Hon the Baroness Warsi**, Senior Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Minister for Faith and Communities, Department for Communities and Local Government (2012-2014); **Major General Noel I. Khokhar, HI (M)**, Director General, Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis, National Defence University, Pakistan; **Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE**, Master, Pembroke College, University of Cambridge and former Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (1999-2004); **Jonathan Powell**, Founder and CEO of Inter Mediate, Prime Minister's Special Envoy to the Libyan transition and Chief British Negotiator on Northern Ireland (1997-2007); **Professor Anthony King**, Professor of Government at the University of Essex; **James Watt CVO**, British Ambassador to Lebanon (2003-2006), Jordan (2006-2011) and Egypt (2011-2014); **Sir Ciarán Devane**, Chief Executive of the British Council; and the **Rt Hon the Baroness Ashton of Upholland GCMG**, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Vice-President of the European Commission (2009-2014). The **Rt Hon the Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon GCMG KBE CH** also spoke as our lunchtime guest of honour following our seminar, *'Bosnia and Herzegovina: New International Thinking'*.

We have held seven debates over the past year on a variety of topics including: the role of

Parliament in taking Britain to war; Iran and the nuclear negotiations; IS-inspired terrorism; foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq; North Korea; the Turkish elections; and the Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.

Additionally, we have hosted or co-hosted four seminars, as follows:

- A seminar entitled *'The IS Threat: Regional Conflict Or Global Jihad?'*, which took place in One Whitehall Place on 22nd October 2014 and was chaired by GSF's Chairman, **Lord Lothian**.
- A seminar entitled *'Protecting Minorities In The Middle East'* in the House of Lords, which took place on 26th November 2014. It was co-hosted with MEC International and co-chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford** and **Lord Lothian**.
- A seminar entitled *'Bosnia and Herzegovina: New International Thinking'* which was hosted in collaboration with SEESOX, the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford and LSEE-Research on South Eastern Europe and which took place in the House of Lords on 3rd March 2015, and was chaired by **Lord Lothian**.
- A review of Developments in the Arctic which took place in the House of Lords on 20th May 2015 and which was co-hosted with Windsor Energy Group and co-chaired by the **Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford** and **Lord Lothian**.

As well as our annual compendium of lectures, we have produced two further publications.

- In November 2014, we published a pamphlet containing two lectures by GSF Chairman, **Lord Lothian**, entitled *'How The West Lost The Middle East & When Will We Ever Learn – The End Of Hard Power Intervention?'*
- In September 2015, we published the proceedings of our final debate of the 2014-2015 season, entitled *'The Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: Tough Choices for Tough Times?'*, with contributions by **General the Lord Dannatt GCB CBE MC DL**, **Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Stirrup KC GCB AFC** and **Admiral the Rt Hon Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC**.

A full list of all events for 2014-2015 can be found at page 105.

Further information on all our activities and events, including audio transcripts, as well as pdfs of all our publications can be found at our website, www.globalstrategyforum.org.

THE LECTURES

NATO: Challenges, Opportunities And The Future

General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE

From The Ebola Virus To Antimicrobial Resistance: Do We Face A Global Health Security Crisis?

Professor Jeremy Farrar OBE

The Shifts And The Shocks: What We've Learned - And Have Still To Learn - From The Financial Crisis

Martin Wolf CBE

British Policy Towards The Middle East: Getting It Right

The Rt Hon the Baroness Warsi

Pakistan's Terrorism Policy Post The Peshawar Massacre

Major General Noel I. Khokhar, HI (M)

Bosnia And Herzegovina: New International Thinking

The Rt Hon the Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon GCMG KBE CH

National Security: Current Threats, Hard Choices And Soft Options

Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE

From Northern Ireland To Libya: How To End Armed Conflicts

Jonathan Powell

Britain: A New Style Of Government?

Professor Anthony King

Democratic Illusions: The Lessons Of The Arab Spring

James Watt CVO

Prevention Is Better Than Cure: The Place Of Soft Power In A World Of Hard Choices

Sir Ciarán Devane

Reflections On Five Years Of EU Foreign Policy Challenges

The Rt Hon the Baroness Ashton of Upholland GCMG

NATO: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND THE FUTURE

Transcript of a lecture by General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE

28th October 2014

Sir Richard Shirreff was born in Kenya in 1955 where he spent his early years. Educated in England, he graduated from Exeter College, Oxford before being commissioned from Sandhurst into the 14th/20th King's Hussars, an armoured cavalry regiment, in 1978. His regimental service was spent in Germany, Canada, the UK, Northern Ireland, the Gulf and, while attached to 6th Queen Elizabeth's Own Gurkha Rifles (light infantry), Hong Kong and Brunei. He commanded The King's Royal Hussars 1994-96. Subsequent command appointments included 7th Armoured Brigade, 3rd (UK) Division, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (with the added responsibilities for the EU as Operation Commander, Operation ALTHEA). He also has extensive staff experience at brigade, Army HQ and in the Ministry of Defence. He has commanded on operations at every level from platoon to division. This has included combat in the Gulf War of 1991 as a tank squadron leader, counter-insurgency operations in Northern Ireland (three tours), together with Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq. He withdrew from active service as a soldier in March 2014 and is developing his second career as a consultant/advisor in strategic risk.

Thank you very much indeed for the invitation to join you today. As you heard, I speak not only as a former DSACEUR, but also very much with a foot in the European Union camp as well, as Strategic Co-ordinator for NATO-EU relations and as the Operation Commander for the EU operation in Bosnia Herzegovina. So I have some perspective on NATO - obviously much better on NATO - but also a perspective on the European Union.

I am going to start by looking at the strategic security context and I think we can identify five important enduring features.

Firstly, NATO, the European Union, the global security environment remain in fluid transition, addressing insecurity associated with the perception of unsolvable 21st century challenges and a global economy that is still digesting a financial and economic crisis.

Second, the cost of security is increasing and at the same time, the tools for producing security and stability in the 21st century are viewed by our publics as increasingly ineffective. The gap between the resources applied and the security realised is a security gap, an effectiveness gap and a credibility gap. It is within this gap of costs and decreasing effectiveness that new approaches - a more comprehensive approach perhaps - can help to narrow the gap, at least in the short term.

Third, despite the outlays of financial and human resources, security problems persist and are multiplying in both number and complexity. The world reflects Clausewitz's description of the nature of war: 'The province of danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance'. Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Ukraine, Gaza and Palestine.....the list goes on. The character of conflict defies neat categorisation

into a spectrum from high intensity to traditional peacekeeping operations. We see a kaleidoscope in which major combat operations, insurgency, terrorism and organised crime are all part of a dynamic and hybrid combination.

Fourth, the complexity of modern security problems is matched by a perceived entropy in the global security system - the majority of our capabilities do not align with the problems we are facing or will face; they were set up to deal with yesterday's problems. The question is: are we capable of adapting them?

Fifth, our solutions today, our action and/or inaction can produce second or third order effects that create new security problems which eclipse the gravity of the original problem we hoped to solve and I think Libya is a very good case in point in that respect.

Linked to this is a factor which I fear is becoming increasingly apparent: a reluctance to engage and a preference for short-term political expediency over long-term strategic solutions.

So what? Well, these challenges highlight the need to focus on crisis warning, crisis identification, crisis avoidance, crisis management and post-crisis resolution as priorities, despite significant differences on what the exact crises are or will be. At the strategic level, common vision, assessment and goals, integrated planning, effective division of labour and universal familiarity with the tools of security, stability and reconstruction are essential to successful security and stability operations in the 21st century.

What does NATO offer us as a political/military alliance? The bottom line, of course, is Collective Defence through Article V of the Washington Treaty, the founding principle of NATO: an attack on one is an attack on all. I note that UK National Strategy may minimise the existential threat to these shores. However, we in the UK should not forget that we are bound by treaty to the defence of fellow NATO members who do see a very real existential threat. Things look very different if you are Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian or Polish.

Common values also matter. NATO is an alliance based on democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. But above all, NATO gives us the means to meet the strategic challenges of our age by pooling the efforts of 28 nations, all of whom, even the strongest nation, would be weaker, either militarily or politically or both, without the Alliance. Hence, NATO's Strategic Concept, agreed at Lisbon in 2010, ratified again two years later in Chicago and reinforced last month in Wales at the Summit, which highlighted its core tasks and principles of Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Co-operative Security.

What about the challenges facing NATO? That is what it says on the tin, that is what NATO offers, but let's look inside a bit.

I think the first and the most pressing issue is Allies' failure to deliver. Strategy is about the integration of ends, ways and means in pursuit of policy - I was responsible as the Deputy SACEUR for engaging with the nations to deliver and generate the means to conduct NATO's operations. So as NATO's force generator, I was confronted on a pretty much daily basis with the reality of the gap between the rhetoric of what nations promised around the North Atlantic Council table and the reality of what they were prepared to actually deliver, particularly, it has to be said, in the maritime

field. The bottom line here - and this is my first major challenge - is European underfunding of defence.

Most European nations have now got themselves, either by default or by design or both, into a position where higher defence spending at the expense of social welfare spending is unacceptable to electorates. There are only three NATO nations which meet the minimum of 2% of GDP spent on defence (and that is something we cannot even take for granted here in the United Kingdom, which of course is one of those nations which spends more than the 2%).

So I think criticism by successive US Secretaries of State is absolutely fair, putting European NATO members on the spot for failing to step up to the mark. It is revealing if you look at overall defence spending some 25 years ago, which was split pretty much 50%/50% between the United States and Europe/Canada. Now the position of the total NATO defence spending works out as the US at 75% and Europe/Canada at 25%.

In terms of the resources committed to defence to meet the challenges of operations, the solution lies very firmly with the Europeans and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the last NATO Secretary General, kept up the pressure on defence ministers in his commendably direct Danish way, making it clear that the challenges of the 21st century will not go away while we fix our economies. All Allies, he would say regularly, need to start planning now for better times: *'Failing to plan is planning to fail'*. The fact is that defence has taken a disproportionate share of the cuts, so we risk placing our military and political credibility at risk as an Alliance, while Europe risks also becoming a global spectator.

Has the NATO Summit addressed this issue? I wonder. Does a ten-year aspiration to try and spend 2% of GDP on defence pass the hollow laughter test? I think not. Linked to this, I would identify a reluctance from the bigger European nations, particularly the UK, France and Germany, to pick up the baton as another challenge. The UK posture, frankly, is increasingly hollow and certainly falls well short of the last Defence Secretary's line, that we define ourselves and I quote here, *'by the extent to which we punch above our weight'*. The reality is that with the departure from Helmand which we saw on the front pages yesterday, the UK will be one of the lowest contributors to NATO operations proportionate to the size of the Armed Forces.

I used to run a league table as Deputy SACEUR and the UK, post Helmand, together with France, sits at about position number 23 and 24. France is prepared to get stuck in - the speed and determination to get involved and do what it could to resolve the Mali problem was in many ways exemplary, but frankly, France is not so keen to contribute to NATO operations. Germany, in my league table, sat at about number 5. Interestingly, Italy was number 4. So Germany does commit a significant proportion of its Armed Forces to NATO operations and there is no doubt that Germany underpins NATO efforts in Kosovo and is certainly playing a major role (or planning to play a major role) in the post-ISAF Train, Advise, Assist mission in Afghanistan together with Italy, noting of course that the UK is hardly contributing anything to that. However, Germany still has constitutional issues about the application of lethal state force.

I think all this adds up to my third challenge, which is this European dependence on the United States. Libya in 2011 demonstrated unequivocally that NATO could *not* have done that operation, despite French and British political leadership, without United States enablers, such as ISR, tankers,

the early strikes of Odyssey Dawn and indeed, that no-fly zone could not have operated without significant American military hardware supporting it.

Now in military terms, it was all about strategic prioritisation between theatres, when you remember that the Americans were not only committed heavily in Afghanistan at that stage, but they also had a major operation on their hands to draw down the presence in Iraq. But in political terms, the view in Washington was that Libya is in the European backyard and that the Europeans would have to fix it.

Can Europe expect to be bailed out again? Well, I think probably yes, *in extremis*, because European defence remains strategically vital to the United States' strategic national interests. However, we should not count on it and we should recognise the shift in US thinking, which is illustrated by an increasing Presidential reluctance to commit overseas and a stated, even if not over-apparent, pivot to the Asia-Pacific region. The reality is that budget, debt, together with significant force reductions in recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews, mean that an economy of force approach will have to apply for the United States as much as for everybody else.

My fourth challenge is Article V weaknesses and I think we have seen that writ large this year with the invasion of Crimea, the Ukraine crisis and unprecedented levels of Russian military activity in the Baltic region, all highlighting the vulnerability of the Alliance in this respect.

So we need to ask ourselves some hard questions and be honest in answering them, and I will come back to the extent to which the NATO Summit has addressed this in my look at NATO's future.

Then there is NATO and the European Union. You would think that, with the common membership of many NATO nations within the EU, relations between the two would be pretty easy and pretty harmonious. But I am afraid the reality is that that is often not the case. Certainly at the strategic level and certainly as the Strategic Co-ordinator between EU and NATO, it was immensely frustrating that the Berlin Plus mechanism for co-operation, co-ordination and mutual support between the two international organisations is frankly dead in the water. At the tactical level, co-operation between NATO and the European Union generally works. For example, in Bosnia on the ground (actually in Bosnia, the second largest force contributor to a European Union operation is of course, Turkey, not self-evidently an EU member). And in the anti-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa, Atalanta and NATO's Ocean Shield work very well together, not least because the Atalanta operational headquarters is co-located at the Permanent Joint Headquarters in Northwood.

However, it is a tragedy that Berlin Plus, under which the European Union can call upon NATO planning and other capabilities to support EU operations, is, as I say, dead in the water because of the political problems of the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, etc.

On top of this, I would say that the security challenges we face in the 21st century desperately need a reverse Berlin Plus under which NATO can call upon the EU for support with soft power, civil reconstruction, financial and governance expertise, which the European Union possesses in abundance.

And just while on the EU, I think we should recognise and note and give much greater credit to the EU than is normally given for its hugely positive impact on security in the Western Balkans, because

there is no question in my mind that much of the better behaviour and positive aspects that we see there, particularly the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia for comprehensive normalisation, is very much down to the magnet of EU membership.

And the final challenge, in terms of the challenges that I am going to deal with today, is a military issue, which is the point about force capability. NATO, as a result of two decades effectively of stabilisation operations in the Balkans and most recently of course, in Afghanistan, is over-structured for stabilisation operations. I do not doubt the extraordinary level of real combat experience that exists in most NATO nations, certainly in those NATO nations that have been engaged in combat in Afghanistan, but there is no question that our capacity for high-end thinking and action in all environments, by sea, by land, and in the air, has withered, as have the levels and frequency of training and exercises needed to achieve and maintain credible high-end capabilities.

But it is not all gloom and doom. Let's look at some of the strengths and I think here, operational success is the best measure. Only NATO is capable of doing or having done Afghanistan. Only NATO could have done Libya and I think both operations underscore how relevant NATO is today. No other organisation is better suited to integrating multinational contributions into an effective operational force. NATO's command structure provides a standing command and control capability that can be used and adapted to address complex situations. NATO doctrine and planning procedures are very effective and indeed, are being increasingly adopted by the European Union.

I think it is pretty remarkable that 28 nations can come together and agree common campaign planning doctrine, train senior officers in it, and make it actually happen and you only have to contrast, particularly in the Libyan context, the 13 days it took between signing UN Security Council Resolution 1973 in New York to NATO taking on the complete operation to protect the Libyan population. When you compare that, for example, with the efforts NATO undertook to take on the no-fly zones in the Balkans in Bosnia and then subsequently in Kosovo, it was a significant improvement.

It is all about slick decision-making, despite, it has to be said, some almost acrimonious exchanges in the North Atlantic Council initially, as a result of major differences between nations, but those major differences were resolved very quickly in a remarkably statesmanlike manner. It is also about highly capable staff work and staff agility, which delivered the planning process so quickly.

And what about Afghanistan? Well. Not perfect, of course, but I think we should recognise the successes of the last four years, despite the major challenges which ISAF faces and will no doubt face for its last couple of months of existence as an operation.

Whatever you may think about the strategy in Afghanistan in the early years of the campaign, certainly since at least 2009 and arguably since the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010, we have got it pretty right. There has been strategic clarity; that has translated into effective operational design in theatre, together with very resolute and capable tactical execution. The result of that strategy, which was all about ensuring that the Afghan security forces were capable of taking on the mission, has seen an exponential improvement in the confidence, the capability and the capacity of the ANSF.

When I started as DSACEUR, visiting and spending time in theatre regularly from the beginning of 2011, if I look over those three years, the speed and pace with which the Afghans were prepared

to take up the baton, was remarkable. Yes, there are still gaps, notably air power, and yes, it will depend on continuing support, but, subject to a couple of caveats, I have confidence that the ANSF can hold the ring against the Taliban in what we should expect to be an ongoing insurgency and the caveats are these:

1. The ANSF will continue to need support, training and assistance and it will need to be done properly. There will be a NATO Training, Advise, Assist mission called Resolute Support and that will move seamlessly from the ISAF mission into the new mission which starts on 1st January, but it will need to be done properly and it may need to be done for some time. So I think we should be concerned that President Obama has time-limited it to two years and I think we should be mindful of what happened with the Iraq training mission when that was withdrawn precipitately in 2011, albeit due to the Iraqi Parliament more than anything else.
2. The second major caveat is the need for continued support and funding from the international community in order to protect the gains made to date and we should remember, we should look back in history. It was not in 1989 that Afghanistan collapsed into civil war when the Soviets left, it was in 1992 when the Soviet Union collapsed and the money dried up.

And just on Afghanistan as well, another key point to make is that Alliance cohesion, effectively its source of strength or centre of gravity, has remained remarkably firm despite some awesome challenges, particularly from the rash of insider killings.

As far as opportunities are concerned, there are a couple of points to make here.

Firstly, reform of the NATO Command Structure. I will not say much about that, suffice it to say that I think particularly at the strategic level and in SHAPE we have seen some really quite revolutionary measures and moves to apply and operationalise a comprehensive approach and to establish the linkages with other non-military organisations with whom NATO needs to operate.

And that really leads onto the second point which is: it is all about partnerships. NATO is a regional organisation, but the security challenges it faces are global. We have seen the strategic importance of partnerships in Libya and Afghanistan. In the Libyan operation, four Arab nations were key partners, which gave NATO much greater political credibility on the Arab street and those came in as a result of the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative and the Mediterranean Dialogue. And of course in Afghanistan, some 22 partner nations all added capability and credibility to the operation from as far afield as Finland and Sweden in the north, Australia and New Zealand and Tonga in the south, El Salvador in the west, to Mongolia in the east. I think NATO needs to be more ambitious about how it deals with other international organisations, but partnership is definitely the flavour of the future.

What about the future? Can NATO meet the challenges? Well, I guess it all depends on what those challenges are and I think there is no question, in a sense, that NATO is moving into a new paradigm now. If the first model for NATO was NATO Cold War version 1.0 - meeting the existential threat and protecting Western Europe from the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - the second model is how the Alliance has met the demands of two decades of enduring expeditionary commitments in the Balkans, Iraq and most recently, in Afghanistan.

NATO now faces an unstable and dangerous world where the only certainty is uncertainty. And I

think there are two aspects to this.

The first is defence. How does NATO ensure that the airspace, sea lines of communication and territorial integrity of the Alliance is defended, particularly in a world which is different from the Cold War world - we still think in Cold War terms very often, we look at Article V through Cold War spectacles. The reality of the sort of asymmetric undermining the integrity of a state that we have seen practised so successfully and professionally by the Russians in Crimea and then latterly in eastern Ukraine, is something that NATO is going to have to get its head around.

Then there is security. How does the Alliance contribute with and through regional partners to an arc of secure and stable states along its periphery, and indeed further afield if necessary? How does it prevent and contain crises through co-operative security instead of dealing with the complexities of post-crisis reconstruction?

As far as defence is concerned, we face a new situation in Europe and the West, following Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea and the continued civil war in Ukraine. Certainly NATO is guilty of sending ambiguous signals, particularly the promise of NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest Summit in 2008. But NATO, I would argue, has also been assiduous in looking to build a strategic partnership with Russia, despite Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008. Arguably the West has, by returning so quickly to 'business as usual' after that invasion, sent a green light to Russia that aggression in its near abroad is okay.

However, the invasion and annexation of Crimea and subsequent events in Ukraine have, for the moment, shattered any thought of partnership. The reality now is regrettably that Russia is a strategic adversary. And I think we need to look at Mr. Putin's words in the Kremlin on 18th March, a hyper-nationalistic speech which sent a dangerous message. While not necessarily explicit, the intent is implicit: that what Mr. Putin has previously described as the greatest disaster of the 20th century, the collapse of the Soviet Union, can only be put right by re-establishing Russian power in the former Republics of the Soviet Union, the near abroad. The pretext? Re-uniting ethnic Russian speakers under the banner of Mother Russia.

Well, of course, potentially that poses a direct threat to NATO territorial integrity, notably in the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania with their significant Russian-speaking populations.

So to avoid Russia setting itself on a collision course with NATO, a strong message needs to be sent: thus far perhaps - but absolutely no further. For NATO, this means refocusing on Collective Defence, the foundation upon which NATO is built. It means a return to deterrence (both nuclear and conventional), with credible, capable armed forces and the means to communicate that capability. It means a reinforced continuous presence in the Baltic States and a credible reinforcement capability to meet any challenges in the Baltic States and it means increased defence spending by Allies. Did the latest NATO Summit achieve this? It certainly said the right things, but I think the jury will remain out until we see the substance of the measures agreed.

Russia, of course, faces many of the same strategic challenges as NATO nations, particularly Islamic jihadism, so the imperative to rebuild the partnership should be uppermost in our minds as a priority because at the end of the day, it is in all our interests to find ways of living together and I think NATO needs to recognise this and send two messages.

First, not only that it is prepared to defend its own space and hold up a very large 'stop' sign, but secondly, that it recognises Russia's concerns about NATO expansion and has no further thoughts of expansion into what Russia perceives as its vital strategic space and that is going to require some pretty deft political and diplomatic footwork plus careful co-ordination with the European Union.

The second big challenge of the future is security and you only have to look at that arc of insecurity running west from Iraq, Syria, Israel, Palestine, the Maghreb, and then into sub-Saharan Africa from AQ franchises and offshoots, whether Islamic State, al-Nusra, Boko Haram or Al Shabaab, to see the scale of the problem. And as if that is not enough, the potential for West African states to collapse in chaos as a result of the Ebola plague needs to be very much on our radar screen.

Three points here. Firstly, if the Islamic State is the apocalyptic threat that certainly the Prime Minister portrayed in his article in a recent Sunday paper, then it needs to be confronted and it needs a proper strategy. It needs international engagement, it needs regional engagement and it needs the application of all the levers of power: diplomatic, economic, reconstruction, yes of course military, but above all, political, and the question remains - and it is an open question - as to whether we have yet seen that.

Secondly, NATO needs the ability to respond, if necessary, to a threat to our security. So it needs a credible and capable reserve force. The NATO Response Force has yet to demonstrate that it is credible and that is down to nations to be prepared to pony up the right sort of capabilities.

Thirdly, much better than responding to a crisis with a hugely expensive military commitment such as we have seen in Afghanistan or Iraq, is heading off a problem in the first place, building upstream security. This means it is in NATO nations' - and therefore the Alliance's - interests, to contribute to comprehensive capacity building. So, governance, law and order, administration, education, health and professional military forces, as a contribution to state stability. Here, partnership is absolutely the key. This is not only a cross-governmental effort within NATO nations, it is a regional and a partnership issue for the Alliance as well. Not only Allies, but international and regional partners and regional organisations and, I would say, potentially the private sector, because it is in the interests of all to see security, stability and ultimately prosperity prevail and this, I suggest, is the strategic challenge of the age.

Is NATO relevant in this new situation and does it have a future? Absolutely it is relevant because pooling all our efforts is better than trying to do it alone. NATO will never be a perfect alliance, but if the nations are prepared to commit themselves - and that is a big 'if' - and do what needs to be done, even if it is only a 60% or 70% solution, then the Alliance definitely has a future, because there is no other organisation like it in the world.

Thank you for your attention and I am happy to take any questions.

FROM THE EBOLA VIRUS TO ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: DO WE FACE A GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY CRISIS?

Transcript of a lecture by Professor Jeremy Farrar OBE

18th November 2014

Jeremy Farrar is Director of the Wellcome Trust. Before joining the Trust, he was Director of the Oxford University Clinical Research Unit in Vietnam, where his research interests were infectious diseases, tropical health and emerging infections. He has contributed to 500 peer-reviewed scientific papers and has served on several World Health Organization advisory committees. Jeremy was appointed OBE in 2005 for services to tropical medicine, and he has been awarded the Memorial Medal and the Ho Chi Minh City Medal by the Government of Vietnam, the Frederick Murgatroyd Prize for Tropical Medicine by the Royal College Physicians and the Bailey Ashford Award by the American Society for Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences.

Thank you very much. I know everybody starts a talk with this, but from a young child, growing up in a very liberal background, with parents from Hebden Bridge, to come and give a talk here at the National Liberal Club is a real privilege: thank you very much for the invitation and I hope the next 25 or so minutes will be of some interest and I hope it will stimulate some discussion.

We scientists - which is what I am - often talk too much within our own communities and we do not reach out and listen to a broader community, so the collective wisdom of the people in this room is very useful for me to engage with and be challenged by. We face a critical time globally in so many ways, our global institutions, their governance and the equitable sharing of our planet. I would like to come back to that issue at the end and open it up for a discussion.

I am very proud of the fact that I have both an OBE from the Queen and also the Ho Chi Minh Medal. I think I am right in saying I am the only individual in the world who holds both of those honours at the same time and I will not say which I value more highly - I am of course hugely honoured to receive both!

I spent most of my life not in the UK - just to give you a little bit of my own biography: I was born in Asia. I did not come to this country until I was a teenager and actually when I first came, I came by boat, and that has very important ramifications for something I am going to go on and talk about. I got on a boat in Asia, came up through the Suez Canal and arrived at the Port of Southampton some six to eight weeks later. If I had got on with the lurgy, whatever the lurgy might have been, I would have died or at best recovered by the time I landed at Southampton's famous docks and I would not have passed it on to the rest of you. That world has now changed and yet many of our structures and organisations, nationally and globally, are not yet adapted to a world where things will happen on a much faster timeline and with far greater reach than they did just one generation ago.

I came to this country after having lived across Asia and I spent seven very wonderful years -

although it seems odd to say this today - living in Libya; and so experienced the world with both an Asian and a Middle Eastern heritage, which has been a huge influence on me and my career.

I trained in medicine in London, then in neurology in Edinburgh, Melbourne, Oxford and San Francisco, then in the middle of a talk like this to a group of neurologists, I decided that I did not want to work neurology for the next forty years and left for Vietnam thinking I might be away for two to three years and 18 years later, I finally came back to the United Kingdom.

So you are seeing somebody now who has not been in this country for 18 years and has spent much less than half my life in the UK. I have to say that it is a much better country today than it was when I left, and I do not know if those two things are linked with my departure or not, but it is much better: it is more optimistic, has a much more positive attitude, is more liberal and accommodating of diversity. I know when you have been in this country all the time, you tend to see the overcrowding on the Tube, the weather or whatever it is that you see every day, but actually, when you step back from it, it is a better country today than it was when I left.

I spent my life in Vietnam over the last 18 years, living and working in a Vietnamese government hospital and focused on infectious diseases and about ten or eleven years ago now, when Asia and Canada was affected by SARS, I became very interested in emerging infectious threats.

Now SARS has been forgotten, but it is critically important to remember that none of us have any idea where SARS went to: we have no idea where that virus went, why it came, why it disappeared, we do not understand its origins, we do not understand why it was circulating. We got lucky with SARS because of the way it was transmitted - we were able to put in place public health interventions that helped to bring it to an abrupt end. It has not returned.

The UK, for some reason which has never been clear to me, did not have a single patient with SARS. But in Asia and Canada it was very nasty. The impact on society in China particularly, and in Vietnam, and in Canada was profound and that changed my professional outlook and from then on, my focus was on emerging infections. If we go back to the dreadful epidemic of SARS virus a decade ago, and now look forward to today, we do not know where the virus has gone. It is still present in animal populations in China, we do not have a vaccine, we do not have a treatment, and if there was a SARS case tomorrow, we would not know how we would prevent or treat it and that is a serious gap in our global health security.

Although the current problem with Ebola in West Africa is clearly a crisis and it should not be seen in any other way, I do not believe we are yet in an absolutely disastrous crisis. I do not like terms like 'we're in a war on X or Y'. We need a much calmer, long-term view of these issues, because the inherent problems are not short term. There may be short-term fixes to this or that, but tomorrow there will be another issue, and we have to step back and take a longer-term perspective.

Of course much of my work has been in the developing world, but the two subjects I want to talk about today, antimicrobial resistance and emerging infections, are actually part of the same issue, they will affect everyone and globally they are a huge problem.

We forget that my mother's generation - my mother is hale and hearty, but she was born in an era with no antibiotics and no one in this room, I suspect, remembers that era. But if you talk to

somebody of my mother's generation, it was traumatic how many young children died. I was at the British Museum for breakfast this morning and there is a wonderful exhibit of mummies from Egypt - if you have not been to that exhibition yet, please do - and you look at the scans, and as a doctor you just cannot help but notice the teeth abscesses, the bone infections, many of which probably did lead to their deaths, because even relatively minor infections were totally untreatable.

We have forgotten what a critical class of drugs these are and of course they came about at a similar time when we were improving public health in the developed world and we were also starting to implement vaccines. Those together - vaccines and public health, and antimicrobial agents - have had a massive impact and allowed modern medicine from hip surgery to diabetic care to chemotherapy to save countless lives.

As a young doctor here in London, I worked through the start of the HIV epidemic in the early 1980s - I was a junior doctor in St. Stephen's Hospital on the Fulham Road. That was an era when we saw 22-year olds, 23-year olds, 32-year olds, mostly male, young, individuals coming in and dying of an infectious disease that we had no capacity to treat, and we and society was scared of. That is within my professional working life. The thought of HIV drug resistance should keep us all awake (not awake at night because everyone deserves their sleep), but it should at least be at the forefront of our minds. This is within my own professional life, of which I hope I have still got 15 or so years' more, not in some far off time in history.

So the combination of vaccines, of public health and antimicrobial agents has had a huge impact and we have come to be complacent about this class of drugs. Eighty per cent of all antibiotics we give are given to animals, although the European Union has officially banned that use. But since the ban, there has not been any significant reduction in antimicrobial use in many countries and in Europe and in North America, they are still massively used. So the human element of antimicrobial use is actually small compared to their use in the animal sector.

The impact in terms of economic costs (and I know costs are critical, even if you think beyond health) runs into the billions in the developed world. But the impact on societies in the developing world is even greater, so that for instance, Thailand, which is not a low income country, has more deaths than North America from resistant infections, purely because the levels of resistance are growing faster in some of those developing economies where they do not yet have the regulatory mechanisms in place. You can get antimicrobial drugs from any pharmacy, on any street corner, and now people have got the money to start being able to afford them, with no controls in place. So what is happening in Thailand today, what is happening in West Africa today, is of direct relevance to us tomorrow and we should not disconnect ourselves from those issues.

On emerging infections, although we think today in terms of Ebola because it is a critical issue and it is on the front page of every newspaper, but if you just look in this year 2014, we have many other emerging infections challenging often fragile health systems.

MERS is a SARS-like virus circulating in the Middle East, and it has done so for two years now. We do not know where it has come from, we do not know how many individuals have been affected, we have no vaccine, we have no treatment. We do not know whether what is happening in Saudi Arabia at the moment is what was happening in Southern China before SARS broke out, where a virus has jumped across from an animal species, is learning to adapt to humans and starts to

then go between you and me. That is what happened to HIV in the 1920s and 1930s. It is what happened to SARS ten years ago, and we do not know if what is happening in the Middle East at the moment is going to lead to that, and the sharing of information and the sharing of data is still not where it should be.

As well as so-called MERS-CoV, this SARS-like virus in the Middle East, we have Ebola in West Africa of course, we have major epidemics in small children in South East Asia at the moment called Hand, Foot, and Mouth Disease, a new emerging infection also now affecting North America, there is an infection called Nipah in South Asia causing severe infection of the brain and what we do not know is how many of these national or regional epidemics will go on to something really big and spread globally.

We do not understand that species barrier between humans and animals and sadly, the species barrier is not complete. Way back in time of course, we shared an evolutionary history with primates, with other animals and therefore there is a rudimentary bit of that in all of us and the chicken viruses out of South East Asia, like bird flu (which I was very involved in) and like SARS, still can find a home in us because we have some of those same proteins that came through evolution.

You will all have seen the film *Contagion* or at least you will have heard of it – it is actually not that bad a film. I was not seeking this, but I have been in the middle of SARS, I was in the middle of bird flu, I was in the middle of the pandemic in Mexico in 2009 and I have been very involved in Ebola, and I can promise you that in the early phases of those epidemics, it is really terrifying to be there, at the bedside, looking after patients when you know you do not have complete protection. It is very like the *Contagion* film, frightening.

A very good friend of mine, Carlo Urbani, the WHO Representative in Hanoi, was the individual who stopped the spread of SARS in Vietnam. He realised in the hospital in Vietnam that something odd was happening and a number of people were getting a respiratory infection and passing it on - to their next-door neighbour and they were passing it on to healthcare workers - and he made an unbelievably brave decision, that he would close the hospital and he persuaded the hospital authorities not to let anybody in or out and in doing so, stopped the SARS epidemic in Vietnam. As a result, Vietnam did not suffer, other than in that single hospital, and tragically he lost his life leaving a wife and three young children. We all knew that and we were all working in that environment and so, when you see on your television screens the bravery (and I do not include myself in this) of those individuals on the Ebola front line today, it is absolutely to be respected because I promise you, it is very scary.

The other thing is the speed that these things happen: if you do not intervene early and act quickly, you really pay the price later. So we allowed SARS to develop too long in China – China did not admit in 2003 that it had a problem. China has changed significantly and there is no doubt China would acknowledge it today, but unfortunately in the Middle East there has not been sufficient sharing of information about what we are seeing with MERS at the moment.

In West Africa, we knew that there was a start of an Ebola breakout in January and yet actually, collectively, and I include myself in this, we did not respond until June/July/August. Even today, almost a year into the epidemic, you can see that certainly in Sierra Leone and in Guinea the epidemic continues to rise and is devastating these countries.

We have an ability to pick things up around the world now and China has led this and should be recognised for that. There is a willingness to share and surveillance is better - we will pick up drug resistance happening in Cambodia in a way that we would not have done ten years ago. We will pick up that Ebola is happening in West Africa in March/April of this year, so we are better at that. But what we have not done is worked out as a global community how we are going to respond. So we have been passive: we are better at picking things up, but we do not have a global governance structure that allows us to act and we certainly do not have a global governance structure that allows us to act decisively.

Take the pandemic influenza of 2009, which I appreciate that many saw and criticised as an overreaction. There is a square kilometre in Mexico City where there are four hospitals and in March 2009, those hospitals (and I was there) were over-full. Every intensive care bed was full, every ward was full to overflowing, and they were full of young people and many pregnant women.

I can promise you, when you looked at that epidemic in March 2009, it looked to all the world as if this was going to be a very nasty 1918-style pandemic which as everyone knows, killed more people than died in the First World War, and you know how quickly you can transmit that round the world now, you do not have to get on a boat to come to Southampton, you can be in Mexico ten hours from now. With that ability to circulate, from what I saw Mexico in March/April 2009, it looked to me, I have to admit, that this was going to be that pandemic that we have all sort of been preparing for.

Now in retrospect, it is easy to say 'we overreacted' and I would be the first to step up and say 'yes, that's true', but I would rather we overreacted occasionally than under-reacted, which is what we are doing today in terms of Ebola. I think that we as a community have to have a thicker skin and just accept that we will occasionally get it wrong.

Influenza is one of those really nasty infections that really, genuinely could do huge damage globally. Ebola will not do that unless it changes, because it is very difficult for me to give you Ebola, unless you come into contact with my bodily fluids, but although Ebola will not cause a global pandemic it is causing absolute devastation in three countries of West Africa. But if that cough in the third row were a nasty respiratory infection, influenza or SARS, it would easily go to the person you are sitting next to, to the person you stand next to on the Tube, because coughing over people and onto surfaces is how infectious diseases are easily transmittable. A respiratory infection spread by coughing is the one we should all most worry about.

So flu is one I do worry about, but if you ask the questions: after 2009, do we know which flu vaccine works and could we develop a new vaccine within the next few weeks and deploy it globally? We could not. Do we know how to treat a patient who comes to a hospital with influenza? We do not. Was the British government right to stockpile Tamiflu or was it not right (and you will have heard all the arguments about whether Tamiflu works or not)? We have not even answered those fundamental questions.

When I talk to family members or friends who are not in the medical profession and I say that we do not actually have a vaccine that could stop an influenza pandemic tomorrow and we do not know whether to treat and how to treat somebody with which drug, at which dose, for how long, to prevent them getting complications or stop them dying, people look at you as if that is mad.

We missed the opportunity in 2009 to address that and I think largely we missed it because of the over-regulated, complex structures that we have put around research such that, during an epidemic, we cannot conduct that critical life-saving research.

Going on to Ebola now, we have managed the Ebola outbreak as if we were in 1976 when Ebola first arrived and was first recognised. The Democratic Republic of Congo in 1976 looked very different to West Africa today. People lived largely in village communities and they did not travel very far. The average person with Ebola in 1976 spoke to nine other people in their community on a daily basis, so you had to follow the contacts of nine others from one person infected.

In today's Ebola outbreak, in the capitals of West Africa, that is 125. It is bigger than this room - you cannot follow, you cannot survey, you do not have the resources to look after that number, so the thought that we can address the Ebola issue of West Africa today using effectively 19th century intervention measures of quarantine and washing hands and wearing a face mask is wrong. We have to combine 21st century medicine and science, we have to bring that to bear alongside classic public health and we have to combine all these together, if we are going to be able to address the issues that we face today.

We should not think antimicrobial resistance is only limited to infectious diseases, it affects modern surgery too. We will probably all need to have surgery at some point and that would become extraordinarily difficult if your risk of infection was higher because of drug resistance and surgery is always based on a risk/benefit ratio. If it is very safe, you can do it to everybody. If it is not very safe, you think twice before you do it, so you do not go into it.

Cancer treatment would be impossible without antimicrobial agents. Many of you will remember HIV coming into the western world and the devastation it caused to sub-Saharan Africa. I honestly doubt there will be an HIV vaccine in my working life, and we are not going to change the behaviour of everybody, particularly in the way HIV is transmitted - you cannot stop people having sex, so you are going to be reliant on antiviral drugs to control the epidemic and that is what the major breakthrough was when I was a junior doctor.

We have turned round malaria in the last decade because of impregnated bed nets and antimalarial drugs; both of those are now suffering from drug resistance. It is not just a health issue because the impact on societies is huge if young children and if pregnant women are affected, if people of working age are not at work but off sick because of the impact of infections or complications of surgery. So this has an implication, not just in medicine, but terms of the economy of countries and the broader society.

We are at a critical stage when in my view, our interconnectivity is greater, and yet we have come to undervalue our global institutions. We have become more nationalistic and inward-looking. Although I am one of the biggest critics of the World Health Organization and the United Nations in their abilities to respond, we do need a robust and equitable global governance of health such that we are not always reliant on the single superpower, the United States. We do need to acknowledge that we have common ground and shared values and say 'health is an issue for all of us', because what happens tomorrow in Jakarta or in Mexico or in Beijing or in London affects somebody everywhere else and will do, because there is massive movement and speed of movement of people all around the world. That drug resistance in Delhi is going to come to London and will come

to University College Hospital or St. Thomas' Hospital; that drug resistance here in London will move to Beijing – it is inevitable.

So despite their failings we have to get back to both respecting and supporting the global organisations that were set up soon after the devastation of the Second World War, including the World Health Organization. But we cannot do that, in my view, without reform of those organisations. They have become massively bureaucratic. It is true that the powerful countries in this world, which is largely countries within Europe and North America, have deliberately sought to have weak leadership in those organisations. If we want weak organisations, we should put weak leaders there, but if we want strong organisations, we should make sure the best people are there to drive those organisations and it is in our interests to make sure those organisations are properly supported and are as strong as they can be.

The World Health Organization's funding to respond to epidemics over the last five years has been reduced by over 40%. The overall organisation has lost 30% of its funding. We are not valuing these global organisations. We are becoming too insular and nationalistic in our thinking but at this time, with such global connectedness we have to be more global in our perspective. That cannot happen without reform. The World Health Organization is not fit for purpose in its current format and it needs to evolve. It is a 1947/1948 organisation trying to deliver in the 21st century, and it is not able to do that, the world has changed so much.

We need to make sure that we work together to try and change these things for the better, because they are critically important, whether it be to drug resistance, whether it be to emerging infections, whether it be the other great challenges of our time - they are not something that will happen to other people and not to us. We are truly all in this together, and the noble traditions of the liberal movement and the ethos of values of the National Liberal Club are as important today as at their founding.

And with that, I will stop. I am happy to take any questions and answers. Thank you very much.

THE SHIFTS AND THE SHOCKS: WHAT WE'VE LEARNED - AND HAVE STILL TO LEARN - FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

Transcript of a lecture by Martin Wolf CBE

9th December 2014

Martin Wolf is Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator at the *Financial Times*, London. He was awarded the CBE in 2000 for services to financial journalism. He was a member of the UK government's Independent Commission on Banking between June 2010 and September 2011. Mr Wolf was joint winner of the Wincott Foundation senior prize for excellence in financial journalism for 1989 and 1997. He won the 'Accenture Decade of Excellence' at the Business Journalist of the Year Awards of 2003. He won the 'Commentator of the Year' award at the Business Journalist of the Year Awards of 2008. He won the Ludwig Erhard Prize for economic commentary for 2009. He won 'Commentariat of the Year 2009' at the Comment Awards, sponsored by Editorial Intelligence. He won the Overseas Press Club of America's prize for 'best commentary on international news in any medium' for 2013. His most recent publications are 'Why Globalization Works' (Yale University Press, 2004), 'Fixing Global Finance' (Washington D.C: Johns Hopkins University Press, and London: Yale University Press, 2008 and 2010) and 'The Shifts And The Shocks: What We've Learned – And Have Still To Learn – From The Financial Crisis' (London and New York: Allen Lane, 2014).

Thank you very much for the invitation. I am very pleased to be here to talk to you about my book and the implications of this crisis and I am very happy to discuss those implications further.

I suspect most of you here are predominantly interested in international security and foreign policy issues, but I hope that I really do not need to persuade you, after the events of the last ten years at least, that economic crises and financial crises have a great deal of bearing on the things that you are concerned about.

For a very long time I have been giving lectures, almost on an annual basis, to the Royal College of Defence Studies, to an almost entirely, not exclusively, military audience and my lecture always starts by saying why economics is the most important single thing that military strategists should be thinking about. It is the ultimate determinant of everything in the modern world and I think the crisis is a pretty clear demonstration of this.

Unfortunately, the crisis also shows - and I will come to this in a moment - the failures and failings of my profession. I was an economist before I became a journalist and before I explain what I am going to talk about, I am going to start with a very apposite quote which I discovered when I was looking into depressions. I think the quote comes from the 1930s, but I have not yet found out whose quote it was, but it goes as follows:

'Such a severe depression and banking crisis could not have been achieved by normal civil servants and politicians, it required active economists' involvement.'

I think that is true in this case, unfortunately.

I am going to ask a series of questions, as I am prone to do. I am going to ask why you should care about the crisis; why it happened; what have we done with it; what should be done; and finally, briefly, what are some of the geopolitical consequences, what are some of the things that are of interest to you. I believe that in a number of respects, this has changed our world from the world we thought we were in ten or fifteen years ago.

So why should you care? It seems pretty obvious, but let me just remind you. There is one very clear indicator that we are not back to normal or anything we would regard as normal after the crises which became obvious in 2007 and 2008 and are still ongoing, particularly in the Eurozone (it has not yet emerged from crisis conditions) and even in the US and UK, and that is the monetary policy of our central banks.

As I have said many, many times, as long as they continue to supply money to their banks and they are prepared to lend to their banks at zero interest rates, we are very, very far from a normal economic situation. That is really very obvious and we have been in this essentially free money situation for six years now in the developed world. The European Central Bank (ECB) resisted, but it is now there too, so there is now no central bank of the four major central banks of the developed world which lends to the banking sector at more than 0.5% (and this niggardly central bank that lends at 0.5% is ours, the Bank of England). All the others are below and I am not even talking about the balance sheet expansions - I will not have time to go into them and their implications, but perhaps we can discuss that in questions.

Just to put this in context, and it is particularly interesting in the case of the UK because the Bank of England is very old - I think it is the second oldest central bank in the world - we have data on bank rate as it used to be called and now base rate going back to the late 17th century, and over that entire period, prior to this crisis, the Bank of England never lent at less than 2%.

So this is a genuinely different world. Obviously in crisis circumstances, world wars and so forth, the financial arrangements were rather peculiar, but that was the norm. So this is an extraordinary crisis and we are very, very clearly still in it. It has had very, very large economic consequences.

Without going into the details of how far the shortfalls in GDP I am going to discuss relative to trend were: 1) due to the way we handled the crisis; 2) due to the crisis; or 3) due to what the debt increases before the crisis masked - these are three possibilities, all of the developed world without exception now has economies that are extraordinarily much smaller than anyone imagined in say, 2005 or 2006. Roughly speaking it varies, but for the major economies, in the UK case, the economy is now about 18% smaller than if the pre-crisis trends had continued and in the US it is much the same. In the Eurozone as a whole, it is about 15% smaller, mainly because the pre-crisis trend was so weak and I am not even going to talk about Italy.

So the losses are extraordinarily large and at the moment, the UK is the only economy to have regained pre-crisis growth rates. No economy - and I mean none - has regained pre-crisis rates of growth and productivity. So as we are now, we are permanently poorer in a very big way compared to how we thought we would be at this point in 2005 or 2006. One of the consequences of that, which is pretty obvious from last week, is we all have to a greater or lesser degree, fiscal problems,

which are really just about how we share out these losses. Who bears the consequences? How do we distribute the consequences of these losses?

The final reason why I think this crisis is incredibly important, is, of course, that it was not expected. Now I mean by this something relatively precise, and I am talking about economies and economic policymakers, so the dominant thinkers about these issues, in Treasury, central banks, the IMF, the OECD, the *Financial Times*, academics and so forth. I do not mean that they failed to forecast that a crisis like this would start in the summer of 2007. I do not think financial crises are forecastable in that sense and if they were, in that precise sense, it is pretty clear we would behave in such a way as to prevent them.

The problem is not that the crisis was not forecast. The problem was - and is - that to these policymakers, a crisis of this scale was inconceivable. That is a much more important failure. It is like living on an earthquake fault - living on the San Andreas Fault and being shocked that there was an earthquake. We know that there is going to be an earthquake on the San Andreas Fault, even if you cannot forecast precisely when it will happen. We did not know before the crisis. We did not know. And while I was pretty clear that the trends we had before the crisis could not continue and I wrote about that, I certainly did not expect essentially the dissolution of the financial sector. I think it is important to understand that in September and October 2008, the core financial sector, the core financial system of the western world, essentially fell to pieces. It required the comprehensive backing of our states and central banks to keep it together and to restore confidence. It was a staggeringly wide-ranging and significant panic.

The second question I want to address is: why on earth did this happen? That is a core part of my book, it is not a simple part, but I will explain what I think happened. My argument is that it was the interaction between two shifts that led to the shocks, and that is why I called it *'The Shifts And The Shocks'*, a title by the way that I stole from some friends of mine, and I give due credit in the acknowledgements.

The first thing that I think happened, which is very surprising and is still not fully understood, was that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a worldwide fall in real interest rates on safe assets. I use a very simple indicator (I could use others, the IMF has made the same point) and that is index-linked gilts. The indicator matters less, what matters more is the scale - that real interest rates on safe assets almost halved from close to 4% to close to 2%.

That is a massive shift in the single most important price in financial markets and the immediate consequence of that (and you can see it almost immediately afterwards) is that in a number of very important markets, real long-term asset prices started rising, above all housing. That was exactly what you would expect - Mervyn King has discussed that - and it was an important trigger moment for the asset price boom that subsequently happened. I will come in a moment to how that linked with the financial sector and subsequent fragility.

Obviously a deep question is why this fall in real interest rates which has lasted since then - it has never reverted to 4% - continued until the crisis, of course, when the real interest rate fell to zero and we are living in a world where long-term real rates on safe assets are in the territory of zero. It is a very strange, very weird world and I am constantly surprised how rarely people talk about it, because it is such a strange world.

The standard theory to explain such a phenomenon is what Bernanke called a savings glut, but basically a massive shift worldwide in income towards desired savings and away from desired investment, globally, and I think that indeed was the driving force. This is not a monetary phenomenon – it is impossible to explain a fall in real interest rates over so long a period simply by monetary policy. I will come in a moment to what role monetary policy played.

I think there were basically two things happening. The first was the shift of the emerging world as a whole, initially East Asia and then the oil countries towards massive saving surpluses. So we got this very strange phenomenon of capital flowing net, with a desire for safe assets (very clearly what they wanted to buy), from the emerging world into the developed world - exactly the opposite of what most people would have expected to happen in a globalised world, which would, one would have thought, be a world in which capital would flow net from rich countries to poorer countries, as happened in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but that is not what happened. It went in the opposite direction. I do not have time to discuss why, but there were clearly policy choices involved in that outcome - decisions to intervene in asset markets, particularly exchange markets, accumulate foreign currency reserves and so forth.

At the same time, in a number of developed countries, the US certainly being the most important, there was a quite general shift in internal income distribution from labour to capital and within labour, towards capital and towards profits therefore, which had been exceptionally high, and towards very high incomes.

The profit share I think is probably the most significant element of this, because simultaneously after the dot-com bubble burst, investment propensities in most developed countries in the corporate sector declined. So the corporate sector of the West joined the Japanese corporate sector, which had been like that since 1990, in having higher retained earnings than it invests. It is accumulating financial assets from the rest of the economy instead of importing them.

Again, this is completely surprising. It is the opposite of what has been normally the case ever since we invented the corporate form, which is by and large, corporates in aggregate import savings from the rest of the economy (basically the household sector) and invest them, but we have been doing the opposite. And those are, I think, the core saving shifts.

Now, we had to find some way of balancing our economies macroeconomically in this situation, and we did not do it deliberately, but we had rising house prices, we had lots of savings coming in from the developing world and also from the corporate sector, in through their Treasuries, and there had to be something on the opposite side. By definition, there has to be something on the opposite side and there are only two possible things on the opposite side if the economy is to balance, and one is household borrowing and the other is government borrowing. And in the first round, up to 2007, it was dominated by household borrowing.

The financial sector, which had been liberalised progressively from 1980 onwards, particularly in the US, was fantastically brilliant at creating ways of channelling money to the household sector to spend much more than its income, backed essentially by the rising house prices that I have described. So this process worked best where you had a financial sector which was designed to do that. Our financial sector had been designed to do that. The American financial sector, even more interestingly (it is a very complicated structure), was designed to that, and so the macro balance

that we achieved came with an incredibly rapid growth, a credit largely collateralised against housing and commercial property overwhelmingly, with an amazing range of new assets invented. Then, when house prices started to peak, as they did in America in 2005 and later in Spain and other countries, the whole thing started to collapse and we had a panic which I have already described.

This, in approximately six minutes, has covered three chapters in my book and I hope it whets your appetite enough to look a bit further at my story as I have tried to tell it to you.

The whole thing collapsed. So what have we done since then? We used a range of unbelievable policies to sustain the system. I have already described the monetary policies which were extraordinary and remain extraordinary. This is crucial - we are desperately trying to get people to spend. We jumped immediately when the economy collapsed into huge fiscal deficits. Overwhelming. I discuss that in the book. In all the developed countries, these huge fiscal deficits were not the consequence of deliberate fiscal policy, they were the consequence simply of the crisis itself: namely, collapses in revenue that occurred because the housing sector collapsed, the profits of the financial sector collapsed and these were very revenue-rich.

The UK, being particularly dependent on revenues associated with these two sectors, suffered from particularly massive revenue shortfalls. Nominal GDP also collapsed, really very markedly. Since nominal spending was more or less given, it could not be changed overnight, and that jumped up spending relative to GDP very, very quickly.

And in an incredibly short period, we moved from (it depended on the country) modest deficits, 3% of GDP or so, or even in some cases surpluses, like Ireland and Spain. Ireland and Spain were running surpluses for years before the crisis and their net debt was down to really low levels. Ireland's net debt was about 10% of GDP, 11% to be precise, before the crisis. Spain's was about 20%, and then they shot up because the fiscal deficits exploded. This is exactly what Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff in their very, very important book, *'This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries Of Financial Folly'* predicted - you have these huge fiscal crises. But the fiscal policy supported the system, the government continued to spend, it ignored its revenue constraints, which is exactly what Keynes would have recommended and that helped turn around the immensely deep recession very quickly.

The financial system was backed in more ways than you can imagine and I cannot even begin to list all the ways we backed the financial sector, but the core of it is that immense amounts of capital were injected into the banking sectors in every country, notably here where RBS and Lloyds were rescued. RBS by the way, it is worth remembering, was the biggest bank in the world by assets at the time of the crisis. It is rather remarkable that that was permitted to happen. Lloyds, of course, was basically the consequence of the forced merger with HBOS.

In America, of course, they put in capital too. The liabilities of the banking sector of the entire western world were socialised and that sentence is correct. The liabilities of the entire financial system were socialised by explicit commitment of the governments and then, after a couple of years, we began to try and normalise policy. I do not have time to go through the Eurozone crisis, which is a very large part of my book, but it is a bit like this, but more complicated, because everything has to be agreed among all its members and of course, as you have probably noticed, it has been a sad story of just enough, far too late. So they are slowly getting to the right point,

but at this rate, it is going to take quite a number of years before they finally do and it is incredibly difficult.

Then we got into the reform process and that has been a very, very interesting process and I just want to summarise very briefly what I see as the core of what we have done in the reform process. Again, I am going to ignore the Eurozone because it is just too much for me to talk about reforms in the Eurozone within the time limits, because I want to stop in about five minutes. But essentially, the following things have happened.

The monetary policy system that we use today is, in terms of its objectives, exactly the same as the pre-crisis monetary policy system. There has been no change in terms of its core monetary objectives.

Inflation targeting: 2%. That remains the case. There has been a lot of discussion of different monetary policy rules and targets, but they have all been scrapped. There is an implication to the way I am putting this, which I will come to in a moment.

Fiscal policy: well, everybody knows that we are trying to tighten. We are tightening slowly, predominantly on spending, which is quite interesting, rather than tax increases. That is true in the US, it is true here and it is true in most of Europe. The fiscal reconstruction is a very long-term process and we have all suffered, to a greater or lesser extent, jumps in public debt. One of the legacies is a big jump in public debt and in some cases, staggering. Ireland has moved from a net debt ratio of about 10% of GDP to 110%, one of the more spectacular rises in world history, in a period of about five or six years. So the financial sector has demonstrated its capacity to break states. A lot of that (not all, by any means, but about a third of that) is because they guaranteed the entire financial sector.

The financial system. We have essentially the same financial system as before, but it is much more comprehensively regulated with far more comprehensive and detailed rules. In a famous paper which was delivered at the Jackson Hole Conference two years ago, Andy Haldane and a co-author said that at the rate they were going (and I have not checked since) the American financial sector rule book would end up at more than 30,000 pages and the European rule book would end up at 60,000 pages. If anybody thinks they know what is in it, I suspect they are wrong. It is remarkable, because I very rarely feel sympathy for the banks, but I really do not see how they can operate in those circumstances.

But essentially, apart from that, the financial system we have ended up with is the same as before except that it is more concentrated - the banks are more too big to fail, because so many of their competitors disappeared, particularly smaller competitors, and we rely for managing the system (and this is the one genuine innovation) on something called 'macroprudential policy', which is essentially the attempt of the all-wise regulators in the Bank of England and other central banks to tweak the entire system constantly in order to avoid it blowing us all up.

So we have developed an extraordinary relationship with the financial sector which we have, as far as I can see, with only one other sector of our economy, and that is the nuclear power industry and presumably for the same reason: we think these people have the capacity to blow us up, economically as it were. I think this is really a toxic relationship and it is a toxic situation that we

have now ended up in.

Now, what should be done? Well, I remain controversial in that I think, and I continue to think, that too much attention was paid particularly in 2010/2011/2012 to beginning the fiscal austerity rather than making sure that we got back to very, very strong demand growth as quickly as possible to minimise the longer-term damage of the crisis. That is now history and I have argued throughout that since government can borrow at 0% real for very long periods, really long periods, there simply will never be a better opportunity in our history for doing lots and lots of infrastructure building. We have done some, but nothing like enough and I think future generations will regret this. That applies particularly to the US and the UK and of course to many of the Eurozone countries.

There are some very big long-run questions here and I will just mention a couple. The first is: developing and emerging countries remain utterly terrified of being net importers of capital from us and as long as they remain terrified of this, because they associate that with crises, they will continue to manage their affairs so they export capital to us.

Since the Eurozone is also busily in the business of trying to develop a large current account surplus, because nobody is allowed to spend any money, that means that all the current account deficits in the world have a tendency to end up in the US and the UK. That has repercussions that, for some reason, the Treasury still does not understand, as I was trying to indicate in my comments on the Autumn Statement. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) however, does understand it, more or less. What it means is we have got to create another great big housing bubble in our economy and that is what we are doing and if that makes you feel happy about where we are, then you are in a different mental state from me, but that is what is happening.

This is very important and my implication of this is we really have to create a global system - and I am sure it is what Keynes would have argued for because it is what he did argue for - that gives developing countries that are net importers of capital, greater insurance against what is called 'sudden stops' in capital flows. The sort of thing that happened within the Eurozone, when capital just stopped flowing into countries like Portugal and Greece and Italy and Spain and Ireland.

And on finance, my view is that we need a deal in which, by making banks more robust and with better internal incentives, which is part of what we tried to do in the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) with ring-fencing, we can reduce the scale of intrusive interventions. To me, the simplest way of doing that - I discuss it at length, there are other more radical ways - is by increasing the capital of banks.

I would like to remind you, and I have just checked this so I am up to date, that the major British banks are now all leveraged about 25:1. Do not look at the risk-weighted capital ratios that they report - they are all based on assumptions about losses of different assets, which are almost certainly going to be proved wrong. Look at the actual leverage and what that means very, very simply is, if they lose 4% of the value of their balance sheet, they are bust. And there are not many complex financial institutions that can promise you safely they will never lose 4% of their balance sheet.

This is a fundamental problem with the banking sector and I discuss that at great length.

Finally, let me talk about the geopolitical consequences and then close.

I will mention five things that this crisis means which should interest people whose main interest is not economics, but geopolitics.

First, we are living, as of course you all know, because it is the great banality of our age, in a time of very rapid transition in relative economic power. It is comparable to, but the reverse of, what happened in the 19th century when the West, as we think of it now, rose from an already very substantial position of power to, by 1900, a position of absolutely overwhelming economic preponderance. This probably reached its apogee by about 1950, at which point, say, if you take the US on the one hand and China on the other, US GDP per head at common international prices was thirty times China's, so that was the extreme.

We are now in a period of very rapid transformation. Most of that transformation has occurred in the last twenty years. It is predominantly associated with China, but also to a significant degree with India and this crisis accelerated that and accelerated it so far that it will be interesting to see what its final implications are for China, because we just stopped growing and they went on growing, so obviously it accelerated this transition rather rapidly.

The second effect of this, and I do not think you can easily exaggerate it, is that we have had a profound loss of western prestige and influence. I spent the first ten years of my career working on developing countries at the World Bank and I have spent a lot of time visiting emerging and developing countries and although I am sure they are not that frank with me, I am a journalist, so I poke a bit. I tend to characterise the view they had of western countries on economic policymaking before the crisis as 'we really, really don't like you and we really, really have had enough of your lessons to us, but we sort of suspect you know what you're doing'. Well, I assure you, they do not think the latter any more. We have demonstrated pretty conclusively we do not. That is a pretty deep shift and it is particularly noticeable in China. So when we talk, they do not listen. It has been particularly true for the US and it will take quite a while for the US to regain this - and I am not even talking about all the foreign policy blunders. This is another category.

Third, there is a great deal of hidden resentment over unfair treatment. For example, the Asian countries were forced to do all sorts of very unpleasant things in the late 1990s because we told them they suffered from crony capitalism and all the rest of it, and they were told to cut their fiscal deficits and raise interest rates and so forth, and we did not do any of these things - and they have noticed. So they think our business is to give them unbelievably unpalatable medicine that weakens them and we do not do the same thing. I am not saying they are right - that is what they think.

The fourth implication of all this is that demands for rebalancing power in global institutions have risen and will rise further and we are doing an incredibly bad job of meeting them. In this respect, although the US is in the doghouse over its refusal to support the latest rebalancing in the IMF, which is the most important of these international monetary institutions, the Europeans are a much bigger problem because they have a much bigger and much more unwarranted share in the votes in these institutions. The result of that is that China essentially is going to create its own and that is a very, very unfortunate development which we could have avoided if we had not been so stupid.

And finally, about three or four years ago, we had a conference in New York and one of the panels

was on geopolitics, but it was mainly about economics, and one of the participants was Joe Nye, who many of you must know and must have read. He is a good friend of mine and I have great respect for him. The crisis was already a couple of years old and he said that one thing that he was quite sure of is that whatever happened, the US would never cut defence spending and I said, *'You are utterly wrong - it is certain you will cut defence spending and it is certain we will cut defence spending, because when this austerity hits, that's what's going to go'*.

Does anyone doubt that now?

Economics, as I said, is the basis of military power, both technologically and of course in terms of the resources people are prepared to devote to security. One of the results of this crisis is that the money is really, really tight, and one of the most fascinating observations is that the Republicans in the US and the Conservatives in Britain have been completely comfortable with pursuing policies whose net effect is really remarkable stringency in our defence and security spending. That surely too will have very long-run implications. The Chinese meanwhile, as I am sure you all know much better than I do, are going very much in the opposite direction.

So there are at least five ways, there are probably many, many more, in which this crisis has immediate, practical and significant implications for the West and for Britain's foreign policy and security stance.

Thank you for listening to me.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST: GETTING IT RIGHT

Transcript of a lecture by the Rt Hon the Baroness Warsi

27th January 2015

The Rt Hon the Baroness Warsi was Senior Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Minister for Faith and Communities at the Department for Communities and Local Government from September 2012 to August 2014. A lawyer, a businesswoman, a campaigner and a cabinet minister, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi has had many roles, but she is best known for being the first Muslim to serve in a British cabinet. The daughter of an immigrant millworker, Sayeeda studied law at Leeds University, going on to work for the Crown Prosecution Service before setting up her own legal practice. In 2007 she was elevated to the House of Lords aged 36, making her the youngest peer in Parliament. In 2010 she was appointed by Prime Minister David Cameron as Minister without Portfolio, becoming the first Muslim to serve in a British Cabinet. She was also appointed as Chairman of the Conservative Party – the first Asian to chair a major British political party. Baroness Warsi has consistently been named as one of the world’s ‘500 most influential Muslims’ by the Middle East think-tank the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre and the most powerful Muslim Woman in Britain by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission.

Thank you very much and good afternoon, ladies and gentleman. You may not know that many years ago, a young would-be candidate, someone who felt she wanted to be a politician, met a man called Michael Ancram and she chased him around a reception event, eventually caught his attention, managed to get a photograph with him, and ladies and gentleman, the rest of my career is before you. So I think Michael can take great credit for what I achieved in politics and he is also clearly responsible for all the mistakes that I made!

It is a real pleasure to be here and to see so many of you here. It makes me feel like an elephant, actually. You may wonder why. It is not because I feel grey and need to shed a few pounds, but because it makes me realise that long after Cabinet positions have come and gone, you can still be precious, like elephants, which sometimes are worth more dead than they are alive. It is great to see people here who hopefully will engage in a good Q&A session and I genuinely hope that we get a robust Q&A session.

Before I start my remarks, in many ways, they are very poignant for today. As Holocaust Memorial Day and the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz-Birkenau is being marked across the world, I think it once more makes us stop and think about how we deal with our foreign policy issues, what our values are, what it is that we should be prepared to stand for and how far we are prepared to intervene. In many ways, the way that Britain handled itself through that incredibly difficult period should be the way in which we set the stepping stones and the foundations for the values that we think are now important for us in our foreign policy decisions today.

I am going to stray a little from the question that Michael set me. It still relates to the Middle

East, but it relates really to the specific role that I had when I was in government. As Minister for Communities and Minister at the Foreign Office, I was in a unique position, which possibly had never been done in government before, where I was both outward-facing and inward-facing in terms of our policymaking.

For a very long time, I have said that how we conduct ourselves overseas reflects on who we are domestically, and the way in which we deal with our domestic communities has both positive and negative consequences as to how we are viewed in the world. Quite uniquely, as a Foreign Office Minister and a Communities Minister, every day I saw how that played out with practical consequences. I want to raise three specific questions and three specific examples of how that played out and I hope that it will form the basis of a much broader discussion.

The first one is in relation to our domestic policy on British Muslims and a huge ideological discussion about which theological form of Islam is an acceptable form of Islam within Britain. Now, there are those of us who are pragmatists on this issue, who genuinely believe that providing people are not breaking the law, providing that they are not causing other communities and themselves harm, then as a country as a whole, we need to have a very pluralistic approach to different theologies within Islam.

I come from quite a pluralistic background: I have both Sunni and Shia roots in my family and I was brought up in a Deobandi mosque, so really if there was confusion to be had, it certainly was there during my upbringing. But it made me realise that there are many different forms of Islam. Not one of them is absolutely right and not one of them is absolutely wrong and therefore pluralism within Islam is a positive thing.

Unfortunately, I think government has over time adopted an ideological position that certain theologies are more acceptable than others because certain theologies are less inclined to be extremist and terrorist. Specific reference has been made, for example, to Salafi Islam, specific reference has been made to Wahhabi Islam, and there has been a sense within British Muslim communities that it depends on which strand of theological Islam they follow, as to whether or not they will be more or less acceptable as British citizens. Some of you may have seen my weekend piece in *The Observer* where I said that the government – not just this government, but the last Labour government – had over a period of time adopted a policy of disengagement from the British Muslim community, predominantly focused on theological beliefs.

So how does that butt up against foreign policy? Well in this way, because our relationship with, for example, Saudi Arabia, which is quite rightly strong and detailed, which is quite rightly an important and strategic one, yet is so clearly against what we are saying on theology. So we have young Muslims, in Birmingham say, who are Salafis or Wahhabis, who feel that they are not accepted within government circles, but see our government paying homage to the heart of Salafi-Wahhabism.

So how does that play out? How does our foreign policy position justify our domestic position and how can we continue to have our domestic position while at the same time doing what is the right thing in Britain's national interest and engaging deeply with Saudi Arabia? I hope it is something that we can talk about.

The second issue is in relation to our commitment to democracy. After the Arab uprising and the Arab Spring, I think many of us were caught by surprise at how quickly things moved and how quickly changes started to happen across the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt was a specific example of where I certainly felt that we started to act, not with our heart, but with our head. We realised that we have a fundamental belief in democracy, our head tells us that that is what we should therefore follow, and even when our heart was dubious about the outcome of democracy in Egypt, we still went with our head.

I was quite involved in what was then a planned visit from President Morsi to the United Kingdom including some events around the Ramadan period which was when he was due to be here and this was not that long before he was overthrown. At that point, we found ourselves in an incredibly difficult position with regard to Egypt. We looked like the awkward boyfriend, we stood and shuffled our feet, looked down at our toes, were not quite sure whether we had broken up with the last girl and we were not quite sure whether we were ready to date the new one.

I think that was not necessarily a bad thing, because in that shuffling of our feet in a way that other countries did not shuffle, we showed that we were genuinely having a thought process about where we felt we needed to be. Our commitment to democracy on the one hand and what our heart was telling us in terms of other things was clearly being played out to some extent in the public domain. I think the fact that we came to the President Sisi period slowly and in some ways, reluctantly, had a positive impact in the long run in terms of our relationship with our own domestic communities and a clear sense that we were supporting democracy.

We were also clear in terms of some of the condemnation of the violence post the Morsi period. And we also said that it was important to defeat ideas that you did not like through the ballot box and that the trials that followed thereafter in Egypt were possibly not the best way in which to ensure long-term stability in Egypt.

But I then question why, having done the right thing in terms of our values and having said just being of member of the Brotherhood *per se* was not a reason to be outside the fold, we felt the necessity to have a domestic review and report on the Muslim Brotherhood which to date has not been published. Now there are many, many organisations and there are many, many individuals who in the past or even now have had some dealings or some connections with the Muslim Brotherhood. If we are saying to them that actually just being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood *per se* is not a reason why the state should persecute you, what could potentially be a positive outcome of this review? Because if the review shows those connections, are we therefore going to adopt a policy of non-engagement with those people? Are we simply therefore going to say 'you're beyond the pale'? Again, I think it raises serious questions about the interplay between our domestic policies and our foreign policies.

The third example and final example I want to give is in relation to the Middle East Peace Process.

Now, ladies and gentleman, this issue will probably stay with me for the rest of my life. For somebody who grew up in a tiny house in the backstreets of an ordinary town, who was the daughter of an immigrant millworker who came with very little from a little village in Pakistan, I do not think in my wildest dreams I grew up Yorkshire thinking that I would one day sit around the Cabinet table. But I did. And when I did in 2010, I probably realised that it was perhaps the

most amazing experience I was ever going to have. It is probably why my response at that time was quite emotional. It was a humbling moment. Therefore, to give up that seat around that table was one of the hardest things for me to do, not just because of where I had come from and what I had achieved, but because the Prime Minister in whose Cabinet I served was a man for whom I have deep respect.

But it was a moment when again, I felt that what we were saying and what we said we stood for, was not what we were doing.

And I give two specific examples: we encouraged the Palestinians to go down a non-violent route. We believe that you come to achieving your ends through international means and that violence is not the right way in which to achieve an end to an occupation. We believe in the United Nations - we are one of its biggest supporters, we are one of its biggest funders, we are a Permanent Member. But yet, when the Palestinians did exactly the actions required in accordance with our values, we encouraged them not to do so. What we said was completely different to what we were asking them to do.

And in terms of our commitment to the rule of law, there has been great discussion over the last 12 to 18 months in the United Kingdom over the definition of British values. It is always incredibly difficult to define what British values are. My mum always says that it is about people putting their bins out in an organised way, it is about people washing their cars on a Sunday, it is about people queuing. If you say to her, 'What does it mean to be British?', these are the examples that she will give. But when we talk about British values in terms of broad principles, the rule of law is always there right at the top. It is something that we fundamentally believe in. It is something that ensures that I, as the daughter of an immigrant, can achieve in the way that other people can achieve in this country.

Yet suddenly we found ourselves in a position where the rule of law was no longer being applied. Where, for example, very clear borders which we had marked out as part of an international community, post-1967 and post the Oslo Accords, were simply not being followed. Where we said that settlements were illegal, but consequences never flowed. I felt that the argument that the government was putting forward (and I think it is a sincerely held argument), that the only way that we will genuinely achieve peace in the Middle East is if we make sure that our relationship with Israel remains strong so that we can continue to be an exorter of influence over Israel in a way which in the past, we have not always been able to do (we only need to go back to the early 1990s to see that), that this a relationship that we must maintain, was flawed. I could completely understand that side of the equation, but what I could not see was the other side of the equation, where the capital and the relationship that we built was being used to effect change. So it was relationship for relationship's sake, rather than relationship for the sake of making a difference.

And that, ladies and gentlemen, was an incredibly difficult argument for me as a Minister to make, when I stand up and call the rule of law British values, but then in my other job, we refuse to follow it. I therefore felt that the only right thing to do at that point was to walk away. I am not going to go any further than that. I hope that I have raised some issues which can then form the basis of further conversation, so thank you very much.

PAKISTAN'S TERRORISM POLICY POST THE PESHAWAR MASSACRE

Text of a lecture by Major General Noel I. Khokhar, HI (M)

28th January 2015

Major General Noel I. Khokhar, *Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military)* was commissioned into the Army in October 1980. He is a graduate of Command & Staff College, Quetta and French Staff College Paris, National Defence University, Islamabad and the Royal College of Defence Studies, London. He has served on varied command and staff appointments including command of an Infantry Division, an Infantry and Artillery Brigade as well as Chief of Staff of a Corps. He has served as an Instructor at the Pakistan Military Academy, Command and Staff College, Quetta, and Armed Forces War Course and Chief Instructor for National Security and War Course at the National Defence University, Islamabad. He holds a Masters Degree in War Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University and Masters in International Studies from Kings College London. Since November 2013, he has been the Director General of the Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis (DG ISSRA), at the National Defence University.

Ladies and Gentlemen, good afternoon. First of all, I should like to thank you all for your time and presence here today. It is indeed an honour for me to be here to deliver a lecture in front of this eminent audience at Global Strategy Forum. I am also thankful to Dr Noman Hanif for arranging and facilitating this occasion in a convenient manner.

Briefly, I should like to introduce myself and my institution before the start of my talk:

- I am Major General Noel I. Khokhar and besides my other qualifications, I am also a graduate of the Royal College of Defence Studies in the UK and Kings College, London.
- I presently head the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) at the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. The Institute, besides overseeing research within NDU, is the think tank for the Armed Forces and is accredited to the National Security Centre for Policy and Strategy Issues. We also organise a National Security Workshop (NSW) for Parliamentarians and another for media personnel.

I will take this opportunity to inform you about security and foreign policy-related developments in Pakistan, the challenges we face and how the government intends to overcome these issues. Primarily, I shall be focusing on the National Action Plan (NAP) to combat terrorism, sectarianism and challenges faced from within the country. After that, I shall be open to any questions.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb, National Action Plan & The Way Forward

Operation Zarb-e-Azb

Pakistan borders three major strategic regions: South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East; and its geographical proximity to Afghanistan has made it an important partner of the Coalition Forces.

Pakistan played a significant role, both during the Cold War and as a non-NATO member in the US-led 'War on Terror' against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The US and NATO launched their campaign against the al-Qaeda network and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite the Coalition's support, Pakistan has suffered in terms of loss of life and economic downturn. Despite being the victim of terrorism, Pakistan has remained determined to eliminate the menace of terrorism. On 15th June 2014, the Pakistan Army began a comprehensive military operation in NWA involving over 30,000 troops. The process is continuing extensively through Operation Zarb-e-Azb and Operation Khyber, the goal of which is to eliminate terrorists from all affected areas of the country.

The military operation was long overdue against militants in North Waziristan. Public support for the Operation Zarb-e-Azb remains very high. If the perception is to be believed, the military offensive in North Waziristan is in the process of a strong blow against militants operating in the region, particularly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its foreign allies such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The ground phase of the operation in North Waziristan, with air support, is progressing towards the culmination phase. We have learnt from the lessons of previous military operations and are prepared to do what is necessary in North Waziristan for the greater interest of Pakistan and global security. Due to the fully fledged operation in North Waziristan, 1,026,000 temporarily displaced persons (TDPs), nearly 42% of whom are children, were settled in settled areas adjoining NWA, Bannu, Lucky Murwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat and other adjacent areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

The Effects Of The Operation

Some of the latest updates of the operation include:

- Over **2,300** terrorists killed (figure as per the intercepts of the Taliban)
- **260** terrorist hideouts destroyed
- Over **50** terrorists surrendered
- Over **90%** areas cleared
- **230** Pakistani troops including three officers martyred
- Over **one million** TDPs

Key Features Of The Operation

There is no discrimination in good/bad or Haqqani/non-Haqqani groups of the militants and the operation is continuing across the board against militancy and terrorism. The operation code named Zarb-e-Azb has national consensus. As indicated, 90% of North Waziristan has been cleared and the return of TDPs to their native home towns will be ensured as soon as suitable conditions in their areas are created for their return. In fact, the middle of next month has been set as a date for their return. The government is determined to tackle this challenge amicably. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has promised to make the area a better place for people of FATA.

Most of the analysts believe the renewed warmth in relations with the US is the outcome of the Pakistan Army's action against the formidable Haqqani network, a group blamed for numerous attacks on foreign forces in Afghanistan. The relations between Pakistan and the US had hit a low ebb following the killing of al-Qaeda chief Osama Bin Laden by US Navy Seals in May 2011. Recently however, there have been signs of improvement, with Barack Obama's administration willing to co-operate with Pakistan in curbing militancy in the ongoing operation Zarb-e-Azb.

Recent battlefield successes propelled Washington to invite Pakistan's Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, in the first week of December, ahead of the US-led coalition's preparations to withdraw most of its soldiers from Afghanistan by the end of last year. The US recently responded by handing over three Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan prisoners, arrested by Afghan security forces to Islamabad and announced that Mullah Omar will not be targeted.

These operations have also eased the rocky relationship with neighbouring Afghanistan, whose new President, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, was given an unprecedented welcome in Islamabad in November 2014, becoming the first Afghan Head of State to visit Pakistan's Army Headquarters.

President Ashraf Ghani stated:

'Not only is the Pakistan Army acting against the Haqqani network and Afghan Taliban hiding on Pakistan's soil, but the US forces in Afghanistan too are targeting Pakistani Taliban operating from Afghanistan. As per the media reports, some of the Pakistani Taliban leaders have been killed in US drone strikes on the Afghan side of the border in the last two weeks.'

The National Action Plan

The National Action Plan was drafted in the wake of the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar attack on 16th December 2014 to chalk out a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism. A parliamentary committee was formed in this regard which evaluated the post-Peshawar tragedy scenario and discussed necessary laws and amendments in relation to terrorism. The 21st Amendment to the Constitution has given us the twenty-point National Action Plan to root out terrorism from Pakistan. The Constitutional Amendment Bill was required to be passed by two thirds of the total participants in both the 342-seat National Assembly and the 104-seat Senate. However, for an amendment in the Army Act, a simple majority was required.

Overview

The National Assembly passed the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill 2015, and Pakistan Army Act (Amendment) Bill 2015, with over a two thirds majority, despite a boycott by religious political parties (JUI-F and JI), as well as the absence of some lawmakers from the Treasury and Opposition benches including Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Thus, 247 lawmakers out of 342 in the National Assembly cast their votes in favour.

The Senate also unanimously passed the two bills as all the parliamentary parties, except Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F), Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and PTI (which abstained from voting), voted in favour (78/104). The President signed the 21st Constitutional Amendment into law on 7th January 2015. The bills will remain in force for a period of two years from the date of commencement and shall cease to be part of the Constitution and be repealed on the expiration of this period. The period of operation of the Pakistan Army Act 1952 is, however, extendable through a resolution passed by each House of the Parliament.

Overriding Effect

The provisions of this Act have come into effect, notwithstanding anything contained in the

Constitution, any law for the time being in force or any judgment of a court including the Supreme Court.

Draft of Preamble to the 21st Amendment:

Whereas the extraordinary situation and circumstances exist which demand special measures for the speedy trial of certain offences relating to terrorism, the waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and for the prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan by the terrorist groups formed in the name of religion or a sect and also by the members of any private armies, armed groups, wings and militias.

And whereas there exists grave and unprecedented threat to the integrity of Pakistan from the terrorist groups by the raising of arms and insurgency in the name of religion or a sect, or from foreign and locally funded anti-state elements including warriors in the name of the religion or sect.

And whereas it is expedient that the said terrorists groups including any such terrorists fighting in the name of religion or a sect, captured or to be captured in combat with the Armed Forces or otherwise are tried by the courts established under the Acts mentioned hereinafter in section 2.

And whereas the people of Pakistan have expressed their firm resolve through their chosen representatives in the All Parties Conference held in the aftermath of the sad and terrible terrorist attack on the Army Public School at Peshawar on 16th December 2014 to permanently wipe out and eradicate terrorists from Pakistan. The provisions of this Act shall remain in force for a period of two years from the date of its enactment and shall cease to form part of the Constitution and shall stand repealed on the expiration of said period.

The Prime Minister's Twenty Points

Some of the details that are listed in the Action Plan include:

1. Immediately after the tragedy in Peshawar, the government decided to enforce executions for terrorists sentenced to death. Implementation of this has begun: executions had been stayed since 2008, as a moratorium was imposed on humanitarian grounds.
2. In the past, criminals involved in heinous acts of terrorism used to evade punishment due to weaknesses in the legal system. Hence, special trial courts have been established under military officers so that such elements can be dealt with without delay. These courts will exist for two years. It is a major development as these courts are likely to energise anti-terrorist courts and the judicial system within the country. Conversely, it can also antagonise the lawyers' community to protect the terrorists as witnessed yesterday when Mumtaz Qadri (the killer of Governor Salman Taseer) was produced in court, approximately three hundred lawyers turned out in his support.
3. No armed organisation will be allowed to operate - recently Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) and Jamat-o-Dawa (JUD) have also been banned.
4. The anti-terrorism organisation, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), is being activated and strengthened to end terrorism.
5. We will act against literature, newspapers and magazines that are spreading hate, sectarianism, extremism and intolerance (hate speech in the short term and the curriculum of schools and madrasahs in the long run).

6. All sources of funding of terrorists and terrorist organisations will be completely eliminated; the State Bank of Pakistan and the banking sector has to play a role in this regard.
7. Banned organisations will not be allowed to operate under another name.
8. A special anti-terrorism force will be created, however, it will take some time to mature.
9. Action is being taken to stop religious extremism and to protect religious minorities. Ban on hate speech/loud speakers/sermons are being checked under existing laws.
10. The registration and regulation of seminaries (madrasahs) is being planned. Mass resistance is, however, being faced. This constitutes a huge challenge, but a comprehensive strategy is being evolved to bring betterment.
11. There will be a complete ban on airing the views of terrorists and terrorist organisations in the print and electronic media. Reforms are being introduced in the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA).
12. Keeping the return of TDPs as an immediate priority, the pace of FATA's administrative and development reforms will be sped up. Necessary funds have also been made available to meet this end.
13. Terrorists' communication networks will be completely dismantled.
14. Immediate steps are being taken to stop the spread of terrorism on the Internet and social media.
15. There will be no space left for terrorism in areas of Punjab, as in every part of the country. In my assessment, the battle against terrorism and extremism will be won in Punjab and the Government of Punjab is working resolutely towards this end.
16. The ongoing operation in Karachi will continue until it reaches its goal.
17. For broader political consensus, the Baluchistan government is being given complete authority by all stakeholders. The Nationalist Party is under pressure to deliver by bringing in dissident Baluchis.
18. Decisive action is being taken against elements that spread sectarianism.
19. A comprehensive policy for Afghan refugees is being developed, as well as the initial stage of registration for them. The international community should play its role, particularly the UN.
20. Criminal law reforms are being sped up for provincial intelligence organisations to get access to terrorists' communication networks and anti-terrorism organisations to be further strengthened. Constitutional amendments and legislation are also being introduced to make this possible. Constitutional amendments will be made for the courts headed by military officers.

On The Foreign Policy Side

Lately, Pakistan-Afghan relations have improved considerably. President Ashraf Ghani enjoys support and confidence within Pakistan. In the security arena, there is better co-operation between law enforcement agencies of both countries to handle border management, terrorism and related issues.

However, critical to Afghan stability and Pakistan's security will be the projected Afghan reconciliation between the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. Pakistan will play a positive role and will do everything in its power to bring about this reconciliation.

On Indo-Pakistan relations, there is an impasse which needs to be broken and the initiative has to be taken by India to recommence dialogue on all critical issues. We have to move beyond blame games and engage constructively.

The US and the UK have, and still play, an important role in security-related assistance to Pakistan. The Pakistan Army Chief, General Raheel Sharif, has visited the US and the UK and considerable progress has been made in this area.

Lastly, to address terrorism, sectarianism and extremism satisfactorily and to improve the security situation in Pakistan, good governance is absolutely critical, not only in the centre but also in the provinces. Hence the conduct of local elections and the installation of local governments are essential. Incidentally they have been missing since 2008.

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you all.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: NEW INTERNATIONAL THINKING

Text of a lecture by the Rt Hon the Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon GCMG KBE CH

3rd March 2015

Paddy Ashdown was born in New Delhi on 27 February 1941. From 1959-1972 he served as a Royal Marines Officer and saw active service as a Commando Officer in Borneo and the Persian Gulf. In 1972 Paddy left the Royal Marines and joined the Foreign Office. He was posted to the British Mission to the United Nations in Geneva. He stood as the Liberal Parliamentary candidate for the Yeovil constituency in 1979. Shortly after entering Parliament in the 1983 General Elections, Paddy was appointed as the Liberal spokesman on Trade and Industry Affairs within the Liberal/SDP Alliance team at the House of Commons. He became Education spokesman in January 1987. He was elected Leader of the Liberal Democrats in July 1988 and was appointed as a Privy Councillor in January 1989. Paddy stood down as the leader of the Liberal Democrats in 1999 and retired from the Commons in 2001. He was made a Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire in 2000 and a peer in 2001. Lord Ashdown was awarded the GCMG in the 2006 New Year's Honours List, for his work in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lord Ashdown was the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 27th May 2002 until 31st January 2006. Lord Ashdown is the author of seven books: 'Citizen's Britain, Beyond Westminster', Vol I and II of his published diaries; 'Swords and Ploughshares'; 'A Fortunate Life' and his latest book 'A Brilliant Little Operation'.

Thank you for inviting me today.

Forgive me if, in what I say, I am rather blunt, but I am getting increasingly concerned about Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in troubled times, it is as well to be straightforward.

I have read the conclusions of the SEESOX conference. I agree with some of them. But not, I fear, all.

The title of your seminar is '*New International Thinking*'. But it is not new thinking that is required in Bosnia, but a new will and a renewed determination to insist on reform in the country, instead of being satisfied with stasis – or something very close to it.

It is not ideas that have failed the international community these last ten years since Bosnia began to drift backwards. It is political will, co-ordination and an ability to use the levers that we have in a united and effective fashion.

We used to have a saying in OHR when I worked there: '*Unless you are prepared to slay the dragon, you cannot save the maiden*'.

The dragon in BiH is state dysfunctionality and those who, twenty years after Dayton, still use that

dysfunctionality to drive the country towards partition.

It is because of dysfunctionality that Bosnia is so burdened with multiple layers of politics and politicians that it cannot find the money to provide its citizens with what they need:

- Jobs
- A secure environment
- The rule of law
- A decent health service
- A modern education

And it is because the provision of these things is the only way to create loyalty to the state, that Bosnia's politics and loyalties remain mired in ethnic division and dependency, sometimes buttressed by dangerous appeals to religious antagonism.

It is because of dysfunctionality that Bosnia cannot secure the only future which will give it security and prosperity – a future as a full member of the EU and NATO.

So why, constantly and repeatedly, do we shy away from tackling the Bosnian dragon of state dysfunctionality and instead seek to find more and more elaborate ways of distracting the beast with smaller offerings – like economic reform – in the hope that it will fail to notice what we are doing?

This is not to say that economic reform is not necessary. Of course it is.

It is rather to assert that though economic reform is necessary, it is not sufficient - unless it is part of, rather than a substitute for - functional reform. Absent that, any economic reform will inevitably be subverted - as so often in the past - by those who have an interest in maintaining the status quo because that is how they preserve their power and line their pockets.

Yet even when it comes to the economic reform package currently under discussion, Europe is divided. On the one hand, some nations sensibly want to enshrine economic reform in IMF conditionality. Others shy away from this because of the perceived risk of increasing disorder, societal collapse and political upheaval – I suppose on the basis that one Greece at a time is more than enough.

I need to remind us that:

After more than a decade of real progress towards statehood and stability, Bosnia started to go backwards nearly ten years ago and now tracks with increasing speed towards either break-up or the dubious status of being Europe's deepest and most intractable black hole.

I need to remind us that:

This has occurred in a country in which the EU has more instruments of leverage than in any other on earth: a huge aid programme; a heavyweight mission; a large police reform programme; EUFOR; substantial leverage over the actions of neighbouring states; a special EU representative

and access to a High Rep still equipped with the Dayton powers. It is not that we do not have the leverage to stop Bosnia moving backwards. It is that we have not, these last ten years, found the will to use it.

I need to remind us too that:

Despite strong statements after last year's elections that the international community would this time insist that things would be different, they are not different at all.

There is still no functioning government at either the Federation or the State level, five months after the elections.

Meanwhile, it has taken us three long tortuous months of heavyweight pressure to finally succeed in negotiating Bosnian signatures on a piece of paper.

Maybe it will work. I certainly hope so.

But don't hold your breath.

The history of the last ten years is littered with pieces of paper which were launched with equal hope and fanfare, but which, for want of international will to make them mean anything, have ended in nothing.

I need to remind us that:

The effects of the stasis that has gripped Bosnia this last decade are not confined to Bosnia alone.

Last Saturday in Belgrade there was a huge gathering in the presence of the Patriarch and the Serbian President to celebrate the founding, not Bosnia, but of Republika Srpska.

In Zagreb the President of the Croatian HDZ expressed his support for a renewed calls by Bosnian Croats for a third entity.

In the Middle East, there are now around 330 young men from Bosnia to be found in Syria and Iraq under the banner of ISIS (this, by the way, from a country of less than four million, about the size of Wales).

And of course Moscow continues to play Ukrainian mischief with Bosnian instability, wherever it can.

In the 1990s the world had to learn the painful and bloody lesson that ignoring instability in Bosnia can have regional, even global consequences. Do we really have to learn that all over again, a quarter of a century later?

I am sorry to be so brutal.

But I fear that during these last ten years the international community and Bosnia have been locked in a kind of diplomatic groundhog day waltz. We sweep off into the same old dance together, accompanied by the same old expressions of hope and determination, only to find ourselves back at the same old place, which we then declare as somewhere entirely new.

We have consistently - and it seems now, will repeatedly - replace killing the dragon of Bosnia's dysfunctionality, with offering it instead a series of small-scale, diversionary reforms, in the vain hope that while the beast is looking the other way, we can nip in and save the maiden for her true destiny - marriage into the EU and NATO.

It has not happened and it will not happen.

Now some are even proposing that actually, it does not have to happen at all. It will be good enough for us to just pretend it has happened. Then by some Brussels sleight of hand, an unreformed Bosnia can be quietly side-slipped into candidate status.

It seems an attractive shortcut, of course. Even though we know shortcuts rarely work - as we have seen with other EU countries.

But it is not a shortcut. It is a myth.

For behind it I suspect is a willingness on the part of some EU states to declare success by welcoming Bosnia to candidate status and then leaving her there - in limbo - forever.

Still a black hole of dysfunctionality and corruption.

Still wracked with division and obstruction.

Still a source of recruits for ISIS.

But now semi-safely parked in a never-never land on the edge of Europe, where she can do minimum damage. A place from which we in the international community can never move forward and from which we can never disengage.

That remarkable EU civil servant who used to work with me in my days as High Rep, Reinhard Priebe, used to say that Europe was not just a union of ideals, it was also a union of standards.

Quite so!

And one of those standards surely is functionality. Is there not a minimum standard of functionality which is required for EU membership?

Of course there is.

So why do we go on dodging the issue in Bosnia?

Why after such extraordinary progress towards a functional Bosnian state for the first ten years after

Dayton, did we abandon the effort in these last ten years?

No one is suggesting a centralised Bosnia.

No one is suggesting either that there should be a return to the Bonn powers to move things forward – though they should be preserved in case things begin to move dangerously backwards, because some destructive elements seek to re-interpret Dayton to support division rather than unity.

No one is suggesting either abolishing the entities.

A functional Bosnia will look and feel much more like highly decentralised Belgium than over-centralised Britain.

But it must be functional – and it cannot be constantly held hostage by those who wish it to fail.

What is needed now from the international community - and especially from Brussels - is not new thinking but rather a new courage to face down Bosnia's separatists and obstructionists and a new will to use, in a united and coherent fashion, the immense leverage to move things forward which we can mobilise, both in country and in the region.

If I wanted to get things done in my time in Bosnia, it was not just to Brussels that I turned, it was also to Zagreb and Belgrade. No policy for Bosnia will work unless it is anchored within an overall policy for the region.

My other key experience in Bosnia was that if the international community is hesitant, risk averse and divided, there is nothing it can achieve.

But if it is united, purposeful and determined, there is nothing it cannot achieve.

Ten years ago, after a decade of extraordinary progress in Bosnia, the international community - and especially Brussels - took its foot off the accelerator and its eye off the road.

What we need now is change of gear and direction.

Or alternatively we can, of course, go on as we are.

Hoping to distract Bosnia from the task of functional reform, but in reality distracting ourselves. Hoping for better in the future in the face of all experience to the contrary from the past. Ducking the central issue of functionality because we have allowed local players to frighten us away from it.

And launching ourselves into another decade in which Bosnia sinks further and further into the black hole, while we in Europe and the international community remain further and further away from the task to which we laid our hand twenty long years ago: helping Bosnia towards the only peace and prosperity it can have, as a full, functional and proud member of the Euro-Atlantic Brussels institutions.

NATIONAL SECURITY: CURRENT THREATS, HARD CHOICES AND SOFT OPTIONS

Transcript of a lecture by Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE

17th March 2015

Sir Richard Billing Dearlove KCMG OBE is currently the Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge. He served as Chief (known as 'C') of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) from August 1999 until his retirement in July 2004. For the preceding five years he was Director of Operations and, from 1998, Assistant Chief. As Director of Finance, Administration and Personnel he also oversaw the move of SIS into its Headquarter Building at Vauxhall Cross in 1994. He is a career intelligence officer of 38 years standing and has served in Nairobi, Prague, Paris, Geneva and Washington as well as in a number of key London-based posts. He is Chair of Trustees of the University of London, a trustee of Kent School, Connecticut, Honorary Fellow of Queens' College Cambridge, Senior Adviser to several international companies, including the revamped AIG, Chairman of Ascot Underwriting and a Director of Kosmos Energy.

Thank you very much. It is nearly nine months since I spoke at RUSI and made a plea for proportionality in the UK's response to the threat of terrorism and I am very grateful to Global Strategy Forum who suggested that I give a follow-up to that talk.

I think the questions are: do I stick by what I said then or in the light of events, have I modified my views? I am not going to talk about cyber threats today and I am not going to talk about China, because there is not time to cover all of that ground. I am going to look essentially at the issue of terrorism again, and I also want to talk about Russia and Ukraine.

Now, quite a lot has happened. Of course the most striking terrorist event has been the *Charlie Hebdo* and related attacks in Paris, but there have been no terrorist deaths in that period here in the UK. Yards of newsprint have been devoted to 'Jihadi John' and the three absconding teenage girls from Bethnal Green. There has been extended debate in Parliament about the government's new counterterrorist powers and most recently, the ISC has exonerated GCHQ from acting illegally, as Snowden and his supporters had alleged, but recommended a revision and simplification of intercept legislation to lend more transparency and understanding to the way in which the powers of government are exercised in this sensitive and topical area.

In addition, the behaviour of Russia in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine has reminded all of us forcibly that much of our national security agenda can be, and is still, set by the threatening behaviour of nation states. It is not only sub governmental organisations like Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Hamas, the Taliban, Boko Haram and ISIS that are destabilising the international situation.

I have always said in talking about national security threats in a post 9/11 world, that the sort of analysis that one has heard in the West about global threats was probably rather different from the way that the world was still being viewed in Moscow and Beijing and a much more traditional nation state view has prevailed there. Now we see a situation where this traditional view is

reasserting itself and of course this has considerable implications for our own assessment of national security and our defence policy needs.

This is a very important and fundamental shift, because we have been through a period where we have thought and focused largely on new global threats. We have ignored some of the nation state equation and I think those of us who recall circumstances at the end of the Cold War will remember the debates in Parliament, in particular about the so-called peace dividend. I remember arguing with the Treasury at the time when I was responsible for the finances in MI6, when they were strongly advocating what they called the Dutch solution to national security. I must say that we have to remember the perspective that covers this period and I think we are moving into a period of significantly different conditions.

The *Charlie Hebdo* attack was deeply shocking, but seemed to me to carry all the hallmarks of al-Qaeda's strategy and thinking, in particular Bin Laden's replacement, Zawahiri. There is no question that recently, ISIS had grabbed international attention and had displaced al-Qaeda as the apparent vanguard of the extremist Islamist movement. The murder of the *Charlie Hebdo* team was designed to send a most dramatic and shocking message to the world by a choice of target as symbolic of western cultural values as the Twin Towers were to capitalism, and it has certainly worked as an act of media communication and is still doing so in the debate that has followed.

It was quite clearly an assault on our values and it is interesting to reflect that if you look our statement of national security which is published online, you look for example at the tasking of the Security Service, there is nothing in those documents which talks about defence of our values, which I think is an interesting side issue. Maybe they should be revised in that respect.

The *Charlie Hebdo* attack underlines the cultural and social nature of the Islamist rejection of the rights and values of the liberal democratic state and in so doing, it points towards the overwhelming case for a social, cultural and educational response in addition to the national security response. We tend to forget that the national security response is really only a preventive one and it does not offer solutions to the fundamental problems which are at, or lie at, the causes of this type of socio-religious terrorism.

I should also add that the success of the attack was in my view a serious security failure by the French state and I think I am qualified in some respects to say that, being an enormous supporter of the French Services and their effectiveness, but the fact is, the target was known, the threat was known and the protection was in place, but proved to be thoroughly inadequate. The attack should have been stopped at a first or second line of defence.

The prevention of terrorism, which in the UK has hitherto been more successful, is actually about throttling the message that terrorists wish to send as much as it is about preventing an attack and I think that we should all reflect, very carefully, on this issue of terrorism as a violent and extreme means of political communication. For this reason, I remain deeply uncomfortable about the massive amount of coverage the story of 'Jihadi John' has been given in the press and the Bethnal Green runaways.

Of course, these stories have human interest aspects which are extremely powerful and seductive, but we do risk giving the subjects a type of iconic status and there will be many confused and

vulnerable young people reading these stories who will be yearning for similar levels of attention.

Now since I wrote that sentence, I was pleased to read Simon Kuper's article in last weekend's *Financial Times* magazine and if you have not seen it, I urge you to read it. It is headed '*How Westerners Became PRs For Terror,*' and he makes the crucial point that terrorism is PR and it is a form of communication, particularly through visual media, television or online visual media. There is no question that, as he says, ISIS has become the new gold standard for terrorist PR. He also refers to struggling western media using terrorism to get clicks and he uses the phrase 'struggling western politicians use terrorism to unite citizens behind them' and I think that is very telling.

But just going back to the problem of these young people, I do sincerely hope that the communities from which these troubled young people come will face up to the fact that their children's actions are ultimately their and their families' responsibility. They cannot expect the police or the Security Service to have the capacity to act *in loco parentis*. What sort of discussion had taken place inside the girls' families about, for example, the struggle between Sunni and Shia Islam, about events in Syria, about al-Qaeda, about the attitude of mainline Islam towards the violence practised by ISIS. If the answer is that none of them had been discussed, the families are certainly at fault for ignoring the very obvious crisis within their own religion and it is absolutely clear to me that many young Muslims take a very strong interest in this crisis. So it should be, as it were, being articulated and talked about.

This brings me back to repeat my plea for proportionality and to emphasise the need to proceed with great care in making changes to the law, to take account of the phenomenon of radicalisation and I am making a distinction here between the phenomenon of radicalisation and actual terrorism. It is a problem that certainly can and does engender high levels of anxiety, but in proportionate terms, it is a problem which, though it stretches the resources of the intelligence and security community, has so far been managed reasonably well. They are under pressure. They have great concerns about things going wrong and about being blamed for failure and there is a lot of pressure on the Intelligence and Security Services for this reason, but that is not necessarily a reason to make far-reaching changes in the law.

To manage this problem, we need the co-operation, indeed we need the leadership of our own Muslim community and we also need patience and staying power. I think we have a tendency to be blown off course politically and legally by incidents, some of which will be shocking and provocative in the extreme, but of course the nature of modern PR terrorism is to drive us towards the extreme in our response.

The more serious danger from terrorism, in my view, is currently more latent than actual. What I mean by this is that I think the thing that worries me more and has always worried me more, is the possibility that the resources of a sophisticated nation state, let us say some of the nuclear weapons capability of Pakistan, are overrun by a group of Islamist extremists, ready to act without any sense of moral or political restraint.

In fact, this was one of al-Qaeda's original ambitions and we know very precisely that they tried to suborn Pakistani nuclear technicians (this is going back to the period after the invasion of Afghanistan), but this was thwarted successfully by intelligence operations. The danger from ISIS, for example, is that it should gain sufficient political momentum that it aspires to control more than the

conventional weapons arsenal it originally captured from the nascent Iraqi military. At the moment, it does not look to me as though this is an advancing risk, but it cannot be entirely discounted.

Now, I think it is this type of risk rather than the risk of radicalisation, which is a powerful argument for the government having enhanced powers, more so, as I said, than tracking radicalised youth, but these powers should be constrained and invoked sparingly.

The ISC's recommendation to revise intercept legislation is a good one. The law needs greater clarity and there also has to be greater public understanding of what the powers of government are and how, when and why they should be used. I think it was the post 9/11 growth of intercept capability without proper debate or explanation (and this is particularly true of the US, it is not so true of the UK) that gave oxygen to Snowden's revelations.

I would also recommend the creation of a new scrutiny body other than the ISC that could work within the ring of secrecy and provide assurance that the powers of intercept, when exercised, were appropriate to the management of the perceived threat. In fact, one of the problems with the current RIPA legislation is that its usage has been debased by excessive police and local authority usage. The Intelligence and Security Service warrants have to be signed at a ministerial level or equivalent. Outside central government, RIPA authorisations are not subject to the same degree of rigorous scrutiny or control.

Finally, let me say something about Russia and Ukraine.

Now if we had any remaining illusions about Putin's regime, they should have been dispelled by the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. However, I do believe that the West mishandled Ukraine. Ukraine's choice of the EU was always going to threaten fundamentally Putin's plans for Russian leadership of a Eurasian Economic Community, quite apart from the emotional impact it would have on Russia's sense of national identity. A dialogue which had started before the crisis might have made it easier to handle and of course a dialogue about Ukraine's status as a hinge country between east and west. However, I am not making excuses for Putin's extraordinary subsequent behaviour. But expect to hear from Putin on the 9th May about the renewed threat of fascism in Europe. Even in Cambridge, I have heard the fascist argument deployed to justify Putin's actions and having spent several 9th of Mays myself behind the Iron Curtain when it existed, expect strong echoes of the Soviet anti-fascist rhetoric that the Party uses to rally nationalist sentiment.

However, I do not subscribe to the idea of a return to the Cold War. But a Russia that does not respect the principles of European security is nonetheless a dangerous neighbour that must be deterred and I think that there is only one way to achieve this, which is unified Western diplomacy backed by an unequivocal expression of power. As Hollande and Merkel have discovered, talking to Russia without the willingness to imply the deployment of power as well, for example, by suggesting/threatening to help the Ukrainian military by arming them with more modern weapons, has little or no effect.

Which brings me to the defence budget and by implication, to the election. I am shocked by the apparent reluctance of the political leadership in this country not to make an absolutely clear commitment to increase defence spending to a real 2% of GDP, and in the medium to long term perhaps to spend above that limit. Advocating increased defence spending at the expense of other

areas - that it should be seen as politically toxic, is depressing and indeed, symptomatic of a society whose politicians are completely obsessed with the domestic agenda.

The fact is that Russia's aggressive behaviour in the European context is probably as important to each of us as the future of the Health Service. Now explaining this to voters is very difficult indeed, but the soft option of not saying anything at all and hoping that we can muddle through, for example, by bumping up the defence budget by including the £3 billion spent on the Intelligence and Security Agencies is playing politics with our vital national interests.

However, I am pleased to see that more important voices than mine are expressing concern about this issue and calling for a clearer political lead, from both of the main parties, and calling for a bit more courage when it comes to stating truths and talking about these political risks which are not, as it were, part of the domestic agenda.

In conclusion, let me make one final point. I think this is also symptomatic of the conditions in which we live of instant information, everything happening at high speed - one of the Cambridge scientists I know well, talks about a 'web year' being the equivalent of two or three months in length and the plea I want to make is for strategic patience and staying power.

Most international problems, particularly security problems, require a long-term commitment if they are to be managed successfully. There is no quick solution to the security problems that we face in Mali, Libya, northern Nigeria, Iraq, Afghanistan or Ukraine or Kosovo for that matter. They all require a long-term commitment of resources, otherwise our opponents simply have to have to outwait us as they are learning to do.

I think we all accept the loss of appetite for foreign military interventions. But part of the reason for a larger defence budget would be to put steel into our allies through sustained training and equipment programmes, so that they might fight their own battles effectively. And as there seems to be a growing acceptance of the view that Special Forces do not count as boots on the ground and we have seen this in a number of conflicts recently, we should be building up our Special Forces even further than they have been built up already. And actually that is something that I think that late in the day, the Obama Administration has understood.

The downside of the 24-hour news cycle is that we are hooked on instant and excessive coverage of every crisis and political interest remains focused just as long as the media remains focused. As I said, we need to be much more deliberate about sticking with a problem for the long term and I hope that our politicians will face up to the challenge of taking actions which are in the national interest, but do carry political risk and are difficult to explain.

The various problems that I have listed or mentioned, most of them, I think each of them, is containable, if we have the will and the patience and the means to contain them, but should they start linking and aggregating together, then we may find ourselves facing a much tougher set of larger problems, which will threaten our vital national security interests and oblige them to be dealt with at much higher cost in the medium term.

Thank you very much.

FROM NORTHERN IRELAND TO LIBYA: HOW TO END ARMED CONFLICTS

Transcript of a lecture by Jonathan Powell

25th March 2015

Jonathan Powell is CEO of Inter Mediate, the charity he founded in 2011 to work on conflict resolution around the world. Jonathan was Chief of Staff to Tony Blair from 1995 to 2007 and from 1997 to 2007 was also Chief British Negotiator on Northern Ireland. From 1978-79 he was a broadcast journalist with the BBC and Granada TV and from 1979 to 1994 a British Diplomat. He is author of 'Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland', 'The New Machiavelli, How To Wield Power In The Modern World' and his new book 'Talking To Terrorists: How To End Armed Conflicts'.

Thank you very much, Michael, and thank you for inviting me here. I feel a little bit diffident talking about Northern Ireland in the presence of Michael, who was the first British Minister since Lloyd George to meet Sinn Féin and wrestle with them after the first ceasefire and Douglas Hurd of course, and John Taylor who I see back there ready to heckle if I get anything wrong on Northern Ireland, and John Alderdice. So I am very diffident to talk too much about Northern Ireland.

What I am going to do is talk a little bit about lessons I took from Northern Ireland and whether they are generally applicable and then come back to Libya at the end. And if you want to talk more about Libya or more about ISIL, we can do that in the conversation afterwards and I will talk strictly for just thirty minutes.

I fell into Northern Ireland really by accident. I had been at the Embassy in Washington doing the Northern Ireland portfolio and looking after people like John when they used to come out to Washington. Tony Blair, when he came into office, decided that he was going to make Northern Ireland a real priority. He used his electoral victory to go straight into Northern Ireland. His first visit outside London was to the Balmoral agricultural show. It was a very unlikely setting for a political speech, surrounded by huge bulls, very woolly sheep, very rubicund farmers and the rest of it, but he did it in order to try and reassure the unionist population, who were suspicious of a new Labour government. He went in there and he made a speech in which he said he did not expect a united Ireland to happen in his lifetime.

He then spent a huge amount of time, as Prime Minister, on Northern Ireland, wrestling with the issue, pushing it and shoving it and he used me as his gopher basically to try and keep the thing going. I spent ten years, once or twice a week often, crossing the Irish Sea to go and deal with Northern Ireland and at the time, it was the most frustrating, the most enervating, the most annoying and the most difficult subject I had ever had to deal with, but in retrospect, it was the most important thing I did in my life, or am likely to do in my life and something I am very proud of, although the real credit for it should actually go to the politicians in Northern Ireland themselves, who were the ones who made the sacrifices and had the leadership to make it work.

I have to say that I was not always in favour of talking to terrorists. The first time I met Gerry Adams

and Martin McGuinness, I refused to shake their hands. The IRA had injured my father in an ambush in 1940 in Northern Ireland. My brother Charles, who worked for Mrs Thatcher, had been on their death list for eight years. I had just spent a year in Washington trying to stop Gerry Adams getting a visa, ultimately unsuccessfully, so I declined to shake their hands, as did Alastair Campbell actually, but Tony Blair was rather more sensible about it. He shook hands as he would with anyone else.

We went immediately afterwards for a walkabout in a very strongly Protestant part of east Belfast, in a shopping centre, and we were mobbed by a crowd of old grannies, 'Hell's Grannies', who started throwing rubber gloves at him and Tony was mystified. He thought it was a protest about washing up. I had to explain that he should have been wearing gloves if he was going to shake hands with a terrorist. When I look at the conflicts I have studied for this book I have just written, it is interesting how often the handshake is such a difficult issue for groups - from Guatemala to Indonesia to the Philippines - to get over.

About three days after that first meeting, I got a call from Martin McGuinness out of the blue, and he asked if I would come to Derry incognito and if I would, in particular, not tell the securitycrats. I asked Tony and he said 'go', so I got on a plane and I flew to Belfast, took a taxi to Derry and stood on a street corner feeling like a bit of an idiot out of some sort of spy novel. Two guys with shaved heads turned up and shoved me into the back of a taxi, saying '*Martin sent us*', and they drove me around and around Derry for about an hour, until I was completely lost and then pushed me out of the door, by a modern little house on the edge of an estate and I knocked on the door and Martin McGuinness came to the door on crutches, making a rather inappropriate joke about kneecapping, which, as you will remember, was the IRA's favoured way of punishing people, by drilling holes through their knees.

I spent three hours sitting there with Martin McGuinness. We made no breakthrough whatsoever, but, over the next ten years I was endlessly crossing the Irish Sea and sitting with them in different safe houses around the Province, and it came home to me that it was because of that that we were able to build a certain amount of trust. If I had insisted they come to Downing Street or if I had insisted they came to Stormont Castle, we would not have been able to get them to take the difficult steps that they took.

There is a limit to how much trust you can build in those sorts of relationships. I remember in 2004 when we were negotiating late, the monks had very kindly given us dinner in Clonard Monastery refectory, and the minute hand on my watch had come loose and was going backwards and forwards loosely and I could not work out what time it was for my plane and I was desperate to make the plane. Martin McGuinness very kindly said, '*Oh, let me have your watch fixed for you. I'll take it to a very good watch mender at the end of my street in Derry.*' And I said, '*No, no, honestly, you really don't need to worry, please, please don't worry about it.*'

He insisted on taking it and he took it away and gave it back to me at Leeds Castle two weeks later when we had the negotiations and I, of course, had to give it to the security authorities. They took it apart and broke the minute hand and I had to have it fixed again at great cost, because they had been looking for trackers and bugs. So there is a limit to what you can do in terms of trust.

What I wanted to do in writing the book that I have just done is to see if any of those lessons from Northern Ireland applied elsewhere. There is no Northern Ireland model. Sometimes people are

ridiculously literal about this. In the Basque Country for example, people on the ETA side tend to say 'we want to do exactly what they did in Northern Ireland'. That is completely inappropriate. The causes in Northern Ireland, the way it was solved - I would not wish the D'Hondt system on anyone in any other country, which is part of the solution we came to in Northern Ireland.

But what does seem to jump out, if you look at the conflicts over the last thirty years, is there is a clear pattern to what works and what does not work - it fails in Sri Lanka if you do it that way, it can work if you do it the other way in El Salvador. So however different the conflicts are, there is some sort of pattern and the first lesson, I think, is that we always say that we will not talk to terrorists and yet we nearly always end up talking to terrorists. We certainly did as part of decolonisation in 1919. Lloyd George said that he would never talk to that 'murder gang'; two years later, he was reaching out, making a secret channel to the IRA through Andy Cope, a former Customs Office official, and then he turned that into a negotiation and negotiated the Treaty of 1922.

We did again with Begin after he blew up the King David Hotel - he was a terrorist, we tried to hunt him down, we later treated him as a statesman. We did the same with Kenyatta in Kenya. We locked him up in the north of Kenya, we called him a terrorist, we let him out to negotiate independence with him, he became President and we welcomed him as a statesman. We did the same with Makarios in Cyprus - we exiled him to the Seychelles as a terrorist, we brought him back to negotiate independence and as the first President.

So there seems to be some sort of collective amnesia and, by the way, it is not just us who are guilty of this. If you look at the French in Algeria, they had exactly the same pattern. François Mitterrand who was Minister of the Interior at the time of the FLN first rising, said '*we will never negotiate with these terrorists*', but that is what De Gaulle in the end did. So we forget how to do it and we leave it too late. General Petraeus said of Iraq that '*America left it far too late to deal with people with American blood on their hands*' - they should have started the negotiations much earlier.

Hugh Gaitskell probably encapsulated it best when he said: '*All terrorists, at the invitation of the government, end up with drinks in the Dorchester*' and that, if we look at our history, is pretty much what has happened.

There are arguments, of course, against trying to talk to terrorists. The first is appeasement that George W. Bush put forward in a speech in the Knesset in 2008, where he said that talking to terrorists was tantamount to dealing with Hitler at the time of Munich. I think he maybe misunderstands appeasement. Talking to Hitler was a perfectly sensible thing to do in the late 1930s to try and avoid another conflagration across Europe. Thinking he could be bought off with a large chunk of Czechoslovakia was a mistake.

Talking to terrorists is not appeasement. Agreeing with terrorists would be appeasement, but usually when governments talk to terrorists, they are not about to agree with them. We would never have agreed to a united Ireland at the barrel of a gun, despite the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland, however long we had talked to Sinn Féin. We never even discussed that with Sinn Féin - we discussed other things like power-sharing, human rights and so on, so I do not really feel that argument holds up.

The second argument, which certainly has more to it, is the legitimisation of terrorists. People fear that if you talk to a terrorist group, you are giving it legitimacy, and certainly armed groups are endlessly seeking legitimacy. That is what they really crave and what they want. However, if you do talk to them, what tends to happen is that you give them a very temporary sort of legitimacy. In the Caguán talks between the FARC and the Colombian government in 1999–2001, the FARC certainly got legitimacy from those talks, but when they rejected the compromise on offer, when they went back to fighting, they lost that legitimacy and actually ended up in a worse position than they had been before. They were seen as narco-terrorists. So that legitimisation is short term and in my view, something which is worth paying to pursue the chance of peace.

The thing that really takes me to the notion that you do need to talk to terrorists is the fact that if you look back over the last thirty years, there does not seem to be a very good alternative in the end if you want a peaceful settlement.

Hugh Orde who was the Chief Constable in Northern Ireland said, quite correctly, that there is *'no example, anywhere in the world, of terrorism being policed out'*. That if there is a political cause, in the end, you will have to find a political solution to it. General Petraeus said of Iraq that you cannot *'kill or capture your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency'* and I think he was right.

Now the academics have looked for lots of different ways in which terrorism might end. They have talked about decapitation, for example, which is where you remove the leader and the armed group fails. However, history does not really favour that argument very much. If you look at the PKK, when Abdullah Öcalan was captured, it is true that the PKK ceased its violence temporarily. But the violence actually then went up while he was in jail, rather than ending. Again, if you look at Sheikh Yassin and Hamas, you would find the same thing, so decapitation does not seem to work.

The argument is put forward that Sri Lanka shows that there is some sort of military solution to a terrorist problem and it is true that the Rajapaksa government managed to defeat the Tamil Tigers quite successfully, but if you look at it in some more detail, it does not look like a model that could apply anywhere else. If you talk to the Norwegian negotiators who worked between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, they say that Prabhakaran was always seen as a military genius, but he turned out to be a military fool in the end. He failed to actually fight a guerrilla campaign and instead, out of hubris, fought a conventional campaign against the government and was defeated. Had he fought a guerrilla campaign, he would still be out there in the bush fighting now.

Secondly, the methods used by the Sri Lankan government at Nanthi Kadal lagoon to end the insurgency and the number of its civilians killed there is not something any western government could conceive of doing if they wanted to end a terrorist structure, so it is no solution that we could find.

And lastly, unless you address the political issue, which is the Tamil desire for autonomy of some sort, you will not solve the problem and that is one of the reasons that the Rajapaksa government has lost the election and been replaced by a government willing to talk.

If you look back at history, there seem to be very few examples of ending an armed group that has real political support. I am not talking about a Baader-Meinhof or Symbionese Liberation Army.

Groups that are fractional have really no significant political support. They are not the same category as an ANC in South Africa, an FMLN in El Salvador or a GAM in Indonesia that have genuine political support.

It is very difficult for democratic governments to talk to armed groups when they are killing innocent civilians in the countries concerned and governments often deny that they are doing so. John Major, who deserves a huge amount of credit for getting the Northern Ireland peace process going, stood up in Parliament and said that he would never talk to Gerry Adams, it would turn his stomach to do so, at exactly the same moment that he was corresponding with Martin McGuinness, and thank goodness he did. If he had not been doing that, we would never have got to the end of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

I was talking the other day to Colin Parry whose son, Tim Parry, died in the Warrington bomb at twelve years old and Colin says that if he had known when Tim died in his arms, the British government was corresponding with the IRA, he would have been horrified. If someone had told him six months later that the British government was corresponding with the IRA, he would have been delighted, because he would have known his son was not going to die in vain, and there was a chance of peace happening, so people understand why it is that governments behave in that way.

In the case of Spain, every Spanish Prime Minister since Franco so far has talked to ETA and denied that they were talking to ETA. Adolfo Suárez who was Prime Minister immediately after Franco, stood up in the Cortes and said he was not talking to ETA. The leader of the Opposition, Felipe González stood up and said, *'But you told me over dinner last night you were talking to ETA'*. Suárez got up again and said, *'No, I'm not talking to ETA'*. So people, governments, always behave in the same way. They try and open some sort of link that allows you to make progress secretly, often through intelligence agencies, as we did in Northern Ireland and as the South Africans did in the case of the ANC.

One thing to mention in terms of democratic governments, one thing that makes negotiations much easier in these circumstances, is bipartisanship. We were very lucky, here in Britain, in that when Tony Blair became Leader of the Labour Party, he changed the policy on Northern Ireland and he decided to support John Major whatever he was doing, even if he disagreed with it, because he thought that was the right thing to do and then when we won the election and took over, the Conservative Party continued to support what we were doing. That made it a whole lot easier to reach a conclusion in Northern Ireland than it would have been otherwise.

Spain has exactly the opposite problem, where the PP opposition made life hell for the socialist government in Spain trying to make peace with ETA. They adopted a policy of *crispación*, of trying to attack them on every single issue and it made it enormously difficult for Zapatero to get to an agreement.

There are an enormous number of things I would like to say, but I am going to skip most of them so I can get to Libya, but let me just touch on a couple of things.

Firstly, drawn from Northern Ireland: in order to actually open a channel, which is what happens in these negotiations, you open a channel secretly. It happens in nearly every negotiation – from Colombia to South Africa (where they started talking to Mandela in jail and then to the ANC in

Switzerland), the point of that contact is to try and build some sort of understanding, some sort of trust. I used to say in Northern Ireland that if we ended a conversation after only half an hour, we would have only got to 1689 and there were three hundred years more of grievances to get through if we kept the meeting going. There were two very different histories and we had to be prepared to listen and understand what the two sides were saying. It is not just about listening, it is not just sitting quiet - you actually have to hear the nuances of what people are saying, what they are not saying that they said last time, what have they said this time that they did not say last time, and where are the patterns that you can succeed.

There is an educative process that really takes quite a long time that people do not understand. You think about these armed groups: they are often living physically in ghettos or metaphorically in ghettos, talking only to each other, talking only to people who share their views. It takes a long time of talking to them for them to understand what the real alternatives are and for governments to understand what is the logic behind what they do. So if you have a channel, it is not always the right time to get into an actual negotiation. My argument is that you should always be prepared to talk to terrorists, but negotiations will only succeed in certain circumstances.

And there are two key factors, I think. Again, they are drawn from Northern Ireland, but they seem to work in most examples.

The first is a mutually hurting stalemate. When I first got to Libya I thought, *'Oh good, there's a stalemate, we'll be able to get some progress'*. What I had not observed was that it was not a mutually hurting stalemate. It was a stalemate where both sides could gain a bit more money, gain a bit more territory and could keep fighting each other. It was not something that caused pain for them; therefore they were not prepared to negotiate.

In the case of Northern Ireland, I think the British military realised towards the end of the 1970s/early 1980s that they could contain the IRA forever, but they were unlikely to be able to wipe it out by military force alone. They understood the need for political talks. In the case of Adams and McGuinness, I think that it was about the mid-1980s. They joined the Republican movement when they were quite young and by the mid-1980s, they were well past fighting age and they could see their nephews and nieces, cousins, sons and daughters getting arrested, getting killed and they understood this could go on forever. They were not going to be able to conclude it by fighting, they were not going to get the Brits out by fighting, and that is when they reached out first to John Hume, then to the Irish government and eventually to the British government.

And if you look at El Salvador or anywhere else, you will see that mutually hurting stalemate is usually what you need to have in place if you are going to get to success. If it is not hurting enough - for example, if you take Cyprus where, for the Greek Cypriots, there is very little pain where they are at the moment - then you are unlikely to make progress. It is only if staying in that situation is uncomfortable.

The second item that seems to be absolutely essential for concluding these sorts of negotiations is strong leadership, and strong leadership on both sides. In South Africa, you would not have succeeded without Nelson Mandela, but nor would you have succeeded without F W de Klerk. You needed to have both of them to be able to make progress.

In Northern Ireland, we were very lucky to have David Trimble and Ian Paisley on the Unionist side who made huge sacrifices politically and personally in order to get to peace and deserve huge credit for it, and we had Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness on the other side who actually risked their lives as well as their political futures to try and make peace. But we also had Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair who were in power for ten years, and that co-operation between the British and Irish governments again was fundamental to reaching success in Northern Ireland.

In his autobiography, Tony Blair accuses me of saying that he had a Messiah complex, and that is what enabled him to conclude peace in Northern Ireland. Actually it was Mo Mowlam who, some of you will remember, had quite a colourful turn of phrase, who said that Tony thought he was ‘***** Jesus’ and that is why he concluded it. That is different, but related to it: if you do not have a leader who believes the problem can be solved and believes that they can do it, then you will not get to success. Tony Blair believed it could be solved and believed he could do it and again if you look around the world at those cases that have succeeded, you tend to have those sorts of leaders in place.

It can also often be a result of life-changing illnesses. In Ian Paisley’s case, as it is quite well known now, when he went into hospital in 2004 and very nearly died, he came out and told Tony Blair that he had a close encounter with his Maker and wanted to end life as ‘Dr Yes’ rather than ‘Dr No’ and thereafter in the meetings with the DUP, even when his party was against him, he really was pushing to try and get to an agreement in a quite different way than he had been before.

The same thing is true of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. When Chávez got cancer, he started going to church twice a day, but he also tried to get to peace in Colombia. It was he who, having supported the FARC and given them a base in Venezuela, pushed the FARC into a negotiation in the last year or so of his life in a quite different sort of way.

Now, in terms in actual negotiations, I spend quite a lot of time in the book talking about this, so I will not spend long on it, but I have a complaint along with many of my old Foreign Office colleagues who are here.

When I joined the Foreign Office in 1979, we had one day of training when we started, and we had a copy of Harold Nicholson’s book on diplomacy, which is a wonderful example of British understatement, because it was published first in 1939 if I am right, and then republished in 1947 and the opening line of the 1947 edition is: *‘Many interesting events have occurred since this book was first published.’* We were also given a guide to placement, about where you should sit at dinner parties, which is extremely useful, but we were given no training on negotiation at all, and I have spent my entire career, both in the Foreign Office and subsequently, working on negotiations without any expertise.

I will not go into all of the examples, but I will mention just one thing, because it is important in the case of Libya, which is that a negotiation is not an event. You do not suddenly get to an agreement and that solves the problem. You have an agreement because people do not trust each other. An agreement does not make them trust each other. It is only when they start implementing the agreement that they begin to start trusting each other. So you have got an arc from people who do not trust each other, trying to get to people who do trust each other. The agreement is just one step along the way.

And what you need is a process to get you to that. I think that Shimon Peres, the master of the one-liner, has the best way of summing this up. He talks about the Middle East Peace Process and he says that everyone knows what the outcome will be in the Middle East Peace Process in terms of territory, in terms of refugees, even in terms of Jerusalem, but there is no process to get us there. So he says: *'The good news is, there's light at the end of the tunnel and the bad news is that there is no tunnel!'* And that is what you are trying to do as a negotiator - build a process, build a tunnel that will get you there.

The second thing to remember is that when you get to a breakthrough agreement, that is not the solution, that is not the end of the negotiation. If you think about the Oslo Accords when they were published, everyone celebrated, particularly on the Palestinian side but also on the Israeli side, but no one did anything to try and implement them. No one did anything to try and put them into practice. They crumbled and we had the Second Intifada.

If we thought when we took off in our helicopters from Stormont on Good Friday 1998 that we had solved the problem in Northern Ireland, we were sadly mistaken. It took us another nine years to get the agreements implemented and get the institutions up and running. So the hardest work in a negotiation is often after the agreement, not before the agreement and that is where you need to apply yourself, if you are going to succeed. Just one more Northern Ireland thing and then we can go on to Libya, which is that a good deal of ingenuity is required (and it may also apply to Libya) to get to a solution and to get a settlement.

In the case of Northern Ireland, we negotiated the whole of the peace agreement between the DUP and Sinn Féin without them ever meeting. It was all done by shuttle diplomacy. Eventually, we got to a stage where Ian Paisley agreed to sit down with Gerry Adams and they agreed on everything: how long the meeting would last, where the TV cameras would be, what they would discuss, but they would not agree where they would sit. Ian Paisley absolutely insisted on sitting opposite Gerry Adams so they looked like rivals, Adams insisted on sitting next to Paisley so that he looked like an equal. And we could just not get round that problem until a very bright Northern Ireland Office official came up with the idea of a new table, a diamond-shaped table, so they could sit next to each other and opposite each other at exactly the same time, and that managed to resolve the problem and get us to the final conclusion on that.

Let me in my last five minutes just move onto Libya and we can discuss it much more in the Q&A, because I know that is probably why many of you wanted to come along.

Libya is, like all of these cases, very different from the cases such as Northern Ireland, but also El Salvador or anywhere else, but there will be some patterns that will work and some that will not.

The first thing to understand about Libya is that it is not Syria or Iraq. If you look at it in a telescope from London or from Washington, it tends just to look like a mess with battles going on, but what Libya does not suffer from are the sectarian divisions or the religious divisions that you have in Syria and Iraq. In Libya, everyone is basically a conservative Maliki Sunni. They are not riven by divisions. There are tribal groups, there are other divisions, but really, even between east and west, the divisions are not that substantial.

So what the conflict is about is power and money and if a conflict is about power and money, it is

often much easier to resolve than if it is borne out of the sort of divisions that we have in Iraq and Syria, so that makes me relatively confident that you can find a conclusion in Libya in a way that would be much harder in Iraq and Syria.

The problem though, is that Libya, if you like, is the last bit of white space on the world map. It has never really had a government or institutions in the sense we would understand them. Under Gaddafi certainly, there were no institutions that we would recognise as a government. If you go back to the King, there was very little that we would recognise, or even under Italian colonialism, which was a particularly brutal form of colonialism (not that we can be particularly proud of our own), but in that case it did not really establish institutions. Going back to the Turks before that, they sat on the coast and governed from there.

So one of the problems is that in trying to deal with a country without institutions, without a sense of a country as a whole, it is very, very difficult to persuade people to make compromises, to make people come to a conclusion that actually settles the problem and it is very difficult - and this is the key problem at the moment - to persuade people to accept the legitimacy of anyone else.

We find it very hard to get the people in the west to accept the legitimacy of the House of Representatives and the House of Representatives will not accept the legitimacy of any of the bodies in the east, and we have the Supreme Court weighing in with decisions that complicate it even further. But it actually is a wider problem than just that.

When Bernadino León, the UN Envoy, brought together the different participants in his talks, people complained about 'why are those people there, why am I not there?' The basic problem in Libya is that all six million Libyans want to be at the negotiations and we do not have a room big enough in which to put them all and get to such a conclusion, so we have to find a way of establishing legitimacy. Dominic Asquith, who is here today, wrote a piece in the FT, arguing very passionately on the legitimacy of the House of Representatives, but the problem with that is that it is not accepted by the people in the west and the people in the west control the territory, so the question is: how do we get to a resolution?

Bernadino León has done remarkable things in his time as the UN Envoy. He has managed, against all odds, to gather all of the people together and all of the groups are sitting now in Morocco talking to each other, he has got them to agree on a sort of framework of what a national unity government might look like. But the problem is going to be moving beyond that, and as always, in a negotiation, you can often get people to agree on the easy things first, but how do you get them to agree on the difficult issue of who should be in power, who should be the Prime Minister in a national unity government, who should be the Deputy Prime Ministers, how is that legitimacy going to be confirmed by the House of Representatives, and does the GNC, the rival body in the west, have any role in that?

So we have managed to get into the process I was talking about, but the question is: can we keep that process going? I always think of a bicycle metaphor that once you have got a process going, you want it to keep going and not let the bicycle fall over, not let anyone walk out.

There is a wonderful story that Michael may well remember about John Major and Ian Paisley, who had a fairly fractious relationship. John Major saw Ian Paisley in his office (he used the Cabinet Room

downstairs in Number 10 as a meeting room) and Ian Paisley behaved outrageously and accused John Major of lying and John Major demanded that Ian Paisley withdraw his accusation, which he refused to do, and John Major said, *'Well, if you do not withdraw it, I am going to walk out'* and Paisley refused to, so John Major walked out. What he had forgotten was he had just walked out of his own office and Ian Paisley sat there for the rest of the day and would not leave. So, if you do walk out, always be careful where you are walking out of!

I will come back, as I am going to run out of time in the discussion about Libya, but the crucial problem in my view is whether we can get that further jump in terms of solving the problem of legitimacy, and most of all, can we actually deal with the military issue? It is all very well coming up with a political agreement, we can come up with a national unity government, but if it cannot go back to Tripoli that is occupied by militias, how on earth is it going to be better off than the current government sitting in a boat off the coast of Tobruk? So we have to find a way of dealing with those armed groups that I was talking about earlier and above all, whether we are actually in a situation with a mutually hurting stalemate and with some real political leadership on both sides that, as I say, seem to be the fundamentals to getting to a success in these circumstances.

In conclusion, to try to tie the whole thing together. The Americans have revised their approach to terrorism twice, once after Afghanistan and once after Iraq. They revised their COIN under the leadership of General Petraeus. What they have done is they have gone from just a kinetic approach to saying they must learn the lessons of Malaya and deal with hearts and minds. They have gone even further in the second revision in talking about reconciliation, although what they mean by reconciliation is actually sort of buying off bits of groups, as with the Taliban.

My argument is that you will not solve the problem of terrorism simply by military pressure down, but equally you will not solve it simply by taking a soft political approach. You have to be prepared to combine all of the tools at your disposal. You have to be able to have the military pressure down, but if you just have military pressure down, the people you are fighting will fight to the death and you will never stop them. You have to offer them a political way out at the same time. Combining those two tools is the crucial element.

The second lesson is that you may not succeed the first time when you are trying to manage talks like this. In Northern Ireland we had Sunningdale in 1973, we had the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, we had the Downing Street Declaration in 1993. None of them succeeded, but the Good Friday Agreement did not come from nowhere. The Good Friday Agreement was built on those previous failures - it was an accretion. Again, if you look at conflicts around the world, it is nearly always this pattern of a series of failed negotiations that lead to a success. Seamus Mallon of course described the Good Friday Agreement as *'Sunningdale for slow learners'* because it had very much the same measures in it as Sunningdale had had in terms of power-sharing, but it had taken that much longer for us to get to it.

So my optimistic conclusion is that all conflicts, including Libya, are soluble. Even the Middle East Peace Process is soluble, even though it has failed so many times before. There is an interesting thing that happens when you get to an agreement. Northern Ireland was considered to be insoluble, Churchill thought Northern Ireland was insoluble, Mrs Thatcher thought Northern Ireland was insoluble. When we got the agreement, everyone said it was inevitable. They said, *'Well, of course there's an agreement, there is an agreement because of 9/11, there is an agreement because the*

economic circumstances have changed’.

Actually, none of these conflicts are insoluble and nor is it inevitable that any of them will be solved. If you think either of those things, you are going to fail because you will not understand what needs to happen, and what does need to happen is you need to have some leadership, people prepared to take risks to get to a settlement, you need to have patience and above all, you need to have some inclination to learn from what went before.

Thank you very much.

BRITAIN: A NEW STYLE OF GOVERNMENT?

Transcript of a lecture by Professor Anthony King

12th May 2015

Anthony King is Professor of Government at the University of Essex. A Canadian by birth, he came to Britain as a Rhodes Scholar and was a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford before moving to Essex during the 1960s. He served on the original Committee on Standards in Public Life (the Nolan Committee) and on the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords. His books include 'Who Governs Britain?', 'The Founding Fathers v. the People: Paradoxes of American Democracy' and, with Sir Ivor Crewe, 'The Blunders of Our Governments,' which seeks to explain why British governments of all parties blunder so often and on such a prodigious scale. Professor King is a Fellow of the British Academy and a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

I am going to talk standing up. The unselfish reason for that is that people can hear me and see me better than they would be able to otherwise. The selfish reason is that I must have Spanish blood in me, because I tend to go to sleep after lunch and you may go to sleep, any one of you, or indeed all of you, I hereby absolve you of any blame for doing that. But if I fell asleep, that would be rather embarrassing, and it would be more likely to happen if I were sitting down.

Let me begin with an apology and a confession. The apology is that in an organisation called the Global Strategy Forum, one should not be talking exclusively about this country. One should not be parochial, but that is what I am about to be and I also apologise for the fact that I am not going to talk, at least to begin with, about the election because the letter from Michael did not invite me to talk about the election. He invited me to talk in and around the book [*'Who Governs Britain?'*] that he just referred to.

The confession is that I have become, rather to my surprise, something of a heretic as regards the way in which this country is governed, to the point of being almost an apostate. I have changed my views radically as time has gone on. Until recently, I was a great and pretty unqualified admirer of our political and governmental institutions, essentially for two reasons. One was that I admired the decisiveness, the capacity to take decisions that arose from the fact that, typically and most commonly, you had in power in London a single party majoritarian government and that meant that, unlike in many other countries which I will not bother to name, you had a government that was capable of governing, of taking decisions in the national interest as perceived by the people in power.

The other reason that I was an admirer of the system was that precisely because you had a centralised government, you had a government in which power was concentrated. As long as ministers had a majority in the House of Commons, those ministers could be held to account. If you look at an awful lot of countries and you imagine the situation of voters in those countries, they have a problem, because they do not know to whom to attribute things that have gone wrong, so that if they want to throw the rascals out, they are not sure who the rascals are. The slow pace for

example, with which health care reform was introduced in the United States - who was to blame? It was never entirely clear.

Well, as I said, I no longer admire the system in the way that I once did, for three reasons.

The first is that I had failed to pick up - and maybe it was not so true once upon a time - that if you have a system in which it is easy to take decisions, it is almost as easy to take the wrong ones as the right ones. Michael was too polite to refer to the predecessor book to the one he did refer to, called *'The Blunders Of Our Governments'*, and I was attracted to work on that book precisely because it had come to my notice over a period of time that British governments blundered frequently. This will sound like a boast - it is not, it is an expression of astonishment - but that book has sold (and it is quite a serious tome - it is not solemn, I hope, but it is serious) upwards of 50,000 copies. So I think it must have had some effect on people, it must have rung a bell somewhere.

The paperback edition has a shot at listing some of the blunders committed by the coalition government and I have been struck by the fact that I have addressed a lot of audiences of roughly this size, sometimes larger, of civil servants, some of them senior civil servants and I have listed the blunders and it is yet to happen that anybody has queried whether something I had identified as a blunder, was a blunder.

People seem to accept that, beginning with the poll tax, which was the first one mentioned in the book and one of the most spectacular, the fact that things have gone wrong is very widely acknowledged, so that people do not defend the way in which the Lansley NHS reforms were introduced. They do not defend the way in which IT projects have been handled over a long period of years. They do not pretend that it is highly desirable to have aircraft carriers with no aircraft - that is generally thought to be slightly strange. Still in the field of defence, government has the power to cut the size of the regular army. It has the power to say it will try to recruit enough reservists to make up for the people who have been axed, but it cannot actually do it and there is a good deal of evidence that it is not proving able to do it and I could go on and on and on.

If you enjoy this kind of literature, I do invite the reports of the Public Accounts Committee when it was chaired by the estimable and formidable Margaret Hodge. Notice one thing about those reports which is that, although they were often highly critical of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition, every single report published by the Public Accounts Committee under Margaret Hodge's chairmanship was unanimous. They were signed off by everybody, including the Liberal Democrats, including the Conservatives, on the Committee.

So that is the first point. My previous admiration for the system was founded in the belief that governments did not very often screw up and it has become clearer and clearer that at least latterly (I will not make any historical comparisons) it has screwed up far too often.

The second explanation for my apostasy is somewhat more subtle, and it is this. If you have a capital 'G' Government that has an overall majority in the House of Commons, that is capable of governing, that hoards power (and I do not mean that negatively, I just mean that factually the government is the centre of the system) then it follows that they are the rascals, they can be thrown out and they are very highly exposed.

And what is the consequence of that? It is to cause decisiveness to be matched by timidity and one of the striking features of the UK system of government over a considerable period of years is the number of 'wicked issues' (as they are called in Whitehall) that officials and ministers have been reluctant to tackle - what Charles Clarke calls 'the too difficult box'.

Take a few pretty obvious examples. Extending airport capacity in the south east of England. The Roskill Commission was appointed in 1960 to look at this and made recommendations which were turned down, and it has gone on and on and on. The London Underground hoardings are plastered with adverts for different solutions to this question which has been out there for a very long time. Meanwhile the Dutch have built Schiphol, the French have built Charles de Gaulle and so on and so forth.

Or the problems - which are enormous - posed by an ageing population, problems having to do obviously with the NHS, also with social care and so on. Demographers have been pointing out that this was going on ever since I can remember and I am part of the ageing population, but successive governments have found this very difficult to tackle (as indeed it is, I am not disputing that) but an allegedly decisive political system has not done that very satisfactorily.

Similarly with the long-term funding of the NHS. It is quite clear that on the present basis, the NHS is going to be fiscally difficult for the foreseeable future and indeed probably well beyond that, and yet that particular problem has not been tackled head on.

Climate change equally is something that, on the whole, people agree about - that there is such a thing, that it is, to use the grand term, anthropogenic, that we are partly responsible for it, but precious little has been done about it, not just by governments in this country, but also by governments elsewhere, but certainly by governments in this country.

Mental health, for example, is another no-no area.

Short termism, I think it is fair to say, has reigned, partly because governments know they are so likely to be held responsible for anything that they do that is unpopular.

The third reason for my disenchantment is of a completely different character. And it is very simply stated that when the capital 'G' Government of the United Kingdom was responsible for an awful lot that went on in the United Kingdom, it was perfectly reasonable to point the finger of blame or indeed to shout paeans of praise to people in power, but one of the central themes of the book to which Michael alluded a moment ago, is that it is no longer reasonable to hold UK governments responsible for a very large proportion of those things that most intimately affect people in the UK.

That is for a number of reasons, all of them obvious. One is the devolution of power to Edinburgh and Cardiff and Belfast. People still talk about the National Health Service. There is no such thing as the National Health Service in the UK - there are four National Health Services, run along different lines, sometimes radically different lines, in the four nations of the UK. Devolution within the UK and of course, for good or ill, we can differ about that, the handing over of very substantial powers that have an effect on the people who live in this country to the European Union. The surrender of some of our so-called sovereignty to the EU.

The courts. I do not know whether you have noticed this, but I am intrigued by the fact that once upon a time, people never talked in this country about the three branches of government: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. That was a language that was known, but it was not spoken, but now we hear that language used all the time. Why? Because the judges are now players in the political game in a way that they never were. We can talk about why that should have happened, but it has happened. The phrase 'judicial review' you never saw in the newspaper a generation ago, now you can hardly pick up the newspaper without seeing somebody is going to claim judicial review of something or other. So the judges matter more.

And of course, the UK economy has always been, more than many others, embedded in a world market economy, but that world market economy has become more interpenetrated, more intertwined, every bit of it more dependent on other bits of it than has been true for a very long time. Going back to my Spanish blood, I get up early and often listen to *Farming Today* and then when I am done with that (that is the EU bit), I listen to the financial news. It is very interesting that currency fluctuations that involve sterling are almost always attributed to things that have nothing to do with Britain or sterling, but have to do with developments elsewhere in the outside world. Market forces are hugely important.

I think by the way - I say this semi-parenthetically - that one of the reasons for the alienation of so many members of the general public from our political class, is because people still campaign in elections and talk between elections as though UK governments were capable of moving mountains, which they cannot. Labour, during this election campaign, talked about a better plan, a better Britain. Well, leaving aside how you voted in the election, that was simply over-promising and I think people have picked up that that language is no longer appropriate.

So what might be done? The question always arises and it is appropriate that it should arise. Let me suggest that there are certain institutional things that might usefully be done without upending the UK's constitution. I think the idea of overall constitutional reform is probably simply not on the agenda and it does not need to be there in my view.

One relates to Parliament. It is well known that Parliament is a noisy debating society, it is well known that it is a labour exchange where you get your ministers from, it is well known as being a partisan bear pit and it is fairly widely known, but should be more widely known, that as a legislative assembly, it is just about useless. It is one of the weaker Parliaments in existence - there are a lot of weak parliaments around by the way, but certainly the British Parliament is one of the weaker ones. Its capacity to deal with government legislation, let alone to initiate legislation from within itself, is very limited indeed and one can think of various ways of dealing with that. For example, it is bizarre that the specialist Select Committees that deal with subjects like health and education, the one thing they cannot do is deal with legislation on health and education. I know of no other Parliament that has this bifurcation between legislative committees and investigative committees in the way that we have in this country.

More radically, I wonder how many people have noticed that the UK is, along with its former colony, Ireland, the only country in the EU that requires ministers also to be Parliamentarians. There are quite a number of countries - France is one, the Netherlands is another - where you can be a minister without being an MP and you can be appointed a minister from anywhere that the Prime Minister or the President decides. More commonly, you may be an MP but you do not need to be an

MP, so that it is open to an Angela Merkel to import into her governing administration people who have not become members of the Bundestag.

It seems to me that the notion that our gene pool from which ministers are drawn should come almost exclusively from supporters of the majority party in the House of Commons is, on the face of it, a rather bizarre idea and if you say, 'Well, some of the people who have been parachuted in have not worked very well', I offer you two thoughts. One is that some of the people who have been appointed from within have not worked very well either, and also that at least some of the parachutees have done rather well. Winston Churchill knew what he was doing in 1940 when he appointed Ernest Bevin who was a trade union leader, not a Member of Parliament, to become Minister of Labour and of course he went on to become a pretty good Foreign Secretary after the War.

Officialdom worries me. This is a subject that, wearing my academic hat, I want to work on more systematically than anybody seems to have done so far, but very simply my strong impression (and it is no more than that at the moment, but I think I am probably right) is that whereas we once took it for granted that ministers took the difficult political decisions, gave their department a broad sense of direction, institutional memory was housed in the Civil Service and it was the civil servants who knew from their own experience about the work of their department, I think that is less and less true, not because most civil servants are not able people, but because they lack the requisite training and they are moved around so often.

The book contains a number of anecdotes. A chum of mine went to see some people in the Department for Education when it was still responsible for universities and was considering (and this was in Labour days, ten years or so ago) accelerated two-year university degrees. There had been a government-sponsored report on that subject a generation before, which had pooh-poohed the idea and given good reasons for doing so. My chum reported to me that none of the officials present had read the report and none of them had ever heard of it. Institutional memory? Experience? Knowledge? I keep hearing stories of that character and they are worrying.

Let me throw one in to which I have no easy answers at all.

Have you noticed - and I had not fully taken this on board until I wrote this book - the odd circumstance that as the number of people who belong to political parties or are party activists has shrunk (and it has shrunk by something like 90% since just after the Second World War), the power of those party members and activists has increased so that they now elect the leaders of all the main parties. Now, if those people's views were representative of the views at least of the people who voted for their own party, but ideally of a broader swathe of the electorate, that would not matter, but the evidence is pretty powerful that on the whole, the people who in 2015 choose to sign up to a political party have different views from the views even from the leaders of the party, let alone the views of ordinary constituents. As I say, what you do about that, I do not know.

Let me just suggest that there are some institutional fixes. I have alluded to a few of them, but the central problem is probably one of mindset, of an insufficiency of pragmatism, an insufficiency of desire to accept that things are problems and to set about dealing with those problems in as pragmatic, non-ideological and non-partisan a way as is possible. In the book, and you may think of a better term, I refer to this as the 'Nordic' style of government, where the aim of the game is

to deliberate, to weigh up options and perhaps think of options that have not occurred to people before, to consult very widely.

If Mrs Thatcher's people, if William Waldegrave and others, had asked people who were then known as town treasurers to tell them how they proposed to collect the poll tax, they would have been told that you could not collect the poll tax in many parts of Britain and they would have been better advised. So you consult widely and meaningfully, not just a document sent out wanting responses to complicated questions in three weeks. It seems to me if you approach problems in that way, you are likely, as I have already hinted, to be concerned about do-ability, deliverability, can this actually be made to happen on the ground? And you can take your time.

Notice the number of governmental decisions, in particular the number of blunders that appear to have been caused in large part by ministers acting at speed, to the extent that sometimes I think they are actually on speed. There are very few decisions that have to be taken very quickly. I remember when I came to this country from Canada, I was told that one of the things that British political leaders prided themselves on was grasping nettles, so I tried grasping a nettle. I had never come across one before in Canada and I thought this was a very odd way to behave.

The Dutch have a phrase: 'if you have a hot potato, put it in the fridge', and typically they do not leave it in the fridge indefinitely, they find means of extracting it from the fridge in better condition than it went in. I think a number of things would follow from doing more things that way. One is probably that you would achieve greater continuity with incoming governments less keen on undoing things that the existing government has already done. I think you would find it easier to deal with some of these 'wicked issues'.

If all stakeholders were going to get involved, you would be more likely (I am not over-optimistic, but you would be more likely) to arrive at agreed solutions and heaven knows, if our political class behaved in a more grown-up kind of way, it is just conceivable that the people now so alienated from our political class might be more respectful of them and I think it is worth pointing out that that degree of alienation is virtually unique to this country and also, for quite different reasons, to the United States.

Anyway, I live more in hope than in expectation. As I said a moment ago, I am not a huge optimist, but there have been occasions, for example, just before the Scottish Referendum, when all the three major parties got together to agree on a programme of fiscal reform for Scotland. There have been occasions - the handling of Northern Ireland over a considerable period of time - when it has been possible to achieve a degree of cross-party consensus and on the whole, I think it is better to strive for consensus than dis-sensus.

Let me conclude by reading a short paragraph from this book, '*Who Governs Britain?*' - I am reading it partly to excuse the fact that I have just been talking about the UK, but it does illustrate tolerably well a number of points I have been making.

'Ministers in successive governments have refused to make difficult decisions on defence. On the one hand, they want Britain to be able to punch above its weight in world affairs, on the other, they are reluctant to spend the money on Britain's military capabilities that would be essential if Britain were really to be able to do that. In both connections, they are inhibited

by electoral considerations. They can't bring themselves to admit publicly that Britain can no longer rank as a world power, and that defence spending can therefore be reduced substantially, but nor can they bring themselves either to raise more revenue for defence purposes or else to slash other budgets in the interests of bolstering the country's defences. Ministers fear the electoral consequences of doing either, so they do neither. The results are badly overstretched Armed Forces, aircraft carriers without aircraft and a cadre of political leaders who, since they cannot punch above their weight, talk above their weight instead.'

DEMOCRATIC ILLUSIONS: THE LESSONS OF THE ARAB SPRING

Text of a lecture by James Watt CVO

19th May 2015

James Watt CVO served extensively in the Middle East, including most recently as British Ambassador to Lebanon (2003-2006), Jordan (2006-2011) and Egypt (2011-2014). He has dealt with some of the major issues and conflicts affecting West Asia and the Arab world, including the unresolved issue of Palestine, the consequences of the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the conflict in Afghanistan, relations between Pakistan and India, the situation in Iraq, sectarian conflict in Syria and Lebanon, and the experience of Egypt following the removal of Mubarak in 2011 and of Morsi in 2013. He has significant hands-on experience in international crisis management, notably the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon and the three years of turmoil in Cairo after the revolution (2011-2014). Support for businesses has been a major part of his work, in particular working with the oil, gas, nuclear, mining and banking industries, in opening markets, resolving disputes and assisting compliance, as well as with higher education and social development programmes.

Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel extremely honoured to be invited on this occasion to speak in front of such a large and distinguished audience. And also glad to have this chance to share some reflections on the tumultuous events in the Arab world in the past four and a half years. I think we are all feeling perhaps a little punch-drunk from the sheer scale and complexity of the turmoil that has hit the region in that time. And we all sense that the next stages of the story are far from clear.

I do not want to attempt too much in the thirty or so minutes I have been allocated for this talk. And I look forward to a lively discussion afterwards in the second half of our session. So I will try to focus on just three areas of enquiry.

For the first I shall seek to give an idea of what it was like seeing the Arab Spring from the vantage point first of Jordan, where I was serving as Ambassador when it all began, and then of Egypt, where I arrived in June 2011 and spent the following three years.

The second area involves asking what we can learn about those historic events. I shall look in particular at Egypt, and at Syria, Libya and Yemen. In doing so I do not mean to overlook the courageous efforts and positive outcome in Tunisia. It is just that the difficult cases illustrate the problems better.

And the third, how this knowledge might guide policymakers for the future.

The Warning Signs

Could I start by saying that while the exact course of events of the various uprisings and power struggles could not be known in advance, it was pretty clear to those of us dealing with the region

that something was brewing. In early 2010 the Middle East researchers of the FCO, inspired by the foundational work of UNDP in its Arab Human Development Reports, highlighted the demographic and other macro pressures building in the region, especially on Egypt, and policymakers took this seriously. So much so that we had the base analysis well studied by the time first Tunisia in December 2010 and then Egypt in January 2011 erupted into revolution.

Western Delusions

From that point, however, Western understanding generally of what was taking place tended to be coloured by some false analogies and some wishful thinking. The main false analogy was with 1989 in Europe and the end of Soviet domination of what was called the Eastern Bloc. The Western press and pundits, even more than the politicians, rushed to applaud, and to apply the same hopeful prognosis, and advocate the same policy instruments that had been applied to Eastern Europe. Despite the bitter experiences of liberal interventionism in Iraq, the start of the Arab Spring saw an uncritical revival of assumptions about the inevitable triumph of Western-style democracy. It has taken not only the subsequent course of events in the Arab world, but also the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to sober up that kind of thinking.

I believe there was more than just democratic triumphalism at work, however, in those attitudes. The previous two decades in this country and elsewhere had seen a sustained and sincere effort to counter Islamophobia and to enable our Muslim populations rightly to play a full part in democratic life. In order to prevail over the sceptics, those fighting Islamophobia needed to show that Muslim-majority states in the Middle East were capable of creating and maintaining genuine modern democracies. Tunisia and Egypt took on huge significance in this regard for Western opinion-formers. That, I think, led to a degree of blindness about what the political Islamist agenda really was, above all in Egypt, and what the real attitudes and priorities of ordinary Egyptians were, and helps explain why the Western reaction to the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime under President Mursi in July 2013 was so horrified and critical. Perhaps you could say that a precious myth had been challenged, and the reaction of press and pundits and politicians was to misunderstand and vilify the societal forces that had led to that turn of events.

It is, I believe, important to remember that the key demand of the populations that rose in revolt against abusive police states in the Arab Spring was for dignity, the dignity of the individual, a sense of worth as a human being, as someone who has inherent rights, and whose aspiration for hope and a better future could no longer bear not just poverty but the ineffectiveness, the neglect and the casual indifference of the ruling order. In the poorer parts of society, resentment was often focused on the brutality and corruption of the police at a local level.

The View From Cairo

My most vivid and enduring memory of the Egyptian uprising is of the heroism of those fighting for human rights and democratic freedoms in confronting the security forces in Tahrir Square, above all in the harrowing weeks in November 2011 when rank upon rank of young protestors were gunned down by police firing birdshot in their faces. All knew that this sacrifice was a supreme protest against the stifling of the legitimate hopes and aspirations of the Egyptian revolution. There should have been no need for that fighting, had the authorities acted wisely and in good faith by drawing all political forces into a genuine national agreement on the future of Egypt. But by

then the upholders of the liberal revolution had concluded that the old security state was back in power unchanged, and some thought that, more dangerously, it had done a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. (Like everything from this period, the truth was far more complex than that.)

Dealing with the post-Mubarak governments, up until the election of Mohamed Mursi as President in June 2012, I became sharply aware of the deep distrust and antipathy of large segments of the Egyptian security state towards the West, and which responded with anger to our post 1989-style policy reactions. What Western countries saw as their absolute right to provide support to a liberal democratic agenda, appeared to them as a neo-imperialist invasion, a gross interference in Egypt's internal affairs at a highly sensitive time. The controversy over foreign NGOs operating in Egypt put the spotlight on this clash of views. The standard conditionality attached to IMF lending and EU funding, demanding as it did an irreversible transition to Western-style democracy, was seen as further evidence of this agenda. This hardened attitudes and made the forces of reaction all the more determined to prevail.

There was of course a vanguard of progressive political forces that was aligned with Western democratic ideals. But from the outset they suffered from the clumsy embrace of Western zeal for revolutionary change in Egypt. They were portrayed as traitors, which of course is exactly what they were not. And from the start the picture was complicated by the strong electoral showing made by Islamist parties, notably the well-organised Muslim Brotherhood.

Many Egyptian liberals stayed true to their principles and respected the victories of the Muslim Brotherhood, first in the Parliamentary elections and then the Presidential election of June 2012. But the recklessly anti-democratic behaviour of the Mursi regime once in power rapidly put an end to that respect. Among the mass of ordinary people the arrogant behaviour of Islamist street-level vigilantes, empowered and given space by the weak and ambiguous leadership in Cairo, led straight to the passionately welcomed ejection of the regime in July 2013. The most telling accusation was that the Islamists were anti-Egyptian, a serious charge in the view of the deeply patriotic Egyptian people.

Over time the fury of Egyptian nationalists was turned on the West, and on the United States in particular, for supporting democracy in order, they believed, for the Muslim Brotherhood to take power. The motive for this apparent policy was widely believed to be a desire to cripple Egypt forever, as part of untiring Western efforts to weaken and dismember the Arab world.

The political Islamist agenda never looked benign to Egyptians as it did to the distant vantage points of Western capitals and newsrooms. And the failure of Western capitals to understand how this was being perceived led to Western statements and measures such as the suspension of aid and of arms sales, marking a strong protest against what had happened. This in turn incensed the mass of the people who thought that their view of what should happen in their country should be what counted, and that taking the fight for individual rights and freedoms to the street was fundamentally democratic. The West went wild with enthusiasm when this was the case against the Mubarak regime in January 2011. But the opposite when it happened against an Islamist takeover which was set to transform Egypt into something it had no wish to be.

I should add that the Muslim Brotherhood leadership, for their part, were totally deluded by what they saw as unswerving Western support for their agenda. They bet on it, to the point of ignoring

warnings and signs that they had seriously misjudged the Egyptian people. And of course they bet wrong. But we should, I think, ask ourselves why they formed that idea and what series of signals Western policies and statements were making that gave it them. It was not just government statements and policies. The Western media, as we saw in some very biased coverage of the second revolution of July 2013, was perhaps even more guilty of feeding Islamist self-delusion.

Beyond Egypt

I now want to turn what was happening elsewhere in the region. The story of the Arab Spring is well known to this audience and I do not need to relate it here. I would just like to extrapolate from the ideas I have presented on events in Egypt and see what points there are in common and what there is that is different.

I think we all start from a belief that the widespread political turmoil in the Arab world springs from a number of large, impersonal developments. There is a degree of human agency involved, but there is not a 'conspiracy' of the sort that populates most political conversations in the region.

Strong demographic growth is unaccompanied by sufficient economic growth. The gap with the world's advanced economies and even the medium economies has grown great in many cases. And the gaps of wealth within the Arab world have grown even greater. Education has failed practically all Arab populations, over a long period, with the result that only a slender percentage of Arabs can now take part in the world's knowledge revolution and link to the global networks of growth. Public health is a disaster on a similar scale. And the quality of life in the Arab world's crowded and badly built cities is often very poor.

These strains have been compounded by brutal and retrograde styles of government in several places. These were roundly rejected by the populations that rose in revolt in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen demanding their rights and their dignity. New group identities are being sought to replace the weakened model of the autocratic security state. Religious divides have overturned centuries-old traditions of mutual respect and coexistence. Power-seeking groups such as ISIL have harnessed social despair by propagating a heady doctrine of hatred, bigotry and violence.

Ethnic identity, never far from the surface, has emerged once more as a defining factor. Where tribal society prevails, and I am thinking here of Jordan as an example, the tribe has grown stronger than ever, its patronage network being of far greater importance to its members than what the impoverished nation state can provide. And, where the tribes are strong, the political parties reaching across the wider population that are needed for modern parliamentary democracy, can never develop.

Egypt

In Egypt the battles were between the new, in the form of reformist liberals and of the young generation more widely, and the old in the form of the repressive security state, with a serious spoiling challenge by pan-Islamists. The security state won in round three, drawing its justification, as it claims, from the need to fight Islamist terrorism. What came through most strongly, in the three turbulent years following the Tahrir Square revolution of January 2011, was the deep nationalist and anti-extremist instinct of the Egyptian people. Egypt's five thousand year heritage as a nation state prevailed.

Syria

Syria has almost as old a history as a cultural entity, though as a state not quite so unambiguously as Egypt. Its divisive sectarian history in modern times, long held in check by the repressive Alawite regime, has now destroyed the country. Islamists lead the armed opposition, which in turn has split into two major Islamist forces, ISIL being the very extreme version. Despite these extremely serious challenges, I am not one of those who sees the dismemberment of Syria as a likely outcome, let alone an unavoidable one.

Nor do I see radicalisation taking hold in the population at large. Syrians, like Egyptians, are proud of their country and its deep history. They too have no wish to see extremism prevail. The great majority want to return to their homes, when the fighting finally stops, and remake their lives as untroubled as possible by ideological fanaticism and violence. None of Syria's neighbours want to see Syria remain weak and war-ridden, and a source of instability. However long it takes, I believe Syria will return to its previous identity as a settled urban and rural society with deep cultural roots, capable of growing towards modern forms of governance.

Libya

In Libya, as I am sure this audience knows, there is no sectarian divide, and no tradition of ethnic discrimination. The proportion of religious fanatics is low, even if they wield disproportionate armed power and are well linked to international jihadism. Tribalism plays a small part overall in identity, which is largely urban and mixed.

What has caused chaos is the power-grabbing tactics of Islamist and other forces in Libya after the fall of Qaddafi, depriving the Libyan people of the chance to build the modern democratic state they rightly claim after decades of despotism. They have a better chance of achieving this than more populous and more diverse countries such as Syria, and they have the successful example to follow of Tunisia their neighbour. The current UN-led mediation is right to work for national unity and to restrain the resort to arms, but should not pretend that the Islamist elements they have drawn in to the negotiations are acceptable to those who are truly seeking a rights-based democratic form of government, or that such an outcome is possible with the participation of hard-line political Islamists.

Yemen

For a time, at the start of the Arab Spring, it seemed possible that Yemen, like Libya, could throw off the past and make a genuine national commitment to develop inclusive and accountable democratic government. It would be a huge task, in view of Yemen's diversity and disunity, and was impelled by the acute need to counter the economic collapse that was looming.

But here too the greed for power of the outgoing regime as it sought to claw its way back, undermined those prospects. A small but destructive minority of violent Islamist extremists also contributed to destabilising the potential political consensus. Tribal rivalries remained raw, and the US drone attacks on al-Qaeda targets, with the now familiar consequence of death and destruction inflicted on innocent civilians, became al-Qaeda's best rallying call with the Sunni tribes of the Hadhramaut and elsewhere. We now have the absurd situation of US support for military action

against the Houthis, who are widely considered to be the most effective military counter to al-Qaeda. The scene is set for prolonged fighting and much human misery.

Concluding Thoughts

I hope this brief canter over some of the analytical ground has given you some elements for further thought and discussion. I said at the beginning that I wanted to ask whether policymaking has drawn the right lessons for the experience of the past four and a half years. Clearly we have all learnt a lot. Western governments are more cautious about intervention, and more conscious of the need to have consistent, realistic medium-term plans and to follow them through. Whether this survives the pressures in our democracies to look good and decisive, and to appear to know all the answers, regardless of the deep complexity of the issues, remains to be seen. The media sphere, for its part, greatly to its credit, has become ever richer in coverage and analysis of the real issues: that too will have to survive the pressure on editors in fast-moving situations to over-simplify and to play to preconceptions.

I would like to finish with one last thought. The notion of democracy lies at the heart of the Western liberal prescription for those countries which are developing their political order to meet the needs of the time. We should be clear that democracy is not just about the ballot box and majority rule. I prefer to keep in mind the notion of accountability. How much of the state and its power is accountable to the people? Is the system of justice working to uphold individual rights, and play its part in obliging those in power to be accountable? How much of the state-owned economy, and I include in that the economic stake held directly by the armed forces, is managed transparently and accountably? Do the media perform their task of holding those in power to account? Is there confidence in society that government is genuinely doing its best?

These elements form democratic societies. I believe we should start from this baseline in conceiving, in cases as different as Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen, what the people of those countries are striving to achieve, all summed up in the word 'dignity'.

Thank you.

PREVENTION IS BETTER THAN CURE: THE PLACE OF SOFT POWER IN A WORLD OF HARD CHOICES

Transcript of a lecture by Sir Ciarán Devane

1st July 2015

Sir Ciarán Devane took up the role of Chief Executive of the British Council in January 2015. Ciarán was Chief Executive of Macmillan Cancer Support from May 2007 to December 2014. He is a trustee of the National Council for Voluntary Organisation and of the Makaton Charity, and is a Non-Executive Director of NHS England. Ciarán was educated at University College, Dublin where he gained first-class honours in biochemical engineering. He then started his career as an engineer before becoming a manager for Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) working across Europe, Latin America and East Asia for eight years. He later joined Gemini Consulting where he led multi-country change programmes for companies such as AstraZeneca and Rolls Royce. He holds a Masters degree in International Policy and Practice from George Washington University, Washington DC. He received a knighthood in the Queen's Birthday Honours in 2015.

Good afternoon. It is a pleasure to be here and a privilege to be the Chief Executive of the British Council. I think the reason I was very keen to apply for the job and thrilled to get it, was really because of a course I took in Washington when I did a Masters there about ten years ago. There was a course taught by a Sinologist on democratisation and it asked: what are the things which make for a good democracy? Of course, it was not just about elections, it was about a lot of other things as well: the rule of law, institutions, a free press and so forth, and I became fascinated by the topic. So when the opportunity came up to apply, of course I did.

I would like to talk a bit about soft power, but also about the British way of doing soft power, because there are different definitions.

Joseph Nye, who is an academic in the United States, was the person who came up with the phrase. He wrote a book which talked about soft power and smart power versus hard power. It became a vogue, so it is probably worth spending a few minutes just talking about the definition as I see it.

The simplest definition of soft power, because it is a collective phrase, is: not hard power. It sounds obvious. It is not the military end, it is the rest. So what does that cover? Well, it covers what the Foreign Office would call 'diplomatic excellence', it covers cultural diplomacy, where from an instrumental point of view, culture is used to create relationships - 'we want to be nice to this country, can we put on a series of events in that country and it will be a good excuse to convene?'

It could be public diplomacy, which is a state or an embassy talking the people of a particular country - that risks being over the head of the government, so it is not always liked in all parts of the world.

It could be cultural relations which is what we think we do and which I will talk a bit more about,

or it could be forward engagement which is one of the phrases the Americans use a lot – it is doing things now which will help engage people who will be useful in ten or twenty years’ time.

In many ways it is all of those things and needs to be seen in the round. In the spectrum of tools available to a state, you have got the very hard end of hard power, you have got the military itself, you have got military relationships, you have got diplomacy, you have got cultural relations, you have got the BBC. A very good example of soft power was when our Prime Minister was in China and one of the questions he was asked at a particular talk was ‘when’s the next episode of *Sherlock*?’. It is about relationships and it is about people understanding a little bit more about somebody else’s culture.

So within all of that, how do we do it as Britain? We talk about cultural relations, we do not talk about soft power. It is what Lord Howell was saying – that we should not be an organisation which says ‘right, we’ve got this foreign policy objective, be it around security or the prosperity agenda, can you do this for this reason and please now do the following...’, because if we do that, then what we are not doing is building the relationships between people and countries.

I want to take us back to 1940. I have been walking around for the last six months (and it is exactly six months today since I was appointed and started), and I have been carrying this with me, which is our Annual Report for 1940-1941. Now annual reports can be dull. This one is not. This one is a beautiful piece of draughtsmanship and it talks about the Council’s aim and the Council’s aim is:

‘To create in a country overseas, a basis of friendly knowledge and understanding of the people of this country, of their philosophy and way of life, which will lead to a sympathetic appreciation of our foreign policy, whatever for the moment that may be, and from whatever political conviction it may spring.’

So the Report is saying that the Council’s aim is not about the pursuit of the foreign policy, it is about creating this basis of friendly knowledge and understanding. And it goes on to talk about – and you could write this today:

‘The annihilation of distance in the modern world has brought the different races and civilisations of the world rapidly and violently together.’

So even then, they were worrying over this question: ‘The world’s getting smaller, it’s getting more connected, how are we going to deal with this? Well, let’s give a Royal Charter to this thing called the British Council’. It says that:

‘The constant interchange of knowledge, ideas and discoveries was always the way of life of Europe in its wiser days, and rightly now no less the way of life of the world. To foster that interchange in the interests of peaceful and happy international relationships, is rightly to be regarded as the function of the prudent state.’

In summary, the goal is to create connections and it is to create interchange. You do not know what will happen, you are not pursuing a specific aim, but by creating those relationships, good things will happen. You do not know what they are, but ultimately the world will be a better place and a safer place and a more prosperous place, and you do it by building those relationships. That, for

me, is the role of the British Council. And if they can think that in 1940-1941, during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, and they can sit in an office in King Charles Street and write that, then surely it is appropriate that we consider its use now.

So, what are the principles of soft power?

The first one, and this is where I think Joseph Nye got it right, is that it is about attraction. If people like you, then they are more likely to listen to you, so I think that has to be one.

The second principle is about mutuality. You have to be prepared to learn yourself. You have to be prepared to be changed yourself through this interchange. In the old days, the British Council would have been good at 'let's send out a theatre group from the UK to show you how good our playwrights are. Shakespeare's marvellous. You can't get enough Shakespeare, we'll send you lots of Shakespeare'. Today, it is about saying 'by all means, let's support a theatre group who wants to go to whatever country, but let's do it in partnership with a theatre group in that country, let's have an exchange and see what happens and we will learn about theatre in Colombia, or wherever it is'.

By the way, it is not only the playwrights and the actors who meet, it is also the technicians, so they can share skills as well and learn techniques from each other. The idea is to create a broad range of connections, which mean that we all understand each other a bit more and therefore these good things are more likely to happen and bad things are less likely to happen. It is not about the bit of the soft power argument which is 'can we get them out there to like what we like, and to want what we want?' It is not about that, certainly not the way that we in the British Council do it.

The challenge for us as the British Council and the challenge for Britain in terms of soft power is to try to understand how that works in the modern world, because the world is changing and I would like to draw an analogy here. My background is largely health in one way or another, and I am fascinated by the parallel, strangely, between the Ebola outbreak in West Africa and modern extremism in North Africa more broadly, because we are seeing the same mechanisms kicking in.

In the past, Ebola, though a horrible disease, was never seen as a global threat, because the connectivity was not there. People were not getting on planes and travelling, so while, if you contracted Ebola, there was a high probability of it killing you, the chances of it actually spreading and becoming a global epidemic were seen as being quite small.

In the modern world where people are travelling, somebody could easily get on a plane in Freetown and head off to Monrovia. It is now a different thing - the disease has not changed, but the transmission factor has changed. There are more mechanisms for the transmission to take place. I hope it is not too stretched an analogy, but if you look at extremism in North Africa now, there are always people who think strange things, who are prepared to be violent, who are prepared to be intolerant and to impose their will. In the modern world, they are just more connected because that is what the Internet is doing.

Controlling the Ebola outbreak was not about better treatment - 70% of people with Ebola still die - it was all about controlling the transmission. It was about identifying people, isolating them, changing the practices, changing the funeral rites which had been there for centuries, to reduce the ability for the disease to transfer.

So one of our challenges then is this: how do we change the transmission factor for extremism? Some of that can be active, which is probably nothing to do with us, such as taking down people's websites, for example. Some of it is actually creating alternative conversations and I will come back to that in a minute. But thinking about this in a holistic way is going to be very important.

The other interesting thing to look at is: who is doing this extremism? They are not the poorest and they are not the most uneducated. If you look at the research in Pakistan, support for extremism is higher in the middle classes than it is amongst those in poverty. Even in Tunisia, if you look at Seifeddine Rezgui, the gunman - he was an engineer, he was not uneducated. So what was it in his environment that meant that he took one path and not the other?

Some of it is around the form of education. An engineering degree in Tunisia will be more academic, it will be more by rote, the university will not have debating societies that some of us all took part in, meaning the education you receive is slightly different. You can analyse what is happening in terms of the deficit of skills which are learnt through education as much as the level of attainment.

The world that we are in is one where we have gone digital, which allows this transmission to take place in a completely different way and ISIS have been exploiting that hugely. We have got vast numbers of people going through challenged education systems and coming out the other end, not necessarily employable, into an economy that does not necessarily have the jobs for them. How are we going to cope with that? HG Wells expressed it when he said: *'Civilisation is in a race between education and catastrophe'*.

When you talk to the education minister in Pakistan, he is absolutely worried about education, but worried about the youth bulge as well. It is the same when you talk to the minister in Egypt and it is the same when you talk to the minister in South Africa.

This race between how we are going to deal with the vast numbers of young people moving through education systems is one of the major challenges for us. And if you go back to the document from 1940, one of the major tools that we use as the British Council relates to education and I will come back to that.

It is why, in my job, I was very pleased to hear our Prime Minister saying that in the wake of the attack in Tunisia, there should be a 'full spectrum response', so not just a military response, not just diplomatic, but the full spectrum. I think that is right. We need to think about what the soft power version of this is, bearing in mind that the timescale is different. If you are trying to build relationships, change the narrative in a society, support a society to develop its own narrative, then that is not a two-year programme, it is not a security clampdown, it is something much more long term.

I think we can see where it works well and we can see where it does not work so well. I think I am allowed to say this: there was a meeting during the surge in Iraq where General Petraeus allegedly thumped the table and said, *'Look, you guys, you're trying to militarise everything. What we need is more of the British Council around here'*, so you can imagine a British Council surge through Iraq! But he was not wrong. He was saying that actually a lot of the issues are not military, they are about relationships.

If you look at some of the good work that was done in Afghanistan and Iraq, it was around working with communities to build relationships, so this concept of a full spectrum response is important - more than important, it is vital. The question becomes: what might it look like and what might our contribution to it be? There are a few things I would like to mention in this context.

Let me talk about three programmes which we are involved in, which I have been to see.

The first one is what we call Young Arab Voices. If you are a young Arab, you are supposed to be seen and not heard in many countries. This idea of talking back to your elders just does not exist, and this idea of debating topics just does not happen. You do not do it at home, you do not do it at school, you do not do it at university. The skills that we grew up with, where being on the school debating team was almost as good as being on the school football team, are simply not part of how things happen.

So we work with young emerging leaders to help them train people how to debate and to run debating competitions, in the belief that in the long term, two things will happen. The first is that we are working with future leaders. The second is that we are helping to change the narrative in society and creating some alternative pathways and that doing that at scale, with thousands upon thousands of young people, can have an impact, but only if you stick at it, year after year after year. It is the cumulative effect, it is the compound interest that works over time.

The second one was a programme I saw last week in north eastern Uganda. This is a community which is split between Christian and Muslim and there is slight suspicion on each side. Again, we are working with the political leadership, the district council (a population of 300,000 in the district, very rural in a way we do not understand), and we are working with these emerging leaders, teaching them to facilitate, to build their capability in order to build the capability of the village elders, who then help the village to work out the resources they have and raise pigs or turkeys or make honey or whatever it is. Of the 300,000 people in the district, in one way or another we have touched 60,000 of them, so this is scale. But what it is doing is building the capability of the leaders because those lead facilitators will be the future leaders of Uganda, and it is also making an impact on the ground at scale.

Now why is that the British Council and not the Department for International Development (DFID)? It is because of the leadership aspect. It is jointly funded: DFID want the outcomes, they want the reduced poverty (we quite like that idea too), but the reason that we are prepared to do it and invest time and effort in it is because we are developing leadership capability in a society that does not have it. And hearing the Youth Association in a particular village saying, *'Look, this side of the road we're Christian, that side of the road we're Muslim, that's why we put the office over here, we're having the meeting this side of it and we're learning from each other and how to do that, because we didn't grow up this way'* - that is the point. This is education, but not in a classroom sense.

The British Council's contribution is, for example, what we are doing in Tunisia with Young Arab Voices. We are not doing it in every country in the Middle East and North Africa and the Gulf and maybe we should be. Equally the Act of Citizen Programme in Uganda - that should be done in many, many more countries as well. I think the next stage in Britain's soft power is to say 'these are great things that we are doing, but let's do them at a more evenly distributed level and maybe to a higher level as well'.

The other advantage we have as the UK is, funnily enough, the English language. We teach English to hundreds of thousands of people a year. Yes, it is about teaching them English, but it is really about connecting them with the world. That has always been the goal. It is connecting people who will then go on to do other things, who will travel the world. In the old days they would get on the boat or the plane and they would end up in the UK and they might go to university here, but they could not do that if they did not speak English and they could not do it if they did not have an exam that people believed. This is why we got into the exams area. One of the things the Chief Minister of the Punjab says very proudly is, 'I sat a British Council exam, because of that, my results were believed - it wasn't that my rich uncle paid off the examiner and therefore I got into university and now I'm Chief Minister of the Punjab'. And we get credit for that. We were not there, but we get credit for that.

The other example is the Mayor of Seoul. We taught him his English, and that connected him with the world. He now wants to connect Seoul with London, two global cities. Now that is a long game, we taught him his English forty years ago, but the next Mayor of Seoul was probably in the classroom the day I met him and that is what we do with our English programme.

Art is another area. The document in 1940 talks about using the cultural resources of the United Kingdom, defined very broadly. Often people think of high culture, but it means science, it means language, it means education. It talks about governance, it talks about invention, it talks about the national character, so you use the whole spectrum for this engagement. So it is no surprise that we use art, because art creates these connections and it creates space for people to have conversations they could not otherwise have.

To give an example: a few months ago, if you went into the ground floor of our building a couple of hundred yards away, you would have seen photographs by artists who had been displaced from Syria, and what we asked them to do was to set up an exhibition which captured the impact that the war was having. There was a photograph by a lady who interviewed people who were fleeing and she asked:

'What was the one thing you put in your bag when you were going?'

And somebody said, *'Well, I put in a tube of hand cream.'*

'Why did you do that?'

'Because, when I want to think of my sister who is staying behind, I unscrew the cream and I smell it and I'm there with my sister.'

And that was one of the photographs.

It was a classic art launch in London, 120 people in the room, the white wine was warm and the canapés were cold, but there were 10,000 people watching on Twitter, so cultural relations in the future will be a very different thing. Art, the use of art and our ability to connect people to it in the future will be very different to the past. In the past there was a danger that it was elitist: we do high art, but only some people like that. So, going to a theatre in Kampala, you are likely to be a particular type of person, voting for a particular party. Using that knowledge intelligently in the future is another one of the aspects.

I talked about education and I think the challenges of education systems are enormous. Fifty per cent of people under 25 in South Africa have no work and South Africa is a relative success story. Now, what you do about that and how you support them is partly around 'how do we help the

economy grow?’ and it is partly ‘how do we make sure that the education people get gives them a skill’? The work we are doing is teaching entrepreneurship, so you can leave with your qualification, but can we help you maybe set up a small business? Because employment is not going to come from more government jobs and it is not going to come from more mining in South Africa.

You see the impact of where the system fails in the huge migration that is happening. We are aware of people crossing the Mediterranean, but there is internal migration too. South Africa is really worried about the migration to South Africa from other countries - if you drive in from the airport, there is a poster saying ‘We do not support xenophobia’. It is a real social issue and the way to solve that is to help education systems equip people with the skills they need, not necessarily to get a job, but to create a job. That is why the digital entrepreneurship work and the social entrepreneurship that we do is so important, because these people will be leaders of something, and you would rather they were the leader of a successful business than the leader of the next extremist group.

This idea of alternative pathways is the next piece of the soft power jigsaw.

Martin Rose, one of our colleagues, talks about the need to change the landscape of the mental territory that allows extremism to take hold, and that is about having conversations with people. It is about finding a way of reaching into society across countries which changes or at least subtly adjusts the prevailing narrative, so we can be about optimism and opportunity, not about unemployment and despair. In Ebola, it was a major, major task to change the funeral rites of people who had been doing it that way for hundreds of years, but you can do it if you have an authentic, open, honest conversation with people.

If we have an authentic, open, honest conversation that says the skills you need to be employable are not just rote learning in an engineering school, but actually, you are going to need what we would call here life skills, then that is the kind of conversation you can have with the Minister of Education and we are good at that here. Again, it is about bringing the cultural resources of the United Kingdom to bear on world problems.

There are some other changes that we see in how soft power is going to need to respond. Influence is moving away from states to cities to people. The idea that cultural diplomacy can be country to country is still legitimate, and there are some good examples: we continued with the Year of Cultural Exchange with Russia, despite the Crimea and despite everything else that was going on, to keep those doors open. But equally, the Mayor of Seoul and the Mayor of London will be part of the equation. Equally, it will be the school in Bath that has a twin in Kampala for two schools for physically handicapped children, exchanging ideas – that is part of it as well. So connecting real people and the digital changes will challenge all of us, but what is common is that it remains about telling the story as it truly is.

If I read a couple more paragraphs from that 1940 Annual Report, it would say that this is not about cultural propaganda, this has to be honest, it has to be open, you have to admit the flaws of your own society and the reason you have to do that is because you want it to be a proper relationship, not just a piece of broadcast and you have to be prepared to be changed yourself by it.

The reason I was excited to join six months ago is because I think the opportunity to get this right

and get it right at a different scale exists, and I think we know how to do it, we just need to be a bit more joined up. It is not only the British Council that plays in this. The Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) have a role as well and the great cultural institutions have a role. Let's focus on getting it right and creating this community of people who buy into the fact that soft power has a greater role and it is a lot cheaper than a small war to get this right.

If you are into political science, there is a realist view of the world which says you have to carry a big stick and it is kind of true; there is the institutional view of the world which is where the European Union philosophy would come from, saying that if you create connections between institutions, then you can do things together as states; and there is a constructivist view which is probably where we would sit as the British Council, saying if you can change people's experiences in the long run, you end up with something different than if you do not.

The truth, of course, is that we have to look through each of the lenses. My fear is that we have not been paying sufficient attention to this cultural relations/soft power agenda. If you look at the amount of money that traditionally we invest in it as a country, we are about 1% of the development assistance budget - we would argue that we are a very good and effective 1% of that (and with the Spending Review, if any of you are in the Treasury, 2%-3% would be fine, thank you very much). We need to develop this idea, which was really the message I wanted to get across in the title of the talk, that we have to anticipate the causes of what we are seeing and intervene, not just deal expensively with the symptoms when we have them.

That programme working in eastern Uganda dealing with a population of 300,000 is probably going to cost us £50,000. Comparatively, it is very little. We can have a big impact and we can leverage that for stability in that part of Uganda, and if any of you were in Uganda ten years ago when the LRA were around and massacres were taking place, you will understand why that is an important issue. It is not an issue we are isolated from - these things do travel. Inter-communal strife travels.

I will stop there and just conclude by saying that I think we need to remember what we have been good at as the UK. We have been good at creating these connections. We have been good at building relationships with the people who will be the leaders of the world in twenty or thirty years' time. One in seven world leaders has had a British education. That is not an accident. They did study here and they studied here because we were connected and our education system was connected. 49% of people who want to study in the UK have had a British Council experience, through one of our fairs or whatever. That is why they know they want to come here.

So we must remember what we are good at, we must remember the BBC World Service and what is good about it and build on that for the future. If we do that, and we work with the clubs that already exist, whether it is the British Council or the Commonwealth or the World Service or whatever it is, then we can punch much harder as the UK, in a world which really needs this sophisticated, full spectrum approach.

That is the end of the homily. I would be delighted to take questions, awkward or otherwise. Thank you very much.

REFLECTIONS ON FIVE YEARS OF EU FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

Transcript of a lecture by the Rt Hon the Baroness Ashton of Upholland GCMG

8th July 2015

Baroness Catherine Ashton is the former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and former Vice-President of the European Commission (2009-2014). As High Representative, she brokered the Brussels Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo and was Chief Negotiator on behalf of the P5+1 in negotiations on Iran's nuclear programme. Previously, She served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department for Education and Skills, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Department for Constitutional Affairs and subsequently the Ministry of Justice. She became the leader of the House of Lords in 2007 and President of the Privy Council before being appointed EU trade commissioner in 2008. In that capacity, she successfully negotiated the trade agreement with South Korea, resolved a number of high-profile trade disputes with major trading partners, and represented the European Union in the Doha Round of world trade talks. She has received a number of awards including Peer of the year and Minister of the year as well as receiving the first ever Stonewall politician of the year award. She has been honoured by a number of Governments and international bodies and was given the GCMG in the New Year's Honours 2015.

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, to see old colleagues and meet new people, and to reflect on some of the issues I believe have become even more important since I left office as the first EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.

I was looking back over some of the talks that you have had in previous months and it was quite interesting to see areas of work I was involved in. For example, you have had a discussion on Bosnia and Herzegovina, you have had a discussion from Jonathan Powell on Northern Ireland to Libya, discussions on defence issues, on the Arab Spring - all areas of foreign policy that I covered.

I want to begin with a small caveat: for many of you, the fact that I have this EU title in my background, you might expect that I could spend some time talking to you about internal EU issues. The truth is, I spent very little time in Brussels. My job was the external part of the European Union. I spent most of my time at 30,000 feet, and when I was not at 30,000 feet, I was visiting over a hundred countries.

I want to focus on thinking about the rapid and dramatic changes that have taken place over the last five years and the implications and effects that they have had on this country, directly or indirectly. I particularly want to challenge the tool kit that we currently have - we as people, we as a nation, we as nations, working together - and ask if it is not time to begin a serious rethink and review of the ways we deal with what seem to be growing crises and challenges, not least in our neighbourhood.

We describe our neighbourhood as those countries around us, south and east in the European

context, many of which have recently seen really difficult times. I do not have to remind anybody of the challenges to the east, of what is happening with Ukraine, but also the difficulties in Moldova, in Georgia. And of course of our relationship with Russia – what relationship will we have in the future?

The Western Balkans are part of that neighbourhood too - I have always believed that the Western Balkans ultimately belong in the European Union. That is what led me to broker the important agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, which still remains. I was in Norway two weeks ago with the Prime Minister of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, and Hashim Thaçi, now the Foreign Minister of Kosovo, who was the Prime Minister when the agreement was made. The three of us, for the first time, appeared in public together to talk about how the discussions started, the challenges we faced in that 150 hours of discussion and how the agreement was made. Their relationship continues to develop and their work continues to grow. My view is that their work is the best example of how to solve conflict through dialogue in that region, particularly if you have an incentive to do so - which in their case was closer engagement with Europe.

I also want to raise the southern neighbourhood and the challenges and difficulties across the region. I do not have to remind anyone of the dangers of what is going on this week in Libya and the consequences of that in terms of migration, where people are fleeing through that most challenging of countries to get into the leakiest of boats in order to try and find a better life.

But it is also important to remember that there is a wider world that we need to be aware of and one small example (and there are plenty I could use) is the role of China in the future.

China is such an important nation – including for this nation – so we need a better understanding of what China is trying to be and do in its own neighbourhood: its actions in the South China Sea; the difficulties of relations with the Philippines; how it is going to develop its relationship with Vietnam. These are just three countries where I can think of long discussions during my visits there about how to develop their relationship with China and their worries especially with big increases in China's defence budget – China says it is in order to bring it in line with where it should be. However, disputes and problems in that region should not be neglected, even if it is only to urge that International Law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are used to deal with any issues.

So there are many different areas where the way in which we support problem-solving, deal with crises, tackle political relationships, recognise the scale, the shape, and indeed the effect of what is happening, needs to be thought about.

I have four reflections from my experience.

The first one is what I called the 'comprehensive approach' and the trouble is, when I say that, people started to think that it was just about putting together things - defence, development, diplomacy - in some sort of little package, but what I mean is an interlocking, interwoven approach to a challenge that we may face. Let me give you perhaps the best example where I think that approach has been successful, and that was in tackling the problems of piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Just to remind you, in four years piracy has dropped by 95%. It is not over yet and of course it

appears in new places, but in the context of what we were facing in 2009-2010, the issue of piracy is no longer high on the political agenda.

Ships were being hijacked, originally about 400-800 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia. By the end of it, they had moved to 1100 nautical miles off the coast and the sophistication of their action dramatically increased as more money flowed into their coffers from ransoms and seizures of goods. The Seychelles (just to give you an idea of how bad it got) lost 100% of its cruise tourism industry, because cruise liners would not go to the Seychelles for fear of piracy. Support to patrol their many small islands was provided by the EU.

And people, particularly from the Philippines and Ukraine, where many of the merchant seamen and other crew come from, were more and more reluctant to work in what is a very important trade route for fear of what could happen.

This was having a dramatic effect on trade, on tourism and of course on the World Food Programme, which relies very heavily on getting food down through that channel to parts of Africa.

We put in place a system which brought together about fifteen countries of the European Union, working with other nations including China, India, working with the US, working with NATO Operation Shield. Our operation was called Atalanta and its HQ was in Northwood, an operation always led by the British who would take responsibility for the overall operational command. We ran sophisticated communications that meant any ship in the area could tap into a frequency and be told about any possible sightings of pirates. We created corridors at sea and as long as ships moved in those corridors, they would be safe. And indeed, most of the problems - the hijackings that you saw in the later times - were ships who had chosen to do something else or for one reason or another had not understood that that was what they should do.

Inside Northwood were people from all of the different countries working together as one team - up to fifteen different armed forces. We had maritime insurance companies, we had merchant navies, we had experts on how to prevent pirates actually getting onto the ships. We took the difficult decision to disrupt the pirates by destroying their boats on the beaches. We also prosecuted pirates. That meant we had to build prisons, and make sure the facilities to prosecute them existed. Thirty per cent of the prisoners in Seychelles jails were pirates. Many countries would have been happy to support prosecutions, but had nowhere to put them.

All of that had to be done. And we also had to start training and supporting all the countries, like Kenya and Tanzania, to be able to patrol their own coastlines. Train them in coastguards, all of the different bits interwoven together to defend the ships, to deter and to prevent.

And of course, we needed to know who the pirates were. Many of them were 14 and 15 year old boys who were given the option: 'you can earn a dollar a day if you are lucky, in Somalia, which has very little because of a twenty year old civil war, or you can earn \$10,000 if you are successful in hijacking a ship'. So it also meant putting in resources to do the development work to give them options.

For example, there is a fantastic programme run through the President's office, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, called 'Give Up Your Gun And Go To School', which is running right across Somalia to try

and get kids away from piracy, and away from joining up with Al Shabaab.

We also agreed that NGOs would follow the African Union troops, who were freeing villages from Al Shabaab, but who needed support to follow for those communities who have no hospitals, no wells, no food, who have been, in a sense, held hostage and provided for, if at all, through Al Shabaab.

I went to Mogadishu and opened an Embassy. It was actually a tin hut with a camp bed in it and a flag. But it was there. To show that we were there and we intended to stay there, and we said we would stay with them, not just for the twenty years we have been helping Somalia, but for the next twenty and the next.

Finally, we then developed a compact for Somalia, a two-way street of support while requiring action from the government - building a new judicial system, working out how they were going to develop democracy, asking of them these things in return for what we offered. We brought together all of the big economic institutions, the World Bank and so on, together with the Presidency of Somalia and all of the African nations surrounding them, to give them support and help.

Now all of those things are required in my view, and more, if you are going to be able to provide support that is going to be lasting. And so my first proposition to you is: you have to have an interwoven approach.

Let me give you another example of that, put slightly simplistically, in the phrase 'economics meets politics.'

It is important to know that in Egypt, in Jordan and Libya, in the beginnings of the demonstrations in Syria - when dramatic change takes place, people are not just looking for political change.

The moment that fired up the situation in Tunisia was the young man who was not going to be allowed to earn money to look after his family. It was, if you like, an economic imperative that turned into a political fire. Across our southern neighbourhood, the countries with big populations, particularly of young people, face dramatic and difficult economic challenges to try and support those young generations into work, into opportunity for the future.

We often see only the tourist areas of these countries, but there is great poverty in these societies - children who are stunted in Egypt; many children who have no hope of education now in Syria; few economic opportunities in rural communities.

So, economic change and support is a fundamental part of what you have to provide when you see countries go through dramatic political change as well. That might be investment, so in Egypt, it was the extension of the Cairo Metro, which is crucial if anyone is ever going to get through the Cairo traffic!

You need investment to build social enterprises and small businesses, you have to have an economic plan in a country, a thirty year economic plan, I would argue. South American countries have worked for a long time on the concept of longer-term strategic economic plans, rather than the traditional five year or even ten year plan, which, in changing economic circumstances, is simply not enough to see you through when you are trying to take a country out of poverty and into a new generation

able to support itself and to trade in the rest of the world.

The second approach I want to talk about is what I call 'deep democracy.' We were just talking before we started about the 800th Anniversary of Magna Carta. It is only in the last hundred years that people who looked like me [women] were allowed to vote. We are looking at countries who are trying to do what we did in 800 years in a matter of a few years, if that. Some of them have, hidden within their histories, quite a lot of the elements that they need. Many do not. And so to my mind, the concept of deep democracy is fundamental in what we do to support countries going through change.

I have sat in Tahrir Square talking with young people, I have been in Green Square in Libya and everybody says, 'What we want are elections' and I usually said, 'Yes, but you need to build political parties or platforms so people can vote for them, and you need to build some of the infrastructure of democratic life.'

It exists in this country, because we have built it over such a long period of time. We have a free press. We have civil society. We have political parties. We have an independent judiciary. We have an administration that works for the people. We have a civil service, we have police officers that work for us and do not arrest people for how they vote. We have opposition as well as government.

By the way, this point about opposition is important. I put in place in the EU the provision of support for training for political opposition, because in too many countries, it is 'winner takes all,' and if you lose, you lose everything. Opposition has a key role to play, both in holding governments to account and in being governments in waiting. In this country, we have learnt this over time, but in many countries, all of that needs to be put in place. Deep democracy is an incredible web of different elements and the establishment of this kind of infrastructure is key.

Elections are crucial – they are the vital icing on the cake. But it really matters that there is process – that there is not just one election, but that there is another and then another one after that. In some countries, when I have asked people what they really want, they have said one thing: 'We would like a President who retires'. In too many countries, leaders are there until they die. So, to some leaders in various parts of the world, when they have asked me to tell them the one thing that I think they should do, I have said, 'Eventually, retire!' It is very, very important.

But building all of that is extremely difficult and time-consuming. For many, it is about starting from first principles. When I went to Tunisia to visit the human rights NGOs, I was the first foreigner, ever, to cross the threshold of their organisations, because nobody had been allowed to visit them. It was a fantastic moment for me as an individual as we went in to talk to them about what we could do to support what they were seeking to try and do.

Getting the infrastructure of government is also vital to help stabilise countries and also to help to deal with security issues that affect us all. So many times, I would go and see interim ministers and they would say, 'I can't make those decisions, you'll have to wait until after the elections.' We cannot impose judicial reform or help them with their security reform systems without their agreement. We cannot ship equipment or people into a country to help without their safety being guaranteed, and the endorsement of those in control. In countries like Libya this has been an ongoing challenge and frustration. The difficulties caused by not having the infrastructure in place should never be underestimated.

So, I would stress the importance of building deep democracy. Fortunately across our continent there are many countries who have had to renew their democracies or find new ways of building it since the end of the Soviet Union. Their knowledge and experience is vital - I have seen politicians and civil servants from across Europe sharing their knowledge and experience with those trying to set up parliaments, organise political parties, develop electoral commissions and so on. It is extremely valuable.

I should add that core to all of this is a fundamental principle, the rule of law. The rule of law is crucial for individuals, for organisations, for business. Without it, people are not free, investment will not happen. So deep democracy together with this linkage between economics and politics - these are, for me, the ingredients that start to put this interlocking web together.

I should add, and I do not think I need to, that it is so important that we remember that these countries and communities will need long-term support. That is why, whether it is in Afghanistan for example, where I put in place a ten year plan of support before I left or in any country going through upheaval, it is vital that we think long term, that we will have to be there for years to come, and we should not be thinking that in five years' from now, we will not need to be supporting them, because we absolutely will.

I want to talk a little bit to you about collaboration, which may seem an obvious point if you are the person trying to work with 28 countries, as I was. But I want to explain why I think it is important and it really matters, whether or not you believe it should be through the European Union or whether you think it is about working with three or four countries or with the UN or anything else.

There is something I describe as 'meeting in the car park'. Some of you might have been in situations in your professional life where you discover that your colleagues are also going to the same place for the same meeting and you meet in the car park. Well, it happens in countries as well and one of the pleas that I would hear very often from leaders in countries, particularly going through difficulty and change, was how much they could not cope with the number of people who came to visit them, that there were ministers who did nothing else but receive visitors from lots of different nations. All with good intent - they were not just there for the photo opportunity, they were certainly there to offer help - but these countries could not cope.

These were countries that did not have a protocol service. They did not have enough cups of tea. They did not have the things that you need to be able to manage and make use of the number of offers and it was a challenge. I heard it in Somalia, I heard it in Libya, I heard it in many places: 'Please, please, can somebody co-ordinate, so that we get one person or we get everybody together?' And if you are the economics minister of a country trying to work out how on earth you are going to get that country back on its feet, you need time and space. You need support and advice, but you absolutely need to be able to control the flow and yet nobody in the world wishes to say 'no' to a visit from an important minister coming to offer their support.

So my third proposition is we need to be better at collaboration, about sending messages as a team. I did that on behalf of all 28 and it was great, because we could ask of the 28 what they were willing to do, what they could offer and then go with one big offer.

Of course, when it came to commercial interests, countries would operate separately, and it did

not mean those countries, by the way, could not go and offer additional things or operate as a solo nation, but it did mean that from time to time, you could put it together.

More importantly, we would do that with other countries. I went to countries with a mandate from the United States, I would go to countries with discussions having taken place with the World Bank or with the African Bank or with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Not to do things on their behalf, but to be able to explain the breadth of what could be on offer.

We need to be able to use assets collaboratively too - especially when you are dealing with crises. When the Haiti earthquake struck, it killed 230,000 people in 35 seconds. It was military and civilian assets working together that created the potential to be able to address the problems on the ground. Hospital ships that could dock without needing a quayside, heavy lifting equipment moved around the island on boats that could carry the weight because the roads were impassable. Working together to solve problems and bring the best of what we have together.

But it is also collaboration on areas like defence. Sovereignty should not in my view ever be undermined. But there is much work to be done - for example the research into Improvised Explosive Devices [IEDs] going on currently through the European Defence Agency for all EU countries and to be shared with NATO and others, will help identify the bomb makers, methods to diffuse and identify them before they explode.

Other research and development - for example, work is taking place on mid-air refuelling, because very few countries, particularly on the main part of the European continent, know how to do mid-air refuelling because they never need to do it. But when it came to missions in Libya, for example, they did need to know how to do it. So training to ensure that in a future theatre this can be done is important. So too the training done for helicopter work in Afghanistan. This is considered hugely important. Two hundred billion euros spent on defence across the EU. You will discuss this next time with three real experts, but I have always been of the view that we could spend it better if we thought a little bit more about how to use our economies of scale on things where it is not about sovereignty, but it is actually about the best of use of materials and equipment.

It is also being creative about who we work with - with the African Union, the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation, ASEAN, helping countries who are working together as groups, to work with us individually or collectively as teams, helping them to develop their capacity - for example, we built a crisis room in Myanmar [Burma] so that natural disasters could be better dealt with in a co-ordinated way.

And there are other models. The most obvious one at the moment is the E3+3, the P5+1 or the six, whichever you prefer to call it, Security Council Permanent Members plus Germany working together in Vienna. My fingers are crossed. I spent four years working on this, leading the talks until the last few weeks. I hope an agreement will be reached soon. I know how difficult it will be to do.

But this model is a fantastic way of bringing countries together to work together. It was a genuinely important demonstration of how, by focusing on one particular issue, you could find solutions. Even during the most challenging times so far on Ukraine, Russian colleagues worked with me in exactly the same way on the Iran talks - you would not have known there was anything else going on in the room even though we were saying and doing a lot outside the room.

My Chinese colleagues used to call it 'the family,' because we would come together and work together, a week a month, for four years. It was a very important model, and I do not think it is one that we should just throw away after this is done. I think it is an interesting model that needs to be examined for the future. For example, could this particular model be valuable in thinking about some of the issues in the Middle East Peace Process? I do not know, but perhaps.

So, in thinking about different kinds of collaboration, it is possible to be part of one team, but also to work on other things in different ways. Thus, Britain is a Permanent Member of the Security Council, a member of the EU, has a close relationship with the US and strong relationships with other countries, India, Brazil, South Africa, other big democracies and growing relations with China. There is much work to be done in collaborations, and I think we need to think very carefully about how this can be taken further.

I suppose what I am really saying is that I think there is very little that I can imagine that can be done alone nowadays in International Relations. It is not about might or power, it is about the scale of the challenge and the breadth of issues that have to be faced.

And then, finally, there is the smart use of both soft and hard power. I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding that leads people to think if we are not exercising that most dramatic form of hard power – military might – we are doing nothing. Of course nothing is further from the truth. In many situations – in the vast majority – it is soft power that works. Influence, negotiation, discussion, finding interests that entice people to move positions are crucial to success – this was what made the agreement between Belgrade and Pristina possible.

Economic power – hard power in my view because of its dramatic impact on those it is aimed at and often those who wield it – is really important. Sanctions in Myanmar had an effect, many argue that sanction relief drives Iran towards an agreement. Sanctions will be important as we consider the future of Ukraine and the role of Russia. Using what power is available to good effect, but with clarity of purpose.

In conclusion, it is about the tool kit. It is thinking about what we now use to try and frame our responses in the future. How we weave our responses together, how we support countries to tackle problems from all directions. It is about thinking long term. It is about collaboration.

But the one thing that I do know from my visits to over a hundred countries amid five years of dramatic change is that everyone I met wanted the same things. In every village or community, whether suffering the effects of war, natural disaster or other crisis, people said 'I want a job, I want to live without fear, I want my kids to go to school, I want proper health care, I want to know that my children have a future.' A universal set of requests. And if foreign policy is going to help to deliver it for our own people, it needs to be engaged in helping to deliver this for people in other places.

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Jonathan Scheele	Lord Tugendhat	
Michael Schoiswohl	HE Kursad Tuzmen	
Patrick Seale	Andrew Tyrie MP	
Mark Sedwill CMG	Dr Kristian Coates Ulrichsen	
Dr Farzana Shaikh	Sir Harold Walker KCMG	
Kamalesh Sharma	Lord Wallace of Saltaire	
Major General Jonathan Shaw CB CBE	Rt Hon Baroness Warsi	
Dr Jamie Shea	Max Watson	
Sir Nigel Sheinwald GCMG	James Watt CVO	
George Shire	Rt Hon Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC	
General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE	Professor Odd Arne Westad	
Professor Avi Shlaim FBA	Samar Whitticombe	
HE Mrs Asta Skaisgirytė-Liauskienė	Lord Williams of Baglan	
Peter Snow	Andrew Wilson	
Olexiy Solohubenko	Dr Tim Winter	
Rt Hon John Spellar MP	David L Wochner	
Mark Spragg	Martin Wolf CBE	
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope GCB OBE ADC	Sir Andrew Wood GCMG	
Rory Stewart OBE MP	Caroline Wyatt	
	Roderic Wye	

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM EVENTS IN 2014-2015

- 21st October 2014 Debate on *'Who Takes Britain To War?'* with **James Gray MP** and **Jesse Norman MP**.
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- 22nd October 2014 Seminar on *'The IS Threat: Regional Conflict Or Global Jihad?'* in One Whitehall Place, chaired by **Lord Lothian**. The following speakers took part: **Afzal Amin**, Former British Army officer; **David Anderson QC**, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation; **Richard Barrett CMG OBE**, Senior Vice President, The Soufan Group; Coordinator of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Group, United Nations (2004-2012); the **Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP**, Foreign Office Minister responsible for the Middle East (May 2010-October 2013); **Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG**, Chairman of the UN Association in the UK, UK Ambassador to the UN in New York (1998 -2003) and UK Special Envoy for Iraq (2003-2004); **Lieutenant General (retired) Sir Graeme Lamb KBE CMG DSO**, Former Director of UK Special Forces and Commander of the British Field Army; and **Sir William Patey KCMG**, Former British Ambassador in Sudan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan.
-
- 28th October 2014 Lecture on *'NATO: Challenges, Opportunities And The Future'* by **General Sir Richard Shirreff KCB CBE**, NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (2011-2014).
-
- 18th November 2014 Lecture on *'From The Ebola Virus To Antimicrobial Resistance: Do We Face A Global Health Security Crisis?'* by **Professor Jeremy Farrar OBE**, Director of the Wellcome Trust.
-
- 26th November 2014 Seminar on *'Protecting Minorities In The Middle East'* in the House of Lords, co-hosted with MEC International and co-chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford** and **Lord Lothian**. The following speakers took part: **Dr. Tim Winter**, Lecturer in Islamic Studies, University of Cambridge; **The Revd Canon Alistair Macdonald-Radcliff**, Director General, World Dialogue Council; **HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan**; **His Grace Bishop Angaelos**, General Bishop of the Coptic Orthodox Church in the UK; and **The Rt Revd Dr Michael Igrave**, Bishop of Woolwich.
-
- 2nd December 2014 Debate on *'Iran And The P5+1: Rapprochement Or Back To Impasse?'* with **Sir Richard Dalton KCMG**, the **Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick** and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**.
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- 8th December 2014 Seminar on *‘Ukraine, Russia And The West: Regional Crisis, Global Repercussions?’* in the House of Lords, chaired by **Lord Lothian**. The following speakers took part: **Sir Tony Brenton KCMG**, British Ambassador to Russia (2004-2008); **Chris Bryant MP**, Minister for Europe, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2009-2010); the **Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP**, Defence Secretary (2010-2011); **John Lough**, Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme, Chatham House; Vice President, BGR Gabara LLP; and the **Earl of Oxford and Asquith OBE**, founding member of the British Embassy in Kyiv, Counsellor in Kyiv (1992-1997).
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- 9th December 2014 Lecture on *‘The Shifts And The Shocks: What We’ve Learned - And Have Still To Learn - From The Financial Crisis’* by **Martin Wolf CBE**, Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator, *The Financial Times*.
-
- 27th January 2015 Lecture on *‘British Policy Towards The Middle East: Getting It Right’* by the **Rt Hon the Baroness Warsi**, Senior Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; and Minister for Faith and Communities, Department for Communities and Local Government (2012-2014).
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- 28th January 2015 Lecture on *‘Pakistan’s Terrorism Policy Post The Peshawar Massacre’* by **Major General Noel I. Khokhar, HI (M)**, Director General, Institute for Strategic Studies Research and Analysis, National Defence University, Pakistan.
-
- 24th February 2015 Debate on *‘Underlying The Charlie Hebdo, Paris And Brussels Terror Attacks: Lessons For London?’* with **Michael Binyon OBE**, leader-writer, columnist and foreign correspondent for The Times since 1971; the **Rt Hon Hazel Blears MP**; and **Professor Michael Clarke**, Director General of RUSI.
-
- 3rd March 2015 Seminar on *‘Bosnia And Herzegovina: New International Thinking’* in the House of Lords, in collaboration with SEESOX, the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford and LSEE-Research on South Eastern Europe and chaired by **Lord Lothian**. The following speakers took part: **Dr Othon Anastasakis**, Director, European Studies Centre and SEESOX, St Antony’s College, Oxford; **Professor Richard Caplan**, Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford; **Jessie Hronešová**, DPhil candidate in politics at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford; **Dr James Ker-Lindsay**, Eurobank EFG Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe, LSE; **Sir David Madden KCMG**, former British Ambassador, and Chair of Development Committee of South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX). The lunchtime address was given by our guest of honour, the **Rt Hon the Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon GCMG KBE CH**.
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- 10th March 2015 Debate on *‘The Conundrum of Foreign Fighters In The Middle East: Who, Why, And Will They Bring The War Back Home?’* with **Lord Alderdice** and **Professor Peter Neumann**, Director of the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord Anderson of Swansea**.
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- 17th March 2015 Lecture on *'National Security: Current Threats, Hard Choices And Soft Options'* by **Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE**, Master, Pembroke College, University of Cambridge and former Chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (1999-2004).
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- 25th March 2015 Lecture on *'From Northern Ireland To Libya: How To End Armed Conflicts'* by **Jonathan Powell**, Founder and CEO of Inter Mediate, Prime Minister's Special Envoy to the Libyan transition; and Chief British Negotiator on Northern Ireland (1997-2007).
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- 12th May 2015 Lecture on *'Britain: A New Style of Government?'* by **Professor Anthony King**, Professor of Government at the University of Essex.
-
- 19th May 2015 Lecture on *'Democratic Illusions: The Lessons Of The Arab Spring'* by **James Watt CVO**, British Ambassador to Lebanon (2003-2006), Jordan (2006-2011) and Egypt (2011-2014).
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- 20th May 2015 Review of Developments in the Arctic in the House of Lords, co-hosted with Windsor Energy Group and co-chaired by the **Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford** and **Lord Lothian**. The proceedings were opened by **Lord Oxburgh KBE**, member of the House of Lords Arctic Committee. Other speakers included **Leiv Lunde**, Special Advisor on energy and climate change policy at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; **HE Mr Claus Grube**, Ambassador of Denmark; **James Gray MP**; **HE Ms Foo Chi Hsia**, High Commissioner of Singapore; **Charlie Kronick**, Senior Programme Advisor, Greenpeace; **Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG**, member of the House of Lords Arctic Committee; **Michael Patchett-Joyce**, Vice-Chair, Bar Council of England & Wales International Committee; and **Lord Moynihan**, member of the House of Lords Arctic Committee.
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- 9th June 2015 Debate on *'Perspectives On The Current Situation On The Korean Peninsula'* with **His Excellency Mr Hak Bong Hyon**, Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in London; **Aidan Foster-Carter**, Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Sociology and Modern Korea at Leeds University; and **Charles Scanlon**, BBC East Asia editor until March 2015.
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- 16th June 2015 Debate on *'The Turkish Election Result: What Does It Mean For Turkey And Its International Relations?'* with **Dr. Esra Özyürek**, Associate Professor and Chair for Contemporary Turkish Studies, European Institute, London School of Economics; **John Peet**, Europe editor of *The Economist* since 2003; and **Sir David Reddaway KCMG MBE**, British Ambassador to Turkey (2009-2014).
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- 1st July 2015 Lecture on *'Prevention Is Better Than Cure: The Place Of Soft Power In A World Of Hard Choices'* by **Sir Ciarán Devane**, Chief Executive of the British Council, chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**.
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8th July 2015 Lecture on *'Reflections On Five Years Of EU Foreign Policy Challenges'* by the **Rt Hon the Baroness Ashton of Upholland GCMG**, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Vice-President of the European Commission (2009-2014).

14th July 2015 Debate on *'The Strategic Defence And Security Review 2015: Tough Choices For Tough Times – Will We Get It Right?'* with **General the Lord Dannatt GCB CBE MC DL**; **Marshal of the Royal Air Force the Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**; and **Admiral the Rt Hon Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC**.

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM ADVISORY BOARD

Sir Menzies ('Ming') Campbell CH CBE QC is one of the most respected and successful politicians of his generation. He grew up in Glasgow, was educated at Hillhead High School and went on to the University of Glasgow. As a successful university level athlete Ming ran the 200m for the GB team at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and became captain of the UK Athletics Team 1965-66. He held the British 100m record from 1967 to 1974. He was called to the Scottish Bar as an Advocate in 1968 and appointed Queens Counsel in 1982. He became MP for North East Fife in 1987. In Parliament he was the Liberal Democrats Foreign Affairs Spokesman from 1997-2006. He has served on the Members' Interests (1987-1990), Trade and Industry (1990-1992) and Defence (1992-1999) Select Committees. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 2003 and elected Leader in March 2006-October 2007. He is currently a Member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee; and of the Intelligence & Security Committee; and Leader of the Delegation on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. In 2001 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate by the University of Glasgow and was given a Knighthood in the 2004 New Years Honours List. He became Chancellor of St Andrews University in April 2006. He was made a Companion of Honour in 2013. He retired from the House of Commons at the May 2015 general election and was subsequently appointed to the House of Lords.

Secretary William S. Cohen is Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a business consulting firm based in Washington, DC which provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board of CBS, and on the advisory boards of the US-India Business Council, the US-China Business Council and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the weekly World Affairs Contributor for CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organisation in the US with a budget of \$300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as Secretary of Defense marked the first time in modern US history that a President chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the US Senate and three terms in the US House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine and received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College, and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or co-authored ten books – four non-fiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

Sir Evelyn de Rothschild is currently Chairman of E.L. Rothschild, a private investment company. He is Chairman of the ERANDA Foundation, a family foundation he founded in 1967 to support charities working in the fields of medical research, health and welfare, education and the arts. In addition, Sir Evelyn currently serves as a Governor Emeritus of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow of Imperial College London and is an Honorary Life President of Norwood and Ravenswood Children's Charity. From 1976 until 2003, Sir Evelyn was Chairman and CEO of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd, the international investment bank. From 1972 until 1989, Sir Evelyn also served as Chairman of the Economist Group, from 1977 to 1994 Chairman of United Racecourses Ltd and previously he served on the Board of Directors of De Beers and IBM UK as well as serving as Deputy Chairman of Milton Keynes Development Corporation, Chairman of St Mary's Hospital

Medical School, Member of the Council of the Shakespeare Globe Trust and President of The Evelina Children's Hospital Appeal. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1989 for services to banking and finance.

Susan Eisenhower is the CEO and Chairman of The Eisenhower Group, Inc, a Washington D.C. based consulting company founded in 1986. For more than 25 years the company has provided strategic counsel on business development, public affairs and communications projects. In addition to her work through EGI, Susan Eisenhower has also had a distinguished career as a policy analyst. She has also been a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics and a Distinguished Fellow at the Nixon Center, now called the Center for National Interest. She is Chairman Emeritus at the Eisenhower Institute of Gettysburg College. Over the years, she has served as a member of three blue ribbon commissions for the Department of Energy for three different secretaries: The Baker Cutler Commission on US Funded Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia; The Sununu-Meserve Commission on Nuclear Energy; and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which released its findings on a comprehensive program for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the winter of 2012. She was also appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control, where she served eight years. After as many years on the NASA Advisory Council, she served as a commissioner on the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. She is currently a member of MIT's Energy Initiative Advisory Board and co-chairman of NEAC, the Secretary of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Board. In addition, Ms. Eisenhower has done extensive work in executive training on strategic leadership. She has authored hundreds of op-eds for newspapers such as the Washington Post, the LA Times, appeared frequently on national television and radio, and her articles have appeared in such journals as the National Academy of Sciences' Issues in Science and Technology and the Naval Institutes' Proceedings. She has written four trade press books, two of which were on regional best seller lists, and she co-authored or co-edited four other books on international security issues.

Rt Hon Frank Field MP worked as Director of the Child Poverty Action Group from 1969-1979 during which time it became one of the premier pressure groups in the country. In 1974 he also became Director of the Low Pay Unit until 1980. In 1979, he was elected Member of Parliament for Birkenhead. Between 1980 and 1981 he served as Shadow Education and Social Security spokesman under the leadership of Michael Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Social Security Select Committee and continued in this role up to 1997. From 1997-1998 he accepted the position of Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair's first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a member of the Public Accounts Committee between 2002 and 2005. Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy and committed. In 1999 he helped set up the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. The group has acted as an important independent think tank for the cause of a long-term, investment led reform to the pension system. Since 2001 he has also chaired the Church Conservation Trust and has helped develop the trust from being one primarily concerned with conserving the best architectural gems of the Church to one which tries to open up such places for alternative use. From 2005, he has also been chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics Commission which is the planning authority for English cathedrals.

Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield is a British historian of government. Since 1992, he has been Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London. Prior to that, he was a journalist for twenty years with spells on *The Times* as a leader writer and Whitehall Correspondent, *The Financial Times* as its Lobby Correspondent at Westminster and *The Economist*. He was a regular

presenter of the BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme from 1987 to 1992. In 1986 he was a co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary British History and he was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2003. In 2008, Lord Hennessy won *The Times* Higher Education's Lifetime Achievement Award. On 5th October 2010, the House of Lords Appointments Commission announced that he was to be appointed a non-political cross-bench Peer. He is a Member of the Chief of the Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Panel. Lord Hennessy is author of several books, including *'Cabinets And The Bomb'* (2007) and *'The Secret State'* (2010).

The Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford is a former Secretary of State for Energy and was until recently Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with special responsibilities for the Commonwealth and for international energy issues. He was Chairman of the House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and British Overseas Influence, and is currently Chairman of the Windsor Energy Group, President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, President of the Energy Industries Council and Adviser to the British Chambers of Commerce. Between 2002-2010 he was Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party in the Lords and Chief Opposition Spokesman in the House of Lords on Foreign Affairs. He was formerly Secretary of State both for Energy and for Transport in Margaret Thatcher's Cabinet and was for ten years Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (1987-97). He served as a Member of Parliament for Guildford from 1966 to 1997, is a Privy Counsellor, and was created a peer in 1997. In an earlier Conservative Government he also served as Minister of State in Northern Ireland, Parliamentary Secretary for the Civil Service and Minister of State for Energy. Lord Howell has been a journalist, banker (Advisory Director of UBS) and is consultant to several companies and funds in the UK, Japan and the Middle East. He was for many years a regular columnist for *The Japan Times* and contributor to the *International Herald Tribune*. He is the author of numerous pamphlets and several books on energy, politics, innovation and the Internet - including *'Blind Victory'* (Hamish Hamilton, 1986), *'The Edge Of Now'* (Macmillan, 2001) and *'Out Of The Energy Labyrinth'* (2008). His latest book, *'Old Links And New Ties: Power And Persuasion In An Age Of Networks'*, was published in November 2013. He is working on two new books, on energy and his memoirs. In 2001 he was awarded by the Emperor of Japan the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, for services to Japan-UK relations.

The Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990-93 and Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Margaret Thatcher. He was a member of the House of Commons for 25 years. He was also a Minister in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce and President of the Economic Research Council. He was made a Life Peer in July 1998. He is an Honorary Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.

Sir David Manning CMG KCVO was educated at Oriel College, Oxford and the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University before joining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1972. He served in Warsaw, New Delhi, Paris and Moscow. From 1994-5 he was Head of Policy Planning; from 1995-8 Ambassador to Israel; and from 1998-2000 he was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence and Intelligence and a member of the Foreign Office Board. He was the UK Permanent Representative at NATO (Brussels) from 2000-2001 before returning to London as Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (2001-2003). He was then Ambassador to the United States for four years from 2003-2007. Sir David is a Director of Gatehouse Advisory Partners; and a Non Executive Director of the BG Group, and of

Lockheed Martin UK. He is also a Member of the Council of Lloyd's of London. He is Chair of 'Ideas' at the London School of Economics.

Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC was elected as MP for Pentlands in 1974, which he represented until 1997. In 1979, when the Conservatives were returned to power under Margaret Thatcher, Sir Malcolm was appointed a Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, at first in the Scottish Office and he was then transferred to the FCO, being promoted to Minister of State in 1983. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992, Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service. Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a MP in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea and he was elected as MP for Kensington in May 2010 until his retirement at the May 2010 general election. He served as the Shadow Secretary of State for Work & Pensions and Welfare Reform until December 2005 when he chose to return to the backbenches. He was Chairman of the Standards & Privileges Committee (2009-2010), UK representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (2010-2011); and Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2010-2015). He was appointed in 2015 by OSCE as member of their Eminent Persons Panel examining Russia-West relations and the crisis in Ukraine. He is a member of the Board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative chaired by Senator Sam Nunn and a Member of Madeleine Albright's Aspen Ministerial Forum.

Rt Hon Jack Straw was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice. He has served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. His autobiography, *'Last Man Standing: Memoirs Of A Political Survivor'* was published in September 2012. He retired as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election. He continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. He is co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum; takes a close interest in Iran; is a member of the Independent Commission on the Freedom of Information Act; and Chairman of the Blackburn Youth Zone.

His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan's Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. A pluralist and staunch campaigner for the rights of all to live in peace and dignity, HRH is a pioneer of Interfaith dialogue and understanding. Prince Hassan's international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prince Hassan has long had an active engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute.

Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC was born in London, and educated at Merchant Taylors' School and the Royal Air Force College Cranwell. He was commissioned into

the Royal Air Force in 1970, and after pilot training completed a number of tours in the instructor and fighter reconnaissance roles. This included two years on loan service with the Sultan of Oman's Air Force during the Dhofar War, and three years on exchange with the United States Air Force in Texas. In the 1980s Lord Stirrup commanded No 11 (AC) Squadron, flying Jaguar aircraft from RAF Laarbruch in Germany, and from 1990 to 1992 he was Officer Commanding RAF Marham in Norfolk, a period that covered the first Gulf War. After attending the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Higher Command and Staff Course, Lord Stirrup served as the Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes in the Ministry of Defence before becoming Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group in 1997. He was Assistant Chief of the Air Staff from 1998 to 2000, and then took up the post of Deputy Commander in Chief Royal Air Force Strike Command. In 2001 he was deployed to United States Central Command immediately following 9/11, and commanded British forces during Operation Veritas, the UK's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Following a tour as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Equipment, he became Chief of the Air Staff in 2003, and was appointed as Chief of the Defence staff in 2006. Following retirement from the military, he was appointed to the House of Lords in 2011, where he is particularly involved in the areas of defence, security, foreign relations and the arts. He lives in Marylebone, is married with one son, a practising cardiologist, and maintains a keen interest in history, music and the theatre.

Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG was Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence from 1998-2005, following a short period as Director of GCHQ. His initial career was with the Ministry of Defence and subsequently, from 1979, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His diplomatic postings overseas were: First Secretary, UK Delegation to NATO; Head of Chancery in the British Embassy at Ankara; Director of Cabinet to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington; and Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington DC. Appointments at home covered defence policy and programmes, international economic relations and resource management. Sir Kevin is now engaged in business, academia and in advising Government. He is a Non-Executive Director of Smiths Group Plc, Chairs the Ascot Barclay Group and is the UK Executive Vice President (Defence and Government) for AECOM Corporation. He is a Visiting Professor at King's College London, a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, and serves on academic Advisory Boards.

Admiral The Right Honourable Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC DUniv joined the Navy in 1965. He spent the majority of his naval career at sea, serving in fourteen different ships and commanding three of them. He is a graduate of the Royal Naval Staff Course, the Higher Command and Staff Course and The Royal College of Defence Studies. In 1980 he took command of the frigate HMS ARDENT taking her south to the Falkland Islands in 1982 where she was sunk in their successful recapture. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action and led the Victory Parade through the City of London. He has held several appointments in the Ministry of Defence in the Plans, Programmes and Policy areas plus three years as head of Naval Intelligence and three years as Chief of Defence Intelligence covering the Kosovo War. He was promoted to Admiral in November 2000 when he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet, NATO Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic and NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces North. He led the United Kingdom's maritime response to 9/11 including the invasion of Afghanistan. He became First Sea Lord in September 2002 and the First and Principal Aide-de-Camp to HM The Queen. He inspired and organized the Trafalgar Bicentennial Year and led the Navy during its crucial and successful role in the initial invasion of Iraq. He retired as First Sea Lord on 7th February 2006 becoming Chairman of the QinetiQ Defence Advisory Board. He advised both Conservatives and Labour on defence and foreign policy before, in July 2007, being asked by Gordon Brown to join the

Government as one of the GOATs (Government of All The Talents) responsible for national security and counterterrorism as well as cyber and Olympic security. He produced the United Kingdom's first ever National Security Strategy and Cyber Security strategy as well as formulating a series of other groundbreaking strategies. He was Chairman of The National Security Forum. He left government in May 2010 and is currently a strategic advisor to a number of small companies, a motivational speaker, Chancellor of Southampton Solent University, Naval Trustee of the Imperial War Museum, Chairman of the Cadet Vocational Qualification Organisation plus a number of other appointments. Lord West was made a Knight Commander of the Order of The Bath in 2000, Knight Grand Cross in 2004, Baron in 2007 and a Privy Councillor in 2010.

Christopher Wilkins is currently chairman of North British Windpower, a privately owned company developing renewable energy in Scotland. Previously he was the architect and first chairman of Hakluyt & Co, an information gathering company. Before that he established and ran his own company in the paper industry, which he then sold. He was a member of the Scottish Economic Council for ten years. He has also worked in the newspaper industry and prior to that he served in the army for eight years – including some active service in the Middle East.

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James Watt and Lord Lothian



Sir Ciarán Devane and Lord Howell of Guildford



Baroness Ashton of Upholland and Lord Lothian

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