GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

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## Lecture Series

## 2012 - 2013

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Rt Hon Jack Straw MP and Lord Lothian

Dr Alexander Yakovenko and Lord Lothian

Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford and Lord Lothian

US election debate panellists

Syria debate panellists

Sir Nigel Sheinwald and Lord Lothian

Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles and Sir Malcolm Rifkind

Sir David Manning and Lord Lothian

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## President

**Johan Eliasch** is the first President of Global Strategy Forum. He has served as Chairman of the Management Board of Head N.V. (the global sporting goods group) and Group Chief Executive Officer since September 1995. He is Chairman of Equity Partners, London Films, Co-Chairman of Cool Earth, non-executive Chairman of Investcorp Europe and non-executive director of CV Starr Underwriting Agents. He is an advisory board member of Brasilinvest, Societe du Louvre, the Centre for Social Justice, and a member of the Mayor of London's and Rome's International Business Advisory Council. He is Patron of Stockholm University and a trustee of the Kew Foundation. He was part of the Conservative Shadow Foreign Office team as special advisor on European Affairs (1999-2003) and responsible for foreign relations (2003-2005). He was Conservative Deputy Party Treasurer (2003-2007). He is the former Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the UK for Deforestation and Clean Energy (2007-2010).

## Chairman

**Lord Lothian** is the first Chairman of the Forum. Michael Lothian was first elected to Parliament as Michael Ancram in 1974. His political career included four years as the Political Minister in Northern Ireland responsible for the opening engagements with the IRA which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement, Chairman of the Conservative Party for three years, and four years as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Opposition. He remains involved in international conflict resolution. He co-founded Global Strategy Forum in 2006 and remains its Chairman. He was appointed to the House of Lords as a life peer in October 2010. He is a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

## Director

**Jacqueline Jinks** is the Director of Global Strategy Forum. She joined Global Strategy Forum as Research Director in June 2006 and became the Director in February 2008. From 1997-2005, she was Political Secretary and speechwriter to Lord Moynihan, a former Conservative Senior Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords. She worked for the Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP and the Rt Hon Francis Maude MP, during their respective tenures as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Prior to that, she worked for the Democratic National Committee (1996-1997) and CMA Consultants (1994-1996).

## Treasurer

**Adrian de Ferranti** was the founder of Ferranti Ltd, an early stage venture capital business. He was also a founder and/or Chairman of Tantus PLC, Cambridge Computer Graphics, Chelford PLC, and PTG. He had an early career at European Banking Company, Murray Johnstone, followed by Montgomery Securities. He is currently the Chairman, Director or investor in NEST, Same Wave, SMB, Ampair, Plasmanet, Updata, Ziani's, Como Lario, Ferranti Farming, and Small Business Bureau. He was the Chairman and Trustee of the Royal Institution of Great Britain from 2007 to 2010. From 2007-13 he was Chairman of the Foundation at Heriot Watt University. He was also a Treasurer of the Conservative Party from 1991 to 2004.

## PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD

THE FOUNDATION of Global Strategy Forum in 2006 coincided with a troubled time in Britain's external position. The Iraq and Afghan campaigns had both run into major difficulties with the result that far-reaching questions were being asked of British defence and foreign policy. The debate in London, however, was frustratingly circular. There were too many entrenched positions and captive opinions. It was Michael Lothian's and my view that we needed a fresh platform for debate from which we could explore new ideas and propose new solutions that went beyond those already under discussion in more conventional formats. So GSF was born.

This is the seventh annual collection of GSF lectures to which I have written the introduction. The easy claim to make would be that, in the years since our foundation, the choices facing British foreign and defence policy have become clearer or more attractive. This is hardly the case. After a decade of expeditionary warfare shaped by the deployments in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, we may be witnessing a decisive change in public opinion no less momentous than after the climactic Suez experience in 1956. Seen from London in October 2013, a gap appears to be opening between the traditional inclination of international relations experts to favour activist engagement and the wider parliamentary and public sentiment which seems content to hang back.

On issue after issue, it is no longer evident that we have a clear understanding of how best to calibrate our response or how to match our resources to our ambitions. In the Middle East, new actors are challenging the UK and other legacy powers. On Africa, we appear torn between regarding the continent as an emerging commercial bonanza or as a continuing humanitarian disaster. With regard to the likes of China, Russia, India and Latin America, a consistent British profile is proving elusive. Closer to home, the UK's fault lines with Europe have deepened, with the prospect of rupture no longer unthinkable.

This state of introspection and pause for reflection is hardly unique to the UK. In the US, similar currents underlie the foreign policy debate. While the US remains the single most powerful nation in the world, policymakers there are also having to contend with political and public opinion pressures that appear increasingly willing to question the post-World War II instinctive forward engagement on the part of the US. And in as far as this attitude continues at all, it seems to focus more on the Asia-Pacific region than on Europe.

These questions are exceptionally challenging. Of course, this underlines the vital necessity for a robust debate designed to set the stage for a new national consensus about Britain's place in the world. This is where I see Global Strategy Forum's essential contribution. Our aim is to test conventional wisdom by providing a forum which actively encourages truly fresh ideas that can help forge a new consensus about how the UK engages with the world beyond our shores.

My vision for GSF is thus ambitious. And also, I am confident, achievable. Over the seven years of its existence, there is much to take pride in. GSF has emerged as an active player in the international relations community where foreign affairs experts and concerned citizens can speak to each other. Our events series is now part of the foreign affairs conversation in London. This exceptional collection of lectures will, I feel certain, enhance GSF's well-established reputation as a unique venue for truly independent, expert and fearless examination of the foreign policy questions facing our country.

This would not be possible without the support we receive both from our speakers and from our members. As always, I must express my deep thanks to all our contributors, whose willingness to share their extensive knowledge and expertise continues to be central to GSF's success; and also to our membership, whose diverse views, questions and contributions are what make GSF a uniquely interactive and dynamic organisation. I would also like to thank our Advisory Board members, a list of whom can be found at the back of this publication, under whose guidance and leadership GSF has flourished.

As we begin our 2013-2014 season, I anticipate another lively and active events programme, characterised by the high-quality debate upon which GSF's reputation is founded and I look forward to working with all our supporters to this end.

**Johan Eliasch**
**President, Global Strategy Forum**
**October 2013**

## ABOUT GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM was founded by Lord Lothian (then the Rt Hon Michael Ancram MP) and Johan Eliasch in 2006 for the purpose of generating open debate and discussion on key foreign affairs, defence and international security issues. As an independent, non-party political, non-ideological organisation, GSF provides a platform to explore some of the more challenging and contentious aspects of UK foreign policy and to stimulate imaginative ideas and innovative thinking in a rapidly changing global landscape.

We aim to bring together those with a strong interest in international affairs and offer them the opportunity to exchange ideas and engage in informed debate. In accordance with our founding remit, we continue to work to build and strengthen the diverse and influential network of policymakers, practitioners and international affairs experts who meet under GSF's auspices. Through our publications and our website, we enable their expertise to be disseminated widely.

GSF's core activity consists of a regular lunchtime lecture and debate series on topical issues. For more in-depth discussion of specific topics, we host seminars in the House of Lords. We also hold small roundtable lunches and dinners on key issues of the day. Separately, as well as our annual compendium of lectures and the publication of the proceedings of our seminars, we also publish an occasional series both of monographs and collections of essays and articles by distinguished experts.

We are supported by a strong and active Advisory Board of MPs, Peers and experienced foreign and defence policy practitioners. We are delighted that this year, the Advisory Board has been joined by Sir Evelyn de Rothschild, the Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford and Sir Kevin Tebbit. We are also delighted to extend our congratulations to former Advisory Board member Senator Chuck Hagel, who was confirmed as US Secretary of Defense on 26th February 2013.

In 2012-2013, we held a record number of 14 lectures, with the following speakers taking part in our lecture series: the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**, Home Secretary (1997-2001), Foreign Secretary (2001-2006) and Justice Secretary (2007-2010) and GSF Advisory Board member; **His Excellency Dr Alexander Yakovenko**, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Court of St. James; the **Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford**, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2010-2012); **Sir Nigel Sheinwald**, British Ambassador to the United States (2007-2012); **Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles**, former Ambassador to Afghanistan (2007-2009) and the Foreign Secretary's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (2009-2010); **Sir David Manning**, British Ambassador to the United States (2003-2007); **Lord Hannay of Chiswick**, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations (1990-1995); **Major General Jonathan Shaw**, head of the Defence Cyber Security Programme at the Ministry of Defence (2011-2012); **General Peter Pace**, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2005-2007); **His Excellency Mr Daniel Taub**, Ambassador of the State of Israel to the Court of St James; **Stephen King**, Group Chief Economist & Global Head of Economics and Asset Allocation Research, HSBC Bank PLC; **Professor the Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield**, Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London; **Professor Christopher Coker**, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics; and **Dr Jamie Shea**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, NATO.

We have also held five debates over the past year on a number of topics including: US foreign policy

following the 2012 Presidential elections; the West's response to the crisis in Syria; the Middle East Peace Process; our annual review of the Coalition Government's foreign policy; and Western relations with Iran following the June 2013 elections.

Additionally, we have hosted five seminars, all of which took place in the House of Lords. These included:

- A round-table with the Israeli Peace Initiative, which took place on 30th October 2012 and which was co-chaired by **Lord Alderdice** and **Lord Lothian**.
- A seminar entitled `*Cyber Security: Meeting The Challenges, Combating The Threats*', which took place on 21st November 2012 and was co-chaired by **Professor Sir David Omand** (Visiting Professor, Department of War Studies, King's College) and GSF Advisory Board member, **Admiral the Rt Hon Lord West of Spithead** (Minister with responsibility for security, Home Office 2007-2010).
- A seminar entitled `*Pakistan - A State In Crisis: Regional Reality Or Western Narrative?*', which took place on 13th March 2013.
- A seminar entitled `*South East Europe: Revisiting Convergence - Diagnosis and Prognosis?*' This was co-hosted with SEESOX, the South East European Studies programme at Oxford and took place on 19th March 2013. It was co-chaired by **Lord Lothian** and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**.

As well as our annual compendium of lectures, we also published the proceedings of our 2012 seminar, `*One Year On: Turmoil And Transition – The Arab Uprisings And The Path Ahead*' during 2012-2013.

A full list of all our 2012-2013 events can be found on page 101.

Further information on all our activities and events, including audio transcripts, as well as pdfs of all our publications can be found at our website, www.globalstrategyforum.org.

## THE LECTURES

**Last Man Standing: The Foreign Office Years**
Rt Hon Jack Straw MP

**Russia's Foreign Policy In A Changing World**
His Excellency Dr Alexander Yakovenko

**Repositioning Britain In An Age Of Austerity: Are We Finding A Role At Last?**
Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford

**The Next Presidential Term: Pressures, Priorities And The Place Of Transatlantic Relations**
Sir Nigel Sheinwald GCMG

**None The Wiser: Reflections On Three Decades As A British Diplomat**
Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG LVO

**Obama's Second Term: Foreign Policy Priorities**
Sir David Manning GCMG CVO

**Britain's Quest For A Role: A Diplomatic Memoir From Europe To The UN**
Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG CH

**Whitehall's Strategic Deficit And Its Threat To Overseas Operations**
Major General Jonathan Shaw CB CBE MA

**Cyber Security: Global, National, Organizational And Personal Vulnerabilities**
General Peter Pace

**Horizon Scanning: Past, Present And Future**
Professor the Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield FBA

**Drones And The Future Of War**
Professor Christopher Coker

**Emerging Security Threats In The New Global Landscape: Is There A Role For NATO?**
Dr Jamie Shea

# LAST MAN STANDING: THE FOREIGN OFFICE YEARS

**Transcript of a lecture given by the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**

16th October 2012

**Jack Straw MP** *is Member of Parliament for Blackburn, which he has represented since first entering Parliament in 1979. His long career has included continuous Cabinet-level roles in Labour governments from 1997 through to 2010 and he has taken a leading part in many momentous political decisions in both national and international politics. He had a number of Shadow Cabinet roles before becoming Home Secretary after the Labour Party's 1997 election victory, and then Foreign Secretary in 2001 and Leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal in 2006. He served as Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice from 2007-2010. His autobiography, 'Last Man Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor' was published in September 2012.*

Thank you very much, Michael, for that generous introduction, and thank you to everybody here for coming today. I hope you will not go away too disappointed.

The book is called *Last Man Standing*. Sometimes people ask me why it is called that and I refer them to page 552, but I will, however, save everybody here the bother of getting to page 552, which is the last page, and tell you that it is because the Lord Chancellor features so high in the precedence, technically above the Prime Minister (not that I ever tried to assert this in front of Gordon Brown). The Lord Chancellor is the last person out of a Government and, as I discovered, the Lord Chancellor gets to the Palace to hand back the extremely heavy Great Seal of State to Her Majesty just as the new Ministers are arriving to be sworn in. So instead of being received in the normal receiving rooms, where they were, I was taken round the corner to a suite, which I had never been in before, appropriately named the Belgian Suite, where I took my leave of Her Majesty.

On Election Day in June 2001, I was knocking up, as we call it, banging on doors in Cedar Street, Blackburn - mill terraces - when I got a telephone call from John Prescott. The plan which had been discussed between JP and me, but also more importantly with our boss Tony Blair, was that I would take over John Prescott's department and John, who had wanted a rest from departmental work, with planning, local government, housing, the railways, the rest of the transport system and other minor matters, phoned me to choreograph, as he said, a 'peaceful transition' from him to me.

Then later on, I got a message as a senior Minister to say that we had to ensure that we were at our posts in London, waiting by the telephone for a call from Downing Street at 11 o'clock the following day, Friday. So, to great groans from the family who were with me in Blackburn, the police drove us through the night, and we got about three or four hours sleep, got up and waited for the call from No.10.

Hours went past: funnily enough I perhaps should have thought that I was about to be told my services were no longer required, and this maybe shows a fine conceit of myself, but this thought did not occur to me. I just wanted to know what I was doing and then go to sleep, so I phoned

No.10 and they said, 'We're very sorry, don't call us, we'll call you'. So I got a couple of hours' sleep and then I phoned back and they said, 'Don't call us, we'll call you,' and I thought, 'Well, I'm fed up with this', so at 5 o'clock, I said to my police officers, 'Look, I'm just going to fetch up in Downing Street, too bad.' So off we drove to Downing Street, went in the back way, and I fetched up there to considerable surprise.

Reshuffles, especially after an election, are a moment of supreme power for the staff in Downing Street - it is a very enjoyable moment, and I guessed that something was going on. Indeed, as I recall in the book, what was going on was nothing to do with any of the senior ministers, but there was this unholy triangular argument taking place between the Prime Minister, his wife and Anji Hunter, his sort of Lady Friday, about whether she could remain there. But anyway, I was ushered into an anteroom and finally got the call to go and see the great man and sat down. This was the conversation that followed:

He said, 'I'm not giving you Prescott's job, Jack'.
So I thought, 'God, what's coming next?'
He said, 'I'm making you Foreign Secretary.'
So I heard myself saying 'f... me!' because there had been a bit of speculation about this before the election which I had completely dismissed because you cannot live by such speculation.
Anyway, he said, 'So, don't you want the job?'
And I said, 'No, no, no, I do want the job, thank you very much, I don't want you to get the wrong idea, I was just rather surprised, I thought . . . you know, as of yesterday, I was getting Prescott's job.'

For the 1997 election, my special adviser managed to spirit my two children into Downing Street and so they were there when Tony came out and saw them and said, 'I'm giving your dad the job of Home Secretary'. Well, this time my daughter was in Uganda on a gap year, but my son was spirited in by the police, so I met him in the corridor and he gave me the hug of his life, and I then went over to the Foreign Office, and, very bemused by this, said hello to people, took away a great pile of briefs and said I needed to get some sleep and I would be back the next day, and with a bit of luck, nothing much would happen in the meanwhile.

The next day, by the way, two people whom Robin Cook, my predecessor and good friend, had appointed personally, came in, in succession, to see me. One was Simon McDonald, who had been appointed as a Private Secretary and had come back from Riyadh, where he had been Deputy Head of Mission, to do this job. He came in absolutely white-faced, asking if I was willing to take him on, and I said, 'Well, if you're okay with Robin, it's okay with me,' so he left relieved. The other was Michael Williams, now Lord Williams of Baglan. He came in to see me, also white as a sheet, saying that he had been Robin's diplomatic political advisor and would I mind keeping him on? So I also said, 'Yes, yes, fine'. As it happened, they were two of the best appointments which Robin ever made for me and I was delighted that they were there.

As Home Secretary, I had had a really punishing time, and I was very pleased to have survived, because it is a dangerous job, I tell you, being Home Secretary, and my wife Alice was pleased for me, but she was not looking forward to even more of the same. Well, for the first three months, it was very quiet and as Michael will remember, whereas at the Home Office, I had to spend my time keeping myself out of the newspapers, we got more and more neurotic about getting me into

the newspapers.

Asked by a friend what I thought the major issues were, I opined that they appeared to be Zimbabwe and Gibraltar. And on the 10th September 2001, Michael and I and a whole troop of folk from the Foreign Office got on the train to Manchester where there is a British Council outpost, where I made a major speech about the future of British foreign policy, to absolutely zero coverage on the morning of September 11th.

Well, we know what happened on September 11th and we all remember where we were: I was in a meeting with Geoff Hoon and the then CDS, in my room in the Commons, when Mark Sedwill, who has now just been appointed Political Director of the Foreign Office, a very bright, young diplomat who was a Private Secretary, came in and said, 'You'd better turn the television on'. We had been discussing with Geoff Hoon and the CDS minor additions to troop deployments in Macedonia, of hundreds. So everything changed.

I have not sought to provide a sequential chronological narrative in the book, but instead, to make it thematic and so there is an opening to the six chapters on foreign policy. The opening chapter is called *Life in the Air* (and it is the counterpoint to the opening chapter of the Home Office chapters section which is called *Life in the Graveyard* because - as well as being literally responsible for graveyards - many, many Home Secretaries' careers seem to end in that dismal way) and that deals with the issue of Zimbabwe and the negotiations which we actually got through the good offices of Obasanjo in Nigeria. He had managed to do a deal with the Zimbabweans about money in return for Mugabe being rather more sensible, and I think we would have been able to make that deal stick, had it not been for 9/11.

Also, it describes what happened immediately after 9/11 and the decisions (which at that stage appeared very straightforward) in respect of Afghanistan. Because time is short, I am not going to repeat the anecdotes, but Michael, who is a Parliamentary colleague and also a very good friend, will remember that I invited him and also Menzies Campbell to come on my first trip to Afghanistan, which took place about a month or so after the Taliban had been removed from control. For the last leg of the journey, we got into an ageing 'Herc', which had not only a co-pilot but also a navigator and an engineer and Menzies Campbell came with me. I was given the privilege of sitting in the cockpit, and I had a sort of Boy's Own Paper attitude to this kind of adventure, so I quite took to it, all kitted up in the front.

The first thing that was slightly unnerving was seeing the crew and some of the loadmasters in the cockpit with night vision goggles, searching, they said, for missiles, which I thought was not entirely reassuring. We knew that one of Karzai's Cabinet ministers had been assassinated in the airport earlier that day, and also that a previous transport plane had knocked out all the lights, so they put paraffin lights down the runway, and we came in down the runway in complete darkness apart from these paraffin lights. And as we were coming in to land, the navigator was counting the pilot down and he said, 'One hundred feet, eighty feet, sixty feet, fifty feet, forty feet' and then the pilot cut in, 'Holy shit, what's that?' And we swerved and then we landed with a screech. The pilot had seen a man with what he thought was a rifle on the runway. Anyway, cutting it very short, there was indeed a man and he had what appeared to be a rifle, but it was actually a broom, and he had been sent out to clear up the debris and I suppose so impervious was he to danger that he had become oblivious to the fact that there was a Herc going in which might have decapitated him.

Another completely mad thing that happened: I go into a little office, and there is a young British squaddie there. He says to me, 'Oh hello, Mr. Straw, I last met you in Macedonia. You know my mum - I come from Blackburn!' And it was the illustration of the fact that politics is always local.

But the thing that most sticks in my mind from that visit was not the negotiations and discussions which I was having with people like Karzai, but visiting a high school for girls, which had been a two storey high school, but was now a one storey high school, because when the shelling had been taking place in the civil war, most of the second storey had been demolished by shells, so they decided to demolish the lot and waterproof it. The school, of course, had been closed during the Taliban period and it was just re-opening, and there was a clutch of women who were teachers, but who happened as well to be mothers of daughters who were in the school. One of them pressed forward, and as I say in the book, she had obviously been very pretty, but she had a face acquainted with grief, and she pressed forward and produced out of her pocket a photocopied bit of paper in a diary. I knew she was saying, 'You should read this.' So I passed it to the interpreter who read it. It was an official court record of her conviction by the one of the courts when the Taliban were in operation, for the criminal offence of educating her daughter. And because you know about these things in the abstract, when you meet somebody who has actually been convicted of this offence, it comes home to you. It stayed with me forever and although I think we have made a number of perfectly obvious errors in Afghanistan, the fact that there was just a handful of women being educated in Afghanistan before we invaded, and now you can measure the numbers in millions is proof, if you needed it, that we have done some good in that country, but please God that we are able to do some more.

The second chapter is not about Afghanistan or about Iraq – it is called *The War That Nearly Was*. People on the whole forget about this, except those of us who were involved, which was the period following the bombing of the Lok Sabha in Delhi on 13th December 2001, when India and Pakistan were very nearly involved in a major conventional war, which might have spilled over into a nuclear war, and this was one of the more frightening episodes of the whole time that I was Secretary of State. It was actually this that in a sense - because I happened by chance to know a lot about the Kashmir issue because of my constituency - got me into my stride as Foreign Secretary.

Just to digress for a second on that. Back in the 1980s, the Kashmiris in this country were trying to persuade both parties to adopt a very, very pro-Pakistani Kashmir approach to this issue and they actually got the Labour Party to sign up to this. This was tried in my own constituency party and there was a natural assumption by the movers (bear in mind that a third of my constituency today, probably about 25% then, are Muslim from the Indian subcontinent) that all good Muslims would vote in favour of the motion, but one of the delegates, a man called Adam Patel, now a colleague of Michael Williams' and Michael Ancram's in the House of Lords, Lord Patel of Blackburn, put up his hand and said, 'Hang on a second, I'm a Muslim, I care about justice for Muslims and for everybody else, but I'm also Indian and there are two sides to this and we mustn't be hijacked by those who are simply supporting one'.

As a result of that, and an extraordinary visit I had made to Pakistan and taken from there to so-called 'Azad Kashmir', where, inadvertently, the government of Azad Kashmir had taken me to a refugee camp which was palpably obviously a training camp for jihadists, I formed some views about the situation. But we (when I say 'we', the Americans and I - this is Rich Armitage, Condi Rice, Colin Powell, David Manning, myself, and our excellent High Commissioners, Rob Young and Hilary

Synnott) went in for a kind of babysitting. We always made sure one of us was in one or other of the capitals. One of the Indian diplomats said to me, 'We can't start the war whilst one of you lot is here'. And I said to him, 'Yes, that's exactly why one of us lot is here.'

But there were the most blood-chilling discussions, particularly with the Indians, about what might happen. Both sides were talking openly about the fact that there was going to be a large war - about a million people were mobilised either side of the Line of Control. And one of the most horrifying aspects of this, which I bring out in the book, was that neither side had proper understanding about what would happen if they did let off atomic bombs and that the fallout of a bomb dropped by Pakistan on Delhi would also kill lots and lots of Muslims - leave aside those in India, but in Bangladesh and back in Pakistan - and the reverse was also true.

But the thing that I always found fascinating, the thing that finally brought both sides to their senses and made them realise 'we can't really go on like this in the modern world', was not anything in the defence category that we did, but was a decision by Colin Powell and me to change the travel advisory for travel to India and Pakistan. We announced on the same day (it was co-ordinated) that we were pulling back our staffs from both posts, including in Delhi, but also that we were advising our citizens not to travel. Suddenly, particularly the Indian middle classes thought 'this is actually really very serious'. It was after that that a process started and we got back to what became the Composite Dialogue. It was a bit like Nixon in China: it was good that you had a hard-line military man in power in Pakistan and a right-wing Hindu leader in India, in Vajpayee.

I just digress to say that I have met all sorts of people, as we all have, in the course of my life, but I have never met anybody less probable to be leader of a great country - admittedly effective - than Vajpayee. There is a kind of rhythm to discussions (many folk in the room here will have gone through them) - you make your pitch and then normally there is maybe a pause of a couple of seconds and the other person will reply. Well, with Vajpayee (and I remember this happened more than once), you would make your pitch and there would be silence and a minute would go past and then the silence would be followed by him closing his eyes, and then you would hear deep breathing and you would think, 'Well I know I'm pretty boring at the best of times, but this is taking it a bit far'. And then, after sometimes literally five minutes, he would come awake and he would give you a completely coherent answer, you would then respond and then it would start again. Just extraordinary, but somehow or other, he managed to keep together a fissiparous coalition for five years.

The third and the fourth chapters of this section relate to Iraq. The third is called *Iraq: The War of Choice* and I open the chapter by saying that I could have stopped the United Kingdom's involvement in the military action. I did not and here is why.

I do not have a conceit that I could have stopped America's involvement, of course, I could not, and I think there probably would have been a war in any case, but I certainly could have stopped the United Kingdom's involvement, and I am happy to take questions. But what I tried to do in that narrative is to set out how I ended up in early March 2003 coming to the view that it was right to take military action, not having wanted to take military action at any stage (it is also true for Tony Blair). And how, if you do adopt what Kofi Annan called a policy of diplomacy backed by the threat of, or the possibility of, the use of military force, you can then end up in a position where that military force is exactly what happens. I then later on in a separate chapter make some

observations about this and why I came to the rather important decisions personally in respect of how we handled Iran.

The other chapter on Iraq is called *The Aftermath: The Wrong Choices*. It would not have altered the fact that the Iraq Survey Group would still obviously not have found the WMD we all expected, because that was, as it turned out, the reality, but one we did not know about. But the level of the killings that took place and the internecine struggles would have been on a far lesser scale had it not been for catastrophic mistakes that not only I believe should be laid at the door of the Department of Defense and the Vice President's Office in the United States, but interestingly, so does not just Colin Powell but also Condoleezza Rice. If you have not read her memoirs, do, because she is very, very loyal and I have huge respect for her, and one of the surprises when I read them was how vitriolic she is about what happened in that period. I will see if I can turn up the exact quotation because it was just extraordinary what she said.

First of all, Colin Powell, at a meeting on 14th February 2003 after a UN Security Council meeting, had told us - reassured us - that the aftermath was in hand and that the State Department and America had a lot of experience of handling the aftermath of military action. Colin said, 'We did it in Japan, we did it in Germany, we can do it again'. Colin knew, not least as a military man, that in the aftermath of any military action, the military have to be controlled, but it is on what conditions and with what support. So the State Department was there working on the plans with the Department of Defense. Suddenly, this unilateral decision is made by Don Rumsfeld to take over the whole thing, to squeeze out the State Department. And Bush frankly does nothing about it.

And then we are faced with this Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. When I went to see ORHA in Kuwait, just as the hot military action was coming to an end, in a hotel room which was not much bigger than this, there were forty or so people at trestle tables and these were the people who were supposed to be running Iraq. It was an utter unbelievable shambles and of course it collapsed almost before it started. As Condi says, it could not even run itself – but this was to handle a country of over 20 million people.

That was then followed by the CPA which was more much effective under Jerry Bremer, but he was given the powers of a proconsul and he then made this catastrophic decision in consultation with the Department of Defense in Cheney's office, but certainly not with defense nor I think with the military on the ground, that he would go in for de-Ba'athification on a massive scale.

One of the absolutely fundamental lessons of what happened in Germany which was in a state of anarchy straight after the fall of Berlin in 1945, was that you are very discriminating in those whose heads, as it were, you cut off. So the de-Nazification programme was very careful, because most of the people who were Nazis were Nazis because they wanted a job and wanted to keep themselves alive and their families alive. But suddenly removing millions of people from public administration and from the armed forces, leaving them no means of support, but lots of arms which had never been secured, was a recipe for a disaster and I am afraid to say, that is what happened.

The last two chapters are about related matters, but slightly different themes.

The penultimate one is called *The Sick Man Bites Back: Europe And Turkey*, and you will know that it was the Tsar at the time just before the Crimean War who said, 'I think we have a sick man of

Europe on our hands.' Well, the sick man has recovered, and the formerly 'sick man' Turkey is now motoring with, for example, rates of economic growth which we would give our right arm for (and not only would we give our right arm, but other EU states where the GDP is similar, that is those with lower GDP, would also give their right arm for). In the AKP government, you have got an administration following a curiously paradoxical, but highly successful strategy. They have been criticised in some quarters and not least by the Kemalists in Turkey, for reasons I comprehend, for being Islamists or tantamount to Islamists. But they are frankly no more Islamist than the Christian Democrat parties of Italy and Germany were in the '60s, '70s and '80s and maybe still are. And what they are seeking is, as Egemen Bağiş (who is the Minister for Europe and a very articulate man) was spelling out at a conference in Istanbul that I attended over the weekend, while absolutely maintaining the secular state, to ensure that their party speaks up for that 98% of Turks who are of the Muslim religion and the significant proportion of those who wish better to celebrate their religion.

But part of this paradox is that this has been the administration in Turkey which has been most comfortable about developing a close relationship with Europe and seeing its future westwards and not just eastwards. It is a terrible tragedy for which the United Kingdom is not remotely responsible under either Labour or Conservative governments (and I am very proud of what I was able to do in 2005 to get it agreed at 27 that Turkey should be admitted as a Candidate Member into membership of the EU) that others have since turned their back on Turkey and six years down the track, the accession negotiations are paralysed as a direct result of blocks on the chapters (which are the various sections of the accession treaties) imposed, some by the Council, but mainly by France and by the Greek Cypriot government in Cyprus. I talk about that and the great error, of which we in the Labour Party were a part, of ever allowing a divided Cyprus into the European Union, a profound and serious error for which we are now paying a very large price.

The final chapter is called *The Inconceivable and the Incompatible: Israel, Iran and the Middle East* and colleagues here may recall that no sooner was the hot war in Iraq over and we were having to cope with hundreds of thousands of coalition forces in Iraq and also in Afghanistan, than the neocons in the US and I am afraid to say, some political parties in Israel, were beating the drum about how Iran would be next, and I deal there with my own personal response and the response of the British Government to this.

We all found out in late 2002 from one of the Iranian opposition groups (NCRI), which was the civilian front for the terrorist organisation (MEK), that Iran had been lying to the IAEA over its nuclear plans. There was a lot of diplomatic traffic about it and to cut a very long story short: in the summer of 2003, the French, the German and British foreign ministers, Dominique de Villepin, Joschka Fischer and I, reeling really from the visceral arguments we had had over Iraq and determined that we should not go through that again, agreed a strategy, which came to be called the E3 strategy, to start negotiations with the Iranians over the nuclear dossier. And we did that with the full support of our heads of government and also with the tacit support of the Americans and I describe in the book the rather contorted negotiations, the lost opportunities with Iran and above all, the fact that decisions made by the US Administration had the direct result of pulling the rug from under the reformist administration in Iran, the Khatami Administration and begetting what we have now got, the Ahmadinejad election which took place in June 2005.

And just two illustrations: one was the famous 'axis of evil' paragraph in President Bush's State of

the Union Speech in late January 2002, which by all accounts was put in there in a sort of incidental, rather trivial way, just because somebody rather liked the alliteration. But President Khatami straight after 9/11 had made a very courageous decision to reach out to America, to say, as it were, 'we are all in this together', and he then found that his legs were chopped off politically and the hardliners were saying, 'Well, we told you so.'

And then at a more operational level, when the Iranians wanted something back for quite big concessions on reducing their nuclear involvement, which included things like medical isotopes, which cannot be turned into a nuclear bomb by the way, and spare parts from Rolls Royce for their civilian aeroplanes because they were falling out of the sky, it was the Americans who blocked that - not Powell who went to such lengths that he got from me the detailed list of the spare parts for these old Rolls Royce engines, which again could not possibly be used to be turned into an F-16 or whatever it was. It was absurd, but they genuinely blocked that.

This will be my last point before I sit down: I came to the conclusion that - this is me making up, as it were, British foreign policy - I could not contemplate the United Kingdom government getting involved in another situation of diplomacy backed by the use of military force and that we could not allow ourselves to go down that slope again. I am as responsible as anybody for what happened in Iraq, but you have to learn lessons from this and one of the lessons I learnt is that if you are constantly presented with a gate marked 'War' and another marked 'Peace', as you go down the path, the gate marked 'Peace' gets narrower and the gate marked 'War' gets wider and more inviting, and that is in a sense what happened in respect of Iraq.

I was not willing to do that, so while I was in Berlin for a visit a day after President Bush had been elected in November 2004, I agreed to do a *Today* programme interview. I guessed that Iran would come up and I just formed in my mind that perhaps this might be an opportunity to put a line in the sand, so when Jim Naughtie said to me, 'Are you saying that military action by the United Kingdom is inconceivable?' I said, 'Yes, I am. It is inconceivable. We are not going to get involved in this'.

Well, this, as you might imagine, led to a certain harrumph around the system including in the United States, and I think it contributed to my being moved, as did also differences over Hamas where Michael and I were on the same side, because we thought that if you have an election and the party gets elected, you have to respect the result – tough, don't have the election if you don't want the result. So although it did no doubt contribute to my being moved, I am also clear that it was worth it and it made some contribution to ensuring that the Americans had to think a bit more carefully about what they did in that situation.

And if you go through all the predictions of the imminence of Iran getting a nuclear weapon, you will see that, as the sun rises in the east, about once in every six months, there is a prediction from the Israeli government and people on the right in the United States that Iran is going to get a nuclear bomb in the next six months. This has been going on for eight years. I do not happen to think that - I do believe that we have got to sort Iran out - but I do not happen to think it is about to get a bomb tomorrow, and if I have done one thing, it is perhaps to introduce a certain caution into how we handle Iran.

Thank you very much. That's my 'Cook's Tour' and I am very happy to take questions.

# RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY - IN THE CHANGING WORLD

**Transcript of a lecture given by His Excellency Dr Alexander Yakovenko**

24th October 2012

**His Excellency Dr Alexander Vladimirovich Yakovenko** *assumed his duties as Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Court of St. James's on 29th January 2011. Before his appointment, Dr. Yakovenko served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in charge of multilateral diplomacy. Having graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Dr. Yakovenko began his diplomatic career in 1976. He has since occupied various positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, including the Department of International Organizations, the Permanent Mission of the USSR to the United Nations in New York, the Foreign Policy Planning Department, the Department of International Scientific and Technical Cooperation, the Department of Security and Disarmament, the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to International Organizations in Vienna, and the Information and Press Department.*

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to say that for all of us, today is a special day because it is the day when the whole world is celebrating United Nations Day, 24th October. We at the Embassy celebrated yesterday together with the UNA-UK Association and with the Director-General of UNESCO, Mrs. Bokova, who came to make a keynote speech at our Embassy. We discussed global issues, since this is the United Nations family, and of course, thinking about the United Nations, it is very important to keep the global agenda in our mind.

The United Nations deals with serious issues, and I remember during my time at the United Nations, two years ago, I was in a meeting at the General Assembly and the Representative from Switzerland was making a speech. He talked about sustainable development and about other very important things, but then he looked at the audience and he said, 'We Swiss, we have watches, but Africans, they have time!' There are instruments, and there is the global agenda at the United Nations and some other places, and that is very important for us.

Being in diplomacy for some years, I realise that maybe fifteen or twenty years ago, multilateral issues took up perhaps just 40% of the time spent by leaders and by ministers of Foreign Affairs. Most of them spoke about bilateral relations. Now, when I look at the agenda of President Putin and Minister Lavrov, 70%, sometimes 80% of the time is spent discussing global issues, and that is quite an interesting sign because we are so dependent on what is going on in the world - that is becoming more and more serious. Of course, for us, it is very important to understand what is going on and when my President, who was elected recently, was making a speech at a Russian Ambassadors' Conference, there was a general feeling that we are witnessing tectonic shifts in the global landscape, accompanied by the rise of tension and uncertainty in international affairs and I would like to stress the word 'uncertainty'. And the transformation process in the Middle East and Northern Africa plays a significant role in these changes.

At the same time, new hubs of economic growth and political influence are taking shape everywhere with increasing speed – that is another reality. The system of international relations is moving in the direction of a polycentric system, which reflects the more active role of some countries and some international structures, such as the G20, and this is the tendency that we are witnessing. The question is: how are we going to cope with this, how are we going to behave in this situation?

**The United Nations**

Since we have United Nations Day, I would just like to start with the attitude of Russia towards the **United Nations**. The United Nations is sometimes criticised by the press and by different countries for an inability to act, but I would like to say that this is probably the best organisation we have and there is no replacement for the United Nations. When the United Nations is not able to do something, this is not the fault of the United Nations, this is our fault - I mean the fault of the member countries.

On the Russian side, the United Nations (and this is the heart of Russian foreign policy) will be the focus of our international efforts for the near future. Definitely. We do not see any replacement and we are in favour of strengthening the United Nations. We pay all our duties regularly, we have no debts, and despite the fact that the budget of the United Nations is now seven billion dollars – that is a lot of money - we still think that the United Nations should be cherished and we should all work together because all the countries are equal. If you come to New York, you will find the small countries and the big countries working together.

**European Security**

I want to say a few words about **European security**. The Foreign Ministry is tasked by President V. Putin to take forward the Treaty on European Security. That is a new challenge for all of us and I believe that the most important part of this task is to set in this document the equal security of all countries in Europe. So that this security should not be divided, that means that security for Russia should be the same as security, for example, for the UK, and that is why all these things should be legally worded. It was fixed a few years ago in a declaration between Russia and NATO and all the partners from NATO agreed on this, but they agreed politically. Now we want to fix it legally, juridically. This is at the heart of the Russian proposal on European security and we are working with other countries of Europe to take this Treaty forward.

**NATO**

We have quite an extensive relationship with **NATO**, but we have a number of problems with NATO too. The first one is the anti-ballistic missile system which is developed basically with the support of NATO. This is one of the thresholds of the relationship. Of course, we will continue negotiations with NATO, but we definitely understand that the heart of this system is an American system. That is why we are having negotiations with the Americans on this issue, but unless we solve the problem of the anti-ballistic missile system, our relations with NATO will be quite difficult. But there are some positive areas where we can see some prospects for our relations with NATO. Piracy is one – that is quite an area. And the second area is counterterrorism, so that is a very important issue for us. And in this area we are co-operating quite well, but there are some other areas, as I said, the anti-ballistic missile system, which need a joint decision.

**Relations with the European Union**

Just a few figures: 52% percent of our trade is with the European Union and we have excellent bilateral relationships with most of the countries within the European Union. We are, to a certain extent, dependent on trade with the European Union. But on the other hand, we would like to have more co-operation, political and economic, with the European Union as a structure. I remember the speech of Gerhard Schroeder which he made last year when he came to one of the Lord Mayor's City dinners and he said that the future of the European Union lies in more involvement with different countries and he named just two countries: Russia and Turkey. He was thinking from the point of view of economic growth.

I am not responsible for Turkey, but as I understand it, Turkey is seeking membership of the European Union. Russia is not seeking membership, but it looks like, for us, with our fast-growing economy, we could provide additional opportunities for the European Union which is now in a difficult economic situation. This combination - the possibilities which we have in Europe and the possibilities that we have in Russia together with Russian money and with the need to build the infrastructure, roads and so forth - will give additional opportunities for the economic growth of the European Union.

Unfortunately, I do not see much enthusiasm for this kind of a close link on the part of Brussels, but I think that the various countries should have a closer look at this and for us, the test drive is a future agreement on the visa-free regime with the countries of the Schengen zone. I hope that in a few years we will do it, as we did with diplomatic passports and this will be some kind of a trial for future relations and the readiness to develop better economic relations with Russia. As I said, enormous possibilities are open in the Russian economy and I think that European countries should use these opportunities in order to support their economies. But for that to happen, we need some kind of a different philosophy and probably different political decisions too, but this is the future.

**Relations with the United States**

When Obama came to power, relations moved quite fast. First of all, we signed the New START Treaty. That is very important for global stability and very important both for economic and political relations between the two countries. We established a Commission where we have 12 working groups. This is the Presidential Commission and on both sides it is headed by Ministers. Over the years, we have moved quite fast on different economic and political issues and it has had quite a substantial impact on relations between the two countries. We did not have it before. A long time ago there was the Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission, but that was purely for economic issues. This Commission works on a broader agenda. We reached an agreement on co-operation in the nuclear sphere which has opened up the market in the United States to Russian companies and Russian nuclear products, which Americans believe are probably the safest in the world in terms of technology, i.e. so-called post-Fukushima.

There are some other issues. Recently we signed a special agreement on visas. Now in Russia and America, in ten days, you can get a three-year multiple visa very cheaply. So basically: just ten days and the paperwork is really very limited. I think that after this agreement, more business people will travel from and to the United States and Russia, and this is exactly what we want to achieve with the European Union, the possibility to travel freely, and that is what was signed up to by all

our countries in 1975 in the OSCE Final Act. So, the only serious problem we have with the United States is the anti-ballistic missile system. We have to find a solution and we are trying to explain to our American friends what our preoccupations are and what the problem is on our side. We still have time, but I think the more they understand our problems and preoccupations, the better it will be for bilateral relations and for international stability.

**Syria**

On **Syria**, of course, we have some really serious fundamental problems, but on the other hand, we have a good basis for a solution. This is the Kofi Annan plan and based on this plan is the joint Communiqué of the Geneva Group which was signed by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, Turkey and the League of Arab States and the United Nations on 30th June 2012.

From my point of view, the heart of this document still is not realised. The key point in this document is to bring two sides to the negotiating table. One side is the Syrian government and the President of Syria accepted. He agreed with the Geneva Communiqué - that is a fact - and he also agreed to the negotiations with the opposition and named the interlocutor. The international community did not solve the other part. We could not get the opposition to the negotiating table and that is the major problem.

As soon as we have brought them all together, the spirit of the Geneva Agreement which was signed, as I said, by the five Permanent members of UNSC, is just to start talking about the sort of transitional period in Syria the people want, how they want this solution to the Syrian crisis to be arranged and managed. We are looking forward to the work of Mr. Brahimi, who will be in Moscow very soon. But for us, the major task is to put both sides around the negotiating table.

**Afghanistan**

In **Afghanistan**, we supported the activities of the international military presences. The decision of the Security Council gave them mandate and, of course, we are not involved on the ground, but we support them with intelligence and we support the government of Afghanistan with weapons, because they want to use Russian-made weapons which were quite familiar to them. We have always supported the transit from Afghanistan to withdraw the equipment and so on. So we did this. We signed bilateral agreements and even an agreement with NATO to that effect. We did all our best.

But we expect that those countries who got a mandate from the Security Council, first of all, to report to the Security Council on what they have done over all these years and then at the Security Council, we will see what could be done in the future for Afghanistan, because for us, it is not just something which is overseas: this is very close to our neighbours and this is a matter of our national security. We still remember the time when the Taliban was very active, when they were shooting the Buddhas and all these things and when they threatened the security of Tajikistan, which is a close ally of ours. Basically, all these borders are quite open, so if we have some hostile activities in this area, we all are in trouble.

**BRICS**

This is the fast-growing economic group (not organisation, because we do not have a charter or anything) - five countries who are moving quite fast in their economic development. Most of our attention will be paid to the economic issues. But what I consider to be important is that when all the countries of BRICS were in the Security Council, most of them voted and behaved and gave similar assessments of the situation, so despite the fact that this is some kind of economic union, I see the closeness of views on the international agenda and it is quite a remarkable thing.

**CIS countries**

For us this is the top priority. Russia is going to develop even closer economic ties with these countries, and we are not talking about politics, because all of them are sovereign countries. The task for us is to gain more economic freedom within this area through the creation of the Customs Union and the next step will be (and this is President Putin's idea) to create the Eurasian Union. It is a project very similar to the European Union as a construct, but without politics. So basically we are seeking closer integration and to continue the savings that we have now – we are talking about hundreds of billions of dollars through free movement of people, goods, capital and so on.

But that is also a challenge. If for example, somebody has better conditions such as Kazakhstan, which I know in certain areas has better conditions for business and some Russian companies have already moved to Kazakhstan because of the taxes and some other things. That is a challenge for us, but I think this is healthy competition and Russia will be promoting this kind of economic co-operation because we need markets and they need markets. It is not the Soviet Union, it is just a new trend in the world because, for us, as Putin put it (and this is one of the goals of his election campaign), the most important part is economic growth.

But recently I spoke to a friend of mine who is the head of quite a big Russian company and I asked him, 'When are you expecting the end of the crisis?' And he said, 'We are not talking about the crisis any more. Basically this is absolutely the new stage of economic development and the way in which the world is developing, moving and behaving - this will be the way for years. It is not a crisis. This is how we are going to be in the next few decades, don't expect anything to end - no, this is the new normal.'

**Investment in Russia**

A few words about the investment climate in Russia. Of course, we are interested in developing good relations with foreign partners and the economy permits us to do so. We have had four years of growth this year, but the goal is probably higher for the next year. The government is trying to work hard, and the rate of growth is very important, but on the other hand, Russia is a very attractive place for investment. All of us have difficulties, all have some special circumstances, but the deal between Rosneft and BP just gives you a good example that serious companies – (they don't read newspapers!) - are just working in the country and they are connecting their future with my country, with big Russian companies and they see a lot of prospects. That is why this is a good signal for other companies just to come, and if they are ripe enough to work in these conditions, they will definitely be welcome.

**Russian-British Relations**

I want to say a word at the end about Russian-British relations. I would like to say that at this stage, we are satisfied with how the relations are growing. In August we had a visit by Mr. Putin who came for the Olympic Games, but of course, he used this opportunity to have a meeting with Mr. Cameron for an hour and he was only here for six hours. They were in agreement on economic matters and political issues and we agreed to co-operate quite actively in hi-tech and there were some ideas from Mr. Cameron in this area and specifically between Skolkovo and Tech City in Shoreditch. I should put political dialogue in the first place, because there is another development in this area, and of course, culture. There was an agreement to have a Russia-UK Year of Culture in 2014 and both sides are ready for this kind of co-operation. So, there are still some problems, some of them are parked, some of them we are working on, but definitely there is a tendency in the right direction and we are quite satisfied and this is the feeling of my President and this is, as I understand it, the feeling on the British side.

So having said that, I would like to stop at this point and I am ready to take your questions. Thank you.

# RE-POSITIONING BRITAIN IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY: ARE WE FINDING A ROLE AT LAST?

**Text of a lecture given by the Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**

30th October 2012

**Lord Howell** *was elected MP for Guildford in 1966. He worked closely with both Edward Heath and Margaret Thatcher and is credited by several authorities with having invented the idea of privatisation in the late 1960s. Lord Howell is the former Secretary of State for Energy, and later for Transport in Margaret Thatcher's first Cabinet (1979-83). He was Minister of State in Northern Ireland (1972-74) and has held several other Government posts. From 1987-97, he was Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. He was made a life peer in 1997 and was Shadow Spokesperson in the House of Lords on Foreign Affairs from 2000-2010. In May 2010, he was appointed Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a position he stepped down from on 4th September 2012 when he was appointed as personal adviser to the Foreign Secretary on Energy and Resource Security.*

When, to my amazement, I was enrolled as a Foreign and Commonwealth Office minister, at the outset of the Coalition, after more than quarter of a century out of government, I wondered what specific and fresh contributions I could best make to our country's interests and future. That of course was over and above my almost daily task of answering an unending stream of questions in the Lords – a legislative chamber stuffed with foreign policy expertise to a degree unmatched, I believe, by any other similar assembly round the planet. I hope nobody misguidedly changes that!

My pondering was soon answered when the new Secretary of State, William Hague, assigned to me what he called 'the issue of my dreams', namely the Commonwealth, together with responsibility for international energy issues – a subject for which I also had some sort of track record.

These two areas may sound disconnected. But in reality unfolding world developments are weaving them together – in ways I shall describe. In fact they form two of the four new cornerstones of British foreign policy in the 21st century, and are set to become more and more central to our future as the century proceeds.

I want to bring all these four cornerstones, or major strands of our new situation, together today, not just because they point the way ahead for our nation in a very dangerous and utterly transformed world, but because they constitute a powerful and unifying narrative for the government as we struggle through the present stormy seas.

The four 'cornerstone' issues are:

- The development of the EU and the settling of our relations with and within it – and especially the British need to get on the front foot about the reform of the EU as a whole, not just our exclusive bilateral links with it.
- Our place in the new Commonwealth network and the gateways it provides to the rising

powers and consumer markets of Asia, the Antipodes, Africa and Latin America; and in consequence the rediscovery of British exceptionalism (i.e. why we are now in a different and potentially more favoured position than any other medium-size European or other power as we confront new world conditions).

- The transformed global landscape, the great eastwards and southern shift, not just of economic but also of political gravity, the 'emerging' economies (or more accurately 'growth' economies) and societies, the revolutionary new distribution of energy and other resources and changed priorities for Britain these developments imply.
- The worldwide growth of people power, and the corresponding weakening of national governments everywhere – as manifested by the continuing Arab uprisings, civil unrest in Russia, in China, protest in India, the occupy movements and street violence in the USA, UK, and many other countries – not to mention the civil unrest in the eurozone periphery nations

These very live issue areas are all interconnected and their coordinates are right now, even while we grapple with them, determining and shaping the position and direction of the UK for years to come. To a worried public they present many bewildering facets.

Yet when set in broad context and stitched into one tapestry they can offer reassurance and hope. The more coherently they are presented as part of an overall picture, the stronger political leaders will be in meeting the demand (sometimes critical) for a clearer foreign policy vision and a sense of national purpose and direction in face of stormy world events.

**Some Background To Our New Situation**

**First**, markets, wealth accumulations, influence and political power have all shifted – partly to non-western governments and states, partly to non-state actors, and on a very substantial scale. The capital investment flows we read about in the last century from the Atlantic industrialised West to the developing east and south have now reversed. The huge savings of the high growth and the resource-rich countries of both the Middle and Far East, Central and East Asia and now Africa, will increasingly provide for the inward project investment needs of the debt-laden West. Even Mozambique is now setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund – which no doubt we shall soon be tapping, along with others, to finance our new airports, airways and other key projects.

**Second**, the world is now one of networks, not blocs. This is a central change of perception – which frankly has not reached all policy-framers, or parts of the commentariat, either in Europe or in the USA. Yet as the Prime Minister has said (for instance at the Mansion House last year), we now need '*the flexibility of networks, not the rigidity of blocs*' in coping with the international scene. Nevertheless Europe remains our immediate neighbourhood and we have to find a settled and comfortable relationship within it. But the EU is full of headaches, and the integrationist model is under growing strain – and will probably fail to solve the current dilemmas in the eurozone, which is structurally flawed in its present extended state.

Far from the UK being 'isolated', 'marginalised', or 'out in the cold' in these conditions, the opposite is more the case. This is our opportunity. As the evidence of the UK's safe haven status becomes apparent, public and media perceptions will come to be tutored and reversed accordingly. In essence we can simply no longer afford to maintain a Eurocentric policy on the old basis. Our destiny lies in bigger hands and wider directions. Rather than becoming bogged down in sterile, polarising and

ultimately divisive arguments about renegotiating Britain's relations and powers vis-à-vis the rest of the EU (a situation towards which we are currently fast slipping), the moment has come for us to take the initiative in reforming (i.e. changing the direction of) the EU as a whole – which can be done in a thoroughly pro-European and Coalition-friendly way.

As William Hague has said: '*The way forward for the EU as a whole is not more centralisation and uniformity, but flexibility and variable geometry*'.

We have, in short, to mount and win the argument for a better sort of Europe – and do so in a manner which wins over, rather than antagonises, allies throughout the EU. We have to show that the integrationist doctrine has reached its limits (as everyone privately acknowledges) and that a better model, in tune with our times, is available.

There are always voices ready to assert – from both Eurosceptical and Europhile wings - that this is 'not on' and that the rest of the EU 'will never have it'. But these views are becoming rapidly out of date. Big forces are building up not only at national and political level throughout Europe, but also at the levels of intellectual argument and theory, which invalidate the old integrationist case and put in reach the alternative, but still highly pro-European, model of flexibility, diversity and decentralisation of powers.

**Third**, the USA remains our strongest ally in the traditional military and security senses, but global security is coming to depend increasingly on new influences, pressures and alliances which we have to cultivate, using the full diplomatic armoury. Whoever gets elected next week, America will have to come to terms with its true new role – as a global partner and NOT a global leader. Yesterday's voices go on calling for American global leadership. Yet that is neither wanted nor does it work.

On the contrary, America's world reputation and its capacity for achieving its global aims, is low and getting lower – especially in the Middle East. But in a world of dispersed power, cloud information stores and e-enabled non-state threats, new instruments and techniques of influence and persuasion are required to underpin security and prevent the exercise of hostile force against British citizens and interests. We need the 'camaraderie, warmth and mutual respect' of other countries (HM's message again) which our over-identification with American policy and approaches fails to deliver – in fact in some areas actively repels.

**Fourth**, the Commonwealth network - or 'family of people in the truest sense', as Her Majesty put it in her latest Christmas message – is for Britain a highly advantageous route (although not the only one) into the new growth markets and high technology zones of Asia (Pacific, South-east, Central and Near) and increasingly of Africa ands Latin America as well. Recently we have all been working on steps to make a more vigorous reality of common Commonwealth values, including commitment to upholding human rights, supporting gender equality and pressing for more democratic procedures and stricter adherence to the rule of law. A great new Commonwealth Charter – truly a global Magna Carta, reflecting this determination, is in the making, and when agreed I hope will be validated in Parliaments across the whole 54-nation membership – including in both Houses of our own Parliament. We should do no less.

But this is not just a question of inter-governmental relations. The real value and strength of our Commonwealth connections lie, as with an iceberg, below the visible governmental tip, and well

below the radar screen of most of the media. It is the soft power potential of the Commonwealth which is going to see us through.

So, **fifth**, alongside our conventional diplomacy and our 'hard power' security protection we will need to rely on new network intimacies in such fields as local government, educational links, language links, cultural connections (such as the museum network branching out from the UK), parliamentary links, common judicial practices, common law similarities, common professional standards (viz. in medicine, science, accountancy, advanced research of all kinds), sporting ties, civil society networks, religious and faith ties, the enduring power of ideas and innovation in all fields and every kind of service, business relationship and design package that our creative and original thinking can generate.

In pure trade flow terms we export 27% of our GDP, of which some 40% (according to the CBI) is said to go to other countries in the EU (although this may be affected by destination distortions, e.g. the Netherlands factor). This means about 11% of UK GDP depends on EU markets. Stagnation in the eurozone, as is now forecast, might reduce this temporarily but would certainly not wipe it out.

The other high importance countries – for the UK - are still obviously the USA, China and Japan (still >8 % of global GDP), but now also increasingly the new tigers like Turkey, Korea, Brazil, the central Asian states, Mongolia, Indonesia and south-east Asia generally – and the whole Commonwealth network, especially its countries with large high wealth components and enclaves (notably Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Malaysia, India, Nigeria, Singapore, South Africa). To these, with the so-called shale gas (and oil) revolution sweeping the globe, we now have to add countries either side of Africa, throughout Latin America (including Argentina) and throughout the Pacific region – each and every one of them with transformed prospects and set to become booming consumer markets for our goods and services. Add again the prospects for Burma, once a closed market and it is clear that the old trade and investment patterns are being turned completely on their heads.

To these expanding markets altogether we sell currently rather more than 35% of total exports. But the balance is changing fast. Forecasts tell us that most of the demand and market growth for the next two decades will come from these non-EU sources. 60% of global GDP already lies outside the US and the EU.

**The Unifying Narrative**

The narrative which begins to piece itself together out of all these trends and developments runs like this:

In a highly dangerous world, in which we need to compete more intensively than ever – even to survive and maintain current standards, let alone rise higher – we must maximise all the new advantages which globalisation and the continuing information revolution provide.

This means adjusting Britain's position to the new international realities - and telling people that is what we are doing. It means demonstrating to the public at large that the British nation collectively has a purpose and direction in the new circumstances and that it can satisfy the domestic aspiration to 'belong' (so evident in all parts of British society), bind the whole UK together, offer a homeland towards which all people, including minorities, feel a sense of loyalty and in which they can take pride.

In practical and policy-shaping terms this must mean:

1. Remaining good and constructive Europeans, despite the current challenges - and indeed taking the initiative with new proposals for EU reform which can win wide support from fellow members. These may include 'more Europe' in some areas, 'less Europe' in others. Logic may point in the direction of complete political union for the so-called core EU countries of the eurozone. But politics and psychology do not so point. Everyone knows that this is THE dilemma, the flaw in the euro's design. How to reconcile the two trends remains, and is long likely to remain, unsolved.
2. Remaining close to, very friendly with, but not, repeat not, subservient allies of the United States.
3. At the same time re-positioning the UK as a global network power, building with all we can on Commonwealth and other strong networks and bilateral links outside and beyond the US-European scene. Canada, however, – a vast new energy power – fits into the new framework, not the old one. Like Australia, Canada is brilliantly adjusting to new global conditions. And like Australia is proving a mainstay of the modern Commonwealth.
4. Deploying with confidence and without apology, our exceptional British qualities, historic associations, English language strengths and worldwide cultural influence to our direct advantage in rising Asia, Africa and Latin America.
5. Using the full range of soft power techniques (new and conventional) to protect and promote British interests, and promote (and repair where necessary) the British global reputation and powers of influence and attraction.
6. Setting out for our own people here at home a convincing and realistic narrative about both the opportunities for us now opening out and the threats which confront us just ahead (notably, political instability, democratic retreat, growing human rights abuse, failed states and terrorist seedbeds, religious fanaticism, trade disruption and growing trade protection, climate change, nuclear proliferation, food, water and energy challenges).
7. Explaining our preparations, priorities and new alliances in a changed international landscape, respecting other national systems, but standing firmly by our own guiding beliefs and convictions in meeting and overcoming these challenges, so as to ensure our safe navigation through the storms ahead.

In two and a half years of travelling the planet, I have been staggered by the vast reservoirs of goodwill towards our country, our values and our culture. All of this can be mobilised to continue to protect our interests, promote our reputation and underpin our welfare and national survival.

But – and there is a 'but' – this goodwill is directed at the UK as a nation and as a key network partner. The less we are viewed merely as a compliant appendage of Washington or of Brussels the higher our reputation will stand. Of course we need the clout of the EU in certain areas, and of course we need a good and close alliance with our American allies. But we also need – more and more - the family connections which the modern Commonwealth brings. We should spend more time with our family.

# THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL TERM: PRESSURES, PRIORITIES AND THE PLACE OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

**Transcript of a lecture given by Sir Nigel Sheinwald GCMG**

4th December 2012

**Sir Nigel Sheinwald GCMG** *is a former British diplomat. His last appointment was as British Ambassador to the United States from 2007 to 2012. He was previously Foreign Policy and Defence Adviser to the Prime Minister (2003-2007) and British Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the European Union in Brussels (2000-2003). Since leaving the FCO, he has joined the board of Royal Dutch Shell and been appointed Visiting Professor in War Studies at King's College, London. He supports the activities of the Ditchley Foundation, Centre for European Reform, Business for New Europe and British-American Business.*

Thank you all for being here first of all, and thank you to Global Strategy Forum and to you, Lord Lothian. You have built this institution up and have very wide experience, but of course, it was one of your predecessors as a Lord Lothian who was an Ambassador in Washington, briefly in 1939-1940, and whose name I think is still on one of the guest rooms in the Residence there, so we are very conscious of your family's involvement in international affairs over the generations.

In this lecture I am going to try to do four things. I am going to try and say a few words about the election itself. I am going to try and describe the emerging Obama Doctrine. I am going to try to set out a few of Obama's second term priorities, particularly in relation to China and Iran and lastly, I will discuss Europe's role and American concerns about the euro, but also about the British role in Europe.

Let me just say a few words about the election. The former Governor of New York, Mario Cuomo, who in the end never ran for President, had the phrase that '*you campaign in poetry and you govern in prose*'. In this election, they never really campaigned in poetry – it was not the most edifying election campaign, but it did get going in the last month or so. It was mainly decided on the issues of the economy, personality and leadership skills. Foreign policy and national security were really not major issues. They flared after the death of the American Ambassador in Libya, but they did not really come to the fore of the campaign for two reasons, I think.

First, Obama had immunised himself to a great extent from the traditional Republican charge that the Democrats do not look after national security by his handling of Osama bin Laden, by the drone attacks, by the death of al-Awlaki in Yemen, so it was difficult to criticise him for being weak with that backdrop. And second, broadly his policies (which I am going on to describe) have been very much in tune with public opinion and he had an edge all the way through the campaign in the opinion polls on his handling of foreign policy and national security.

What emerged from Election Day is a very interesting snapshot of a new demographic - certainly for the future - today in America, with the increased importance of the Hispanic American and Asian American votes, and also the size of the African American vote that was for Obama. For those of

us who have been watching America, it has been a long time since we have relied in any way on the traditional east coast elites on foreign policy or anything else. That was something of the past, but that has certainly been reinforced by the picture of tomorrow's America which emerged on Election Day.

I want to start with the economy. I am not going to spend a lot of time on it, but the economy is obviously the number one issue, not just for Americans, but actually for the rest of the world as well. The economy and how it will fare, whether they are able to deal with this set of fiscal issues, the short-term aspects of which they are dealing with now, will be the dominant theme for the next Administration. It is the relationship between the risk of dysfunction in the American political system (which is one of America's real weaknesses going forward, the difficulty of making strategic economic decisions) combined with what we assume must be quite a debate going on in the Republican Party about their future economic policy and their soul.

So there are major issues at stake there for America and for the rest of us, in particular whether Obama and the - maybe slightly chastened, but only slightly chastened - Republican leadership can, first of all, deal with the fiscal cliff before the end of this year, but then can forge some sort of bipartisan agreement on the big issues of fiscal policy and also issues like immigration policy where the Republicans will want to present themselves differently to that Hispanic minority I was talking about before. In this term, unlike his first term, I think the markets will be much more unforgiving in relation to fiscal issues in America as they see the projections of the size of American debt towards the end of this decade. It is very, very important that they deal with this and get this under control over the next couple of years.

Now in foreign policy, Michael sketched out the terrain. The fact is that, with a re-elected President, we can expect continuity of a kind, but the degree of change and volatility in world affairs mean that things will seem anything but static and I just wanted to sketch out what I think are the main elements of Obama's foreign policy and the sort of emerging doctrine which you can derive from them.

The broad aim since he got into office has been to get out of costly ground wars, first in Iraq, now in Afghanistan, and to accentuate America's long-term and complex partnerships with China, India and the other emerging powers. That explains largely the Asia-Pacific pivot or rebalancing that Michael talked about and it is a deliberate attempt to align the American national interest more with foreign policy, with nation-building very much beginning at home.

That does not mean, to my mind, that America is ready to or needs to give up global leadership. It is not what they want. The relationship between American and China today is not the relationship between Britain and America a century ago. It is not as though the baton of world leadership is going to pass peacefully from one country to another. Some Americans, being on the psychological defensive over the past few years, already think the Chinese economy is larger than theirs. The majority of Americans actually think that, even though the Chinese economy is half the size of America's today. And of course China's economy will overtake the United States over the next decade or so at some point, but American per capita wealth may never be overtaken by China or the other emerging countries.

At the same time as we have looked again at the growth rates and growth models in the BRICS,

we have looked at the foundations of American power in the period ahead and they look a little bit better. They are going to have a generation at least, of cheap energy. Their demographic profile is very, very much more favourable than their competitors in Europe or China or Japan. They still have a remarkable edge in innovation and higher education and research. Sixty of the world's top universities are American, fifteen of the top twenty. Now these are things which will change over time, over decades, as the Chinese, Indian and other universities start to move up the pecking order, but that is a huge advantage that the United States still has.

Despite 2008 and 2009, they still have a very strong financial sector and they have a degree of geostrategic comfort that China certainly does not have. They are easy in their hemisphere, they are not threatened in their hemisphere compared with the uneasy regional relationships that China has. And they still have allies. The capacity to acquire and retain allies is a great American virtue, a great American asset in this networked world that we are in.

So, I think America will remain the most powerful country in the world for some decades to come, but it wants to exercise that leadership differently. And Obama wants to do that at lower risk, militarily and politically and financially, and that involves the acceptance of limits, not just on American military power, but also on American influence and I think if you look at the way that the Administration handled the Arab Spring, consistently standing back, not wanting to pretend that they could control things which were out of their control, or intervene in ways which might be counterproductive - that is a good example of that.

Now, you can exaggerate the difference. It is not as though America has been able, at any time in my former professional existence, just to snap its fingers and things would happen, as in a recent film about the hostage taking in Iran in 1979/1980. That did not feel like a period where America was on top of things, either domestically or internationally, so you can exaggerate the extent to which things have radically altered, but there has been a change. We are in a much more unstructured and contested world. America is the only power that has genuinely global ambitions and a genuinely global capacity to have some impact in the areas she is operating in, but, nevertheless, that ability to operate is incomplete and leads to that sense of no single country being in control, which I think a number of us feel.

And that has led to this cautious and selective use of force which one of Obama's own team, maybe unwisely, called 'leading from behind' - that was at the time of the Libya episode last year. I think that was trying to capture a couple of things. It was trying to capture, first of all, areas of the world, issues where there was not a direct and overriding American national interest, number one; where they did not feel they were in control of events, number two; and number three, where there was a possibility, by standing back a little, of drawing allies in. I think there is an element of after the event rationalisation about that.

And that policy, that deliberation which is Obama's personal style, can sometimes lead to triangulation. It can lead to a balancing of policy outcomes as in Afghanistan, where at the end of 2009, Obama decided that he would go with the surge that he had been so strongly recommended to adopt by his military commanders, but at the same time he was going to do it with so little passion and giving it so little time, that the surge was to be reversed within about a year and a half of it going in. So the surge had its own counter meaning built into the policy, the counter meaning being one of relative pessimism by that stage about the outcome in Afghanistan.

This sort of foreign policy, where everything is very, very carefully thought through, very little reliance on instinct or ideology, can be a bit unpredictable for allies. It is very different from the more assertive, clearer American policies that we have seen in the past and sometimes found difficult to deal with for that reason. It is sometimes difficult for allies to penetrate exactly how these things are going to come out.

Now despite that Asia pivot that I was talking about, American foreign policy is going to remain global in the decades ahead, rebalanced maybe towards the Asia-Pacific, but America is going to stay involved in the Middle East. The growing energy independence will reduce that somewhat, it will certainly reduce any sense of psychological intimidation from the Middle East which Americans may have felt in the past. But there are many other reasons why America will stay involved. They will need to continue to protect Israel. There is a wide American support for that and that will not change in the period ahead, not dramatically, I feel. They will have to continue to deal with Iran – we will come onto that in a moment - and of course, the counterterrorist threats still come very much from the Middle East, from East Africa and from South Asia. So this is not a part of the world that the US is going, in a black and white sense, to retreat from.

They have a number of defence tools at their disposal, despite what will be a shrinking defence budget - this is a defence budget which is still larger than the next twelve or thirteen defence budgets in the world combined. In Asia, the accent is on presence, particularly naval presence. But you will also have seen the decision on the Marines, the small number of Marines going into Australia. So it is naval presence, reassurance to regional partners and allies. And elsewhere, the stress is on agility and speed, on technological edge and on stealth, so you see the accent on cyber and special operations and the use of drones, which is bound to bring increased legal complexities as the second term goes on, but I, for one, cannot see that fundamental policy being given up, because it fits Obama's template of wanting to continue to have effect, but at a lower risk.

This is an Administration which is going to continue to be very White House-focused in the way that it makes decisions. Most foreign policies are ultimately decided in the White House, most Presidents tend to take this area for themselves. That has been more pronounced under the Obama Administration than previously and there will not be a Bob Gates, there will not be a Hillary Clinton in the Administration in the second term and I cannot see their possible successors being as powerful as they were, in different ways, in the way that the Administration ran its foreign policy.

Now as far as priorities are concerned, probably the most important for the long term, is the relationship that Obama strikes up with the new Chinese leadership and I think his aim there will be to maintain a balance between the traditionally co-operative and competitive elements in American policy towards China. I think he has kept that balance pretty well - maybe one or two populist elements during the election campaign itself, but by and large, he has avoided that populism in his economic and trade policies towards China and really the Asia-Pacific policy has been one of the reasons why he has renewed his interest in using allies and partners in the ways that he has in the Asia-Pacific region, but maybe more generally as well.

I do not think this is going to be a very easy area of policy. It is obvious from reading scholarly literature, from reading what is going on in China, that there is a huge risk of mutual misunderstanding between China and the United States. There is a clear potential flashpoint between China and Japan and this will require the most skilful, very careful management by Obama in the period ahead, but

I think that this will be an area that they will give priority to, and they will want to maintain that balance I was talking about before.

If that is the long-term requirement, the most immediate set of issues are probably those in the Middle East and particularly the problem of Iran, which will be high up in his in tray as he enters his second term. And Obama, I think, will approach the Iran issue in 2013 in much the same way as he has approached it before, with some caution, but unlike the situation that would have arisen if it had been President Romney, there is now a chance of putting additional emphasis on the negotiating track of western policy.

So that means for me that the track which involves the P5 countries plus Germany, the P5+1 strand continues, as a framework for negotiations, but the aim would be, I would hope anyway, to build a US-Iranian channel of some kind, which can work in parallel. The Administration tried to do that in 2009, it did not work for a number of reasons, not least the theft of the Iranian election which changed the politics in both Iran and American in the middle of 2009. So it will not be straightforward given the Iranian elections in the middle of the year, the need to persuade Israel after their own elections to hold off, but it seems to me to be absolutely right to try to exhaust all the possibilities and to broaden the agenda with Iran if possible, to test whether there is some measure of reassurance that can be given to the Iranians before any serious consideration is given to military options, conceivably by the United States itself.

And on the Arab Spring, obviously very much in the headlines at the moment, with events in Syria and Egypt and elsewhere, I do not think their policy will fundamentally change. There is obviously a shift both here and in America towards giving more direct support to the rebels in Syria, but I think there will be some redlines that they will not be crossing, including that all-important area of avoiding the deployment of ground troops in these Middle East countries.

And not to forget - and with Sherard coming, how could I forget - Afghanistan and Pakistan, a very difficult drawdown of forces over the next two years, before the end of 2014, and some difficult political decisions for Obama on what America and the rest of us will leave behind with Afghan elections in 2014 and a very problematic relationship with Pakistan, where I would think they have fairly low ambitions for what can be achieved over the next few years.

Now where does Europe fit into all this? Arguably our main interest is in the American economy recovering and remaining as open as possible. There were pinpricks of American protectionism over the past few years, since the financial crisis of 2008 and the recession. Nothing major, but nevertheless, not a healthy atmosphere and a very different atmosphere on trade from the 1990s. I do not think that is going to be revived, but there is a chance in 2013 of getting a round of EU-US negotiations on a free trade area going, on the basis that the Doha Round of international trade negotiations looks unlikely to get going again and that regional trade talks probably are the short-term answer and I hope that does happen next year.

In foreign policy, I think the key point is that Europe is going to have to continue to make this adjustment to a more mature view of its role. It is twenty years since the end of the Cold War. Europe is not the main theatre of American foreign policy concern, but we are a source of military and political support and the future of our relationship really depends on the quality of our partnership and that requires effort on both sides. It has been a pretty mixed record so far. There are some pluses

which are worth mentioning. US-EU handling of Iran has been actually a very big success story, both in the toughness of the sanctions that we have adopted, but also in persuading Americans since the middle of the last decade to adopt this two-track approach, to keep a balanced approach to the issue, to avoid any encouragement to Israel. In fact, rather the opposite - to dissuade Israel on a couple of occasions from going ahead with military action. I think that has been an effective policy. It has not yet changed Iranian strategy fundamentally, but it has been the right policy.

I think Libya was a success for Europe and America. It would not have happened without David Cameron and President Sarkozy. This was a case where Obama was uncertain where to go. He eventually defined the military operation that NATO conducted in a more ambitious way, but it was very uncertain that he would be involved initially and it would not have happened without Cameron and Sarkozy taking the political risk and being very clear that they wanted to take on this initiative.

Burma may be a smaller issue, but nevertheless an area where Europe and America have so far co-ordinated successfully the signals being given to Burma and in Burma on the relaxation of sanctions and the reintegration of Burma in the international economy.

Handling the Arab Spring: I cannot say that it has been a success in an absolute sense, but we have had broadly the same approaches to it and have broadly the same set of instruments available.

Less good without going into great detail: handling of Russia - always an area of European difficulty because of our relative disunity on that subject; the very variable European response to the military action in Afghanistan; Pakistan, where very few of our European allies sense, as we do, the strategic importance of Pakistan; the Middle East Peace Process where Europeans continue to be frustrated by the lack of progress and tend to blame America for not putting enough effort in, whether that is fair or not; and lastly the Asia-Pacific region itself, a priority for America, a priority for all of us commercially, but it is not obvious that anyone in Europe is putting together any coherent policy on the political and security side, or whether we have assets or ambition to do that, working with America and other partners in the area. So, as I say, it is a pretty patchy picture.

And as for our relationship, the UK-US relationship, I do feel that it is time for us in Britain to be a little bit less defensive and obsessive about it. For both the US and the UK, it really is not a question of history and sentiment alone, the relationship has to serve our national interests and be seen to. It is damaging to the British Government, if it is seen to subjugate policy to transatlantic good relations.

I think Obama and his Administration does understand the importance of allies. They may not have come into office realising the importance of those relationships, but I think it is one of those things they have picked up during the first term. And they will see a very strong UK role, not just in defence and intelligence, but also on trade policy, on development, on knowledge of the subcontinent and the Middle East, our influence in multilateral institutions and a global mindset and that is a mix they will not get really from anyone else, and Obama will hear about that without us having to bruit it, from his own briefings, from his own conversations in the White House, and he will hear how the UK contributes to shared security and economic goals, week by week.

Now this is not a world where America has a large number of other potential allies with that breadth of assets available, who are more capable, more strong-willed than the UK. We have access

still, we have a candid and a deep way of working between our political systems and our military chains of command and we have that opportunity to influence, and that to me remains a valuable commodity in a world where the United States will continue for the decades ahead to be the world's number one economic and political power.

Now the main American preoccupation in Europe is, of course, the euro and that means constant interaction with Germany - the President, the Treasury Secretary, the Federal Reserve Chairman in a constant dialogue with their German opposite numbers. But the US also worries about the difficult period the United Kingdom is going through economically, and the impact that that is having on our defence, intelligence and foreign policy budgets, and there has not been a dramatic or radical reaction so far, but it is worth noting that our final decision on Trident is going to come in Obama's second term and they are watching very closely our debate here on Europe. A Britain on the sidelines of Europe would not plainly be in the American interests, either strategically or in terms of American financial and wider business interests.

So it is difficult, as our Chairman was saying earlier, to enter the next Presidential term with huge confidence, given the state of the world that we are in. I heard one very eminent British academic a couple of weeks ago, surveying the scene and he concluded that of all the issues that we had discussed, that he was most optimistic about Iran, which was a sure sign that the rest of it was pretty gloomy. My analysis points, of course, to a fair degree of continuity in the approach, in the underpinning of this re-elected President, but I do not think it will feel like that, given the pressures and given the volatility in the world around us.

So thank you very much and I now look forward to some questions.

# NONE THE WISER: REFLECTIONS ON THREE DECADES AS A BRITISH DIPLOMAT

**Transcript of a lecture given by Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG LVO**

10th December 2012

**Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG LVO** *has been the Business Development Director, International at BAE Systems plc since February 2011. He served as the Foreign Secretary's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009-2010. He took Early Retirement from the Diplomatic Service in October 2010. Sherard was British Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2007-2009. He returned to Kabul as Chargé d'Affaires in the spring of 2010. He was British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 2003-2007. Before that he served as British Ambassador to Israel from 2001-2003. He was Head of the Foreign Office Hong Kong Department for over three years leading up to the handover of the Territory in 1997. In 1999-2001, he worked as Principal Private Secretary to the then British Foreign Secretary, the late Robin Cook. His book, 'Cables from Kabul: The Inside Story of the West's Afghanistan Campaign', was published in 2011, and 'Ever the Diplomat: Confessions of a Foreign Office Mandarin', was published in October 2012.*

Thank you very much, Malcolm. This lecture was not my idea - and I am more than slightly embarrassed to be here with a very distinguished former Conservative Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, and also the best Conservative Foreign Secretary we never had, Michael Ancram, Lord Lothian - and I am flattered that so many of you should have turned out to hear my remarks.

I was told, because it was Christmas, I had to entertain you as much as inform you and that this should be a festive occasion as much as a serious foreign policy occasion. So what I thought I would do is adopt the model which Nikolaus Pevsner uses in his magnificent series, *The Buildings of England*, in which he starts every chapter with an account of the serious public buildings, the civic buildings, the churches, of the area which he is studying, and then goes, insofar as Pevsner can ever be flippant, on what he calls a perambulation and he wanders round Ealing or Chelsea or Southport or wherever it may be, and casts in his rather Teutonic fashion, aspersions on some of the horrible buildings, as he describes them.

So what I thought I would do, in the first quarter of an hour or so, is say something serious about foreign policy, some of the bits in my book which the critics do not seem to reach, and then treat you to a few anecdotes. I am not here to sell the book surprisingly – I have earned everything I am ever going to earn from the book at about 50p a copy and frankly I do not particularly care whether you buy it or not, but it is very nice of you to come along!

Now certainly the Silks among us will remember the famous story of Lord Birkenhead, when, as F. E. Smith, he had finished his submission to the Judge, and the Judge said to him, 'Mr. Smith, I've heard your evidence and I have to say I'm none the wiser', and like a flash, Lord Birkenhead/F.E. Smith said, 'None the wiser, my Lord, but very much better informed.' And that is rather as I feel after just over three decades in the Diplomatic Service - certainly better informed about the world

and the way it works, both abroad and at home, but whether I am much the wiser, I rather doubt.

Some of you may know or remember that I started my first book about the experience of working in and on Afghanistan for three and a half years, which was an experience I would not have missed for all the world, an absolutely passionate experience of real public policy in a way which mattered above all for the lives of ordinary British servicemen and women; but I began that book rather pompously, by quoting (but not comparing myself to) Thucydides and saying that he wrote his history of the war between the Athenians and the Spartans in the hope that in recording the mistakes that men had made, he would encourage men not to repeat those mistakes, and he said this was a 'κτῆμα ές ἀεὶ', a 'possession for all time'. But then rather disarmingly, he ended the preface by saying, 'although I have recorded this history, I know that human nature does not change and that despite all my efforts, men are probably going to repeat those mistakes again and again and again, because human nature is human nature.'

And then at the very end of my second book in looking through the rear-view mirror at Afghanistan, I cite an American academic and political advisor, a former very distinguished officer in the United States Marine Corps, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, the man best known, of course, for photocopying at great length, the Pentagon Papers and then leaking them to the New York Times among others. He wrote rather interestingly in 1972, an essay which I think would strike a chord with the former Secretary of State for Defence, Bob Ainsworth, who is with us here this afternoon, called *The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine* and this essay, I was glad to see, was quoted not long ago by Larry Summers in one of his regular columns for the Financial Times, but in relation to the euro crisis.

And in this essay he struggled to come to terms with the reasons why 'the best and the brightest' advising a young first-term Democratic Senator who had become President, John F. Kennedy, knew that the American strategy in South Vietnam both could not work and would not work, but carried on saying that while challenges remained, progress was being made. Those around President Kennedy, including the young Daniel Ellsberg, knew that simply putting a few more advisors into the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the infamous MACV, would not work, that essentially one needed to double or quits: one needed to put in several hundred thousand troops and garrison the country for perhaps fifty years, or one needed to move out. And in neither case would one succeed unless one had a credible political offer to the people of South Vietnam - and no one in the White House was so stupid as to believe that the Diem regime was a really credible offer to the people of South Vietnam.

And then the other day, I re-read perhaps the best book of contemporary history, certainly that I have ever read, Barbara Tuchman's *The March of Folly*, in which she asks herself why unreason triumphs so often over reason in public affairs, in international affairs, in the governance of foreign policy, in which she looks at the Trojan Horse, the Renaissance Popes, the loss of Britain's colonies in North America and above all, the Vietnam War, and points out that so often in foreign policy, the choice is between the unpalatable and the catastrophic, but that in most cases (and certainly in all the cases she examines) those responsible for making policy and at least those responsible for advising those making policy, know, if they ask themselves honestly, which is the less bad course, but, for reasons which Ellsberg pointed to in his essay, somehow it becomes easier to muddle along, marching towards the cliff of unreason, rather than taking the radical steps needed to correct course, to adopt, to go for the unpalatable option rather than the catastrophic option. That somehow it is easier to avoid short-term pain, even if you know in the long term that it is likely to cause serious problems.

Now I came across only three examples in my thirty years in the Diplomatic Service of where officials at least, I think, connived at what was objectively and obviously the wrong choice, and in this I often except from blame the politicians themselves, because they are responding to a different set of stimuli, but the job of their professional advisers, just as the job of your solicitor or your doctor or your accountant, is to give you the best possible objective advice.

And the three examples I point to are: first, the one to which Malcolm referred, the way in which we handled the handover of Hong Kong. Now I came to this only in 1994 after the great strategic decisions had been made in the summer of 1992, and as I say in the book, Chris Patten was really my ideal kind of politician in every way, and the main reason why I was so enthusiastic about being appointed the Head of the Hong Kong Department was the pleasure of working with someone as talented as Chris Patten.

But then, actually on my 40th birthday, I had this profound shock of discovering that the Governor and some of those round him in Hong Kong wanted unilaterally to break off negotiations with the Chinese over the judiciary in Hong Kong and the 'through train' for judges appointed under British sovereignty, and table immediately in the Legislative Council, a bill proceeding with arrangements for the judiciary without Chinese assent. In other words, to repeat over the judiciary the problems which we had had two years earlier over the legislature.

Now this faced me with a most appalling dilemma, because we had intelligence that the Chinese wanted to continue negotiations, that they were very worried about confidence in Hong Kong after the handover, that they wanted, if possible, for judges appointed under British rule to continue to sit in Hong Kong after the transfer to Chinese sovereignty. And I flew back to London in something of a quandary and consulted a number of experts on China, of which I was not one. Some of them said to me: 'Well, if you want to save your career, it's best to go along with what the Governor wants, it's better not to create waves, it's his judgment, not yours, you're only an official' and of course the Governor of Hong Kong was a very big political beast who had managed the political campaigns not just of the Foreign Secretary, but who had also won the election for the then Prime Minister.

I had commissioned a study by the Foreign Office Research Department of what had gone wrong in 1992, when I discovered that the Governor had not been told of private exchanges between the British Foreign Secretary and the Chinese Foreign Minister, and had not formally been warned of the likely Chinese reaction to going so far and so fast in extending the franchise in Hong Kong. The only Foreign Office official to warn him was the rather unfortunate British Chargé in Beijing, who sent what was described as a courageous telegram, saying this would provoke a very fierce reaction from Beijing, particularly if it was announced before it had been shown to the Chinese in private, and he was sent back a personal telegram saying that this sort of advice was not welcome, the instruction on officials was to support the Governor in whatever he wanted to do.

Anyhow, after many sleepless nights and much worry, I decided that I had to, in all duty, in all conscience, say that I thought on this the Governor was wrong, that it was not right or necessary to break off negotiations unilaterally, and to his great credit, the Foreign Secretary for whom this was not easy, disagreeing with one of his closest friends in politics, said to the Permanent Secretary that he wanted to continue to receive objective independent advice from officials in London, even if it did not track with what the Governor and those around him in Hong Kong were saying.

In the end I was saved from this dilemma because one of the big beasts in the political jungle, Tarzan, the Deputy Prime Minister, swung into action. Michael Heseltine was flying to China with a jumbo jet full of businessmen and did not want anything done to disrupt that visit before it took place. In the end, the team in Hong Kong decided to do a deal rather surprisingly with the Chinese, offering concessions that we would not have dared recommend in London, and the dilemma evaporated. But it was a damn close-run thing, and if the bill had been tabled in LegCo unilaterally in February 1995, the Chinese would have broken off negotiations. It would have ended all dialogue on the judiciary and we would have been faced with the prospect of handing the Chinese both a carte blanche to appoint a puppet legislature, but I think even more damagingly for Hong Kong and for the prosperity and security of the territory and of six million Chinese, we would have enabled the Chinese, to their embarrassment, to have to appoint their own set of judges.

The second example I quote in the book is the one of Iraq, where I was luckily spared the dilemma of officials serving in London, of dealing with this agonisingly difficult problem. I sat in Tel Aviv, accredited to one of the few governments which enthusiastically supported invading and occupying not just Iraq but probably as many Muslim countries or Arab countries as the neocons could get round to invading and occupying. So I had no difficulty with my host government, and I confess that I read the intelligence that I was shown in Tel Aviv, and I was certainly convinced from what I saw, that Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass Destruction. What I was not convinced of was the need to invade and occupy Iraq in the spring of 2003. I could not see why the policy of containment was not working, but that was not my business.

But people back in London were faced with this appalling dilemma and it is of course the subject of an Inquiry, the results of which we will see next year, but there were plenty of officials who found this extremely difficult to deal with. One of them, actually in the chain of command on Iraq, said to me about a year ago, that he knew that he was having to trim his advice to what the Prime Minister wanted, but he said it was very difficult: 'I couldn't resign, I'd got two children at boarding school, I couldn't possibly have hoped to have found in short order a job that would have paid the school fees for my children, so I'm afraid I did the dishonourable thing, but I swam with the tide' and who is to second-guess somebody caught in that position? It is extremely difficult.

Another senior official said to me the other day that he thought the invasion of Iraq was illegitimate, but because of the last-minute somersault by the Attorney General finding it legal on the basis of a Security Council Resolution passed in 1991, he decided that because the invasion was not actually illegal, but 'nevertheless I thought it was illegitimate', he too could go along with what was proposed.

Now, easy for me, easy for outsiders and we will have to see what Chilcot says, but there were many, many people who knew that invading and occupying Iraq, especially without anything approaching a credible plan for securing and governing the country after it had been occupied, especially alongside a country of such limited strategic stamina as the United States, was wrong, but very few chose to say so, at least in terms that confronted a Foreign Secretary who was obviously wavering with unambiguous official advice, and we know what happened.

Afghanistan. I go round this country talking about Afghanistan and I find very few people who can actually subscribe to a strategy which involves garrisoning selectively parts of the country with our own forces, and then substituting our own forces with those of an Afghan army and police force

whose loyalty, stamina and ethnic mix, to put it mildly, raise questions about how long they are going to continue the job after our forces leave. That is the bad news. The good news is, of course, that keeping Afghanistan together is not a military problem, it is a political problem, and garrisoning it with any number of forces this side of half a million is not likely to work.

I recall in the book, General Dan McNeill of the 82nd Airborne Division, an officer proud never to have served north of the Mason-Dixon Line, saying to me one evening in Kabul, that, 'Sherard, to do this properly, I need half a million men' and I discovered only the other day that the Commander of the 2ème Division Blindée, the 2ème DB, General Leclerc, on being sent out as Commander in Chief to Indo-China by France after the war, cabled back to Paris that in order to do Indo-China properly, he would need at least half a million men. Half a million men and fifty years.

None of our forebears, above all not the greatest of Viceroys of British India, and a great Conservative Foreign Secretary whose statue stands outside the office where Llyr Jones and I work every day, George Nathaniel Curzon, none of them would have believed that building forts across the Pathan lands and filling them with soldiers, whether they are from the 3rd Battalion The Rifles or the Tajiks of the north of Afghanistan, was somehow going to hold the country together.

And this question again arises: why, if nobody who knows anything about Afghanistan, why if no intelligent politician really believes in a strategy of garrisoning the country and handing it over to forces commanded by President Karzai, why do we carry on? And the answer of course is to be found in Barbara Tuchman's book, in Daniel Ellsberg's essay and, I think, in Bob Woodward's damning book, *Obama's Wars*, in which he shows rather as 'the best and the brightest' round an earlier young Democrat Senator-become-President, did not believe the strategy would work, so those closest to President Obama never believed that the surge, on its own, could possibly work, that there is a place in grand strategy for the intelligent, selective use of applied force, but force without strategy, without politics, is never going to work.

And that was tacitly recognised by Mrs. Clinton in a lecture which she gave to the Asia Society of New York in February 2011 in memory of my friend and colleague, the late Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. In that lecture, Mrs. Clinton promised a political surge, a diplomatic surge, to accompany the military surge which was then under way. But that surge has not really materialised and the result, I fear, is all too similar to the results we have seen when Britain pulled out of India in a hurry in August 1947 without attempting a political solution to the problem of Kashmir, the problem a year later when we pulled out of Palestine a year early, or much earlier than planned, without attempting a political solution. And then twenty years later after a Labour government had announced that we would be staying in Aden forever, a sterling crisis loomed and in November 1967 we left South Arabia without a political solution. In all those cases, the problems are with us today.

So, that really brings the serious part of the talk to an end and we can now embark on the pre-Christmas perambulation. With just one coda. I was sitting at dinner the other night opposite a distinguished foreign Ambassador in London, and I was talking to him about *The March of Folly* and he said to me, 'It's funny you should mention *The March of Folly*, because I've just been re-reading it and I've just sent a cable back to my headquarters (I won't say in which European capital) entitled *Britain and Europe: The March of Folly*, and in this cable I ask, "is Britain sleepwalking towards separation from Europe?"' No one pretends that working with the Europeans is particularly palatable, but the alternative of a Britain in mid-Atlantic with the United States turning towards the

Pacific was catastrophic in his view, and he had entitled his cable (which one day perhaps we will be able to extract from the archives of a European foreign ministry) 'The March of Folly'. And let us hope that Britain in having to face this choice between the unpalatable and the catastrophic, does not take the wrong course.

And so finally to the perambulation.

I would not have missed the 32 years I spent in the Diplomatic Service for anything in the world, certainly not the career at the Bar that I had hoped to pursue or the rewards of Warburgs Merchant Bank, and the fun we had, the professionalism of working with colleagues of the calibre I did, who actually believed in teamwork.

One of the differences I find between the public sector and the private sector is that in business people do not write things down. The problem perhaps in the public sector is that too many people write too much down, but it is done at least in the Foreign Office, and certainly since the advent of classified e-mail, in a spirit of teamwork and in the knowledge that, with exceptions, and especially at the very top, promotion is mostly on merit, that there is very little office politics, and so I really did love those years and start the book by saying that it is in many ways a love letter to the diplomatic career.

I recall the incident in Cairo when I started, when I had prepared a card in Arabic and English. I was very proud of this, no one else in the Embassy had a card with Arabic on the other side because all our cards were then supplied from London. They came out embossed with tissue paper, utterly useless because they had no information on them, but entirely elegant. As someone once said at RUSI about a draft by me: 'Typical Foreign Office, Sherard, delightfully elegant but utterly irrelevant'.

Anyhow, instead of these rather elegant cards which were sent out by the Personnel Services Department after one had filled in the requisite form, I had printed a local card at a rather rough and ready printer in downtown Cairo and on leaving, I showed this to my successor, Michael Crawford, who many of you will know in one of his many different manifestations, but one of those is as a rather more distinguished Arabist than me, and on looking at my card, my title then was 'Second Secretary (Information)', Michael turned it over, looked at the Arabic, noticed that there was a mistake there and that rather unfortunately an accent was missing, and that for three years I had been handing out to the Egyptians cards which announced me in Arabic as 'Second Secretary (Flags)' and no Egyptian had either been pedantic or well-educated enough to point this out to me, but I suspect the real reason was - and there is at least one Admiral in the audience today - that they thought that there really was, in the British Embassy in Garden City, a 'Second Secretary (Flags)'!

Just as, many years later, I recall visiting the three armoured brigades then in Germany and the last and most elegant of them was commanded by one of the most elegant and exuberant of our cavalry officers, Brigadier Arthur Denaro, late of the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars, and on arriving at Rheindahlen, I was greeted by a young escort officer, a rather languid foppish figure, from one of our more languid and foppish cavalry regiments, and I asked him what his job at the Rhine Army Headquarters consisted of, and he said, 'Well, I organise the Rhine Army summer horse show, that's my main job, and then I put on a couple of hunter trials in the winter', and I was rather amused to hear that. Even more amused and delighted to hear that he favoured the replacement of the

Main Battle Tanks, then littered across the Lüneburger Heide, with a modern advanced armoured reconnaissance vehicle, something that I as a military anorak had long favoured.

I reported this to my boss in London that we ought to be supporting the MOD in its efforts to get the British Army a modern, fast, well-armoured reconnaissance vehicle. He then rather vaguely copied it to our Ambassador to NATO, who copied it to the British Military Representative at NATO, who copied it back to the Chief of the General Staff, who exploded. This was none of the Foreign Office's business, second-guessing the British Army on the sort of equipment it should have, and a rebuke was sent from the CGS down to the Commanding Officer of the Rhine Army, down to Brigadier Denaro telling him that his young officers should not talk to Foreign Office officials about equipment issues. In fact, of course, still today, the British Army does not have what it needs and deserves, which is a modern, fast, armoured reconnaissance vehicle.

Other stories in the book include my buying, as at least one of you here did, a seersucker suit from Brooks Brothers in order to accompany the Queen on a State visit to Texas and Florida, and I was immensely proud of this suit and when the Queen arrived at the airbase, I stood at the bottom of the steps in this suit, on its first outing, and the Queen, followed by the Foreign Secretary's minister in attendance came down, there was the line-up and then she got into the limousine and drove away and the Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary, Richard Gozney, who had been standing behind the Duke of Edinburgh and the Queen, said, 'Sherard, I think you should just know what the Queen said to Prince Philip. She said, "What *is* that man wearing?"' So the suit was rapidly disposed of.

There are plenty of other stories about a man by whom I was very surprised to be chosen as his Private Secretary. I had hardly met him, I hardly knew him, the late great Robin Cook. He was the most difficult of bosses, the most awkward of men, but I developed a strange affection for him and a respect for his single-minded determination to focus on what would be called today outcomes rather than process.

He used to infuriate the upper levels of the Foreign Office by ringing up the desk officer for Chile direct and asking for advice on policy. Under-Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries in the Foreign Office think that the Foreign Secretary's job is to hold meetings with them and they all troop solemnly into his great office and say 'on the one hand, on the other hand, Secretary of State' and they all troop out. Robin Cook could not stand office meetings. I told him that he had to meet his ministerial team and he reluctantly agreed and he began the meeting by saying, 'I've been told I've got to have a meeting with you, I've got nothing to say to you, have you got anything to say to me?' This to his political colleagues!

He refused to deal with the then Permanent Secretary, who like Robin Cook, was a highly intelligent Scot who took no prisoners, and the Permanent Secretary constantly accused me of stopping him seeing the Foreign Secretary. In fact the reverse was the case. I was trying to persuade the Foreign Secretary to see the Permanent Secretary, and once I levered the Permanent Secretary into the diary on a Monday morning after the Foreign Secretary had been to the dentist, and my reward was to have Robin Cook come storming into the office, having been to the dentist, saying, 'Sherard, I cannot think of a worse way to start the week than the dentist followed by the Permanent Secretary!'

But I thought things were getting better when one day he came in and said to me (perhaps following the example of Peter Mandelson, who had bought a Golden Retriever), 'Sherard, I've decided to buy a dog'. I thought this might sort of soften his image, because he was actually very keen on racing and the country and riding and all that sort of thing, but then the effect was rather spoilt when he told me three days later that he had decided to buy not one but two dogs that were small, bearded, Scottish and aggressive: two Scottish Terriers who proceeded to attack American tourists in St. James's Park, and whom I found myself as Principal Private Secretary walking round St. James's Park on those infuriating extendable leashes.

But I will end with a story which I was told by Buckingham Palace who cleared the book, that I could not repeat in the Queen's own words, but I could repeat in the words of the second person who told the story, and this is the story of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia visiting Balmoral. After lunch the Queen asked him if he would like to see the estate and King Abdullah, perhaps feeling a siesta coming on, said no, but his Foreign Minister said, 'Yes, we would like to see the estate.' So the Royal Land Rovers were drawn up in front of the castle and the King was escorted out and helped into the front seat of the front Land Rover with an interpreter behind and to his surprise and I have to say, horror, into the driver's seat climbed the Queen. Now Abdullah had never knowingly been driven by a woman before, and I know one is not supposed to repeat what the Queen says, but she did say to me when I kissed hands on my appointment, that she thought perhaps he had been made rather nervous by this experience.

When I presented my credentials to the King, I said to him that I brought greetings from Her Majesty the Queen and that she recalled his visit to Balmoral with great pleasure. Immediately his face lit up and he said, 'It was one of the most terrifying experiences of my life.' And in his sort of Bedouin Arabic, he waved his finger at me and he said, 'I said to the Queen, look at the road, don't look at me!' And those of you, probably Lord Lothian, who have been driven by the Queen, I have not had the pleasure, but Englishmen and Scotsmen and Irishmen and Welshmen who have been driven by the Queen do confirm that, even if you are not the King of Saudi Arabia, it is quite a terrifying experience!

So thank you.

# OBAMA'S SECOND TERM: FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

**Transcript of a lecture given by Sir David Manning GCMG CVO**

22nd January 2013

**Sir David Manning GCMG CVO** *joined the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1972. He served in Warsaw, New Delhi, Paris and Moscow. From 1994-5 he was Head of Policy Planning; from 1995-8 Ambassador to Israel; and from 1998-2000 he was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence and Intelligence and a member of the Foreign Office Board. He was the UK Permanent Representative at NATO (Brussels) from 2000-2001 before returning to London as Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (2001-2003). He was then Ambassador to the United States for four years from 2003-2007. Sir David is a Director of Gatehouse Advisory Partners; and a Non Executive Director of the BG Group, and of Lockheed Martin UK. He is also a Member of the Council of Lloyd's of London. He is Chair of 'Ideas' at the London School of Economics.*

Thank you very much, Michael, for that introduction. Thank you for having me back. It is very nice to be here and can I just congratulate you on the Forum? I do think it is a remarkable success story. It has become part of the national conversation on foreign and security policy and it is a great tribute to you and your team that it has done so well.

I would like to make one thing absolutely clear to this audience before I begin, which is that I speak for nobody but myself. I want just to clarify that fact. I left government service nearly five years ago, so what you will get are the thoughts and opinions and prejudices for what they are worth of D. Manning, but they do not represent anybody else, so please do not go away from here thinking that you have heard anything but my private view. And can I just say: if there are Americans in the audience, I always feel slightly embarrassed telling Americans about their own country. So please feel free in the question and answer session to come back to me and correct me.

Michael has asked me to talk about the foreign policy priorities of the second term of the Obama presidency, but before I list what I think those might be, I want to give some context, because it is very important to think a little bit about the backdrop to what the President will be doing. The first thing is to say that foreign policy will not be the ultimate priority for this President. I am quite sure of that. Michael has already touched on isolationism, we might get into that later, but I would certainly agree with Gideon Rachman in the FT this morning, that domestic preoccupations will be the President's priorities.

He will anyway be faced with the whole question of fiscal balance over the next year. He and the Congress may have avoided the fiscal cliff on the 1st January, but there are plenty of excitements and dramas ahead, not least in the next few weeks, and trying to find some sort of modus vivendi with the Congress over tax, spending and debt will be an absolute top priority for the President this year and there may well be some alarms along the way. If he is to build on what has been the American economic recovery of the first term, it is essential that he is not, and the economy is not,

subject to unacceptable shocks to the system on the fiscal side in the next few months.

The recovery in the United States has been considerable. If you go back four years to the first Inauguration, the backdrop was very much darker than it is now, but the recovery remains fairly fragile. It looks pretty good if you are a European, I have to say, but, nevertheless, nursing it along and ensuring that the United States economy grows and prospers over the next four years is certainly going to be his top priority.

He has also made it clear that he has (what has become a tag word now) 'nation-building' in America at the top of his list. He is concerned about immigration and he may sense that there is an opportunity to do something about it. His predecessor George W. Bush wanted to do something about immigration, but his party, in my view, foolishly was unwilling at that stage to contemplate action on the immigration problem. Having seen the results of the Presidential election and the Congressional elections and the scale of the Hispanic vote for the Democrats, it may well be that this is an area that the Republicans will now be willing to engage in, not least for a sense of political survival. So I think he will try and do something about immigration.

He has also decided to lead with his chin on gun control. This is brave, if - in the eyes of many Europeans anyway - essential; and after the series of massacres, I think he has decided he is going to try to do something not least about assault weapons. This is a very tough agenda to be tackling, but it is all part and parcel of his desire to focus on America itself, rather than the wider world.

But of course the wider world will not go away and it will not wait and even if he wants to be a domestic President, the foreign and security policy imperatives will be there. He will not be able to avoid the pressures on the United States to be involved. There will be arguments about how far he will be involved. If the unipolar moment ever existed, it is obviously gone - but it is nevertheless the case that America, in the words of Madeleine Albright, remains the indispensable country for many international issues and whatever the wishes in Washington, I have no doubt that the President will find that he has got to be involved in many of the issues that will crop up in the next four years, whether or not he would prefer to use his energies elsewhere.

A couple of other points in this discussion about context and background. One is that he won very well. I am absolutely not with the right-wing shock jocks on American radio that this was not a big victory. This was a very big victory for the President in November. He won by 51% to 48%. He won in nearly every category of voter. He did that extraordinary thing post-2008: he is a leader of a leading western country who has been re-elected and only eighteen months ago there was lots of speculation that the President and his party would lose the Senate. They did not. They have held the Senate. They did extremely well, all things considered, in the Congressional election and they have shown that they are able to mobilise support on more than a one-off basis in 2008.

The President therefore, in my view, has real moral authority and political capital. He showed that he was prepared to use it in the approach he took to the fiscal cliff crisis of 1st January. I do not want to exaggerate this, it does not suddenly mean that he is able to make a recalcitrant and polarised Congress do his bidding, but I think that he has been re-elected in a way that gives him some real authority and I think that is important in international affairs as well as domestically. He is also a President who does not have to get elected again. That matters. That gives him more leeway domestically and, at the same time, makes him inclined to think more about legacy.

Finally, the foreign policy of the next four years as far as the United States is concerned, is going to be in the hands of a different team. Of course the White House is central, of course the President is central, but with the appointments of Senator Kerry as Secretary of State, former Senator Hagel as Secretary of Defense, and John Brennan at the CIA, you have a new top team of three. They are hugely experienced. John Kerry has enormous experience of foreign policy, of course he was a Presidential candidate himself. Chuck Hagel was equally very active on the Hill on foreign and security policy issues during his time in the Senate. Both of them have strong views of their own and are certainly going to be important in the policymaking process as well as the policy execution process. And John Brennan's experience will be very important in terms of the challenges in the terrorism world that lie ahead.

So what are the priorities? And how far does the President choose those priorities and how far do they choose themselves? Well, there are former Foreign Secretaries in this audience and I think they will know far better than me the extent to which foreign affairs imposes its own agenda, however much you might like to drive it yourself. Michael has already said in his introduction that last year the President was talking about the pivot to Asia and I think at the same time, the Administration was hoping to pivot away from the Middle East.

When I was in the States in November, so before Michael, the buzzword was 'rebalancing'. 'Pivot' seems to have been replaced by 'rebalancing', but the basic idea is the same, namely that the United States Administration wants to spend less time on the Middle East and more time on Asia. But that is easy to say and very hard to do and the President has been re-elected against the backdrop of the crisis with Iran. It feels less acute than it did last autumn, but nevertheless, it is waiting to burst upon us again. The Israelis have their elections today. This is an extremely important issue as far as Mr. Netanyahu is concerned and he seems likely to be re-elected.

Of course the Iran problem is one that we have been wrestling with for more than a decade. The issue for the President is: is he going to be able to resolve it peacefully in the next four years or are we going to be driven perhaps into some kind of military action? My own view is that he would much prefer to avoid the military option and I suspect that his team around him, the Kerry-Hagel team, is of that view too. However, I was struck when I was in the States in November - people reminded me that he has taken no option off the table and that it is not inconceivable that if all negotiated options fail, that he might be pushed into some kind of military response.

I hope that - and I hope that I do not hear about it, because I think if we do not hear about it, there is a much better chance of it working - there is going to be some sort of negotiation between the Administration and the Iranians about the way forward. If there is, it will have to be, in my view, a big negotiation. It is not going to work if it is confined to the nuclear issue itself. One of the problems in handling Iranian negotiators is this (as they would see it) fixation on a narrow front. The Iranians are living in a neighbourhood where their neighbours are nuclear: Pakistan, India, Russia, Israel and they have legitimate security concerns. We have to think about that in our approach to them. There are economic issues. Are we willing to engage with them economically, not least in developing the oil and gas industry? What is the recognition that the Iranians are going to need if they are to stop short of developing a nuclear capability and the weapons system to deliver it?

There are no easy answers here, but I very much hope that the Obama Administration will try to engage the Iranians on this and make this a priority and perhaps this will have to wait until the

elections and the stepping down of Ahmadinejad in the summer, but I hope that that will be a priority. I do not know that it will, but my own sense, when I was in the States two months ago, was that this is certainly something under discussion.

And then of course, even more urgent on a day-by-day basis, there is Syria. What is the Administration going to do about Syria even if it does not want to become involved on the ground, or directly involved and would like to see the regional actors and the Syrians themselves resolve this? There is quite a lot of pressure on Obama domestically, with 60,000 dead now and the risk that some of the insurgents are becoming ever more extreme, to take a more energetic role in deciding what to do about Syria. I do not think there is much appetite for it, but the risk of an imploding or exploding Syria in the Middle East is not one that the Americans can ignore.

Is this an issue that perhaps he will try again to build some kind of coalition to deal with? Is this an opportunity for a second reset of relationships with Russia? I do not know. It will be interesting to hear from the Russian Ambassador who is here today, very kindly. But this is not a subject that the United States can deal with on its own.

There is the Middle East Peace Process. The Middle East is full of these issues that America cannot get away from. The Peace Process seems a bit of a misnomer these days. There is not much process and there is only a very fragile peace and it is not easy to imagine that, if the polls are right, the Israeli election today is going to push this forward in any very obvious way. Is it going to be a grumbling appendix that Washington can look at, but not do very much about, or will it become a really serious crisis again? Is there a risk of some sort of explosion between the Israelis and Palestinians in the next four years?

We are told that Mr. Kerry wants to re-engage on this. If so, my own view is you need to do it right away. The Bush Administration became interested in this problem in about year six, and did not give themselves enough time to address it. It is not easy. It is not just an Israeli scepticism about the Peace Process, there is the problem about talking to Palestinians. How can you have any sort of process if you are not talking to those who are running Gaza? Is it really conceivable in present circumstances that there can be a two-state solution when we already have in effect three states? What is the magic arithmetic and alchemy that is going to resolve this? The temptation will be to hope that it will sort of just grumble along, but as I say, a grumbling appendix could turn into peritonitis.

Then there are the wider issues for the Administration - whether or not they want to be involved in what is happening in Egypt and Tunisia, and the so-called Arab Awakening. The dynamics of the region are changing. America's relationships are bound to be affected by this, especially if this now moves into the Gulf in some way, so I think that the Middle East is going to be at the top of the President's in tray, whatever his preference for focusing elsewhere.

A second area that I want to touch on is, of course, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Here the President has committed the United States to leaving by 2014 and in his speech yesterday, he made a point of saying that the United States was at the end of a decade of wars, and getting out of Iraq and out of Afghanistan is very much part of his legacy.

But getting out of Afghanistan raises all sorts of issues of its own. What is going to be left behind?

Does getting out mean getting out completely? Is he going to leave a residual force there? And what sort of legacy will it be if after a decade or so of American and wider effort, some sort of political chaos is left in Afghanistan with a resurgent Taliban and not least the effect this is going to have on the role of women, on education for girls and so on? It is not the sort of legacy that the President is going to want to leave behind.

It is not a good legacy either for NATO and although I do not want to talk much about NATO today, in fact NATO's engagement has been sustained and rather staunch over Afghanistan over a long period. It will not be a particularly happy prospect for NATO if this operation turns out to see the return of the Taliban and the sort of consequences socially that I have described.

So is this another case, rather like Iran, for trying to engage the Taliban off-piste? Again I open it as a question. I do not know the answer. I think it is striking that the Americans are apparently allowing the Taliban to be politically active in the Gulf and I hope very much that there is an effort to find some sort of political accommodation, some new political settlement in Afghanistan at the same time as the troops are being withdrawn. Whether or not the Taliban is up for that is a separate question.

The other area of obvious priority for the Obama Administration is not new. It is Asia, it is China, it is India, it is the whole question of the shift of economic and political power and influence to Asia. For the United States, China has become, if not the key, certainly a key bilateral relationship and it has many layers. It is crucial to the United States for economic and trade reasons. It is crucial to the United States in terms of its own relationships with Asian countries and China's relationships with those Asian countries and the United States' role in Asia. And one of the things that has not been worked out by the United States and China in the first Obama term and is up for discussion in the second, is what sort of long-term relationship are Beijing and Washington going to develop?

There is a new leadership taking charge in Beijing and it may be that this offers new opportunities to a newly elected President. What are the elements that are inevitable of competition and what are the elements where co-operation might be possible? How urgent is it for the United States to try and diffuse the looming confrontations as it seems between the Chinese and their neighbours over maritime boundaries and over the islands in the South China Sea? This seems to me to be one of the real flashpoints, not because I think any country necessarily individually wants to start a shooting war, but because accidents happen. Finding some way of managing this crisis and lowering the temperature is a real priority and it is very important for the United States because of course it has its own security commitments, not least to Japan, and will find itself engaged if there is some sort of accidental or deliberate military confrontation in North Asia.

Al-Qaeda and terrorism: these issues are not going to go away either, whatever the domestic priorities on the President's desk and we have all seen the impact of that in the last few weeks. The issue for the President in Afghanistan, as I said, is to make sure that an Afghanistan is left behind that is not a free fire zone for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, but he has a global problem on his hands. We all have a global problem on our hands.

What is the impact of terrorism going to be in the Middle East, in the Gulf, Somalia, Yemen and now across the Maghreb? It is quite a thought that Mali is now on the front pages of British newspapers. I doubt whether such a thought was conceivable a year ago and we have got the crisis as we

have seen in Algeria. What is going to be the approach of the United States, of its UN partners to Al-Qaeda and terrorism? How far is it going to be possible to put together some sort of a coalition to tackle the social, economic, political, institutional problems of failed or failing states or empty spaces?

This is all something that the President is going to have to address, whether or not this is something he would choose to tackle in a different world. If not, the risk is that the situations grow worse and you find yourself sucked into situations that had you tackled them earlier, might be less severe.

Finally, Europe. Once upon a time, Europe would have been at the top of my list. These days, Europe is quite a low priority for the United States and for the President. One of the things about President Obama is that he is not a Cold War or a post Cold War President. He is somebody who is actually focused not on Europe at all in his international relations. Not because I think he is in any sense indifferent to Europe or that he is anti-Europe, it is just not a top priority for him. This is a President whose time in public life has been focused on other things. He grew up in the Pacific; and Europe, in a sense, is not a problem.

There is a lot of head shaking about Europe in my experience, a worry (certainly when I was there a couple of months ago) that Europeans generally are unable to grapple with their problems or show a sort of urgency about dealing with them. And a bit of a tendency to see us all as giant basket case, to which the reply certainly as far as I was concerned was: 'Well, you know, you want us to sort our economic problems out, it would be very nice if you would show that you could govern yourselves and sort out the fiscal cliff', so there is a lot of mirror imaging here. But I think we are kidding ourselves, the Europeans in the audience, if we think that we are a particularly high priority for the United States. There is a sense that Europe is not doing itself justice, that it is introverted, that it is focused on its own problems, that it is not pulling its weight and there is a lot of head shaking about defence expenditure in Europe and the willingness to be involved, whatever may be the record, in Afghanistan.

But I think there is one element here that I would certainly find promising and which might affect this argument, which is the possibility that the second Obama term will see an effort to negotiate a free trade area between the two sides of the Atlantic and I would very much favour that.

First of all, if the economists are right, if a free trade area became a possibility and were negotiated and tackled (such things as existing tariff barriers and regulations and so on), it could add half a percent to the GDP of Europeans and indeed of Americans. At a time when Europe anyway is mostly in recession, half a percent is a great deal better than nothing. It would still make an impact on the United States and some economists believe it would have a bigger effect than that. Now this is still going to be a difficult negotiation if it gets off the ground, not least among those who argue that we should not be going in for regional free trade arrangements, we need global arrangements. But since the Doha Round has manifestly failed, it seems to me not unreasonable for the Atlantic partnership to try and do something about free trade in its own area.

And so I would welcome it for economic reasons, I would welcome it for political reasons. I worry, I must say, that the western world generally is a bit fatalistic. It is not obvious to me that we are trying to shape our environment rather than be shaped by it and for us to get out and try and negotiate a free trade area would be a welcome display of energy and purpose. I think it would

also do something to re-inject some life into the transatlantic relationship, which is – I am not going to say moribund - but I do not think, as I have said, that it is the top of anybody's agenda at the moment.

Finally, I would welcome it (and certainly there will be people in the audience who will not share this view) because I think it would very much strengthen the case for Britain staying in the European Union when we are making arguments about whether or not the UK benefits economically from membership or whether it would do better outside. I am certainly very clear where I am on that: I think it would be a great mistake for Britain to leave the European Union and not just, incidentally, for economic reasons and trade reasons and we could talk about this later perhaps. But I think it would undoubtedly strengthen the case for those who say that our membership of the European Union as a great trading bloc has just been enhanced through this Treaty.

I am conscious that I am out of time. I am conscious too that the list is much longer than I have made it. There are a lot of unknown unknowns out there that will ambush the President in his second term and some of the known unknowns will ambush him as well, but I come back to where I started. I think that he does want to be a domestic President and I think that is what the American people want. I think there is a sort of exhaustion with foreign adventures, but I do not myself believe it will lead to isolationism. I believe it may result in a greater reluctance to be involved, a greater expectation that others will take more of the strain, but I think it is impossible for the United States to become isolationist in the sense that it will not be involved in the great political and security issues of the day.

Globalisation may be a pat term, but the fact is that the last time the United States was seriously isolationist before the Second World War, it made some kind of sense. This time, in an era of global terrorism - cyber warfare, energy crises and all the rest - it is impossible to imagine a United States that really withdraws from the world on any great scale. It may be reluctant to be involved, it may take more encouragement to be involved and it may look to its partners and allies to do more, but I do not think that, even if President Obama wants a domestic four years, he will be left alone to have it.

My final thought too is that if he were able to deliver some sort of deal over Iran or get some movement on other crises in the Middle East or elsewhere, this might be a very welcome way of burnishing his legacy.

Thank you.

# BRITAIN'S QUEST FOR A ROLE: A DIPLOMATIC MEMOIR FROM EUROPE TO THE UN

**Text of a lecture given by Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG CH**

5th February 2013

**David Hannay** *entered the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1959. From 1984 to 1985, he was Minister at the British Embassy in Washington and from 1985 to 1990, he held the post of Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the EC. From 1990 to 1995, he served as the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations. Following his retirement from the Diplomatic Service, he was the UK's Special Representative for Cyprus from 1996 to 2003. Lord Hannay is Chairman of the House of Lords EU Sub-Committee F - Home Affairs. He is the author of 'Cyprus: The Search for a Solution'; 'New World Disorder: The UN After the Cold War – An Insider's View'; and 'Britain's Quest for A Diplomatic Solution: A Diplomatic Memoir from Europe to the UN'.*

It is a great pleasure to be asked to speak at a meeting of the Global Strategy Forum about my recently published book of memoirs, which, somewhat to my surprise, was short listed for two categories in tomorrow's Total Politics book awards. In the unlikely event of my winning, this session will be a great curtain-raiser; in the more likely event of my not winning it will be an agreeable consolation prize.

I am a regular attender at Global Strategy Forum meetings and I would like to being by paying tribute to Michael Lothian's initiative in setting up the Forum which does so much to keep the Westminster village informed about the wider world, something which the Westminster village is not always terribly good at. It is particularly generous of you to be providing a platform for someone whose views on Europe are, let us say, some degrees removed from your own.

I will spare you a long march through my professional career from Tehran and Kabul to Washington, New York and Nicosia, with long periods in Brussels – seventeen years in all – in between, which form the backbone of the book I have written, which is a narrative.

Instead I will concentrate rather on three principal themes which criss-cross that narrative from beginning to end – Britain's relationship with the rest of Europe, its relationship with the United States and its role in the wider world. It was the dominance and pervasiveness of those three themes that led me to choose a rather more ambitious title than the usual run of diplomatic memoirs. In doing so I will try to look forward as well as back.

I will begin by looking back even further than the beginning of my diplomatic career in 1959 – back to the two seminal events of the 1950s as I see them – the Suez fiasco and the decision not to join the European venture from the outset – which have shaped, and still to a considerable extent, continue to shape, Britain's handling of those three themes. It is hard to escape the conclusion, I would argue, that those two sets of decisions and their knock-on effects represent two disastrous strategic errors of judgement for which we have paid dearly.

Looking at those three themes, let us look first at the transatlantic relationship. The British reaction to Suez was to cling even closer to US foreign policy choices than before (which was of course the exact opposite of our Suez partners, the French – but that is another part of the story). The guiding mission of British foreign policy thereafter became never to find ourselves again openly at odds with the Americans. Basically, give or take a few moments of normally quite well concealed tension, that has been the pattern ever since.

From time to time that policy has paid dividends, for example at the time of the hostilities over the Falklands in 1982, but broadly speaking I would argue that it has led to an often unhealthily close and uncritical relationship which has underplayed the scope for influencing US foreign policy, particularly if and when the Europeans can speak in Washington in harmony. Among other negative consequences it has led to our being discounted as mere echoes of the US by other main global players such as the Soviet Union – and now Russia – and China.

To say that is not advocate a policy of systematic opposition to the United States in the style of General de Gaulle. That was as great, if not a greater, strategic error than ours, which led absolutely nowhere. There is not, in my view, a binary choice facing British foreign policy of either going with the US all the time or going with the other Europeans, and we should not be misled into believing that that is a binary choice we have to make. None of the other Europeans, not even the French, really believe that is so.

And now for the second thread that I have identified, Britain's wider role as a global actor, albeit one whose influence on its own has been and is likely to continue to be in relative decline (and when I use that dangerous word 'decline' that is intended to be as close as I can be to an arithmetical statement and not an embrace of declinism). It is a trend incidentally which the US too is having to come to terms with, however reluctant their politicians may be to do so.

Here the record of British foreign policy seems to me a good deal better. From the end of the Second World War, we helped to found, we embraced and we threw our weight behind the great multilateral global institutions whose emergence distinguishes this period from any previous ones in modern history – the UN, NATO, the IMF, the WTO and the Commonwealth to mention the most important. We backed the gradual development of what I would call islands of rules-based order amidst the swirling mists of disorder, for example, the trade dispute mechanism of the WTO, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Law of the Sea Convention, the banning of land mines and of cluster munitions, acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and the establishment of regional war crimes tribunals leading on to the setting up of the International Criminal Court.

The real failure, however, and now I come to my third theme, which has also infected and affected the other two themes, has been the third one, Britain's relationship with the other countries of Europe. That has consisted of a litany of errors of judgement laced with, alas, a good dose of bad luck. The original mistake of not joining the ECSC and then the EEC from the outset was, of course, our choice. De Gaulle's two vetoes were not. The coincidence of our eventual accession with the economic crises of the 1970s, the splits in both main political parties whose domestic political handling has led to so much futile manoeuvring in Brussels, and many missed opportunities there. It is a sorry story and I hate to say this, I think it is getting worse.

It has often seemed to me that the British who have traditionally prided themselves on their pragmatism – which others have sometimes called opportunism and even on one occasion, perfidy - have suddenly become heavily ideological over Europe. They have lost sight of the fact that Europe is about politics and not about religion and that in politics, or at least in democratic politics, you have to strike compromises, not brandish vetoes as if they were some kind of nuclear missile. The Eurosceptics worship at the altar of national sovereignty, a concept far more complex and far less capable of simple and effective application than they would have us believe.

Well, what then for the future, having looked a little bit at the past? The transatlantic relationship, surely I would suggest, needs to become less special and certainly we should stop trying to delude ourselves that it can be exclusively special, because it cannot be exclusively special whatever we want, because the Americans are not going to accept that kind of exclusivity: think Israel. It needs to become an essential but better balanced relationship, one where the Europeans makes common cause when their interests coincide: think climate change, think trade policy, think Palestine. We should be urging too the resumption of moves towards multilateral nuclear disarmament, the revival of a Middle East Peace Process and doing everything we can to explore the diplomatic route in dealings with Iran. And we should be seizing with both hands the opportunity of freer trade across the Atlantic, while promoting the case for freer and fairer trade on a worldwide basis.

More generally, and here I turn to the second theme, Britain needs to work hard to strengthen the major multilateral institutions which are frankly flagging a bit under the impact of austerity and the turning inwards of some of their principal member states. We should not simply be chasing after elusive bilateral networks which are part mercantilist, part illusion because they will not be there when we really need them. So we should be working to revive and to refocus both the G8 and the G20 – in the latter case reviewing progress in the first five years, which has, as I said, has begun to flag a bit and giving the main emerging powers more weight in decision-making, both within the G20 and more widely.

We should be working too to avoid the UN Security Council slipping back into something resembling Cold War deadlock, as it has seemed to be doing over Syria. That will require a lot of close co-operation among its five permanent members. The handling so far of the situation in Mali does offer some hope that it is already happening and that some of the wounds inflicted over Syria are being healed.

On climate change there may be an opportunity now to breathe new life into negotiations which have recently seemed to go round in circles, and to find some way through the hopelessly unwieldy UN decision-making process among 192 member states. The G20 after all account for over 80% of the world's carbon emissions. Why can they not provide leadership in finding a way out of the impasse?

Then there is the third thread, Britain's relationship with the rest of Europe, which will in many ways prove to be the key to handling the other two in an effective manner and to so much else. Variable geometry is already a fact of life in the European Union and has been since the late 1980s and it works - look at Schengen, look at the Eurozone, look at the system for opting in to Justice and Home Affairs legislation. Such an approach can surely now be adapted and developed to the new circumstances of greater fiscal, economic policy and banking integration among the Eurozone members, which I hasten to add – it is in our interests should succeed, because anyone who

believes that the Single Market would emerge unscathed from a collapse of the Eurozone is not awfully good at risk assessment.

Above all we need a positive agenda and one that starts now and not just in 2015, and one that is not so dependent on the outcome of the next election. Such an agenda will need to go, I would suggest, beyond the traditional UK comfort zone of completing the Single Market, further enlargement and freer and fairer world trade, important though those objectives remain and we should not give up pursuing them, I am clear of that. It should surely include resumed Anglo-French leadership in the security policy and defence field in order to meet the challenges of shrinking defence budgets and a rising US demand that Europe do more to underpin the security of its own neighbourhood.

Such a positive agenda would be far more likely to enlist the support of those right across Europe who want to see Britain remaining a full and engaged member of the European Union than a diet of redlines and attempted vetoes as we chase after the will o' the wisp of repatriation. To return to some of the experiences and lessons of my own career, do we really want a re-run of the charade of the renegotiation of 1974-5 followed by a referendum billed as settling the issue of British membership once and for all, but which actually settled it for about three months.

I have perhaps trespassed a little on your patience by straying so far from the historical narrative of the past fifty years of British diplomacy and my own modest involvement in it, but that I can assure you is the main theme of the book that I wrote. But it does seem to me that we are in fact at a rather important turning point in that diplomacy, when learning and applying the lessons of the immediate past while not falling into the error of expecting an exact repetition of those events, is at a premium, even if so far those lessons seems to play a rather limited role in the public debate.

Thank you very much.

# WHITEHALL'S STRATEGIC DEFICIT AND ITS THREAT TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

**Text of a lecture given by Major General Jonathan Shaw CB CBE MA**

26th February 2013

**Major General Jonathan Shaw CB CBE MA (Oxon)** *has a portfolio career in the fields of strategy and technology and leadership coaching, having recently retired after 32 years in the Army in which he commanded on operations at every rank, including being the GOC of MND(SE) in Basra in 2007. Since 2000, he has held senior appointments in the Ministry of Defence in Counter Terrorism, Military Assistance to Civil Powers, and International Security Policy. His last appointment in Defence was as the creator and first head of the Defence Cyber Security Programme, working to the Cabinet Office and across Whitehall as well as to the MoD.*

My lords, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour to be invited back by the Global Strategy Forum for the third time. This time for the first time, I have chosen the topic – strategy and Whitehall's inability to do it, something that has been bothering me since 2000 when I began to work either in or directly for Whitehall. Hence the first part of the title of today's talk: 'Whitehall's Strategic Deficit'.

In the autumn I hoped that this topic might be of some general interest. But the importance of this topic has only grown since then. Events in Algeria and Mali have prompted our Prime Minister to commit the UK to a 'generational struggle' in North Africa and to the deployment of 350 troops there to assist the French. Commenting on this latest deployment, Philip Stephens of the FT observed that it was easy to deploy troops to the African crisis, but asked 'where is the strategy?'

If my experience of the last 13 years is anything to go by, that is an easy one to answer – there isn't one.

The reason there isn't one is very simple: Whitehall does not do strategy. And I believe that it is Whitehall's inability to do strategy, particularly overseas, that undermines its ability to achieve its desired effect. Hence the second part of the title: 'Its Threat To Overseas Operations'.

Not only does Whitehall not do strategy, Whitehall cannot even agree what strategy is.

Just after the last election, the Parliamentary Public Administration Select Committee did an investigation into Whitehall's Grand Strategy. Bernard Jenkin, the Chairman, asked every attendee for their definition of strategy and got almost as many different answers as he had interviewees. The lack of agreement on terminology undermined the subsequent interviews.

I recall particularly the inability of Jenkin to confront the Foreign Secretary with the incoherence of an ambition to retain global influence in times of rising challenge with fewer resources. For the Foreign Secretary was using strategy to mean policy; Jenkin had in mind something altogether wider; and the two talked past each other.

As George Orwell wrote in *Politics and the English Language*: 'if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought'. Without clarity about language, clarity of thought is impossible and misunderstandings encouraged.

I should note at this stage that I am absolutely not accusing the Foreign Secretary of deliberate cunning or evasion. I still think that our public services attract a disproportionate amount of talent to their ranks; we are lucky in the UK with our political class. The problem is that they are ill-equipped by experience or training for the executive role demanded of them. So there is a skills gap.

And then there is the structural problem: Whitehall is set up for departmental delivery of departmental responses; it has to bend itself out of shape to do cross-Whitehall governmental responses, precisely the responses that the original National Security Strategy in 2008 said would be the norm if UK was to meet future security challenges. And in the absence of any cross-Whitehall doctrine or executive methodology, Whitehall pretty much makes it up as it goes along. It is this absence of sound methodology and precise language that makes fools of us all.

But, you will protest, Whitehall has the reputation of being one of the most joined-up capitals in the western world. And the frightening thing is that I would agree with that. Whitehall achieves what it does due to the quality of the people, their innate pragmatism and service culture, and the physical construction of Whitehall, described by a previous CDS, General Walker, as 'a street designed to run an Empire'.

And indeed the executive picture of Whitehall has some very bright spots, such as its ability to handle CT incidents. Whitehall handles CT incidents better than any other capital I have seen, Washington and Paris in particular. The handling of the 7/7 crisis was as good as you will get for an incident such as that, drawing on a long tradition of excellence in this area. But the Whitehall domestic security world works so well for a number of reasons largely peculiar to itself:

- its personnel are practitioners as well as policy experts, and they bring their executive training with them;
- the command and control is well established and exercised;
- those involved are used to working together and have compatible and well understood cultures and methodologies;
- and they have an executive attitude to risk, used to taking decisions in conditions of uncertainty to get ahead of events.

These qualities are more or less lacking across the rest of Whitehall.

Jack Straw as Home Secretary was so impressed by what he saw of this CT system in COBR during the spring 2000 Afghan hostage crisis that when, in September 2000, the fuel protest required his handling, he re-convened COBR – and was dismayed it did not work. Policy experts from across Whitehall were thrust into an executive environment they had no training for or experience of; and the pace of the three-day crisis outstripped the ability of Whitehall to create co-ordination or to react to events, let alone get ahead of them. The fuel protest was not won by Whitehall, it was lost by the protesters who unwittingly had chosen the nuclear option. They had no intermediary negotiating postures and faced with imminent national breakdown, including deaths in hospitals for which they would be held responsible, they took their finger off the button.

Worse was to follow in the foot-and-mouth disease crisis of 2001, which outfaced the ability of Whitehall to co-ordinate the national response to the crisis. Whitehall recognised its executive failing and called in 101 Logistic Brigade Headquarters to coordinate the government's efforts from MAFF. And this they did, filling the executive deficit of Whitehall by applying a language, methodology and discipline across departmental activity. So alien was this to some that, according to one civilian participant I spoke to, the key to successful execution appeared to be to make sure everyone turned up five minutes early for a brief, make a map birdtable around which everyone gathered and make everyone stand up during briefs. If only life was that simple!

Meanwhile, inside COBR, at the start of one morning of particular crisis, the minister looked plaintively at the assembled officials and declared, 'I'm sorry, you are looking to me for leadership, but I am completely untrained for this role'. The minister could well have been speaking for increasing numbers of politicians whose experience is increasingly political and hence decreasingly executive. Yet power and leadership are notoriously complex to master; that takes training and experience. Politicians increasingly share their civil servants' lack of either.

All of which suggests structural, methodological and training shortfalls in the Whitehall system Cameron has inherited from Blair.

And while he has chosen to adopt the language of Blair in committing us to a generational struggle in North Africa, he might be well advised to adapt Blair's machinery of government if he wants greater success in his foreign adventures than Blair had in his.

But, I hear you cry, surely we have come a long way in the last ten years, with the creation of the much vaunted Comprehensive Approach. 'Up to a point, Lord Copper'.

Much has been achieved under this banner, particularly I understand latterly on the ground in Afghanistan. But we would have been much better served if we had had a Comprehensive Plan. For it was the absence of a national plan that led to what I saw as so much incoherence in both Afghanistan on the counter narcotics ticket and in Iraq when I commanded in Basra in 2007. At its best, the Comprehensive Approach has allowed departmental action to be co-ordinated on the ground to good national effect. At its worst, it has provided a political smokescreen, an illusion of coherence, whilst allowing departmental independence to dominate over government intent. The sum of government action needs to be more than the sum of its individual parts. At present there is no mechanism to cohere these individual parts and to add the value you get from conjoined action.

Let me give a grossly simplified illustration of the creation of cross-government activity as I have witnessed it.

- A problem is identified;
- Departments offer activity in pursuit of addressing this problem;
- The government's PR people then announce that the government has identified a problem it will address by the following departmental activity;
- No. 10 is happy, the departments are happy, the PR and media message people are happy.

Until it is found that this voluntary and un-cohered activity does not actually amount to a plan:

- There are gaps between departmental activities;

- some work together, some are disconnected, others contradict each other;
- and few endure to achieve the unified desired effect over time on the problem.

Take Afghanistan. For years, we have been told of the amount of drugs seized, the number of school opened, the miles of road built and the number of 'terrorist' arrests that have been made. And this suits what I call the photographic school of journalism. This paints a picture of what it sees, it focuses on activity, but is incapable of or uninterested in exploring why or where this present tense is heading. And this deflects from the key question, which should be: 'So what? Where is the political plan that all this aid and security effort is meant to be enabling? And what about the future?' It was this that made the Whitehall debate about how to respond to the 2009 McChrystal plan for Afghanistan so futile. Given that the political plan was only going to be decided in Berlin the following spring, i.e. after the military plan had been decided upon, the McChrystal plan was doomed from the start, lacking a political objective to enable. It is only latterly that the Coalition has been forced to accept the importance of this absence of a long-term political plan. If Whitehall is to move from an Approach to a Plan, it needs an agreed methodology and a command structure in Whitehall to enforce it.

Time now to put my money where my mouth is and define my terms when I talk of strategy, for it is only by doing so that I can hope to explain why its absence so undermined our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and why it risks dooming our ventures in North Africa even as they are just beginning.

Let's start on familiar ground, with Clausewitz, who famously defined strategy in terms of 'ends, ways and means'. My observation is that this can all too often be interpreted from our perspective only; to wit,

these are our ends we are pursuing,
these are our means we are going to deploy,
and these are our ways we are going to deploy them.

The vital player missing from this UK-government centric misinterpretation of 'ends, ways and means' is the enemy; and the enemy has a vote, as we have been reminded in Iraq, Afghanistan and will be again in Africa. So I have learnt to adapt Clausewitz in seeing 'strategy' as the constant process of cohering policy (the objectives) with reality (the object of one's policy) and resource (the assets, most importantly including time, required to close the gap). Policy is decided upon at the strategic level, reality is grappled with at the tactical level. Critically and least understood, resource is allocated at an intermediate level known in the military as the operational level. This is a level of command, not just a co-ordinating function; and it is this level of command that no longer exists in Whitehall. I am told this role used to be filled by what is still officially called the Central Department, but is now more commonly known as the Treasury.

I understand it had authority not just over finance but also over the coherence of departmental actions. The Treasury's cohering authority fell victim to the Blair/Brown conflict, and the Cabinet Office has never been authorised to fill this command role and still only has co-ordinating but not directing authority. This has removed a vital level of command without which Whitehall will struggle to create and can never hope to execute strategy.

Let me emphasise the constant process required to execute strategy over time. It is a constant

process of cohering, as there are changes in reality, as resources change or face competing priorities, and as the original policy goals come under challenge.

The political damage of altering policy goals during a campaign makes it all the more important to choose achievable policy goals at the outset. As our political class gets less experienced in what is and is not achievable in the real world, so policy objectives are more likely to tend to the politically desirable than the actually achievable. And it is here that the Blair government is so culpable for ignoring Foreign Office caution before Iraq and Afghanistan. And did Cameron pay them any more attention with his Libyan policy? Perhaps we should pay more heed to the advice of Douglas Hurd, writing in 1997 on his lessons from the Balkans: 'Do not proclaim in public what you hope to accomplish until you are confident that you can carry it through. Be prepared to say no, to stay out unless and until you have that confidence and share it with the main actors.'

Having set realistic goals, a feedback loop between the policy, reality and resource needs to be established to keep these three in balance over time.

Cabinet government might once have been capable of executing strategy as described. But it has struggled to cope with the increasing responsibility of government, the increasing cross-departmental working required to discharge this responsibility, and the 24/7 media demand and speed of modern communications. In response, Jonathan Powell said before 1997 that a future Labour government would be more executive in style. The resulting trend towards centralising of policy making on No. 10 has combined with the demise of the Central Department cohering role. The demise of Cabinet has reduced departmental ministers to executors of others' policy, and the feedback loop that is so essential to strategy execution has been lost. Policy is now disconnected from execution and there is no operational level command to address the resource issues. In Iraq and Afghanistan, this resource issue was in large part avoided by the use of the 'reserve' that funded the operational costs above those the departments had planned for. Now that the UK is broke and still getting broker, where the new money will be found to fight this next new campaign is unclear to me.

As No.10's dominance has grown, the disincentives to speak truth to power in Whitehall have also grown. I recall a bizarre moment in the FMD crisis where it became clear that the cost of saving an industry worth millions was going to run into the billions; but no minister could be found to tell the Prime Minister this, and so no challenge was made to the policy pledge to support the farmers no matter what.

Equally, the treatment of the FCO following the Camel Corps' opposition to the Iraq invasion acts as a disincentive to anyone to speak truth to power; and Cameron has openly dismissed 'armchair generals' who urged caution with regard to the Libyan operation.

Such disincentives to honesty invite perverted behaviours by departments, and it could perhaps be understood if they sought advantage within a flawed policy rather than to challenge it; Whitehall is after all a battleground for resources.

So the military will ask for more resource for the security line of operation, DfID will ask for more aid money to improve well-being etc., and no one will address the key questions of, first, what a realistic, self-sustaining success looks like in Iraq, Afghanistan or now the Sahel and, secondly but

strategically vitally, how departmental activity will combine to achieve the effect over time.
When my headquarters arrived in Iraq in 2007, four years into our occupation, we found there was no Iraq-focused political plan to which our military activity could be enabling; so, as the tactical, deployed military HQ, we had to write the political plan ourselves and get buy-in from the other departments in Theatre.

In Afghanistan, policy objectives have steadily reduced over time, forced by events, not our planning. This in the absence of any Whitehall or Coalition process that, based on our historic knowledge of Afghanistan, should have recognised at the outset the cultural realities of Afghanistan and the irrelevance of many of the West's traditional levers of power, and should prudently have lowered our ambitions accordingly. As soon as Laura Bush went on air to justify the invasion of Afghanistan on the basis of creating women's rights there, the subsequent strategic incoherence of our efforts was inevitable. Which is not to object to women's rights but rather to recognise that we could and should have anticipated that we lacked the means to change the cultural soil of Afghanistan.

It was the late and great Professor Richard Holmes who used to quote a Russian general as saying that 'you can excuse us making a mess of Afghanistan, it was our first time. But you Brits, it's your fourth! You have a great history, the trouble is you don't read it.'

Now, you will rightly declare, I am making a comment more about our politicians and their politics than about government process. But I would argue that it is the lack of rigorous government process and education that makes it all too easy for politicians, themselves 'completely untrained for the government role they have been elected for', to pay attention more to the politics than to the good government of a situation. Jim Murphy, the Shadow Defence Secretary, admitted in the Guardian on 13th February 2013 that Blair and his government had rushed into Iraq and Afghanistan, in ignorance about Islam and ignoring Foreign Office advice. A publicly recognised strategic methodology would have made it easier for the holes to be exposed in the government's approach at the start rather than have them rudely exposed by reality later on.

This tendency to prioritise politics over government would be made all the more powerful if the Civil Service were to follow suit. And there is some evidence that our Civil Service culture might increasingly be part of this problem. Sir John Bourn, on his retirement as Comptroller and Auditor General, head of the National Audit Office, said this in an article in the FT in 2008:

> *"The top jobs should go to those who have successfully managed programmes and projects... At the moment they are given to those best at helping their ministers get through the political week. [Changing this would produce a new breed of civil servants who would concentrate on securing public services. It would alter ambition and behaviour down the line.]"*

How generally true is the criticism? In December 2011, a letter was sent to the civil servants in the MoD directing that the reduced number of MoD civil servants was to produce the same MoD output by prioritising; and they were to make sure that their top priority remained to serve the needs of their minister.

The lack of a rigorous methodology to discipline behaviours makes prioritising politics over government all too easy. I judge patience is running thin with the executive inadequacies of Whitehall.

In researching for this speech, I have discovered many bodies considering just this question of how to improve Whitehall. I have not had a chance to explore 'public choice theory' by Buchanan and Tullock; I have not caught up with the Better Government Initiative run by Christopher Foster; and I am yet to have a long awaited meeting with Peter Riddell of the Institute for Government. And only last night I attended Andrew Rathmell's speech at the Special Forces Club on 'Why Whitehall Can't Do Strategy'. So I can only add my stick to the logpile others are building under extant Whitehall structures and processes; the question is how to light the bonfire. For I have said much of this before to 3 and 4 star civil servants and politicians, who, having not objected to the criticisms, have made comments such as, 'we don't want to end up with a military government as in Pakistan, do we?', 'inefficiency is the price you pay for democracy', and 'the problem is just too big, no one can get their arms round it, so the system will ignore the criticism and carry on as before'.

I do not know about you but I find those to be rather unsatisfactory responses. As every householder knows, renovating the home whilst living in it is a nightmare; but we all know it is possible, and that the house is better afterwards than it was before. To my mind, the reductions in Whitehall funding represent a good opportunity to renovate the structures and practices of Whitehall.

My question is, does the Whitehall political class have the will to change itself?

Before the last election, there were encouraging papers being issued by the Strategy Unit of the Cabinet Office, under the prompting of Gus O'Donnell and the pen of William Nye. These were quite open about the changing nature of the challenge and the need for reformed cross-Whitehall practices to respond to them. But after the election, GOD was ennobled, William Nye was posted to the Prince of Wales's office, and the CO Strategy Unit was disbanded after the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) apparently on the basis that 'we have the strategy, now it's just about implementation'. Then came the Arab Spring….

Since the SDSR, I have observed renovations only within existing structures and practices. In the MoD a series of internal reforms were instigated, to ensure it could deliver the SDSR. But the SDSR was primarily about security and not defence; and achieving the goals of SDSR will take concerted effort by most departments of state. To repeat what I said earlier, it was the very first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008 that sounded the conceptual death knell of departmental primacy in addressing our national security challenges. It declared that no one department was sufficient to address them on its own and that teamwork i.e. the Comprehensive Approach, was required. What is overdue is a review of the overall structure of Whitehall in response to the NSS, not a review within existing Whitehall structures. Whitehall should do to itself what quite rightly it has encouraged the Armed Forces to do over the last twenty years, which is to embrace Jointery, by creating cross-Whitehall doctrine, education and permanent not reactive structures to drive government activity.

Again, you will cry that this has already been done. And again I would retort by saying that the pattern of behaviour I observe in Whitehall in a crisis is to recognise the central executive deficit, create a central structure to cope with the crisis and then, as the crisis recedes in the corporate memory, for the big departments to re-assert themselves.

To take three examples,

- the Stabilisation Unit is merely the latest reincarnation of what began life as the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit;

- the Civil Contingencies Secretariat has come up with some good contingencies but is not empowered to create and enforce consistent unifying methodology;
- and there is still no Ops Room for the UK in permanent session – our reactive C2 based on COBR is at odds with the pace and frequency of challenges in the 24/7 news era.

And as for the National Security Council (NSC), I have yet to see the evidence that this marks a fundamental shift in the effectiveness of government's handling of security issues. Apart from imposing an even faster battle rhythm on an already struggling system, I have seen no definitive break with the procedures that pertained under the NSC's predecessors, NSID under Gordon Brown and TIDO under Tony Blair, each of these committees having broadly the same remit. Indeed, there is an argument that, by allowing heads of intelligence to report weekly to the Prime Minister thus by-passing the JIC assessment system, the NSC institutionalised the very flaws that contributed to the dodgy dossier et al. That the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy judged that the NSC got 'sidetracked into short-term crisis management' suggests again the power of the established Whitehall culture to subsume new ideas. For Whitehall's default setting is crisis management, it has conspicuously lacked, in my experience, a future tense.

To conclude, there is a consensus that Whitehall could do better. The challenge is how to get Whitehall to improve its cross-departmental capability to conceive and execute strategy. I believe it should be possible to create a cross-Whitehall doctrine and executive methodology and to train all in the Whitehall village in its execution, without bringing Whitehall to its knees. More ambitiously, the Central Department should be re-empowered to direct finance and cohere activity to provide that missing operational level of command between policy and execution. And a rationalisation of departments on leaner functional lines would lead to better-integrated government action and a reduced bill in line with current austerity measures. For all this to happen, it will take a concerted effort by us all to light that bonfire that so many observers of Whitehall have built under current structures and practices.

# CYBER SECURITY - GLOBAL, NATIONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONAL VULNERABILITIES

**Transcript of a lecture given by General Peter Pace**

20th March 2013

**General Peter Pace** *retired from active duty on 1st October 2007, after more than 40 years of service in the United States Marine Corps. General Pace was sworn in as sixteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 30th September 2005. In this capacity, he served as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council. Prior to this, he served as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Pace holds the distinction of being the first Marine to have served in either of these positions. General Pace was commissioned in June 1967, following graduation from the United States Naval Academy. During his distinguished career, General Pace has held command at virtually every level, beginning as a Rifle Platoon Leader in Vietnam. In June 2008, General Pace was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honour a President can bestow.*

Thank you, Lord Lothian, for your very kind introduction. I appreciate this opportunity. It is a privilege to be here in Parliament, in the House of Lords - thank you for the invitation.

Folks often ask me what hot spot around the world keeps me awake at night. And I tell them quite honestly none, because for most of the hot spots you can think about around the planet, although we may not always get it right, as nations we have ways of dealing with most of the problems. Most of them have to do with either economic challenges that we have ways to deal with or military challenges that we have ways to deal with and, as I said, we may not get the solution right, but for the most part we know how to deal with those kind of challenges. Except for one very important area and that is cyber attack and cyber defence.

For the four years I was Vice Chairman and the two years I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it was my responsibility to know what the capabilities of the United States were and if any of our military commanders ever asked to use those capabilities, to take it to the President and recommend whether or not we should, and if I recommended that we should, what the impact would be.

It is because of those six years, and since I have retired, my continuing interest in cyber that I know, quite clearly, what my nation can do offensively in cyberspace and I know that we as a nation cannot defend against what we can do offensively. As a military man, that concerns me, first because potential enemies may be trying to do what we can do, or they currently can, or worse, they may have already thought of something we have not thought of. But in cyberspace, the attackers are way ahead of the defenders and as I said, I know what my nation can do and I know that we cannot defend against what we can do.

Nothing I say tonight is going to be classified. I have what they call bots out there on the Internet

that feed to me all these cyber articles that are out there on a daily basis, so I read what has been published, and the things that I talk to you about tonight will be things that have already been published.

There are several layers of cyber to be concerned about: nation states, nation-sponsored, terrorists, criminals and hackers and pretty much in that order as far as magnitude and severity.

At the top, you have got nation states and the advent of cyber weapons is impacting on relations between nations the way that the advent of nuclear weapons impacted the relations between nations. The difference being that nukes were used some sixty plus years ago and thank God have not been used again. Cyber weapons are being used thousands of times every single day. At the national level, you have supercomputers, billions of dollars of investment by the UK, by the US, by Russia, by China, by Germany, by Israel, by France. Nation states have invested enormously in this capacity. And as with nuclear weapons, cyber weapons are basically being self-deterred by the nations that have the capacity.

Most of the time when I took something into President Bush to make a recommendation, my recommendation was: do not use this weapon for this purpose. Why? First because if it was used against us in that regard, we would consider an act of war, and second because we have a separate way of dealing with this, we do not need to use cyber. Those are the primary reasons that I would use. Additionally, you do not want to be, if you do not have to be, the first person to use that kind of capability.

Nation states are basically self-deterring, but even when they decide to use these weapons, and as much thought as goes into it, there are unintended consequences. This should still be highly classified, but it has been broadcast enough times on the Internet now where it is not, and that is that the Stuxnet attack in 2010 against the Iranian nuclear weapons programme was a nation state going against a nation state.

The thought behind the attack was that to enrich uranium to make it highly enriched uranium, you must have centrifuges that are rotating at a very precise speed for a very precise period of time. The attack that was developed was to reach out to the power source of those centrifuges and to perturbate the power grid between 50 and 60 cycles to get the centrifuges to start to wobble and self-destruct, which is what happened. So you had someone thousands of miles away, pushing the enter key, sending bits and bytes down range that had kinetic impact on the other end.

Only nation states have that capacity right now, but even as I said, those who have it have to be extremely cautious in how they use it because there are unintended consequences, and in this case (and again this has been published), when the attack went down range over the Internet, it went to a lot of power sources on the globe, looking for the right power source and it attacked the power source it was designed to attack, but it is now resident in all the power sources that it found that it did not attack – unintended consequences - which means that whoever sent it down range in the first place possibly could use that against those sources and perhaps somebody could reverse engineer and use it against those sources.

Below nation states, you have state-sponsored events or at least state-condoned. Examples of that: in 2007, the NATO nation of Estonia decided that they no longer wanted to have a Soviet era

war memorial on their property. They took it down. That made some folks in Russia unhappy and from Russia - not the government - but from inside Russia an attack was placed onto the Estonian Internet. It was a denial of service attack, which means that they used a million computers from 70 nations and had those million computers call into all the Internet nodes in Estonia, so that an Internet node that would normally get 1,000 visits a day was getting 2,000 visits a second.

If something happened in London right now, and we all get on our cell phones to call home, none of you would be able to talk because the airways would be jammed. That is basically what this attack from Russia did to the Estonian Internet and they did it for two weeks, just to prove a point. They were not able to reach in and change ones and zeros into zeros and ones, they were simply able to carpet-bomb the Internet service in a way that it was not usable.

In 2008, when Russia went into the country of Georgia, the same thing happened to the Georgian nets, only they also reached out and touched President Saakashvili's computer on his own desk, just to let him know they could do it.

In 2009, perhaps similar to what is happening right now, the North Koreans rented a botnet (and I will explain that in a minute) and it attacked South Korean computers and US computers. A botnet is a configuration of computers that one individual or one group of individuals is controlling, no matter where they are on the planet. There are estimated to be about two billion plus computers hooked into the Internet at any given time. Of those two billion computers, about 10%-15% are believed to be zombie computers, being used by botherders to put together these networks. So when you turn your computer on, you are using it – and so is somebody else. When you have downloaded some kind of malware, you do not know it, your computer is on, and they are using the power of your computer hooked into maybe a million other computers to do these kinds of denial of service attacks that I have talked about in Estonia and in Georgia.

Even when your computer is off and you think it is off, it can be turned on remotely. If you think about it, sometimes when you put your computer to sleep, you turn it back on and it says 'there's new software available to download', that sign on the software was delivered to your computer after you turned it off, but in this case someone you authorised to do it, Microsoft for example, turned it back on and downloaded the stuff because you have authorised them to do it in your Agreement. But just think about the fact that when you turn it off, somebody else, having put a code into your computer by downloading a virus perhaps, is able to use your computer when you do not expect it. So in 2007 going into Estonia, most of the computers were in Egypt, Peru and Vietnam. In 2008, when they went into Georgia, most of the computers were in the United States. These botnets are very large, powerful, brute force mechanisms.

Below that level you have terrorists and terrorists are now the first and primary entity that we cannot hold anything at risk. At the nation state and at the nation-sponsored level, you can reach out to nation states and get their attention through various economic means or various counter attacks to whatever they are doing to you. With terrorists, there is no such thing other than holding their lives at risk, but other than that there is not much that a terrorist holds dear that you can use as a deterrent against them. As I mentioned right now, they do not have that capability to reach out with the exquisite supercomputing power needed to change ones and zeros to zeros and ones. But I believe that sometime in the next five to ten years, as computers evolve, small groups of individuals will get the capacity that only nations have right now and when that happens, you know

that terrorists will use them.

Below that, you have got criminals. Criminals are using botnets to do things like denial of service attacks on banks. You want your bank back? Pay our extortion money, we'll give you your bank back. Banks are paying the money because they cannot defend against it. They want their bank to function and they do not want to tell the depositors that there is a problem because they do not want to spook the herd. So they do not alert the herd, they pay the ransom.

The other way criminals use the Internet is as follows. If I wanted to go out on the Internet and illegally buy the information about your credit card, a couple of years ago it was about $16 per credit card which is not a bad price for a credit card, but the open market being what it is, today, there are so many folks out there selling your data, you can get your data for 50 cents. Those are two examples of what criminals do.

Then you have got the hackers. They are the most benign in one way, but they are also the biggest problem. If you go back to thinking about the Internet ten to fifteen years ago, when we just all started using computers, nobody worried about viruses and then all of a sudden there was a virus on the Internet and it really slowed things down and made it difficult to operate. When viruses first came online, there were about 5,000 new viruses a year. Now there are 15,000 new viruses a week and it counts up somewhere around 75 million known viruses on the Internet, put there by hackers, most of whom are just saying to their buddies, 'hey, watch this,' as they push an enter button. Some are not quite that benign. But if you think about five to ten years from now, hackers having the ability not only to disrupt traffic on the net, but to change the data, to change your bank account, to stop the electric grid - if you start thinking about hackers having that capability, then you really have a pause.

So today, if a nation wants to turn the lights out here, turn the electricity off in London for a week or a month or two months, they can do that. It is why I say that cyber is an existential threat to our way of life. Nuclear weapons and cyber. Anything that is dependent on computers is vulnerable. The more dependent it is on computers, the more vulnerable it is. The banking system, the stock market, the electric grid, water supply, oil and gas, you name it, all your critical infrastructure and everything less important than that is vulnerable right now to nation state attacks and it is only because nation states have things at risk that they self-deter. Or they are currently putting in what are called zero-day codes into our banking systems, our electric grid and the like, waiting for the problem that festers itself into some kind of conflict, and then they will pull the trigger on those embedded codes. We do not know what we do not know about that - we know as friendly nations that friendly nations have the capacity to go do that to potential enemies, therefore we have got to presume and assume that they can do that to us.

We have, as I said, five years, maybe ten years, between now, when you have things you can deter and when terrorists and hackers get the capability and they may not be deterred.

So what are we doing? First and foremost, and why I really appreciate being invited to speak to you, is to have as much information sharing as possible, even at the unclassified level, to understand the nature of this problem - it is huge - and then to understand what our own individual responsibility is. If we are in government, what might we do in government to facilitate business getting better prepared and governments getting better prepared? And if we are in business, what kind of target

are we? Is your business the kind of business that has some kind of military economic power behind it, or provides that to your country? Are you a target because of a military action? Or do you have intellectual property that would be of great interest to somebody else to steal. Or are you both?

Today the Chinese are sucking our brains out, intellectual property-wise. They are pulling down more than a terabyte of data every single day. There are locations you can go to inside my government and yours where you can physically sit and watch the computer screen and you can watch the data flow from business government locations in your country and mine to China. Mandiant, which is a commercial company inside the United States, recently published an article tracing back to China.

I was in China in December. They flat-out denied even having any capability. They invited me to go and when I told them that one of our major concerns is their cyber theft, this is the new leadership and the new government said to me, 'We don't have any cyber capability.' I just laughed and said, 'Certainly, you did not fly me all the way over here and insult my intelligence, come on'. But they are - and they see nothing wrong with - catching up to the West by stealing our secrets. If that is all they are doing, that is bad enough, but you have got to believe they are also putting in some zero-day codes, and they do it in ways that are not what you would initially think.

For example, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. They have gone after not only Lockheed Martin as a major contractor, but they have gone after the computer systems of all the sub suppliers to that aircraft. They have gone into their computer systems which are less defended than Lockheed Martin's and they found out what does this piece do and what are its vulnerabilities, what does this piece do, what are its vulnerabilities. So even before the airframe is in the air flying, you have the Chinese looking at the various pieces of it and which pieces are the most vulnerable and how to get at it, as an example.

So back to what do we do?

My guesstimate is that this is about a 20/80 solution, about 20% government and 80% commercial. Government has a 100% responsibility for protecting government systems and about 20% responsibilities in helping educate our business leaders on the nature of the threat and then helping them devise solutions.

If I am building a product and you are building a product, and I know that we collectively have a cyber threat and I start defending against it and you do not, I am spending money that you are not, you are outbidding me on various projects. You are getting the business, I am not. If I have deep pockets, I might be able to hold on, but if I do not have deep pockets, I am going out of business, and when the attack comes, you are going out of business. So I think it is proper realm for government, not to reach in and direct how to, but to help businesses design their own tools to be able to protect themselves inside an environment that says for banks or for the electric grid or pick any of the major categories that are of interest to our countries - by a certain date we will all be at tier one secure, by another date we will be tier two, by another date tier three. So we have the incentive and the help needed to get these things moving.

It will also have the desired effect, I believe, of having a lot of these ten pound brains who really like playing with computers, instead of being hackers, being the folks who start these new companies that are going to be needed to help us deal with this.

If you are government, I will just use my own government as an example: we have spent hundreds of billions of dollars to build our National Security Agency, which is world-class cyber attack, cyber defence. And now, for correct concerns about the US military operating inside the borders of the United States, which we do not do, we have two choices.

One: build another capacity inside the United States, which to my mind is crazy. First of all, we do not have another $500 billion in case any of them have been watching our news, and second of all, we do not have that many ten pound brains to do this. You do not want to dissipate your capabilities. For us, General Keith Alexander, under Title 10 US Code works directly for the Secretary of Defense. Under Title 50, he works directly for the Director of National Intelligence and my recommendation to my Congress is: have title wherever it is that also has him work for our Secretary of Homeland Security.

Now for a military guy who is used to working with two to three different bosses and keeping that straight, that makes completes sense to me. I understand why my fellow citizens have privacy concerns, and understandable concerns that some guy with stars on his uniform is going to be controlling that much of our powers. Fine, replace General Alexander with Mr. Someone or Mrs. Someone, I do not care, but make it one person who can start holding together how we defend our nation externally and how we defend our nation internally, because on the Internet, they are exactly the same.

If I send twenty emails between me and the folks at that table right there, I push the enter button twenty times, it is going to take twenty different routes to get to you, some are going to be inside the UK, some are going to be outside the UK, every one is going to be different, so you cannot think about this as territory of the UK or territory of the US, this is cyberspace. And we have law of warfare for war at sea, on land, in the air and in space but we do not yet for cyberspace. Why? Because it is too young and because folks are just trying to understand what is going on. So another thing we can do as governments is start talking to our potential adversaries about the things that we might try together.

You know when we wanted to be more friendly with the former Soviet Union, now Russia, what we have tried to do was 'rescue at sea' drills between navies, 'down pilot' drills between air forces, to just start getting to know each other a little bit better. You can do the same thing in cyberspace. Pick a topic. Pornography. It seems to me that most nations on earth would want to limit pornography on the Internet. Use that as a stepping stone, or anything else that people can agree to, to start working through what kind of protocols you need, how do you make this work, what are the things we need to do together? It is going to take decades, but it is going to take decades from when we get started and we have not got started yet.

And I think I will stop talking as I have used up my thirty minutes, and answer your questions, and I am happy to continue the dialogue about cyber or about anything else you want to ask about, but I would simply like to remind you all that I am here as a private citizen. I do not represent my country, I had that privilege a long time ago, but I do not any more, so my answers are personal answers to your questions.

# HORIZON SCANNING: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

**Transcript of a lecture given by Professor the Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield FBA**

25th June 2013

**Peter Hennessy** *is an English historian of government. Since 1992, he has been Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London. Prior to that, he was a journalist for twenty years with spells on The Times as a leader writer and Whitehall Correspondent, The Financial Times as its Lobby Correspondent at Westminster and The Economist. In 1986 he was a co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary British History and he was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2003. In 2008, he won The Times Higher Education's Lifetime Achievement Award. On 5th October 2010, the House of Lords Appointments Commission announced that he was to be appointed a non-political cross-bench Peer. He is a Member of the Chief of the Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Panel. Lord Hennessy is author of several books, including 'Cabinets and the Bomb' (2007) and 'The Secret State' (2010).*

Thank you, Michael, it is a pleasure and an honour to be here. You may have noticed a look of relief on Michael's face as I got to the lectern, because the last time we appeared together on the boards, it was *Any Questions?* in the Midlands, and Michael arrived just in time and I could see he was in need of water, so I said, 'Do have some water, Michael' and I managed to spill the water, not just on his left thigh in considerable quantities, but nearly knocked out the electrics of the entire *Any Questions?* set with three minutes to go, but he is such a natural gentleman, he was charming about it at the time and has forgiven me since. But anyway, we have just held it together today, which is quite something.

Being a university teacher, I always like to start with a little cascade of quotes. My first one on this theme, which really is the defence of the utility of the horizon scanning craft, is from Louis Pasteur, and Louis Pasteur said: *'Chance favours the prepared mind'*. And the other one is from a favourite author of mine, John Buchan of *The Thirty-Nine Steps* and he wrote this in his memoir in 1940: *'In the cycle in which we travel, we can only see a fraction of the curve'*. And I always use that as a justification for the historian's trade, because we have to get the curve, as far as we have travelled it, as sorted out as we possibly can.

But I need to warn you that as a historian, I have enough trouble trying to put patterns on the path without distorting it and I am absolutely hopeless at looking at the future. I have a truly lamentable record as a forecaster, so anything I say that is tomorrow and beyond - discount entirely just to be safe, perhaps take 10% of it. I peaked as a forecaster in January 1957 when I was nine, because I was certain that Harold Macmillan and not Rab Butler would succeed Anthony Eden (and this was before the Conservatives got round to having votes on that sort of thing, and I probably believed that because the Daily Express told me to). But I did peak as a forecaster in 1957, so I must be candid with you about that.

But I have always had a fascination for this world. I think it is built into many historians. It is what

the great French historian of medieval Europe, Fernand Braudel, called *'the thin wisps of tomorrow that are just discernible today'*. And there is almost a human compulsion to try and grab hold of those.

As many of you will know (some of you, I think, are from the bits of Whitehall concerned) horizon scanning is a faintly hot topic in Whitehall at the moment. A year ago, the Coalition published a Civil Service Reform White Paper. It is utterly, utterly boring. It is a language which is out of management consulting through Blue Peter - you know, sort of exhortation and management bollocks. It is a life-diminishing read, but there was, in one paragraph, a plan announced to have a review of horizon scanning to see if the multiple efforts of horizon scanning across Whitehall could be brought together more effectively and indeed, there was such a report. It was completed in October last year and we got it declassified just in time for the debate in the House of Lords on the ISC report that Michael referred to, and it is all to the good. It is a way of using to more maximum effect what has already gone on for a long time in Whitehall.

I have been keen for a long time that this should happen, because, as an outsider who is interested in Whitehall, I occasionally come across bits of the product that are declassified. For example, I am a great fan of the Defence Academy at Shrivenham, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). In the run-up to each Strategic Defence and Security Review, they produce a 40-year forward look at global trends, from which I always learn an enormous amount. It is carefully caveated, of course, classically crafted without overdoing it, but the press takes no notice and as a friend of the DCDC, I suggested at a seminar a few months ago that in the one they will have ready for the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the way to get any notice taken of it at all is to put a very, very high classification on it, preferably with a strapline and to leave it on a towpath in the traditional manner, so that a journalist can pick it up and then the press will take an interest in it. But it was remarkably good stuff and I commend it to you if you do not know about the product already.

The other thing that I have been keen on is a historical treatment of Whitehall's attempts, over the last hundred years plus, to horizon scan. The first one was literally the notion of forecasting that most people have a sense of, which is weather forecasting. Captain FitzRoy in 1854 persuaded the government that the Navy needed weather reports and indeed, he is immortalised in the international waters forecast, the area of FitzRoy, which I think is somewhere off north west Spain.

But it did not really begin until just over a hundred years ago when Arthur Balfour, probably the cleverest Prime Minister in terms of little grey cells that we have had for quite a long time, which is not being too unkind to the others because Arthur Balfour was quite extraordinary. He set up the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1902 as an experiment, and the Committee of Imperial Defence we would now call a National Security Council. And indeed, Mr. Cameron's invention of the National Security Council is, roughly speaking, the Committee of Imperial Defence with rather better IT (and of course you could not rename it that, because it would have been misunderstood abroad, wouldn't it?). But it is essentially the CID, and the CID was amazingly productive. Not only did it worry about the threats, which was the Russian threat to India, which was very soon superseded as the number one anxiety by the Kaiser's arms race with the dreadnoughts and so on, it was bipartisan in the sense that the Liberal Government when it came in, Campbell-Bannerman and then Mr. Asquith, invited Balfour back to sit on the CID as a Privy Counsellor, because he was inside the ring of confidentiality and he had sworn the Privy Counsellor's oath of confidentiality. The most famous

thing it did in the run up to World War I was to create a Secret Service Bureau in 1909, which split in 1911, as many of you will know, into what is now MI5 and the Secret Intelligence Service, but also it began the practice of War Books.

I read the first ever War Book recently in the National Archives. It was commissioned in 1912 and circulated in 1913, but never published, and Germany was not mentioned in it, but of course that was what it was all about - it was all about 'in case of a war with a certain European power'. I love those euphemisms. Like in the Cold War when some of you did those 'transition to war' exercises, the Soviet Union was always orange and NATO was blue, if I remember. Anyway I digress, but the first War Book set a tradition and a pattern which runs right through to today.

My research students and I in recent years have been examining the transition to World War III War Books which were declassified long after the Cold War ended for understandable reasons and they are absolutely extraordinary things to read, partly because they are based on novels, written in the Cabinet Office and the Home Office, on the scene changing to one of peril: a change of regime in Moscow to a bunch of adventurers who try it on, escalation takes over and they always ended up with R hour, nuclear release hour. And they write the stories, they write about internal subversion, the nature of the war, the conventional phase and so on, and they are the best novels that have ever been written in Whitehall and they used to do them every two years. So that tradition runs on.

In 1919 after the Great War, with the Bolshevik Revolution worrying the guardians of national security quite a lot, David Lloyd George commissioned a study which led to the creation of the Supply and Transport Organisation, which mutated through the Emergencies Organisation after World War II into what we now know as the Civil Contingencies Secretariat. And this was to find ways of mitigating strikes that struck at the essentials of life. The 1920 Emergency Powers Act was the underpinning for all of that, and after the Committee of the Imperial Defence again was sprung in 1923, the Chiefs of Staff Committee which still meets every Monday afternoon, I think, and with it a backup staff, which became its Planning Staff later, which also did horizon scanning in addition to the intelligence world.

In 1936, the Committee of Imperial Defence again spun out the Joint Intelligence Committee, all-source analysis, but the Joint Intelligence Committee did not really hit its stride until World War II because the Service Intelligence Departments did not like it and starved it of material. But when Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, the Joint Intelligence Committee and its backup became the main all-source analysis suppliers of his voracious appetite for intelligence.

But it was not always on the politico-military side, the expression of the British urge to horizon scan, which is deep within us. For example, in November 1942, William Beveridge produced a plan for post-war welfare and full employment. Now this was an accident, because Beveridge was almost impossible to work with, in fact he was impossible to work with, and the great Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service, could not bear him anywhere near him in the Ministry of Labour, so he said 'find him something from which he'll never reappear' and there are certain Bermuda Triangles in British politics and government, one of which is House of Lords reform, for example. Every generation, people disappear into the Bermuda Triangle - some never come out, others come out singed round the edges, bemused and dazed and vowing one thing, never to return. That is House of Lords Reform - we have had a lot of trouble with that lately.

But National Insurance is another Bermuda Triangle, welfare, overlaps, all that. So Beveridge was given a small team to work with him from across Whitehall in the expectation Ernie Bevin would never see him again and nobody would hear from him, but being William Beveridge, he turned it into a manifesto. He was a genius for publicity and he wrote it in the usual porridge-y way that welfare documents are written, but Jessy Mair who later became his wife, said to him, 'William, nobody will read this, you've got to strike a Cromwellian tone'.

So he decided he would and it has sentences like: *'A revolutionary moment in the world's history is a time for revolutions, not for patching'* and *'Want is one only of five giants on the road of reconstruction and in some ways the easiest to attack. The others are Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness'*. It's Cromwell, it's Bunyan.

Just imagine if Iain Duncan Smith produced a White Paper like that now, he would at the very least be offered counselling. But it sold 750,000 copies and it made the political weather and it was a horizon scan, because his argument was that unless you struck those five giants, all of them simultaneously, the crust of deprivation would not be broken. And without full employment, you would not be able to afford the welfare and the health service and all the rest of it. And without free secondary education for all, you would never get the transformation in productivity that you needed and it was an integrated plan and a long forward look, with a lot of actuarial stuff in it, that has never been replicated since - we do it in little penny packets now, which is a great mistake.

But that was a remarkable horizon scan, and the big idea of Mr. Attlee's Labour Government, after all, was planning. They had seen planning being very effective in World War II on the home front and on the military front, and they set up a Central Economic Planning Staff, but did not really know what to do with it, and it used to take snapshots of what had happened in the previous year and be full of Stafford Cripps-like exhortations to work harder in the forward look. It never really took off, but again, it tried to do its horizon scans of where the British economy might be going and where the bottlenecks were. In 1948, the pound sterling being ever shaky, the Treasury adopted their own version of all this with the Sterling War Book as they called it, and it was all ready to go for the devaluation which duly came in 1949.

Now, the post-war period was quite productive in changing the nature of horizon scanning. Of course, the Cold War concentrated peoples' minds. That was where the bulk of it was done for obvious reasons and the Cold War secret state we constructed bit by bit over the forty years of the great confrontation reflected that. But in 1957 - these institutional changes can make a big difference - the Joint Intelligence Committee and its backup moved from the Chiefs of Staff Committee to the Cabinet Office, so it could do not just defence planning in the main, politico-military, but wider political analysis too, after the Suez crisis, in which British Intelligence had warned Anthony Eden (it is the most remarkably prescient Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of early August '56) what the outcome will be if he tries to go it alone with the French without American backup. Fascinating: he took no notice of it. But the Joint Intelligence Committee is brought into the Cabinet Office and becomes the recognisable body that we know today.

The best forward look I have ever seen in the post-war years, because I can only see it when it is declassified after thirty years, not being an insider, was something Harold Macmillan commissioned in immense secrecy in June 1959, in the run-up to what was the smuggest post-war British general election until the Blair years, the they 'never had it so good' general election. Macmillan being

a scholar and an anxious and thoughtful man, in private was very worried, not just about the Cold War which he was hypersensitive to - everything ending in a great thermonuclear blast one afternoon - but also about Britain's place in the world and our economic underperformance. So he commissioned the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to do a study of where we would be by 1970 on current policies and to spare them nothing. And they got the brightest people from the military, the intelligence world, the domestic and the foreign departments and the defence ministries (or the service ministries as they then were) and it was so candid that he pulled it from full Cabinet discussion in February 1960 and took it into a small Cabinet committee.

And when one reads it - it is beautifully written, unlike the management consult-ese that we get now - it spared them nothing and the only thing it got seriously wrong was it said 'there is not likely to be a recrudescence of troubles in Northern Ireland.' But most people would have said that in 1959-1960, so I am not criticising them. And I have been keen for a long time that Whitehall should do it again, horizon scan like that across the piste, but every time I suggest it, I am told 'no, you couldn't do that because it would leak' and also it would be under the Freedom of Information Act, so you could not produce the levels of candour that Macmillan got, which is a terrible reflection on one aspect of freedom of information. I am an open government person really, but not if (unless they are using it as an alibi, I do not think they are) the fear of leaks means speaking truth unto power, which is the prime purpose of crown servants under our system, in uniform or not, is much diminished.

The Foreign Office sets up the Planning Staff in 1964 which does remarkably good things and still exists under another name and in 1968 the Cabinet Office creates an Assessments Staff to back up the Joint Intelligence Committee more effectively. Ted Heath, who is a much underestimated man (a very difficult man: he produced ripples of unease around him wherever he was), but a very interesting man, set up the Central Policy Review staff, his think tank in the Cabinet Office, quite small, to do quite a bit of horizon scanning, and the great Victor Rothschild was recruited, Chief Scientist from Shell (he was an extraordinary man) to do it. He set up an Early Warning System for Ministers, because Willie Whitelaw (he was a lovely man) had a little outburst after an insurance company, Vehicle and General, collapsed in 1971: 'Why is it I learn about cataclysms in my bath? Why are we never given any warning?' So to cheer up Willie Whitelaw, they created the Early Warning System, but they fell into the trap that very often happens to horizon scanners, is the stuff was so sensitive, particularly if you were candid, that Ted Heath said it has to be kept to a very small number of people, it cannot even go to the full Cabinet, so it becomes self-defeating.

There are other problems with it, which I will come to in a minute.

More recently, we have had Foresight in the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Fusion, and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. There are all sorts of good things being done, but there are perpetual problems with it. Now the attempt to bring it all together I am sure will bear fruit, but fragmentation is always a besetting problem. Also, the difficulty of talking about friend to friend intelligence, which we do not do, of course! In the financial cataclysm of 2008, we had a seminar on this. Richard Mottram who was Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time said that if the Joint Intelligence Committee had prepared a paper on derivatives, it would not have been welcome. Partly because the people we are bothered about are own people and our allies, you see. So the intelligence world has always been rather hobbled by that.

Her Majesty the Queen's question at the London School of Economics: If this was so big, why did nobody foresee it?' I chaired a couple of British Academy sessions answering her question which were delivered down to the other end of the Mall, and we suggested - cheeky really, shouldn't have done it - that she should bring together (this is before this recent initiative) all the horizon scanning that is done in Whitehall by asking for a Quarterly Report, drawing together all the horizon scanning available in her Crown Services and if she asked the Cabinet Secretary for it, they would have to give it to her, wouldn't they? But the Queen is very sensible about these sorts of things and the idea was not taken up.

The other problem is a human one. Ministers do not like the product of horizon scanning. I am very fond of politicians, I really am, and they are absolutely indispensible, but quite a lot of them have to tell themselves fairy stories. The great cosmologist Carl Sagan had a phrase that humans have a tendency to mistake hopes for facts, which is the besetting sin of the political class and not just them.

But the problem is, if you get endless warnings about what might happen, it lowers you. You have to believe that because you are there and your colleagues are there, the great intractables have become malleable. Otherwise you would not get out of bed on a wet Monday in February. So if you are in the horizon scanning craft, there is a kind of lowering effect - you know, when the report is coming from some group: 'Oh not again, what are they going to chill our flesh about this time?' Also, mercifully, some of the worst possibilities never occur and so they can always say, 'Oh, they warned us about this years ago and we are still here' and so on – Tamiflu, the flu virus stuff and all that, that is the latest one of them. So the customers do not like it, which is a problem.

And if you look on the Cabinet Office website for this horizon scanning review last October, it is very candid. It says 'Ministers are very short-termist, they're not really interested in this, therefore it is the duty of the Civil Service to fill that gap.' And it is all there in this Report and indeed, the Cabinet Secretary chairs quarterly meetings to bring it all together and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee chairs the regular meetings more frequently at a slightly lower level. It is very good for Whitehall and I hope as much of the product can be released to Parliament and the public as possible, because it will be very good for us.

There is one bit where I would be critical of the Coalition. I think that the National Security Council is an entirely good thing; it has changed the rhythm of tasking of the intelligence world for example, and it is the first time we have tried to bring the entire spectrum of British defence and diplomacy together, from the first line of defence, which is the SIS people in the field and the Royal Navy submarines that go into extraordinary places and do remarkable things and bring back home stunning material, to the very last line which is the Vanguard-class Trident submarine out there in the North Atlantic as we meet, with everything in-between, politico-military, trade and aid, soft power and all that, and I am a great fan of the NSC.

But where I would criticise the Coalition was a decision it took, at the turn of the year, that there should be no contingency planning for Scottish separation. Well, that is absurd. Alan West has given eloquent evidence to this to the Select Committees on the defence side and the reason as I understand it, is, if we do it, it will leak that we are doing it, and Alex Salmond will say, 'Look, it's viable, they're getting ready for it' and to allow yourself to be mesmerized by admittedly a remarkable politician, is a huge own goal. You have got to plan seriously.

Isn't it funny how three politicians can so make the weather? Alex Salmond, obviously. Boris Johnson. Would Boris be bothering us if he was called Eric and had brown hair? It is just a thought, I have often wondered about that. And Nigel Farage. There are terrible effects – the seepage into the Cabinet room of all these, but not to do contingency planning strikes me as bonkers, it really does, but there again, that is a personal view.

When you think about it, poor old Britain, there is more uncertainty on us in peacetime than ever in any of our collective memory, because of the possibility of Scottish separation, the configuration of the Isles, and us being reduced to RUK - isn't that poetic, the Remainder of UK? We ought to have a competition of what we would be called if it is Northern Ireland, Wales and us. The Improbable Kingdom is my entry. RUK: there is no poetry in it. But also the question of the European referendum, so there is more uncertainty in our geopolitical configurations as well as our physical configurations than in any time in my lifetime, but that is another point.

On your seat is a little threats diagram (overleaf). A few years ago I was getting ready – it came out in paperback the other day - a book called *Distilling the Frenzy*, writing the history of one's own times and I have a little crack at this theme in a chapter called *The Thin Wisps of Tomorrow*. And a friend of mine who is on the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy of the two Houses, asked Alan Judd and I to draw up what we thought the threats might be to the UK (not remotely are some of them likely to happen), but to do the whole lot as we could see it, internal and external, though internal and external are very much muddied these days compared to the era in which some of us grew up, and this is what we came up with a couple of years ago.

One happened, as if on cue, which was the summer riots of two years ago, but mercifully the rest have not happened, but I thought I would bring it with me today and show it to you, because the collective wisdom in this room is palpable, and you have got bags of experience - between us, we have got huge amounts of experience - and I would be interested, if not now, we can always be in touch, about what you think is wrong with this or what is missing from it, but this was an attempt to have a look at some of the things that might be threatening us in the near to medium term, or indeed the long term.

And we did not do it to chill the bones of the civilian population. It is just as a kind of antidote to Polyannaism, that everything is going to be terrific and I do hope, and I will finish with this, that the next Strategic Defence and Security Review and National Security Strategy will be rather better.

I am not criticising those who did it, because they had to do it at great speed against a terrible financial backdrop and the Strategic Defence and Security Review was essentially five desperate spending reviews with a thin patina of strategy, but the one bit we must not do again - and I say this with respect to the people who do it and deep affection for our country, is we must not have a National Security Strategy White Paper next time in which the only memorable line is this one: *'The National Security Council has decided there shall be no shrinkage in Britain's influence in the world'* and the very next day the SDSR takes away several of those instruments of influence. That is self-delusion on a heroic scale. It is a mantra you hear all the time and the Ministry of Defence has to produce papers as if that were true, and if you build in self-delusion like that, it is a huge own goal. And it is the only memorable sentence in the whole thing. I mean between us, can we remember any other line in the National Security Strategy of 2010? I don't think so. It is not settable to music. So I respectively suggest to those who are here from that world that it is done slightly




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differently next time.

I also think, though I am no judge of public opinion and I am not a politician, that the British people are very realistic about the world and the condition in which we find ourselves, and that they might actually prefer it if they were spared nothing, as was the tradition in World War II, right through it, rather than be given self-delusory lines from a political class who should know better. I have broken my own rule. I did not come here today to preach, but I have ended up doing exactly that, but it is lovely to see you and I am very grateful to have been invited.

# DRONES AND THE FUTURE OF WAR

## Transcript of a lecture given by Professor Christopher Coker

2nd July 2013

**Christopher Coker** *is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Head of Department. He is also Adjunct Professor at the Norwegian Staff College. He was a NATO Fellow in 1981, and served two terms on the Council of the Royal United Services Institute. He is a serving member of the Washington Strategy Seminar; the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Cambridge, Mass); the Black Sea University Foundation; the Moscow School of Politics and the IDEAS Advisory Board. He is a regular lecturer at the Royal College of Defence Studies (London); the NATO Defence College (Rome), the Centre for International Security (Geneva) and the National Institute for Defence Studies (Tokyo). He has written for many publications and is the author of many books including most recently, 'Warrior Geeks: How 21st Century Technology Is Changing The Way We Fight And Think About War'.*

Thank you very much for the invitation to come this afternoon and to address a few words, and they will be a few within the time limits that I have been set. I want to talk mostly about the future and put drones into historical context for you. I would be very happy in the question and answer session to concentrate a little bit more on the present and the issues that are more immediate.

Let me start with an episode that was not really reported in the newspapers back in August 2010, when a drone, this time an unmanned helicopter, a Fire Scout helicopter, suddenly went off-line and started heading towards Washington and the pilots could not get back control for twenty minutes. It was not armed, but that is always the problem that I think we face with these new technologies. We produce drones. There are non-state actors, Hamas and Hezbollah that actually use them: there are Hezbollah drones over the skies of Syria at this very moment (a special issue of Foreign Affairs magazine does actually address this). We are not necessarily going to continue to have total control over the technologies that we develop. But you cannot undo a technology - once you have invented something, it is invented. As Dan Brown famously says in his latest novel *Inferno*: 'you can't put Pandora back in the box'. She was never in the box, of course, to begin with, but.....

Let me mention two existing problems with drones and they are to do with human fallibility. It is one of the reasons why we are heading from an analogue world to a digital world and why we are moving in this particular direction.

One is the fallibility of pilots and you have probably read a lot quite recently about post-traumatic stress disorder. It used to be denied only a few years ago, it is now quite an important factor, particularly for the Americans. There are chaplains and psychologists now, who have to be present at all times to advise and help people who are conflicted about what they are asked to do or what they see on their screens.

But the real problem with human fallibility from the military point of view is cognitive overload. It

is simply that they are watching so much – there has been a 3,500% increase in video streaming in the last ten years - that they are having to deal with too much information. Impossible to process it, impossible to store it away in a part of the brain where you can retrieve it later and impossible to actually check with the data you already have in your brain to see whether it confirms or does not confirm what you have suspected or already know. In other words, what do you do in these circumstances? You switch off your attention: attention deficit disorder. We all know it, those of us who have to teach students, attention deficit disorder, and that is why some pilots now are being wired up. Their attention span is being monitored according to their heart rhythms and their brain patterns on scanning machines.

Of course if you have got this problem, the next way to go is to replace the pilots altogether and make the drones autonomous. They are already heading in that direction. In two years' time the US Air Force will test the first drones that can independently navigate without a drone pilot in the air. A few years after that, they probably will have drones that will be able to analyse their own video streaming, so you will not even need human pilots on the ground to do it. A year or so after that, they should be able to target independently and by 2025, if not earlier, there will be no drone pilots at all. Nobody who has actually got a joystick, nobody actually flying them, they will be totally autonomous, they will have become robots. And at that stage the pilots will be managers - they will be managing the system, managing the programmes in which they are programmed. That is the way we are going.

The second problem about human fallibility: social intelligence. What are the real issues for the US military at the moment? It cares about these issues, the ethical issues, and their care is really important, particularly those who subscribe to the so-called Warrior Ethos which the US military cherishes so much. Is this kind of warfare becoming a game, a video game? You play video games at home, eighty hours a week. Some of those drone pilots now play video games eighty hours a week. Is it the same thing when you find yourself targeting the Taliban or whatever?

And that is important to us because war is an intensely human activity. The first military historian, Thucydides, described war as 'the human thing' - it was the only definition he was willing to offer. It is what we human beings do. We do it very well. We do it very ruthlessly. We constantly improve on our past performance, but one thing that has made it human is our attitude towards the enemy. Our humanity - which is a term we use not only for our species, this unique species, but for the qualities which we feel it embodies. And we tell ourselves another story – that we are human only to the extent that we recognise our humanity, even in the people we are trying to kill and they recognise their humanity in us.

The problem with a suicide bomber is that that dialectic does not necessarily hold true. And talking about social intelligence, the ability to empathise, even with the people that you are targeting, to put yourself in their place, to see yourself through their minds is absolutely vital if you are to do war successfully. Because war is not about killing people – it is persuading them to stop killing you. And when you have got to that stage, you are winning. You have a chance of winning and you have a chance of winning humanely.

The problem is with drone pilots, we have discovered, not all of them but just a few, is that they are switching off because of the attention deficit and also because of the cognitive overload. And they are switching off that part of the prefrontal cortex in which you find the neurons that provide

and produce empathy and imagination.

Something has to give if you wish to process all this information. It is a bandwidth problem. What do you do with a bandwidth problem? You go broadband. How do you go broadband if you are a digital warrior? You can take Ritalin. That will probably boost your attention by about 20%. My students take Ritalin before they sit exams now. Apparently 25% of scientists take Ritalin anyway, self-prescribed, just to keep up with the literature that is coming out. The website for Science magazine is updated every 13 seconds - that is the amount of information overload that as a society we are all facing in our different ways.

The other is to put computer chips in the brain. That will actually boost probably your memory. But we already do this by the way for quadriplegics in the United States; they have computer chips that enable them to use the computer without having to use their hands. Blind people who can now see: 15,000 blind people in the United States have computer chips that enable them to see. There are consequences and there are side effects and one of the reasons we do not do this with our pilots at the moment is we are not sure what the side effects are. They have a choice. If you are blind, you do not have a choice, you probably are going to go for it.

All of these strategies are all very well, but there is of course an alternative, and this is really where drones are setting the pace for the future of warfare, and that is robots. Get the robots to do the fighting, the analysis and everything for you, on the grounds that they are not human. They do not suffer from fallibility and since 2007, ever since *The Economist* first discovered him, Ronald Arkin has been trying to programme the next set of robots with a conscience. What is a conscience? A conscience is just a set of computer algorithms to replace the moral heuristics we have been hardwired in by natural selection. We have a conscience because it is dangerous not to have a conscience. Psychopaths do not have a conscience. Psychopaths are very successful people, but usually they unseat themselves in the end. What if the robot will do the moral thinking for you?

Some of you may be familiar with Douglas Adam's book, *The Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy*. There is another series called *Dirk Gently's Holistic Detective Agency*, and in this wonderful world of the 23rd century, there are robots to do everything for you, including an electric monk if you buy it, that will believe in God for you. Why bother if a machine will do it for you? There is a deluxe version if you can afford it, which will believe in things they won't even believe in Salt Lake City. I like to say this in DC, because apparently 10% of the people who work in the Department of Defense are Mormons, but anyway, it annoys them, it makes sure that I do not get invited back.

And the great thing about robots is that they do not need empathy. They do not need compassion and they do not need imagination, we cannot programme that into them, because those are all very human. What they have is consistency. They obey the rules all the time. The idea is to programme the Geneva Conventions into them so that they never break those Conventions. No Abu Ghraibs, no atrocities on a battlefield, no soldiers going berserk because they have seen their friends killed, who were standing next to them a few minutes before, no racial prejudices, no mention of 'towelheads' or 'Talibaddies' or 'gooks', because obviously robots do not have such prejudices, no fear which leads to bad behaviour, no stress, because they do not get stressed out. They are the perfect machines for war that we can possibly devise.

And Clausewitz, the great German philosopher of war got there first as he got there first in many

things. He said, 'well, one day it may be possible to do war by algebra, with mathematical consistency, and when that day happens, war will cease in a sense to be a human thing.'

Let me just put this thing into some historical context because this is what has been happening for a very, very long time, for about five thousand years. Reduction first of all in human labour, that is what war is all about - reducing the human labour it takes to kill another person.

Primatologists have observed chimpanzees trying to kill another. Two male chimps tried to kill another male chimp on raids. I do not think chimps do war, though some primatologists would disagree with me, but they certainly do raids. It takes about twenty minutes for two male chimps to kill another adult male chimp with their fists. In fact they cannot produce fists, they are literally hammering the ape to death in twenty minutes.

We can kill a person in seconds with tools - a lance, a bow and arrow - and actually you can be the weaker of the two, but you are more intelligent or you are using your weapon systems more intelligently. That is why we replaced, by the way, muscle power with gunpowder in the Middle Ages. Chemical power: less physical effort. Not always, by the way, the most sensible thing to do. The Duke of Wellington said after the Battle of Waterloo that if he had had a hundred English longbow men, the people who had won the Battle of Agincourt, he would have won that battle in a few hours. It would have been a very easy win, rather than a damn near run thing, which it was. Why? Because with a 100lb drag on the bow, the longbow was the most lethal invention that had been invented by anyone, anywhere, until the 1830s-1840s, much more than the flintlock muskets of the 18th century. But of course we have this idea that we have to change everything, we have to have the latest technologies, we roll on and on and on for that reason.

Chemical power is now being replaced by digital power. It is being replaced by digital systems, it is being replaced by cerebral systems. This is the second historical change: war has become more cerebral, it requires more from the analytical warrior and less from the heavy duty warrior, the kind of Achilles paradigm, if you like. Think of war in cyberspace: purely cerebral, absolutely cerebral. Think of drone pilots, the cerebral activity. This is where we are heading and have been heading for some time.

There is a novel called *Ender's Game* written by Orson Scott Card which will be appearing in our cinemas in a few months' time. It has been on the syllabus of the US Marine Corps ever since it was written because the Marine Corps believes it is the future of war, and in that game, the warriors (who are actually teenagers, but let's forget that) are in a battle room. They never actually emerge from the battle room. They win the war in the battle room without having to emerge from it. That is, of course, a great dream of many scientists who are trying to deliver the systems - people who work for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the United States.

Ultimately, I think we are going to be looking at the fusion of data and the person. You know, we interface with technology at the moment; we need a mouse, all sorts of physical things we have to do with our hands. The interface will be when information and data is literally integrated in us, through sight, through beaming onto the retina of your eye, so you do not need a laptop, you do not need a GPS system, you do not ever use a compass, you will not even need to use maps any longer, all of this will be directly integrated into your brain.

If you think this is all science fiction, please think again. It is not. It is called ubiquitous computing, it has been around since 1988 when the term first came up. And actually, if you look at a Boeing 747 pilot, he is already there. It is ubiquitous computing. He lives in the same space as the computer. The computer monitors him and he monitors the computer, they both coexist together. We have had ubiquitous computing for some time; we are going to get more of it in the future.

The final historical change has been reducing the human input into decision-making in war. Getting machines to take the decisions more and more on our behalf and this is where we come, of course, to robots. The first armed robots to appear were in Baghdad in the summer of 2006. We have not seen many armed robots. Most robots do logistic and other activities, guard duties as well - the Israelis have been using them for some time. We should not expect them to look like the Terminator - it is only excessive anthropomorphism that allows us to think that we are going to build robots that look like us, so they are going to take many shapes and sizes. If you are interested in that, just have a look at one of the YouTube lectures given by Peter Singer, whose book *Wired for War* is still, I think, the best book on this subject - fascinating examples of the kind of robots that have been deployed by the United States in Iraq beginning in 2003.

What is the point about robots and decision-making? The point is really to go back to a great wish by the great French philosopher Descartes, that we could actually produce logical thinking in war, not rational thinking, but logical thinking. It was not only Descartes' great wish; it was also Immanuel Kant's with his Categorical Imperatives. A Categorical Imperative is a law that you cannot break.

Let me just give you one of Kant's favourite Categorical Imperatives: you should not lie. A woman wrote to him to say, 'I've been cheating on my husband for the last fifteen years, but the affair is over, my husband doesn't know about it, I want to stay with my husband, I want to remain married for the rest of my life, shall I tell him?' And Kant said, 'Of course you must, good heavens, how could you lie to your husband, of course you must tell him about your relationship, even if it destroys your marriage'. But that is logic for you, it is not a very rational thing to do in the circumstances. Rationality means you continue lying quite happily.

What is the difference between rationality and logic? Niels Bohr, the great quantum scientist, shouting at one of his students one day, 'Stop being so bloody logical and start thinking!' Because logic has got nothing to do with thinking. Thinking is about making exceptions. Thinking involves compassion, mercy, whom you extend your mercy to, whom you do not extend your mercy to. Thinking is a judge who allows you to leave a court, even though you have broke the law, because it would be unjust to enforce the law in these circumstances. Unjust. Justice has got nothing to do with logic. Law has got to do with logic, justice is about rationality: what is appropriate and what is inappropriate.

We live in a rational world of exceptions, which is why we are told we are supposed to have character. But we do not like this, because it is an inconsistent world. We do not like inconsistency and this is the idea of war, I think, in the future, that we will have robots that will be perfectly logical and consistent a hundred percent of the time. This is a great dream. This is where we are heading.

Where does this all lead us? Well it leaves us, I think, with a very diminished sense of our own humanity. As DARPA says in one of its reports: 'the human is the weakest link in the chain.' If

we can get rid of human fallibility in war, we will have redesigned war, rebooted it, for the 21st century. We will be successful every time. And this is to see human beings themselves as very imperfect machines, with imperfect hardware. What is our hardware? The body - fragile, vulnerable, weak, easily destroyed in war, in battle. And what is the software? Our minds, easily broken, post-traumatic stress now the greatest incidence of hospitalisation in the American armed forces, the suicide rate amongst American soldiers at almost epidemic levels now.

If we are so weak that we cannot do war as effectively as our ancestors could for one reason or another, we have two choices. One is to go out of the war business altogether, and the other is to privilege machines. And yes, it is - for me - a rather unpleasant future lying ahead. It takes out the mystery, the humanity, the interest, in the whole experience.

Richard Dawkins was at a conference and he was lectured to by a fellow who invoked the famous words of Hamlet, *'There are more things in heaven and earth... than are dreamt of in your philosophy'*. And Dawkins said, *'Sure there are, but we're working on it'*. That is where we are taking war: we are working on it.

I think that is probably enough of my introductory remarks. I look forward to questions.

# EMERGING SECURITY THREATS IN THE NEW GLOBAL LANDSCAPE: IS THERE A ROLE FOR NATO?

**Transcript of a lecture given by Dr Jamie Shea**

16th July 2013

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Thank you for that very pleasant introduction. As you can see, I am spending my whole life not being a Deputy, not being an Assistant, not being a Secretary and I will never be a General. I do not have the most important job in NATO, but at least I have the longest job title. It's a start!

First of all, I would like to thank you, Lord Lothian. I am delighted to be here and I am also delighted to see so many people in the room. I bet if you are honest with yourselves, at least 90% of you on your way here said, 'Do I really want to go and spend my lunchtime listening to this Shea guy, when I can have a picnic in the park?' But I am very heartened to see that in this world of globalisation, the puritanical spirit of duty and self-abnegation is still very much alive and kicking, at least in the UK!

But thank you very much for being here.

I am also happy to see, because it means that the world is pretty much the same as it always used to be, that you cannot have a talk about NATO without a question mark in the title, and so I will do my best, if not reply to the question mark, to clarify at least what it means.

I also see a couple of people in the audience, Nick Watts, Robin Ashby, who have heard me recently on previous occasions, and I also see Pauline Neville-Jones, Dame Glynne Evans - some pretty formidable defence debaters. So as we get to the discussion, they in particular and some others of you, may echo what William Pitt said about Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, which was that it was a rhapsody in which there was much to be admired and absolutely nothing to agree with. And therefore you may also find, hopefully, that my talk is a rhapsody, but you may not agree with everything I say. But the great thing about talking about the future, is, of course, that nobody is right and nobody is wrong. As Woody Allen said, 'I love the future - I want to live in it for as long as possible.'

Today I want to look a little bit at where we are at the moment in the Alliance and where I see things going in the future.

The first thing: as we come out of Afghanistan, the end of the ISAF operation now being just little more than one year away, and as we go from what my boss, the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, calls a 'posture of deployment' to a 'posture of preparedness' - being prepared for something at least in the future - we go also into a context that NATO has never really experienced before. In all the thirty years I have been in the Alliance, even once the Cold War was over, and for a good thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the basic parameters did not change. We had lots of money and lots of people. If we had a problem: we had 26,000 people in the NATO command structure to sort it out. Today we cannot find 7,000. It is a push. We had 14 NATO agencies to help us with the capabilities. Today we are down to three. We had at least double the number of battalions on duty in Europe that could be deployed in comparison to what we have now. The United States was always the default option that could provide 100% of the capabilities in critical areas like surveillance, air transport, lift, tanker refuelling - the sort of capabilities that the Europeans traditionally lacked - so you could always rely on the US to bail you out in a difficult situation.

The Alliance had a basic consensus about what the threat was and above all, we had one big thing to do. It was a tough thing, like enlarging after the Cold War or sorting out the Balkans or trying to embrace Russia, or more latterly, dealing with Afghanistan, but at least it gave NATO a sense of purpose. I used to say that NATO was good for the Balkans, but the Balkans were probably even better for NATO in the sense that after the Cold War they gave us a new focal point where many of the assets that we had built up to confront the Soviet Union, such as integrated command structures and forces that could work together, could be converted to peacekeeping duties.

But now, as we come out of Afghanistan, we are confronted with a situation which is rather unprecedented for the Alliance. For the first time since 1949, we do not have a clear threat or a clear reference point, a clear 'greatest danger of dangers', which can focus our planning activities and bring us together.

If you give Allies today a list of threats, you would probably find that many of the same things would crop up on their shopping list, but in a very different order and often they would not be talking about the same thing. For example, terrorism for the French means a different area of the world - Mali, Niger, and with different organisations - than terrorism for the British or for the United States. That is number one.

Number two: we now, instead of facing one big threat, face a whole range of different threats, and different Allies ascribe different priorities to those. These threats come more in the form of flows – they are interconnected. The way, for example, in which organised crime is increasingly showing up in terrorism or the narcotics trade or is linked to environmental or governance factors. Therefore in the defence world, there is now much more confusion than there used to be about whether you get at these threats via the finance route or via the legal route or via the nation-building route or via the traditional defence route, which makes it harder, of course, for NATO to situate itself on that spectrum.

As you said at the beginning, Lord Lothian, the United States is no longer the default option in the Alliance. The three previous Secretaries of Defense, beginning with the Gates speech in Brussels and then with Mr. Panetta and more recently with Hagel have all pointed it out. The US does not have the means or the will any longer to provide the kind of capabilities that the US feels the Europeans should be able to provide themselves.

And as we come out of Afghanistan, there is now a big debate opening up in NATO between those, many of them in Central and Eastern Europe, who see the end of Afghanistan as a kind of breathing space for NATO to come home to the barracks in Europe and go back to its traditional mission of border collective defence in Europe, which was somewhat neglected while we were diverted in Helmand or Uruzgan or the Hindu Kush; and another group which believes that no, the global orientation of NATO which we have pursued since Afghanistan is the one that best corresponds to our security interests in a globalised world and is the one that is best geared to keep NATO in business.

The big question, however, is: can you remain global without 150,000 troops in Asia? How do you keep a global orientation and global activities if you do not have the 'big enchilada' of a mission as a kind of locomotive to drive things forward?

So we have a situation where the world is changing at a time when NATO also internally is changing. Normally, if you are in politics, as many of you have been, you can cope with one and not the other: you can cope with internal change if the external parameters remain stable, or you can cope with the external parameters as long as internally you maintain your cohesion. But when the two are increasingly linked and are fragmenting at the same time, this is difficult.

The Secretary General often likes to point out that we have a triple burden-sharing problem in the Alliance at the moment. We have the fact that, for example, ten years ago, even less than that, the NATO total of world global defence spending was 69%, Europe and the US together. Then by 2011, it was only 60%. Today it is 55%. So the first differential is between NATO vis-à-vis China, Russia, India and the rest of the world. Secondly, it is between Europe and the United States. Ten years ago, the Europeans were still at about 45%-55% in terms of defence spending vis-à-vis the United States. Today, the US is 72% of the NATO total. Then finally, the third differential is within Europe itself, where the UK and France together are 45% of all EU - 28 countries - defence spending. You put Germany into the mix, it goes up to 65% and if you add research and development, it goes up to 88%.

So the problem today is that increasingly in an Alliance of 28 countries, only one or two or three are able to provide real defence capability, while the small and medium size countries that form a great majority of our member states are less and less able to contribute anything at all. How can you have an Alliance where ultimately only size matters and you have basically to give a free pass to the majority of your membership when it comes to burden-sharing? Clearly you cannot do this, so what is it reasonable to ask them to do?

Faced with these issues as we come out of Afghanistan, what is the first thing that we have to do? Well, the first thing we have to do is, of course, to keep NATO capable, even if it may take some time to figure out where the next big operation is going to be or where the next big threat that NATO will confront will be. The key thing is that we have to give NATO at least the wherewithal to still be a militarily relevant Alliance in the 21st century.

This means four things and these four things are what I would like to briefly focus on today.

The first one: stay connected. The military forces coming out of Afghanistan and going back to their barracks are smaller than those we have known before. For example, the UK went into Afghanistan

being able to deploy 20,000 troops at any one time, but it comes out of Afghanistan with 6,000. France went into Afghanistan being able to deploy 30,000 troops; the current White Paper in France puts that figure down at 15,000 troops. So clearly we are all now going to have much smaller forces, but the forces coming out of Afghanistan are more capable, more interoperable and more bloodied than those we have had before.

Many little groups have formed in Afghanistan. For example, the Brits with the Danes and the Estonians have achieved a very high degree of defence integration and trust. The Nordics the same, the Visegrad countries the same. There has been a great deal of pooling and sharing of effort. The problem is that within a couple of years of coming back to Europe, much of that will inevitably disappear. Like any athlete that stops training, the fitness, the skills, dwindle very quickly, and we could have a long hiatus before NATO engages somewhere again.

So how do we maintain this interoperability, this connectedness? The answer is something called the Connected Forces Initiative, which Defence Ministers in NATO are due to approve in October, but essentially it has a number of challenges. The military, as you can imagine, would like to have an enormous number of exercises, some focused on Collective Defence, Article 5, others more about integrated approaches with civilian organisations or the police, others more about deployment, but a very intensive schedule of activities.

I do not think the money is going to be there for that. Nations are also very reluctant to commit themselves to a multi-year training programme: yes to the next exercise, big question marks after it. With sequestration, the United States is cutting in precisely this area that NATO needs most, paradoxically, which is the education, training and exercises area. For example, we are having an exercise called Steadfast Jazz in the Baltic States in a couple of weeks' time after the summer break, our first major Article 5 exercise for several years. The US is sending a company at the moment, not the brigades that were suggested recently by Secretary Panetta. So clearly that is going to put a question mark over the ability of the Europeans to remain connected to the United States.

The other thing is that NATO now, for the first time, has to rely on a much closer interaction between the multinational structures that we have built up in Brussels and the national structures. Paradoxically for an Alliance that has been in the business for well over sixty years, we do not have a high degree of articulation or interaction between the national headquarters force structures, and the multinational ones, so you have got a lot of people in national structures who have never served in NATO, as we discovered during the Libyan operation where we had to go and find people from the national structures particularly to do targeting or weaponry, who had no experience of the NATO procedures.

So how do we bring those things together? How do we do smart exercises so that we ensure that we get the maximum benefit when we can afford to put one of these very expensive things on? One idea circulating in Brussels is we should try to marry up with the EU in this area. They have got battle groups which have never been used, we have got our NATO Response Force - similar sort of certification, similar modes of operation, so how can we therefore do joint exercises together?

The next problem with connected forces is what you exercise for. Of course, the obvious thing to do is to say, 'Well look, let's exercise our contingency plans'. We have contingency plans for Article 5, the defence of Poland, the defence of the Baltic States, and that is logical, right - tie your exercise

to an actual military operational plan. The problem is that if we do that, the exercises will be purely collective defence. Secondly, the signal will go to Russia that NATO is once again basically spending its time in Central and Eastern Europe, preparing for the old Cold War scenarios. That is not something ultimately, I think, that is in our interest to happen. I think we need to make sure that we do not have all of our exercises in Central and Eastern Europe. For example, in 2015, we are planning to have one in Portugal and Spain – good, not all near to the Russian border - although how we leverage our exercises to get the Russians to be more transparent about their exercises is also going to be a big political issue.

But the first challenge is how do we keep the connectivity going? How much is enough, below which, of course, gradually, we are going to go back to the heavy metal, non-deployable, static armies in the barracks that we had before?

The second major challenge: defence integration. Virtually every expert you talk to sees no way out of the European capability problems at the moment, in view of the declining defence budgets. Two thirds of the allies have cut their defence budgets by more than 15% over the last five years. Today we have an Alliance where half the members - *half the members* - contribute together only 1.5% of the total defence spending together. We have five allies that together make up nearly 90% of defence spending. So clearly, looking to nations alone to provide a full spectrum of forces is not going to be something that we can rely upon in the future. So - integration, multinational capabilities, pooling and sharing are the way ahead.

Some firmly believe that the time has come for a kind of European army, or at least what is called in Brussels a 'full European spectrum of forces', and that this has to be organised along EU European lines, around ideas of common procurement of transport, aircraft, common air defence, development of a European drone capability, European air tankers and so forth.

Others, while still acknowledging that we are going to have to have some kind of European solution, do not really want to talk about it politically as a kind of EU army or an EU spectrum, because they argue that, as Lord Lothian said, given that the US is repositioning to the Asia-Pacific area politically, the last thing you want then to do is to divide the NATO force structure down the middle and have a bifurcated North American structure and European structure, because that will accentuate the strategic drift even more.

But whether you see this solution as a kind of European integration effort or not, virtually everybody in Brussels is arguing at least that we need what is called a 'coherent set of forces'. We need to integrate.

The question is: how do we get there?

The first idea was basically having a 50-50 split with the United States. The problem for the Europeans at the moment is that we have in NATO more than we need in many important categories. For example, the Americans have 680 refuelling tanker aircraft. That is double the NATO requirement, so should Europeans invest in tanker aircraft? Many in Europe say, yes they should, because can we rely, in this new situation, on the United States to provide these assets? And if not, then we have to start duplicating, so should Europeans develop in the areas not covered by the US or covered by the US? Should we have a 50-50 where no ally (that is, the United States) should be expected to

provide more than 50% of a capability? The problem is that meeting this goal is impossible in any short time frame for most Europeans.

Secondly, should the answer be regional groups? I described these earlier - the regional groups that have grown up in Eastern Europe, the Benelux Group, the Anglo-French cooperation in defence, the Lancaster House Treaty from just around the corner, of a few years ago. Is this the way forward - that these groups should identify and generate capabilities for the Alliance? Or instead, should the UK, France and Germany act as so-called framework nations? In other words, these three big countries come forward and say, 'Right, we will be, if you like, the spine, the command, the control, the core of the capability, and the Slovaks and the Czechs and the Belgians and the Dutch will hook on in the best way that they can, so that everybody contributes and we have the capabilities that way'.

The French have come up with another idea which is called burden-pooling, not burden-sharing, where they argue that Europeans should just mix into a consortium, like a European air transport consortium that exists already, 150 aircraft, pooled by five European nations, and pool their capabilities into a reservoir from which people can draw.

The first problem, of course, is getting this off the drawing board - many of these are studies. The second problem: many of them concern capabilities like helicopters or air transport aircraft that we started in the 1980s and are only coming on stream now and very few concern capabilities that we are going to need in twenty years' time. The third problem: many of them are about standards, rather than about actual projects. The fourth problem: many of them are fine in the sense of 'you merge your tennis court and I merge my tennis court – great, we have saved money', but merging tennis courts does not help frontline troops, so we have to try to direct these so-called smart defence programmes to high visibility flagship projects and to areas where NATO really has requirements.

But this is going to be one of the biggest challenges. Before we get below the critical level when European capabilities decline absolutely vis-à-vis the rest of the world and we can do nothing more than very small operations in the neighbourhood, how do we rationalise the European defence market, even on the industrial side? The EU has nine big defence contractors, ten smaller ones, which is more than double the United States, even today, in both those categories - so how do we deal with this over-capacity? How do we merge in a way that particularly to a country like the UK (where I do not have to start talking about our national debate on the EU, or countries like France which are preoccupied with sovereignty and with strategic autonomy) in a way which marries hard defence economics and political sovereignty and acceptability. It is a massive challenge.

Number three, very briefly: cyber. There are some in NATO who believe still that we do not really need to do much about a cyber attack, because we are not yet at the stage where cyber is a threat at the same level as nuclear weapons or proliferation of chemical and biological weapons or large conventional threats. Certainly maybe not so far in terms of killing large numbers of people, but I think we are very close to the stage where cyber is now a strategic threat to the Alliance, on operations, to our command and control and to the integrity of our systems, and it is time that we started upping our game.

We have made a lot of progress in this area over the last couple of years. We have a very good NATO Cyber Centre of Excellence in Estonia, we have an NCIRC which does our day-to-day cyber incident

response and protection, we have Memoranda of Understanding on cyber defence with a number of Allies and we do exercises, so we can provide them with assistance in a crisis.

But we have three big issues that we still need to address. If we are to equip NATO for cyber conflict, or even protect our members against cyber attack, the first one is assistance to Allies. We still have quite significant disagreements among Allies as to whether, if an Ally is attacked, NATO should come to its defence. Some Allies say, 'No, I've invested heavily in national cyber capabilities, I'm not going to pay twice to then invest in a NATO one, everybody has to assume their responsibility'. Whereas other Allies say, 'Hey, look, you know, I'm contributing financially to a NATO common capability, and are you trying to tell me that if I'm attacked, I can't access that capability, you're not going to let me have some of it back to protect myself? In that case I'm not going to bother to invest in the first place'.

So the arguments are finely balanced. Is cyber an Article 5 collective defence?

We had a Defence Ministers' meeting in NATO a few weeks ago when virtually half of them said, 'No, it's not. I can't conceive of any instance in which a cyber attack, no matter how paralysing or embarrassing or compromising in terms of the banking sector, would actually be a casus belli Article 5'. Others said with equal passion that of course it could be and we should prepare for it, so we need to sort out a common NATO view on the strategic relevance of cyber and what NATO's role should be. I find it inconceivable that NATO would interpret collective defence as applying only to traditional things like missiles or tanks, and not to electrons or the sabotage of critical infrastructure. These are no less "attacks" than sending troops across borders. They are centrally planned and directed and also designed to inflict maximum damage and losses.

The second thing is, we have got to start getting all Allies up to at least a minimal standard of cyber protection, by setting standards and by setting targets. We have started to do that for the first time this year. Thirdly, we have got to get our military to actually look at a major military cyber event and let us know what we need in terms of capabilities. The military often go around, like a former Supreme Allied Commander, saying that cyber is the area where there is the greatest gap between the threat and NATO's preparedness, but often when you say to the military - and if there are any here, please accept this with good grace - 'well, what sort of capabilities do you need to plug this gap?', the answer is, 'I don't really know'. We know how many tanks we need and aircraft and missiles and pipelines, but what is a cyber military capability? What does a military cyber contingency plan look like? This is what we need to clarify.

The final challenge and then I will stop and we will get into questions. The maritime component. One of the things that is going to be important in the years to come, as our land forces come back to Europe and probably for some time to come, most of them stay in the barracks apart from small operations by Special Forces, the bulk of the sort of things that the land forces were doing for us over the last ten years is going to be transferred to the maritime dimension. For example, forming partnerships and relationships with the Chinese or the Indians, and acting as our eyes and ears in terms of intelligence-gathering in the wider world.

If you look at the tasks that are going onto the maritime domain at the moment, they are quite impressive. There is this idea of support for land operations; there is this idea of keeping the sea lanes of communication open, as 90% of world trade goes by sea (and you think of choke points

like the Straits of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits); they are increasing being used in counter piracy operations, now looking more to the Gulf of Guinea after the time in the Gulf of Aden; and they are increasingly being seen as an arm for interdicting trafficking: human trafficking, small arms trafficking, trafficking in chemicals and other components, and support of the customs. They are increasingly being used to protect critical infrastructure at sea as more and more oil is now being extracted as well as transported at sea, and yet the naval area is one which has suffered some of the biggest cuts both in terms of platforms and budgets in NATO. So we need - and this should be a key feature of NATO's Summit next year - to develop a NATO maritime strategy for how we start boosting our NATO forces.

For example, one key area is law. Maritime operations often are a legal black hole. We saw this with piracy - what do you do with the pirates? And we went into the piracy operation with different NATO countries having different rules of engagement because of different legal interpretations, so I think we need to do something about that.

There is the whole business of information exchange. Dame Glynne Evans is here and we could talk at great length about the role of private security companies and the private sector in maritime protection, which is something we need to factor into our planning. How do we, for example, also have maritime patrol aircraft, as we have fewer and fewer ships? Maritime operations are becoming increasingly dependent upon sensors and satellites and maritime awareness, and how do we put the two together?

I could talk at great length about this and I am sure I have convinced you of that already, but the point I want to make is that we need to anticipate the future now and increasingly 'go maritime' and develop that as well.

So those are four things to keep NATO in business, but of course, if we develop them, there is still going to be this argument - and I come back to where I started - between the approach of 'come back to Europe, let's have a rest to rebuild after Afghanistan, let's go back to NATO's traditional role as a European security organisation' and the globalists, who argue that there is no going back to the old Article 5 mission of NATO and if it does not remain global, it will increasingly lose relevance, and not just to the United States.

I am in the globalist camp, but I accept that there are a couple of things that we need to pay attention to if we are able to remain relevant without an Afghanistan.

The first one is, as we do fewer operations ourselves, can we not do more to help the other guys: the African Union in Somalia, the UN now sending 12,000 troops into Mali, the guys who are doing the operations, but who badly need financing, who need training, who need medical evacuation, who need in extremis support.

Interestingly, you may have seen a couple of days ago, some UN commanders in Africa asking the international community to give them drones so that they could acquire greater situational awareness. I argued that it would be a great tragedy, just in one example, if NATO, having spent $60 billion (this is my area) on countering the threat of roadside bombs in Afghanistan, was unwilling or unable to pass all of this know-how and technology to the UN who are now being blown up by roadside bombs in Mali and elsewhere.

We have eighteen Centres of Excellence that train our own troops: why don't we train the African Union or the UN or others to the extent we become a supporting organisation rather than a leading organisation? It will be less sexy - of course it will, it is great to be the leader - but it is also in our interest, at a time of financial constraint, to encourage others to take on a security burden.

The second thing that we have to do is define NATO's role in homeland defence. I started with cyber. There is terrorism, there are freak weather conditions, there are borders. I saw the other day at RUSI that the incoming UK Chief of the General Staff gave a speech basically saying (if I am not badly presenting what he said, I only saw the press reports) that the army now has to play a bigger role in domestic defence because we are not so much needed outside.

Well, is that the way to go? And if so, what should NATO's role be alongside the Police, the Intelligence Services, the Fire Brigade? I know the Army played a useful role during the Olympic Games here last year, dealing with site security, but should the military stay out there or is there scope for them to be more involved in homeland defence?

The third thing is partners. I mentioned earlier that we have this very extensive network of partners. 26 of them are in Afghanistan alongside us, they provide 6,000 troops. How do we keep that network of partnerships vibrant and active, once the operations have come to an end? It would be a great pity to see the Australians go home, or the Tongans go back to Tonga, and so forth, and to have to start all over again from scratch the next time we have an operation. Of course the partners, having been with us in Afghanistan (think of Sweden or Finland) have a great expectation that they are now virtually allies and should be treated as such. So how far should we go in incorporating into core NATO business, countries which are not NATO members, which are not seeking NATO membership, but which have demonstrated that they have a lot to offer? Should we be less of an organisation and more of a network?

And finally, in a world where we cannot really any longer deal with every threat, how can we better equip NATO in terms of intelligence, in terms of early warning, to predict a little bit better than we have done in the past where the next crisis is going to come from and use more political preventative means to deal with the situation, instead of always being reactive and using military forces late in the day? So in other words the organisation needs geniuses like you, because frankly, if these were easy problems, you would not need NATO, right? Security needs very intelligent people precisely because the problems are so intractable.

But I want to finish on a more sober note. It is a tricky time, it is. As I say, we are coming out of a world which, even after the Cold War, was nice and simple. The enemies did not put up any resistance. They were often isolated – as unloved by their own people as by the rest of the world. Even modest interventions could topple them. The threats could be seen and properly evaluated. Russia and China were more or less prepared to let us do what we felt we had to do. At least rhetorically they made noises, but they did not try in any way to block us. The biggest problem was simply getting NATO to agree - the rest of the world took care of itself. That is not true any longer and if we want to keep this organisation, we are probably going to have to invest not only financially in it, but a lot more intellectually than we have done on both sides of the Atlantic and find a way through the woods.

Too often in Europe, NATO is what the Americans do for us, too often in the United States, NATO

means the Europeans filling in all the gaps that Americans do not want to take care of themselves. It is rarely 'us', and we are going to have to rebuild that relationship and make it a much more balanced one than we had in the past.

The question I leave you with: there are some people in Brussels who think we do not need to bother in the security world any longer - the transatlantic trade pact is all we need to keep the two halves of the Atlantic united. I am not so sure. I think if we want a good transatlantic relationship, it has to exist in the security area as well and the next NATO Summit should not just be about how we get out of Afghanistan, but what is going to be the future of the Alliance thereafter.

Thank you very much indeed for listening and I will now take your questions.

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Lord Ahmed of Rotherham
Dr Shirin Akiner
Haider Al Abadi
Dr Christopher Alden
Lord Alderdice
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Sir Harold Walker KCMG
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Admiral the Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC
Samar Whitticombe
Lord Williams of Baglan
Andrew Wilson
HE Yasar Yakis
HE Dr Alexander Yakovenko
Dr Shamil Yenikeyeff

## GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM EVENTS IN 2012-2013

| | |
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| 16th October 2012 | Lecture on *'Last Man Standing: The Foreign Office Years'* by GSF Advisory Board member, the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**, Home Secretary (1997-2001); Foreign Secretary (2001-2006); Justice Secretary (2007-2010). |
| 24th October 2012 | Lecture on *'Russia's Foreign Policy - In A Changing World'* by **His Excellency Dr Alexander Yakovenko**, Ambassador of the Russian Federation in the UK. |
| 30th October 2012 | Round-table with the **Israeli Peace Initiative** in the House of Lords with **Avraham Bigger**, IPI Member and **Koby Huberman**, Co-Founder, IPI, co-chaired by **Lord Alderdice** and **Lord Lothian**. |
| 30th October 2012 | Lecture on *'Repositioning Britain In An Age Of Austerity: Are We Finding A Role At Last?'* by the **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2010-2012). |
| 7th November 2012 | Debate on *'US Foreign Policy After The Election: Is It 'Time To Change Course'?'* with **Professor Michael Cox**, Co-Director of LSE IDEAS and Professor of International Relations at LSE; **Mark Fitzpatrick**, the Director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and formerly of the US Department of State; and **Professor Anatol Lieven**, Chair of International Relations in the War Studies Department of King's College London, and a senior fellow of the New America Foundation in Washington DC. |
| 20th November 2012 | Debate on *'Syria And The West: Damned If We Do, Damned If We Don't?'* with **Henry Hogger**, UK Ambassador to Syria (2000-2003); **Professor Rosemary Hollis**, Professor of Middle East Policy Studies and Director of the Olive Tree Scholarship Programme at City University London; **Shashank Joshi**, Research Fellow at RUSI; and **Lord Williams of Baglan**, United Nations Under Secretary-General and Special Coordinator for Lebanon (2008-11) and UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East (2006-07), chaired by **Lord Anderson of Swansea**. |
| 21st November 2012 | Seminar on *'Cyber Security: Meeting The Challenges, Combating The Threats?'* in the House of Lords, co-chaired by **Professor Sir David Omand GCB**, Visiting Professor, Department of War Studies, King's College and **Admiral the Rt Hon Lord West GCB DSC PC**, Minister with responsibility for security, Home Office (2007-2010). The following speakers took part: **John Bassett OBE**, Associate Fellow, Cyber Security, Royal United Services Institute; **Robert Hayes**, Senior Fellow, Microsoft Institute for Advanced Technology in Governments; **Major General Jonathan Shaw CB CBE**, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Global Issues) Responsible for Cyber, Ministry of Defence (2011-2012); and **Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG**, Chairman, Finmeccanica UK Ltd (2007-2012); Permanent Under Secretary of State, Ministry of Defence (1998-2005). |

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| 4th December 2012 | Lecture on *'The Next Presidential Term: Pressures, Priorities And The Place Of Transatlantic Relations'* by **Sir Nigel Sheinwald GCMG**, British Ambassador to the United States (2007-2012). |
| 10th December 2012 | Christmas Drinks and Lecture on *'None The Wiser: Reflections On Three Decades As A British Diplomat'* by **Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles KCMG LVO**, former UK Ambassador to Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. |
| 22nd January 2013 | Lecture on *'Obama's Second Term: Foreign Policy Priorities'* by **Sir David Manning GCMG CVO**, British Ambassador to the United States (2003-2007). |
| 5th February 2013 | Lecture on *'Britain's Quest For A Role: A Diplomatic Memoir From Europe To The UN'* by **Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG CH**, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations (1990-1995). |
| 12th February 2013 | Debate on *'The Middle East Peace Process: Are The Chances For A Two-State Solution Fading?'* with **Lord Lothian**, Global Strategy Forum's Chairman; **Sir Tom Phillips KCMG**, former UK Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and to Israel; and **Patrick Seale**, journalist, author and consultant, with a special interest in Middle East affairs. |
| 26th February 2013 | Lecture on *'Whitehall's Strategic Deficit And Its Threat To Overseas Operations'* by **Major General Jonathan Shaw CB CBE MA**, creator and first head of the Ministry of Defence Cyber Security Programme. |
| 13th March 2013 | Seminar on *'Pakistan - A State In Crisis: Regional Reality Or Western Narrative?'* in the House of Lords, chaired by **Lord Lothian**. The following speakers took part: **Owen Bennett-Jones**, writer and journalist, author of *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*; **Robert Brinkley CMG**, UK High Commissioner to Pakistan (2006-2009); **Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce MP**, Chairman, International Development Select Committee; **Baroness Falkner of Margravine**, Chair, Liberal Democrats House of Lords Parliamentary Policy Committee on Foreign Affairs; **Professor Anatol Lieven**, Chair of International Relations, Department of War Studies, King's College London, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, Washington DC; **Patrick Moody**, Head of Pakistan and Afghanistan Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office; and **Jonathan Paris**, Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council. |
| 19th March 2013 | Seminar on *'South East Europe: Revisiting Convergence - Diagnosis and Prognosis?'* in the House of Lords, co-chaired by **Lord Lothian** and GSF Advisory Board member, the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**. The following speakers took part: **Sir David Madden KCMG**, Chairman of SEESOX Development Committee and Senior Member, St Antony's College, Oxford; **Jonathan Scheele**, European Studies Centre Visiting Fellow, St Antony's College, Oxford; and **Max Watson**, Director of Financial Markets Programme, St Antony's College, Oxford. |

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| 20th March 2013 | Lecture on *'Cyber Security: Global, National, Organizational And Personal Vulnerabilities'* by **General Peter Pace**, United States Marine Corps Retired; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2005-2007). |
| 14th May 2013 | Lecture on *'Twenty Years From Oslo, Two Years From Tahrir - The View From Jerusalem'* by **HE Mr Daniel Taub**, Israel's Ambassador to the UK. |
| 4th June 2013 | Lecture on *'When The Money Runs Out: The End Of Western Affluence'* by **Stephen King**, HSBC's Group Chief Economist and Global Head of Economics and Asset Allocation Research. |
| 18th June 2013 | Debate on *'Three Years On: Is The Coalition Government's Foreign Policy Still Clear, Focused and Effective?'* with GSF Advisory Board members, the **Rt Hon Sir Menzies Campbell CH CBE QC MP**, Leader of the Liberal Democrats (2006-2007); the **Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC MP**, Foreign Secretary (1995-1997); and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw MP**, Foreign Secretary (2001-2006). |
| 25th June 2013 | Lecture on *'Horizon Scanning: Past, Present and Future'* by **Professor the Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield FBA**, Attlee Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London. |
| 2nd July 2013 | Lecture on *'Drones And The Future Of War'* by **Professor Christopher Coker**, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. |
| 9th July 2013 | Debate on *'After The Elections: A New Era For Iran And The West?'* with **Sir Richard Dalton KCMG**, former UK Ambassador to Iran (2002-2006); **Dina Esfandiary**, Research Associate, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; and the **Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick**, Chairman, British-Iranian Chamber of Commerce. |
| 16th July 2013 | Lecture on *'Emerging Security Threats In The New Global Landscape: Is There A Role For NATO?'* by **Dr Jamie Shea**, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges at NATO. |

## GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM ADVISORY BOARD

**Rt Hon Sir Menzies ('Ming') Campbell CH CBE QC MP** is one of the most respected and successful politicians of his generation. He grew up in Glasgow, was educated at Hillhead High School and went on to the University of Glasgow. As a successful university level athlete Ming ran the 200m for the GB team at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and become captain of the UK Athletics Team 1965-66. He held the British 100m record from 1967 to 1974. He was called to the Scottish Bar as an Advocate in 1968 and appointed Queens Counsel in 1982. He became MP for North East Fife in 1987. In Parliament he was the Liberal Democrats Foreign Affairs Spokesman from 1997–2006. He has served on the Members' Interests (1987–1990), Trade and Industry (1990-1992) and Defence (1992-1999) Select Committees. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 2003 and elected Leader in March 2006–October 2007. He is currently a Member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee; and of the Intelligence & Security Committee, and Leader of the Delegation on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. In 2001 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate by the University of Glasgow and was given a Knighthood in the 2004 New Years Honours List. He became Chancellor of St Andrews University in April 2006. He was made a Companion of Honour in 2013.

**Secretary William S. Cohen** is Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a business consulting firm based in Washington, DC which provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board of CBS, and on the advisory boards of the US–India Business Council, the US-China Business Council and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the weekly World Affairs Contributor for CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organisation in the US with a budget of $300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as Secretary of Defense marked the first time in modern US history that a President chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the US Senate and three terms in the US House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine and received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College, and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or co-authored ten books – four non-fiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

**Sir Evelyn de Rothschild** is currently Chairman of E.L. Rothschild, a private investment company. He is Chairman of the ERANDA Foundation, a family foundation he founded in 1967 to support charities working in the fields of medical research, health and welfare, education and the arts. In addition, Sir Evelyn currently serves as a Governor Emeritus of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow of Imperial College London and is an Honorary Life President of Norwood and Ravenswood Children's Charity. From 1976 until 2003, Sir Evelyn was Chairman and CEO of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd, the international investment bank. From 1972 until 1989, Sir Evelyn also served as Chairman of the Economist Group, from 1977 to 1994 Chairman of United Racecourses Ltd and previously he served on the Board of Directors of De Beers and IBM UK as well as serving as Deputy Chairman of Milton Keynes Development Corporation, Chairman of St Mary's Hospital Medical School, Member of the Council of the Shakespeare Globe Trust and President of The Evelina

Children's Hospital Appeal. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1989 for services to banking and finance. He is married to Lynn Forester and has three children and two step-children.

**Rt Hon Frank Field MP** worked as Director of the Child Poverty Action Group from 1969-1979 during which time it became one of the premier pressure groups in the country. In 1974 he also became Director of the Low Pay Unit until 1980. In 1979, he was elected Member of Parliament for Birkenhead. Between 1980 and 1981 he served as Shadow Education and Social Security spokesman under the leadership of Michael Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Social Security Select Committee and continued in this role up to 1997. From 1997-1998 he accepted the position of Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair's first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a member of the Public Accounts Committee between 2002 and 2005. Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy and committed. In 1999 he helped set up the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. The group has acted as an important independent think tank for the cause of a long-term, investment led reform to the pension system. Since 2001 he has also chaired the Church Conservation Trust and has helped develop the trust from being one primarily concerned with conserving the best architectural gems of the Church to one which tries to open up such places for alternative use. From 2005, he has also been chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics Commission which is the planning authority for English cathedrals.

**Hüseyin Gün** is a financier and managing director of Avicenna Capital. The firm invests in strategic sectors such as natural resources, financial services and energy, with a focus on emerging and frontier markets. The British-educated Gun has an Honours Degree in genetics. He began his career as a commodity trader and thereafter as a banker in Merrill Lynch and Credit Agricole Indosuez. He is an Executive Member of the International Advisory Board of the Global Strategy Forum, a leading London-based think tank, the Leaders Group of Britain's Conservative Party and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Gun is the founding board member of the Iraq Britain Business Council and founding trustee of the Omar Al-Mukhtar Foundation for Libya. He is the former chairman of the advisory board of the Global Fairness Initiative in Washington, D.C., a group that had former President Clinton as chairman of the board. He is the Honorary Ambassador of the Israeli Peace Initiative. Gun is an Executive Member of the International Advisory Board of West Asia North Africa Forum chaired by HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan. Last year, Gun published *'Creating a Middle East Economic Community'*, in which he argued for an aid programme rivalling the size of the Marshall Plan to be administered by Turkey and other regional actors.

**The Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford** is a former Secretary of State for Energy and was until recently Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office with special responsibilities for the Commonwealth and for international energy issues. Between 2002 and 2010 he was Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party in the Lords and Chief Opposition Spokesman in the House of Lords on Foreign Affairs. He was formerly Secretary of State both for Energy and for Transport in Margaret Thatcher's Cabinet and was for ten years Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (1987-97). He served as a Member of Parliament for Guildford from 1966 to 1997, is a Privy Counsellor, and was created a peer in 1997. Lord Howell has been a journalist, banker (Advisory Director of UBS) and is consultant to several companies and funds in both the UK, Japan and the Middle East. He was for many years a regular columnist for The Japan Times and contributor to the International Herald Tribune. He is the author of numerous pamphlets and several books on energy, politics, innovation and the Internet – including *Blind Victory* (Hamish Hamilton 1986), *The Edge of Now* (Macmillan 2001) and *Out of the Energy Labyrinth*. His latest book, *Old Links and New*

*Ties: Power and Persuasion in an Age of Networks* – will be published in November 2013. In 2001 he was awarded by the Emperor of Japan the Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, for services to Japan-UK relations. He is President of the British Institute of Energy Economists and Chairman of the Windsor Energy Group, President of the Royal Commonwealth Society and currently chair of the House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and British Overseas Influence.

**The Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Norman Lamont)** was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was a Cabinet Minister under both Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and was a member of the House of Commons for twenty-five years. He was heavily involved in the Thatcher reforms including privatisation that transformed the British economy. He was a Minister also in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector, several with Middle East involvement. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, President of the Economic Research Council and a former Chairman of Le Cercle (a foreign affairs think tank). He was made a Life Peer in July 1998, and sits on the House of Lords EU Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee.

**Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC MP** was elected as MP for Pentlands in 1974, which he represented until 1997. In 1979, when the Conservatives were returned to power under Margaret Thatcher, Sir Malcolm was appointed a Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, at first in the Scottish Office and he was then transferred to the FCO, being promoted to Minister of State in 1983. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992, Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service. Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a MP in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea and he was elected as MP for Kensington in May 2010. He served as the Shadow Secretary of State for Work & Pensions and Welfare Reform until December 2005 when he chose to return to the backbenches. He was Chairman of the Standards & Privileges Committee 2009-2010 and UK representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (2010-2011); and he is Chairman, Intelligence and Security Committee (2010-).

**Rt Hon Jack Straw MP** is Member of Parliament for Blackburn, which he has represented since first entering Parliament in 1979. His long career has included continuous Cabinet-level roles in Labour governments from 1997 through to 2010 and he has taken a leading part in many momentous political decisions in both national and international politics. He had a number of Shadow Cabinet roles before becoming Home Secretary after the Labour Party's 1997 election victory, and then Foreign Secretary in 2001 and Leader of the House of Commons and Lord Privy Seal in 2006. He served as Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice from 2007 until 2010. He returned to the Opposition benches after the 2010 general election and continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. His autobiography, *Last Man Standing: Memoirs of A Political Survivor* was published in September 2012.

**HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal** has been at the centre of Middle East Politics and for many decades in the course of which he has won exceptional respect. He is concerned inter alia with humanitarian and interfaith issues and the human dimension of conflicts. This is exemplified by his work with Partners in Humanity and his co-chairing of the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. Amongst the well-nigh innumerable positions of HRH Prince Hassan of Jordan, he is President and Patron of the Arab Thought Forum and Moderator of the World Conference of Religion and Peace. His Royal Highness is a founder of the recently formed Parliament of Cultures,

dedicated to fostering dialogue amongst philosophers, thinkers and those exercising power. HRH Prince Hassan is the author of seven books, which have been translated into several languages, including A Study on Jerusalem, Search for Peace, Palestinian Self-Determination and in 2004 in collaboration with Alain Elkann, To be a Muslim: Islam, Peace and Democracy.

**Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG** was Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence from 1998 -2005. Before that he was Director of GCHQ. Previously his career spanned both defence and the diplomatic service, including UK-Turkish relations; NATO; UK-US relations; and strategic nuclear policy and programmes. He is now engaged in business, academia and advice to Government. He is a Non Executive Director of Smiths Group Plc, and a Senior Adviser to URS Corporation, Hewlett Packard, Finmeccanica and the Minister for Trade and Investment. He is a Visiting Professor at Queen Mary, London University, a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United services Institute, and sits on the Advisory Board of the Institute for Security Science and Technology at Imperial College.

**Admiral The Right Honourable Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC DUniv** joined the Navy in 1965. He spent the majority of his naval career at sea, serving in fourteen different ships and commanding three of them. He is a graduate of the Royal Naval Staff Course, the Higher Command and Staff Course and The Royal College of Defence Studies. In 1980 he took command of the frigate HMS ARDENT taking her south to the Falkland Islands in 1982 where she was sunk in their successful recapture. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action and led the Victory Parade through the City of London. He has held several appointments in the Ministry of Defence in the Plans, Programmes and Policy areas plus three years as head of Naval Intelligence and three years as Chief of Defence Intelligence covering the Kosovo War. He was promoted to Admiral in November 2000 when he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet, NATO Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic and NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces North. He led the United Kingdom's maritime response to 9/11 including the invasion of Afghanistan. He became First Sea Lord in September 2002 and the First and Principal Aide-de-Camp to HM The Queen. He inspired and organized the Trafalgar Bicentennial Year and led the Navy during its crucial and successful role in the initial invasion of Iraq. He retired as First Sea Lord on 7 February 2006 becoming Chairman of the QinetiQ Defence Advisory Board. He advised both Conservatives and Labour on defence and foreign policy before, in July 2007, being asked by Gordon Brown to join the Government as one of the GOATs (Government of All The Talents) responsible for national security and counterterrorism as well as cyber and Olympic security. He produced the United Kingdom's first ever National Security Strategy and Cyber Security strategy as well as formulating a series of other groundbreaking strategies: the counter-terrorist policy (Contest 2); cyber security; CBRN (Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear; science and technology for countering international terrorism; guidance for local government in enhancing the security of crowded places. He was Chairman of The National Security Forum. He left government in May 2010 and is currently a strategic advisor to a number of small companies, a motivational speaker, Chancellor of Southampton Solent University, Naval Trustee of the Imperial War Museum, Chairman of the Cadet Vocational Qualification Organisation plus a number of other appointments. Lord West was made a Knight Commander of the Order of The Bath in 2000, Knight Grand Cross in 2004, Baron in 2007 and a Privy Councillor in 2010.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick and Lord Lothian

Middle East Peace Process debate panellists

General Peter Pace

Major General Jonathan Shaw and Lord Lothian

Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield and Lord Lothian

Professor Christopher Coker and Lord Lothian

Iran election debate panellists

Dr Jamie Shea and Lord Lothian

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The views expressed are those of the authors and not of Global Strategy Forum unless otherwise stated.

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