GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

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Lecture Series

2013 - 2014

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Rt Hon Stephen O'Brien MP and Lord Lothian

Robert Hayes and Lord Lothian

HE Mr Ünal Çeviköz and Lord Lothian

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President

Johan Eliasch is the President of Global Strategy Forum. He is Chairman and CEO of HEAD (the global sporting goods group), Chairman of Aman Resorts, Equity Partners, London Films, Co-Chairman of Cool Earth, non-executive Chairman of Investcorp Europe, non-executive director of CV Starr Underwriting Agents. He is an advisory board member of Brasilinvest, Societe du Louvre, Capstar, the Centre for Social Justice, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Foundation for Renewable Energy and Environment and a member of the Mayor of London's, Rome's and Jerusalem's International Business Advisory Councils. He is Patron of Stockholm University and a trustee of the Kew Foundation. He is the Chair of the Food, Energy and Water security program at RUSI. He is the Founder of the Rainforest Trust which is conserving 400,000 acres of rainforest in the Amazonas. He was part of the Conservative shadow foreign office team as special advisor on European affairs (1999-2003) and responsible for foreign relations (2003-2005). He was Conservative deputy party treasurer (2003-2007). He is the former Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the UK for Deforestation and Clean Energy (2007-2010).

Chairman

Lord Lothian is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum. Michael Lothian was first elected to Parliament as Michael Ancram in 1974. His political career included four years as the Political Minister in Northern Ireland responsible for the opening engagements with the IRA which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement, Chairman of the Conservative Party for three years, and four years as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Opposition. He continues to be involved in international conflict resolution. He co-founded Global Strategy Forum in 2006 and remains its Chairman. He was appointed to the House of Lords as a life peer in October 2010. He is a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

Director

Jacqueline Jinks is the Director of Global Strategy Forum. She joined GSF as Research Director in June 2006 and became the Director in February 2008. From 1997-2005, she was Political Secretary and speechwriter to Lord Moynihan, a former Conservative Senior Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords. She was seconded to work for the Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP and the Rt Hon Francis Maude MP, during their respective tenures as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Prior to that, she worked for the Democratic National Committee (1996-1997) and CMA Consultants (1994-1996).

Treasurer

Adrian de Ferranti was the founder of Ferranti, an early stage venture capital business. He was also a founder and/or Chairman of Tantus PLC, Cambridge Computer Graphics, Chelford PLC, and PTG. He had an early career at European Banking Company, Murray Johnstone, followed by Montgomery Securities. He is currently the Chairman, Director or investor in NEST, Same Wave, SMB, Ampair, Plasmanet, Updata, Ziani's, Como Lario, Ferranti Farming, and Small Business Bureau. He was the Chairman and Trustee of the Royal Institution of Great Britain from 2007-2010. From 2007-13 he was Chairman of the Foundation at Heriot Watt University. He was also a Treasurer of the Conservative Party from 1991-2004.

PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

It is no exaggeration to say that for all the twists and turns in British foreign policy since the foundation of Global Strategy Forum in 2006, the present time exhibits uniquely challenging characteristics. In 1991, President George H W Bush invoked the idea of a 'New World Order' to define the post-Cold War era. But today, there is increasing talk of a 'New World Disorder' and an 'arc of instability', as unrest and conflict take root from Ukraine to the Middle East and North Africa. Instead of being able, as many had hoped, to put Iraq and Afghanistan in the rear-view mirror, both are very much in front of us. The rise in the Middle East of ideologies even more extreme than al-Qaeda, the collapse of the positive expectations of the Arab Spring and the emerging radicalisation of Jihadist-inclined young people at home call into question many of the assumptions under which British foreign policy practitioners have been working. My concern, which I share with Michael Lothian, is that the debate in London still struggles to come up with fresh ideas in response to these unprecedented challenges. There is little doubt that the need for GSF as a neutral convenor of the best in innovative thinking has never been greater.

This is the eighth annual collection of GSF lectures to which I have written the introduction. Taken together, it presents a comprehensive overview of the areas where the UK faces its most difficult choices. It is not surprising that essays about the Middle East and North Africa are disproportionately represented. Despite the expenditures of vast resources, the commitment of Britain's top diplomatic and military minds and at the cost of many British lives, the problems seem hardly to have moved. And a new one has been added in the form of deepening concern that the extremists overseas exercise a dangerous attraction for disaffected British youth. Truly the problems are coming home. Over the year, GSF lectures and debates have examined the way in which the easy assumptions about the territorial integrity of European states have been rendered null and void by the Russian actions in Ukraine. As in past years, Afghanistan has continued to feature. With the looming withdrawal of foreign forces in an atmosphere of deepening political uncertainty in Kabul, this is a subject we will revisit in the coming year. On top of everything else, the UK faces its own constitutional problems both in terms of its own cohesion and with regard to its continuing membership of the EU, one of the bedrocks of British foreign policy since entry in 1972.

Across the Atlantic, our US ally and partner is also facing a searching examination of its foreign policy posture. After years of relatively violent swings of the pendulum between external belligerence and war-weary detachment, the pendulum seems to be swinging back in the direction of engagement, less in terms of the erstwhile 'shock and awe' than in long-term consensus building. Where will this lead? Is the UK ready to adhere to another US-led coalition of the willing in the Middle East? What are the implications for the earlier US 'rebalancing' to the Asia-Pacific? These are some of the questions we will be addressing in our next series of lectures.

None of these questions has an easy answer. This is precisely why we need a robust debate with multiple options on the table, not just those supported by conventional wisdom. This is where I see Global Strategy Forum's essential contribution. Our aim is to act as a stress test to legacy opinions by providing a forum which actively encourages truly fresh ideas that can help forge a new consensus about how the UK engages with the world beyond our shores.

As I wrote last year, this amounts to an ambitious agenda for GSF. It is also one that is realistic. GSF has an enviable track record. We have established ourselves as an active player in the international

relations community and as one of the key policy discussion groups in London, attracting both high-level speakers and attendees. We provide an open and independent forum where all those with an interest in foreign affairs can exchange views on the seminal questions facing our country, and where long-held attitudes and preconceptions can be challenged and overturned. Like its predecessors, this remarkable collection of lectures will further augment GSF's well-established reputation for bold debate and innovative, policy-relevant thinking.

As always, I wish to take this opportunity to convey my enormous gratitude to all our contributors. Without the readiness of our speakers to share their experience, their specialist knowledge and their insights, GSF simply could not exist in its current form. Our membership has increased dramatically over the past year, which I believe is a clear endorsement of GSF's approach, and the unstinting support and commitment of our members remains indispensable. I would also like to thank our Advisory Board members, a list of whom can be found at the back of this publication, under whose wise oversight and broad leadership GSF continues to thrive and develop.

I look forward to another busy and dynamic programme in 2014-2015, as we once again convene the diverse and influential network of policymakers, practitioners and international affairs experts who meet under our auspices and for which GSF is now well known. I hope to see many of our members, both old and new, at our events over the coming year.

Johan Eliasch
President, Global Strategy Forum
October 2014

ABOUT GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM was founded by Lord Lothian (then the Rt Hon Michael Ancram MP) and Johan Eliasch in 2006 to generate open debate and discussion on key foreign affairs, defence and international security issues. As an independent, non-party political, non-ideological organisation, GSF provides a platform to explore some of the more challenging and contentious aspects of UK foreign policy and to stimulate imaginative ideas and innovative thinking in a rapidly changing global landscape.

In accordance with our founding remit, we aim to bring together those with a strong interest in international affairs and to offer them the opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas, and to engage in informed debate. Through our publications and our website, we enable their expertise to be disseminated widely.

GSF's core activity consists of a regular lunchtime lecture and debate series on topical issues. For more in-depth discussion of specific topics, we host seminars in the House of Lords. We also hold small roundtable lunches and dinners on key issues of the day. Separately, as well as our annual compendium of lectures and the publication of the proceedings of our seminars, we publish an occasional series of monographs as well as collections of essays and articles by distinguished experts.

We are supported by a strong and active Advisory Board of MPs, Peers and experienced foreign and defence policy practitioners. We are delighted that the Advisory Board has been joined this year by **Ms Susan Eisenhower, Sir David Manning GCMG CVO** and **Mr Christopher Wilkins**.

In 2013-2014, we hosted a total of 24 lunchtime events and seminars. We held eleven lectures, with the following speakers addressing our lecture series: the **Rt Hon Stephen O'Brien MP**, Prime Minister's Envoy and UK Special Representative to the Sahel; **Robert Hayes**, Senior Fellow of the Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technologies in Government; **His Excellency Mr Ünal Çeviköz**, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; **Leo Johnson**, Co-Founder of Sustainable Finance Ltd (now a part of the PwC Group) and Visiting Fellow of the Smith School of Enterprise and Environment, Oxford University; the **Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP**, Foreign Office Minister responsible for the Middle East (May 2010-October 2013); **Sir Martin Davidson KCMG**, CEO, British Council; **Sir Dominic Asquith KCMG**, British Ambassador to Libya (2011-2012) and British Ambassador to Egypt (2007-2011); **Sir David Reddaway KCMG MBE**, British Ambassador to Turkey (2009-2014); **Alastair Crooke**, Director and Founder of Conflicts Forum; **Peter Snow**, journalist, author and broadcaster; and the **Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP**, Minister of State for International Development (2010-2014).

We have also held seven debates over the past year on a number of topics including: the future for British military intervention after the August 2013 Parliamentary vote on Syria; 'Mission Accomplished?' in Afghanistan; two debates on the Ukraine/Russia crisis; GSF's annual review of the Coalition Government's foreign policy; and two debates on the balance between security, surveillance and privacy.

We have also hosted two panel discussions: the first examined the prospects for the Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2013 and the second provided the opportunity to hear from an

UNRWA-supported delegation of three Palestine Refugee representatives from the West Bank on an advocacy mission to the UK.

Additionally, we have hosted or co-hosted four seminars, all of which took place in the House of Lords. These comprised of:

- A seminar entitled *'China In The 21st Century: Changing The Face of Global Power And Economics – Implications For The World And The UK'*, which took place on 9th October 2013 and was co-chaired by GSF Chairman, **Lord Lothian** and GSF Advisory Board member, the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**.
- An Energy Security Expert Review, which was co-hosted with the Windsor Energy Group and which took place on 27th November 2013 and was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian** and the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**.
- A seminar entitled *'Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements And Beyond'* which was co-hosted with SEESOX, the South East European Studies programme at Oxford, and which took place on 4th February 2014 and was chaired by **Lord Lothian**.
- A seminar entitled *'From Arab Oil Embargo To Crimean Sanctions: Energy Security Or Insecurity?'*, which was co-hosted with the Windsor Energy Group and which took place on 18th June 2014 and was chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**.

A full list of all events for 2013-2014 can be found at pages 99-102.

Further information on all our activities and events, including audio transcripts, as well as pdfs of all our publications can be found at our website, www.globalstrategyforum.org.

THE LECTURES

The Sahel – Terror Averted Or Just Postponed?
Rt Hon Stephen O'Brien MP

Governments And Technology - Does It Have To Be Quite This Difficult?
Robert Hayes

A Turkish Perspective On International Relations And The Challenges And Opportunities Facing Turkey
His Excellency Mr Ünal Çeviköz

Do We Have The Rights To Optimism? Capitalism And The Next Wave Of Growth
Leo Johnson

Is The Middle East Imploding?
Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP

Downton versus Daring: Can Cultural Influence Be A Substitute For Britain's Declining Hard Power?
Sir Martin Davidson KCMG

What Really Drives The Middle East And North Africa Today: Religion Or Politics Or Both - And What Next?
Sir Dominic Asquith KCMG

Turkey: Moving Forward Or Moving Backward?
Sir David Reddaway KCMG MBE

The Geostrategic Divide: An Undeclared War?
Alastair Crooke

When Britain Burned The White House: The 1814 Invasion Of Washington
Peter Snow

The Arab Spring: Can Britain Piece It Back Together?
Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP

THE SAHEL - TERROR AVERTED OR JUST POSTPONED?

Transcript of a lecture given by the Rt Hon Stephen O'Brien MP

23rd October 2013

Stephen O'Brien MP *was appointed to be the Special Representative for the Sahel at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office on 26th September 2012. He served as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for International Development from May 2010 to September 2012. Stephen was educated at Sedbergh School and Emmanuel College, Cambridge where he studied law. After practising as a solicitor in the City of London for several years, he became the International Director and Company Secretary of Redland PLC. He was elected as the MP for Eddisbury in 1999 and held a number of Shadow front bench positions including Shadow Secretary of State for Industry between 2003-2005 and Shadow Minister for Health and Social Care from 2005-2010.*

Thank you very much indeed. It is an enormous pleasure to be with you this afternoon and I am very pleased to have this opportunity to share with you some of the experiences, the questions and the thoughts that are provoked by a subject that people are increasingly becoming aware of: the Sahel.

I am delighted to be able to accept Michael's invitation and I do congratulate him on the progress of Global Strategy Forum in having such a significant impact on thinking around the globe on these key issues over the years that he has been so focused on it. Michael was the Chairman of the Conservative Party when my by-election happened and he was the one who made the fateful phone call on a Friday night - I was the candidate by Tuesday and the MP three weeks later. So he has a lot to answer for! But his commitment to peace and security is absolutely total.

It is interesting, given that we are talking about the potential for understanding how you deal with a terror threat in a particular part of the world and what drives that, that everybody in this audience from wherever they come, whether in the UK or abroad, has had their lives in some way affected by terrorism. It is one of the challenges of our generation, both as politicians and as people. I am particularly touched that Sir Jeremy Greenstock is in the audience, because he was at the UN-UK Mission at the time when I was one of the UK Parliamentary representatives to go and lay a wreath just a few weeks after the terrible events of 9/11 at Ground Zero. So, as I say, we have all been affected by terror.

Let me just try to set the scene a little bit. The Sahel is a band, starting from Mauritania and affecting nine countries, but not including all of them. It reaches through Chad and on to Eritrea, but we are really focused on those countries situated in the north and west of the African continent.

I came to know about the area because as I left Cambridge University with a couple of friends, we went on an expedition across the Sahara and the Sahel in an old Desert Rat radio repair lorry, back and forth, collecting mosquitoes (as you do for malaria research) and I came to know the beauty, the grandeur, the enormous distances of that series of deserts and marginal-life land and it was

something which has stayed with me. That malaria campaigning, and the fact that I was born on the east coast of Africa, gave me this interest.

But I came to realise how we in the West, for our two or three hundred years in the command of the seas, had been focused totally on the littoral of Africa, whereas for millennia, people had been criss-crossing west, east, north, south across these deserts, which we regard as natural barriers, but which had never been regarded as such by those who are part of that very, very large desert landscape.

And it is extraordinary: it has a series of mountains, of corrugated crust, of dunes, it is very difficult terrain to get around. We tend to try and do it on wheels or tracks, those who know what they are doing tend to go on hooves or feet. It is very important to recognise that the ability for this area to be remote, cut off and not particularly understood by the traditional Western nations has actually been part of what has led to the challenge that we have all faced recently.

Mali, for instance, right in the middle of the Sahel, in that part of northern West Africa with no coastal boundary, is twice the size of France, more or less. In the northern half, there is a thinner neck and then the southern half. About 90% of the population live in the southern half and about 10% of the population live in the northern half, more or less split between what is traditionally known as the white Arab as against the black central and south part of Africa, but I am going to hasten to add that in the narrative of what took place, and from that, the issues that will surface, the terror threat that emerged in the Sahel did not seem to be driven by racist issues, as some people would claim. There does not seem to be the evidence that it has been effectively a northern African people versus a central and southern African people, or between the old traditional form of rather tolerant Islamic faith-based traditionalists in the north versus the more Christian-based and animist traditions in the central and south.

I think that is important to recognise that, in the same way that we have to recognise that Timbuktu, for instance, was twice in history (I am told, I have not seen the proof) the highest per capita income in the world - no accident because of the marvellous amounts of commodities of great high value trans-crossing the desert regions. And so with that challenge, of us being very focused indeed on the UK interest (always an important aspect as to why we should be engaged in this area at all), our equities if you like, are in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, in relationships with Morocco, Algeria and Libya more recently, and many others besides, but each one of those - with a coast.

The areas we have been talking about across the Sahel are broadly in the Francophone sphere in terms of historical connection and of course, it is pretty useful to speak French when you are travelling around the area. But the issue has not been that there was a strong relationship, however connected they are with France. It is because the way that France had their relationship with those Sahelian countries was an extremely different model to the one that, for instance, the British had with their relationship countries in Africa.

If you think about it, in the desert areas, they would have forts and they would go out and they would make relationships and come back, whereas the old British model in the littoral states was a more administrative approach. I say that with some authority: my 81-year old father was one of the very last, if not the last, District Officer appointed in the old Colonial Service and went off to Mtwara in East Africa (hence I was born there) and he would argue that they were trying to forge

relationships in a much more organic way with communities from the bottom up and have an administrative control that way.

This has actually lasted and I will come back to this point, but I think it will be important for us to understand the continuing threat and opportunity in the Sahel region is how much the French model, that top-down, dirigiste approach to administration and political engagement and control is one which is going to help to re-engage what is felt to be a totally disenfranchised north of Mali, people (often Tuareg-based tribes) who do not feel associated with the Bamako-based 90% of the population where the power elite (totally encapsulating all the vested interests) lives. Or, whether more of an organic approach is going to be part of the way we think forwards to try and counter what has become the opportunity for terrorists to take advantage of areas which have become disengaged and which are relying on incomes which are informal or corrupt or criminal.

So what actually happened in the Sahel? As it happens, we know that quite a lot of cash was being raised through the kidnap-for-ransom commercial model, if you can put it so bluntly. It was a successful model and I was absolutely thrilled that the G8 made the announcement as they did, that governments at least were now totally committed to not pay on kidnap-for-ransom. But as we know, as the G8 communiqué stated, about $70 million had flowed to al-Qaeda in the last three years, of which $33 million was in the coffers of Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb. So that gave them a capacity to be able to take action in their interests.

But, as we have more recently come to understand the Sahel challenges, this was not, in my opinion and I think it is well supported, a function of the Arab Spring. There are many interpretations of that across the north coast of Africa and whilst there were obviously some connections, many would argue that male youth unemployment was at least one of the issues driving a lot of that disenchantment. Of course you could say that is equally applicable to the Sahel, except we are not dealing with intense populations. These are very high mobile, travelling populations, many Bedouin populations, where the normal form of jobs, as we would see them, does not really apply.

This is to do with moving to pastoral areas, but let us not forget the other reasons - take, for instance, the very well-researched UNODC statistics where they now have maps published on the Internet. The former head of the French judicial police who is heading up the UNODC based in Dakar, Senegal, has on evidence shown the arrows of all the criminal flows of people-trafficking, of oil, sugar, salt, other medicines, counterfeit medicines, obviously narcotics of various types, flowing - as they always have done - partly up the west coast of Africa, often sourced at Nouakchott in Mauritania and coming right across and flowing up traditionally into the western high purchasing power markets of Europe through Morocco and Algeria, but now getting across far more widely (many coming out through Tripoli and the Libyan coast), and not just coming into Europe, but going into the Middle East as well.

And it is on the back of those flows and all the traditional criss-crossing of this area by people who know what they are doing, that they were able to find that this was their form of income, but one which was resented and not counted and certainly informal.

As a result of which there was this disengagement between the structures under sovereign jurisdictions, whether it was the Bamakan government or the government in Niamey a long way south in Niger, another huge country which has been very fragile.

As a further result of which, those with ill intent, Al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb, were able to say, 'we've got a lot of people who are very unhappy and we can go and effectively occupy this area, we can be somebody who can land in this area of such deep disengagement.'

So that was where the cause came from, if you like, but the political cause that lay behind it was that a number of the Tuareg wanted their independent state of Azawad, a fundamentalist Islamic state: this was a call for independence.

Poverty, of course, drives so much of people's sense of disengagement and disappointment in their leaders and so, as a result of that, there was a significant feeling that the Sahel would attract not just al-Qaeda, but others who had come from southern Algeria and of course, there was evidence that many people in northern Mali were not Malians. They were traditional insurrectionists from southern Algeria, from many parts across what is known as the 'arc of instability' which the G8 identified, from Mauritania right the way across, beyond the African continent.

Thus I found myself as the Minister for International Development having to look at it from a donor point of view, because we had a massive humanitarian crisis in the Sahel. In deciding we had to be much more limited in how we applied our aid, we had pulled out of Niger, but when we looked at our strategy of putting money where the most need was, it became absolutely clear to me that we had to go and address the 20 million people at risk of starvation in and across the Sahel, mainly the southern part of it. That we did, and £58 million from the UK aid budget went that way.

The Europeans stepped up in a big way, but it became clear - and this is going back to late 2011, early 2012 - that nobody had access to northern Mali. Now that is a clue which is pretty powerful. Then we had the coup in March - remember, we had had a coup about a year or so earlier in Niger, so there was a lot of instability in the area, but then there were these interim governments.

I found myself in July 2012 at the National Security Council arguing that we should take a much more fundamental look at the threat posed by what was going on in the Sahel because it affected UK interests, and the longer we left unaddressed these sources of instability, the more likely it was that we were going to find insecurity on the southern geography of Europe.

As it happens, there was then the French election and there was a change of President and in the first conversation between our Prime Minister and President Hollande, in answer to the question, 'What is your priority, M. President, in foreign policy?', he said, 'It's Mali, Mali and Mali'. And the Prime Minister said, 'Well, I've only ever heard that word from one person in my government, so I'm going to have to do something about that', so that is how I came to be in the job I am in.

And so my job is very simple. We will support our French ally. We must do everything we can to deal with any genuine existential threat to our security and the capacity for that security and we should also be prepared to rely on the experience we have had from the past, whether it is in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen or Somalia. In other words, at a political level, if something happens that is dreadful, a terrorist attack, to people like me who have constituents to answer to on every Friday, you have got the proof of the terror that you are going to address. But how you actually then demonstrate that the UK should be engaged in something before it happens - that is a much more difficult political case to make.

This was an area where, in particular the French, who had been discussing it at the UN, had decided that there was a real threat. The UN, I have to say, was absolutely brilliant as we sought to negotiate. There were a series of resolutions in July 2012, then in October and as you know, December last year and then April.

But it was because we were only discussing a genuinely development, governance and security approach (as you should at the UN – that is the three-legged stool that has to stand in order for you to have a strategy), it was because we were only looking at military preparedness, trying to have an African-led solution, that meant we were able to have this combined collective view against the force of terrorism.

There had been an accusation, which is somewhat supported by the evidence, that Wahhabist tendencies had started to infiltrate what had been a more tolerant Sufist tradition in that part of Africa to the point where there was a need to be both militarily ready and to try to get the African Union (AU) as well as the regional organisation, ECOWAS, engaged.

Of course, there was a capacity problem in ECOWAS. There has always been a capacity problem in agreement. If you were a business, which of course quite rightly, sovereign countries are not, you would look at the north and west of Africa and you would say 'this is ripe for a series of takeovers', because these countries are not capable economically of standing alone, but that is not the way you can deal with countries. They were looking to have a more cooperative, coordinating approach through ECOWAS, but that was really under-capacitated and there was also a sense that it was Abuja-centric rather than regionally focused.

The AU was finding it quite difficult to be as strongly engaged in this part of the world as in other parts of Africa where it was taking the lead and so it became clear, not least because it was the only way we could engage Morocco, which is neither a member of ECOWAS nor the AU for reasons well known, that we had to engage them through the UN. As a result, the UN found itself being both the mandator, the authority, the legitimiser and the people taking the action, and that was absolutely right as we moved forward, trying to make it an African-led military preparedness force, AFISMA as it was known, which was coming together, but it had to transmogrify into MINUSMA, which is the current force trying to keep the peace.

As we went beyond December and January, we were at that point of trying to look to about now, this time last year - we were thinking October 13th was roughly when we needed to be ready, after the rains, after the time when it is too hot for anybody to think of starting to fight. Of course, al-Qaeda were looking at all the stuff that we were looking at and they could see what the world was doing in terms of getting ready and they thought, 'Well, why should we wait around to get hit?' So they started moving and they started moving in January and of course at that point, the person who led the original coup, Captain Sanogo, who was in the Kati barracks just outside Bamako back in March 2012, started coming out of his barracks and so it was quite clear that the intelligence was as published.

Al-Qaeda, MOJWA (another terrorist element which was more locally hired) and Ansar Dine, the charismatic local leader and rather regrettably, at the last minute, the original Azawad independence movement, the MNLA (somewhat Tuareg-based), also threw its lot in with that collection of people, not just from Kidal where they are based up in the northern mountains near Algeria, but also

Timbuktu and Gao and the areas that al-Qaeda and MOJWA had commandeered, which had been welcomed initially by the local people, because of the disengagement they had had from their own government. They had even welcomed Sharia law until too many of them were finding it was actually too rigorous and they were very happy to have, as we know from elsewhere in the world, the basic services delivered by al-Qaeda, which they had absolutely never received from their own government. So that had won hearts and minds and that is how they were able to garner the support to then get on the road down to Mopti.

It was at that point and one has to broadly calculate it, there was about three hours to go before it looked as though the Bamakan interim government would fall. And so the French acted and they were ready, they were able to do the surge from their forces stationed in other parts of Africa.

Because of the unusual approach - there have been Prime Ministerial Envoys but never for an area and a cause, it has been for thematic reasons in our government - I had been rattling around Whitehall with no budget, but trying to get everybody to understand the problem, and what assets collectively we would need to bring to have options, to help allies, to make sure that in addition to aid, we were pushing good governance, legitimising the governments locally through elections, and pushing on the regional structures, engaging the UN as a responsible member of that body in the Security Council and engaging as many people as we could across Africa, and of course, working very closely with our principal equity interest, if you like, in Nigeria, who have a big influence in that part of the world.

So when President Hollande said at a weekend, 'We've had to marshal about 4,000 troops, we're going in, we've got the invitation of the Malian government, the Malian army has not been able to do anything to repel this advance', we were able immediately to supply some logistical support and I know that the Secretary of State for Defence was well prepared with two C-17s and with our Sentinel R intelligence-gathering airborne asset, as well as some roll-on/roll-off ferry transportation and other intelligence-sharing.

So that was a useful, very quick response that encouraged lots of others and there was a much more collective effort, but I think we must salute the approach the French took in a way which raises questions about whether a military solution is the right answer. Well, certainly against the sort of advance we had in Mali, which was absolutely the apex of an episode within the broader Sahelian challenge which we all face. This challenge is ongoing, as a result of poverty, lack of development, intense population growth and a lack of resources to support that, and desertification, partly caused through an overuse of what assets there are to eat, as well as global climate change.

So the French led this effort and interestingly, the key response in terms of military support came from a non-ECOWAS member, Chad, who did a remarkable job as part of Operation Serval, and all the time we had the UN looking at this. As you know, this was a unified response - there were no vetoes, there were no difficult discussions. Going back to 19th October last year, I found myself sitting next to the Russian Ambassador, the representative on that occasion in Bamako as we were discussing these issues, so this was very much a United Nations approach to an area which had not yet had a terrorist incident, but was suddenly faced with a known al-Qaeda terrorist threat, trying to get for the first time a total state as a safe haven, close to the soft underbelly of Europe, and before - and we still pray - any bombs went off in Marseilles or Paris or London. So that was why this was different. I think it is dangerous to make too much of an equivalence between other areas which have had a

lot of focus, but one of the reasons we have not heard a lot about it recently is because the success of Operation Serval, to which I pay tribute, has been that it has given a new platform for legitimacy. We have had the inauguration of IBK, the new President, we have legislative elections in Mali coming along, we have a recognition that it is right that the UK, along now with the US (because there is an elected President, which gives them a legitimate government, this gives them a better conversation with Congress) is able to support the aid effort and we have got Mali in a place where it is back in the context of the total Sahel.

The danger is, we move off and say 'job done,' when in fact all the issues that led to the original terrorist opportunity remain in place. Poverty, terrible poverty, no better now than when I was driving through all that area in 1979. Terrible disease. More people dying of malaria than were dying then, even though we have got many more tools and solutions, and an incredible population growth, because of the lack of confidence that children will live, the usual problem, but also because of the continuing, absolutely appalling lack of opportunity, both for life chances and choices for women, not least when, whether and how many children to have, and birth spacing.

All that leads to this perfect storm of opportunity for people to say 'we will receive whatever you are prepared to offer' and that, in my opinion, in the light of the Sahel experience, is what those who are organising for terrorism are looking for, to give themselves a safe haven platform. Populations (and this is absolutely true in that part of the world) are well connected, with lots of communications at the moment crossing Niger, going from the northern parts. Some are flowing back up to Libya, where, although it is not because there were arms coming out of Libya that we had this problem, unquestionably a lot of groups were emboldened by the fact they suddenly had a huge number of cheaper arms available to them; and now that corridor is open, the southern border of Libya is a concern.

There is, of course, a major asset in northern Niger, just north of the corridor, south of the Algerian border, at Arlit. I happened to more or less bump into the uranium mine in 1979 just after it had been built, and it is obviously very important in terms of an international asset. Then, as you go further south, you have got the whole of the Niger and the Nigerian border and you have been reading not least in these last few days about the continuing activities of Boko Haram and Ansaru.

And so, in a forum which is an open forum, in the light of the experience of what has taken place in Mali, in recognition that all the conditions that led to what happened are perceived by most of us to belong to an area which we thought was the natural barrier between 'west Africa' and 'north Africa', in fact, that barrier does not exist – that has been connected by people, some of whom want to do well and others who would wish to do us ill.

To answer the question of whether we have had terror averted, we can at least look back over the last twelve months to the fact that we have averted what was unquestionably a terror platform. But whether it is just postponed because, of course, there are plenty of those from the original cadres of those groups in northern Mali who are still around and who are regrouping, is still unclear. The threat is now probably more asymmetric across that part of the world, but we are also really struggling with having functioning regional groupings, where borders are often honoured only in the breach, where they are almost impossible to police, thousands upon thousands of miles of desert.

Speaking to the President of Mauritania the other day (as it happens, IBK was three hours late

for his own inauguration, so all the Presidents were sitting along the front row in 41 degrees in the heat, and it was quite nice because I have been travelling around in the last 13 months so intensively, to have the chance to talk to all of them) and he said, 'Well actually, we don't see our border as a line. Our border, increasingly, is going to have to be those remote groups who live near our border with Niger or Algeria. We are going to have to say to them "you need to become an extension resource of our government, because you know who is coming, who is an infiltrator or not local - we don't".' This is true of the discussions I had in Libya, which is not strictly part of the Sahel, but their southern border is unquestionably affected by all the worries of the Sahel and the Toubou, for instance, completely control part of the southern borders of Libya.

So, the question, for us and for them, and above all for regional co-ordination which I think is the challenge we have to still face up to, is: how do you make some of those who have not been part of the establishment, part of the power base, part of the vested interest, who feel excluded, who have had the chance to prey upon the vulnerability of very poor people who are in desperate need for the basic materials of life, how do we make them part of the extension resource of legitimate governments, of good administration, of slowly emerging formal, counted, recognised instruments of democratically accountable governments as against competing for advantage to the exclusion of others and often in a corrupt way?

On top of all that, there is one final point I would leave you with, which is a tangential point that we might want to bring out in discussion, and that is: there has been some suggestion that this area is prey to, indeed was driven by what we call 'narcoterrorism'. I respect the fact that His Excellency the Ambassador of Algeria is here, it is a phrase you hear a lot in Algeria, but what has become clear is that the terrorists, particularly al-Qaeda, did not move drugs. These drugs are big consignments, huge articulated lorries - this is not on the back of Toyotas - and there is the money to be able to do this stuff, where corruption is the language to get through the borders and these massive shipments are going through. But the terrorists do not possess them, there are protection fees, there are passage fees, but they do not enter the criminality of the drug transportation. That is for the criminal gangs who have been doing this for millennia and so I think we need to be extremely careful not to conflate some of the issues about the narcotics trade and terrorism. Unquestionably there will be links and unquestionably there are of course financial transactions which flow both ways, but to conflate it into this phrase 'narcoterrorism' could be to aim off too far from the reality on the ground that we actually need to address and to organise ourselves in order to have an appropriate response to a continuing threat.

Most of this threat can be averted, not by simply having military preparedness and the willingness to use it and the projection of political will which, if you like, is my appointment by the Prime Minister to show the UK felt it had a real interest, a real stake in the ground in this remote area, which felt too remote to most people, but also by focusing on good governance, engagement, respect, and equally on development issues, not just the humanitarian response, but good, strong stabilisation and resilience programmes over the long term, which are going to give people hope and jobs and a sense of engagement and justice. That is the best antidote and that is the best way we can try to play our collective way forward on an international platform.

Thank you.

GOVERNMENTS AND TECHNOLOGY - DOES IT HAVE TO BE QUITE THIS DIFFICULT?

Text of a lecture given by Robert Hayes

30th October 2013

Robert Hayes *is a Senior Fellow of the Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology in Governments; a small group established to give high level support and advice to governments on the threats and opportunities posed by emerging technologies. Robert is an acknowledged expert in strategic risk who has advised major private and public sector organisations on risk and security strategy; he is also an international authority on issues between government and industry in the Internet, communications and computing sectors. Prior to joining Microsoft, Robert worked for the UK Government in senior positions in the law enforcement, security and intelligence community; he also served as a hostage negotiator for ten years. Robert holds a BSc. in Psychology, is a Fellow of the British Computer Society and a Freeman of The City of London.*

I would like to discuss three broad areas in this talk:

Firstly, I would like to describe what it feels like to be a global IT company in the cyber era, and discuss some of the complexities that shape the relationships between industry and governments in this sector.

Secondly, I would like to discuss the potentially transformative impact of cloud-based technology in developing countries, and why, if this is not positively channelled, it may threaten the relevance and legitimacy of some states.

I then want to dwell on the question 'Governments and technology: does it have to be quite this difficult?' before concluding with a vision for the future.

So, what does it feels like to be a global IT company in the cyber era?

I find it helpful to give some context at this point, as I find people are often surprised by the scope and scale of Microsoft's global operations. I also need to emphasise that I am describing here only Microsoft's operation – Google, Facebook, YouTube, and Amazon, to name but a few, also operate on a similarly global scale.

Firstly, let me describe Microsoft's corporate architecture:

- We have 200,000 people operating from bases in 112 countries, but covering almost every country on the planet;
- Between us we have over 1.25 million devices that we connect to the company network through over 17,000 wireless access points;
- We make 120 million Lync (Microsoft's internet telephony voice and video service) calls per month (which incidentally has saved the company over $215 million each year since we migrated away from traditional telephony).

But it is when you consider our customer facing services that the scale becomes impressive. We now have over 1 billion customers and 20 million businesses using our cloud services. At this point, I think it will be helpful to dwell a little on the term 'cloud', as it is an unhelpfully broad term. In simple terms there are three variants of cloud environment – Public, Private, and Hybrid.

Public Cloud – if you have a Hotmail or Gmail webmail account, use Facebook, or shop at Amazon, then you are using the public cloud. You will be using some type of internet enabled device, connecting to the internet through a commercial provider, and accessing the service you require from a data centre, owned by a private or public body, somewhere in the world.

Private Cloud – typically used by military and other organisations requiring the highest security standards, this is a closed system using locked down devices, private networks, and closed private data centres. Whilst private clouds can be very powerful, they lack connectivity to external sources, and therefore are of limited utility to most governments departments and the private sector.

Hybrid Cloud – combines the richness of the public cloud with enhanced security for a subset of data. There are a number of types of hybrid: some use public cloud only to "burst out" for scalability; others are based on public cloud, but store some data and run some services from behind their organisational firewall. This is increasingly the choice of governments.

So, the question "how secure is the cloud?" which I am frequently asked is difficult to answer! Although the US Defence Science Board did write an excellent paper on the subject, which I highly recommend, earlier this year entitled *Cyber Security and Reliability in a Digital Cloud* – it can be found here http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports2010s.htm.

It is also worth a quick diversion to say what all these people are using our cloud services for:

Firstly, they use it to communicate:
- We have over 1.3 billion email addresses sending 4 billion emails per day;
- We route 2 billion minutes per month of Skype voice and video calling per month;
- Yammer, our corporate networking tool, is now used by over 200,000 global businesses;
- Over 48 million people are members of our X-Box live online community and play games with other gamers, who may be on the other side of the world.

Secondly, they use cloud services to search for information:
- We receive 1.7 billion hits per day and over 500,000 concurrent connections to the Microsoft corporate websites - which incidentally is also one of the most popular targets for cyber–attacks.

Thirdly, they use cloud services to store data:
- We are storing over 4 trillion objects in our cloud platform;
- Over 250 million people now use Skydrive to store or back up their data.

Fourthly, they use cloud services to run businesses:
- Businesses of all sizes are increasingly deciding that running their infrastructure from a commercial cloud environment offers enhanced resilience, scalability, mobility, and cost savings.

So, how do we run this huge operation? It is run from a very small number of strategically sited,

very large data centres, each run by a very small number of staff. The number and position of these is calculated to provide resilience to disaster or failure.

So, what does having this scale of global operation mean for us?

Firstly, we are effectively part of every nation's critical national infrastructure – even for those countries that seem to buy very little of our products and services.

Secondly, we hold information (ours and our customers) which is of interest to governments.

Thirdly, we work within an incoherent and inconsistent framework of national legislation, with little tangible assistance from international bodies or initiatives.

And, lastly, our products (along with everyone else in the industry) are used as an attack vector for cyberattacks.

A few words on cyberattacks, as this is an environment which has changed in the six years I have been at Microsoft. Cyberattacks are not new, but the nature of attacker has evolved.

The first attacks were from individual hackers who hacked for kudos from the community – we still see this.

Then there were hackers who attacked and defaced websites in support of causes – often single issue groups – we still see this, as the Anonymous Group attacks prove. As an aside, the Anonymous Group attacks, conducted by asking individuals to download and use denial of service tools, have arguably brought hacking into popular consciousness as a tool of legitimate protest.

Then we saw the birth of hacking for gain - organised crime gangs using the internet as a means to commit crime – we see much more of this.

Then we saw nation state attacks to obtain information, and more. Now, we still see all of these, but also literally armies, from an increasing number of countries, seeking to exploit the cyber domain.

But please do not forget that the cyber domain is predominantly owned and operated by industry. So, exploiting the cyber domain often means looking to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in products, services, and infrastructure. It is also notable that research indicates that the top buyers of vulnerabilities from the hacking community are now governments – some of which do not appear to be passing on all of this information to the people, such as us, who can fix the vulnerabilities.

This raises an interesting question about the level of resistance to attack that commercial software and services, sometimes free services, needs to have. If the benchmark is the ability to withstand concerted nation state attack then it is rather like expecting Ford to produce a standard Mondeo that can resist a rocket-propelled grenade.

It also raises an interesting question of trust.

So, let me move on to talk about the relationship between industry and governments, and how

trust is established, and sometimes damaged. Every government cyber strategy cites support from industry as a critical component, but what does support actually mean? Support is a mix of compliance to legislation and voluntary co-operation.

We have a range of co-operative programmes designed to:

- Support government's efforts to improve the security of their infrastructure;
- Fight cybercrime and cyberattacks;
- And help to educate their citizens about cyber security.

But there is a real issue here – threat information from industry can be dual use. Knowledge of a vulnerability can be used as a potential attack vector, if weaponised and deployed before the victim has updated their defences. As an aside, we estimate that it takes less than a week for our monthly security patches to be reverse engineered, the vulnerability we have patched to be identified, and a weapon created to attack that vulnerability. This is why it is so critical, as CESG constantly restate, for security patches to be applied promptly. It is also why it is so disappointing to see how long some governments take to apply these critical security patches.

As a company we have developed a clear red line to frame our relationships with governments. We support governments in the development of defensive information assurance, but we will not support the development of anything that will be used offensively. We have to trust governments to respect this, but that trust is fragile.

More and more governments have, or are, developing both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. This is enshrined in an increasing number of cyber strategies. This causes some challenges to industry as often there does not seem to be an effective air-gap between these offensive and defensive capabilities.

A current example is the proposed MoD Joint Cyber Reserve where it is clear that there is a desire that industry will release staff for reserve duty, yet it appears that the duties of the Reserve will include "clinical cyber strikes that could disable enemy communications, nuclear and chemical weapons, planes, ships and other hardware." Bearing in mind the fact that we not only do business in almost every country in the world, but are also subject to potentially similar requests from the governments of these countries, we are seriously concerned about the potential conflict of interest should our staff be engaged in this work.

I would like to end this section with some thoughts on coherence.

Firstly, it would be very good to see a more coherent approach from within governments. We often receive very different messages from privacy advocates and security advocates in the same governments.

Secondly, it would be good to see a more coherent approach between governments. The following quote from the *New York Times* (26th October 2013) says it better than I can:

> *'The European Union wants to require American companies, led by Internet powerhouses like Google and Yahoo, to get the approval of European officials before complying with warrants issued in the United States seeking information, e-mails or search histories about European*

citizens. The European Union would slap the technology companies with huge fines if they failed to agree to those rules, meaning that the companies would be caught between two masters and several legal systems.'

Clearly, this is extremely unhelpful.

Finally, some international government processes are woefully unfit for purpose. We receive many requests and orders to support global law enforcement agencies, often in extremely serious, fast-moving matters. Yet, we often have to comply using a MLAT process which stems from 1905, and where as far as I can see, the only measure of progress is that letters are now taken between embassies by taxi rather than on horseback!

So, let's change direction.

I would now like to discuss the potential transformative impact of cloud technology in developing countries, and why this may threaten the relevance and legitimacy of some governments.

I am going to focus on capacity building in Africa. The history here is not good. There are many examples of projects, by many organisations, over many years, to develop government capacity in Africa. Many projects have invested heavily in the provision of IT equipment. However, the combination of poor infrastructure, corruption, and a shortage of in-country technology skills has meant that the majority of these efforts have foundered.

Events in Africa have brought a renewed focus on this issue. The growth of al-Qaeda groups across Africa has put an increased focus on law enforcement capacity building and in particular the development of channels where intelligence can be generated and shared between local and global agencies.

So, what has changed that may allow future projects to succeed where past projects have failed?

Two factors have changed this situation:

The first is that Internet penetration in Africa is growing exponentially - but primarily through low cost, low spec, and importantly low bandwidth mobile phones.

The second is the ability to host data in commercial or government clouds, and operate services, through mobile devices without the need for infrastructure in-country.

Interestingly, the local economies within Africa have already identified this opportunity, and there are some wonderful and innovative examples of mobile e-commerce developing in rural areas of Africa with no reliable power, and where Internet access and ability to charge mobile phones are real commodities.

Investment in infrastructure could therefore be made where infrastructure and geopolitical stability could be assured – in Africa or elsewhere, and services delivered through mobile devices directly to and from local staff or citizens. This combination offers real step change potential to deliver government services to citizens.

But there is another side of this coin: this same technology is allowing Africa's many diaspora, tribes, religions, and other groupings to remotely communicate, bond, and coalesce. The increased identity, influence, and ultimately power of these groupings has the potential to make state structures, particularly states which are unable to provide basic services, less relevant to their population and ultimately threaten state legitimacy.

If I as a citizen can get the services I need from other entities, or indeed other states, why do I need the state to which I notionally belong? This is an area which has the potential to change the balance of power and destabilise the region. It requires greater attention than it is getting.

My final section: governments and technology: does it have to be quite this difficult?

My role takes me around the world talking to governments and I am often presented with intractable "government technology" problems. 90% of these intractable problems, on closer examination, are problems that just do not seem to be a problem in equivalently sized organisations in the private sector.

So what is it that makes technology change such a challenge to governments?

I make three key observations:

Firstly, technology change should be to enable the execution of a strategic vision or plan – it is a means to an end. In my experience, it is rare to find such a vision or plan, and where plans do exist they are far too narrow in scope. In my view, and having cognizance of industry best practice, there is a genuine opportunity to think in terms of one coherent public sector architecture.

Secondly, within governments there often seems to be a profound disconnect between technology strategies and other key strategies such as estate or people. So, it is far from unusual to see an organisation with an estate strategy focused on rationalising estate, and a people strategy aiming to increase flexible and home working – yet no read across of these key points into the technology strategy.

Finally, piecemeal, bottom-up, incremental change will not deliver the type of step change that is needed. Thinking and processes will have to change. And a key process that must change is procurement. Current procurement orthodoxy drives fragmented, bottom-up planning and thinking.

Let me give a hypothetical example:

Let us say that a London Borough needs a new records management system. That Borough will set out a requirement, tender, and procure against that requirement. Industry will form a number of consortia who will bid for, deliver, and manage the work.

However, let us assume that each of the neighbouring four Boroughs have the same requirement for a new records management system, and so do agencies that the Borough will need to share records data with – such as health, or the police. Each of those agencies will go through the same process, likely completely independently.

The net result is likely to be a number of different solutions, built and managed by different industry consortia. Worse, there may well then be the need to develop middleware to enable each system to talk to the others. If you doubt this, I cite the National Audit Office which identified over 80 government organisations with a mandate to bestow grants.

There is little commonality in how this is done, with individual systems that have been created organically and separately. Each system will have system administrator costs, hardware costs, energy costs, and likely a service contract. More importantly, if I am defrauding all 80, the only way to determine this is by asking each agency to interrogate their system.

Let me contrast this with industry best practice.

Industry is moving to a platform approach, increasingly cloud-based platforms. These enterprise scale platforms are based on a common set of simple core programs and are designed to deliver multiple services to a range of devices.

In the NAO example, this would involve one "Grant Aid" program being developed and hosted from a cloud platform (public or private), but with "local" personalisation for each agency. It would be updated and security patched centrally, with central authentication and audit functions. In addition, there would be an ability to search and undertake analytics across the 80 sets of data. And it would provide secure (we can argue about what that means) and resilient access to the data and services on a range of devices, in or out of the office – assuming the user and location are within policy for that particular document.

Every good talk should end on a vision and so here is my vision for where public sector IT should be by 2020.

All public sector IT services will be run from a handful of large, secure, failsafe data centres with a minimum of two instances of each set of data.

Security, authentication and audit will be designed into the system using tools which are routinely used in the private sector, such as rights management, intuitive virtual private networks and two factor authentication.

Users will be able to access data, from across government and from external sources through a small number of common open standard applications, on a range of devices, wherever they are.

Communication between governments and their citizens will be as intuitive and easy as shopping on Amazon.

A vibrant community of SMEs will develop applications which will enhance government service delivery.
The technology to do this exists, today.

Incremental change will not deliver this vision, neither will current thinking – there is the challenge!

A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FACING TURKEY

Transcript of a lecture by His Excellency Mr Ünal Çeviköz

19th November 2013

Ambassador Ünal Çeviköz *was born in Istanbul in 1952. He graduated from the Bosphorus University, Department of English Literature in 1974 and Political Science in 1978. Ambassador Çeviköz entered into the Foreign Service in 1978. He was promoted to the rank of Ambassador in 2001. He served as Ambassador of Turkey to Azerbaijan between 2001-2004 and as Ambassador of Turkey to the Republic of Iraq from 2004-2006. Between 2007-2010, Ambassador Çeviköz held the position of Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His portfolio covered Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Asia, Africa as well as international security issues (NATO, OSCE, disarmament). Since July 2010, he has served as the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.*

Lord Lothian, thank you very much. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to be here and to address you on this sunny London day. I am also aware of a very sad reality: you are here to listen to perspectives on Turkish foreign policy, not because of my personal charm. I wish it were the other way around, but it is a sad reality!

Lord Lothian, you mentioned that the last five years have shown very interesting developments in Turkish foreign policy. I think I would rather go even further back and perhaps start with ten years before and I would simply submit for your attention that the last ten years of Turkish foreign policy have shown a very dynamic development. Turkish foreign policy has continued and even strengthened its proactive approach to problems in and around a very volatile and a very complicated neighbourhood: the eastern Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, the east Mediterranean and the Balkans.

I think this foreign policy approach has replaced a reactive foreign policy implementation, which prevailed in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy before. Reactive foreign policy had been the main feature of Turkish general foreign policy conduct, particularly up to the beginning of the 1990s, but change, beginning in the 1990s in international relations, particularly after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and then the former Yugoslavia, forced Turkish foreign policy to adapt itself to the rapidly changing conditions in the international environment and to become more dynamic and more proactive. Such foreign policy conduct has been particularly visible in the last decade.

Let us remember the conditions which were prevailing around Turkey ten years ago. There was the intervention in Iraq; foreign policy disputes with almost all of our neighbours, Syria particularly and then Armenia and also other neighbours; and unresolved conflicts, such as the Cyprus issue and Turkey's frustration with the lack of progress in relations with the European Union. A redefinition of Turkish foreign policy towards its neighbours was absolutely necessary and a forward-looking constructive foreign policy conduct was necessary.

You will also recall that this was the time when Turkish foreign policy introduced the concept of "zero problems with neighbours". Let us recall the basic characteristics of this "zero problems with neighbours" policy. First of all, there was an intention to reintegrate Turkey with its surroundings. There was also a desire to improve relations with Turkey's neighbours. There was also an ambition to pursue a more dynamic, proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy, but this foreign policy implementation has started to yield some concrete developments such as efforts to resolve the Cyprus issue. You will recall in 2003 there were very serious negotiations, particularly in Switzerland in Bürgenstock, which resulted in the adoption of the Annan Plan and then the referenda on both sides of the island, on the Turkish Cypriot side and on the Greek Cypriot side.

There was also a development in ending enmity with Syria, because you also know that Abdullah Öcalan, the Chief of the PKK terrorist organisation, who was in prison in Turkey, was very much supported by Syria at that time. Then there was also a result which, in a way, normalised relations with Armenia. You remember in 2009, Turkey and Armenia for the first time in their history since 1925, were able to sign two documents bringing the two countries together and planning to overcome their historic differences.

But it was not only pertaining to developments in the neighbourhood of Turkey. The "zero problems with neighbours" policy was also complemented with a more visible and global presence of Turkish foreign policy in the world. There was the start of accession negotiations with the European Union in 2005, there was also a continued commitment to the importance of transatlantic relations and Turkey was opening to new geographies and developing ties with emerging actors in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Now, the "zero problems with neighbours" policy probably became the most publicised feature of Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. But today, after ten years of implementation, where do we stand? What is the result of the "zero problems with neighbours" policy?

First of all, we have broken ground in reconnecting with the Balkans, the Black Sea Region, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The foreign policy agenda is no longer dominated by chronic disputes with neighbours that used to consume energy in regional and international affairs. As a result, Turkey's neighbourhood started to be perceived not as a source of problems and potential threats, but as an arena of co-operation and partnership. But there are always unexpected developments and I think one of the most unexpected developments was the new wave of important change which started with the Arab revival. But with the Arab revival, I think the Turkish foreign policy approach was still valid. It is an important neighbourhood and since it is our immediate neighbourhood, Turkey could not remain indifferent to the developments in the Middle East and North Africa.

As Turkey at that time was preparing itself for the 21st century, with democratic freedoms, a liberal market economy, strong civil society, further integration with developed economic and political system, values and principles based on human rights, no discrimination as to ethnicity, gender, race, sect, religion, Turkey also wished all these values to be adopted and to be pursued in its neighbourhood as well. But there is regional turmoil. Arab peoples wanted a new way of life and their desire was a genuine demand for good governance, human rights, civil rights and dignity.

Turkey was facing a very important decision: either we should maintain our ties with the oppressive, anachronistic authoritarian regimes or we should support popular uprisings to secure basic democratic rights.

You will also recall about three years ago, when the first of these events started in Tunisia and then continued with Libya, Egypt and then finally with Syria, Turkey tried to reach out to all these countries, to establish dialogue and to show, as we understand it, the correct way to pursue and insert reform into the system and to transform the existing political system into a more democratic one.

I think after several years, and particularly after five years, Turkey stands at a very interesting juncture - because of the implementation of this Turkish foreign policy, there are very important criticisms and questions about Turkish foreign policy, such as: Is Turkey drifting apart from the West? Is Turkey turning its back on its transatlantic commitments? Is Turkey turning its back on NATO? Are we losing Turkey? This is of course being asked by the European allies - is Turkey's bid for membership of the European Union no longer a priority? Is Turkish foreign policy going to be labelled as neo-Ottomanism? Is Turkish foreign policy being transformed to a new vision based on sectarian religious emphasis? Is Turkey conducting a Sunni foreign policy?

I think all these questions and criticisms are unfair.

First of all, there are several factors that overlay each other in Turkish foreign policy choices. The dynamics of internal change, issues of identity, old traditions, old alliances, new friends, new trading partners, realpolitik, national interest, and then there is the intricate balance between Turkey's neighbours themselves, Russia, Iran, Syria. Relations with the European Union, divisions within the European Union, the regional role of the United States, transatlantic relations, Turkish/US relations, US/Russia relations, the evolving situation in Cyprus from closed chapters to gas exploration - is it a new crisis or a new opportunity? - the post Sarkozy/Hollande era in Turkish/French relations, slow progress in the EU accession process, what will happen with the damage repair exercise with Israel, Turkey's stance in regional conflicts and tensions, the Arab-Israeli peace process, Iran's nuclear programme.

So there are a variety of issues which are affecting the conduct of Turkish foreign policy. And all of these issues have their own ups and downs and inevitably impact each other. Therefore, Turkey's foreign policy choices are not confined to, or driven by, an East/West nexus, but rather a fine-tuning balancing act between all of these interchangeable and interdependent issues that directly impact Turkey.

Now here I will show some courage and make a brave attempt and suggest the idea that Turkish foreign policy straddles three realms.

The first realm is the traditional transatlantic relationship, the second is Turkey's religious and ethnic ties to the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Central Asia and the third is a pure realpolitik reasoning based on national interest. The last one is particularly visible and understandable in relations with regional powers such as Russia and Iran and also particularly in the field of energy, given Turkey's dependency as well as Turkey's aspirations to become an energy transit hub.

Now these realms are not mutually exclusive. They are mutually reinforcing. There may be times when Turkish foreign policy implementation prioritises one of those realms, but this does not mean that the other is given away - it has been replaced by a new foreign policy approach. Hence Turkish foreign policy is not changing, but there is a very important continuity in the conduct of Turkish

foreign policy, because these realms complement one another and they are the basic fundamental parameters within the general framework of Turkish foreign policy implementation.

The fact that Turkey has been focusing more on the Middle East has created a misperception for allies looking at Turkey. A misperception that Turkey is driving away from western commitments, that Turkey is developing a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, that Turkey is conducting a sectarian policy.

What is needed? I think what Turkey needs to do is correct this misperception.

First of all, no country can rely on its own resources in international relations in today's global, interconnected and interdependent setting. Turkey also needs to work together with the international community. Therefore Turkey needs a concerted transatlantic approach to managing the region and its neighbourhood. There is also a need to clarify the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy implementation. Some suggest that this is a reset. I tend to call it correcting the misperceptions, correcting the undeserved labelling of Turkish foreign policy implementation, correcting the wrongly developed perception of an unfair image.

And this is exactly what is happening. I would simply submit to you the recent developments and then probably stop there, so that we can have a very lively Q&A session.

Do not forget that the new Iranian Foreign Minister has recently visited Turkey and there has been a very serious discussion between the two foreign ministers about the future of Turkish/Iranian relations, but also the effect of Turkish/Iranian relations in the geography in which we are living.

The visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, to Turkey, is also a very important development and has probably overcome certain misunderstandings between the two countries.

And then the visit of the leader of the Kurdish Regional Government, Massoud Barzani, to Turkey, particularly to Diyarbakir and his meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan, and currently, the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister to the United States.

I think all these have to be watched, followed and monitored very carefully, which suggests that Turkey is now correcting the misperception which has been created because of its last five or six years of foreign policy conduct in the region. I will stop there and I will simply ask for your comments and your questions. I am sure that there will be a very lively discussion, because I tried to be rather provocative instead of giving you a very descriptive situation.

So here I am and I am afraid I have about half an hour because I am leaving for Istanbul. Tomorrow we are going commemorate the killing of the British Consul General, ten years ago, after the al-Qaeda bombing in Istanbul.

Thank you.

DO WE HAVE THE RIGHTS TO OPTIMISM? CAPITALISM AND THE NEXT WAVE OF GROWTH

Transcript of a lecture given by Leo Johnson

10th December 2013

Leo Johnson *is the Co-Founder of Sustainable Finance Ltd, now a part of the PwC Group, and a Visiting Fellow of the Smith School of Enterprise & Environment at Oxford. His specialisation is making business sense of sustainability, identifying environmental and social megatrends and the risks and opportunities for business leaders. He has hosted a number of programmes for BBC World News, including 'Down to Business' - helping scale up BBC World Challenges ground-breaking small businesses, and 'One Square Mile'. He is a Judge for the Financial Times 'Boldness in Business Awards' and a co-Founder of the Prix Pictet, the world's leading prize on photography and sustainability, for which Kofi Annan is the Patron. He has commented and written irregular guest columns for the Financial Times, Huffington Post and Wall Street Journal.*

It is lovely to be here and to recognise so many faces as well, but there are many who will be thinking that I look vaguely familiar and I ask them to suspend that thought. I have got this set of siblings who are all politically monolithic and physically monolithic. I am a completely separate entity from them. I am technically known as the 'unknown Johnson', but, as has been revealed, I had a tiny sustainability strategy company that got bought by PwC a few years back, in a process that I now realise was slightly more of an acquisition than a full-scale merger between our organisations, and in the last couple of years, as well as doing some documentaries, I have been writing a book called *Turnaround Challenge*.

I know that there are many people in this room who have written much deeper books than this one, but it was hard work. Just as an example, we had it all ready to go, we had the camera-ready copy for the cover, with the R's reversed backwards, Russian style. It looked very chic, very avant-garde, and I showed it to my dad. He looked at it and he said, 'Like in 'Toys "R" Us'?'

But we got it finished, the book came out and we managed even, in one brief shining moment of glory, to hit No. 2 on the Amazon Best Seller list in the most uncompetitive category, which is, yes, Business Ethics. Just to give you an idea, No. 3 was a book simply called *Liar*, and No. 1 was a book by the supreme ethicist, Lance Armstrong.

We agreed to keep it light today, so we decided to have a relatively easy small topic like 'Do we have the rights to optimism?' and 'Capitalism: will it deliver?'' So we are just focusing on that little bite-sized topic!

What I would love to do is relay a couple of things that shifted my position on this, because I came at this from a sustainability angle. I came at this from a position where I was saying to myself, 'There's doing the right thing and then there's doing the wrong thing, and are a lot of the businesses that I am working with on the sustainability side just doing a little bit of window dressing? Am I not

just a fig leaf, am I a toxic fig leaf who is actually helping business to do some really nice window dressing while we meanwhile just go quietly down the tubes?' That was the question. And why did I write this book, this incredible headache of writing a book? It was because I had that jagged piece of shrapnel inside me, this little piece of doubt, that I was doing something that was not just a waste of time, but that I was actually participating in a fraud.

So what I would like to do is play with this notion of the rights to optimism. I want immediately to define our terms. What does success look like? What does the good look like? What does society look like where we are thriving, not just being resilient (I loathe the word 'resilience')?

I want to tell a story. This is a story about a German economist and a cow. It is not a promising start to a story, but here it goes. The economist is Fritz Schumacher, the author of *Small Is Beautiful* and of *Good Work*.

There is Schumacher, and he made the mistake of being in England at the outbreak of World War II and he got interned. He was interned on a farm, which is a pretty civilised way to do things, but the problem is, if you are a farmer and you have suddenly got a German economist internee, there is really not a huge amount you can do with a German economist on a farm, it is almost axiomatic. So the farmer came up with a brilliant idea, which was to get Schumacher to count the cows. Genius. So every day Schumacher goes to the fields and he counts the cows and there are 32, and every day he reports back to the farmer that there are 32. The weeks go by, the months go by. One day he goes to the field and there is an old farmer leaning against the gate. The old farmer says to him, 'The cows, they're never going to flourish with you counting them like that'. Schumacher looks at the old farmer and says, 'What do you mean?' And he goes back and has his lunch. The next week he goes on his tour of the fields, counts the cows and there are 31. He walks round the gates, walks round the perimeter and there in the ditch, legs up, stomach distended, is cow 32.

It is at that point that Schumacher had what he called the defining realisation of his life and the thing that changed him as an economist. He realised that what he was doing was counting the cows from a distance, he was counting them as a herd, he was not connecting with the cows as individuals, he was not looking into their eyes, checking the sheen of their coats, checking their tongues enough to tell what was ailing them, what they might actually need, he was just counting the cows as the herd. I leave that as a fragment of a story, which I hope, if the structure of this speech sustains itself, we will return to at the end. If it does not, please remind me about the cow.

What is the big conclusion from that story? The world that we thrive in is the world that acknowledges what the philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre says of human beings: that we are dependent rational beings. We are not just rational beings, we are beings that need those around us to be close enough and connected enough to us, like Schumacher's cows, to heal each other and to be there for each other and if we do not have that interconnection with each other, we will not be capable of thriving.

Are we headed towards that? Is capitalism taking us towards a city (and by city, I mean it in the term that the French theorist Boltanski means it, the *cité*, the model of capitalism, the model of life, as well as the physical space) are we heading to a *cité* where that capacity to be with each other, to connect with each other and to heal each other is going to be available to us, or are we headed in a very different direction? That is what I want to explore.

I would like to start this by asking you to deliver the verdict of history. The question is this: when they look back at this noble species that is mankind, who are they going to say is on the shortlist of the most extraordinarily compelling, the most attractive, the most mojo-filled, the most god or goddess-like people in history? Find a neighbour who is close to you, who looks remarkably intelligent. If you need to move, just move. Give us the shortlist. It is basically the sexiest person in history. We have got a very international crowd here, so give us some names we have not heard of if you need to: the sexiest person in history. With your neighbour, a group of two or three, 30 seconds.

Okay, let's get some names. All around the world, international names, other contenders, who have you got? Alexander Fleming, the inventor of penicillin; David Lloyd George, the welfare state; Gandhi. Okay, can I just check: we are asking the question 'who is the sexiest person in history? Marilyn Monroe and John F Kennedy. Now, I am totally with you, and I will tell you what: we can all have our own views, everyone is right on this one, it is one of those beautiful things, but Marilyn said this extraordinary thing, which for me is the defining phrase on optimism. She said, 'Sometimes good things fall apart, so that better things can fall into place'. It did not work for her, as we know, but is it going to work for us? This is what I want to explore. Because what she said, in her beautiful Marilyn formulation is pretty much what Schumpeter was trying to say a little bit, if you will excuse the colliding of his various life works into one sentence. When Schumpeter is talking about great gales of creative destruction, he is talking about good things slowly falling apart to be replaced by the new, by a new wave of growth coming in. So you know, she is on strong grounds there in terms of an economic theory.

The Economist has called the 21st century Schumpeter's century, and what I would like to explore is exactly this question: is there another wave of growth about to happen and could it be a wave of growth that is not just what has been called 'immiserizing growth', or growth that is economically negative growth because of its social or environmental costs, is it growth that is actually going to work and fit the world around it?

Two years ago, when I first really started digging into this question, my answer to that would have been 'you can bet your bottom dollar that the answer is "no"'. I propose to try to lay out and condense (which is actually saving you reading it) 226 or so pages into these next ten minutes. I will try to present two or three arguments around the reasons why you might want to feel tiny little nibbles of waves of optimism lapping at your feet, and the first is this.

If you think about Schumpeter's theory, it is complicated, but the best way to think about it is in terms of juice. What Schumpeter is talking about is general purpose technologies and these general purpose technologies (like water and the spinning wheel, like coal and the steam engine or the railways, like electricity and transition lines, obviously oil and the combustion engine) are all big beasts. These are the technologies that really shape the economy and they have the capacity to transform productivity so much that they just rumble through sector after sector, creating a surge in productivity, bringing juice to the economy, but then something happens.

We have all made tequilas, I know that for a fact, all of us in this room. We have all squeezed limes. We have all squeezed oranges for fresh orange juice. It is like a juicer. That general purpose technology is like the giant Florida orange or grapefruit and it gets squeezed and its juice floods through into the economy, raising productivity, giving new people new power to do new things, by

delivering this new energy source to them. But then, eventually, generally after a forty or fifty year cycle, guess what? Like the grapefruit, like the orange, the juice starts to run dry. As you squeeze it more, you end up with stuff that is not really juice. You end up with a lot of rind, a lot of lemon skin in there, and ultimately you think 'forget it, this one is over, it is time for a new one'.

So if you take that lime juice-tequila theory of capitalism, with apologies to Schumpeter, what are the two real signals that we should be optimistic? Well, they are very simple.

One: is the current juice supply starting to run out and we are into rind and peel territory? Two, just as important: is there is a new one in the bag, that is just as big, if not bigger, that is going to give us a new supply of juice?

I want to explore those two conditions for optimism: are they there?

So let us look, first of all, at the process of the juice becoming a trickle. We actually see this in one really interesting statistic that is in the book, which is not much highlighted. This is a statistic that looks at what has happened to returns on investment into the real economy - I know we have got financiers and former financiers in the room - but there is a statistic from Deloitte in their Shift Index.

In 1965 when fossil fuel-driven mass production as the general purpose technology that shaped the 20th century was at its peak, the return on investor capital in the US was about 6.2%- 6.3%. It has been a 45-year nosedive. Where is it now, across the US economy, anyone give me a clue? It is about 1.2%. This is not into the financial economy, not in the hedge funds, not into derivatives, but into the real sector in the US.

And what is the analysis? Well, one analysis is that it is the juicer, it is the diminishing marginal returns that, as you automate and automate an already automatic process, as you replace Sushi-slicing chefs with robots that slice sushi, you have not really done very much to transform production the way you did when you replaced the horse with the car, for example, and suddenly opened up whole new markets and transformed people's productivity. So we have got the core statistic, which is a 6-ish per cent to 1-ish per cent nosedive in returns to the real sector, from 1965 to 2012.

What is interesting then is to talk about the mythologies that get spat out alongside that. One, of course, is a carbon issue. If you were to lie in bed dreaming up a machine to maximise carbon emissions, it would look a little bit like fossil fuel-driven mass production, transportation and consumption of goods. We are now, as we know, past 400 parts per million of carbon dioxide concentrations.

The second mythology is the economic cycle of business. Because what happens when your returns go down? Well, as the many people in this room who have had direct business experience will know, that is going to cause you pain. If your profits are dipping, you are probably going to turn to one place, which is wage costs. So what we have seen, of course, is the trend to offshoring. We have seen jobs haemorrhaged off to China as a core place of manufacturing, we have seen broken communities, jobless, we have seen in-work poverty, we have seen out-of-work poverty and as well as that economic pathology and the collapse of OECD manufacturing, we have seen another pathology.

How does government respond to communities that no longer have jobs, where they no longer have the income from their jobs to spend? Well, it is by putting cheap money into the system and by encouraging debt rather than savings-based spending and with the cheap interest rate policies that we have had, you have got (as we have seen in the last two weeks) collectively £1.4 trillion debt in the UK - £54,000 per head.

At the macro level, you have got something that is scarier still, which is current account imbalances between producer nations and consumer nations, where the total imbalance between the US and China is $700 trillion, based on a $204 trillion positive current account for China and a $465 trillion US current account deficit.

So what you have got is an unstable system with high levels of personal debt, high levels of national debt and at the same time, you have got capital doing what capital needs to do, that is its function in the system, which is to hunt for returns. If capital is only finding 1.2%, then of course capital will seek other outlets and capital will then flow into whatever bubbles that look to be available.

It was Will Rogers who said to Henry Ford, 'It will take a hundred years to tell whether you've helped or hurt us, but you certainly didn't leave us in the same place'. One hundred years after the first Model T in 1908, what do we have? We have capital in a giant collective search for another asset class in which it can attempt to find some returns and as we know, this bubble, as bubbles have a tendency to do, popped.

I offer that up as the first argument for optimism, because this is where we are. Going back to the Schumpeter analogy, where we are is in a place where we are holding up the orange and we are saying, 'Okay, this one looks like it is past its sell-by date, this one looks like its influence is passed', and if we carry on locked in a technological monoculture where we believe that this is all that is available to us and where we subscribe to some political ideologies that are rooted into subsidising these technological monocultures, then we do risk running into a position where things do not look good.

I repeat, I offer that up as the first piece of evidence for optimism, because you do not throw away the grapefruit or the orange until it is out of juice. It is the first precondition for growth that the old way has actually started to decay. The darkest hour, in other words, can come before dawn.

Let's look at the second. Is there any real argument that there is a new general purpose technology or driver of growth that is waiting in the wings?

Let me just tell you one story which is indicative of the choice before us. In Kenya now, about 20 kilometres from the rubble of the Westgate shopping centre, there is a city going up and it is called Konza. A $14.5 billion smart city. Right around Nairobi, there are several of them. There is Migaa, there is Tika Tatu City, there is Konza. They are part of a new massive trend to use technology to build these smart cities, these shimmering plasma-screened citadels of state capital, where what you have got is a new smart city being created for an urban elite. As Nairobi starts to crumble, the old cities are basically getting swiped, and instead you have got these new cities being built up.

Migaa is being built on seven hundred acres of old coffee land with a 12 kilometres long, armed

perimeter wall around it, with its 'shop until you drop' mall and two hundred acres of executive golf course. On that two hundred acres golf course, by the way, right beside it they are going have a museum to promote the rich cultural life of Migaa, and guess what the museum is going to be about? Coffee-growing. You will be able to sit there, sipping your cappuccinos, sipping your coffee. In other words, a site that was a site of production has become, accelerated by technology, a site of consumption.

We have got this possibility to use the new technologies of ICT, the information and communications technology revolution, to escape and to create these urban silos and to disconnect ourselves from the world's problems.

Let me just give you another example of something where that technology is being used in a different form. This is a quote from Kentaro Toyama, the former Microsoft Research Director, that 'technology is not the answer, it is the amplifier of intent'. What is this other example? Exactly the same spot in Nairobi, where you have got the old crumbling Petropolis, you have got these new cities, you could call it Cyburbia, but you have also got a different city that is starting to form. I just give you this example.

This is a group called M-KOPA, one of 16 self-organising groups that have sprung up in Nairobi (there is Akirachix, there is M-COW using technology to monitor the oestrogen levels of cows to improve their fertility), who are taking the issue of power, because you have got 1.4 billion people in the world powerless because they have got no power. They are taking the mobile solar light and they are putting a SIM card in the light, and the moment you do that, this light which otherwise costs $200, you can lease for 40-50 cents, because you can turn it on and off remotely via a SIM card.

This basically means that it becomes accessible to that entire population group. Once they have got that light with the SIM card, and the 40-50 cents is far less than they would be paying for kerosene or firewood, they can use that mobile light with a SIM card as a banking source, like M-PESA, they can use it for assurance. The Kilimo Salama programme provides weather insurance and they get mobile payments into their mobile banking account if there is a flood or if there is drought. The moment they have got weather insurance, they can then dare to invest in the crops because they will not be losing their life savings. They can also make mobile payments to the $34 KickStart agricultural handpump, which gets them access to the underground water table, which is available for 96% of un-irrigated southern African land.

Put these together: exam pass rates go up from 68% to 82%, income goes up from $160 a head to $1,600 a head. Why does it interest me? Because I think within this model, you have got the fragment of the DNA of a different type of capitalism. There is this quote from Klaus Schwab of WEF that capitalism needs to evolve to 'fit the world around it'. Well, this is an interesting evolution in capitalism, because it is something that does actually fit with the market for growth. The market in Kenya is $1 billion – that is what the Kenyan poor spend on kerosene. Globally it is $36 billion. They want to expand that model into Tanzania, Rwanda and other parts of eastern Africa. They want to expand that model into other productive equipment.

So it fits with capitalism, but I think what it is also symptomatic of is a shift from a model of business as usual that had ceased to work in four different dimensions: from fossil fuel to a combination of that and renewables; from mass production to a combination of that and one

which is mass and micro production - your own app, your own handpump; from top down and centralised, to one which is bottom up and distributive, not the giant smart city, but the bottom-up, self-organising group that is identifying the local needs and delivering on them; and finally, from one that is intensive, a model of mass production serving only essentially the affluent, and the manufacturing desire within that urban, suburban, affluent elite to one that is inclusive, using distributive technology, just like Ford used the car to gain access to new markets and to link them in beyond people who were just covered by the train. These new distributive, localised technologies enable us to hook up and deliver inclusive goods and services.

What is my real source of optimism on this? I will end on this. It does give growth. It gives growth that does not violate to the same extent the model that we see of demand. But above all, I think it gives the possibility for us to have spaces, to have cities where we are using technology, not vertically to isolate ourselves, but horizontally, to connect with and be close enough to, and then identify and deliver on the needs of those in the community around us.

And with that, thank you very much.

IS THE MIDDLE EAST IMPLODING?

Text of a lecture by the Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP

21st January 2014

Alistair Burt *entered Parliament for the first time in 1983 for Bury North and since 2001, he has been the Member of Parliament for North East Bedfordshire. From 1985 to 1990, he was Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the Environment, for Education and Science and Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. He was subsequently appointed Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and then Minister of State at the Department of Social Security (1992-1997). In Opposition, he served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition (2002-2005), Shadow Minister for Communities and Local Government (2005-2008) and Opposition Assistant Chief Whip (2008-2010). From May 2010 to October 2013, he served as Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at Foreign & Commonwealth Office with responsibility for Counter Terrorism, Counter Proliferation, Counter Piracy, North America, Middle East and North Africa, the Maldives and Sri Lanka.*

Thank you so much for offering me this opportunity not so much as to give you – of all people - a 'lecture', but more to play a part in a continuing conversation amongst friends of the Middle East, who alternately hope for it, pray for it, are frustrated and shocked by it, but love it.

I do not intend to give a potted history of my three and a half years at the FCO. If you wish to hear that, come to my CMEC briefing on 4th February in the House of Commons. But in seeking to address the question directly, I must inevitably omit much, so I begin with an apology. There is so much background to this, that all cannot be covered. If I have missed anything you consider to be blindingly obvious, please correct me by question, or write subsequently. Please excuse any ignorance. I speak in the company of those who know the Middle East with a depth which I can never match, and I speak not as an expert but as a commentator, for we are too close to many events which are still evolving; in the old phrase it's journalism and not yet history capable of the analysis of perspective.

And may I, right at the beginning acknowledge my debt to a number in this room for their patience and support in teaching me about the Middle East in the midst of its turbulence. Ministers have an embarrassment of riches at their disposal, and I have been more embarrassed than all. Academics, serious journalists, authors, those doing business in the region, NGOs, Ambassadors, Foreign Ministers and Diplomats from all the countries in the region, and all who I met on my travels - I am indebted to you for the insights you have offered. And above all to my colleagues at the FCO at every level for their extraordinary dedication to our country and the peoples of the region - any reputation at all I have in this area is built so much upon them.

Let us begin. Is the Middle East imploding? The honest answer is that no one knows, but that would not be much of a lecture if I left it there! I think the answer is no, but the region possesses all the ingredients which could make it so, some of which it is well used to, and some that are new.

I argue the following: I am still optimistic about the Arab Awakening, or Spring, or however we can characterise this latest outpouring of expression in the Arab world, even though the path will inevitably be long. A new narrative of governance by consent is in process of being developed throughout the region. An agreement between Israel and Palestine is needed this year. Although regional power issues involve Western interests, the Sunni/Shia divide is out of Western hands, and not for us to pronounce upon. However, the region needs religious tolerance and brave leadership to encourage it, and faces increasing dangers if not.

But, where there is stability, opportunities abound for economic and commercial development, with a young demographic as able and ambitious as any in the world, given the chance to flourish.

I commence with my last point: economics, coupled with demographics. The Middle East is not a region unto itself, but a key and growing player in world growth and prosperity, and in investment overseas. On arriving in Dubai for the first time some three and a half years ago, I had an experience common to many. Our Consul General said to me as we drove through a stunning urban landscape from the airport to his residence, 'nothing that you see in the next half hour was here thirty years ago'. Gulf growth and development has, of course, been outstanding, with Dubai 2020, and the World Cup in Qatar in 2022 simply further major milestones on the world stage, and its influence will likely be stronger still in years to come.

With that commerce comes greater world stability, as we become more interdependent. But this is not just about exporting finance, it is also about realising the relentless human instinct for achievement, for security for one's family, and possessing the drive to do better than previous generations. Arab young people possess this as much as any other: you only have to dip into Lebanon's vibrant social media world, or talk to Noura al Kaabi, the UAE's CEO of TwoFour54, a media and entertainment hub, and discuss film production ambition to know this. These are people whose conversation does not revolve around politics, but life!

However, the brutal facts are that the Arab world needs to create forty million new jobs in the next decade to provide for its predominantly young population. This cannot simply be achieved through public employment, even for those states blessed with carbon resources, still less for oil importing states.

A further sobering fact, as the *Economist* reported in its review of the Arab Spring last July, is that in 1960, Egypt and South Korea were roughly economically equivalent, whereas now Egypt's GDP is one fifth that of South Korea. This tells not simply its own story, but reads across into the region as a whole.

A growing young population, increasingly aware of what is available to their counterparts around the world, is not going to accept that for some reason their birthright in an Arab state includes an acceptance of a fixed economic disparity with others. There is no reason why it should, and all over the region I have observed those with a commitment to improvement staking out new ground in terms of emerging entrepreneurial business. They have to overcome an attitude to state employment seemingly tied simply to personal subsidy, or a means to find a quick temporary solution to longer term structural needs. Encouraging entrepreneurship also means recognising increasingly the role of women, to set up and run sound businesses, inevitably impacting upon their previously restricted roles in some states.

I do not see this grinding to a halt. Future development is already being encouraged in some places by enlightened moves on the economy; Erbil and the Kurdish region have been making the most of their peaceful environment to encourage growth and investment, other states are implementing liberalising reforms to make it easier for businesses to set up and grow; and developing the transference of expertise in carbon energy and technology to new energy sources in oil rich states constitute just some examples.

These changes will be boosted still further through advances in education. As in other parts of the world there has been an increase in domestic higher education, though this has yet to be coupled with the increase in graduate level jobs which should naturally follow. But perhaps even more important will be the wider influence flowing from those who have been educated by their states abroad. As an example, and of course a number of states have done the same, the enlightened policy of HM King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia to educate over 130,000 in western universities, up to a third of them women, has far-reaching, beneficial consequences of which we have not yet begun to see even a fraction, but we will.

The drive of all those exposed to further and higher education will be to be engaged in charting their own life and making more of their own decisions. Those educated to higher levels domestically, and even more those educated abroad with their greater exposure to a world beyond their own shores, will want what they see others in Asia, South America or the West want: material security, opportunity and dignity in their occupations. An imploding Middle East will not provide that, but a stable one will.

Will the next generation of those in the Middle East find that their politics provides that stability? Any analysis yet of the Arab Spring is way premature. I have already lived through the early waves of optimism, and the doom-laden characterisation of the Arab Autumn or Winter. When will we ever learn that such determination to find seasonal comparisons merely leads to open invitations to irony and hubris?

We are still at an early stage of trying to work out quite what the phenomenon of public expression, commenced in Tunisia in late 2010/early 2011 might mean. We know some things. It was not externally calculated or organised. It was not prompted either by the West or al-Qaeda. It was not Islamic. It was not about Israel. It was not caused by Facebook and social media, though they played a part.

From the very origins of spoken or written word, the people have always found a way to reach the main square and begin marching to the palace! But it might have been about Al Jazeera, a decade of questioning of rulers in an unfamiliar manner. For it was not the same, state to state, but there were similarities. It was about corruption. It was about economics. It was about illegitimate republican dynastic expansion. It was about exclusion from political process of the young, of women, and of the quiet.

Contrary to popular opinion, I do not think there was ever a time in the FCO when there was a naïve belief that suddenly a whole series of problems had come to an end and there was now a brave new world. From posts to directors to Ministers we recognised early, that, in William Hague's words, we were witnessing the most profound political change in the 21st century, but no one was in any doubt that change would take time and its course was uncertain.

But I do believe that some of what we are witnessing is, in terms of value judgements, good, and better than what was in the past. Not to believe this would be to deny what has already been achieved, and to belittle the bravery of those currently engaged in struggle, and I also believe that what is being undergone is a better safeguard against implosion than what was there before.

The easy, and in some places, fashionable opinion is, of course, to hint darkly that things were rather better as they were; that provided you were not one of the minority on the capture and torture list in states of repression, it was all sort of OK, from the Christian supposedly protected by the Assad policy of sectarian divide and rule, to the UK and the US with our allies, to people who were prepared to trade their own freedom for relative domestic peace and security.

I would argue that it was actually this which was more likely to lead to implosion than that which has eventually reacted against it, my principal witness in such a claim being the indisputable fact that it has actually occurred. So although there may well be more local pain, and worse, the horror which is Syria, the long term of a process in which people are more engaged in deciding their lot in life than having it done to them has got to be ultimately more stabilising than the alternative.

I believe the UK has been right, and in good company with the EU, to declare that, whilst there is no single model of governance which fits all, where there is freedom of assembly and of the media, where human rights are respected and the role of women is full in society, and where in some manner there is a measure of the consent that a people offer to their government, then this is more likely to lead to long-term stability than the contrary.

I also think it has been appropriate to support such progress by offering to states in transition, through the UK's Arab Partnership, a variety of institutional capacity building choices, not at our behest, but at the request of those who know their states and people best.

In some places that process has been obvious, and brought about by dramatic events, and in each of these places the people and the process deserves support. In Tunisia today, the deliberations of politicians continue to find a pathway through the tortuous balances of secular politics and moderate Islam given political expression. It appears clear that they both watch the developments in other states carefully, whilst recognising that they have an historical position to protect, and want to make their move away from dictatorship one which will last and be fully inclusive of all shades of political opinion.

In Libya, politicians and militia find their way in a political landscape left scorched and barren through forty years of dictatorship and occasionally bizarre rule. Egypt finds a new way down a not unfamiliar path, after Tahrir Square 2, as its process of revolution seeks to create a new constitution, balancing rights and freedom of expression with security considerations. Slightly away from the glare of publicity (for now, but watch out if things go wrong), Yemen has wrestled extraordinarily with a democratic process encouraged by the GCC and other friends to lead its people away from a legacy of warring rulers.

But I do not think we should confine our concept of governance change to the dramatic part of the Arab Spring. It is not, in my view, a zero-sum game between an Arab Spring-style revolt and the same old repression. The more gradual process being followed in other places is worth much more than a passing glance, which leads to my next point in favour of a belief that implosion can be avoided.

At an early stage following the Tunisian revolution, I offered a memo to the FCO – how presumptuous I was - on the concept of governance which was being challenged by events. Recognising that democratic expression was manifested in more than just the Westminster model, how would we make our own judgements on progress?

I wrote to William Hague:-

> *'I hope there might be some chance for the FCO to lead discussions in some forum or other about the concept of consent in Govt, and how the Arab Spring might affect it. Recognising that each Arab country is different, we must assume that the constitutional outcome is different in each, from North Africa to the Gulf. A newly defined concept of consent may help provide some intellectual underpinning for apparent inconsistency.'*

There are no Arab states which have not been affected by the Arab Spring in some way. There are a number for whom the Arab Spring has provided a new impetus towards change or reform of some sort in which they have been engaged to a greater or lesser extent in the years leading up to 2011.

In North Africa, Morocco continued with a series of reforms instigated and backed by the King. These have led to a change of government personalities, some of whom are clearly different from the past, and an accommodation with moderate Islamist parties, of which the new Prime Minister is from one. Algeria has responded more cautiously, the pain of its civil war still all-pervading, and offering a narrative that maintains its own Arab Spring came some years earlier. But its Presidential election this year will undoubtedly contain clues to where it sees itself going in terms of further change and reform.

In Jordan, once again a monarchy is leading reform efforts, both political and economic within its own context, but doing so whilst also handling the pressures of the refugee crisis from Syria.

The Gulf demonstrates a different pattern of response, and of course a different history of government, and that measurement of consent to which I referred earlier. But the UAE has expanded its electorate to its Federal National Council under my good friend Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Anwar Gargash. Kuwait has a longer standing Parliament than most, and has also made electoral reforms. Oman's great advances over recent decades exhibit a further manner of ensuring consent between monarch and people. But in many places there is a wariness of the motives of those professing political Islam as a banner.

Bahrain has been touchstone for many. A complex picture, the UK has chosen to recognise and support the efforts at reform made over a lengthy period, and the extraordinary open response, unique in the region, to the events of February 2011, in which lives were lost. We continue to believe that the response of moderate leaders there, both in Government and Opposition, by keeping talking and working on a path of reform laid out in the Independent Commission's report, present the best opportunity for stability. Despite immense difficulties and interruptions, people keep talking, as the UK does there to all.

So the path of political reform, of how states may remain stable, whilst accommodating the changes that their people may want, is an individual one, with the best prospect of success in 2014 likely to be more around the slow and steady, rather than the sudden and spectacular.

As if the processes of internal upheaval, political reform and urgent economic development were not enough to cope with, all this must be played out against the backdrop of the most intricate of regional relationships, in an area of vital importance to countries on the other side of the world, where almost every nuance of change is impactful, at a time when the world's superpower is experiencing pressures and tensions as a result of its previous engagement with the region, and whilst one of the most chilling and outrageous acts of civil warfare is being played out. If perfect storms were political as well as physical, then we might well be looking at one.

But there are ways out. The first is Israel/Palestine. I said earlier that the Arab Spring was not about Israel and it was not. There were no anti-Israeli banners on the streets of Tripoli, Tunis or Cairo. But that this long-running, emotional dagger of a dispute remains at the heart of the Middle East should be missed by no commentator. If the chance is taken this year to end it, there can be every opportunity for a new future. If not, then the assessment is very bleak indeed.

A few weeks ago, at a Wilton Park conference - and may I thank Richard Burge, and through him all those who engage in the quiet, unsung but vital work of meeting and talking in third countries – I suggested to yet another conference on the future of the MEPP, that perhaps instead of looking at all the stumbling blocks which we all know very well, suppose we held a conference which imagined that an agreement between the Prime Minister of the State of Israel and the President of the Palestinian Authority had been signed the day before.

What then? What if we worked through the responses? For Arab states as part of the Arab Peace Initiative, when would recognition follow? What economic benefits would flow from the absorption of Israel's economy and talents into the commerce of the region? What mutual security might there be, not least for a Palestinian State which might face rapid challenges from terrorists and extremists? For the EU – what more assistance might flow to Palestine in terms of trade advantages? What access to markets for the new industry making its way to now undisputed territory, underpinned by the new investment as part of the Kerry package?

And if we thought about what could happen, instead of what penalties and sanctions would befall the area, further depressing the economy and giving the victims of enmity for generations on both sides yet more misery to come, and fearing the opportunity thus given to those whose only creed is violence, could we make success a self-fulfilling prophecy, making the day after an agreement a day so enticing that no sane negotiators could ever turn it down?

Of course it is a huge ask, but when would it ever not be? And can we truly imagine or bear another defeat on this, in a region beset with not just old suspicions and enmities, but new threats to all? We must continue to wish Secretary Kerry well, and our old friends Saeb Erekat and Tzipi Livni as they do their work, take comfort from the fact that little is leaking and with so much else going on, at least they can get on with the job somewhat out of the glare of publicity.

But it is no sideshow. The consequences of failure for both peoples are bleak. The status quo is not strong enough to hold back the consequences – for the sake of the Middle East, it is time for those who are partners for peace, despite provocations to each, to make the agreement that we all want to see. Then the world must pile in behind it and Arab states will have as crucial a role as any, to make it work and hold off those who would derail it.

If this does not happen, then I am less sure about implosion.

But even if this part of the jigsaw is finally put in place, this will not be enough on its own. I think no longer is it the case that if only Israeli and Arab came to resolution, all else in the region would be well.

Lebanon and Jordan will need to retain their remarkable stability, despite all the pressures which they have been enduring. Iraq faces the challenges of Parliamentary elections in the teeth of severe internal political disagreements and appalling attacks from al-Qaeda designed to plunge the country into civil war, whilst having to balance pressure from Iran on the one side and the implications of Syria on the other.

We can go no further with our considerations now without a view on Syria, the catalyst for so much else which is taking place in the area.

Can the region remain stable with the crisis in Syria continuing?

Appallingly, probably the answer is yes, but surely only for a short and finite time. Yes, other parts of the region have endured long drawn-out and costly struggles, but the crisis in Syria is becoming of a new order, seeing the dismemberment of a state and a people.

The figures for death - 130,000, and disruption - nine million displaced either internally or externally, we all know well. This is all bad enough, but states surrounding Syria are just managing to stay apart from the worst, though it cannot be ruled out that the conflagration will spread. Surrounding states, whose generosity towards refugees has been remarkable, though not without cost, are already affected one way or another.

What are the prospects of peace from the Geneva process? Your guess is as good as mine, but it is the only thing we have going. I subscribe to the view that a military solution is unlikely due to the existing balance of forces and the allies of those doing the fighting, but I do not subscribe to a view that the fighting on the ground is irrelevant to the politics, so I do believe that influencing what happens on the ground can influence the chance of an outcome.

That is why I have taken a stance against Parliamentary will in the UK. I think that allowing the forces of the official opposition, recognised by over 100 separate states and entities, which has demonstrated commitment to a pluralist, democratic future for Syria and human rights adherence, deserve to be allowed the chance to defend themselves by having access to weaponry which could limit attacks from the air and ease the bombardment and blockades by the regime which is costing so many lives, and starving people totally contrary to international humanitarian law. Today's headlines merely confirm what we have all known to be the truth - this is a vicious regime determined to do all it can to retain power, being inadvertently protected by an inept international security system.

If it is only diplomacy which is the answer, why have Iran and Russia put so much hardware behind Assad? Why have Hizbollah been on the ground? What farce it must sound for some to say there must be no foreign intervention, when there are already boots on the ground and weapons in the hand from a number of foreign shores.

Unless the regime feels some pressure or threat, why should it negotiate to allow what the international community agreed in Geneva 1, a transition of power process?

The Syrian slaughter cannot continue without both immediate, and longer lasting disaster for the region, and perhaps nothing today is quite as needed to avoid implosion for the region as finding a way to stop the killing now, and prepare for a new future engaging all those who want to see it, and isolating as far as possible, those who plainly do not. Then, alas, there is likely to be a new reckoning with them.

There can be no serious consideration of Syria without straying into the issue of how external powers are seen and what their intentions might be. Implosion of the region is more likely if there is a breakdown of international understanding and relationships, and the strains over Syria have tested these to the limit.

In no particular order: the US has some convincing to do over its foreign policy in the region. Recent forums in the UAE and Bahrain have seen senior US Government figures, Tony Blinken and Chuck Hagel, being fiercely questioned particularly by Gulf allies puzzled at the US position on Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood, on the talks with Iran and the decision not to punish Assad with a military strike following his use of chemical weapons against his own people.

This is an unhappy situation. I do not doubt the continued engagement of the US in the region. We all understand that the needs of the US for Gulf oil are changing, but the need for a stable Gulf, for the allies of the US, indeed for the world, to have access to the energy it needs increasingly, is not going to go away. The US needs its allies there and they need the US – and Secretary Kerry's recent visit to Saudi Arabia went well and will have gone some way towards reassurance. I would not be surprised if there is a small price to pay for some of the difficulties, and tensions remain over the perception of lack of leadership at a crucial time, but it seems to me that each is bound to the other for mutual support in so many ways. I do not see this at risk, despite all the pressures, and remember that Secretary Kerry's extraordinary commitment to a resolution between Israel and the Palestinians rightly buys him credit.

And there are those who see in President Obama's decision not to resort to a strike against Syria a President conscious of his country's image in the Muslim world, responding not as anticipated, but offering a different narrative. Time will tell if that is an honest, but ill-timed gesture.

For Russia, this has been a good period. They got on the wrong side of Arab opinion with their veto in the UN, which meant the international community failed to respond robustly to the Syrian crisis, and their support of Assad. But, through gritted teeth, their commitment by word and deed to their ally has been noticed. They appeared to outflank the US over chemical weapons. They secured a deal which is undoubtedly good in that it removes, if adhered to, chemical weapons from the area, but on terms which will not have inconvenienced Assad, nor exposed him to what he will have feared most, a US plus one or two, strike. This latter, of course, allowed the conventional killing and other atrocities to go on. And the Russians also popped up in Cairo to tweak the nose of the US there too. Neither nature, nor the Middle East, can sustain a vacuum.

Geneva is a big test. If the Russians now can use their leverage with Assad to persuade him that his time is done, and can secure their interests another way, thus ending this phase of conflict, they

have much to gain. If they use this opportunity of diplomacy merely to confirm existing positions and encourage delay, they will miss an important chance of advancement.

And what of Iran? Certainly an Iranian regime commitment to a nuclear programme deliberately forcing a confrontation with Israel and the US would have brought us significantly nearer implosion. That is not where we now appear to be, though I am in the camp of being extremely wary at this stage of a 'new' Iran. Breakthroughs are not always what they seem, though there is some limited evidence to date that the E3+3, where the contribution of Russia and China has not been negligible, together with a tough sanctions regime, has moved us closer to a resolution over the nuclear file than we might have anticipated. Enough to keep talking. But let us not be starry eyed. The damage done by this regime over decades, to its own people, to those affected by its sponsorship of terrorism, to those in Syria now feeling the direct impact on the ground of IRGC troops and Iranian-induced Hizbollah fighters, has been immense. It is no surprise that many cannot easily accept that Iran has earned a place at anyone's table yet.

And what price will Iran extract for offering to be part of a solution to a problem which they and Russia have helped inspire?

Let me offer two final thoughts to complete my overview of the question, though I concede there may be many more. Whilst what I have sketched out, in terms of difficulties to be overcome, is plausible though difficult, there are threats which could tear any such efforts apart, for they are matters beyond the reason of diplomacy and calculations of best interest.

Any analysis of the regional picture must include the struggle for hegemony between Sunni and Shia, and Persian and Arab, and any analysis must include not only state actors, but also the growing band of extremists and non-state actors whose actions may yet wreck all that sane and rational people may aspire to.

It is not for those outside the Muslim world to be involved in the Sunni/Shia discourse or to propose ways to resolve it. Christian believers know only too well the stains that the abuse of faith for power has left upon our own country and upon the wider world. But no commentator can exclude concerns that the historical divide in the Muslim world is being played out today in a manner which belies generations of peaceful communities united in their Islamic faith rather than being divided by sect. The readiness of some to issue a call to violence is wreaking untold havoc on the lives of Muslims throughout the region.

There have been various calls by leaders, political and religious, to end this. All one can ask from here is that such efforts continue. There need to be brave, unequivocal statements denouncing violence in the name of faith, and strong united leadership to back up statements such as the declaration by the OIC amongst others, led by HM King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, in Mecca in August 2012.

The spread of this violence towards other communities, notably Christians indigenous in the area for two thousand years is already the subject of much heartrending debate. Their Royal Highnesses Prince Charles and Prince Ghazi of Jordan drew attention to this in an advent message last month, echoing the extraordinary summit of Muslim leaders on the subject called by HM King Abdullah of Jordan in September last year.

Religious tolerance, at least, is a core component of any society which wishes to make the most of its peoples and encourage the diversity of society which contributes to its overall development. Tolerance does not demand the renouncing of a state religion followed by a vast majority, nor any compromise on the key principles of anyone's faith. But it is time at least that we challenged a world where tolerance of another's faith is held to be more dangerous than its repression. That is when the lights go out.

The implosion of the Middle East is at least as threatened by misplaced religious fervour as any state activity. I have spent three and a half years being sickened by the cruelty and wickedness in its wake, which demonstrates not a humanity touched by God, but the nightmare of man without God lashing out in the darkness. Enough.

And on the back of all this, shamefully exploiting, sits the terrorist and extremist, crossing borders which mean nothing, taking any opportunity to spread a doctrine by force and subject a populace to violence unless there is submission. From Mali to Iraq, and many points in between, this menace threatens us all. It thrives in ungoverned space and will expose any flaw in governance in order to create a credible narrative for its existence.

I do not want to end on a low note. As a democratic politician, I can easily be accused, and plead guilty, to being an optimist. But my optimism comes from the young I have met, from young women playing football in a free Libya, from the excitement of a social media awards evening in the joyful mayhem of Beirut, from the earnest admonition of women on a British Council entrepreneurs course in Riyadh to let them move forward at their own pace, to young internet start-up wannabes in Amman, from the enthusiasm of the young for the new in the Gulf, to the hope of the Kurdish women passing legislation against domestic violence in Erbil: this is a Middle East of hope, opportunity and promise. It is up to us, an older generation still with our hands on the tiller, to help steer the ship to the calmer water which will give their hopes a chance.

DOWNTON VERSUS DARING: CAN CULTURAL INFLUENCE BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR BRITAIN'S DECLINING HARD POWER?

Text of a lecture by Sir Martin Davidson KCMG

11th February 2014

Sir Martin Davidson *took up the role as Chief Executive of the British Council in April 2007. Prior to the British Council he worked for the Hong Kong Government as an Administrative Officer. He joined the British Council as Assistant Representative in Beijing in 1984. He was responsible for opening the South China office in Guangzhou in 1989 and returned to Beijing in 1995 as Director China. He speaks both Cantonese and Mandarin. He has also held various posts in the British Council's London HQ with responsibilities covering South East Europe, the Middle East, East Asia and the Americas. He is International trustee for Leonard Cheshire Disability, a Governor of Goodenough College and Board Member of the Great Britain China Council. He was knighted for his services to British cultural, scientific and educational interests worldwide in the 2014 New Year's Honours.*

Introduction: Retreat From Juba

A few weeks ago, the British Council's Country Director in South Sudan, a man named Tony Calderbank, reluctantly took the decision to suspend our operation in the country. His first responsibility – as with any boss – is to his staff. With gunfire in the streets, and following advice from our own security people and the Foreign Office, he made the decision that it was too dangerous to carry on. So Tony, his wife and the other UK based staff were evacuated by RAF C-130 from Juba airfield and brought back home, leaving two cats and many of their possessions behind.

It was a sad day for Tony and his colleagues, and it continues to be a worrying time for the locally appointed staff they left in the country, and for the people who had begun to use our services and to see us as a valued friend.

A cynic might say, looking at what is happening in South Sudan, 'Well, what did you expect? The country was bound to go to the bad, it's barely a country at all, you should have kept well out of it. And to imagine that cultural relations could work in such a poor place – that's the worst kind of utopian thinking'.

I do not agree.

Rather than seeing the retreat from Juba as an ignominious failure, I think it can stand as a textbook example both of the value and the risks inherent in the use of soft power.

South Sudan has only been a country for a very short time. It is a nation born out of a long and bloody civil war. It is a minnow among nations, and the best strategy for minnows, if they want to avoid becoming lunch for some larger fish, is to find some influential friends. So having established its right to independent statehood in 2011, South Sudan sought to establish itself as a citizen of the

wider world, by – among other things – applying to join the Commonwealth.

The British Council's work in South Sudan is another part of that connecting process. We set up an office in Juba, the capital city, and after just a few months of operation were offering English language teaching, programmes to encourage active citizenship, and running collaborative arts projects. The latter culminated in the South Sudanese theatre company's production of Cymbeline at the Globe Theatre in London: a fantastic boost to the new nation's self-esteem.

All of that – I hope you agree – is good for the people of South Sudan. But what do we get out of it? Why is the UK putting time, effort and hard cash into a tiny country that most people in this country would struggle to locate on a map? I said that it was in South Sudan's interest to become a citizen of the world. But it is also in the world's interest, and therefore in the UK's interest.

A community in which people are connected – through local clubs and activities, ties of friendship and family – is a strong community. The same is true for communities of nations. The more ties we have – whether of commerce or culture – the stronger the trust between us, and the less the chance that we will decide to resolve our differences violently.

My organisation, the British Council, exists to tell the United Kingdom's story to the world. We do that through the teaching of the English language, through our work in education and civil society, and in the arts. In short, through bringing our nation's cultural assets to the world.

Of course 'culture' often gets a bad press, particularly when it is destined for an audience of foreigners. It is an attitude that goes back a long way, to Lord Beaverbrook's deep antagonism towards the British Council.

Thus the *Daily Express* of 4th August 1939 fulminated:

'Which is the best propaganda for us – the roar of ... British bombers and fighters, or the melody of madrigals broadcast by the British Council? If we saved the money wasted by the Council, we could have three extra squadrons of fighters to join the display.'

It seems unlikely that British Council spending on madrigals would have bought even a single Spitfire, but that is not the point. A population facing total war could easily be persuaded that 'culture' was a luxury it could not afford; and the *Express* was not in the business of giving nuanced explanations. For Beaverbrook and his readers, in a period when the British Empire was still – just – a living entity, national character was properly expressed in a far more muscular manner.

Yet if the British people in 1939-45 were not fighting for culture, why were they at war? Above and beyond the realpolitik of mid-20th century power, it was surely to defend values and beliefs – in the right of individuals to live as they wished, as much as anything else – that the war was fought.

Syria Debate

We tell stories to let others know who we are, and also to define, for ourselves, 'our place in the world'.

'Britain's place in the world' is a phrase that has been around in the media a lot recently, notably in the wake of another debate – the House of Commons debate in August last year about whether to join the United States in military action on Syria. It led US Secretary of State John Kerry to make pointed reference to the 'oldest ally' of the United States: France. Rather different from the mood in March 2012, when President Obama affirmed to Prime Minister David Cameron what he described as 'one of the greatest alliances the world has ever known'.

Language matters, and so whether the relationship with the USA is 'special' or 'essential' has a real bearing on how we feel about our place in the family of nations.

'Britain's place in the world' of course goes back to the rather cutting remark of Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State under President Truman, to the effect that Britain, having lost an empire, had 'not yet found a role'. It is a dilemma we still seem to be obsessed about at home, although it does not necessarily seem so important to those observing us from overseas.

Unusually, perhaps uniquely among long-established nations, we suffer from a historical lack of definition about what to call ourselves. Do we live in 'the UK' or 'Britain'; are our people 'British' or 'English', 'Scottish', 'Welsh' and 'Northern Irish'? Are they Pakistani British, Bangladeshi Welsh or Afro-Caribbean Londoners? Or all or none of the above?

The 'British' tag has recently been wrested back from the far right, but is nevertheless one that makes many people in these islands, for many different reasons, feel uncomfortable. Yet when we are abroad, we're usually 'Brits' – or, more regrettably, all too often just 'English'.

It is so much easier to be French, with a national 'offer' that has been conveniently boiled down into three words: *liberté, egalité, fraternité*. That's even snappier than America's 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness'.

If you are selling your brand abroad, you need an easy-to-understand definition that engages with the widest possible number of people.

Power Spectrum

Perhaps because the shadow of the British Empire does still hang over our public discourse, in the wake of the Syria vote, the phrase 'Britain's place in the world' was generally understood in the media in a political and military sense. The discussion was all about our seat as a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, and our role as the United States' go-to military ally. Our place at the 'top table', in other words.

But our place in the world is dependent on far more than our military or economic muscle. There are many tables at which we might gain influence, and cultural relations – or soft power – gives us access to one of the most potent.

I would argue that the apparently rigid distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' power is a simplification. The two forms of influence are – and always have been – non-exclusive and overlapping.

Cultural relations exists on what we might think of as a 'power spectrum'. The spectrum is all the

ways that a state has to exert influence in the world and to engage with it. It runs from military force at the 'hard' end, to aid at the 'soft' end.

Cultural relations, towards the attraction end of the scale, seeks to engage people's interest and build a relationship for mutual benefit.

And of course each element of the spectrum shades into the next, so that it is difficult to say where one begins and the other ends. It is a long way from the 'hearts and minds' end of the spectrum to the bombs and battleships end, but like the US – and unlike most of our competitors – the UK has the capacity to project power in all its forms, around the world.

France and China are arguably the only other contenders, able to project military might around the world and also heavily engaged in promoting a clear and comprehensible version of their national culture.

Other nations, for historical or political reasons, are unwilling or unable to operate across the whole spectrum. At its most successful, the UK's foreign policy engages on all points of the spectrum simultaneously.

Sierra Leone is a good example of what can be achieved by coordinated engagement, with UK military power creating the environment in which development assistance, education reform, capacity building and reconciliation work could begin.

It is notable that even at the extreme hard power end of this sliding scale of influence – military intervention – the cultural aspect remains in play. Personnel in the small British military force that remained in Sierra Leone after the fighting were instructed that the correct procedure when driving anywhere in the country was, 'Windows down and waving'.

British soldiers, in other words, were not to present themselves as a faceless armed presence, but as individual human beings making an effort to engage with the local population, learning a few words of the language, handing out bottles of water. This is cultural relations in action, just as much as British Council language programmes or Brazilian festivals of football.

The famous essay on Tolstoy by Isaiah Berlin, 'The Hedgehog and the Fox', takes its title from the ancient Greek poet Archilochus, who wrote: *'The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing'*.

We must be fox-like to survive in the modern world – quick on our feet and adaptable to circumstances. The age in which nations could get by with knowing just one big thing is probably over.

The power spectrum as visualised by the UK is not exhaustive. It does not show all forms of influence that a nation may employ to further its interests. Religion does not figure on it at all, for example, because we in the West feel deeply uncomfortable with religion. The days when we went abroad with a gun in one hand and a Bible in the other are long past. If today's cultural ambassadors have a book in their hand, it is more likely to be the latest Booker Prize winner.

Others, of course, do not feel the same way, and it may be that future researchers into soft power – those working at the new Centre for Cultural Relations at Edinburgh University, for instance, may wish to examine religion as a soft power phenomenon. It might be a useful and interesting piece of research, for example, to look at the way Saudi Arabia has used its position as the keeper of Islam's most holy site to project itself as a world power.

If we are serious about understanding soft power, we should be prepared to open our eyes to the fact that other people's definition of the term will not always be the same as ours.

Post-Cold War Cultural Relations

In 1959 Richard Nixon and Nikita Khrushchev spent some time looking at a kitchen. The kitchen was the latest in labour-saving design and was on display at the American National Exhibition in Moscow. In front of a party of journalists, the Vice President and the First Secretary argued about the merits of Soviet and American kitchens, and whether or not they were within reach of the average working man.

The cupboards and the aluminium saucepans swiftly became a cipher for the two leaders' national ideologies. 'Don't be afraid of ideas!' they exhorted one another.

The American National Exhibition was organised by the US Information Agency [USIA], a body dedicated to American 'public diplomacy'; and the 'Kitchen Debate' remains a high point of the form.

In the late 1950s, when the alternative means of getting your point across could well involve ballistic missiles, a proxy war of jazz, abstract expressionism and waste disposal units seemed like a good option.

The Kitchen Debate was a classic piece of Cold War cultural relations. For as long as the world was held in balance by two opposing ideologies – two ideological blocs – the purpose of such cultural discourse was clear: to get across to as wide an audience as possible the superior nature of your cultural offer.

So what has happened in the two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union?

The end of the Cold War might have been seen by the 'victors' of the West as a chance to engage fully with societies that had hitherto been difficult to reach. Societies, moreover, that might be expected to welcome such an approach with open arms. But change in Moscow was seen in many quarters – not least in the US – as a signal that state-sponsored cultural relations had had its day.

Professor Nicholas Cull of the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy has a view on this. He argues that USIA's *'ideologically driven masters believed that increased US public diplomacy would be a short-term phase in Eastern Europe's march to capitalism, rather than a long-term project to promote mutual understanding'.*

USIA was effectively abolished in 1999, the battle for ideas having been – it was presumed – overwhelmingly won.

The irony, as Cull observes, is that the presence of the USSR helped shore up the ideological underpinnings of its mirror image, the USA. In the Soviet Union's absence, the work of explaining the American Way was perhaps *all the more important* at the very moment when the cultural and influencing agenda moved into ever higher gear.

If that had been suspected before 11th September 2001, it became blindingly obvious afterwards.

It was clear that other people in other parts of the world thought differently from us. History had not ended, as we had been promised it would. There had been a return to ideology; or rather we were forced to realise that it had never gone away.

The British and American military have been involved in two continuing conflicts in the years since then, and there is widespread agreement that 'the terrorists' are not going to give up any time soon. Any ultimate solution is going to be political and cultural: military action can only buy us a space in which political and cultural action can take place.

Al-Qaeda itself could be seen as a good example of a networked organisation: working through ideas, in semi-autonomous cells, with no single, easily identifiable command structure.

The world has become more networked. Power is no longer about immovable blocs, but about connections, webs, networks. And in fact that is how soft power has always worked.

What Others Are Doing

So cultural relations continues to matter. But the nations of the West are no longer the only significant players. Booming economies in the South and East, new national priorities, and new technologies have all had a role in bringing new players onto the scene – each playing by a different version of the rules.

Al Jazeera launched in 1996 and states its intention to present *'the opinion and the other opinion'* – the station's motto. Viewers in the Arabian Peninsula were shocked by an early broadcast in which Israelis were heard speaking Hebrew: a first for Arab TV. And the station's coverage of the war in Afghanistan won plaudits around the world. Like other soft power institutions, Al Jazeera asserts its independence from its owners, in its case the Qatari royal family.

Other Arab countries have followed in Al Jazeera's wake, including Saudi Arabia's Al Arabiya, and Sky News Arabia, a joint venture between BSkyB and Abu Dhabi Media Investment Corporation.

Chinese soft power – *ruanshili* in Mandarin – is expressed in various ways, including the 300 Confucius Institutes that have sprung up around the world since 2004; and a recent interest in African media.

Over the last decade, China has invested large sums in building communications infrastructure across Africa, providing technical upgrades for state broadcasters, and training journalists. It has also been gaining influence in the continent's media landscape. Xinhua, China's state-run news agency, now has more than 20 bureaux in Africa. In 2008 it launched the China African News Service, and also offers a mobile phone newspaper in Kenya. Meanwhile a Beijing-funded scholarships

programme takes 12,000 African students a year to study in Chinese universities.

Russia and India are also becoming self-conscious exporters of their own culture. India is expanding its network of cultural centres, while Russkiy Mir, founded in 2007, now has 82 offices around the world.

Cultural relations is becoming a conversation at a noisy table. We need to speak louder or make the most interesting point, if we wish to be heard.

Fragmentation

A second and perhaps even more significant way in which the conversation is changing is the levelling out of communication as a result of digital technology.

The cultural relations paradigm is no longer national broadcasting agencies speaking truth to vast audiences who tune in at fixed times of the day; but individuals speaking their own experience to other individuals or communities of individuals.

When we think about the UK's great cultural treasures, we tend to think – at least, people of my age tend to think – about institutions, and we have many. The BBC World Service, our great universities and museums, as well as cultural icons like the RSC, the British Museum and the National Theatre of Scotland. And of course these remain tremendous glories, hugely attractive to visitors from abroad and a source of pride to those of us who live here.

But in soft power terms – in terms of reach and engagement – other aspects of our national life and culture may be far more influential. For instance, Manchester United claims to have 108 million 'followers' in China. That is considerably more people than belong to the Communist Party of China, which has around 85 million members. I do not know how you would go about measuring the relative significance in people's lives of those two organisations – perhaps that is another question for the Centre for Cultural Relations. What I do know is that even if the definition of 'fans' is somewhat loose, there are still an awful lot of people in China who feel a visceral connection with a great British institution, and who therefore have an interest in and an attraction towards, this country.

There are many other such connections: through gaming, our creative industries, and the impact of social media, for example.

And the UK's greatest soft power triumph of recent years was of course the 2012 Olympics. The opening and closing ceremonies were a chance to tell the UK's stories – very deliberately plural – in the most compelling ways, to the largest imaginable audience. The sporting events – the meat in the sandwich – were an opportunity to show that we could match the very best in terms of athletic competition, as well as organising the greatest show on earth.

All of these new connections and networks pose a challenge to traditional forms of cultural relations, at the same time as offering – and I am sure you would expect me to say this – huge opportunities.

The title of this talk – *Downton versus Daring* – is rather tongue-in-cheek. But it does make a serious

point. For some things a gunship is the appropriate response, and no amount of brilliantly crafted period drama will fit the bill. But for the making of connections with huge numbers of people around the world, a TV show may in the long run be a more effective tool.

While retaining our ability both to defend ourselves and take the fight to our enemies, we should be aware of the effectiveness – and the cost-effectiveness – of soft power channels.

British Council Model Of Soft Power

It comes back to mutuality and the idea of building relationships. I said at the beginning that cultural relations had in the past been treated with suspicion by people who felt it was an effete and unmanly way for a great country to tell its story.

On the other hand, critics have attacked cultural relations for being, more or less, propaganda. The British Council – and more generally the UK – has always maintained a robust stance on this. Propaganda is a megaphone, blaring messages at people whether they want to hear them or not. That is not the way we work; and indeed if we tried to work in that way, we would fatally undermine our aims.

We have to *receive* as well as transmit – otherwise the relationship-building which is at the heart of our mission cannot happen. There are no relationships where only one person does the talking; or at least, no happy ones.

For the same reason, the British Council has maintained since its foundation in 1934 an arm's length relationship with government. That is essential if we want to maintain our independence and continue to generate trust. We are not the cultural wing of the British government, any more than the BBC is. It is our job to create the space in which culture and conversation can flourish – not to determine the content of the debate.

And indeed that toleration – more than toleration, that encouragement – of different voices and independent thought is one of the great lessons I believe this country has to teach. We are not a monoculture, nor do we wish to be. The UK is composed of different nations, of different peoples, and of different cultures.

The best way to tell that story and show that it is possible to be strong while containing all this diversity – that in fact the diversity contributes massively to the strength – is through cultural relations.

Conclusion

There is something of a Great Game going on in soft power terms around the world. But the great powers of old are being joined by smart players – new and agile players who are making up their own rules.

Do we have what it takes to keep up? Undoubtedly. But we must make the best use of all our assets if we are to succeed. We should be joining up the various elements of our national power – hard and soft – to ensure they are used in the most effective way possible.

The world has never been entirely at peace with itself; but the argument for engagement is today stronger than ever before, particularly for a country whose military might – for all we could wish it otherwise – is seriously diminished from fifty or even twenty years ago.

Soft power has to be smart power. We have to use all our assets in the most intelligent combination, for the best effect in any given circumstances.

What my opening story about South Sudan demonstrates is that there is no either/or here. If we want to retain our influence in the world – and I think we do – then we must maintain both our naval fleet and our cultural offering.

But we may find that if we deploy Downton Abbey a little more, we have to deploy *HMS Daring* a little less.

Thank you.

WHAT REALLY DRIVES THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA TODAY: RELIGION OR POLITICS OR BOTH – AND WHAT NEXT?

Text of a lecture by Sir Dominic Asquith KCMG

25th March 2014

Sir Dominic Asquith *has held a succession of high-level diplomatic posts in the Middle East. In 2001, he became Deputy Head of Mission in Saudi Arabia, after which he moved to Iraq issues, serving as Deputy UK Special Representative in Baghdad, Director for Iraq at the Foreign Office in London and Ambassador to Iraq from 2006 – 2007. He served as Ambassador to Egypt from 2007 – 2011 and then as Ambassador to Libya prior to leaving the diplomatic service in 2013. His early experience in the British Diplomatic Service focused on Syria and Oman. Since leaving the FCO in 2013, Sir Dominic advises companies engaged in the Middle East and he is also Chairman of the Libyan British Business Council.*

Over the four decades I have been involved in the Middle East, one characteristic has been enduring: the region makes a fool of any optimist. A relatively new characteristic, however, is that no sooner have you made sense of the pattern you are observing and established how you want to describe it, than the kaleidoscope is turned.

'Religion or politics as drivers?' asks the exam question. Both, neither – it depends on where you are and whom you are talking about. It depends also what you mean by a driver: there are real and there are synthetic drivers. What is undoubtedly true is that someone will use politics/religion to further their own narrative or interests – that is, religious differences will be politicised; and ethnic or regional differences will be sectarianised.

Consider the following:

Sectarianism was not a factor originally in the Syrian revolution; but it has become its overriding characteristic.

The Muslim Brotherhood were elected by a plurality of Egyptians in three consecutive elections but are now branded as terrorists in Egypt/KSA/UAE – though interestingly the other Islamists (the Salafists who won a quarter of the vote in the 2011 elections in Egypt) are both legitimate and popular. Moreover, while the public is viscerally anti-MB, it is not anti-religious.

Those who criticised the recent constitution in Egypt or encouraged a vote against it were branded as 'pro-MB'; yet two years earlier, those who argued against the military's declaration of constitutional principles were dismissed by Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood as heathen.

The protesters of Tahrir Square in the first revolution were united on what they did not want, but could not articulate a political programme for what they did want.

It has been well summed up by one Egyptian analyst: *"We don't understand politics. Politics are war. We seem to have this idea that winning politically means total physical annihilation of your opponent."*

In such a mindset, both sides are locked in a conflict viewed as an existential fight to the end. As another commentator pointed out: *"The (Muslim) Brotherhood is very comfortable in this milieu, this cosmic battle between good and evil. When it comes to the Brotherhood, the government genuinely sees it as an organisation willing to burn the country down. And [the government] genuinely believe that dissent is akin to treasonous activity at a time that the country is fighting a war on terror."*

Brotherhood/Islamist politics have always helped former regimes sow division among their opponents. Authoritarian regimes in Egypt were more comfortable with debates over secularism versus Islamism than debates about the transparency and accountability of state institutions, the powers and role of the internal security forces, equitable economic development, or anticorruption measures.

Obviously in some sense both politics and religion remain drivers; and in essence the region's core challenge is finding a model that reconciles Islam and modernity, religion with non-sectarian statehood. However, dealing with the problems which the region faces at the moment may not best be achieved by trying to tackle the religious and political aspects – because the region is not ready for those problems to be resolved. Moreover, experience indicates that attempts by outsiders just make matters worse.

Revolution is not new in the Arab world. To simplify brutally, the aim of local notables through the last century of the Ottoman Empire was not to overturn and replace Ottoman authority (though that might happen), but to become the sole and indispensable channel of communication between that authority and those it ruled.

But after the Second World War, the withdrawal of the British and French, the Ottoman successors, meant the office of ruler fell vacant. Those who wanted to exercise power now had to put themselves forward as possible rulers, prepared if necessary to destroy rival claimants and overthrow government using the only effective method – the army.

Which is when the real revolutions happened, involving not only the overthrow of regimes, but also overturning the social system in which they were rooted (Egypt in the first decade after Nasser; Syria from 1963 onwards). Political groups seized power on a wave of mass mobilisation. They promised the restoration of national/Arab dignity; freedom; modernity; Arab unity; independence; socialism and social justice. However, they honoured this promise more in the breach than the observance. In Egypt post-1952, people sacrificed political freedom/democratic representation for social welfare. And so arose the era of indigenous autocrats reliant on a powerful security apparatus.

Then throw in two further influences - Palestine and the Iranian revolution – whose effect was to expose the ineffectiveness of the indigenous autocratic regimes; and to focus popular disaffection not merely against those regimes but against the Western powers which supported them. On both of these would political Islam draw for its appeal.

Arab and Western views of the causes of the region's current problems differ. For the Arabs, American and European efforts at reform have been both ineffective and destabilising. The Iraq war of 2003 was the start of the problem and unleashed the forces that produced the revolutions that began in Tunisia seven years later. A strong central government based on brutally repressive security forces had been the tradition for fifty years. Moreover, with its collapse, the dyke Saddam had maintained against the Iranian revolution sweeping into the Sunni heartlands was breached and with it came increased influence of Iran – by no means confined to the Shia crescent - and further impetus to the ideology of "resistance" to the West and to what were presented as failed regimes. The remaining autocracies sought to ensure Iraq was read as a cautionary tale about the folly of unseating even the worst of despots, of humiliating Sunni Islam and of empowering Shiism.

But it was to get worse. Confessional politics, which had been largely confined to Lebanon with unhappy results, became - under US insistence - the process by which power in Iraq was apportioned. Strong central power under the old regimes had worked hard to suppress sectarianism, and with it religious, ethnic and regional fragmentation. Suddenly, post-2003 Arab religious vocabulary became sectarianised and politicised. As identity became increasingly determined by sectarian loyalties and AQ became the centre of gravity, so it prevented consensus about the nature of the state, the rule of law or a concept of citizenship which rose above sectarian allegiance. To the extent that now, with good reason, people seriously question whether the post-Ottoman or Sykes-Picot borders will survive as populations are relocating on sectarian and ethnic lines and creating "soft partitions".

In short, it made it impossible to place the next generation's prosperity above the settling of past scores. Politics became, in that horrible phrase, a zero-sum game. And the interests of rulers and governments throughout the region became directly threatened in a way that Palestine had not threatened for a generation.

Since then, in Arab eyes, Western efforts at reform have exacerbated the problem. They were instrumental in Mubarak's fall and the ensuing political and economic chaos in Egypt, to the point that now only the Egyptian military can bring order and stability. Nor was there any useful or concerted Western effort in Libya or Tunisia.

And as the West's "occupation" of Iraq presided over spiralling casualty figures, the West gradually lost confidence and sought ways to reduce its profile in the region. To the point that the West, in all its naivety as seen through Arab eyes, appears determined not only to leave its historic allies in the region exposed and mortally vulnerable to an existential threat from their two overriding religious and ideological enemies, Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, but with whom – to compound matters – the West seems intent on seeking an accommodation.

From a Western perspective, of course, it looks very different. The upheavals are the product of decades of authoritarian repression, weak and ineffective governance, failed social policies, poor economic development and growing inequality of income distribution, corruption, and crony capitalism – all identified in the searing series of Arab Human Development Reports issued by the UN since 2002.

The key theme at the heart of all this is not democracy, but the dignity of the individual citizen. With extraordinary prescience and directness over the following decade, the Human Development Reports, written by Arab experts for Arab governments, analysed the underlying tensions building

in society. They identified how the actions of the State in the Arab world were stunting human development, the acquisition of knowledge, political freedoms, economic growth and women's rights. Education, they argued, was dominated by religion, and societies were dominated by autocratic, corrupt and unaccountable elites of families, business and security agencies. The result was that the bond between citizen and state was almost non-existent, preventing the embrace into the nation of those with differing origins and inclinations.

And here emerges a key new factor. Agents of change were no longer governments or established security forces, they were new civilian or armed groupings and individuals. Managing the region, for governments in and outside the Middle East, became a whole lot more complicated. If you had to visualise it, think Jackson Pollock rather than the old Cold War chessboard.

Moreover, the 2008 global economic crisis led to a spike in commodity prices, repeated two years later, which hit the poor despite the subsidies. Food inflation in Egypt averaged almost 20% in 2010. The requirement to increase subsidies and wages still further brought huge pressure particularly on budgets that did not have massive oil wealth to fall back on. Corruption accentuated a rising, visible disparity between rich and poor.

Political activism was also increasing. In Egypt prior to 2011, the Kifaya movement (2004) was essentially a grouping of the Nasserite/liberal/secular elite. It was joined in 2008 by the 6th of April Movement (workers' rights) and in 2010 by Wael Ghonim's page on Facebook 'We are all Khaled Said' – the young Egyptian beaten to death by security forces who assumed they could do as they liked with impunity. The result was that by 2011, there was a substantial reservoir of politicised energies that could also (and this is the important extra) be assembled by using advances in the technology of social network communications. That finally made mass demonstrations feasible.

The revolution in Egypt was not the idea of the religious. However, the Muslim Brotherhood thought that for the West their key assets were their religious credentials – their potential ability to control jihadists, whom they had the religious legitimacy to contain; and their potential ability to counteract Iran's "revolutionary" appeal to the street.

But like nuclear weapons, the influence of political Islam flowed chiefly from its potential. Once in power, Islamists were beset by choices that inevitably created deep divisions. Side with the secularists? Or the Salafists? Against Shiism? With Saudi Arabia? Work for the Brotherhoodisation of politics? Or allow the movement to adapt to politics? Long term or short term? How do you reconcile the concept of individual rights, freedom of expression and so on with the collective good of the Umma? And so on.

This rapid move from prison to palace and back to prison will present the biggest challenge not just for the Muslim Brotherhood but political Islam. Its claim to the authenticity of tradition-ism has been rejected on a massive scale by Muslims who, though devout and conservative, refused to have religious practices imposed on them and declared the Islamist agenda not suitable for modern Egypt. At the optimistic end, it could produce a group which focuses on Islamic values rather than Sharia, according to the model of Turkey's AKP. But there will inevitably, I fear, be a strand which will resort to violence, provoked by the failure of Islamisation through democratic means.

This is a question Islam, not the West, will need to resolve and it goes to the heart of the

debates over identity and religious values. Who is the source of ultimate authority: God, King, People – or Army? In combating extremism, many governments of the region, far from separating religion and the state, believe they need to control religious space, both physical and ideological. For them, "Moderate Islam" means an interpretation of Islam that accepts state authority and therefore you deradicalise your youth by making them more religious, not less. As with the Church in pre-Reformation Christianity, they cannot separate the Mosque and State. This is profoundly uncomfortable for policymakers in the West.

It is easier for governments to succeed in building the physical state religious network (mosques, religious schools, religious endowments and imam training programmes) that can compete with extremists.

But winning the ideological battle is harder. For the youth, state institutions are less appealing. More importantly, if religion is to be depoliticised, state-employed preachers will shy away from addressing those challenges of daily life which are inherently political: poor governance, economic exclusion and corruption. By limiting themselves to safe topics and championing respect for authority, state clerics are out of step with the rebellious spirit of Arab youth and lose ground to violent extremist messages.

However, I wonder whether in looking at the forces at play in the region and how we as outsiders might respond, we might more profitably focus on three other factors. The first I have hinted at already – it is the changing demographics or more specifically, youth.

The young were behind the revolutions – though of course did not emerge as rulers. The UN reckons over half the Middle East's population is under 25 years old. One fifth is between 15-24. Unfortunately, over half the unemployed are also from that age bracket. At the time of the Egyptian revolution, about one third of youth were unemployed. Moreover, a high proportion were university graduates. But higher education is not a reliable social stabiliser; indeed, if you are unemployed, it exacerbates unrest and appears to encourage disregard for the cautious politics of your elders. In Egypt, college graduates were ten times more likely to have no job as those who only had elementary education. Today, Egyptian entrepreneurs in their 20s tell me that the only thing their prospective employees are interested in is – you have guessed it - not religion or politics, but employment.

Moreover, Middle East youth, like their Western counterparts, are highly adept at social media. In Saudi Arabia, for example, mobile phone penetration is 200%, Facebook usage more than doubled to 5.5 million between 2010 and 2012, while Twitter users doubled to nearly 2 million in the year to March 2013 – that constitutes half the total Twitter traffic in the whole Middle East. 70% of social media users are in the 15-29 age group. Interestingly, 90% of those claim they are more connected to their society, understand it better and feel they have contributed more to it as a result of social media.

So Middle Eastern youth are more connected to the world, more opinionated, daring and entrepreneurial. If the economic and political structures are not enabling them to find satisfactory answers to the question "How do I create a future I want?", their alternative of resorting to rebellion will draw potency from their ability to connect with others who share their frustration. One effect could be to weaken further the centralisation of power, already being weakened by the

fragmentation of societies into community-based identities.

So one conclusion, while accepting the risk of a youth rebellious over dashed ambitions, is not to close off opportunities we can offer Middle East youth, whether in education or training; and keep working with civil society.

The second factor I have also hinted at in the Egyptian context, namely the economy of the region.

Most of the ruling structures established a dependency culture, which they manipulated to placate the populace. I remember telling key members of the Egyptian ruling party from early 2010 that they should not assume that their old ways of buying off discontent among their subjects would work any longer - the world had changed.

But I suspect it is in the Gulf where, out of necessity, one of the most profound cultural shifts is already taking place. And it comes down to oil price. Very simply put, the problem is that to fund their ever inflating benefits packages, the Gulf States need oil prices and export volumes that look like becoming unachievable given rising production in the US and elsewhere and Gulf energy consumption.

Here again is something to ponder. 8.5% of the GDP of the Middle East as a region goes on subsidising energy for their citizens (for advanced economies the figure is 0.03%). Energy subsidies consume 22% of government revenues and are equal to half the global energy subsidies. On the current trajectory, Saudi Arabia will be importing fuel by 2030. As a result, the six GCC states collectively consume more primary energy than the whole of Africa.

Something has to give. Apart from more effective energy use and more realistic domestic pricing, one obvious answer is that there has to be a more productive indigenous workforce that moves away from a culture dependent on government largesse: currently only 12% of private sector workers in the Gulf are Gulf nationals. As that change in working practices takes place, the relationship between citizen and government is going to alter radically.

And the final factor. TE Lawrence's often quoted judgement that:

> *'Arabs believe in persons, not in institutions'*

contains some truth. But I remain convinced that building institutions is the most important contribution we can make. In the words of the anthropologist Lawrence Rosen the aim should be to:

> *'Transform the individual situated in a network of obligations into a citizen able to play a variety of discrete roles within a government of limited powers'.*

Without that, any number of constitutional guarantees will not circumscribe the powers of a legislator who cannot separate his office from his personal allegiances.

Where our influence is accepted (and we have to earn that acceptance), we should provide assistance in building institutions that restrain the aspiring or accidental autocrats; protect against the monopoly of power by those who will not tolerate "the other" and against corruption which has

proved to be the breeding ground of extremism; and that distribute power to the largest possible number of qualified persons.

The title asks: 'What next?' and I have got to this point having failed to mention the two most pressing issues facing us today in the Middle East: the barbarity in Syria and the Iranian nuclear talks. I am sure there will be opportunities to discuss these over questions. So let me limit my comments on both to the following.

On the first, the Alawites need to see a solution that convinces them they have a place in post-Assad Syria. There is no consensus in the opposition – neither three years ago nor now - on a post-Assad plan. Regional powers have backed different opposition groups, aggravating the divisions. Russia, Iran, Iraq and Hizbollah have succeeded in helping Assad stay in power. There will be no solution without a political solution; but I cannot see how to get there - still less post-Ukraine.

Moreover, given the dramatis personae, it is hard to believe any political solution will be an improvement on what went before. As a stalemate grinds on in a country fragmented along an east/west axis, our immediate interests look to be humanitarian and counterterrorist, with over 7,000 foreign fighters from over 40 countries.

On Iran, this is an issue I am prepared to risk making a fool of myself by remaining optimistic, principally because it is the biggest strategic opportunity since the end of the Cold War. Middle East politics have been predicated on US/Iranian hostility for 35 years. Alter that equation and you dramatically alter the dynamics.

Provided – and this is a big proviso – US and Western policymakers are sufficiently subtle to deal with the four key potential spoilers – Iranian hardliners, the US Congress, a Saudi Arabia which feels vulnerable and exposed, and of course Israel, and who knows, maybe now there is a fifth in the form of a vindictive Russia – this will make many challenges in the region much easier to deal with. Of course, success also means Iran, with an expanding economy, reintegrating into the region. If the P5+1 talks fail, it will be largely due to the spoilers being unable to change their mindset.

And so some final assumptions.

While democracy has not broken out after the Arab revolutions, the rulers will not escape the global trend towards greater accountability. Kings, Princes and Presidents will increasingly see their power limited by elected bodies and non-elected and non-state actors capable of applying pressure. *"We must be in the kitchen, but not on the menu"* as one in the Gulf so aptly put it.

The Arab revolutions occurred in those non-monarchical (but not necessarily non-dynastic) Republics where rule was passing from those who were long in the tooth to those who needed still to cut their teeth. But even monarchs are mortal. Over the next ten years, the biggest Gulf monarchy may face two successions, one of which potentially will be to a younger generation.

The appeal and capability of political Islam have been tested. But the test is far from over. In Egypt it failed. Tunisia is providing a fascinating laboratory. In Turkey it is under challenge. Like the monarchies and Republics, political Islam also needs to grapple with the challenge of a younger generation which recognises the mistakes of those who remain imprisoned in the mindset of an earlier proscription.

The Muslim Brotherhood will not suddenly fade away, whatever misgivings one may have over its practices and ideology; it has been a significant political movement in many Arab countries for decades. It will not slip into irrelevance. I believe Islam still needs to go through its Reformation. I often wonder whether we are witnessing the early stages of that now. Meanwhile, no modernisation can succeed if political Islam monopolises power, and no modernisation can be sustained if political Islam is excluded from the democratic competition. We need to ensure it is not Arab Spring – Islamic Year – Militia Decade.

While nationalism is ascendant in Egypt (another reason why political Islam became so distrusted), regionalism and fragmentation are increasingly dominant motivations elsewhere. This will unquestionably put pressure on post-World War I borders – at a time when state institutions are demonstrably ill-equipped to deal with the consequences. Even if borders do not get redrawn, increased transnational interaction (Kurds, Shia, Jihadi Sunnis etc.,) may make borders less relevant.

In such a confused and exposed environment, above all it is essential for us to be consistent – in our dealings and to our values. Among many other things, that means politics has to be inclusive.

Amin Maalouf has argued hard for recognising the variety of factors that constitute a person's identity, factors moreover that may change in the course of a person's life; and against the rigid categorisation of identity according to only one component part, namely religion. It is his message to the West with which I conclude:

> *'The perennial fault of European powers is not that they wanted to impose their values on the rest of the world, but precisely the opposite: they have consistently renounced their own values in their dealings with the peoples they have dominated'.*

TURKEY: MOVING FORWARD OR MOVING BACKWARD?

Transcript of a lecture by Sir David Reddaway KCMG MBE

20th May 2014

Sir David Reddaway *was British Ambassador to Turkey from 2009 until January 2014. Previous posts include Ambassador to Ireland; High Commissioner to Canada; Chargé d'Affaires in Iran (where he had worked during the Iranian Revolution); and UK Special Representative for Afghanistan. He has also served in Argentina, India and Spain; and was a Fellow at Harvard University. He studied Persian at London University and History at Cambridge University, and was a volunteer teacher in Ethiopia.*

Thank you very much for the invitation to speak today.

I think it is fair to say that, even before the appalling mine disaster of last week and the pretty unprepossessing scenes we saw subsequently in terms of the government reaction to it, the Turkish brand, which not long ago had been running very strongly, was going through a bad patch.

There were longstanding concerns that many of our Parliamentary friends here today will know about - over freedom of expression, over the workings of the media, over the shortcomings of the judicial system - and the Turkish government had recognised these with a series of reform packages. But, more recently, the brand has taken a much bigger knock, primarily because of concerns over the acceleration of what many Turks have considered an overly intrusive socially conservative agenda. It was these concerns that in large part prompted the escalation of the Gezi Park protests and the related riots. The government then handled these protests in what one might call a robust manner, with a lot of gas and tragic deaths, and what looked like fairly vindictive follow-up. Extraordinarily, tourism in Turkey outside Istanbul continued to flourish during these events. But we did see scenes across the global media that did not project the sort of Turkey we had come to know.

I think the events also showed civil society in Turkey that they appeared better able to express their dissatisfaction through social media and street protests than through the enfeebled parliamentary opposition that is still a feature of Turkish life today.

As we moved nearer to the local elections that have just been held in Turkey, there was another extraordinary hammer blow to the government in the form of what has come to be called the December 17th crisis, a series of allegations of corruption, tapes and bugged conversations in what amounted to an open conflict between the government and its erstwhile allies, generally believed to be linked to Fethullah Gülen, the US-based religious figure, who had become very powerful in the judiciary and in the police in particular.

Since then, we have seen a government fighting to regain control of the apparatus, with huge numbers of transfers of judicial and police officials and also other extraordinary steps such as attempts to close down YouTube and Twitter because the government, taken by surprise by both

these events, was also surprised by the power of social media. The AKP is an incredibly well-organised and energetic party: but it had not really got hold of social media before the events that I have just described.

This has also been a difficult period for Turkey on the international front in terms of the brand. I do not really blame Turkey for that. "Zero problems with the neighbours" is an admirable aspiration that we would all share. It is particularly ambitious if you have particular neighbours, and I will not go into further detail than that - but clearly Syria is a huge problem for Turkey. I would pay tribute to the extraordinary generosity of the Turkish government and people in hosting massive numbers of Syrian refugees, and I am glad that the British government, among others, has been able to help significantly in that effort. But the breakdown of relations with Syria clearly spelt doom for "zero problems with the neighbours". There was also the breach with Israel over the Mavi Marmara affair; tensions with other regional friends over policy towards Egypt; and tensions with Iraq, not least over the relationship Turkey has established with the Kurdish regional government.

Looking to the west, meanwhile, the EU process is still depressingly slow. The Cyprus problem runs on with additional tensions over energy in the Eastern Mediterranean. So the international scene has been difficult for Turkey.

The economy has also slowed - almost inevitable given the extraordinary speed of growth in recent years. There are continuing concerns not just over the current account deficit and over unemployment, but also over alleged political dimensions in the awarding of contracts, over corruption, and over the independence of institutions such as the Central Bank.

So overall, the flow of good news stories out of Turkey has been relatively thin in recent months. But of course none of this stopped the Prime Minister and the AKP winning a resounding victory in the local elections we have just witnessed, which were in effect a referendum on him and his policies and his style of government. That success appears to open the way to the Presidency this year, if that is what Mr. Erdogan decides he wants to go for; and very few people would bet against the AKP winning the general elections scheduled for next year.

If we are making a judgement on whether Turkey is moving forward or moving backward, as I have been asked to do today, we have to establish the starting point from which to measure that movement. We are all familiar with the story of the two hopelessly lost American tourists in the depths of rural Ireland who stopped to ask a local gentleman how to get to Dublin, and he replied, 'I wouldn't start from here'. I rather feel that about our judgement on Turkey. But I think the point from which we should best start is 2002, when the AKP first came into office; and if we take that starting point, I think we have to conclude that the overall balance is still positive. I will try to explain why.

In 2002, Turkey was of course an important NATO ally and a regional power, but it was still constitutionally what many would have called a military-guided democracy. There was a track record of military interventions and inbuilt military tutelage of national life. That balance was well illustrated by the fact that the Chief of the Turkish General Staff was senior in national protocol to the Defence Minister and did not report to him. There were also concerns over the use of the death penalty, over torture, freedom of expression, minority rights and the way that the Kurdish issue was being handled, with over 40,000 people killed.

President Özal had started dismantling the old state machinery and had got the economic transformation under way before he died in 1993; but between 1993 and 2002, I think it is fair to say that a succession of Western-orientated secular minded governments, if I can put it like that, had produced an increasingly obvious record of inefficiency and corruption. And in the 2002 elections, the AKP offered change from that in the form of what it called conservative democracy. It did not describe itself as Islamist. Turkey today is still a secular Republic, and the AKP would still describe itself as a conservative democracy party.

If we start from 2002, I suppose the best measure of forward movement is that the AKP continue to win elections, usually with an increased proportion of the vote compared to the previous election of the same type. The fact that they can do that shows that the majority of the Turkish electorate think they are delivering; and they are helped by the fact that the opposition parties are still feeble and divided.

I would argue that the key area of delivery has been the economy. I am not going to give you a statistics fest. But I think that anybody who has been to Turkey in recent years, or read about Turkey, will be aware of the extent of the transformation there, and that a rising tide of prosperity has lifted virtually all ships. Talking before the last election to what one might call grass-roots AKP supporters, it was noteworthy that their consistent line was that they now had access to better hospitals, schools, and universities; that infrastructure had improved; and in some cases that they were getting jobs away from the agricultural sector. They felt better off. They did not care if politicians engaged in corrupt activities, as alleged, because they thought that was what politicians always did. So they did not change votes because of allegations of corruption.

I think one has to pay tribute to the AKP for their extraordinarily skilful handling of the political opportunities in Turkey, very cleverly combining measures that were consistent with EU accession and the introduction of more modern democratic norms on the one hand, and with the agenda of dismantling the structures of Kemalism and the Kemalist grip on power on the other. Who could reasonably argue with an agenda that asserted the civil power's control over the military, even if there were doubts about some motivation and some of the ways it was achieved? Who could argue at revision - gradual revision, one would hope - of some cadres of the machinery of the state? Who could reasonably refuse to give credit for a succession of legislative reforms, including those put to referendum successfully in 2010; for the abolition of the death penalty; for signing up to the Convention for the Prevention of Torture; for a succession of packages to reform the judicial system, most notably to do with pre-trial detention delays; for the appointment of an Ombudsman; and for gestures towards minorities and their rights?

I was interested that a very senior Christian religious leader in Istanbul has quite often said that of all the governments he has worked with - and he has worked with a lot - this government is the one most attentive to the rights of minorities in Turkey. And I think it is also right to pay tribute to the determined effort being made by the Turkish government to reach a political solution to the Kurdish issue, a hugely difficult task but fundamental to the future of Turkey as a strong democracy.

Internationally, if we are looking at progress in the period since 2002, the Turks have pushed forward with their effort to join the EU, of which the UK (and of course many other governments) remains a strong supporter – despite the difficulty of the process. I have already mentioned "zero problems with the neighbours", which for all its problems has had its successes, and which was part of a

hyperactive engagement in foreign policy, developing relationships and building bridges globally. I remember a British Foreign Secretary saying to me that he assumed that the Turkish Foreign Minister did not sleep, because there was no other way to work as hard as the Turkish Foreign Minister was working. Turkey seemed to be out there in any dispute that needed a mediator; and, although clearly focusing heavily on Muslim minorities and Muslim issues internationally, was opening up relationships and business opportunities in Latin America, in Africa, and in Asia. This activism was well symbolised by Turkish Airlines, now flying to over 200 destinations in over 100 countries.

At the time of the Arab Spring (and we have some great experts on the Arab Spring here, I know), there was talk of Turkey being an inspiration or a model for the region, as a functioning democracy with a successful economy in a Muslim-majority population country. And if you had asked any international observer in 2009/10 whether Turkey was moving forward or moving backward, there would have been virtual unanimity.

But if you asked the same question today, the answers would be much more varied. Mr. Erdogan and the AKP would clearly say that Turkey is continuing to move rapidly forward; that successive election results show that Turks want that government to continue; and that the AKP look well set for success in the next two elections of the trilogy that we are going through at the moment. They would argue that the economy is still doing well; that the fundamentals are strong, even if the growth rate is not as before; and that the reform process will continue. AKP supporters would argue that Turkey is well set to go through to 2023, the celebration of the foundation of the Republic, with them in control. (In my view, this celebration may be at least as much about the transformation of the Republic into what it is today or will be then, as of the founding of the Republic. These are two very, very different Turkish Republics).

The AKP government would argue that the biggest challenge to moving forward comes from people who cannot get themselves elected – not just the opposition parties but what the government are now calling the "parallel state", the people in the machinery who produce the allegations of corruption; and the "interest rate lobby", an organisation or group whose composition I have never fully understood or indeed been convinced by, and who some allege were behind the Gezi Park protests. (I recall a lively private exchange of views with one Turkish mayor who had been particularly vocal in his criticism of the BBC and its coverage of the demonstrations and elections. At the end of it, I said to him that this had been the first time I had felt that I lived in the same city as somebody else but apparently on another planet).

If I were a member of the minorities in Turkey, at risk of over-generalisation, I think I would also agree, that on balance Turkey was still moving forward. There is a concern that "pious Muslims" get more attention than others in the eyes of the government. But the position of minorities has improved. Some properties have been returned. Mor Gabriel Monastery in particular, has had encouraging news on its land. There have been church services where they were banned before. I think that a key element in all this - although under the Lausanne Treaty, Kurds are not counted as a minority - is that if there is progress in negotiations over the Kurdish issue, other minorities would reckon that rights given to the Kurds will also have to apply to other minorities - and therefore that they will all benefit if that deal eventually goes through.

If, however, you are a secularist, Western-orientated Turk, if I can use that label, I think you would

be pretty gloomy about Turkey's direction of travel. In fact, you would be profoundly depressed. You would be encouraged that civil society has been able to show its teeth recently. But demography is against you; your political parties can't win elections; and the opposition parties can't unite to present a serious challenge. The expectation of such people is that socially intrusive conservative or Islamist agenda changes will continue; and that centralisation of power will continue if the current Prime Minister takes over the Presidency, or even if the Prime Minister stays as Prime Minister (which I think is the less likely option after the last elections), with reason for anxiety about freedom of expression and corruption.

So you have very divided views in Turkey.

As for my own personal view, I think that Turkey is well ahead of its 2002 situation, but that it is fair to say that there are grounds for real concern about the events we have seen in Turkey since 2011 and particularly last year; and that the overall forward momentum has as good as stopped in the last few months.

You might expect that anyway in a pre-election period. As I have said, Turkey is going through a series of three elections, not formally linked but connected in reality. One might reasonably assume that this process would almost inevitably make politicians concentrate on producing policy measures designed to appeal to its electors. The fact was that the government was pushing ahead increasingly openly with what some might call socially restrictive legislation, albeit often with very good wider accompanying arguments. For example, the legislation restricting alcohol sales was accompanied by statements of support from the WHO and was compared with legislation in Sweden. But if you talk to Istanbulers who like to have a drink on the street pavements, they find this sort of change very unwelcome, and part of a wider restrictive trend.

There have also been increasing worries over continuing restrictions on freedom of expression; self-censorship by media proprietors who had wider business interests and did not want their media organisations to cause problems for their other business interests; and a general polarisation of society. All this came together with Gezi Park, and with December 17th. The government was caught by surprise. The reaction was crude. The government did not want to disavow police handling of Gezi Park, but did actually admit that there could be improvements and that police procedures would change. Turkey-watchers are looking to see evidence of that working its way through the system. The measures against social media were really part of the panic that followed the December 17th allegations of corruption in high places, and those restrictive measures too now look likely to be whittled back.

Against a background of socially conservative change, do I think that Mr. Erdogan, whether as Prime Minister or as President, will take Turkey in what you might call a Sharia law direction, as some fear? No, I do not. I think that he will regard himself as having a mandate to continue with a socially conservative agenda, but not in an extreme form.

A lot of Turks will not like even that: who judges how extreme is extreme? But I think and hope that the structures of the Turkish state are now such that even those dissatisfied with the agenda of an elected government would reckon they had a fair chance in an election to choose a new government, rather than to say the time has come for another military intervention. I think the military really have been driven out of politics at least as long as the Turkish economy is going well, which it is. That reflects a real strengthening of Turkish democracy.

As in any country, there is a question about whether a Prime Minister or President who has been successful and long serving will be ready to listen to suggestions from others that some things may be going wrong or that moderation is required, and this will be one of the big tests in the coming months and years. Mr. Erdogan does need to continue the reform process and says he is committed to that - it is part of the vision of building a new Republic. He also needs to reassure foreign investors that Turkey is back to being a predictable place, because for the last six months it has not really been quite as predictable.

As I have suggested, the Kurdish process will be very important in this context - fundamental to the stability of Turkey and therefore welcome to the central government, but involving, inevitably, a degree of decentralisation and recognition of rights that will run against the contrasting tendency towards centralisation. So we should follow the "solution process" with attention, and support it.

On the international front, I expect more of the same: a mixture of idealism and pragmatism. I have referred to the challenge of Syria. I hope we will see a deal with Israel before too long; and it would be terrific to see a deal with Cyprus, which Turkey is very keen to have. Turkey will anyway need to keep up its interest in EU membership, however doubtful about progress; and it will remain an important member of NATO. It will want and need to have good relations with its main energy suppliers, obviously Russia, Iran, and Iraq. They too will be wanting predictability in Turkey.

So to conclude. A key measure of the success of any country, I have heard it said, is whether people want to leave it or to get into it. I do not see evidence at the moment of people leaving Turkey because they think it is going down the tube. In fact, you see statistics of more people coming back from Germany to work in Turkey than of Turks going to Germany to work there. But the government does need to reassure people, and I hope that this will be an outcome of the Presidential election, given that the Turkish President is traditionally supposed to have a more statesmanlike and less party political role than the Prime Minister. I am hopeful that Mr. Erdogan understands that and has got the message – we will see.

But if I answer the question about whether Turkey has moved forwards or backwards compared to 2002, I must answer that Turkey has been transformed and is a more democratic, more prosperous, more stable country, and a better friend for us, than it was in 2002.

Thank you very much.

THE GEOSTRATEGIC DIVIDE: AN UNDECLARED WAR?

Transcript of a lecture by Alastair Crooke

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Thank you very much. As Michael has just indicated, the topic is about the strategic divide that is affecting the Middle East, which of course does have wider ramifications as we are now seeing.

In the context of the Middle East now, I think we have four points of inflection or what I would call 'strategic pivots' that are apparent. I do not know which of these is going to be the most important and so I am not putting them in any particular order. What I propose to do today is to concentrate on two such pivots and only give a quick mention to the other two, not because they are insignificant or because they will not emerge in importance, but simply because I have been given half an hour to speak, these are complicated issues and I cannot manage more than two. But feel free to talk about the other two or raise them in the questions, if you choose.

The first thing that I want to talk about is Daesh or ISIS as it is called in English, because I think it is very important to break this narrative that you see repeated endlessly in the press, that Daesh is an affiliate of al-Qaeda, that it is somehow an offshoot of it, a franchise of it - this language that you see all the time.

Let me make it absolutely plain and clear that Daesh is not al-Qaeda. There may have been a brief alliance at some point, but it differs totally (both in terms of how it arose; they have very different points of origin from each other) from what I am now no longer going to call al-Qaeda, but bin Laden-ism (maybe that is not a very accurate title, we should call it perhaps Abdullah Azzam-ism). Bin Laden-ism and Zarqawi-ism have very different aspects. It is very important to understand what is going on in the region by understanding that it is radically different from al-Qaeda.

How was al-Qaeda born? Well, I was there at the time bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam were there, and it derived from the myth that the mujahideen had defeated the USSR, that they had somehow imploded a major world power by prompting it to overextend itself economically and politically. And it is a myth - I will not go into that much further – but a myth that has taken hold and from that, it became the clear idea that if you could do this to the USSR, you could do this to the West.

The great insight from Abdullah Azzam that provoked this was an understanding that the great asset of the West, globalisation, could actually be used against the West by provoking it, in a virtual way, in a global way, to the point that it would then overextend itself economically and politically in a global context and implode. Some of you may recoil at my describing it like this, but it was, if you like, an intellectual approach to the problem, from a philosophic position, not at a ground-roots level - it was top down.

Zarqawi-ism was totally different. Its origins came from the dispossessed agricultural and agrarian communities, forced into the desperate poverty and the squalor of the industrial suburbs of Oman as a result of changes in the weather in the region. Zarqawi himself, when he moved from there into Iraq, used this very strongly, this sense of really deep anger and hostility and grievance, the sense of usurpation that existed amongst the Sunni community and also the sense of bigotry, of deep hatred of those who had usurped the Sunnis from their rightful place, of Iran, of the Shia, of the Alawite usurpation of Syria, of the Hizbollah usurpation in Lebanon, and a desire for revenge. So it was very different.

Osama bin Laden's vision was that of imploding, first of all, the USSR and then imploding America and he said very clearly, 'forget your internal fights'.

Zarqawi-ism was about the internal enemy within Sunni Islam that was preventing it from reaching its goals. But it was far more than this. These are the roots and these are the currents that from 2002-2003 transferred themselves into Syria and embedded themselves around the aggrieved communities of Homs and Hama and the villages surrounding them. A very strong sense of hatred and anger, not only just at Sunni and Shia, but also at the urban elite. This was very marked in Aleppo and in other states, but it is much more than this.

To understand what is happening now, you have to understand that it is not simply that they are a more bigoted, more violent form of al-Qaeda, they have completely overturned the doctrine of al-Qaeda. It is a revolutionary historical revisionism that we are seeing in Daesh or ISIS and it undermines completely the pillars of Sunni power and Saudi power. Those pillars rest in three main parts.

- First, in their claim to be the successors to the Quraysh, the Prophet's tribe;
- Secondly, in their control of the Mosque;
- Thirdly, in their control of the interpretation of the Qur'an through Al-Azhar or through the ulema in Saudi Arabia.

What Daesh and ISIS say is this: they say, actually the Islamic State was never founded by the Quraysh. The early Islamic state (I am talking about at the time of the Prophet or just after the Prophet) was not founded by the Quraysh, it was not founded by the establishment, the Caliph and the four righteous communities after it, it was not even founded by Saladin. Actually (and this is not nonsense, there is a historical case), they say that the State came about by fighting scholars leading their own groups of armed men fighting in the name of Islam and these fighting scholars were also the authority for the interpretation of the Qur'an. They were the authority and they were, secondly, in a sense, the Mosque. A peripatetic mosque if you like, without buildings, but a mosque in that sense and at the point that these groups coalesced, we had the Islamic State - this is their historical revisionism.

I am spending a little time on this because it is so important. Anyone who wonders whether historical revisionism is important can only look at Israel to see how important it is and how it can shape politics very clearly.

This is quite different from bin Laden's view. Bin Laden largely remained within the Wahhabi doctrine. Yes, they did not like him inside the Kingdom, but it was fine if he said it outside, because it was not threatening.

This, however, undercuts every pillar of Saudi authority. It undercuts the Quraysh and the claim, it undercuts the Mosque and it undercuts the authority to interpret the Qur'an. This is really quite revolutionary.

Also, secondly, they claim to be a state. Al-Qaeda was a movement. This is a state and therefore anyone that challenges it is challenging the state. Hence the conflict that we often saw with Jabhat al-Nusra during that time and the other groups fighting in Syria.

What we had in Iraq was a brilliant move by Daesh, who were about to lose the struggle in Syria with big ramifications, because this is, after all, a divine project and the consequences of a divine project failing can be very large. The lightning strike into Iraq has changed the whole perception of the movement and its situation dramatically.

Some people ask me, 'Are we dealing here with sectarianism or are we dealing with politics? Which is going on in Iraq now?' and I would say that actually, they are just different sides to the same coin. Yes, it is politics, but it is very important to understand what is happening, because the question is, how come then Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are in alliance with a movement that is directly opposed to their own legitimacy and their standing in the region?

Therefore you have to understand how it is seen and that the politics is not the politics just of today, although that is clearly one plane of it, but it is seen through the prism of the politics of Mecca and Medina, both for Shia and for Sunni.

The Arab Awakening, if you like, was the leaving of Mecca, the departure, the Prophet taking the community out and then the big battle at Badr in which 313 men overwhelmed, and people saw the beginnings of the Arab Awakening for Sunnis in these terms, of this great victory.

Then, of course, in history came the Battle of Uhud and the Prophet faced a reversal. He was defeated by Mecca at that point and that is seen as Syria - Syria is symbolically seen as the battle of Uhud for the Sunni Islam. Of course, you will understand immediately that Iran and the Shia are taking the role of Mecca in this. So Syria was the existential threat to the Sunni project for many people.

After Uhud, the Prophet then had a string of unrivalled military victories and that is what people are seeing today in Iraq, in the imagination. And this of course has a resonance that goes beyond young Islamists. Gulf leaders are all applauding this - they may not do so to westerners too loudly, but many of them are saying, very clearly, 'This is great, the Sunni project has achieved this'.

Apart from this resonance, how come Saudi Arabia and others, including some elements of the

Ba'athists, some Naqshbandi groups and others, are supporting and working with this group?

Let us be quite clear: ISIS walked into Mosul with no more than 1,300 men, there was no fighting, there was no battle, it was clearly prepared, the people simply took off their uniforms and underneath they had on their civilian clothes. No doubt money passed hands, no doubt some understandings were reached before that and clearly there is support from many of those Ba'athists and also former military officers who were part of the disbanded army of Saddam Hussein. If you go to Mosul, you will see those army officers are principally the ones still trying to take control of the scene.

I think the answer or at least one answer, I am not sure that I can say it is the answer, but one answer to this is that the Saudis tell people that I know, who know the Saudis very well, that they feel that Iran has played 'blood politics' in Syria. Sunnis have died, Sunni blood has been spilt and that they need to inflict blood politics back on Iran. Only in this way can some sort of equilibrium in the region be established, by which maybe it is possible for Iran or Saudi Arabia eventually to come to some sort of settlement. But blood must flow, whether it is the blood in Iraq of protégées of Iran, or directly, but there must be an equalling up, if you like. Many suggest that this will provide a basis ultimately for some sort of solution.

I was last week in Damascus and in Beirut and some of the Ba'athists said to me specifically this: that they believe that for the Ba'athists involved in this project of supporting Daesh, these Ba'athists see this as a chance then to find a political solution, an Iraqi solution to what has happened to the Ba'athists. They feel very humiliated. They feel that they were thrown out of power, ousted from power. The army was dishonoured, even though it had reached understandings with the Americans that they would not fight, but believed that they were going to be treated with a certain respect. They were not. Great bitterness, and again this sense of great grievance and usurpation that Zarqawi capitalised on so well in Iraq, is present in the party.

Some of them say, 'Well, maybe this therefore is the basis on which we can start talking to the Shia of Iraq and finding a solution.' I think some of them believe this, but I have to say this is not how Iran sees it. Iran sees this in a different light. If you ask the Iranians and clearly the Iranian leadership, they say, 'No, this is nothing like this. This simply is a coup d'état. This is a coup d'état and it is in the line of coup d'états that runs from General Sisi in Egypt to the attempted coup d'état that is going on in Libya at the moment' and that this is a defining moment in the region and that there is no sign of a Saudi opening to them and they add, 'Far from it. This is a very serious challenge to us: it is an attempt to break up Syria and Iraq'.

So what does all this mean? What is this likely going to mean for the region? None of us has a crystal ball and I certainly find mine very cloudy, but I think it is not likely that Daesh will be able to advance much further than they have. Baghdad after all is a city of six million and it is a Shia city largely now, it is not the same situation. Mosul has a very different character. It has always had a very different character and it has been the source of revolution and opposition for many years.

Iraq is *de facto* divided now. We will see what happens with this. Equally, and I think this is a view that the Iranians would share, Maliki is unlikely easily to be able to prize some of these groups particularly out of Mosul. Anyone who recalls - perhaps some of you will - that battle in Lebanon, when there were about 150 forerunners of Daesh, who took over a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli in Lebanon. It took the Lebanese army three months and 300 casualties to dislodge a mere

hundred odd members of this group who had had experience in Iraq and were used to urban fighting. So I do not think we are going to see any quick victories.

What then will Daesh do? There are signs, and again it is perhaps a little early, but already last night, there were two attempts to cross into Jordan by groups of Daesh members. Undoubtedly they have cells there and they have sleeper groups in Jordan. I do not know that this is what they will do, but I think there is a high possibility that rather than coming down south into the Shia parts of Iraq, they will move, if they move, into Jordan. Jordan is vulnerable. The King does not have strong support within his Bedouin base any longer, who also feel usurped, and he really hangs in his position by virtue of the Americans, so it is not a strong position. But we will see.

What will happen politically in Iraq? Well, from the Iranian perspective, I do not think they feel they have to do too much. They have done what they feel is the most important. Suleimani has already visited the Shia shrines at Samarra and Najaf and ensured their defence against being taken by this group. If they were taken or attacked, then it is completely different – we are talking about full-scale sectarian conflict, but I think Iran has assured itself that they are largely safe. It does not relish or feel the need, I think, to intervene at this stage militarily. It has already succeeded in uniting the normally deeply factious Shia political parties in Iraq, they have been united themselves and united by Sistani too.

So the next stage for Iran will be to negotiate a new political dispensation amongst perhaps a more willing Shia set. I know that at the moment, John Kerry is going around the region, going to, of all things, the Gulf States to ask them to try and bring about a more participatory and more balanced state. I think it is extremely ironic that he is going precisely to those states who are responsible and who support Daesh, asking them to bring about a solution in this, adding as he does (or at least, as his spokesman does) that of course, in urging a wider political dispensation, Iran must not have any more power than it had and that we must see a lessening of Iranian influence in Iraq. But I am afraid the arithmetic is very clear: 60-65% of the Iraqi population is Shia, only 20% is Sunni, so it does not take too much to understand who is going to form the next government. It is going to be formed in Tehran by Suleimani probably, almost singlehandedly. I do not think the West will have much say in this and certainly the old names that keep coming up, Ayad Allawi and others, I am not sure that that will be the case.

But it is not going to be easy for a number of reasons. I may be being somewhat provocative here, but I want to say that I have been very struck how much the West has absorbed and taken over the Sunni narrative, partly because of the connection with the Gulf, but also the sense of the Sunnis invariably as victims. You see this now in the desperation and the sense that people are saying, 'Well, the Sunnis, you know, must be brought into power and there must be a power-sharing government'.

But - and I am just simply asking you as an exercise - put yourself in the Shia shoes. Yes, of course, Maliki has been suspicious and hostile to many of the Sunni groups, but some of those Shia say, 'Well, why did actually the present Iraqi army walk away in Mosul? They walked away precisely because Maliki had given in to Western pressures to include Sunnis in the army and what did they do? They walked out of it'. And when Maliki looks at what is happening, the Shia will say, 'We told you so. The Sunnis cannot be relied on. Here they are, engaged in mounting a coup d'état to overturn the government'.

Let us not forget that Maliki's party has only just faced elections and emerged as the largest party in Parliament. How do you ask him to leave office? If you say, 'Oh, that doesn't count, we must have someone else in his place', what are you saying? Let's unstitch the whole political fabric of Iraq? That the elections did not count, the votes of the Shia do not count? That we can just say that there should be someone else? I do not think, therefore, that the Iranians will be seeking Maliki's departure.

I do think that the Iranians want and have wanted for some time to try and bring the Shia into a relationship and bring Sunnis into a relationship, but I do not think it is going to be achieved by simply constructing these unity governments which are so fashionable at the moment. After all, perhaps if I am allowed to say it - I do not know if there are any Americans here - but perhaps as Obama looks back on his own decision to have a team of rivals and has seen the disadvantages of that in Ukraine and elsewhere, where he seems to have been fighting certain of the politics within his own administration, we should perhaps question the very merits of teams of rivals particularly being inserted in the volatile atmosphere of the Middle East.

I have about one or two minutes left before Michael thumps the table, so I will just mention in no more than headlines my other inflection points that will determine and affect the strategic future of the Middle East in some way.

Once again, please understand I am not suggesting that Iraq and ISIS are the only ones, but ISIS is going to be very important. The ground is fertile not only there, but throughout North Africa where a sort of literal Salafism is bedding itself in, and elsewhere in the region, not just in Jordan and Lebanon. It is seen by many Sunnis as the symbolic politics of, if you like, the Sunni cause marching to a victory, and it is hugely attractive, particularly to foreign people. It is not al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda paradoxically has withered. Bin Laden-ism is not important. This is the new. So in a sense, yes, al-Qaeda has been defeated and yes, you have something that is much more dangerous and much more serious that has bypassed it. That is the reality of it.

The third of my points of inflection is, of course, the Iran P5+1 nuclear talks. That is being affected even now by events in Iraq, has been affected by Ukraine and is going to be a very important strategic element

And the fourth pivot in the region is paradoxically Ukraine. I think firstly, what we see happening from Ukraine is something long discussed and long hinted at, suddenly crystallising and taking a real form, which is an alliance between Russia and China in terms of their interests and against the existing global order as it stands today and the existing financial order. Every day you see small moves that are taking place between the Bank of China and Russian companies.

This is hugely important to the Middle East and the region, this challenge to the post-war global order of Bretton Woods. This is going to be important and I do not think that Ukraine is finished. Every day we watch the escalation of the deaths and the killing. We are just at the moment in a ceasefire - I do not know whether it is going to have substance or not - but both sides, both President Putin and President Obama need it. The great difference between them is that for President Putin, this is existential, this is right on the border of Russia and also this is family, family in a way that far exceeds what Mrs Thatcher felt for the Falkland Islands. Everyone you meet in Russia almost has family there. The outcome of the Ukraine issue, who prevails in this tussle between America and

President Putin, is going to be watched very, very closely. I can tell you when I was in Damascus, in the middle of the war, everything stopped as they watched, only one topic discussed, only one thing on television: Ukraine, Ukraine, Ukraine.

So those are my four strategic pivots that are going to affect the whole of the region. A global strategic change is taking place, no doubt about it. Structures of thought are changing, institutions are eroding, some are being replaced and some are not. This is one of those really key points in history that occurs every so often, maybe the last was in 1848, where you have a change in consciousness. European states particularly need to look and see and wonder where will be the centre of power in the future. I think that the great fear of Brzezinski is about to come true, that the one thing the West should never tolerate is the rise of a power in Eurasia. I think that is precisely what we are seeing globally at this time - a rising of the locus and the centre of gravity of power moving from the Atlantic to Eurasia, which is well funded with energy resources and other things.

Thank you very much.

WHEN BRITAIN BURNED THE WHITE HOUSE: THE 1814 INVASION OF WASHINGTON

Transcript of a lecture given by Peter Snow

1st July 2014

Peter Snow *is a highly respected journalist, author and broadcaster. In 1962 he joined ITN as a scriptwriter and reporter and began newscasting the same year. He was ITN's Diplomatic and Defence Correspondent from 1966-1979 and for the next decade reported from all round the world. He joined the BBC in 1979 where he was one of the first presenters of Newsnight when it began in January 1980, and went on to cover elections and other live political events for the BBC until 2005. He has also covered military matters on and off the world's battlefields for forty years and at the Royal Television Society Awards in 1998 he won the Judges' Award for services to broadcasting. In 2004, Peter and his son Dan presented the BAFTA-winning Battlefield Britain for BBC2 and worked on the follow-up series, Twentieth Century Battlefields. He is the author of many books, including most recently, 'When Britain Burned the White House: The 1814 Invasion of Washington' (John Murray, 2013).*

Thank you very much, Michael. It is lovely to see so many friendly faces. This is just about the last gathering that I will be talking to before I go to America for the publication of this book in New York in about a month's time and I shall be taking a flak jacket with me, although I do not think it is a secret over there that we burned the White House. I do not think they think of it as anything other than part of the fun of history – two hundred years ago is a long time - and so I think it will not be too bad.

Having said that, I have had the most extraordinary two years studying what is, I suppose, the nadir of British American relations. It has been absolutely fascinating and a huge eye-opener – I did not realise how bad things could get between us! When you think of how good things are on the whole at the moment, it is an extraordinary contrast.

And the contrast is more than that: here we have America, with one of the smallest navies in the world, oddly and rather foolishly deciding to declare war on a country with the largest navy in the world. The position is now completely reversed (although I know we are not going to declare war on America!). But given the scale of power in those days, although of course we had lost the War of Independence thirty years earlier, there was no way that the Americans would say that we were going to lose the war of 1812.

I would argue that neither side really won the war of 1812, but on the whole, because the Americans declared it and did not win it, they probably 'lost'. But that is another matter. What I really want to talk about is this extraordinary episode in the war. The reason for the war of 1812 in which this episode took place, was because the British, rather arrogantly, were in control of the seas, with a huge navy, and they were fighting Napoleon in 1812. The Americans wanted to trade with France. Understandably, the Americans said, 'Look, we're a neutral nation, you ought to let us

trade with France'. But the British were stopping their ships and saying. 'We must have a look here and see what you are doing'. The British were also very naughtily saying that many American sailors on the American ships which they stopped were actually British and so they should be pressed into working on Royal Navy ships fighting the French and going up the masts and pulling down the sails on those ships. Well, that was intolerable for the Americans.

On the other hand, the Americans declaring war and invading Canada because their ships were being intercepted on the high seas, and being foolish enough, as I say, to declare war on the nation with the biggest navy in the world – it was all rather odd. We were fighting Napoleon, we thought we were fighting for liberty and here were these Americans, who were very much a symbol of liberty, no question about that, who were fighting us and they seemed to be on the side of the French, which in a sense they were. So it was a very odd situation.

And come 1814, when Napoleon mercifully abdicated after being knocked out at Leipzig at the end of 1813 (Wellington had beaten him in the Peninsula, but the key trouncing of Napoleon was by the Eastern Europeans at Leipzig), then we were able to concentrate on this rather awkward enemy that we had on the other side of the Atlantic.

So a lot of the men who had fought very successfully in the Peninsula and other professional soldiers in the British regular army were told they were going to go to America and they scratched their heads and said, 'What? Oh, 1812, yes, all right, fair enough'. So 4,500 of them went across the Atlantic and here we get to the characters involved. The excitement of this book is not just this extraordinary piece of history, which is such a contrast to life today between Britain and America, but also the characters involved.

On the British side, you have General Robert Ross, who was a wonderful Northern Irishman, very gallant, very honest, very true, very charismatic, a very impressive character. Beside him, you have Rear Admiral George Cockburn. He was an amazing man – a fiery, ruthless, tough so-and-so, a Scotsman who was out to give these Americans a good lesson if he could. He was really the one who ran the campaign, although he was not an army commander, he was a naval commander, and this was an army operation in Washington and also in Baltimore, which I will come to in a moment.

And so these two chaps crossed the Atlantic. Cockburn had already made himself very unpopular in Chesapeake Bay by bashing away since 1813, burning American houses, impounding tobacco crops, and being thoroughly unpleasant to the Americans. The Americans were so furious about it that they offered $500 for each of his ears. They were determined this chap was simply unacceptable.

Cockburn joined up with Ross, who took his troops across once they were freed from fighting in Spain in 1814. The two joined up at the bottom of Chesapeake Bay and anchored there with something like fifty ships. The Americans had not seen anything like this since the War of Independence – suddenly the British were here again, what on earth was going on? There was pandemonium and panic in Washington. So you have the British, Robert Ross and George Cockburn, with a Task Force commander, Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane (one rank above Cockburn and Ross) in charge of the whole operation.

Then, on the American side, you had a fascinating team as well. Here is Madison, the President. A cerebral, studious, rather introverted, wonderful, fascinating character, father of the Constitution, he

wrote the Bill of Rights. Tremendous guy. But not a war commander, not a war leader. He had been more or less pressed into declaring war in 1812 by people saying that what the British were doing, impounding American ships and so on, was simply unacceptable.

So Madison declared war, but his war was a failure. Canada was not being invaded successfully, there had been scandals on the Canadian border, and the Americans simply could not get any territory off the Canadians at all. They did manage to burn the Parliament building in York, Toronto – I think, actually, that that was American soldiers running amok. I do not think, to be fair, that burning the Parliament building in York was an Act of State, in the same way as what happened in Washington. But anyway, they had burned the Parliament in Toronto, which was not very clever, because obviously it gave the British an excuse for what they did in Washington.

On the American side then, you have James Madison, this fascinatingly serious-minded, cerebral President, with an extraordinary wife, Dolley, who is still thought of as one of the great American First Ladies. She was outgoing, she was attractive, she was exotic, she dressed in turbans and wonderful bright dresses and she went round at parties at the White House with a little silver snuff box, offering people a pinch of snuff and she served ice cream – they loved ice cream in the White House in those days (still do, no doubt). She was wonderful, very outgoing, hated the British, as of course by this time, Madison did too. The war had been pretty unpleasant over the last two years by August 1814, when the British had turned up.

And there was the Commander of the Army in America, but before I get to him – the situation was extraordinary. Here were the Americans, who had won the War of Independence decisively against the British thirty years earlier, who had bashed up and sent packing the biggest, most powerful nation in the world. But come 1812-1814, the American military were in complete shambles, because the Republican Party in charge of America did not really believe in a regular army and any regulars there were, were up fighting the Canadians anyway. So what you had was a man called John Armstrong, a disastrous, stubborn, hopeless character, who was in charge of defence. He was the War Secretary and he did not believe in having a regular, trained army and it was chaos. There were militia who were supposed to be called up, but most of the states who were asked to produce militia said, 'No, sorry, we are far too busy looking after ourselves and we can't do anything to save your federal capital, so forget that'. So it was complete chaos.

The commander in the field was a man called Brigadier General William Winder. He was even worse than Armstrong. He was frantically trying to get troops together without any idea of what the British were doing turning up in Chesapeake Bay. Where were they going? Were they going to Annapolis, were they going to Baltimore, were they going to Washington? Goodness knows.

So you had this shambles on the American military side and this rather head-scratching American President and his wonderfully exotic wife, Dolley. So that is just to give you the main characters, the dramatis personae, as it were.

The British turn up and George Cockburn (who was junior to the Task Force commander and was the naval commander of the naval force, but not in charge of the whole operation) said, 'Right, what we do is we go up the Patuxent river to a place called Benedict, land the chaps there, march up to Washington and burn the place down'.

And the others in charge, Cochrane and Ross said, 'Well, George, we hear what you say, but we will see what happens, we will certainly land and we will start marching and we will see what the Americans do'.

The instructions from Whitehall were to give the Americans a bloody nose. The actual words were *'Give the Americans a good drubbing'* – a wonderful expression. The British government, Lord Liverpool and Castlereagh, wanted the Americans to stop fighting this war, which we thought was rather stupid and a nuisance, so it was a matter of 'let's give the Americans a good drubbing. George Cockburn and Cochrane - get on with it, think of something to do'.

Well, Cockburn said, 'Let's go to Washington and burn the place down'. Everybody else was rather scratching their heads, with Ross somewhat reluctantly following on, 'Well, as I've got the army, let's think about that'. They moved up the Patuxent river and it became more and more apparent to the Americans that Washington was the target, although of course, the Patuxent is a clever river - you could have been going to Baltimore, you could have been going to Annapolis, you could have been going to Washington. It was not the Potomac, it was the Patuxent, the one next door – you need to look at a map.

So up this river they went and when they got to the top of it, the Americans produced a force of about 1,000 men under William Winder to face 4,500 British troops. Winder got them out of bed and marched them out about ten miles outside Washington, and he took one look at the approaching British and said, 'I think we will go back to Washington'. So they went back to Washington the same day.

That night, he heard that the British were marching not actually to Washington itself, but towards a place called Bladensburg, which is five miles north east of Washington on the eastern branch of the Potomac, where you can actually cross a rather narrow part of the river and then you can turn down to Washington. And he said, 'Oh, we had better go to Bladensburg, we had better march our chaps up there and take the whole army to Bladensburg'. The whole army consisted of about 6,000 men, most of them young recruits, young militia.

So the same night that he got back to Washington, he marched them up to Bladensburg. The guys were absolutely exhausted. Most of them were very patriotic and very enthusiastic. A chap called John Pendleton Kennedy is a good example. A wonderful chap, he was very excited about it all. He was a great hero in Baltimore and he had marched down from Baltimore with his military friends, and he had lost his boots on the way down and he was, rather oddly, wearing dancing pumps. His friends said to him, 'What are you doing in dancing pumps?' And he said, 'Oh, quite straightforward, we are going to win this battle with the Brits if they try to get hold of Washington or Annapolis or Baltimore and obviously the President will call a ball at the White House and I will be at the ball and I am wearing my dancing pumps. I should have my boots, but second best'. A great chap.

So they were hugely patriotic and they were furious with the British for turning up again thirty years after the War of Independence – what on earth was going on? The answer was, of course, that they had declared war on us, so it was not surprising that we were turning up and being difficult.

The British arrived at Bladensburg, and there were the Americans. Madison turned up himself on the battlefield and said, 'Chaps, are you sure we are very well deployed here?' because he saw that

the Americans had deployed three lines, with the first two lines 500 yards apart, and the third line 1,000 yards behind that. They were using muskets, which I am sure you all know about. If you have ever fired a musket, you would be lucky to hit anything at 70 yards. So here they were 500 yards apart, not able to support each other in these three lines.

Robert Ross, the military commander, who had been persuaded by Cockburn on the march up, had been wavering and Cochrane had sent a message too, saying, 'I think, chaps, you might come back to the ships now'. Cockburn said, 'Don't be ridiculous, ignore the man's commands, Robert, we are not going to go back to the ships. We are going on to Washington'. It was Cockburn who kept driving Ross forward and telling him to ignore Cochrane's orders coming from the fleet back in the Patuxent river, that they should return to the ships. In the end, to be fair to Ross, he was behind the whole project and when they got to Bladensburg, he was going to beat the Americans and then he was going to burn Washington.

Well, they did beat the Americans. It was a ridiculous battle. There were some very brave American soldiers and some very fine units there. There was a wonderful chap called Joshua Barney, who fought very valiantly indeed with his flotillamen. But they were beaten. It was absurd – one line after another was wrapped up and rolled up, and Winder, this terrible chap, hopeless chap, the Brigadier who was in charge of the American army, kept on saying, 'Guys, don't fight, pull back because we cannot beat these Brits'.

The redcoats, of course, had fought their way through the Peninsula. These chaps had beaten the French who had won the battle of Austerlitz – they simply just tramped forward in their lines and the Americans had no idea what to do. It is understandable. Most of the American regulars, as I say, were up on the Canadian border. So the Americans effectively ran from Bladensburg. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say Bladensburg was one of the worst defeats in American history, very small scale compared to Vietnam, but nevertheless it was an awkward moment in American history.

The Canadians, I may say, were clapping on the sidelines and getting on with defending their own country very successfully, but they were not involved in this – it was a British operation. So the Americans were beaten and the British went down from Bladensburg. It was not really a great fight, apart from this little moment at the end, when Joshua Barney fought very valiantly.

And the Americans abandoned Washington. James Madison said to his wife, 'Dolley, you had better get out of the White House'. She said, 'Well, I have got the dinner on the table, because I assumed you were going to win this wretched battle. Dinner is all ready, for forty people, lovely damask tablecloths, silver candlesticks, madeira wine on the sideboard. I have got dinner all ready for your successful Cabinet coming home and the military commanders and now you tell me I have got to leave the White House?' He said, 'Yes, yes, you had better get out.' And so she said, 'Well, I tell you what, I will just take the picture of George Washington (a very fine picture by Gilbert Stuart) off the wall of the dining room', which she did successfully. It took her some time and she took a risk waiting to get this picture off the wall and getting it onto a cart. Then she told the servants to clear off and off she went across the Potomac and James Madison also went across the Potomac, abandoning the capital.

He was only the second President in American history to be a fugitive in his own country. The other one was George Bush Jr, if you remember, when al-Qaeda attacked the Pentagon, and it

was thought unwise for him to go back to the White House and so he was pulled off to an airbase somewhere in the Midwest, I think

There was the White House, there was Congress, in rode Ross with his horse, just coming up to Congress, when suddenly, bang - his horse was killed under him. Some clot had gone and fired at the British Commander's horse from a nearby house, so Ross said, 'Right, I want that house burned to the ground and the people inside killed and then I want Congress burned'. And Cockburn said, 'Well, good for you, Robert, excellent fellow, that is the stuff, that is what you need to do with these wretched Americans'.

So the house was burned down and everyone in it killed. The house has been rebuilt actually, a beautiful Georgian house very near to Congress. And then they went on to Congress, burned Congress, burned the Library of Congress, never mind the books. It was a case of 'come on, let's go for it, just hit the Americans, make it hurt'.

There were some Brits at the time, even on Ross' own staff, who objected. Harry Smith on Ross' staff said, 'What we are doing is barbaric'. When he got home to England, Sam Whitbread, the sort of Tony Benn figure in Parliament, said, 'Even the Goths did not do this in Rome'. So there were people scratching their heads a bit about the burning of Congress and certainly over the burning of the Library of Congress. But they did it, and Cockburn and Ross took the view 'to hell with all fuss and palaver and moral qualms, we have been told to give these people a good drubbing. Now for the White House, up Pennsylvania Avenue'.

Incidentally, Washington at this time was a village. It was only really finished in 1800, and there was hardly anything there, lots of shacks and these two fantastic buildings, jewels of the Renaissance. Congress was a beautiful building, much the same building it is today, although smaller, and the White House was a magnificent building, as it is today.

They marched up to the White House, door flapping, no one there, in they went, lovely smell from the dining room. So they went in, they sat down to dinner at the table and they ate it and it was great. Cockburn raised his glass and said, 'I give you 'Down with Madison and peace with America!' and they all tucked in, drunk the President's wine and had a lovely time. Then Ross and Cockburn said, 'Right, chairs on the table, and burn it down'. So after their meal, in good British fashion, they then put the chairs on the table and they burned the White House.

Now mercifully there was a storm the next day. The White House was burned on 24th August and on 25th August, there was a huge storm, and the flames were dowsed and the walls survived. The interior, all the partitions and curtains and so forth were absolutely knocked out, but the exterior walls survived.

Madison and his wife had a terrible time trying to get refuge on the nights of the 24th and 25th, and the Americans were absolutely appalled at what had happened. I mean, wouldn't you be? The army literally more or less scuttling before the British, the capital occupied and burned. It was a humiliating moment for the Americans, many of them watching from Georgetown, just down the road. They were watching this happen and seeing the flames of their own public buildings. The British also burned down the War Department, the Treasury and the State Department, just for fun. They were very clear about burning public buildings and not private buildings. For example, the

Patent Office, where the very brave William Thornton, the Patent Office superintendent, came out and persuaded the British not to burn it down on the grounds that patents were private possessions.

So that was it. The British pulled out of Washington, the President went back two days later and George Cockburn said, 'Right, what shall we do next?' And Ross said, 'Well I think we will go back to the ships'. He was the army commander after all and Admiral Cochrane was saying, 'Well done chaps, back to the ships, in spite of my doubts about it, it has been great success and I must say, I do admire what you've done'. Cockburn said, 'What are you talking about? Thirty miles north east of here is Baltimore. Baltimore is a much more powerful, wealthy, serious, populated city than Washington, although Washington is obviously a symbol. But Baltimore is a serious target. All we have got to do is march a couple of days up to Baltimore and wham, burn it down too and pinch a lot of money.'

But Ross and Cochrane said 'I think, back to the ships, let's talk about it' and so they did. They went back to the ships and that gave the people of Baltimore, a contrasting gang of people from those in Washington, a chance to get the place sorted out.

And here is the other big hero, General Sam Smith. Joshua Barney, as I have mentioned, fought very valiantly at Bladensburg. General Sam Smith was the military commander in Maryland and Baltimore, and he was quite clear that he was not going to let the British do in Baltimore what they had done in Washington. He put trenches out, he got about 20,000 militia together – they had only had 6,000 in Washington – and put them on the heights of eastern Baltimore. He made sure the fort at Fort McHenry, at the entrance to the small inner harbour at Baltimore, a key fort, was well fortified, with guns all ready to fire. A great chap called George Armistead was the commander of Fort McHenry. These chaps were serious soldiers. They were old warriors. Smith had fought in the War of Independence.

And along came the British. They had decided by this time to accept George Cockburn's advice, but three weeks later. That was the trouble - Baltimore had had time to get ready. They turned up and they landed and Cochrane took his ships up and started bombarding Fort McHenry and Ross took his army up and started approaching from the east side.

Well, Ross was killed. He was leading his men from the front and an American rifleman killed him. And that was a bit of a shock. Arthur Brooke took over, who was nothing like as charismatic a figure as Ross. But Cockburn was there at Brooke's side, saying, 'Go on, let's go, keep going, keep going, sad to lose Ross, but you are good lad, Arthur, we will get there, we will make it' and so they marched on and they got to the edge of Baltimore. They found themselves facing a huge army on the American side in terms of numbers, although they were mostly militia, and they found Fort McHenry was not being suppressed by the bombardment from Cochrane's ships. They could not destroy Fort McHenry. It was a very clever fort, a Vaubanesque fort, built like a pyramid with no vertical walls to knock down and make breaches. Terrific fort. It is still there today and you can see it exactly as it was.

The Americans hoisted a huge great flag over Fort McHenry, 40 feet by 30 feet, a great big banner, a wonderful thing. It gave a great big morale boost to the people of Baltimore and also to the soldiers in the fort. The fort survived the bombardment, which was horrific. There were flares, there were rockets, there were mortar bombs, about three or four Americans died, but the fort survived and

Armistead's defence of it was very successful. The American army was again beaten at the battle of North Point, and they retreated, but of course, they had huge reserves guarding the heights above Baltimore.

Cochrane, the Task Force commander, sent a message to Cockburn and Brooke, saying, 'Look, I think we can't really support you, I cannot get into the inner harbour, I cannot get passed this fort, I think we should just call this thing off. It is up to you, if you want to go ahead, but I really think you would be unwise'. Cockburn said to Brooke, 'Look, we can do it, we can do a night attack, we can defeat Baltimore, we can burn it down, we can be in there tomorrow'. But Brooke said, 'I think we will just have a second thought about that and I must talk to my commanders and see what they say'. Cockburn knew the game was up then. The commanders again scratched their heads and said 'I think, Arthur, probably it might be unwise - we are completely outnumbered. We have done good things in Washington, let's just go home.'

The British pulled out and the following morning after the all-night bombardment suddenly came to an end, a young American poet and lawyer, Francis Scott Key, who had been watching all this from a nearby American ship and had thought, 'Well, it will soon all be over. The Union Jack will be up there tomorrow morning, It was nice seeing that fine Stars and Stripes the night before, but I think the Brits will be flying their flag in the morning. It will all be over and Baltimore will go the way of Washington'. But he looked, strained his eyes, by jove, the Stars and Stripes was still there! So he took a bit of paper from his pocket and a pencil and he started writing a nice poem:

'Oh, say can you see, by the dawn's early light
What so proudly we hailed at the twilight's last gleaming'

And he took it home to the pub and the Americans in Baltimore said, 'That's a nice poem, we will set it to music.' So they got hold of a British drinking song called *To Anacreon in Heaven* and they set this poem to it and they started singing it. Interestingly, it took 115 years for it to become the American national anthem, in 1931. *Hail, Columbia* had been a great national anthem in the 19th century, so it took a long time. It is an extraordinarily evocative song – and we Brits inspired it!

So that is the story. This extraordinary episode, it was all over, they pulled out, they left Baltimore, they went off and then they went and attacked New Orleans. It was a tragic story – there was the Battle of Plattsburg which the Americans won, the Battle of New Orleans they won. It was a disastrous British defeat at New Orleans. The war was very much tit for tat: one side won one battle, one side won another. In many ways, the Americans did pretty well to do as well as they did against this most powerful nation.

Canada was a total failure. On Christmas Eve 1814, they signed a peace, the Peace of Ghent. Neither side gained anything from the other. Both sides recognised it was a futile war – why on earth were either side fighting it - and from then on, things only got better and better until we found ourselves fighting on the same side in 1917.

But I think the most disgraceful thing about the Peace of Ghent in many ways was the way that Britain abandoned the Red Indians, the First Nations, the indigenous people of America. They had been on our side fighting the Americans, obviously terrified and understandably so, by the American expansion westwards to Ohio, Illinois, Michigan. The British were very much on their side and very

much committed in the negotiations at Ghent to secure Indian rights in any peace that followed. They completely abandoned that commitment. When the Peace of Ghent was signed, the Indian commitments were just shoved to one side, and so we deserted our allies, people like Tecumseh, a very fine Indian chief, who had fought very powerfully with us and the Canadians against the Americans and that was disgraceful. I would love to know what you think about all that. It was something we abandoned and so of course, the Midwest was wide open to American expansion.

There it is. I think it is a fascinating story. It was clearly the low point in American-British relations and things have only got better since then. Americans talk about it as a Second War of Independence, which seems to me to be nonsense. It was not about independence. There was never the slightest intention by Britain of reoccupying or trying to reoccupy America. It was about trying to stop the Americans fighting this rather futile, rather foolish war in many ways, and rather tragic.

But there are, in this story, all sorts of fascinating bits and pieces, which I will not go into now, because I have run out of time, but you will find them in the book. I will end now. Thank you very much.

THE ARAB SPRING: CAN BRITAIN PIECE IT BACK TOGETHER?

Transcript of a lecture given by the Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP

15th July 2014

Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP *was appointed Minister of State for International Development in May 2010. He has been the Conservative MP for Rutland and Melton since 1992. After graduating from Oxford, Alan worked with Shell International between 1979 and 1981, and then as an oil trader for Marc Rich and Co from 1982 to 1988. Between 1988 and 1992, he was an independent consultant and adviser to foreign governments, specialising in oil supplies, shipping and refining. In 1989, he set up the independent Harcourt Consultants to advise on oil and gas matters, and has specialised in the Middle East for 30 years. Alan held a number of roles in the Shadow Cabinet before being appointed Minister of State for International Development.*

Michael, thank you. I think Henry Kissinger was once introduced with the sentence: 'This is a man who needs no introduction'. He said, 'You're quite right, I need no introduction, but no one enjoys one more than I do'! Thank you for such a comprehensive launch for what you have dignified with the title of a lecture, but given the busy-ness of the last couple of days and the reshuffle last night, I feel a bit like a school boy who has not quite done all the homework that he should have done.

But I have concluded four years as a DFID minister and I would like to draw on that experience and my longer experience travelling around the Gulf in particular, just to give you a canter over the region to share my thoughts. And then, because there are many former Ambassadors and experts present who have specialisms in greater depth than I do, perhaps we can have some questions and discussions about the individual countries I am going to mention.

I have entitled it *'The Arab Spring: Can Britain Piece It Together?'*, a rather pretentious title, I am afraid, as if to suggest that Britain can do anything these days in the region with sufficient authority and clout. But in a way, that in itself answers part of the question and explains a world that has changed since the days when we did have such influence and were drawing lines on the map, which are still causing so much difficulty today.

It's Humpty Dumpty: the map is very much shattered and somewhat scrambled and I think piecing together again what we have enjoyed in the past is going to be nigh on impossible. Indeed, 13 or 14 years ago when Michael was Shadow Foreign Secretary and I was his deputy, we could travel the region and meet people who had been there a long time and there was a certain stability of structure and power which has been completely shattered in many areas over the last few years. We met the likes of Arafat and Mubarak and Ariel Sharon and perhaps a lot of the debate has not changed even if the people have, but certainly the pressures inside all of the countries which we visited has most definitely changed, and I think the future for many of them is going to be very unpredictable.

But let me start by saying what I think the fulcrum is, in terms of what is right and what is wrong

in the region, and that has to focus on the Arab-Israeli dispute. To many people, this is the origin of double standards across the world in the actions of foreign policy. It is a source of widespread moral indignation, which is certainly not being allayed at the moment.

My starting point in everything I say is this: this is not about process, it is, above all, about principle. It is about what is right and what is wrong and the continued gradual annexation of someone else's land is wrong and that has to be the starting point of all understanding in the region in my view. So now that I am free and no longer a minister, this is something that you will hear more from me, I predict.

Let me just look then at the phenomenon which we perhaps again rather arrogantly have chosen to label the 'Arab Spring' as if we are entitled to define the phenomenon from where we sit. It is a phenomenon which is deeply complicated and different in each and every single country. But, I suppose, stepping back and looking at it, it had different characteristics in different countries.

In the GCC countries in particular, it could perhaps be described as a 'youthquake' where young people in countries which are relatively rich compared with the others do not have jobs, but they do have very high expectations and an attitude of entitlement which they feel is being unmet by their leaders. It was a phenomenon of much deeper economic and political malaise elsewhere. The difference has been that in the GCC, there were enough resources to be able to buy off trouble, albeit things got pretty hairy in Bahrain.

But looking at the non-GCC countries, you are looking at much deeper mayhem and of course consequent regime change, which is leading to what could eventually turn out to be near contagion, if not contagion. As of today, looking at the likes of Iraq and even some of the other countries I want to talk about, it is fair to say that almost anything could happen.

So, if you will allow me, I am just going to canter across the countries that have been affected, with a few little vignettes. I am not pretending that I am giving you a deep and comprehensive analysis of each, but I just want to give a flavour of how I think all of this can be seen to be pieced together. Strangely perhaps, one of the paradoxes of this phenomenon is that the country where it all started, Tunisia, is the one which has faded away most from the news and can almost be parked to one side.

Libya, on the other hand, where the United Kingdom government played a significant part in bringing down Muammar Gaddafi and where I played my own part in trying to make sure the Benghazi end got their oil in and out and the Gaddafi end did not, has not switched into the great resource-based idyll perhaps even I optimistically thought it could.

I have been there a few times as a DFID minister, and as a former oil trader, the picture is grim. What should be exports of 1.65 million barrels a day is jogging along at about 200,000 barrels a day and you have got this triangular problem, which is that the economy needs the oil, the politicians need the money from the oil, but to get the oil in the first place, you need the security which comes with strong politicians and none of this is cohering yet in a way which is leading to the revenues which are necessary for cohesive government.

When I was there two weeks ago, they were actually very optimistic, thinking that within a matter of two or three months, they could get production up to 600,000 or 700,000 or even 800,000

barrels. Indeed, there are two ports which have recently opened towards the eastern end, Marsa Al Hariga and Es Sider, but whether this is going to lead to the early increase in produced volume is another matter. You need engineers and a lot of those expat engineers have left.

The politics is very vexed. They have gone through a number of Prime Ministers. I saw Prime Minister al-Thani and he is doing his very best and I think we can place some hope in the fact that the envoys who have been appointed, Jonathan Powell, and David Satterfield for the Americans, are two figures who I think are going to have significant influence over the government. And if, notwithstanding Khalifa Haftar's buccaneering efforts around Benghazi, they can piece together a government which is more effective, then if the resources do flow, there is yet hope.

In terms of what the UK is doing, we are doing our bit. We have a £62.5 million security, justice and defence programme, which at the moment has got hundreds of Libyans being trained in Bassingbourn and without those underpinning characteristics of a government, there is no hope, so I hope at least that we as the UK are doing something to piece together the jigsaw of government. Watch carefully, however, the Egyptians just getting anxious about the eastern border. One has to hope that nothing erupts there, but there were mutterings of dangers when I was there.

Moving on to Egypt, it is, of course, pivotal: in terms of population, the origins of Arab nationalism and everything else. It is also the country which the likes of the UAE are watching very carefully as they fear the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood moving more to their own backyard, hence a very close link now between Mohammed bin Zayid and General Sisi to find a coincidence of interests in wanting to expunge extremist elements affecting both countries.

I think it is true to say that we made a mistake. We were too quick to say good riddance to Mubarak and too quick to believe that at the flick of a switch, democracy could appear overnight in a country like Egypt. This was naïve and it has cost us in terms of our reputation in the wider Gulf and has needed quite a lot of repair work for us to restore our reputation as people who understand the region.

But crucially, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Morsi, and Morsi's victory has galvanised vitriolic anxiety about radicalism more widely across the region. It has meant, with General Sisi coming in, let's admit it, that Egypt is once again a security state. What will be interesting will be to see how a failing economy can be handled by General Sisi, particularly when he has just removed all fuel subsidies and prices have gone up - how will he marry order with economic unhappiness? Let's watch that one very closely.

Yemen. I have been going to Yemen for thirty years. I bought their first exported cargo of oil in 1986, did quite well, went back for more, but it has meant that I have had an abiding interest in the country, which coincidentally has been one of my main responsibilities in DFID. It is the one country which has actually had a relatively peaceful transition. The GCC initiative, assisted by Jamal Benomar from the UN, has actually been effective in removing Ali Abdullah Saleh and bringing in his deputy, President Hadi, with whom I have developed very close relations over the last year. We, helped by DFID, have seen them have a national dialogue, which has tried to bring together all the competing factions to agree what the political future should be.

They are now going through some constitutional drafting, but the real truth is that the security

backdrop is pretty dire, with al-Qaeda in the south, the extremist elements of Al-Islah causing President Hadi no end of grief, but crucially and dramatically over the last two weeks, the advance of the Shia Houthis from the north to the edge of Baghdad, even taking `Amran and the whole of the 3-10 battalion and all their weaponry, which is now of course in their hands and can be used.

Donor funds have been pledged, but they have not been dispersed. Too much administrative chaos, but with Hadi going to Saudi Arabia last week and getting a promise of $2 billion, there is a chance that when that is combined with the IMF package that is on offer, there can be a significant degree of economic reform, which can remove fuel subsidies which consume over a third of the national budget, but which mostly go into the hands of rich smugglers and can use perhaps $300 or $400 million to soften the blow of fuel subsidy reform and rebalance the economy, so there is an element of hope, but next week will be the key to see whether this economic package can be banked.

Moving on to Syria, it is the most insoluble and complex issue I have ever seen in the region and I defy anyone to think that they have a straightforward solution to the problem. I most certainly do not. Whereas it might have started with an element of goodies v. baddies with the regime as the baddies and the moderate rebels as goodies, nothing now is so simple and it is so entwined and includes so many extremist elements in urban civil war, disentangling the Syrian conflict is nigh on impossible at the moment and of course, the knock-on effects to Jordan and Lebanon are severe.

That is why the UK has spent $1 billion, the largest humanitarian intervention ever, on the Syrian problem, half of it inside Syria, half of it on refugees in Lebanon and Jordan. This is going to continue, but will do so in the face of very severe donor fatigue, where I fear the needs of Syrian refugees are not going to be met by the international community for very much longer, particularly as other problems, be they Gaza, Iraq or anything else, are growing.

In Iraq, my view – I will be interested to hear yours – is that it is only just beginning. Maliki has been irresponsibly provocative with his sectarian divisiveness. The country is disintegrating at least into three, the ISIL threat is real and advancing, something Michael warned people about as much as two years ago, but nobody listened.

Although Kurdistan may have more autonomy and more confidence, a problem remains about whether the world community will look upon people who purchase their oil as doing so legally or not, and so the commercial tidiness of this division and oil ownership remains a mess and there are 650,000 displaced people. So the problem that was Syria has now spread into Iraq.

While Iran, the bogeyman for so many years, is semi-rehabilitated. I think Oman's brokering, particularly with the United States, has been very adept. The Sultan takes a very long-term view about Iran. He looks across the narrow straits and knows that they are a well-resourced, potentially much richer neighbour and is wise to try to consider what his country can do with them in a long-term strategic relationship. And yet Iran is still causing difficulty in Lebanon and Yemen and given that the nuclear deal is as yet inconclusive, it is not yet near being a fully welcome member of the international community.

There are other problems. There are deep ructions within the GCC. What in the face of it over many years has looked liked a happy club really has some pretty scratchy and unhappy relationships now within it. To many, particularly the UAE, Qatar is the bogeyman. We have seen the arrest of two

Qataris, supposedly for spying. A lot of these relationships are very fractious. Saudi Arabia was none too pleased with the Sultan of Oman's negotiations with and on behalf of the Iranians, so the happy, tidy family which perhaps casual observers of the Gulf States think is the case, is, in my view, far from the truth.

So I think what we have seen in the so-called Arab Spring is a number of phases. We have had the balance of regime change and within the GCC, the bolstering of existing regimes. We have seen the increasing awareness of that underlying and continuous threat which has always existed, but has come much more to the fore, the fight and the hatred between Sunni and Shia. We have begun to see the disintegration of some of these young nation states and we have now come, if not full circle, at least into a new phase where perhaps it is true to say that for some of them, my enemy's enemy is my friend, even to the point where the Saudis are backing the Shias in Baghdad.

So let's just go back to where I started, which is the Arab-Israeli conflict. We in DFID, I in particular, were arguing a year ago that Gaza was going to explode, that it was going to run out of power, water, food and therefore patience. What goes on in Gaza makes it almost uninhabitable, and to see rockets firing is deplorable. It is also very stupid and Hamas are at their weakest, so this is the most idiotic tactic they could ever deploy, but unfortunately its effect has been to pull the moral rug from under the broader Palestinian cause, which I deeply regret, because in my view, they do have a moral cause.

In terms of the UK, we will continue to support the Palestinian Authority. We have made a significant contribution to stabilising and maintaining Yemen and keeping it from collapse. We have ploughed massive resources into Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. It is all good stuff, but the honest truth if I am to answer the question put at the beginning of the lecture is that it is of limited strategic impact. Perhaps I can just conclude by reading two paragraphs which explain the dilemma we are going to have to wrestle with over the coming months and years. And it goes as follows:

> *'Our capacity to craft a coherent Middle East security policy is becoming increasingly difficult because of the complexity of the cross-currents in the region. We are trying to advance the Peace Process against the backdrop of the proscribed Hamas in a Palestinian unity authority and the egregious Israeli settlement policy; to reconcile with Tehran on the nuclear issue while trying to thwart its regional ambitions; to support the Shia government in Iraq on the basis it is democratically elected, although it has been self-defeatingly sectarian, while helping to overthrow the Shia government in Syria, although both regimes are critically dependent on their close relationship with Iran.*
>
> *At the same time, we are supporting the Sunni Gulf monarchies, quite rightly, and the Sunni opponents of Assad, but only those Sunni elements we deem moderate, because the more extremist Sunnis are among those now threatening Baghdad and our Gulf allies, although some are funded by the Gulf States themselves. These same extremists will pursue international jihad which will constitute a direct threat to ourselves, not least by contributing to radicalisation within our own domestic security arena.*
>
> *Sadly, many of those with democratic credentials have proved to be illiberal because they simply have viewed electoral victory as an opportunity for 'winner takes all' and the suppression of opposition. Conversely, illiberal regimes begin to be perceived as having historically given*

a better deal to secularists, to minorities and women among others, than most current so-called democratic alternatives. The democratic so-called governments of Morsi and Maliki proved to be sectarian, discriminatory, divisive and incompetent, while the autocratic governments of Sisi and the Gulf monarchies will only permit narrowly defined political participation or dissent.

However, the latter group hold the key to Suez security, to peace with Israel, stability in Jordan, the livelihoods of 200,000 UK expatriates, the fight against extremist Islam and also energy price stability and global energy access.´

So put all that in the pot and clearly our work is not yet done.

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GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM EVENTS IN 2013-2014

9th October 2013	Seminar on *'China In The 21st Century: Changing The Face Of Global Power And Economics – Implications For The World And The UK'* in the House of Lords, co-chaired by **Lord Lothian**, Chairman of Global Strategy Forum, and the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2010-2012). The following speakers took part: **Isabel Hilton OBE**, Founder and Editor of www.chinadialogue.net; **Nigel Inkster CMG**, Director of Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS; **Jonathan Paris**, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council; the **Hon Kevin Rudd**, Prime Minister of Australia (2007-2010; 2013); **Lord Sassoon**, Chairman, China-Britain Business Council (2013-) and Commercial Secretary, HM Treasury (2010-2013); **Sir David Tang KBE**, Entrepreneur, businessman, founder of the China Club and Shanghai Tang; **Professor Odd Arne Westad**, Professor of International History, LSE and Director of LSE IDEAS; and **Roderic Wye**, Associate Fellow, Chatham House and Head, Asia Research Group, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2002-2011).
23rd October 2013	Lecture on *'The Sahel – Terror Averted Or Just Postponed?'* by the **Rt Hon Stephen O'Brien MP**, Prime Minister's Envoy & UK Special Representative to the Sahel.
30th October 2013	Lecture on *'Governments And Technology: Does It Have To Be Quite This Difficult?'* by **Robert Hayes**, Senior Fellow of the Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology in Governments.
6th November 2013	Panel Discussion on *'The Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit: A New Milestone In EU History?'*, co-chaired by **Lord Lothian** and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**, Foreign Secretary (2001-2006) and GSF Advisory Board member. The following speakers took part: **Valery Dougan**, Senior Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Belarus; **His Excellency Mr Iulian Fruntaşu**, Ambassador of Moldova; **His Excellency Mr Fakhraddin Gurbanov**, Ambassador of Azerbaijan; **Tamara Kapanadze**, Chargé d'Affaires, Embassy of Georgia; **His Excellency Mr Volodymyr Khandogiy**, Ambassador of Ukraine; **Ara Margarian**, Chargé d'Affaires, Embassy of the Republic of Armenia; and **Her Excellency Mrs Asta Skaisgirytė-Liauškienė**, Ambassador of Lithuania.
19th November 2013	Lecture on *'A Turkish Perspective On International Relations And The Challenges And Opportunities Facing Turkey'* by **His Excellency Mr Ünal Çeviköz**, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
27th November 2013	Energy Security Expert Review co-hosted with the Windsor Energy Group in the House of Lords and co-chaired by **Lord Lothian** and the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**.

10th December 2013	Lecture on *'Do We Have The Rights To Optimism? Capitalism And The Next Wave Of Growth'* by **Leo Johnson**, Co-Founder of Sustainable Finance Ltd (now a part of the PwC Group) and Visiting Fellow of the Smith School of Enterprise & Environment, Oxford University.
21st January 2014	Lecture on *'Is The Middle East Imploding?'* by the **Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP**, Foreign Office Minister responsible for the Middle East (May 2010-October 2013).
4th February 2014	Seminar on *'Serbia/Kosovo: The Brussels Agreements And Beyond'* in the House of Lords, co-hosted with South East Studies at Oxford (SEESOX), and chaired by **Lord Lothian**. The following speakers took part: **Dr Othon Anastasakis**, Director, European Studies Centre and SEESOX, St Antony's College, Oxford; **Professor Richard Caplan**, Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford; **Dr James Ker-Lindsay**, Eurobank EFG Senior Research Fellow on the Politics of South East Europe, LSE; **Sir David Madden KCMG**, former British Ambassador, and Chair of the Development Committee of SEESOX.
11th February 2014	Lecture on *'Downton versus Daring: Can Cultural Influence Be A Substitute For Britain's Declining Hard Power?'* by **Sir Martin Davidson KCMG**, CEO of the British Council, chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC**, First Sea Lord (2002-2006), Minister with responsibility for Security, Home Office (2007-2010) and GSF Advisory Board member.
25th February 2014	Debate on *'After The Parliamentary Vote On Syria - The End Of British Military Intervention?'* with **John Baron MP**; **Jeremy Browne MP**; and **Gisela Stuart MP**.
18th March 2014	Panel discussion on *'Refugee Voices From The Occupied Palestinian Territory (oPt): A Forgotten Perspective?'* chaired by the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**, Foreign Secretary (2001-2006) and GSF Advisory Board member, with Palestine Refugee representatives from the West Bank, **Mohammed al Korshan**, **Nabil al-Kurd** and **Mohammed Abu Srour**; and **Michael Schoiswohl**, Acting Senior Protection Coordinator, UNRWA; and **Nicola Harrison**, Operations Support Officer, UNRWA.
25th March 2014	Lecture on *'What Really Drives The Middle East And North Africa Today: Religion Or Politics Or Both - And What Next?'* by **Sir Dominic Asquith KCMG**, British Ambassador to Libya (2011-2012) and British Ambassador to Egypt (2007-2011).
1st April 2014	Debate on *'Afghanistan: 'Mission Accomplished'?'* with **Sir Robert Fry KCB CBE**; **Rory Stewart OBE MP**; and **Caroline Wyatt**, BBC Defence Correspondent.

8th April 2014	Debate on *'Crisis in Ukraine, Crisis in Russian-Western Relations: What Next?'* with **Chris Bryant MP**, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Minister for Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2009-2010); **Olexiy Solohubenko**, News and Deployments Editor at the BBC World Service; **Andrew Wilson**, Sky News Presenter; and **Sir Andrew Wood GCMG**, British Ambassador to Russia (1995-2000).
30th April 2014	Debate on *'Sense And Sensibility: Security And Freedom - Are They Mutually Exclusive?'* with the **Rt Hon Hazel Blears MP**, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (2007–2009); member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament; and **Professor Sir David Omand GCB**, the first UK Intelligence and Security Coordinator and a former Director of GCHQ.
20th May 2014	Lecture on *'Turkey: Moving Forward Or Moving Backward?'* by **Sir David Reddaway KCMG MBE**, British Ambassador to Turkey (2009-2014).
17th June 2014	Debate on *'Four Years On: Is The Coalition Government's Foreign Policy Still Clear, Focused and Effective?'* with GSF Advisory Board members, the **Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell CH CBE QC MP**, Leader of the Liberal Democrats (2006-2007); the **Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC MP**, Foreign Secretary (1995-1997); and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**, Foreign Secretary (2001-2006); and chaired by **Lord Lothian**.
18th June 2014	Seminar on *'From Arab Oil Embargo To Crimean Sanctions: Energy Security Or Insecurity?'* co-hosted with the Windsor Energy Group in the House of Lords with **Professor Bill Arnold**, Professor in the Practice of Energy Management, Jones Graduate School of Business at Rice University in Houston, Texas; the **Honorable Steven Mann**, Senior Counsellor, International Government Relations, ExxonMobil; and **David L Wochner**, Partner, K&L Gates; and chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**.
19th June 2014	Debate on *'The Ukraine/Russia Crisis: Whatever Happened To Western Strategy?'* with **Sir Tony Brenton KCMG**, British Ambassador to Russia (2004-2008); **Robert Brinkley CMG**, British Ambassador to Ukraine (2002-2006); and **Sir Gerald Howarth MP**, Minister for International Security Strategy at the Ministry of Defence (2010-2012).
24th June 2014	Lecture on *'The Geostrategic Divide: An Undeclared War?'* by **Alastair Crooke**, Director and Founder of Conflicts Forum.
1st July 2014	Lecture on *'When Britain Burned The White House: The 1814 Invasion Of Washington'* by **Peter Snow**, journalist, author and broadcaster.

2nd July 2014	Debate on *'Whistleblowers, The Media And The Government: Who Is In The Right?'* with **Sir Simon Jenkins**, journalist, author and Chairman of the National Trust; and the **Rt Hon the Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC**, Minister with responsibility for security, Home Office (2007-2010) and GSF Advisory Board member.
15th July 2104	Lecture on *'The Arab Spring: Can Britain Piece It Back Together?'* by the **Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP**, Minister of State for International Development (2010-2014).

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM ADVISORY BOARD

Sir Menzies ('Ming') Campbell CH CBE QC MP is one of the most respected and successful politicians of his generation. He grew up in Glasgow, was educated at Hillhead High School and went on to the University of Glasgow. As a successful university level athlete Ming ran the 200m for the GB team at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and became captain of the UK Athletics Team 1965-66. He held the British 100m record from 1967 to 1974. He was called to the Scottish Bar as an Advocate in 1968 and appointed Queens Counsel in 1982. He became MP for North East Fife in 1987. In Parliament he was the Liberal Democrats Foreign Affairs Spokesman from 1997–2006. He has served on the Members' Interests (1987–1990), Trade and Industry (1990-1992) and Defence (1992-1999) Select Committees. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 2003 and elected Leader in March 2006–October 2007. He is currently a Member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee; and of the Intelligence & Security Committee; and Leader of the Delegation on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. In 2001 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate by the University of Glasgow and was given a Knighthood in the 2004 New Years Honours List. He became Chancellor of St Andrews University in April 2006. He was made a Companion of Honour in 2013.

Secretary William S. Cohen is Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a business consulting firm based in Washington, DC which provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board of CBS, and on the advisory boards of the US–India Business Council, the US-China Business Council and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the weekly World Affairs Contributor for CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organisation in the US with a budget of $300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as Secretary of Defense marked the first time in modern US history that a President chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the US Senate and three terms in the US House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine and received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College, and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or co-authored ten books – four non-fiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

Sir Evelyn de Rothschild is currently Chairman of E.L. Rothschild, a private investment company. He is Chairman of the ERANDA Foundation, a family foundation he founded in 1967 to support charities working in the fields of medical research, health and welfare, education and the arts. In addition, Sir Evelyn currently serves as a Governor Emeritus of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow of Imperial College London and is an Honorary Life President of Norwood and Ravenswood Children's Charity. From 1976 until 2003, Sir Evelyn was Chairman and CEO of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd, the international investment bank. From 1972 until 1989, Sir Evelyn also served as Chairman of the Economist Group, from 1977 to 1994 Chairman of United Racecourses Ltd and previously he served on the Board of Directors of De Beers and IBM UK as well as serving as Deputy Chairman of Milton Keynes Development Corporation, Chairman of St Mary's Hospital Medical School, Member of the Council of the Shakespeare Globe Trust and President of The Evelina

Children's Hospital Appeal. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1989 for services to banking and finance.

Susan Eisenhower is the CEO and Chairman of The Eisenhower Group, Inc, a Washington D.C. based consulting company founded in 1986. For more than 25 years the company has provided strategic counsel on business development, public affairs and communications projects. In addition to her work through EGI, Susan Eisenhower has also had a distinguished career as a policy analyst. She has also been a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics and a Distinguished Fellow at the Nixon Center, now called the Center for National Interest. She is Chairman Emeritus at the Eisenhower Institute of Gettysburg College. Over the years, she has served as a member of three blue ribbon commissions for the Department of Energy for three different secretaries: The Baker Cutler Commission on US Funded Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia; The Sununu-Meserve Commission on Nuclear Energy; and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which released its findings on a comprehensive program for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the winter of 2012. She was also appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control, where she served eight years. After as many years on the NASA Advisory Council, she served as a commissioner on the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. She is currently a member of MIT's Energy Initiative Advisory Board and co-chairman of NEAC, the Secretary of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Board. In addition, Ms. Eisenhower has done extensive work in executive training on strategic leadership. She has authored hundreds of op-eds for newspapers such as the Washington Post, the LA Times, appeared frequently on national television and radio, and her articles have appeared in such journals as the National Academy of Sciences' Issues in Science and Technology and the Naval Institutes' Proceedings. She has written four trade press books, two of which were on regional best seller lists, and she co-authored or co-edited four other books on international security issues.

Rt Hon Frank Field MP has served as Member of Parliament for Birkenhead since 1979. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Social Security Select Committee and continued in this role up to 1997. In that year he accepted the position of Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair's first government. He then served as a member of the Public Accounts Committee between 2002 and 2005. In 2010 he was appointed by the Prime Minister to lead the Independent Review on Poverty and Life Chances. Frank is also Vice-Chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation and last year chaired the Modern Slavery Bill Evidence Review.

Hüseyin Gün is a financier and managing director of Avicenna Capital. The firm invests in strategic sectors such as natural resources, financial services and energy, with a focus on emerging and frontier markets. The British-educated Gun has an Honours Degree in genetics. He began his career as a commodity trader and thereafter as a banker in Merrill Lynch and Credit Agricole Indosuez. He is an Executive Member of the International Advisory Board of the Global Strategy Forum, a leading London-based think tank, the Leaders Group of Britain's Conservative Party and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Gun is the founding board member of the Iraq Britain Business Council and founding trustee of the Omar Al-Mukhtar Foundation for Libya. He is the former chairman of the advisory board of the Global Fairness Initiative in Washington, D.C., a group that had former President Clinton as chairman of the board. He is the Honorary Ambassador of the Israeli Peace Initiative. He is an Executive Member of the International Advisory Board of West Asia North Africa Forum chaired by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan. In 2011, he published 'Creating A Middle East Economic Community', in which he argued for an aid programme rivalling the size of the Marshall Plan to be administered by Turkey and other regional actors.

Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford was born in January 1936 and educated at Eton. From 1954 to 1956 he was in the Armed Forces in the 2nd Btn Coldstream Guards. He went to King's College, Cambridge and studied Economics, graduating in 1959. His first job was in HM Treasury from 1959-60, after which he was a leader writer for the Daily Telegraph from 1960-64. In 1966 Lord Howell was elected MP for Guildford. He worked closely with both Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher and is credited by several authorities with having invented the idea of privatisation in the late 1960s. Lord Howell is the former Secretary of State for Energy, and later for Transport in Margaret Thatcher's first Cabinet (1979-83). He was Minister of State in Northern Ireland (1972-74) and has held several other Government posts. From 1987-97, he was Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. He was made a life peer in 1997 and was Shadow Spokesperson in the House of Lords on Foreign Affairs from 2000-2010. In May 2010, he was appointed Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a position he stepped down from on 4th September 2012 when he was appointed as personal adviser to the Foreign Secretary on Energy and Resource Security. Lord Howell is the author of several books, including the best-selling The Edge of Now, published in 2000. His most recent book, Old Links and New Ties: Power and Persuasion in an Age of Networks was published in October 2013. He also writes columns for The Japan Times, the International Herald Tribune and the Wall Street Journal.

Rt Hon Lord Lamont of Lerwick was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990 – 93 and Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Margaret Thatcher. He was a member of the House of Commons for 25 years. He was also a Minister in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector, several with Middle East involvement. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, President of the Economic Research Council and a former Chairman of Le Cercle (a foreign affairs think tank). He was made a Life Peer in July 1998. He is an Honorary Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.

Sir David Manning GCMG CVO was educated at Oriel College, Oxford and the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University before joining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1972. He served in Warsaw, New Delhi, Paris and Moscow. From 1994-5 he was Head of Policy Planning; from 1995-8 Ambassador to Israel; and from 1998-2000 he was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence and Intelligence and a member of the Foreign Office Board. He was the UK Permanent Representative at NATO (Brussels) from 2000-2001 before returning to London as Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (2001-2003). He was then Ambassador to the United States for four years from 2003-2007. Sir David is a Director of Gatehouse Advisory Partners; and a Non Executive Director of the BG Group, and of Lockheed Martin UK. He is also a Member of the Council of Lloyd's of London. He is Chair of 'Ideas' at the London School of Economics.

Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC MP was elected as MP for Pentlands in 1974, which he represented until 1997. In 1979, when the Conservatives were returned to power under Margaret Thatcher, Sir Malcolm was appointed a Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, at first in the Scottish Office and he was then transferred to the FCO, being promoted to Minister of State in 1983. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992, Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service. Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a MP in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea and he was elected as MP for Kensington in May

2010. He served as the Shadow Secretary of State for Work & Pensions and Welfare Reform until December 2005 when he chose to return to the backbenches. He was Chairman of the Standards & Privileges Committee 2009-2010 and UK representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (2010-2011); and he is Chairman, Intelligence and Security Committee (2010-).

Rt Hon Jack Straw MP has been the Member of Parliament for Blackburn since 1979. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice, appointed as part of Gordon Brown's first Cabinet. He has also served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007 under Tony Blair. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. He continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. His autobiography, Last Man Standing: Memoirs of A Political Survivor was published in September 2012. In October 2013, he announced that he would be standing down as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election.

HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal has been at the centre of Middle East Politics and for many decades in the course of which he has won exceptional respect. He is concerned inter alia with humanitarian and interfaith issues and the human dimension of conflicts. This is exemplified by his work with Partners in Humanity and his co-chairing of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. Amongst the well-nigh innumerable positions of HRH Prince Hassan of Jordan, he is President and Patron of the Arab Thought Forum and Moderator of the World Conference of Religion and Peace. His Royal Highness is a founder of the recently formed Parliament of Cultures, dedicated to fostering dialogue amongst philosophers, thinkers and those exercising power. HRH Prince Hassan is the author of seven books, which have been translated into several languages, including A Study on Jerusalem, Search for Peace, Palestinian Self-Determination and in 2004 in collaboration with Alain Elkann, To be a Muslim: Islam, Peace and Democracy.

Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG was Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence from 1998-2005. Before that he was Director of GCHQ. Previously his career spanned both defence and the diplomatic service, including UK /Turkish relations; NATO; UK/US relations; and strategic nuclear policy and programmes. He is now engaged in business, academia and advice to Government. He is a Non Executive Director of Smiths Group Plc, and a Senior Adviser to URS Corporation, Hewlett Packard, Finmeccanica and the Minister for Trade and Investment. He is a Visiting Professor at Queen Mary, London University, a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United services Institute, and sits on the Advisory Board of the Institute for Security Science and Technology at Imperial College.

Admiral The Right Honourable Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC DUniv joined the Navy in 1965. He spent the majority of his naval career at sea, serving in fourteen different ships and commanding three of them. He is a graduate of the Royal Naval Staff Course, the Higher Command and Staff Course and The Royal College of Defence Studies. In 1980 he took command of the frigate HMS ARDENT taking her south to the Falkland Islands in 1982 where she was sunk in their successful recapture. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action and led the Victory Parade through the City of London. He has held several appointments in the Ministry of Defence in the Plans, Programmes and Policy areas plus three years as head of Naval Intelligence and three years as Chief of Defence Intelligence covering the Kosovo War. He was promoted to Admiral in November 2000 when he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet, NATO

Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic and NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces North. He led the United Kingdom's maritime response to 9/11 including the invasion of Afghanistan. He became First Sea Lord in September 2002 and the First and Principal Aide-de-Camp to HM The Queen. He inspired and organized the Trafalgar Bicentennial Year and led the Navy during its crucial and successful role in the initial invasion of Iraq. He retired as First Sea Lord on 7 February 2006 becoming Chairman of the QinetiQ Defence Advisory Board. He advised both Conservatives and Labour on defence and foreign policy before, in July 2007, being asked by Gordon Brown to join the Government as one of the GOATs (Government of All The Talents) responsible for national security and counterterrorism as well as cyber and Olympic security. He produced the United Kingdom's first ever National Security Strategy and Cyber Security strategy as well as formulating a series of other groundbreaking strategies. He was Chairman of The National Security Forum. He left government in May 2010 and is currently a strategic advisor to a number of small companies, a motivational speaker, Chancellor of Southampton Solent University, Naval Trustee of the Imperial War Museum, Chairman of the Cadet Vocational Qualification Organisation plus a number of other appointments. Lord West was made a Knight Commander of the Order of The Bath in 2000, Knight Grand Cross in 2004, Baron in 2007 and a Privy Councillor in 2010.

Christopher Wilkins is currently chairman of North British Windpower, a privately owned company developing renewable energy in Scotland. Previously he was the architect and first chairman of Hakluyt & Co, an information gathering company. Before that he established and ran his own company in the paper industry, which he then sold. He was a member of the Scottish Economic Council for ten years. He has also worked in the newspaper industry and prior to that he served in the army for eight years – including some active service in the Middle East.

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

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Alastair Crooke and Lord Lothian

Rt Hon Sir Alan Duncan MP and Lord Lothian

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