

# GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM



## **GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM**

**Lecture Series**

**2019 - 2020**

[www.globalstrategyforum.org](http://www.globalstrategyforum.org)



Rt Hon. Lord Howell and Lord Lothian



Rt Hon. Jack Straw and Lord Lothian



Secretary Chuck Hagel and Lord Lothian



Rt Hon. Lord Butler, Lord Lothian, Bronwen Maddox  
& Professor Robert Hazell



George Magnus, Lord Lothian & Charles Parton



His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın and Lord Lothian

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## **NOTES**

## **PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD**

This is the fourteenth edition of GSF's annual lecture publication, which I am delighted to introduce. Without doubt, it is the one written against the most troubling global background that any of us has experienced. The COVID-19 pandemic, foreseen by some but ill-prepared for by all, is still raging throughout the world. Some promising news is emerging on the vaccine front, but otherwise the trajectory of the crisis remains deeply unclear.

Under the circumstances, it is a cause of great satisfaction to me that GSF has responded so robustly. Our programme of events was in full flow before the pandemic emerged and has continued unbroken in various forms, albeit functioning remotely. In these pages you will once again find a full record of the extensive events programme which we delivered during the course of our 2019-2020 series. As ever topics and regions ranged widely. The focus on great power rivalry intensified, but others subjects covered included Iran, Turkey, Brexit and the UK constitution, the forthcoming Integrated Review, and the global impact of climate change in Antarctica.

In previous years I have underlined the complexity of the challenges implicit in Brexit – now achieved – and the need to put flesh on the bones of the 'Global Britain' concept. The pandemic has deepened this complexity further and has also fuelled a debate that has become, sadly, increasingly partisan and intolerant of opposing views.

To provide a counterweight to this state of affairs is exactly the mandate I see for GSF. Of course, all our members bring their own views and experience to our events, but our commitment is to the principle of frank and open exchange. We purposefully welcome opinion and expertise from all quarters. Fresh thinking and cognitive diversity are precious commodities in these times, when the decibel level of debate tends to leave everyone short-changed.

Our aim is to foster rigorous, but collegiate discussion, debate and analysis in a process which seeks to keep partisanship in check and open the

door to potential solutions. Our events seek to avoid the reiteration of entrenched positions and to let in fresh air. The UK has a rich and diverse legacy of positive engagement in world events. In these difficult times, there has rarely been a more urgent need for the country to come together and agree on the main lines of how 'Global Britain' aligns with the new circumstances. This may sound like a grandiose ambition, but it is where GSF will be focused for the coming year.

Against this background, I am more grateful than ever for the opportunity to thank all those who have contributed to GSF in myriad ways: our superlative speakers, who have allowed us to disseminate their expertise, alongside the authors of our regular expert articles; our dedicated membership, whose questions, comments and observations – online or in-person – have continued to ensure that GSF is truly a forum for discursive exchange; and as ever, our Advisory Board members, a list of whom can be found at the back of this publication. Their encouragement, their ideas and their generosity with their time have been invaluable during these testing months, and without their unwavering support, GSF simply would not have weathered the challenges posed by the pandemic as effectively as we have done.

Planning for our 2020-21 programme is well in hand. Whatever the course of the crisis, I am confident that we will sustain GSF's voice as a strong one in the debate about the UK's role in the world and where the country is best equipped to participate in and most positively shape global events. Whether we return to our usual in-person meeting format or adopt some other model, or a combination, I look forward to seeing GSF address the issues of the day with its usual creativity and commitment to intellectual innovation.

**Johan Eliasch**  
**President, Global Strategy Forum**  
**October 2020**

## GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM LEADERSHIP

### President

**Johan Eliasch** is the President of Global Strategy Forum and the former Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. He is Chairman and CEO of HEAD (the global sporting goods group), Chairman of Aman Resorts, Equity Partners, London Films and Co-Chairman of Cool Earth. He is an advisory board member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Polar Regions, Brasilinvest, Societe du Louvre, Capstar, the Centre for Social Justice, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Foundation for Renewable Energy and Environment and a member of the Mayor of Rome's and Jerusalem's International Business Advisory Councils. He is a Patron of Stockholm University. He is the Founder of the Rainforest Trust which is conserving 400,000 acres of rainforest in the Amazonas. He was part of the Conservative Shadow Foreign Office team as Special Advisor on European Affairs (1999-2003) and responsible for foreign relations (2003-2005). He was Conservative Party Deputy Treasurer (2003-2007). He was a member of the Austrian President's delegation of State for Trade and Industry (1996-2006). He was chairman of the Young Conservatives Party in Djursholm, Sweden (1979-1982). He did military service in Sweden in a specialist unit, the Royal Life Guard (K1).

### Chairman

**The Most Hon the Marquis of Lothian PC QC DL** is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum which he co-founded in 2006. Lord Lothian was first elected to Parliament as Michael Ancram in 1974. His political career included four years as the Political Minister in Northern Ireland responsible for the opening engagements with the IRA which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement, Chairman of the Conservative Party for three years, and four years as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Opposition. He continues to be involved in international conflict resolution. He served on the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament from 2005 to 2019. He was appointed to the House of Lords as a life peer in October 2010.

## Director

**Jacqueline Jinks** is the Director of Global Strategy Forum. She joined GSF as Research Director in June 2006 and became the Director in February 2008. From 1997-2005, she was Political Secretary and speechwriter to Lord Moynihan, a former Conservative Senior Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords. She worked for the Rt Hon. Michael Howard QC MP and the Rt Hon. Francis Maude MP, during their respective tenures as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Prior to that, she worked for the Democratic National Committee (1996-1997) and CMA Consultants (1994-1996). She was educated at the University of Cambridge and Westminster School.

## Treasurer

**Adrian de Ferranti** was the founder of Ferranti, an investment vehicle for engineering and technology companies. He was the founder and/or chairman of Tantus PLC, Cambridge Computer Graphics, Chelford PLC, and PTG. He had an early career at European Banking Company, Murray Johnstone, followed by Montgomery Securities in the US. He is currently the chairman, director or investor in NEST, SameWave, SMB, Updata, Ziani's, Terrascope Ltd, Ferranti Farming, and Small Business Bureau. Adrian was the chairman and a trustee of the Royal Institution of Great Britain from 2007-2010. From 2007-2013 he was chairman of the Foundation at Heriot Watt University. He was also a treasurer of the Conservative Party from 1991-2004.

## ABOUT GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM was founded by **Lord Lothian** (then The Rt Hon. Michael Ancram MP) and **Johan Eliasch** in 2006 to generate open debate and discussion on key foreign affairs, defence and international security issues. As an independent, non-party political, non-ideological organisation, GSF provides a platform to explore some of the more challenging and contentious aspects of UK foreign policy and to stimulate imaginative ideas and innovative thinking in a rapidly changing global landscape.

In accordance with our founding remit, we aim to bring together those with a deep interest in international affairs and to offer them the opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas, and to engage in informed debate. Through our publications and our website, we enable their expertise to be widely disseminated.

GSF's core activity consists of a regular lunchtime lecture and debate series on topical issues. For more in-depth discussion of specific topics, we host half-day seminars. We also hold small roundtable lunches and dinners on key issues of the day. Separately, alongside our annual compendium of lectures and the publication of the proceedings of our seminars, we publish an occasional series of monographs as well as collections of essays and articles by distinguished experts.

We are very fortunate to be supported by an active and committed Advisory Board comprising of foreign and defence policy practitioners of the highest calibre. We are delighted that this year, the Advisory Board has been joined by the **Rt Hon. the Lord Hammond of Runnymede**.

In 2019-2020, our in-person programme of events was necessarily curtailed by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and the ensuing lockdown measures, but until March 2020, we hosted a total of 13 in-person events, comprising ten lectures and three debates.

The following speakers addressed our lecture series: **The Rt Hon. the Lord Howell of Guildford**, Chairman, House of Lords International Relations Committee (2017-2019); Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office

(2010-2012), and GSF Advisory Board member; **The Rt Hon. Jack Straw**, Secretary of State for Justice (2007-2010); Foreign Secretary (2001-2006); Home Secretary (1997-2001), and GSF Advisory Board member; **Secretary Chuck Hagel**, US Secretary of Defense (2013-2015), US Senator from Nebraska (1997-2009), and GSF Advisory Board member; **His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın**, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; **Air Marshal (Rtd) Philip Osborn CBE**, Chief of Defence Intelligence (2015-2018); The co-authors of *Tipping Point: Britain, Brexit And Security In The 2020s*, **Professor Michael Clarke**, Director General of the Royal United Services Institute (2007-2015) and GSF Advisory Board member, and **Helen Ramscar**, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute; **Jonathan Rugman**, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Channel 4 News and author of *The Killing In The Consulate: Investigating The Life And Death Of Jamal Khashoggi*; **General The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL**, Constable of the Tower of London; Chief of the Defence Staff (2013-2016); **Professor Dame Jane Francis DCMG**, Director of the British Antarctic Survey; and **Sir Anthony Seldon**, Contemporary Historian, Educationalist, Commentator and Political Author; and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Buckingham.

We also held three lunchtime debates on the following topics:

- *The Brexit Crisis: Do We Need A Written Constitution?*
- *China's Challenges: Is The Long Success Story Over?*
- *Iran: Growing Threat Or Failing State?'*

Lord Lothian's July 2020 submission to the Integrated Review, announced by the Prime Minister on 26th February 2020 and intended to 're-examine the UK's priorities and objectives' and 'define Britain's place in the world', is also included on page 127.

A full list of all our events during 2019-2020 can be found at page 133.

Further information on all our activities and events, including event transcripts and recordings, together with pdfs of all our publications, can be found on our website, **www.globalstrategyforum.org**, on our Twitter account, **@strategy\_forum**, and on the GSF YouTube channel.

## THE LECTURES

### **Look Where We're Going: Escaping The Prism Of Past Politics**

The Rt Hon. the Lord Howell of Guildford

### **The English Job: Understanding Iran And Why It Distrusts Britain**

The Rt Hon. Jack Straw

### **A Changing World Order**

Secretary Chuck Hagel

### **Turkey's Foreign Policy And Current Affairs**

His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın

### **The Contemporary Battlespace Of Great Power Confrontation**

Air Marshal (Rtd) Philip Osborn CBE

### **Tipping Point: Britain, Brexit And Security In The 2020s**

Professor Michael Clarke & Helen Ramscar

### **The Killing In The Consulate: Investigating The Life And Death Of Jamal Khashoggi**

Mr. Jonathan Rugman

### **Some Thoughts On The 'Biggest Review' Of Our Defence, Security And Foreign Policy Since The End Of The Cold War**

General The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL

### **Climate Change In Antarctica And Its Global Impact**

Professor Dame Jane Francis DCMG

### **300 Years Of British Prime Ministers**

Sir Anthony Seldon

### **The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy: The Moment For Common Sense**

Lord Lothian PC QC DL



## **LOOK WHERE WE'RE GOING: ESCAPING THE PRISM OF PAST POLITICS**

**Transcript of a lecture given by the Rt Hon. the Lord Howell of Guildford**

**Tuesday 8th October 2019**

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**The Rt Hon. the Lord Howell of Guildford** *has been at the centre of government and the political debate for more than half a century. He is the only person to have served in the three administrations of Heath, Thatcher and Cameron. He is also the only minister to have 'come back' after a 27-year break. Between spells in government, he has filled numerous other roles in journalism, banking and industry. He is currently President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Chairman of the Windsor Energy Group and most recently, Chairman of the House of Lords Committee for International Relations. Lord Howell has a track record in forecasting developments long in advance and pioneering thinking on the major issues of our times. His qualifications are unique, enabling him to weave together the ideas, hopes, lessons and consequences of the past fifty years and explaining where they are now leading the British nation. His latest book, 'Look Where We're Going: Escaping The Prism Of Past Politics' was published in September 2019.*

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Chairman – Michael - thank you very much for that brief selection from the full criminal record! I am honoured to be asked to come to this meeting and to share with you some thoughts relating to my recent book which was published the other day.

I have been thinking quite hard how to convey to you and how to share with you the messages of this book at this time of general social and political turmoil, and chaotic manoeuvrings amongst the body politic.

Last week I was in Switzerland where I was addressing an audience who kindly had some interest in this book, and one thing I tried on them, a sort of prop, was to wave at them a copy of *The Times* from one day last week and to point out that in this one copy in one day, there were accounts of the chaos in the House of Commons, the Brexit battle, the rude language allegedly being used; and another account of how global warming is now dangerously threatening the entire Swiss Alps on the ski resorts sector of the Swiss economy; an analysis of whether the EU structure is now falling apart or coming together or doing both at the same time; a warning that in the age of digital capitalism, the trend of inequality is about to create an explosive reaction and unless we can get the financial wizards to operate effective reform of what we still call capitalism, we are all in for a lot of trouble; a query as to how far President Trump wants to go - if he wants to go anywhere - in the all-out war against Iran following the evidence of the drone attacks which knocked out Abqaiq and are alleged to come from Iranian soil; and the Iranian tanker which was released in Gibraltar on the promise it would not discharge its cargo in Syria which it promptly did; and a splendid report on how the UK's plans to go green by way of low carbon nuclear power are actually not going at all well and are only being kept going - just - by Chinese support.

What I told my Swiss friends was that that was just one day's worth of items, and it does illustrate the changing nature of the issues we now face. It really is a world away - and this is something I begin my book with - from the old debates of the last century about inflation control (we were terrified of inflation); the state versus the individual; the ideological line-up which we inherited from the earlier parts of the 20th century; the rise of markets; trade union power; oil shocks; and monetary policy - the monetarists were all round us those days. These are all issues which have faded into the background, you hardly hear them mentioned in the daily media, while entirely new forces, new pressures and new crises, new politics as well, are paraded daily before us.

And they do remind us too of a broader fact which hovers over the whole of this current discussion in this disordered world, that, whatever happens in the next few weeks or months or even years, there is going to be no return to what we used to call normal times. Brexit may or may not take

place and we will probably be discussing that later. Donald Trump may or may not get his comeuppance, now or later – I suspect he will.

But the book's message, and it is one I want to elaborate, is that it is a complete illusion to expect the world to return to its previous path, with Europe moving at stately pace towards political union and integration, with the US returning to Pax Americana and genial Uncle Sam, and business as usual in the global economy led by a confident West. That world has gone forever.

So that was one prop I used, and I think it worked quite well. But since then, another prop has come to mind, which I find even more telling for us here in London and that is a document in yesterday's *Financial Times*, marked on the blogs very grandly: '*This is the considered view of the editorial board of the Financial Times*', a worldwide highly admired publication. And what was the conclusion of this editorial board in their first leader yesterday? It was that America was no longer a reliable ally, and therefore we had to think in terms and expect to prepare for the decomposition of the western alliance.

Now I am afraid that when I listened, I heard distinctly the sucking sound of ostriches lifting their heads out of the sand, because if ever something has been increasingly evident in the network world we are living in, it was that while America is a brilliant place and our good friend and partner, its role as the reliable superpower in whose hands the world is safe, policing and guarding against all attacks, clearly has disappeared over the last twenty years. I do not think that is fully realised in America and certainly not realised here in the Foreign & Commonwealth Office until recently, but at least it has reached the editorial board of the *Financial Times*.

I wanted to call in aid one other thing before I turn to the details of my book, and that is a splendid little booklet by my colleague and dear friend, William Waldegrave, who is currently Provost of Eton, a former minister of great distinction, a great Classics scholar, also with a vast grasp of modern science - and he is chairman of a bank as well, on top of everything else. He put out a book the other day, just pointing out with classical elegance and clarity, that the narrative on which Britain had been trying to organise

itself and the assumptions behind all the stances taken on all sides in recent times drew originally from Churchill's three circles: the special relationship with America; the Empire; and our relations with our neighbours in Europe. He points out that these three circles have evaporated. They do not exist. And therefore if we want to have a narrative and a story, we need to think very clearly about whether we are in a circle at all. Or are we moving into a sort of blank and rudderless existence and direction in the world?

That is very much the starting point of my book as well, that the narratives of the past no longer stand up and therefore those who start their thinking from the stories about where Britain stands in the world and so on, really need a considerable reset to grasp fully, in Keynes' words, what is actually happening in the world, rather than what they hope for or what things looks like from the Westminster and Whitehall bubble.

My book actually goes further than William, because I go on to say, well, if this has happened, if the three circles have broken and disappeared, why has it happened? Why is there this international splintering and fragmentation? Why is there a growing attack on the rules-based order and a disintegration of the assumptions, customs and attitudes which kept that three circles world in place? Why has there been such a huge shift in the last thirty years to Asia - to the point where my friend, Parag Khanna at Harvard, who wrote a brilliant book I strongly recommended called *The Future Is Asian*, is telling us that according to the Asian Investment Bank (that is the old one, not the new one the Chinese have invented), the growth of consumer markets in the world over the next ten years will be of the order of \$30 trillion - the growth - of which \$29 trillion will be in Asia, and \$1 trillion in the West. This is the considered view of reasonably impartial banking experts at the AIB. And why the general breakdown of trust and respect and reverence and appreciation of the experience of hierarchies (those who seem to be wise, ranging from parents up to governments and authorities) and so on. These are all features we can see swirling around us and I go beyond the conclusions of William in trying to analyse some of these in my book.

Here, I am afraid my book becomes the book of a bit of a nerd. I am a nerd because my first answer to the question that I have just posed is that

it is all rooted in the microchip. It is all rooted in the ability, developed 30, 40, 50 years ago, to put a computer on a microchip; and secondly, to accelerate the processing speed of that microchip, not by ones, not by tens, not by hundreds, not by thousands, but by millions and it is continuing to accelerate. Staggering communication power, revealing and creating connectivity on a scale never before known in history - anything like it, nothing like it - and changing attitudes on every side and changing processes and behaviour.

The children of that system, the children of that phenomenon, that opening of the iPad in the morning (just under half the world's population have iPads now) or opening of the iPhone in the morning creates a sort of power nexus and a sensation of authority and readiness to challenge people who do not agree with you, on a scale which has never been known before.

This of course is where we can see the sub-phenomenon of this age coming out, first of all, the new e-empowered populism. Now everyone will say, *'Well, we've had populism down the centuries, the populists have risen up at various times and indeed taken over.'* There are many examples: the time of the French Revolution; the Chartists nearly overthrew the British establishment in the middle of the 19th century; and of course, in the 20th century, dictators - without the aid of the iPhone or the web or the digital age - were able to mobilise populism with terrifying effect. And having mobilised it, to lead it and mislead it into disastrous attitudes both to their own interests and to international interests, which led to the horrors of the 20th century.

But this the populist story on a new scale, one we have never seen before.

Secondly, the identity story: people are now connecting with each other and creating first of all a happy identity, and then turning it into relative fury as other people do not recognise that identity. Then an attack on hierarchies and Parliament - and this is all the language of populism really, 'them'/'the other'/'they', and certainly 'the foreigner', I am afraid, and many other bogies and demons, as against 'we the real people' - and this is all vastly empowered by the Internet and the web.

Then we have seen the polarisation and loss in moderation: as my book rather mournfully begins by saying, this is not a good time for moderates at all. Moderate opinion and nuanced argument get swept aside by the polarisation of opinion which is e-enabled. That is what the microchip does: creates the extremism and the direct street action, of which you have got a good example just outside the door today.

So the masses have been empowered. Karl Marx would have been amazed, I think, when he talked about the rise and rule of the proletariat and the empowerment of the masses. That is what has happened, although it has not turned out at all the way he or anyone else forecast. We have had direct action increasingly seen as the way forward as hierarchies are swept aside, parliaments are denigrated - 'all politicians are corrupt' and 'the system does not work for us' - all in language you have heard every day. And everyone is 'out of touch'. I bet you, most of you today during the course of the day, will have heard someone say that someone else is 'out of touch'. It is the phrase of the age. Everyone feels they are at the centre of things and everyone else is out of touch.

We have seen that expressed here in Europe in the 'gilets jaunes'. You can see it going on in a rather terrifying form now in the streets of Hong Kong. We have seen since 2011, the so-called Arab Spring, which was the most ridiculously misnamed thing of all - it was not a spring, it was not like the Prague Spring. By bringing tyrants down, it was not going to bring democracy to the streets to break out in happy harmony. Instead it was going to bring tribal grievances, divisions, a cacophony of different views and a lot of violence to every street and every square and every city of the Middle East almost, most visible obviously in Iraq, in the horrors of Syria which continue to this moment, in Libya, which is getting worse than ever, and I suspect at any moment, in Egypt. But elsewhere the general feeling is that landmines are everywhere and the peace and hope of a democratic world has certainly not followed from the pulling down of the various tyrants.

So that is my first rather gloomy message - don't worry, I am going to get happier a little later on - but that is the first.

Second, and related to that, is the giant paradox that for all this liberalisation, pulling down of tyrannies and so on, along with all the fragmentation, along with all the national stridency, we have seen a giant pattern of networks across the planet being spread at enormous speed by people who often do not like what they see. But in fact, their own preferences and their own demands are what is driving it, both the commercial hi-tech platforms and algorithms which are shaping people's views and attitudes in a way that quite often is not understood but is very, very strong.

And of course the new networks between countries replacing the more familiar institutions of the 20th century, which were created by the architects of 1945 and the post-Second World War world. In my book, I try to get hold of this tableau, I try to cover the last fifty years in two sections, or two revolutions, the first one triggering the second.

The first revolution was the rise of markets – well, let's go back even further. We had laissez-faire at the end of the 19th century, and we had the failure of laissez-faire. As people like Walter Lippmann used to write, the laissez-faire doctrines had failed to have any moral content.

We had the rise of the state accelerated by the two World Wars and the rise of the domination of state capitalism, which lingered on after the Second World War into the 1960s and 1970s - then met by the rise of markets, and market economics and market liberalisation, which actually began in this country, and this is something which I have not heard very much elsewhere. It began actually, oddly under the much-maligned Ted Heath. That was the first point at which people began to say, *'This can't go on, this socialist corporatism is clogging up this country.'* How often did you all hear the phrase, *'We won the war and now everyone else all round us in Europe is doing much better'?* This created an impetus for liberalisation, for questioning the size and role of the state in many areas and led eventually to privatisation, contracting out and all the other things which then spread around the world, quite considerably towards the end of the last century.

Then – that is the first part, the rise of markets – we have had the rise of the digital age. Not foreseen at all in 1970 and hardly in 1980, although it was just beginning then, but of course, bringing a completely new dimension

to the then liberalised situation. The cork in a sense was out of the bottle. I use the fairy-tale analogy of the Sorcerer's Apprentice: you remember the wizard went out, leaving instructions about cleaning the place up and the apprentice lighted on the formula for getting the buckets and the brooms to do the job. And they did the job, and they did the job, and they could not be stopped, and they went on and went on until the whole place was flooded and chaotic. In the end, the wizard had to come back and put it all right. But in a way, our liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation of the 1980s was rather similar to that: we were undoubtedly onto a good thing in that the immediate effects were extremely beneficial, and after a few hiccups, people recognised that. But then it began to turn and then somehow people began to feel that it was no longer in their control at all, and then of course, as we know, it all led to the vast explosion of sub-prime capitalism and the Lehman crisis of 2008, 2009, 2010.

That was the first impact of the digital age which was not foreseen, which created this funny kind of turbo-boosted capitalism, but with it, it brought a change in the mood about whether just arguing on ideologies left and right was really going to deal with the new situation. It invalidated the ideological '-isms' which were much traded around in the 20th century. It questioned the practicalities of democracy itself, as to whether it really works in the way we operated it in the past.

And as I said earlier, and William Waldegrave had observed, it collapsed the narrative. Suddenly it was not at all clear where we were going and now we have rather brilliant commentators and authors like Yuval Noah Harari whom I quote quite a lot in my book, author of *Sapiens and Homo Deus*, who is really saying that with the failure of religion, the failure of the replacement '-ism' – fascism, communism, and the failure even of liberalism to identify where its heart was and what it was leading to, we were in danger in of having a nihilist future in which there was no story at all.

So that will take you up to about two-thirds of the chapters in the book, and now my tone is going to change.

I can apply what I have said so far to the global situation, but I have not got the arrogance or the conceit or the idiocy to try to talk about global

answers. I can offer though, some answers for this island, this kingdom, in which we are now all sitting.

So are there some answers for us? Is there a role? And my answer is yes.

Internally, I think we have to make our own democracy work much better and deliver quality government. That requires - and I argue at some length - two particular projects, amongst many others.

One: there has got to be a device or devices for spreading the benefits of new wealth to millions of households. The capitalism that we have now got, which is not at all the same as capitalism of the textbooks that some of us learned at school, does concentrate wealth to an extraordinary degree. Not only does it concentrate it, but of course it is now all visible on the iPad, on the iPhone, it can be seen 'who is getting what' as they say in *The Week* magazine. And it can be seen that the concentration of capital - regardless of inequality measurements which may tell another story - is now amazingly in the hands of fewer people than ever on a scale which they cannot possibly use and leads to a sense of disappointment and outrage to the newly empowered masses who feel that it is time that they were recognised and time that capitalism, if it exists in that form at all, works for everybody, which it clearly does not.

I promote one particular area of capital ownership and wealth spreading, developed by Louis Kelso in California fifty years ago which we tried out under Ted Heath in this country. And there was considerable enthusiasm from Margaret Thatcher who saw its most important expression in the sale of council houses, but was also determined to spread ownership in other forms, ESOPs, QSOPs, savings instruments of all kinds to more people and made some progress. It did work, up to a point, but then somehow faded and other things took over, particularly the rise of the pension fund.

So all that needs the attention of our financial experts to a degree that it is not getting now. My contempt is reserved for those who are always saying we must defend capitalism, and then they spend a lot of time defending a system that does not exist anymore, because we are in an entirely new situation. The defence we need is one that delivers dignity on status and

ownership to millions of people of the kind which is at presently reserved only for a fairly thin layer at the top.

If that sounds un-Torylike, I am sorry, but as I said earlier, we have to move away in our political parties from the ideologies of left and right. The '-isms' – whether capitalism or socialism – do not really describe what is going on in the world or even this country.

Second, I think, and this is not so much in my book, but I was just saying to the Ambassador of Switzerland that I came back last week convinced that we have got a lot to learn from the Swiss political system because it is so marvellously decentralised. I do not want to exaggerate, but I do not think everyone in Switzerland even knows the name of their President or Prime Minister. What they do know is the name of the people leading their canton and their commune and what they are involved in, because they have a lot of referenda as we know (and that may make some people shudder) and it means everybody feels very closely in touch. You do not hear the words 'out of touch' so much in the Swiss political ambience which you do hear of course in ours. Here people say, *'Of course you're out of touch, you're at the centre, you're in the London elite, the metropolitan elite, you don't know what's going on'* and so on.

What I am really saying is that I think we have to brace ourselves for very considerable decentralisation and maybe to save the United Kingdom, which is trembling at the moment, we have to change that 'U' to 'F' or 'C' even - we have to think about a confederal kingdom, which gives even more replete-ness and coverage of policy to the kingdoms within our kingdom.

Those are the two stories which I think do provide the beginnings of some sort of direction and answers internally, domestically in the situation I have described.

Internationally and related, overlapping that - because healthy internal structures lead to a healthy attitude to world responsibilities and international obligations and law, whereas of course populist internal anger leads to the opposite, as it did in the 20th century with disastrous

results - we now have the chance, first to recognise that the world is not organised as the Americans and some Chinese keep saying, between two superpowers with the rest of us trailing behind. It is actually organised in networks of immense power and activity which are dominating world trade and shaping the global economy.

Secondly, for this country, we have luckily inherited a network of common language, common outlook, common law, common accountancy which is called the Commonwealth network. Forget the idea of Britain being at the hub of something with spokes, that is a very old-fashioned idea. Think instead of a network in which everyone is connected to everyone else, some nodes are a bit bigger, some connections are a bit stronger. Basically we are talking here about a network of 54 countries, most of them aspiring to democracy, not always achieving it; all of them linked by a sense at a non-governmental level through professions and through, as I say, common language and common working practices to an amazing degree. Aren't we lucky? We did not work for it, we tried to throw it away. In 2003, the people over at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office tried to take the word 'Commonwealth' out of the system, they thought it was so passé. But one or two people, including Her Majesty The Queen recognised that it was a platform with a future in a digital age and that it was ideally suited, fitted like a glove, to the world of connectivity which has now emerged.

I am talking about not the old networks, they are important still, some of them, NATO, the Bretton Woods institutions, the European Union itself. I am talking about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Region of Economic Cooperation (RECP), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, ASEAN, COMESA, the Pacific Alliance, a new kind of pattern of European links which I think will emerge eventually even though we as potentially one of the major contributors to it have stepped aside for the moment, and indeed even links with Americana through NAFTA, all of which have been suggested and aired in the media and are under discussion, although none as yet really have taken off.

So that is the story that I offer in this book at the end. These are directions which are attainable and achievable. They require huge effort. You may say really, to write a book to try to bite all that off is ridiculous, but all I would

say in return is that we have entered an entirely new epoch, we are in a totally changed pattern of arrangements in our society.

I begin the book by commenting on a picture that is above my desk in my London apartment, which is a very good copy, brushstroke by brushstroke, of a painting by Turner called *The Fighting Temeraire*. *The Fighting Temeraire* shows a steam tug dragging this magnificent old 92-gun ship of the line, sailing ship, to the breaker's yard and of course it struck a tremendous chord in 19th and 20th century Britain. In fact, it was voted Britain's most favourite painting because it showed the new technology replacing the old and presaged the colossal changes in social affairs and social structure which were coming (as Trevelyan reminds us, politics is the outcome of social change), and it led to a kind of technology which John Stuart Mill called '*reaching the inner domain of consciousness*'. I think the digital age has also reached the '*inner domain of consciousness*' and this is where we have to start in preventing the whole system sliding into anarchy (which otherwise it could certainly do and has already done in the Middle East) and in providing orderly governance.

Somebody wrote to me after the launch of this book saying, '*Oh but you haven't provided a nice list of solutions*,' and I said, '*That's the point, that's the point, there are no solutions, we are moving to an age of colossal fluidity in which we are going to have to adjust constantly and continuously in order to survive and provide order rather than chaos*.'

I want to talk more about other things, like Adam Smith's mother - she plays an important part in this, I will tell you why later when we discuss it - and the bankruptcy of the neoclassical economic system, which is not a system at all, but having raised your hopes with other things, I will stop here and let the dialogue and exchange begin.

Thank you very much.

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## THE ENGLISH JOB: UNDERSTANDING IRAN AND WHY IT DISTRUSTS BRITAIN

**Transcript of a lecture given by the Rt Hon. Jack Straw**

**Wednesday 16th October 2019**

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**The Rt Hon. Jack Straw** was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice. He has served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. His autobiography, 'Last Man Standing: Memoirs Of A Political Survivor' was published in September 2012. He retired as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election. He continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. He is co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum; takes a close interest in Iran; is a member of the Independent Commission on the Freedom of Information Act; and Chairman of the Blackburn Youth Zone. His most recent book, 'The English Job: Understanding Iran And Why It Distrusts Britain' was published in July 2019.

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Thank you very much, Michael, and thank you all for coming. It is really good to see so many old friends and some new ones as well, including some people who helped me with the book – I am looking at David Logan and I will come back to him in due course.

I got involved in Iran because of 9/11. I was due to visit Iran when I first got to the Foreign Office in June 2001, which was a tranquil period in international affairs, and having spent four fairly turbulent years in the

Home Office, my wife could not believe how calm my days were. Anyway, that all ended with the terrible events of Sept 11th. It then became imperative - if we could - to gain the cooperation of the Iranians, because an international alliance, particularly the US, UK and others, was being assembled to invade Afghanistan and to end the Taliban's rule and their accommodation of al-Qaeda, and we needed Iranian help.

Iranians know Afghanistan very well: it is the same language and in the west of Afghanistan they are basically the same people around the Herat area. Also significantly, whilst on September 11th/12th, in Baghdad Saddam Hussein had organised celebrations in favour of the terrorists, yet in Tehran and many other centres, there were spontaneous demonstrations (but encouraged by President Khatami), vigils, in sympathy with the victims, which sent out a really important message, not least to the sceptics in the US.

Anyway, I went there and we got cooperation, which was profoundly important to us. Things would have worked out better with the Iranians and their cooperation, had it not been for an inadvertent line in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union speech at the end of January 2002, where, as I account, the line about the 'axis of evil' being Iraq, North Korea (which you can understand) and Iran was drafted by a speechwriter called David Frum, who is now redeeming himself as a very ardent critic of President Trump. I have spoken to him; he did not expect this line to survive in the finished draft and nobody in the White House or in the State Department noticed it, as Condi Rice accounts in her memoirs. They all expected the focus of the speech to be on something different. It was not, and that was profoundly undermining to Khatami and the moderates in Iran, and actually good news for the hardliners, who immediately used it - as often they use good news of this kind - as an excuse for further repression.

I went back to Iran four more times as Foreign Secretary, not least to start the E3 negotiations which Joschka Fischer, Dominique de Villepin and I got going in 2003, and I have been back on a number of occasions since. I caught the bug as I think many people do. I think Alistair Burt, a wonderful Minister of State at the Foreign Office handling the Middle East and Iran dossier if I may say so, has got the bug too (and Alistair - I am very sorry,

I fully understand the circumstances, but I am extremely sorry that you are not still there). It is a mixture of being bewitched, intrigued and infuriated by this extraordinary country.

My wife said one day, *'Well, why don't we have a holiday in Iran?'*, and a couple of friends said that they would join us. So we went on this holiday in October 2015; and the first chapter opens with the account of this holiday, which turned out to be an involuntary insertion into a thriller and was really unpleasant. The long and the short of it was that we were chased around the place by the Basij, the militia attached to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and we were given police protection, not against potential criminals or terrorists against us, but against other agencies of the same state. In the end it was the stronger agencies of the same state, the Basij and the Revolutionary Guards who won and we had to leave, and it was pretty frightening at times, as I account.

However, they did me one favour. We first encountered the Basij at a revered cypress tree on the route between Yazd, which is a wonderful desert town in the south of Iran, and Shiraz. What happened there was, we turned up (our itinerary – yes, it was known to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it was not public at all and you have to guess how the Yazd branch of the Basij found out about it) and there were six young men in Muharram black, because it was a period of mourning leading up to the most holy day of the Shia calendar, Ashura, which commemorates the assassination of Husayn ibn Ali in Karbala in AD680 by the Sunni and which really confirmed the schism within that religion which has gone on ever since. These six young men were perfectly polite, but they presented me with a declaration in Farsi, which is reprinted at the back of the book for those who read Farsi and there is a translation here, which said in terms why I was not welcome in Iran. And it started off:

*'Although it is our tradition as Iranians to 'welcome' guests and we have a hospitable culture which we abide by, this 'welcome' gesture does not apply to you! To be honest with you, we are not at all happy with your presence.'*

And then it went on to talk about *'you know better than us about the*

*crimes and ample plots that were orchestrated by your country against the people of this holy land'* and then it lists all the crimes and ample plots in which we the Brits – including me – had been involved, starting with the Paris Treaty and the separation of Afghanistan from Iran, running through the cunning contracts of D'Arcy, Talbot, Reuter; and through to the 1953 coup, our role in the Iran-Iraq war and, it says, *'the insults from people such as you against officials of our country during the nuclear negotiations [which were in October 2003] at the Saadabad Palace'*.

That list of the crimes and ample plots has actually framed the book, because I had wanted to write a book about Iran before, but this declaration sets out one perception (it is not by any means all Iranians) about the nature of Britain's role in Iran. It is worth just saying that although this sort of semi-paranoia is peddled continuously by the hardliners and so you see this daily, weekly in speeches from Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader and many others of that persuasion, the view that we are a kind of hidden hand, a malign hidden hand, behind what is going on in Iran is very powerful and it is very long-standing. It comes out brilliantly in a wonderful novel which is in translation. It is called *My Uncle Napoleon*, which is about Uncle Napoleon, a member of a middle-class family in Tehran in 1942 who is convinced that the Brits are out to get him; it is hilarious, quite poignant. And by the way, the Brits were not out to get Uncle Napoleon as it turns out in the story, but we Brits were running Iran between 1941 and 1946, a little-known fact outside, and we did go and get quite a lot of Iranians and lock them up because they were inconvenient to our war effort.

The title of the book comes from a phrase in Farsi (apologies to those who speak it properly) which is *'kar kareh ingilisee hast - the job is always an English one'*, so if things go wrong, there is a propensity to come out with this phrase and blame the Brits for things that have gone wrong.

There are plenty of others like that. I mentioned David Logan – he recounted a story which I repeat in the book about a friend of his who spoke very good Farsi, who gets into a cab – only a few years ago, when Gordon Brown was Prime Minister – and the cab driver says to him, *'Look, we all know that the mullahs were put in by Margaret Thatcher,'* and so David's friend says, *'Well, could be, but probably not.'* Anyway, the driver

said, *'No, we all know that, and I want you to give a message to Prime Minister Brown – we are fed up with the mullahs now, would you get rid of them?'*

And the same encounter, exactly the same, happened just a week ago at RUSI, at a panel of exiled Iranian women to celebrate their courage in standing up to the regime. A lady, who in her question to the panel had a clear, abject opposition to the current regime in all its forms, came up to me afterwards, and I very politely said,

*'Hello, madam,'* and she paused, and she said, *'I hate you.'*

So I said, *'I am really sorry to hear that, why is that?'*

And she said, *'Because you spoke to the mullahs.'*

I said, *'Well, that is true, but if you are involved in diplomacy, you can't choose who you talk to.'*

So this woman said, *'I don't care, you spoke to the mullahs. Anyway, we know that Margaret Thatcher put the mullahs there.'*

I did not try to explain to her that the timing was wrong - apart from the fact that she did not - because the Revolution happened four months before Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister, not afterwards.

Then she said, *'And anyway, we all know that the US and UK governments have ordered the media to downplay all the dissent that is going on in Iran.'*

I said, *'Well that is not true, either – it is just very difficult for British and American journalists to get access to report what is going on, but there is quite a lot of information about the dissent.'*

*'I don't care,'* she said.

The finale was that somebody else came up and asked if they could have a selfie with me so I said *'yes'*, this lady went to give her telephone to my protagonist and said, *'Could you take a selfie of Mr. Straw and me?'*  
*'No,'* she said, *'I hate him,'* and walked off.

But it gives you a flavour of this underlying suspicion of the Brits. What I have tried to do in the book is to provide some appreciation of why that is, but the book starts with a brief history of Iran's very distinguished history going right back into the millennium before Christ, to Cyrus the Great. It is worth bearing in mind, because I will come back to Israel, of course, that Cyrus the Great is celebrated in the Old Testament for the fact that he

liberated the Jews and allowed them to rebuild their temple.

Run through that period, particularly drawing out the important of Zoroastrianism, not only then but today, because it is a really intriguing country, Iran. Yes, it is Shi'a, but it is also still partly Zoroastrian. And it all runs into this powerful singular sense of national identity and when that is wounded, which it is at the moment, the Iranians are much more likely to come together. Their New Year is not an Islamic New Year, it is a Zoroastrian New Year, Nowruz. Khomeini thought about abolishing it, but it was, even for him, a step too far.

Iran was basically Sunni, run by Arabs, until the early 16th century and then the Safavids came in, who were effectively Persians as we now call them, and they decided to convert Iran to a state religion of Shi'ism. I had spotted this connection, but I am pleased to say that distinguished historians have also done it, about the parallel between what was happening in Iran, where the state, the government, had decided it needed to mould the religion in the image of the nation, and what was happening here with the creation of the Church of England. In both cases, detachment from a supranational power - in Mecca and in Rome respectively. It is just worth bearing that in mind today, although religious observance has fallen away and it is a matter of great concern. This is, as a number of our diplomats have said to me, the most secular country in the Middle East by a long way, not least because the mullahs have been running it for a long time and that tends to lead to the scales falling from the eyes about the nature of the religious practice. But it is very, very nationalistic, with Shi'ism and national identity all mixed up together.

The book then, at much greater length than I can possibly do in the next 12 minutes, runs through these crimes and ample plots.

The Treaty of Paris - they said they had never forgotten it, I had actually never known what it was, I am sorry to say - in 1857, the Iranians tried yet again to take Herat and that part of western Afghanistan which was once part of the Persian Empire. We sent troops up the Persian Gulf, invaded Iran from that end, they eventually got the message, they had to sign a humiliating treaty. Part of that treaty was an undertaking that we the Brits,

as the Russians had previously managed to extract from the Iranians, could set up as many consular posts as we wanted.

So by the end of the 19th century, for a country of five million people, we had 23 diplomatic posts in Iran. We were everywhere, running this, under the excuse or anxiety that we had to do this, both in order (certainly by the early part of the 20th century) to protect our oil, but critically to avoid anybody else opening the back door to the Indian Raj, through Afghanistan or through Baluchistan.

Later in the 19th century, we have this extraordinary rapacious concession granted to Baron Julius de Reuter, still celebrated in the news agency, to give him complete control, total development for sixty years – over railways, roads, mines, industries, which he got in exchange for the usual bribes given to the Shah and members of his court. There was such a fuss about that that it fell away, but his consolation prize was that he was able to establish the Imperial Bank of Persia which was the central bank over which the Iranian government had no control. It issued bank notes, it issued coins, it controlled credit, it was run by the shareholders from London.

Just on the railways: there were no railways in Iran until the 1920s, apart from a toy town 10 km little line which ran from the centre of Tehran to a shrine. This was at a time when thousands of miles had been built in India, in the Ottoman empire, in Russia. Why? Because we and the Russians had done a deal to give the other a veto over any building of any railway, because we wanted one to go east-west, that really worried the Russians. They wanted one to go north-south, that worried us. So there were no railways and the result of that: it was one of the most undeveloped nations in the whole of that region until the 1920s.

Run forward, you then get to Major Talbot, a really egregious figure, put up to this by an even worse figure called Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who was a British diplomat who had served as our Minister, our Ambassador, in Iran in 1890. Major Talbot, a distant cousin of Lord Salisbury, then the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at the same time, extracted a concession from the Iranians for complete control over the growing manufacture and export of tobacco and tobacco products.

Everybody smoked in Iran at the time, including women, and it was a cottage industry employing thousands. Whereas for the Reuter concession, only the elite were bothered, but they were offended - for this, everybody was bothered and the balloon went up, and the mullahs started to organise and agitate against this. It is of crucial significance because up to that point, the clerics, yes, had been active, but like clerics elsewhere they had been active in support of the state, and this tobacco monopoly radicalised them. The balloon went up and led to the most senior cleric issuing a fatwa banning all Iranians from smoking. What is astonishing about this is that it was obeyed. Everybody stopped smoking and the market for Talbot's Imperial Tobacco Company of Persia fell away. The Shah, who was standing to make a lot of money out of the concession, got very angry about this and issued an order to this senior cleric to start smoking or he would be exiled. It is an indication of the balance of forces - this chap just said, '*No, I am not doing that,*' and in the end, the concession had to be withdrawn.

We redeemed ourselves a bit at the beginning of the 20th century, when the same mullahs having tasted political power, some of them were in a similar position to parish priests in Ireland, so they were quite embedded in their own community. There was great agitation especially in Tehran, but also elsewhere, for a constitution, because the law up to that point was simply what the Shah said it was, and they sought sanctuary, *bast*, in the British Embassy, Ferdowsi, a big, lovely 12-acre site.

It started off with a handful of people sitting at the Legation - I went through all the telegrams that were being sent by our increasingly agitated chargé who was there, because it ended up with 14,000 sitting in, but we accommodated them. The result of this - it is called the Constitutional Revolution - was the peaceful 1906 constitution, echoes of which are still in the current constitution. So we did well there.

However, we undermined our reputation a year later when we and the Russians negotiated a secret treaty carving up Iran into spheres of influence with the north going to Russia, the south coming to us and the middle bit up for grabs. Meanwhile, another exotically named man, William Knox D'Arcy, had managed to get a concession to search for oil in Iran, and he finally struck oil after spending much more money than he had anticipated,

in 1907/1908. Burmah Oil had to bail him out, and that started as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which is now BP - that is where BP started.

And that – the finding of oil – coinciding with Churchill's decision to convert all our big boats as well as smaller boats to oil from coal, meant that Iran for almost ever after was going to be of huge strategic importance to us. Churchill nationalised APOC – BP – in the summer, June 1914, just before the war and also entered into a secret deal with BP/APOC for guaranteed supplies to the British navy at a cheap price. Not least for that reason but also to do with India, British troops were all over Iran in the First World War, as were troops from other countries, and the countryside was really ravaged, we did not bother what we were doing.

In 1919 Curzon, who I think on my list probably goes down as the worst British Foreign Secretary, although there are plenty of other candidates, proposed a treaty. He got the Shah to agree it on payment to his three sidekicks of £133,000 then from a secret fund (about £7 million today), to turn Iran into a protectorate. That was too much for the market, but meanwhile a very wily British general, Edmund Ironside, had spotted a young lieutenant in the Persian Cossacks, promoted him to brigadier-general, suggested to him that he might like to organise a coup, which he duly did. That was 1921 and by 1926, this man who started as a gunnery sergeant from a poor family had himself crowned as Shah.

His period was autocratic. He tried to emulate Atatürk and to crush public expressions of religious faith, which is sadly not forgotten still, and he did a great deal of development. But by the early 1940s, we were very worried that he was too pro-German, too Nazi and so we and the Soviets moved in and took the country over, and replaced him with his compliant son. After we had left in 1946, democracy broke out in Iran and one of the increasing demands was first, that the Iranians should have more of the money being made by APOC and that later it should be nationalised.

I write the history of this period, the so-called Abadan Crisis - it is something that ought to be studied more in international relations courses for a failure of British foreign policy. There were plenty of opportunities at this time to do a deal with the Iranians for a 50-50 share of the proceeds and so on.

They kept being blocked by myopia – not in the Foreign Office actually, in the Treasury and by obduracy by this nationalised oil company, BP, who were refusing to accept instructions from anybody.

The net result of that was in 1951, Mossadegh the Prime Minister, lost his patience, we were expelled, and our embassy was closed a year later.

Well, we then in reprisal had the 1953 coup which was organised by SIS and the CIA. No papers from SIS have been published, I am in no position to ask to see them even though I am a former Foreign Secretary, but many are now being published in the States, including lots of SIS's papers, so it is all there.

The interesting thing about the coup however: yes, it would not have happened but for organisation and money from the US and the UK, but it also required some local support, and that local support came from many of the clerics who had been scared stiff that Mossadegh was paving the way for the Tudeh, the communist party, which would have no room whatsoever for clerics. But the current myth in Iran is that everybody was against the coup, it was entirely from the outside. It is not the case and some of Khomeini's friends and compatriots in the clerical establishment were in favour of the coup.

Run forward through the period after 1951 when the Shah sort of found his stride. It was a period of relative prosperity buoyed by increases in oil sales and quite a good time for middle classes living in urban areas, not for others, but a great market for the Brits and the Americans.

By the end of the 1970s, the gilt was wearing off that, there were plenty of signs you can now see as to how discontent could easily bubble up. Interestingly, our embassy did not spot it. I quote one young man in our embassy who did, Peter Westmacott, who later became our Ambassador in three places. But officially they did not spot it, they were not reporting this here, nor were the Paris, American or Russian embassies, but there were demonstrations, they were harshly repressed in September and onwards in 1978 and then the Shah had to run for his life in January 1979 and Khomeini took over.

I am going to be very brief in my last remarks. It was not obvious which way the revolutionary forces would go, because it was not just Islamic forces, religious forces behind the Revolution, there were plenty on the left, Tudeh and Islamic Marxists, all sorts of people. In the early stages of drafting the constitution, Khomeini held back from proposing what is called *velayat-e faqih*, which is 'rule of the jurists', which lies behind the power of the Supreme Leader and gives the Supreme Leader complete authority beyond the elected government over all the coercive power forces of the state, but by bad negotiation from moderates, he did get that established.

Then Saddam (with a nod and a wink from the United States) invaded in September 1980 and you had, completely unprovoked, the start of the absolutely bloody Iran-Iraq war. If we are still defined, as we are, by our standing alone in 1940 and 1941, so much more are the Iranians defined by their recollection of standing alone in that period. And they did stand alone, they had no allies to speak of, but one, and that one was Israel, who were the only reliable supplier of arms to Iran and who kept badgering the US without much success throughout that period.

The last thing I just wanted to say (and I am very happy to take questions) - I think getting across this kind of background and I bring it up to date in a much more contemporary way in my book, is this: what you have got in Iran is called a single government, it has got a single constitution. But it is not a classic dictatorship where there is one person who is determining everything. Yes, ultimately Khamenei does determine and make the decisions and yes, his instinct is that of a hardliner and certainly very hostile not just to the United States, but to the West. He has never been outside Iran since the day he became Supreme Leader in 1989, his understanding of international relations is very poor. But even within the hardliners, the Revolutionary Guards, the judiciary, there is a lot of vying with a relatively moderate government, there is still more tension.

Iran in my judgement is more susceptible and its politics are more susceptible to outside influence than almost any other country I can think of. So how we operate, how the United States operates in respect of Iran directly affects the politics there. One of my many regrets about President Trump's decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement which President

Obama agreed, was that not only has it made the world less safe because there was a guarantee, pretty nearly, that Iran could not create a nuclear weapons capacity for at least 15 years, but that it has also played into the hands of the hardliners and it has weakened - just as Bush's speech did all those years ago - more moderate reformist forces.

Where it is going to go, I do not know, but what I do know is that the strategy which President Trump has embarked on is not working. It is impoverishing Iranian people for sure, but it is not working in its own terms and he has just handed the Iranian hardliners a bonus, because they are now able to move into Syria unimpeded by United States forces, so it is a terrible mess.

But I am clear about one thing: Iran was, and is, a very important country in the region. I have got no illusions about the nature of some of those in power - how could I, after our experience on our holiday - but I do think that engagement and understanding is the way to try and get through there and to build better relations.

Thank you very much.

## A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

### Transcript of a lecture given by Secretary Chuck Hagel

Tuesday 22nd October 2019

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**Chuck Hagel** was the 24th Secretary of Defense, serving from February 2013 to February 2015. His current commitments include service on the Board of Trustees of RAND; Advisory Board of Corsair Capital; Senior Advisor to GALLUP and to the McCarthy Group; Centennial Scholar, Georgetown Walsh School of Foreign Service; Distinguished Scholar, University of Nebraska at Omaha; Distinguished Statesman at the Atlantic Council; Board of Directors of Public Broadcasting Service (PBS); Director and Founding Member of the American Security Project; and Advisory Board Chairman of the HillVets Veterans Organization. Hagel served two terms in the United States Senate (1997-2009) representing the state of Nebraska. He was a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations; Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and Intelligence Committees. He also served as the Chairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the Senate Climate Change Observer Group. Previously, Secretary Hagel was a Distinguished Professor at Georgetown University, Co-Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, Chairman of the Atlantic Council. Prior to his election to the U.S. Senate, Hagel was president of McCarthy & Company, an investment banking firm in Omaha, Nebraska. He is the author of the book, 'America: Our Next Chapter' and was the subject of a 2018 book by General Daniel Bolger entitled 'Our Year of War'. He is a graduate of the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

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Michael, thank you, and good afternoon, Ladies and Gentleman. I am very grateful that Michael and you all have invited me to share some thoughts today on world affairs. You probably note from the title that I gave Michael

when he said we must have a title for your lecture that I made it fairly general, 'Changing Global Order', so we can go anywhere we like with that framework of conversation, and I do look forward to hearing your thoughts.

And I would be happy to answer any questions and share with you at least my perspective not just on a changing world order, but I know specifically you might have some interest in what is going on in Washington, and where all this is leading. I know you are asking the same questions here in London about the UK.

A number of western democracies around the world, as well as, I think, all regions of the world are in some state of volatility, and I would even say some were in real danger, because when the world starts to fray and go in different directions and there is very little order, things become particularly volatile, unsettled and uncertain, unstable and dangerous.

We have not seen the world in this state of affairs since World War II. Every region of the world is in some difficulty. The most significant focus is probably the Middle East, where there is really no good news, and it is as dangerously unsettled as I think we have ever seen it. But coming back to Washington and London, it has been a while since we have seen such unsettled times in our capitals, as well as uncertainty in the Canadian election. It appears Mr. Trudeau has held on, but he is going to have to form a coalition government. We are seeing coalition governments across Europe, and in Germany, Mrs Merkel will be leaving soon.

Asia-Pacific is no different: yes, different dynamics, different frameworks, different governments, different challenges, but still very uncertain, whether it is North Korea, or the differences that are becoming more and more obvious between South Korea and Japan, which is not good news. Trade, tariffs, sanctions, all now woven into the same fabric of a world order, a world order that we all, particularly the United States and the British and other nations, came together in building in the ten-year period after World War II.

Let me begin my remarks there, because I think in order to have any understanding or appreciation of where we are today, it is important that

we step back and review where we came from, how we got here, and what is this so-called liberal world order that we hear about, that is being challenged today everywhere: by nationalism, by populism. A questioning of these institutions that were created in the construction of that world order, institutions that I often refer to as 'coalitions of common interest', because the world order that we saw built after World War II was based on primarily the common interest of all people.

It was never intended to be the perfect order, nor could it be; or to solve all the problems, nor could it. But it was a world order built around institutions that shared the same values of common interest, of trade, of prosperity, of improvement, all disciplines of the world, science, technology, freedom, democratic reform, individual rights. Those are in the interests of every people and on every continent. So as we review all those institutions, the United Nations, collective security - NATO, the IMF, the World Bank (it came from the Bretton Woods 1944 conference), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which as we all know is the WTO now, dozens of multilateral development institutions and banks, all encouraging more commerce, and more ventures to understand each other.

It held the world together pretty well for seventy years and I would be so bold as to say if we had not had those institutions, as complicated and difficult as the world is today and this period that we are going through, I am not sure we would be in as strong and good as position now had we had no such institutions over the last seventy years. We have had no World War III. I think of the continent of Europe and the UK. The United States was spared from World War I and World War II - of course we had men and women who lost their lives - but we did not see the devastation on our land and what happened to people's economies, devastated, in World War II especially. The mass slaughter of millions and millions of people that resulted from those two World Wars. So the first fifty years of the 20th century were not good years.

But the seventy years that we have lived with this new world order have produced no World War III, no nuclear exchange, more freedom for more people than at any other time in the history of man, more prosperity for more people, more opportunities, more advances in every discipline, in

technology. With all the problems and all the failures, we still have done pretty well.

As history informs us, you go through these periods every so often, fifty, sixty, seventy years, when there is a general questioning of the current state of affairs. Not just sovereign nation affairs, but world affairs, because we are all global citizens. Yes, we are citizens of our sovereign nations, but we are global citizens, we are not going to unwind that and undo that. We are connected to everything, a world commerce, world trade, world security. Start really with the fundamentals of climate and clean air and clean water and clean oceans, and then work from there.

As I begin working my way through this to share some thoughts, I want to go to a book that many of you will have read and certainly are familiar with, because the British are very prominent in this book. It is former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's book called *Present At The Creation* that he wrote after he left office of Secretary of State. During that time, he was one of the global architects of the world order. I read that book years ago, but I have just recently read it again, when I have had a little more time on my hands. It does take you back and remind you clearly of what it took to build this order and how it was not easy to get the French and the Germans after World War II to agree on anything, and how the British played such a role in that effort. All the people that you know: Anthony Eden, Clement Attlee, Churchill, all giants of the architecture. How important Konrad Adenauer was to working with Schuman and other French leaders to make things happen. It was not just as if this new world order of prosperity dropped out of the heavens, it was tough as hell for ten years and it was uncertain. NATO was uncertain, so much was uncertain.

Now it is being questioned. It is being questioned in some terms, some ways, and that is natural and comes every fifty, sixty, seventy years in cycles, as I mentioned.

And to take you back to that, I am going to quote from Abraham Lincoln, something he said in 1862 (and this is in Dean Acheson's book) because I think it sets the framework for what we are talking about this afternoon and the framework of the reality that we are experiencing today in the

world. Lincoln said this in his second annual message to Congress in 1862 when – and you know the history of America, we were going through the Civil War - a number of his Cabinet members and others in the Congress said, *‘Why don’t we just let the south split off, the north split off, we will divide the country, we will have two different countries, and everybody will be happy?’*. That was a pretty prevailing thought at the time. Abraham Lincoln listened intently to all the points of view and then he said this, that I think particularly pertinent to our times:

*‘The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.’*

I have read this over more and more, and the more I read it, the more it really does in my opinion explain a lot of where the world is today. The legitimate questioning of institutions: I think you here in the UK are focused on questioning one of those institutions as much as anything, but I think it is more than just membership of the EU, it is *‘what has the EU done for us, what penalties do we pay?’* Regardless of which side you are on, those are legitimate questions to be asked by a sovereign nation. Is it still relevant to our needs, to our sovereignty? We are a sovereign nation. I will leave that to you British to figure out, we have our own issues in Washington!

It is the same thing that is being applied in Germany. However you want to brand it, nationalism, populism, I suspect most of that or a lot of it, has been brought on by the refugees coming out of the Middle East. Much of the populism/nationalism in Europe is a result of what we are seeing in the Middle East, but every western democracy is going through some phase of that questioning of those institutions: have they really helped us?

We are going through it in the United States and I have said about the Trump administration, about President Trump specifically: President Trump was not the cause of what we are going through, he was the consequence.

This questioning and not trusting anybody, that is very much an issue here

and all over Europe, mistrust in government, mistrust in leaders, *'what have you done for us, we cannot rely on you.'* It is aided and abetted of course by social media and 24-hour breaking news. We are not going to unwind all that – you are going to have 24-hour breaking news, I suspect, forever.

So what Abraham Lincoln said in his comment is quite relevant and he made those comments in 1862: you adjust and you adapt to the times, there are new challenges, new realities we must face, and so the institutions that we have relied on for seventy years may need adjustment to be relevant to these times, and changes and demands in our sovereign needs. But he also meant you do not throw it all out, you do not just unwind it all and leave it in a heap of trash, because then what do you have? Seven billion people on the face of the earth, all going their own way? Demographers tells us we are going to have two billion more people by 2045. Now if we have got a few problems with seven billion, I do not think it gets more uncomplicated with two billion more. It is more complicated, starting again with the environment and everything else that we are going to have to address and continue to address in governments, in trade, in relationships, security, intelligence-sharing, police-sharing.

Terrorism is not new, it is just more sophisticated. Terrorism has been around since man, and it is going to continue. Because of technology, it has given non-state actors now tremendous opportunities and advantages that they never had, and they have brought terrorism to a new sophistication of slaughter and intimidation and killing. No one nation, not the United States, nor the UK, is capable of dealing with that alone, and one of our great strengths is alliances.

Certainly I saw first-hand as Secretary of Defense of the United States the strength alliances bring when you combine the interests of intelligence-sharing with allies. Our defence, the projection of American power, is directly a result of alliances. Now we have the biggest, most sophisticated military in the world, but we would not be able to project that without the allies allowing us bases around the world where we could put our rotation or our permanent bases, men and women; where we have landing rights for maintenance of our planes; and port calls and harbours for our ships,

keeping those sea lanes free. The British are part of that in NATO, as are other NATO nations.

Alliances bring a tremendous amount to a sovereign nation and I have always been mystified in our current President's position on this, as he has suggested it. I guess his foreign policy is 'America First' - that is not a foreign policy - but he announced it again at the United Nations last month, that we essentially do not need the rest of the world, the rest of the world have been freeloaders, taking advantage of us. Well, as someone who has served a number of years in the United States Senate, I have also built international companies, been all over the world as a businessman, as a Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee and the Intelligence Committee, as Chairman of President Obama's Intelligence Advisory Board, I was in the Reagan administration, I worked for President George H.W. Bush, and then as Secretary of Defense, I have seen first-hand the critical relationships and what they bring to nations through these alliances. And they are imperfect, they need to be adjusted, yes, but without them, the world would be a whole different place and it would be much more dangerous.

I want to continue along the line of Washington, since I know a lot more about Washington politics than UK politics or any other, but I do pay attention and I have had wonderful relationships that I have been able to renew in the last couple of days that I have been here in London with former defence ministers of yours, and foreign ministers, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, and of course, my old friend Michael, who I have known for a long time.

It just is refreshing and renewing for me as an American to hear from these men and women in your country and your government, who I have worked with over the years and for whom I have great respect, who also give me their understanding and appreciation of allies and relationships, because it is like a community, it is like a society, it is built on relationships.

Relationships do not determine how a sovereign nation will respond, because every sovereign nation always responds in its own self-interest and there is nothing wrong with that, that is predictable, you know that. But responsible relationships, relationships that have respect for each

other, that understand each other, that is a special glue that holds an architecture of different nations together. And it binds people: even though you will always respond in your own interest and the US will respond in its, but in between, there are so many more common interests that we have with the United States, with Britain, than different interests. It has always been that way, and again, that is how this world order was built and on the framework of that and sustaining that thinking in those ten years after World War II.

In Washington today, we are going through as chaotic a period as I have seen in my lifetime.

I can tell you, when I first came out of Vietnam, I was not around for all of it, but I was in Vietnam all of 1968, with my brother, who served side by side with me, he started college, I finished college. My educational career, Lord Lothian, was not one to be emulated. I had gone to four colleges before I got out of any of them, finally one was generous and just let me out, it was probably in everyone's best interest.

But I went to Washington in 1971 looking for a job, and I became the chief of staff to a Nebraska congressman at the end of 1972. I tell you that because I was there at the front end and during the Watergate mess and I worked for a Republican, so I recall Gerry Ford coming in and out of his office and all the players that you know from history. Some of you probably knew Gerry Ford, as fine and decent a man and leader as I have ever known. But I saw all of that, I had a front row seat. I was just a kid and knew nothing, but I knew enough to pay attention to what was going on. As bad as that was when Nixon left office in 1974 and the impeachment process had started (as you know, the articles on impeachment had been voted on in a judiciary committee of the House, but he resigned before the House impeached him), I never ever lost track of what I learned during that time.

Roll forward to 1998, I was a United States Senator. Bill Clinton was impeached. So I sat as a juror in the Senate and that is the role of the United States Senate during impeachment. The role of the House of Representatives is much like a grand jury - it is not to convict or exonerate,

it is 'we think there is enough here, it should go to trial'. The trial then goes to the Senate, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides in the Senate, and we have a trial and both sides present evidence. So I watched that.

And I go back to my Watergate times, the Clinton times and how all that happened, what started it, what perpetuated then the first question. There is always a pulling of the string, and there is always another string that is pulled that starts to unwind something, and it unwinds and unwinds and unwinds. That is what is going on in Washington today. It is normally a fairly slow process, and it is a painful process because it consumes the entire nation (not unlike what Brexit has done to the UK, I suspect). And that means the government has very little time to focus on other issues and that is very dangerous in a world like we are living in today. Very dangerous.

That is the biggest concern I have in my capital, in my country, and it is going to get worse as this administration becomes more and more consumed with trying to salvage itself and protect the President. And where does this go from here? Again, our situations are not exactly analogous - what you are going through here, what we are going through in Washington - but there are some similarities. One being that the government's time is distracted, and energy is taken away from what you should be focused on, what we should all be focused on, the big issues of our time.

We are going to continue, unfortunately, with this, certainly for the next 13 months in Washington. We have a presidential election next November, one third of the United States Senate will be elected or re-elected, the entire House of Representatives is up for re-election, a large percentage of governors across the United States, so next year's election represents a big, big year of voting.

This is going to be right at the tail end of the impeachment process and I suspect, observing this and knowing a little something about it, the President will be impeached by the House. Nancy Pelosi, Adam Schiff, the leaders that are heading the impeachment inquiry now, are doing it the right way (if there is a right way on impeachment), methodically, step by step, and that is the way it must be done. Not a rush to anything,

but to see if there is enough there to indict, meaning putting together articles of impeachment, which will be voted on one by one. One could be obstruction of justice, one could be perjury - I do not know, I do not think they are there yet, but it is a process. It is day by day, week by week, and if you have been following our week in Washington this week, today begins a week-long number of major, very significant witnesses who were all in the US Embassy in Ukraine during the so-called phone conversations and the meetings and so on. This is most likely not going to come out well for the President in what these people have to say. Next week, it will be followed by another series of witnesses coming before the House Intelligence Committee, which is the main committee leading this impeachment inquiry.

Something else I learned about that process during Watergate and during Bill Clinton's is there are always surprises. I used to tell my Senate staff and all the different staffs I have had over the years, with the Reagan administration, and when I was at the Department of Defense, *'Don't ever think that you are getting away with anything, there are no secrets in Washington.'* And I suspect there are no secrets in London. There are no secrets in Washington. You might get away with something for a while, but when a process like this starts, a lot of people are shaking in their boots because they do not know if the string is going to be pulled next on what they know or what they did or what they were party to. It makes everybody uneasy and what it also does, not immediately, because people want to see where this is going, but once a decision is made that this is serious and this is going forward, is it produces as we say in our country, a coming-to-Jesus meeting. You want to get right with the world very quickly and that means that you abandon the President very quickly if you know anything. It happened during Watergate, it happened during the Clinton administration. And out of all that comes a number of things that you did not anticipate, that you did not think about, you did not know, and I suspect we are going to have the same kind of thing in Washington.

On the political scene, that is generally our state of affairs that we are going to be living through and consumed by for the next 13 months until we have new election in November. Who the candidates are, we still do not know, certainly on the Democratic side. The Democrats will not start

voting in their primaries until early February. The two leading and continuing leading candidates are Joe Biden and Elizabeth Warren. That probably does not change - when you look at polls and after now three debates and after a few months of this, you start to see things breaking out into the clear. Other than Bernie Sanders, most everybody else is way, way down here in the basement in polling numbers.

That does not mean it cannot change. It has happened in our system many times that a candidate comes out of nowhere and wins Iowa. Barack Obama was good example. Hillary Clinton in 2008 was odds-on favourite to be the Democratic nominee for President and pretty much everybody thought she had it sewn up. Barack Obama upset her, beat her in Iowa and that just took all the momentum away from her and gave it to Obama, then as you know, the rest is history. Jimmy Carter in 1976, the southern governor that no one had ever heard of - 'who is he, that's a joke' - he wins Iowa and become the nominee. So there are a lot of things that can happen yet in this process and will.

On the Republican side, I think it is still very unclear whether Trump is the nominee for President. That is going to obviously depend on impeachment. If he is impeached, but not found guilty in the Senate and right now that would be a tall order, because the Democrats would need twenty Republican senators, they need 67 out of 100 to convict. But we are at the front end and you have seen a few of these Republican senators tiptoe away a little bit: *'Well, show me the evidence, I mean, if the evidence is there, we are probably going to have to do something.'* So they are kind of hedging their bets on this, and we are long way from knowing who is up, who is down. Lot of scenarios can be written, maybe Mike Pence is the nominee. Maybe Trump is impeached and convicted, maybe he is impeached but not convicted and he resigns. Pence may be implicated in some of this, so you just do not know.

I do not want to spend more time on that political dynamic in Washington, but it affects what I was talking about earlier, global affairs. I do not mean this to sound arrogant at all from an American, but because during the last seventy years we have played such an important role in the world (we have not played the central role, but we have played a very important role

with our allies), I have always believed that when America is off balance, the world is off balance. You may agree or disagree with it, but when you cannot rely on America's word, and when you cannot trust America's word and our credibility with NATO allies, there is uncertainty. Would we come to the defence of eastern Europe, those Baltic countries, for example? If Putin were to decide to roll in ten divisions of tanks, what would we do? Well, you all know the rules of NATO. An attack on one is an attack on all. But with President Trump, I do not know. He has made it uncertain. That has to reflect on the thinking in each of the capitals of NATO countries: how much can we count on the United States?

It certainly has in Asia when President Trump pulled America out of the TPP trade relationship, which I think was one of the biggest, biggest mistakes we have made. It opened the door to China, and I have had Chinese counterparts who were foreign ministers, defence ministers, ambassadors from the Asia Pacific countries, say to me, *'Mr. Secretary, we do not have any choice now but to make some accommodations.'* What they are saying is make some accommodations to China.

And by the way, I am not one who believes that the answer to China for the United States or the world is to do everything we can to keep China down or push them backwards. I think that is folly. That never works. That is not the approach. You use statecraft, you use leadership, you use allies, you use common interests to deal with China. Or Russia. Not America First. The strength America brings is our alliances. I said to somebody the other day, *'Who are China's allies?'* Nobody. Who are Russia's allies?

We so, I think, understate and undervalue the strength of alliances and friendships, that it is dangerous, and I think that is part of what we are going through now in the world: do we really need each other? Do we really need these institutions, as imperfect as they are, and they are constantly requiring maintenance to ensure that they are addressing the problems of all our citizens in each of our countries.

The United States has come up with some economic numbers in the last week about prosperity in our country. When you start breaking down prosperity across the board in any of our countries, median income,

average income, well, you have got to be careful with those numbers, because you can make about any point you want with numbers, depending on how you frame it and how you cast it and so on.

We have had some difficulties in our country. Going back to the comment I made about Trump being the consequence, not the cause of what happened, I think that is an important point to remember, at least in my mind, because Trump represented something new in 2016. Americans were not happy. We had gotten ourselves into senseless wars in the Middle East, at least in my opinion. We helped to bring on the biggest economic catastrophe since the Great Depression in 2008/2009 that affected everybody, it surely affected us. We saw a balanced budget that President George W. Bush inherited in 2001 from Bill Clinton completely squandered. Earlier, it took President George W. Bush's father, George H. W. Bush, down in defeat. That is why he lost that election in 1992 to Bill Clinton, because he went back on a promise of *'read my lips, no new taxes'*, but he did the right thing for the country and he knew it was at his peril, and he was defeated because of that economic issue.

American presidential elections are rarely, rarely, if ever, settled on foreign policy issues, because we do not think that way: there is an attitude that *'why would we have to, we are the biggest, most powerful country on earth and everybody has to respond to us.'* So that is the way a lot of voters in America have viewed elections over the years. It is not foreign policy, it is economic issues, that is the bottom line.

And so when you look at the divisions in America, as we are seeing more people fall below certain lines and people on top increase their wealth, and we are seeing that gap widen, you are going to have an issue, just like what is happening in Lebanon today, just like what is happening in Chile today. Everywhere you look around the world, call it nationalism, populism or any way you want to frame it or say it, a lot of people feel that they have been left behind and our politicians and leaders have failed them. So Trump comes along in 2016 and his line is, *'I haven't been part of the problem, my strongest point to offer you, American voters, is that I know nothing about the job of President of the United States, so vote for me, because I haven't been part of the problem, because I am a*

*billionaire successful [he said 'businessman', but he is not a businessman] real estate huckster, and that is why you should vote for me. Because look at Hillary Clinton, her pedigree. I mean, she represents the elite political classes who have got this country in all kinds of trouble.'*

Well, Hillary's presidential campaign was probably the worst I have ever seen run. She was not a good candidate. Everything was just right for Donald Trump. I talked to a lot of people across the country in 2016, and their attitude was, *'Well, you know, I don't like a lot of stuff that has come out on Trump, his mannerisms, what he said about women and so on and so on, but hey, we are not electing St. Francis here and I am willing to give him a try.'*

In American politics I have always had a theory and I think it has generally been borne out, not because it is any special, profound theory, that the American people will give a president about three years. By the end of the third year, the American people have made a decision on the president, and it is not probably going to change in the re-election and it is just like day and night and it happens: *'We gave him a chance, he has not done as well as we thought, or he has done better than we thought, or he has done terribly,'* and they make a decision and that is it. That is it. As you see this impeachment process go forward, it is probably accelerating voters' views of him, and the polls show it too. Polls are polls, so they are one indication, but you are always mindful of the problems with polls.

Again, I know I have thrown a lot out there and I know the title of my lecture is so general that we could have covered anything, but I think you have got so much on your minds, and probably you want to talk about what you want to talk about.

I am very happy to take time now to understand what you are thinking about and talking about in particular, so if I have meandered around too much, I apologise, but I am a former US Senator, so I pick up bad habits that I have not gotten rid of! Again, thank you very much.

## TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY AND CURRENT AFFAIRS

Text of a lecture given by His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın

Tuesday 12th November 2019

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**Ambassador Ümit Yalçın** was born in Ankara in 1967. He graduated from Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science, Department of International Relations in 1989. Ambassador Yalçın joined the foreign service in 1989. He served in the Turkish Consulate General in Rotterdam and in the Turkish Embassies in Baghdad and Moscow. He was Consul General at the Turkish Consulate General in Plovdiv from 2005 to 2009 and Consul General at the Turkish Consulate General in Dubai from 2009 to 2012. He also served in different political departments in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was promoted to the rank of Ambassador in 2012 and served as Ambassador of Turkey to Kuwait. Ambassador Yalçın held the positions of Director General for Bilateral Political Affairs and Deputy Undersecretary for Bilateral Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His portfolio covered North Africa & Middle East and Asia-Pacific. He was appointed as Permanent Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2016. He held this role until August 2018. Since 1st October 2018, he has served as the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the UK. Ambassador Ümit Yalçın is married to Mrs. Gül Yalçın. They have one son.

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We live in an **age of uncertainty**. We witness that the open, inclusive and rules-based global order is increasingly being questioned. Russian President Putin last June said that liberalism is dead. French President Macron claimed that NATO is becoming brain-dead.

Wasn't it less than thirty years ago when we were all celebrating the end of history following the fall of the Berlin Wall? How did we lose the post-Cold War euphoria and descend into pessimism?

There are deep divisions over the benefits of globalisation, free trade and multilateralism. Threats of international terrorism and extremism are persistent, dispersed and increasingly complex.

Abuse of religion, populism, racism, xenophobia, anti-migrant discourse, animosity towards Islam and anti-Semitism are rising trends. Various extremisms fuelled by radical groups threaten social cohesion and cause division. Public discontent, disaffection, and polarisation are increasing challenges to governance.

Climate change, income disparities, trade wars, cybersecurity issues add up to the already complicated global outlook. The influence of non-states actors in domestic and international affairs is also increasing.

The global economic order is changing. And political power is much more diffused today. There is no centre of gravity anymore. The current global governance structures do not correspond with such a change.

The UN is under increasing pressure - and in some cases not able - to deal with complex global challenges and threats. The same is true with the economic institutions.

One of the defining features of the new global landscape is the growing importance of regionalism. At a time when global structures are ineffective to deal with the change, regional configurations become more important. And unfortunately, the responses of certain political parties and leaders are just counterproductive. In this era of competing nationalisms and rising populisms, there is a genuine need for collaboration and cooperation.

In this general context, **Turkey** is located at the epicentre of a broad geography hosting a number of serious challenges.

To our south and east, there is a vast geography suffering from instability. Power vacuums materialise, proxy wars proliferate, geopolitical equations and new demarcation lines reshape. It is also endowed with 70% of the globe's known hydrocarbon resources.

Our wider region is prone to crises. Economic degradation, environmental disasters, terrorism, mass migration are among the outcomes.

Our region has become an arena of multiple actors, with divergent interests and sometimes hidden agendas. This further impedes efforts to inspire or find home-grown solutions. Embargoes, blockades, sanctions, shipments of weapons to a favourite terrorist group to fight another, artificial divisions are not part of the solution but the problem.

At the geographical heart of such a grim picture, Turkey's role is vital. Our hard and soft power components are utilised to overcome these challenges and to reinforce stability around us.

We want to live in a region that is peaceful, stable and prosperous. That is why we take part in international missions aimed at providing stability around the world conducted by UN and NATO. That is why full membership of the EU is still our strategic goal. That is why we built one of the largest airports in the world. We want to host more tourists. We want to increase foreign trade volume and mutual economic ties and investments.

But we confront shocks emanating from no less than three distinct geopolitical basins, or regions.

One is the Middle East.

Another is the Caucasus and Ukraine.

The third one is the Mediterranean and Europe, including the Balkans.

Although Turkey directly borders these regions, a more accurate description would start Turkey's neighbourhood from Central Asia and dive all the way to Africa. Foreign policy in this broad neighbourhood is not a walk in the park. The stakes are high and real; risks and threats are also clear and present.

Turkey pursues an enterprising and humanitarian approach to all the matters that influence our region. That is how we have formulated our foreign policy concept.

The first task of Turkey's foreign policy is to manage the active regional crises and protect our country. The most prominent of these crises take place in Syria, Libya and Yemen. There are of course other crises.

We take concrete action to help resolve problems. We also pursue a positive agenda in terms of cooperation and dialogue. There are global initiatives like Mediation for Peace or the Alliance of Civilizations in which Turkey assumes key roles.

Even from this summary picture, it must be evident that for European and western security and welfare, Turkey's contributions are vital. Could you imagine what kind of a Europe would exist if Turkey did not stand in between or could not engage actively in order to tackle all the problems of these regions?

I ask this question because it is not a secret that we are facing significant public distrust towards both Europe and the US. There are concrete issues where cooperation, solidarity and empathy fall critically short on the European and US side.

Let me take the US first.

Despite the long experience of mutually beneficial partnership and the NATO Alliance, we have not been able to articulate common ground on two specific issues:

- As hard as it is for us to understand it, the US has been providing weapons to an offshoot of the PKK terrorist organisation in Syria. The US says this is to fight ISIS, but the weapons and training ends up threatening and killing our people. PKK and YPG are the same. Arming one means aiding the other to kill our soldiers and civilians. We have to resolve this. The US must stop arming the YPG. And work with Turkey in ending PKK/YPG.
- Similarly, the kingpin of a vast criminal and a new generation terrorist network lives in the US. Even after the coup attempt he masterminded and conducted three years ago, he still lives in the US. FETO owns a

criminal network in business, banking and the media, financing their illegal operations through schools. They are active in the US and Europe and in over one hundred countries. They are not only a threat to Turkey but also to the countries where they are active.

These two issues haunt our relations with the European Union as well. The support and shelter provided to PKK activities and elements in Europe for many years already created distrust on the side of Turkey and the Turkish people towards the EU/the West. To change this situation is in the hands of the EU.

What has been happening in Syria for the last nine years is indeed a reflection of the state of global state of affairs. The Syrian crisis has caused humanitarian disaster, exacerbated terrorism, created irregular migration and risked territorial integrity of several countries.

We acted responsibly in the face of the Syrian crisis. This responsibility also requires us to start thinking and preparing conditions for the safe and voluntary return of Syrian refugees, to encourage a political solution and to eliminate terrorism. We should not just wait and try to see positive developments as if they will emerge out of our best wishes. An active position that will facilitate creating these conditions must be adopted.

This is one of the reasons for Operation Euphrates Shield in 2017, Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring recently. Necessary conditions will be met within the safe zone which is being established through this operation. This zone will be safe because it will have been cleared from terrorism.

Accordingly, it will gradually create the conditions for the safe and voluntary return of Syrians. The UNHCR is and will be a very important partner in our efforts for the Syrian refugees (115,000 already returned: OCHA). Neighbouring countries Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan are also stakeholders.

A viable solution in Syria will require a new social contract. In this regard, the roadmap needs to be implemented in line with UNSC Resolution 2254

(2015) where support was given to the post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation of Syria.

The Syrian crisis is and will be an important indicator for the level of cooperation and solidarity the West can offer. So far, what we have witnessed from the West is rather short-sighted and has opted for seemingly easier short-term solutions. What is happening and will happen in Syria not only affects regional or European security or stability, but has repercussions for global order.

In such a regional and international environment, we can only meet challenges if we can act together.

Risks and threats in our common neighbourhood require immediate, comprehensive and effective cooperation. There is a need for an enhanced and outward-looking Europe adopting a long term and strategic approach.

The question is whether Europe is in good shape to display its leadership capabilities and use its potential to make a difference. I am afraid the current outlook is not very promising. Look at the EU's identity crisis and the debate on the future of European integration.

Yet I am much more concerned about the future of Europe after losing one of its most innovative and outward-looking members.

The perception of so-called 'enlargement fatigue' is hampering the EU's soft power and transformative capacity.

Some narrow-minded politicians argue that enlargement only brings burden on the EU and would eventually weaken it. However, the idea of a fortress Europe does not solve any problems. Besides, the EU cannot really maintain its normative power without enlargement.

There is only one way forward if we are keen to deal with the challenges of this new era. We must create an environment of effective multilateralism and genuine international cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We believe that Turkey already contributes more than its share and no less than any EU country to European peace and security. This is true in terms of stabilising the neighbourhood, fighting terrorism, preventing fragmentation of the nation states around us, blocking irregular migration and many other fields.

There is a broad consensus in Turkey that Turkey must be better appreciated and better treated by our US and European friends and allies. It is my sincere opinion that both Europe and the US need to look up and face the realities of our day and age.

When they do, they will see a capable and reliable partner in Turkey.

When they do, they will agree that the world has been changing and in this world they need a strong and friendly Turkey more than ever before.

And we need strong, resilient and friendly allies and partners too.

A sincere effort must be made to reform the international order. Turkey is already a player in its own right in that regard.

I would also assert that we need fresh energy and strong leadership based on realism, sincerity, reliability and trust and confidence to re-energise the Western partnership with Turkey.

Thank you.



## THE CONTEMPORARY BATTLESPACE OF GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION

**Text of a lecture given by Air Marshal (Rtd) Philip Osborn CBE**

**Wednesday 4th December 2019**

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**Air Marshal (Rtd) Phil Osborn** *has a unique perspective on Defence and National Security, after over three decades in UK Defence. Most recently, he was Chief of Defence Intelligence until the end of 2018, and as such was at the heart of national security decision making, strategic intelligence provision, and national offensive cyber capability. Previously, he commanded one of the two operational RAF Groups, and led the extensive Joint Forces capability portfolio. He is now focused on raising strategic awareness of the unparalleled defence and security challenges facing Western and like-minded democracies. He also provides board-level geostrategic insight and advice, and he is active in senior leadership development.*

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My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, good afternoon.

And thank you for that immensely kind introduction. Lord Lothian asked me to offer you some thoughts on our current national security context from the perspective of a just retired Royal Air Force officer who, until recently, was UK Chief of Defence Intelligence, responsible for strategic intelligence, Defence counter-intelligence and Defence offensive cyber.

It is a pleasure and privilege to be here, well, for me, anyway. I am sure you'll let me know in due course how it was for you!

And why is it a pleasure?

Well, it is unusual to have the opportunity to discuss national security. Indeed, during this time of upheaval in political norms and great power

relationships, there is an almost total lack of meaningful strategic debate about the subject.

And yes, I know this week has been preceded by the most recent of a series of despicable terror attacks, today is the NATO non-summit, and the Chief of the Defence Staff is scheduled for his annual lecture on Friday.

But this is a blip - the debate about national security is routinely reduced to sporadic soundbites, usually about the size of the British Army, how many football pitches fit on the deck of a Queen Elizabeth class carrier, or which Essex householder has endured a Typhoon sonic boom, and of course veterans' affairs, which as a recent retiree, I actually think we should focus on even more.

National security is not an item of concern that regularly features at all. And it should - yes, to test government and national security thinking, but most importantly, to educate, inform and engage decision-makers, influencers and the public, the most important stakeholders in all of this.

And as I reflected on Lord Lothian's request, I was particularly struck by three particular facets of our national security picture:

- Firstly, the continuing and increasing severity of Great Power competition and confrontation.
- Secondly, the acceleration and proliferation of certain military and dual-use technologies.
- And thirdly, the increased use of transnational commercial organisations to deliver progressively critical national security capabilities.

Hence for the next 25 minutes or so, and before taking your questions, I will briefly explore these three themes and then offer some thoughts on why I believe that, unmitigated, they present a dangerous and underestimated threat to peace and security.

Indeed, going one step further, we should perhaps ask ourselves if what we are all witnessing is just business as usual, and tomorrow will therefore

be broadly the same as yesterday, or is this a strategic inflection point in national security, one which we risk recognising only in hindsight?

We will come back to this at the end.

But, before I continue, some caveats:

I am constrained by time and hence this will be a bit of a skate over a number of issues.

Also, in focusing on the Great Powers, I am not saying that other threats and malign influences are not important. They just increasingly sit within the context of a confrontational Great Power interplay.

I will also not cover the incontrovertible and highly significant effects of climate change, save to say that, with the consequent increase in economic migration and, for some, the struggle to access dwindling natural resources, climate change will exacerbate greatly the instability to which I will refer. And any lasting solution requires a degree of trust and cooperation between the Great Powers that I cannot today envisage.

A much more personal caveat is that I feel somewhat overawed by you, a highly intelligent and informed audience.

For example, I know that the overwhelming majority of you will know many or all of these issues far better than I. Indeed, you might argue - my ever-supportive wife would say with some significant justification - that I am not really qualified to offer such views. All too often, a military perspective is branded as narrow, biased and not sufficiently politically aware.

Let's therefore examine my bias:

- Yes, I have spent the last 37 years in the military, but during the last four years, as Chief of Defence Intelligence and Deputy Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, I was privileged to be part of national security decision-making.

- I would also offer that it may not be such a bad thing to have an informed military view, at a time when the military lever of national power is being enhanced and used by many malign nations.
- I confess that I am naturally air and space-minded, but I did serve my last six years in the military in our Joint command and I have looked after many joint and non-RAF capabilities.
- I am of course western-educated and hence I struggle, as I think most of us do, to see the world through non-western eyes. I cannot change this, but I try to acknowledge it, and recognition of this bias is to at least guard against it.

I should also say that I am naturally optimistic – I am a Charlton Athletic supporter after all – but I would offer that our aim as intelligence professionals is to see the world as it is and as it might be, not as we would wish it to be, hence this will not be a particularly happy twenty minutes or so.

I mentioned the privilege of being part of national security decision-making for some years.

As I reflect on that time, it is obvious that we did not, we could not, focus consistently on the broadest sense of the strategic threats to the nation through time.

It is the short-term nature of the National Security committee process that too often we were preoccupied with the politically urgent instead of the strategically important.

And so, in an effort to try to rebalance this in some way, I am grateful to have the space to talk a little about the contemporary battlespace, those three themes I mentioned - Great Power confrontation, technology proliferation, and the growth of commercially-provided national power – and some ‘so whats’.

**Today’s Contemporary Battlespace** can perhaps be characterised by multiple strands of continuous ‘state vs. state’ and ‘state vs. many states’ concurrent activities. In military speak, we might call these ‘courses of

action', but I am going to describe them as 'activity lanes'. Some of these activity lanes are peaceful and supportive, or at least appear so, and some are more aggressive and confrontational. Some will be in the physical space, some the virtual, and most a mix of both. All will have a cognitive element.

Many activity lanes will be predetermined and deliberate, while some will be reactive or opportunistic. All will interrelate, sometimes by design, sometimes by accident or neglect, and some will be legal, at least in the country of origin, while several will be illegal if viewed from elsewhere.

While many of these concurrent activity lanes will be open, some will be hidden and some designed to be deniable, plausibly or otherwise. Importantly, most will aim to remain below whatever has been deemed as a threshold for escalation. This is the essence of hybrid warfare - unless of course escalation is a desired outcome.

The number of activity lane options open to a nation is of course variable but perhaps the most dominant are that nation's respect for international law, its risk appetite, and, pre-eminently, its ability to think and then act strategically.

And the guarantors of strategic success are probably having the time, intellect and appetite to do the difficult thinking that goes with strategy, and being able to visualise the vastly complex, interwoven interplay of activity lanes and unintended consequence.

Now, you would rightly say that I am not describing a new phenomenon in international relations, but two things are different today than previously, and both are caused by the burgeoning information environment.

The first difference is that the virtual element is a relatively new, rapidly expanding and highly destabilising aspect of this battlespace. It is obvious that the art of statehood and the craft of national security has not kept up with the opportunity offered by the information environment to malign disruptors.

The second difference is the opportunity offered by technology to make a difference at the strategic level, to enhance intelligence and decision-

making, and to unravel and perhaps predict this interwoven tangle of activity lanes, but more of this later.

Let's now look in turn at the **three key influences on the modern battlespace** I described earlier: increasing Great Power confrontation, the acceleration and proliferation of disruptive technologies, and the increased use of commercial organisations to deliver national security capabilities.

Not so long ago, the UK Government's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review assessed that there was likely to be an increased risk of state-based threats to the UK. In hindsight, we were generally on the money but out on timing - this threat has matured much quicker than we expected.

Any similar review today would have to go even further. The threat today is not just from individual states, but increasingly from the collective impacts of Great Power competition and confrontation, and the pernicious combination of **Great Power ambition and introspection**.

Let's look briefly at this - and I do not intend to offend, just to offer a dispassionate perspective.

Xi's **China** is uncompromising, forward-leaning and to western eyes, repressive and dismissive of human rights, and deliberate actions and sharp words tend to speak volumes. Its military power is growing quickly, but not at the pace of its economic reach and influence; this is a mismatch that presents it with a critical vulnerability.

Importantly, because of its actions, I believe we are witnessing the beginning of the end of the cognitive dissonance that has dominated the thinking of some nations in their dealings with China. Choices are just about to get harder.

We are now used to the opportunistic and pugnacious ambition of Putin's **Russia**, which is ever more reliant on its ability to manage chaos and instability better than anyone else. We also know that, diametrically opposite to the UK and others, Russia reaches for its hard power levers first as it has good evidence that they work.

However, its systemic economic and demographic challenges remain, and any credible solution to these would further challenge the hold on power of the Russian elite. This makes the peaceful adoption of these necessary solutions a very distant prospect and hence there is no clear different course that we could view as peaceful.

The **United States**, divided and inward-looking, is erratic and fickle with opponents and allies alike, and that unpredictability is of itself a significant cause of uncertainty and instability. Importantly, many allies would be justified in worrying over the reliability and willingness of the US to fulfil long-standing commitments upon which those allies have shaped their security.

And this interplay between Chinese expansionism, Russian opportunistic adventurism, and US volatile introspection is self-evidently creating instability and uncertainty, power vacuums and opportunistic initiatives, and obvious winners and losers.

At best, this continual confrontation sharply raises the risk of miscalculation for every nation, not just the Great Powers. And at worst, history tells us that Great Powers are seldom supine when faced with strategic loss.

Against this backdrop of continuous Great Power confrontation, we should consider **the acceleration and proliferation of certain military and dual-use technologies**.

**Anti-access area denial** is a very military, impenetrable phrase which obscures a much simpler concept. It is increasingly more difficult for militaries to have the freedom to act wherever and whenever they wish. Sophisticated long-range weapons now dominate every battlespace, including space. Russia and China have particularly invested in defensive options to counter the traditional US strength in offensive capabilities. When combined with the prolific use of geographically unconstrained cyber and information capabilities, one can quickly see how any nation's freedom to operate can be limited significantly, and therefore reduce markedly the probability of mission success. The military instrument is more uncertain in its outcome.

At the higher end of warfare, **unmanned vehicles** deliver previously unheard-of persistence and hence precision, they can bring affordable mass to increasingly over-committed military budgets, they will drive down personnel numbers and costs, and they offer the opportunity to penetrate the increasingly high threat environments we touched on a minute or so ago at risk levels that are acceptable. They are an inevitability.

Moreover, the democratisation of the air through the rapid expansion of and access to civilian unmanned vehicles has also enabled many smaller states and non-state organisations to enjoy the ubiquitous capabilities that air has for so long offered the more advanced war-fighter.

**Space** is another area where the historic dominance of space by a few countries is being challenged. To deny that space is an active warfighting domain is futile; most state activity, including that of the military and other national security players, is ever more dependent on access to space, and hence it presents an opportunity, at the right time, to deny critical capability to any opponent.

Much has already been said and written about **cyber and other information capabilities**, and how they offer new dimensions and fronts within state-on-state confrontation. I will not therefore review much of what you already know. I will, however, highlight three areas.

**Cyber** is now a fact of life in warfare as it is a fact of life in our day-to-day existence. It is therefore to some extent like the weather; states have to be able to operate within a cyber contested environment, rather than to seek solely to remove an opponent's cyber capability. Hence, a nation's cyber resilience is as important, albeit less superficially attractive, as its offensive cyber capability.

**Information warfare** is not new. What is probably different, and much more potent, is the speed at which a false narrative can spread and therefore the difficulty of using the counter-narrative (usually, but not always, the truth) at a pace which is relevant. In this, states may find, as the UK has, that being able to deploy the convincing truth at pace is essential, even if this

means shifting intelligence equities to make that which would previously have been secret, much more widely available.

Finally in this section, embracing **AI and Quantum** in national security is not a choice. The commercial sector will continue to develop these technologies and hence others will maximise the benefits of enhanced understanding, decision-making, and decryption. I will come back to AI shortly.

I now want to touch on **the increased use of the private sector, particularly global and multinational companies, to deliver critical national security capabilities.**

This is not new. Many nations' military logistics capabilities are already dependent on the commercial sector; indeed, governments and militaries have encouraged dependence as they look to cut costs. There is a continual requirement for manufacture, repair and resupply, and everyone from original equipment manufacturers and their sub-contractors, to the vast world-wide commercial delivery network, are involved.

To Logistics, we can also now add Space and Information as national security capabilities progressively delivered by the private sector.

We have already highlighted that commercial space offers exponential access to increasingly sophisticated space-based communications, navigation and intelligence. Capabilities previously the preserve of large powers are now available, at a cost, to a much broader customer base. Growth and innovation in this sector are fuelled by commercial requirements and investment, and increasingly not by governments as used to be the norm.

The same is true of information capabilities, including cyber and cloud. Governments and militaries are striving to embrace digital, they are investing heavily in cyber resilience and offense, and they are increasingly recognising the advantages of cloud and synthetic environments. Indeed, due to unmatched growth in the private sector, and a straightforward read-across from civilian use to national security use, the delivery of these new but increasingly pivotal aspects of national security has involved the private sector almost from the start.

Key capabilities therefore are dependent on the resilience of any one part of this multi-faceted series of commercial networks and relationships. Hence, it is not difficult to see the threat of physical and especially virtual attack and disruption to this fundamental and growing commercial pillar of military and national security capability.

Having touched on the nature of the contemporary battlespace and some of the key influences on it, this brings us to the **'so what?'**

The advancement and proliferation of physical and virtual long-range attack capabilities is rapidly removing any sense of **strategic depth**. Increasingly, no base or facility, deployed or otherwise, is a safe haven from attack. Indeed, the whole of the Defence threat surface, including the many, many commercial providers integral to Defence capability, is already engaged in confrontation, and is likely subject today to both intelligence gathering and shaping activities for any future conflict. I wonder if all Defence personnel, military, civil service and contractor, realise they are already on the frontline.

Turning to the greater role played by **the commercial world**, my comments about private sector penetration into the delivery of national security should not be construed as advocating that governments and militaries should wholesale seek to take back from the commercial world those capabilities that are much better provided by them.

However, governments and militaries should be much clearer on the safeguards and redundancy that their commercial partners should have in place, and insist that their capability is resilient today and in any future escalation of conflict. This will cost, but it is for nations to decide how much they want to protect an overly exposed flank.

Moreover, governments and militaries should also determine what can be outsourced, with redundancy and protection, and what cannot. This may not mean ownership, but it does mean policy clarity and constraints that again will cost.

And as nations embrace international cloud providers and other information technology companies in their rush for information and digital benefits, the

next costly decision will be how much do governments and militaries view national data sovereignty as a critical capability, or are they content for a multinational, perhaps driven by balancing other markets, to have control over the availability of that critical capability?

Turning specifically to **AI**, I believe that the introduction of AI to military affairs is likely the 21st century equivalent of the introduction of air power. It is increasingly clear that AI will change the nature of intelligence, command and control, and by implication warfare.

Indeed, the rush for AI and machine learning is the oft-quoted arms race, and it could be argued that the nature of western and like-minded societies puts us a significant disadvantage to nations who are less worried about data protection and personal privacy. How we offset this intrinsic disadvantage is perhaps the major challenge of the application of AI to military and national security thinking in our society.

Because, put simply, to opt out of this arms race is to lose.

The first to begin to understand and predict the complex web of activity lanes that I talked to earlier will be able to not just stay ahead of their opponents, but will also influence and shape the picture that those same opponents have of their supposed reality. AI will not just revolutionise intelligence, and command and control, but also perception and deception. And hence, for the first time on a long time, we are seeing the application of technology in confrontation and warfare that can, and arguably will, have a directly strategic effect.

AI will also change the way we think and the way we fight, which brings me to my final 'so what', which topically is **the challenge of alliances**.

Our ability, and the ability of our like-minded partners, to trust and to ally with each other is still our strategic strength. I do not believe that China and Russia have alliances founded on trust. However, we have already seen that the importance of strategic alliances to the UK and like-minded nations is only matched by the difficulty of sustaining them.

I have three examples.

Firstly, to defence and security practitioners, it is obvious that the US is the UK's only credible strategic ally. Yet you would not believe this from much of the supposedly informed public discourse. The US' pivotal importance to our national security today, let alone in the future, is hugely underplayed, and the UK and many, many others benefit immeasurably from its breadth and depth of capability, and its mass. A recognition of this, whatever the short-term difficulties, and a consequent shift in public narrative and investment priorities is long overdue.

Secondly, thinking, acting and fighting in a manner which is similar enough is the bedrock of fighting as allies; without commonality of approach, the force-multiplication benefits of alliances disappear rapidly. Indeed, maintaining and promoting this commonality, this interoperability, has been one of the incontrovertible successes of NATO. NATO is the only organisation that is configured to provide the intellectual framework for coalition operations.

However, I have already mentioned that AI will change the way we think and fight. Our challenge therefore, as like-minded nations scrabble at different speeds and in different ways to embrace this new air power, is to keep sufficient commonality of approach to maintain interoperability and with it our ability to operate as an alliance. If we fall behind, we fall behind at the speed of Moore's Law.

And lastly in this list of alliance challenges is the role of private companies who, depending on the depth of their involvement in delivering critical national security capabilities, will change the nature of alliances themselves. In the very near future, alliance planning has to include an awareness of commercial imperatives and constraints, especially with multinationals who may, at worst, find themselves contracted to supply the same capabilities to opposing sides of any conflict and, at best, are in danger of being pressured to balance market access in one country against the national security objectives of another.

## **Summary**

In summary, I want to return to a question I posed at the beginning of this semi-coherent ramble: is what we are all witnessing just business as usual, or is this a strategic inflection point in national security?

This is important, because if what we are witnessing is indeed business as usual, then nations can keep doing the same type of things that they have always done. However, if this is a strategic inflection point, then nations must do different things.

And, unsurprisingly, I do think that we are at that inflection point. To recap:

Great Power confrontation raises the risk of winners and losers, and it is a brave, or resigned Great Power that steps back.

And that Great Power confrontation, and the interplay around it, exacerbates uncertainty and instability, which in turn lifts the risk of miscalculation. This risk is increased still further by the new factor in state-on-state relations, the information environment. The pervasive and immediate nature of information means that transparency and deception are both simultaneously likely more dominant than ever, and hence both add to volatility and uncertainty.

Military operations are more and more difficult, just at a time when sub-threshold activity is increasing in terms of frequency and sophistication. Hence there is an even greater risk of escalation as states attempt to be first to secure what advantage there is when any particular threshold is breached.

The increased role of commercial organisations within the delivery of critical national capabilities is an unbounded risk unless and until nations begin to prioritise assured capability over cost efficiency.

And the potential benefits of technology, particularly and uniquely at the strategic level, have brought with them an arms race that nations dare not lose.

And, finally, just at that time when trusted alliances are at a premium, the nature and challenges of alliances are both shifting and increasing.

I remember saying that this would not be a happy twenty minutes.

This all feels like an inflection point, and recognising it as such is the first step for nations to the different, difficult things they need to do.

**I have one closing thought:** to even to begin to address this dark picture, informed public awareness, trust and support is essential. And if defence and security challenges are continuous, then this engagement with public opinion also has to be continual.

More openness will bring more enduring realism and less sensationalism. And ultimately this puts pressure on our politicians.

Pressure to allow defence and security professionals to inform and debate, even at the risk of highlighting apparent shortcomings in policy.

And pressure not to play fast and loose with information presentation in the short term, at the expense of a general and enduring lack of instinctive trust when it is really required.

My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, you have been immensely patient, thank you.

## TIPPING POINT: BRITAIN, BREXIT AND SECURITY IN THE 2020s

**Text of remarks given by  
Professor Michael Clarke & Helen Ramscar**

**Tuesday 10th December 2019**

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**Professor Michael Clarke** *was Director General of the Royal United Services Institute from 2007-2015, where he remains a Distinguished Fellow. He is an adviser to two Parliamentary Committees and Associate Director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the University of Exeter.*

**Helen Ramscar** *is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. She has worked at the House of Commons, Royal Household and US Embassy in London. She is a graduate of Durham University, SOAS and Cass Business School.*

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The book we have just published – *Tipping Point: Britain, Brexit And Security In The 2020s* – looks at the problems that Britain is likely to face in the coming decade and calls for a new approach to thinking about British security in the broadest of contexts. We believe that at the turn of this decade, we are already at a political, and perceptual, ‘tipping point’. That has not been created by Brexit, and Brexit will not be the answer to the problems that have created the tipping point. But Brexit has become deeply entrenched into the tipping point equation. Though it is necessary to understand the independent nature of the problems the 2020s will pose to Britain and other European states in similar positions, it is impossible now to divorce the effects of Brexit from our thinking about how to deal with them.

In theory, Brexit should have less effect on matters of security, defence and foreign policy than most other aspects of British policy, as in the economic and social spheres. But this distinction is less obvious when, for example, matters of policing and dealing with international crime or cyber security

are considered. And our analysis has revealed how intimately the social and economic fabric of British society – in particular the way it responded to the attractions, and costs, of globalisation – has played into our security and defence future as it has revealed itself over the last decade.

As a result, Britain is facing unprecedented security challenges in the 2020s. The decade to come will not be as favourable as the two past decades. For a country as ‘globalised’ as Britain, security challenges cover a wide spectrum – from terrorism, international crime and cyber-attack – through to the prospects of war in its own continent or even, again, for its own survival.

The Brexit decision of 2016 has entered these equations and turned them into a very short-term political tipping point that we define, from which there is no hiding and no turning back. Britain has many strengths as a power in the world, but to address the challenges of the 2020s it must recognise them in a hard-nosed way and deploy them effectively. And soon.

This book began from a growing sense between us that the future for British security would be more difficult than in its recent past; a sense that world politics were beginning to move against Britain’s natural best interests, but also that the country was struggling to grasp quite what was happening, or the speed at which conditions were changing. As we discussed and wrote up the manuscript, world events were always catching up with us. What felt as if quite radical conclusions in 2017 and 2018, seemed to have become commonplace by 2019 – that Britain’s international environment was deteriorating, that Brexit would not be settled easily and was turning British politics inside out; that our natural international allies and partners were also in trouble and for different reasons, and so on. Above all, the country was depressed and did not look with much optimism to its security future in the 2020s.

So, we found ourselves painting our picture of Britain on a broad canvas. British security is affected by the economic structure of the country and the changing face of economic power as much as by the military potential of any possible adversaries.

Being 'secure' in a globalised economy, therefore, is not straightforward and lots of natural vulnerabilities – to terrorism, cyber-attack, crime, or to the unexpected consequences of novel technologies – just have to be managed at an acceptable level of risk; even while the country has to defend itself against more traditional threats. 'Acceptable levels of risk' are something that politicians find difficult to admit to the public, but they are intrinsic to addressing the multifaceted nature of security for globalised countries.

Of course, Britain is still a prosperous and inventive country with many natural advantages that others in the world recognise. So, we wanted to create a headline 'audit' of the capabilities Britain possesses to, manage risk acceptably and navigate through the tougher times awaiting us as we turn a decade. What would it take, we wondered, to mobilise all our broadest security resources to meet the challenges ahead? And could the upsides of the Brexit process be exploited better, not just to counteract the downsides, but to avoid a drift towards international irrelevance that would ultimately diminish British prosperity?

That task is made all the harder because of the ingrained social and economic tensions of the decade just ending, and the growing threat of the break-up of the United Kingdom in the decade now beginning. Effective security cannot be based on a fractured society. Britain now constitutes, in effect, the 'five kingdoms' of the United Kingdom – Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Greater London, and 'England outside London' – which has become the 'Fifth Kingdom'. And the Fifth Kingdom – the biggest, accounting for 71% of the population, but not the richest – is angry and increasingly nationalistic. Britain has got to address this incipient fracture both as a constitutional imperative but also as an imperative of economic development. It must deal with an economy that has become rapidly more unbalanced, both geographically and in terms of social mobility, even since the turn of this century.

In this situation Brexit increases all the security stakes and the risks, and leaves little room for mistakes or missteps. Outside the EU, Britain must prove to its allies and the rest of the world that it is not isolated; that it is not more vulnerable to economic or political pressure; that it is still – or even more – a valuable ally and international partner.

To make all this a reality, Britain must reverse a decade of tentative and confused security policy and devote real resources – money, people and political energy – to embrace more clearly the challenges awaiting us in the 2020s. Britain crossed a Rubicon in 2016 with the Brexit referendum and whatever the eventual outcome of the Brexit process, Britain will not be the same sort of European power as it was when the Cold War ended.

The major security and foreign policy review that is anticipated as a new government settles into its environment after the election will have to be prepared to adopt wide and ambitious terms of reference. We are struck by the urgency with which key strategic decisions need to be made in the next 12 to 18 months. Brexit will not be ‘settled’ for some years yet, and we cannot afford to wait until it is, before reassessing our approach to British security. We are at a tipping point now, even now, in the midst of the Brexit imbroglio.

We offer the outline of some radical changes to meet these challenges:

- To create a ‘strategic surge’ in resources and political commitment for at least five years - in diplomacy, defence, aid, intelligence, research and development - in order to give some reality to what ‘Global Britain’ will really mean; devoting to those outward-facing policy instruments at least an extra £20 billion a year through to 2025/6. We already spend just over £60 billion per annum on these items, so our recommendation is that about 30% more could be spent on them every year for the next five years – taking £60 billion to £80 billion per annum. This is not an implausible amount. It is around the amount the government intends to spend on HS2 over a comparable period. And it would be big enough to have a galvanising and sustained effect on Britain’s outward-facing policy instruments; i.e. to provide the financial headroom for a genuinely ‘strategic’ effect.
- To concentrate defence and Britain’s physical security efforts on the European theatre, where our own neighbourhood is becoming increasingly dangerous. But also to be more proactive as a good and trusted partner in the wider world, with big increases in the depth of our thinly-spread diplomatic and economic promotional resources.

- To make big increases, from the currently very low levels, in government sponsored R&D and to help prevent so many innovative British start-ups becoming foreign-owned and losing their essential intellectual property as they search for development capital.
- To be prepared to engage in major constitutional reform to address some of the tensions inherent across the 'Five Kingdoms'; and initiate a Constitutional Convention with a view, eventually, to moving, if necessary to a completely federated United Kingdom – as the best way to save it from belligerent dissolution.
- And not least, to take on a serious exercise in encouraging the British people to characterise themselves as they would like to be seen by others, and develop a proactive national branding exercise, particularly during the 'Brexit years', that would create a sense of agreed national direction. There are innumerable calls in journalism, speeches and commentary for Britain to define 'what it wants to be' in world politics. But governments never seriously embrace this question.

***Tipping Point: Britain, Brexit and Security in the 2020s*, Michael Clarke and Helen Ramscar**, London, I.B. Tauris/Bloomsbury, was published on 28th November 2019.



## THE KILLING IN THE CONSULATE: INVESTIGATING THE LIFE AND DEATH OF JAMAL KHASHOGGI

Transcript of a lecture given by Jonathan Rugman

Wednesday 22nd January 2020

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**Jonathan Rugman** *has been Foreign Affairs Correspondent at Channel 4 News since 2006. A BAFTA award-winning journalist, he was previously based in Washington, D.C. and Istanbul. He has reported from Turkey for more than 25 years and also covered the Arab Spring revolts. He has previously worked for the BBC and written for The Guardian and The Observer. His new book, 'The Killing In The Consulate: Investigating The Life And Death Of Jamal Khashoggi', was published by Simon & Schuster in October 2019.*

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It is very good to be here and to talk to you about Jamal Khashoggi. I guess the subtext of everything I am going to say really points to a photo I have here of the G20 summit in Japan last summer, where you can see Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince, standing centre stage. That was less than a year after Jamal Khashoggi was murdered, allegedly on the prince's orders. President Trump is standing next to the prince in the front row.

The contrast could not be starker between the death of Jamal Khashoggi and the attempt by Russian agents to kill Sergei Skripal in Salisbury six months earlier, by smearing nerve agent on his door in Salisbury. The difference is this: 153 Russian diplomats were expelled, including 60 from the United States, in the aftermath of the attack on Skripal. In the aftermath of the attack on Khashoggi, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia is standing in the front row of the G20 summit and indeed co-hosting the next meeting with his father later this year. We should think about that further.

I want to say a little bit about pronunciation. Jamal Khashoggi is a sort of horrible hybrid between Arabic and Turkish pronunciations. 'Kaşıkçı'

in Turkish means 'spoon-maker', and the Khashoggis were of Ottoman descent and they moved to Saudi Arabia possibly hundreds of years ago. Jamal was distantly related to Adnan Khashoggi, the arms dealer, and Adnan's father was the physician to Ibn Saud, the first king of Saudi Arabia. Jamal talked about his family's Ottoman past when he was spending more time in Turkey (he bought a flat in Istanbul, he was planning to get married there when he was killed). When he visited one of the tombs of the Ottoman sultans, he joked, *'If I die here, I wonder if they are going to bury me here.'*

I tell you that story because history is incredibly important in understanding the geopolitics of the response to Jamal Khashoggi's murder. It is worth bearing in mind that Adnan Khashoggi in the 1980s owned a yacht called the *Nabila*, it was a very sinister-looking gin palace of a yacht, which was actually used in the James Bond film *Never Say Never Again* as the villain's yacht. Adnan ran into trouble, people were chasing him around the world, he had debts and unexplained amounts of money in his bank accounts and he sold the yacht to a certain Donald Trump. So if you go right back to the 1980s, the name Khashoggi is not foreign to the current US President. Trump eventually sold the yacht himself, because he was running up large debts in his gambling business and in fact, it ended up back in the hands of a Saudi prince.

It is also worth bearing in mind that if you read Donald Trump's first speech, announcing that he was running for president, the speech he made in Trump Tower in 2015, he said, *'I love the Saudis, they buy property from me'* - you can read it in the speech. The Saudis had bought a floor in Trump Tower itself. And Trump's own response again, I think, points to the importance of understanding some of the background to this.

The dispute between Turkey and Saudi Arabia is historical, it is about the colonial past. If you think about the fact that the Ottomans suppressed a Wahhabi rebellion led by the al-Sauds and they razed to the ground the first provisional Saud capital. And if you think about the fact that the Turks executed publicly one of Mohammed bin Salman's predecessors, a senior member of the al-Sauds, you have to understand that there is an enormous amount of bad blood going back a long way, which might go some way -

some way – to explaining why Jamal Khashoggi was killed where he was killed, why wasn't he killed in the street in a pretty anonymous kind of way - you could have done that and sent a perfectly sufficient message to silence Arab dissidents living in Turkey, whether they are from Syria or other parts of the Arab world in the aftermath of the failed Arab Spring. You could have sent a message to Turkey that it should not harbour dissidents and it should not allow them to embark on political activities. But the Saudis 'owned' this operation by carrying it out inside the consulate.

If you go back to March 2018, six months before the killing, the crown prince was quoted during a visit to Egypt (the Sisi government there had received a lot of financial support from the Saudis who were opposed to the Arab Spring) as calling Turkey part of a 'triangle of evil' including Iran and terrorist groups. So there was no love lost with President Erdoğan, who supported the revolution in Egypt, and that conditioned how the drama played out in the aftermath of Khashoggi's death in Istanbul.

I thought I would try and answer some basic questions.

First of all, about this current story in the *Financial Times* and the *Guardian* today about the allegation that Mohammed bin Salman had hacked the phone of Jeff Bezos, the world's richest man, the owner of the *Washington Post* and therefore indirectly Jamal Khashoggi's employer. So we will talk about that.

I thought we might talk about the killing itself and what happened.

I think we should talk about the case against the crown prince: did he do it?

The trial. You may remember there was a verdict mysteriously produced on December 23rd, when many in this part of the world were thinking about Christmas.

And of course, why any of this really matters.

The British response was understandably and incontrovertibly tempered by the fact that in March 2018 the crown prince visited Theresa May in

Downing Street and signed a memorandum of understanding for the delivery of 48 Eurofighter Typhoon jets on top of the 72 the Saudis had already purchased. BAE Systems had laid off a couple of thousand people, it needed the new business. It had sold dozens of jets to the Qataris, but it wanted new orders in an important deal for UK Plc, clearly.

First the hacking of Bezos's mobile phone, not long after he'd swapped numbers with the crown prince. When the world's richest man hired FTI Consulting to conduct a forensic analysis, he concluded with medium to high confidence that the phone was hacked via an encrypted video file in May 2018. The Saudis' involvement seems to me entirely credible because in June - the following month - a dissident in Canada called Omar Abdulaziz claimed that his phone had been hacked by a link that he had mysteriously received. In his case, it was one of those apps that says 'you have a package waiting for you' and it wasn't. That is important because Abdulaziz was a friend of Jamal Khashoggi. Khashoggi had sent Abdulaziz 400 WhatsApp messages, one of them for example talking negatively about the crown prince: *'He is like a beast "PacMan"',* Khashoggi wrote in this text, *'the more victims he eats, the more he wants.'* And when Abdulaziz pointed out to his friend Khashoggi that he thought his phone had been hacked, Khashoggi responded by texting back, *'God help us.'*

Abdulaziz is currently taking legal action against an Israeli spyware firm, to which the Saudis, according to the Israeli press, paid about \$60 million dollars for the spyware technology. The hacking of Saudi dissidents' phones and the surveillance campaign associated with it gives you some idea of the atmosphere in which Jamal Khashoggi was murdered.

If you think about why the crown prince might have hacked the phone of Jeff Bezos six months before the murder, there are three possible explanations.

One is that the crown prince loved technology and was playing with it.

The second is that he was seeking commercially sensitive information - after all, Microsoft and Amazon were trying to bid for contracts to build web servers in Saudi Arabia.

And the third explanation is that in May 2018, he was already plotting against Jamal Khashoggi, an employee of the *Washington Post*.

Whatever the truth, Bezos in publishing his allegations is taking aim at the Saudi crown prince (without naming him) at a time when governments would rather not. The UN would rather not: Agnes Callamard, the UN Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, who is due to make a statement about this phone hack in about 45 minutes' time, is very much on her own, she does not have the support of the UN Secretary-General, nor any member state of the UN (and I include the Turks in that, interestingly). Nor the Canadians, whom you might have thought might have been a bit more proactive, given that Abdulaziz, the dissident I was telling you about, is based in Canada. So it is quite a lonely business, campaigning for justice for what happened to Jamal Khashoggi.

The killing itself.

Well, at 1.02pm, there was a conversation inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, involving Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Salah al-Tubaigy, who is the man who was allegedly carrying the bone saw. He is a University of Glasgow trained autopsy specialist. Here he is in military uniform. Here he is wearing his medical kit. This photo is taken from the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine in Melbourne, where he also spent some time training.

So there is a conversation at 1.02pm, in which Dr. Tubaigy says, *'It will be easy, joints will be separated, it is not a problem.'* And then the leader of the operation, Brigadier-General Maher Mutreb asks, *'Will it be possible to put the body and hips into a bag this way?'* And Tubaigy replies – I have a longer version of the transcript that has appeared elsewhere – *'No, too heavy. Jamal is very big, he has got buttocks like a horse.'*

In other words, these Saudis are quite methodically discussing how to dispose of a body before Khashoggi has even arrived, which is of course extremely important when you come to assessing whether this was a premeditated attack.

At 1.14pm Khashoggi walks through the consulate doors to be met by Brigadier-General Mutreb. In 2007 Mutreb was based at the Saudi Embassy

in London at the same time that Jamal Khashoggi was the spokesman for the Saudi Ambassador there. They had taken tea in Mayfair, so when Khashoggi walked through that door at fourteen minutes past one on 2nd October, he would have known this guy. Mutreb was the ringleader and arrived at the consulate a couple of hours before Khashoggi himself.

I should say something about these photographs of CCTV footage at the entrance to the consulate, because the Saudis took back to Riyadh with them the hard drive that had the pictures stored, but the Turks went into a police booth; and the Saudis had failed to remove copies of the recordings from there, so that when the Saudis said, *'There are no recordings,'* it was not true. The Turks had them, and they have selectively leaked these pictures for their own political purposes.

The same of course can be said of the audio transcript, which I have quoted from. A translation from Arabic has been leaked selectively to the Turkish and American press. Agnes Callamard, the UN Rapporteur, has been allowed to hear the tape. But Turkish intelligence, who possess the recording, did not give her a copy and were reluctant to allow her to take notes, so it was quite difficult for her to piece together what was going on as accurately as she would have liked.

But in spite of all that, I think the Turks have produced a pretty conclusive case for exactly what happened inside the consulate.

There was a struggle. The hit squad said to him, *'We are taking you back to Riyadh,'* and he said, *'I am not going back to Riyadh.'* And they said, *'There is an Interpol arrest warrant for you,'* and he knew that was not true. Then they said, *'Show us your mobile phone, we want you to send a text to your eldest son to tell him everything is fine.'* And Khashoggi quite wisely had left his two mobile phones outside with his fiancée on the pavement. There was a scuffle. Khashoggi was drugged, and it is believed that a bone saw was used about six minutes after his death to dismember the body. You can hear the sound of plastic sheeting being moved around, as if the body is either being wrapped up, or they are trying not to contaminate the crime scene. The bone saw, the infamous bone saw, has never been found. Those who

have heard the recording of it that the Turks have, say it sounds a bit like an air conditioning unit or a very quiet electric toothbrush, it does not sound as you might think that a saw might sound. The Saudis insist to this day that there was no bone saw, but they certainly admit that Khashoggi was killed.

The case for the crown prince's innocence? I think it is the Henry II defence, deployed in 1170 when Henry II was accused of murdering Thomas a Becket in Canterbury Cathedral – *'Who will rid me of this troublesome/turbulent priest?'* In other words, if you think about that sentence, *'Who will rid me of this troublesome priest?'*, it is not a specific kill order, is it? Perhaps there was no written or verbal instruction from the Saudi crown prince to kill the 'troublesome' Jamal Khashoggi either. Just a general understanding among his underlings of what their boss wanted.

Jamal never thought that he would be killed. He thought he would be kidnapped. He thought he would be rendered back on a plane to Saudi Arabia. He talked about it a lot. He told his friends, *'If anybody offered me a lift on a private jet, I'm not taking it'* - he said that to one of them at a meeting in a hotel here in London. And I think it was a legitimate concern. His friend Abdulaziz in Canada had been offered a ride back to Saudi Arabia. He had been asked to come into the Saudi Embassy in Ottawa for a chat. A friend of Abdulaziz's said, *'Don't go near the Saudi Embassy in Ottawa,'* and that friend was, oddly enough, Jamal Khashoggi, who later on completely failed to follow his own advice in Istanbul.

There is an interesting conversation which I have transcribed between one of the killers and an official in the Saudi consulate, on the Friday before the murder took place. The official in Istanbul says, *'Is Jamal, our brother who has just come to us, among the people sought by you?'* and Mutreb, the commander of the operation who is still in Riyadh replies and says, *'There is nothing official, but it is known that he is among the people sought after.'* So there is *'nothing official'*, which takes you back to the Henry II defence, but then Mutreb adds this: *'Even if you are going to chop off his head, he is not going to say anything.'* So this is a conversation a few days before the murder. Could the 'he' be a reference to Mutreb's boss, the Saudi crown prince?

How come the Turks were recording all this quite so successfully? Well, on the Thursday before the killing, two officials from Saudi Arabia flew out to de-bug the Saudi consulate, a routine operation for Saudi diplomatic missions. Shortly afterwards, the Turks had managed to re-bug it, so that on the Saturday the two Saudis flew back to Riyadh mistakenly thinking their de-bugging mission had been successfully completed. So that is why I think you have a situation where the killing does not take place in a so-called 'safe speech' room, which many diplomatic missions have. The Saudis are supremely confident that they can carry out this attack without it being recorded.

Then of course you have that extraordinary scene of a Saudi 'body double' walking around a tourist site in Istanbul after the murder, wearing Khashoggi's clothes and a fake beard and pretending to be him, wearing Khashoggi's glasses too, though they are slightly down his nose so that this Saudi intelligence officer can see over the top of them. If you look at the CCTV pictures closely (and the Chief of Police of Istanbul spotted this) you can see that he is not wearing Khashoggi's shoes because they don't fit him; he is wearing his own shoes, and it is a pretty poor attempt to cover up the crime and pretend that a dead man is alive.

I think the best that can be said for the crown prince's knowledge of an operation against Jamal Khashoggi is that Plan A may indeed have been to render the journalist back to Saudi Arabia – after all, there are several previous cases of dissident princes being returned there by force. But if you accept that this was Plan A, I think Plan B must have included some kind of consent that he could be killed if Plan A did not succeed. The killers flew from Saudi Arabia on a plane with diplomatic clearance and it seems to me and to many others inconceivable that the crown prince did not know what was going on. And I think you have to ask yourself what was Dr. Tubaigy, whose training was in carrying out autopsies, who actually boasted about his skill in dissecting a body in seven minutes, what was he doing there? Why was he in Istanbul, if there was not the clear intention to kill and then divide up the body?

As for the CIA's conclusions on the crown prince's involvement. Well, the CIA's assessment, which I have not seen, but I have sourced from people

who have seen it, is that with 'medium to high confidence', the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia personally targeted Jamal Khashoggi, probably ordered his death, though with this caveat: *'We lack direct reporting of the crown prince issuing a kill order.'* To which of course Donald Trump responded by saying, *'It could very well be that the crown prince had knowledge of this tragic event, maybe he did, maybe he didn't.'* A prevarication which allowed the US president to take very little action against him, although the US Treasury issued financial and travel sanctions against members of the hit squad itself.

I think it is interesting that the CIA's conclusions were leaked. Some people might say that it was an attempt by those in the intelligence community to put pressure on Donald Trump to come clean. The spies were already very upset about being described by Trump as 'Nazis' for their investigation into Russian interference in his election. Actually, I think Gina Haspel, the head of the CIA, was angry about the leaks and was trying to restore relations between her agency and Donald Trump.

But there was a convenient outcome from these leaks, which was that some kind of warning was sent to the Saudi crown prince to behave himself in future, without Donald Trump endorsing it himself or actually taking any action himself.

The crown prince sent at least 11 messages to his media adviser Saud al-Qahtani in the hours before and after the killing and Qahtani sent him 15 back. There is no suggestion in those messages that they discussed the murder, but it does demonstrate a close relationship between the two men. Qahtani has been named by the American and British governments as instrumental in the operation. In the US intelligence assessment, there is this allegation that Mutreb, the commander on the ground, told Qahtani, *'Tell your boss that this operation had taken place'*; and in the US's routine scrub-through its intelligence intercepts on the crown prince, which obviously it did in the aftermath of the murder, they discovered that the crown prince had used the word 'bullet' talking about Jamal Khashoggi, that he had told somebody that he would like Jamal Khashoggi returned to Saudi Arabia, dealt with 'by force', I quote, or 'with a bullet'. So that is an important part of the case against the crown prince.

I think the major reason why Jamal was killed was because of his writing. The 60-year-old was having a delayed midlife crisis in which he was finally saying and writing what he believed, having been very much a Royal Court insider up to now, having very much towed the government line, often explaining Saudi foreign policy in a useful way for outsiders.

So he wrote very critically, for example, about the Yemen war, which was of course the crown prince's signature project which he launched in 2015. He wrote that the crown prince needed to '*restore dignity to the birthplace of Islam.*' That reference to religion makes this a very serious verbal attack on the prince, and it was published in Washington of all places, close to the heart of American power.

Jamal was only paid \$500 a piece for about 20 articles that he wrote, but I think they had a disproportionate effect on a volatile, impulsive crown prince back in Saudi Arabia, who was trying to establish a good relationship with the Trump administration, particularly the President's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, with a view to a Middle East peace plan and with a view to containing Iran; and with a view to starting off on a better footing than the previous relationship with Barack Obama. Although Barack Obama visited Saudi Arabia more than he did Israel during his presidency, the relationship had become unstuck because of Obama's support for the Iran deal.

I have talked a bit about why the crown prince may have ordered the killing. Obviously there were 15 men who flew to Istanbul, many of them from the Crown Prince's Royal Guard units or from Saudi intelligence. Brigadier-General Mutreb was identified in the security detail of the Crown Prince in Houston, Boston, New York, Paris, Madrid, London, so the link is clearly there.

I thought I might say something about the trial, which of course concluded on 23rd December 2019. Five men were sentenced to death, three jailed, but the majority set free.

You have Saud al-Qahtani, the crown prince's media advisor, also cleared of any involvement. In a rather wonderfully Saudi way, Qahtani responded by writing a long poem about it, which has been published in the last couple of weeks.

I am going to read you a little bit of it, it goes on and on, but what it says is this:

*'Yet I am from Qahtani stock, steadfast as a mountain  
With truth on my side, walking the righteous path  
What fault do I have, except defending my homeland?  
Those who wear the fez [in other words, the Turks] and people of the  
turban [in other words, Iran]  
The door of forgiveness is closed to them  
The old history of the Turks and their regime  
Filled with injustice and hatred and ingratitude  
None of us have forgotten those events  
Save the most despicable wretches  
We defend religion and of the state.'*

I think what you are seeing out there in that rather vindictive poem, is a sense of what I was talking about earlier: Turkish-Saudi, Ottoman-Saudi history in the background to this murder. President Erdoğan understandably very upset that it should have happened on Turkish soil to a friend of his, a fellow supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutions across the Arab world, the killing a very deliberate slight to the Turkish president, who if you will remember in October 2018 was grandstanding for a couple of weeks and saying 'all will be revealed.'

Hasn't Erdoğan gone quiet quickly? Where is the indictment that the Turks promised - they first promised it about a year ago. Either they are still working on it, or they know there can never really be a trial in Turkey because the Saudis will never extradite their citizens or cooperate in any way.

So the Turks have gone quiet, interestingly. Some people will say, 'Well, maybe the Saudis paid them off.' The Turkish economy went into recession in the final quarter of 2018. The Turks have already received a loan from the Qataris, which might seem pretty good leverage to go to the Saudis and ask for financial help as well. I am not sure I believe that. I think Erdoğan is a very proud man who resented a visit from a Saudi delegation suggesting that he accept some money in lieu of an official apology. However, King Salman, the crown prince's father, is Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques

and Erdoğan respects that. So the Turkish president has made his case against the Saudis and for now abandoned taking any further action, in the absence of any international support for it.

At the start, I said I was going to say something about why any of this matters. I had better do that now because we are running out of time.

The Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia is likely to rule the Kingdom for the next fifty years or more. He is likely to be in charge of the world's biggest exporter of oil - we all know how critical that is, given the brief effect on the price of oil which followed the attack on Saudi oil installations last year - so it matters who runs Saudi Arabia for all sorts of obvious reasons.

And I think what happened really crystallises a major concern about the 'rules-based order', a phrase we hear often these days. Whether that is the murder of Daphne Caruana Galizia in Malta, whether it is the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in Iraq, a man with an awful lot of blood on his hands, including the blood of British troops deployed to Iraq after 2003. But nevertheless, where do we draw the line in our response to acts which are perceived to be against the rules-based order?

We should always be asking ourselves about the trade-offs we all know have to take place, between commercial and strategic advantage and the defence of basic human rights.

Jamal's Turkish fiancée, Hatice Cengiz, who I can tell you now has been living a short distance from here for the last few months while she learns English, summed up the situation well when she wrote this:

*'If the democracies of the world do not take genuine steps to bring to justice the perpetrators of an act which has caused universal outrage among their citizens, what moral authority are they left with? Whose freedom can they credibly continue to defend?'*

The UN Rapporteur, Agnes Callamard, concluded last summer that this was a deliberate, premeditated execution, and that the people directly implicated in the murder reported directly to the crown prince. She recommended sanctions

on the crown prince's assets, possibly including the world's most valuable painting, allegedly by Leonardo da Vinci, as well as his chateau in France.

Is justice likely to happen? I do not think so. The UN Secretary-General has pointedly, markedly, not supported his own Rapporteur, has not set up an independent judicial commission of inquiry of the kind which, for example, followed the Kosovo War at the end of the 1990s. The Secretary-General would say, *'Well, there is no nation state supporting such an act.'* And I think that is true. Interestingly, no nation state offered to mediate between Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of this killing. The UK would have been in a good place to do that, as a member of NATO like Turkey, and the Saudis obviously being very old friends of ours.

But the honest truth is, did anyone really want to get involved in bringing ALL the perpetrators to justice?

Jeremy Hunt, when he was Foreign Secretary last year, said that that the Saudis had *'paid a terrible reputational price with profound diplomatic consequences.'*

Yes, they have paid a *'terrible reputational price'*. *'Profound diplomatic consequences'*? I do not think so. I will leave it there.



## **SOME THOUGHTS ON THE 'BIGGEST REVIEW' OF OUR DEFENCE, SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR**

**Text of a lecture by  
General The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL**

**Tuesday 28th January 2020**

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**General the Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL** is a former UK Chief of Defence Staff. He stood down in July 2016 and is now the Constable of The Tower of London and a Cross-Bench Peer in the House of Lords. He joined the Army in 1973 aged 18 and was commissioned from Sandhurst into the Green Howards, a Yorkshire Infantry Regiment. He undertook an in-Service degree in Modern History at St Peter's College, Oxford. In a 43-year military career he served seven times in Northern Ireland earning operational awards as both a Commanding Officer and a Brigade Commander in Belfast. He was the Deputy Commander of the Multi-National Force Iraq in 2005-2006 for which he was awarded the US Legion of Merit. He was the Chief of Joint Operations from 2006 to 2009, in charge of all overseas operations of UK Forces, including the final extraction from Iraq. He was both Vice Chief, then Chief, of Defence Staff over the period 2009-2016 during the time of two Strategic Defence Reviews and the end of combat operations in Afghanistan. He was the Colonel Commandant of the Intelligence Corps and the founding Colonel of the Yorkshire Regiment. On leaving the Army he established his own consultancy company which specialises in giving strategic advice to multinational corporates. He is a Trustee of RUSI, the Historic Royal Palaces, Royal Armouries and The HM Tower of London Chapels Royal Foundation. He is an Honorary Fellow of St Peter's College, Oxford.

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Good afternoon everyone. I am delighted to have this opportunity to address Global Strategy Forum again; and I am most grateful for the invitation.

Unusually for an ex-CDS, I have a son who is a stand-up comedian. This gives me scope for a certain amount of fun. Still occasionally at cocktail parties, some wag from my earlier career will come up to me and say, 'Tell me, General, young Tom, did he follow you into the Regiment, or did he go into the City?' and I'll pause, straighten my face, and say, 'No, he became a stand-up comedian.' If I time it just superbly, just as the individual is lifting a glass to his lips, I can get a genuinely effervescent response, normally followed by 'Oh, you must be so proud' and a swift disappearance to compose themselves!

But in truth, comedic sons are invaluable sounding boards for public speaking. Tom and I co-share a house in the Tower of London. We compare notes about life on the gig economy. To him an occasion such as this, rather like a contribution in the House of Lords, is a gig. Having explained Global Strategy Forum to him, he likened this gig to a new material night.

This is when a comedian does not accept money for his efforts; but rather he performs some partly formed material, in front of an audience composed of non-paying, largely friendly, but highly critical individuals, in the hope that his material can then be improved.

So I thought that, for this new material lunchtime, I would choose to offer some thoughts on the Government's forthcoming Review of Diplomacy, Defence and Security.

After all, we were promised in the pre-election period and in the Queen's Speech, a Review which would be '*the most profound since the Cold War*'. To my mind, therefore, this must necessitate a Review which is both global and strategic: the very purpose of this Forum.

As both the Vice Chief in 2010 and as the Chief of Defence in 2015, I participated in the last two major Reviews at fairly close quarters. I have elsewhere commented that I considered both of those Reviews, perhaps unsurprisingly, creatures of circumstance.

The 2010 Review was primarily a response to the strategic shock of austerity. An un-pretty attempt to fit an inflated Defence Programme to a

much-diminished budget. In retrospect I fear it was a missed opportunity. A braver Review might have leveraged the stark reality of national finances, to face down the pressures of national military nostalgia. But, instead, what suffered was any truly meaningful attempt to reinvest in the novel capabilities increasingly demanded of the age.

By contrast, the 2015 Review was a remarkable indulgence in political hubris. A Review that linked defence to prosperity, but that made the affordability of defence capability wholly dependent on the alchemy of unrealisable efficiency.

Both Reviews had some justifiable pretension to strategic re-evaluation. But, despite some very insightful work on the changing strategic context, the reality was that this new thinking became little more than the intellectual garnish, of what at their core, were two failed exercises in achieving a sustainably affordable Defence Programme.

So, my start point is that I believe that the government is absolutely right to embark on a Review that is profound. And I believe we have a national duty to hold them to that task.

It is also my firm belief that we must conduct the Review, not through the twin prism of affordability and national military nostalgia; but by a most thorough exercise in the evaluation of the global context and our country's place and role within that context.

I start, therefore, with what some will see as a contentious observation. It is that, contrary to the view pedalled by many, we do not live in the most dangerous of times. Indeed, there is much evidence to support the belief that there has never been a better time to be alive.

Certainly, in respect of those things that form the primary underpinning of the human condition: health, food and violence (or its absence); we have never been more fortunate. Specifically, when it comes to violence: societies have become more peaceful; and we are experiencing historic and, seemingly, sustainable lows in the levels of interpersonal and interstate violence.

Of course, the statistics do not necessarily translate into how we perceive our own sense of security. This is partly because we enjoy a media that is seemingly addicted to the sensationalising of human anxiety.

Forgive me, but we are also very much more aware that the future survival of our planet is more likely to be achieved by collective human action than any other course: certainly not hope, faith or luck.

For the purposes of this talk I would just offer that at least some of our anxiety derives from the current situation, in which it appears that what you might call the traditional format of war has been replaced by more insidious forms of interstate rivalry.

New vectors of attack have supplanted formal warfare: such things as proxy terrorism; political assassination; cyber war; disinformation; economic coercion. None of these novel in themselves, but novel to the extent that some countries orchestrate them as a routine methodology for the conduct of external affairs.

Such interstate action, and our knowledge of it, brings the reality of violence and insecurity much closer to home: violence no longer feels like the function of professional militaries at strategic distance.

This tendency towards malevolent competition, as opposed to open warfare, combines with a greater understanding of, and exposure to, what some people call the megatrends of our dynamic planet. I refer to such things as climate change; population growth; migration; urbanisation; the pace of technological change.

It becomes increasingly obvious, to many people, that although, in one sense, we live in the best of times; in another sense, we live in a world that is still characterised by the stark reality of relative disadvantage. The extent of the maldistribution of wealth and opportunity between countries and within societies is one expression of that disadvantage.

The fact that the current rules-based order denies some countries their sense of historic entitlement is another. The combination of malevolent

rivalry, global change and relative disadvantage, makes a lot of us feel rather vulnerable, and others rather angry, at both at a personal and national level.

In reviewing this changed and changing strategic context, I think that one of the most important first questions to ask is: whether or not we think that this strategic shift, from interstate warfare to interstate security malevolence, is a permanent one.

Some commentators suggest that the teleological progression of humankind, to a state of enduring mutual harmony, is an inevitable certainty. Indeed, many people within society have started to indulge the belief that the relative peace we have enjoyed for the last seventy years is naturally occurring.

My own view is neither so idealistic nor optimistic. I firmly believe that the natural instabilities and inequalities of a dynamic planet (the megatrends to which I referred) when coupled to the emotive politics of populism, are more than sufficient to create the conditions for a return to formalised warfare, unless we take active precautions to prevent them doing so.

I think for some time yet to come, it will only be through the mechanisms of deterrence and diplomacy, that interstate violence will be limited to the levels we currently enjoy.

If I am right, then I think that the start point for any truly profound review of the UK's Diplomatic, Defence and Security posture might lie in answering three questions.

The first is the defence question: if, by and large, we want to retain the rules by which the world is currently organised, how big a contribution do we want to make to the collective defence of those rules, principally through the mechanisms of deterrence?

Second is the security question: having recognised that, in the changed security context, even a relatively peaceful world is still a dangerous one, how much national resource should we devote to ameliorating the new security threats to our people?

And third, the question is the diplomacy one: what strategies can we employ and support, in order to bring about the circumstances in which the likelihood of a relapse into formalised major war is further reduced, perhaps ultimately eliminated?

Let me offer a few thoughts on each of these questions.

Firstly, defence. The UK is a nuclear armed state and has Tier One military capability. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It is the leading NATO power in Europe and for seventy years has formed the bridge that has anchored the United States security interest to the forward defence of Europe.

But the UK is also struggling: struggling to afford the sustainment of the nuclear deterrent and retaining the totemic capabilities of a Tier One power, without seriously hollowing out the resilience of its conventional force structure.

I attended Sir David Omand's excellent Michael Quinlan Memorial Lecture at King's College last week on the subject of modern deterrence. I have always shared Michael Quinlan's oft-quoted belief that it cannot make sense that, for what remains of human history, the method by which mankind remains at peace, is by the retention of the capability to mutually destroy itself.

But I took away from David's lecture some important truths; truths which I had not necessarily always bought into.

We are not yet at a point where we can abandon the nuclear guarantee with confidence. Handled well, war between two nuclear armed states is too dangerous to contemplate. This fact has stood us in good stead for an extended period.

Equally, we must accept the reality that nuclear deterrence does not prevent nations exploiting lesser means to achieve their ends. Moreover, we must not be seduced into the belief that cyber offers a morally more credible or effective alternative to nuclear deterrence. Certainly not any time soon.

We must also continue to recognise that, if payloads are properly calibrated and, importantly, communicated, nuclear weapons can deter far more than just other nuclear weapons. We should also consider the increasing utility of the deterrence theory of Entanglement in the increasingly globalised and mutually reliant world we live in.

In respect of conventional hard power, my own observations are that we worry too much about issues of sovereign capability in a context where collective security is the only sensible answer to global and regional stability. This is where military nostalgia sometimes clouds rational judgement. The European nations of NATO cannot individually generate meaningful full-spectrum capability. Conventional deterrence is a collective effort.

So, we need to further encourage initiatives like the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, in which the UK provides the Command and Control architecture which gives relevance to the force contributions of smaller nations.

The aggregate conventional military capability of NATO is unequalled anywhere in the world, but it remains remarkably suboptimal in its mechanisms for standardisation, force generation and sustainment. Somewhere along the way NATO became an agent for national capability improvement, rather than an Alliance optimised for operations.

I firmly believe that the true alchemy of efficiency is far more likely to be found through international agreement, than through further excruciating and debilitating exercises in the self-examination of procurement processes.

Moving to the second question: the **security** question; the issue of domestic resilience to the novel vectors of threat. Here I think the choices for government may be tougher ones. I say this because domestic security is an unalienable sovereign responsibility. So the issue here is one that relates to risk tolerance.

Starkly put: what risk will government carry, on behalf of society, when ameliorating those threats which are not existential? What level of resources buys sufficient amelioration?

In truth, we are quite advanced in this country about our understanding of vulnerability; about our knowledge of critical national infrastructure; about our active cyber defence.

There are certain areas where I judge that we have not truly confessed to our shortcomings. Forgive me, across all the elements of the national intelligence effort, what I have heard described as the narcissism of small differences, is sometimes deployed to mask some failures to innovate and adapt.

My greatest personal concern, however, would be that, if my wider assessment of the strategic context is correct, we have not yet even remotely understood the potential scale of the domestic threat.

We are perfectly capable of dealing with isolated acts of terror, sabotage, assassination, cyberattack, misinformation. We have not, however, scaled up our thinking to consider how we deal with the state-sponsored weaponisation of all these things at the same time.

Hybrid war, undeterred by deterrence strategies, and below the red line of a return to formalised warfare. This is a poorly considered national risk.

I offer that the only organisation capable of providing the national Command and Control response to such a scenario is the Armed Forces. And that is not, when I last looked, what we currently spend much of our time worrying about or preparing for.

Indeed I would go one step further. As a nation we tend to organise ourselves for crisis response. But, in a global context where countries are engaged in a continuous fight for competitive advantage, using novel vectors of threat and leverage, we should have some form of permanent national operational architecture.

The third question is how do we do more to avoid, perhaps even ultimately remove, the risk of a relapse into formalised interstate warfare? This is the **diplomatic dimension** of the fundamental Review.

I make observations on this question from the viewpoint that the most important function of diplomats is to either avoid or resolve war. Avoidance is much the better scheme. Successful deterrence is not a cop-out for diplomats; it's a method of buying time to allow them to do their work.

Again, if my strategic analysis is correct, the current situation of a dynamic planet, characterised by multiple forms of disadvantage, contained only by very expensive forms of hard power deterrence, is simply not a sustainable one.

So, the prime drivers of diplomatic effort must be the elimination of disadvantage and the accommodation of inevitable change. Again this is not something that the UK can do alone. But I do not think it remotely beyond the ambition of the government for the UK to be global leaders in this.

I personally am open-minded on whether the DFID budget sits within or without the Foreign Office's control. But I do think that we need to be more hard-headed about the degree to which it should be targeted to avoid conflict and instability; and more widely to help ensure that some of the more dangerous megatrends, such as migration and inequality are ameliorated at source.

The greatest challenge to diplomacy, however, will be in the thought leadership of solutions that lead to the accommodation of disaffected states. Iran, Russia, and China all represent diplomatic challenges of differing natures, complexity and scale. But all three also represent the greatest challenges to the sustainability of global stability, so they cannot be left unattended.

I think I have said enough by way of a formal remarks. I much prefer questions. I hope I have said enough to spark some. And I also hope that they will help improve this what I remind you only ever aspired to be a new material luncheon.

In closing I would offer that I genuinely hope that the government seizes this opportunity to conduct a review that is profound.

My consistent view for many years is that the challenges that face us, though complex, are not unfathomable. I believe that there is a single grand strategic challenge of this age and it is this: how do we accommodate the change which is inevitable in a dynamic planet, whilst maintaining the stability on which the continued betterment of the human condition depends?

The answer to that challenge ultimately rests on establishing a greater mutuality of self-interest. It, or something like it, should form the reference point for the forthcoming Review.

I strongly believe that the UK is, by history and nature, both suited and inclined towards playing a leading role in meeting such a challenge; it should be what Global Britain is mostly about.

Thank you.

## CLIMATE CHANGE IN ANTARCTICA AND ITS GLOBAL IMPACT

### Transcript of a lecture given by Professor Dame Jane Francis DCMG

Tuesday 25th February 2020


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**Professor Dame Jane Francis** is currently Director of the British Antarctic Survey, a research centre of the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC). In 2017, Jane Francis was appointed Dame Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George in recognition of services to UK polar science and diplomacy. She has also been awarded the Polar Medal by Her Majesty The Queen and in 2018 became Chancellor of the University of Leeds. She is involved with international polar organisations such as the Antarctic Treaty and European Polar Board and on several advisory boards for national polar programmes. Her research interests include ancient climates and fossil plants from the Arctic and Antarctica, for which she has undertaken over 15 science expeditions to the polar regions.

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The British Antarctic Survey (BAS) is a research centre of the Natural Environmental Research Council, part of UK Research and Innovation. An MOU with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and BEIS [Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy] confirms that BAS undertakes world-leading polar science and supports the UK presence in Antarctica, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich Islands. Part of BAS provides logistic support for any UK scientist who has a grant to work in Antarctica. There are also scientists working as part of BAS in the home base in Cambridge.

Currently BAS operates five stations in the Antarctic and one Arctic station at Ny Ålesund on Svalbard (Figure 1). Currently, BAS operates the James Clark Ross science icebreaker, soon to be replaced by a new world class icebreaker, the RRS *Sir David Attenborough*. In addition, BAS operates five aircraft. Over 400 staff are employed by BAS, including 120 scientists, many support staff in Cambridge and Antarctica, and expert operational and engineering support teams.



*Figure 1. Map of Antarctica showing the main research stations operated by BAS, plus two summer field stations.*

Rothera is the main UK research station in Antarctica and hub of the UK Antarctic activities. It is rather like a small village: there are normally about 120 people in Rothera during the summer, including scientists and support staff. BAS operates an airfield for its five aircraft and all other aircraft that transit to other Antarctic stations through Rothera from South America or the Falkland Islands. There is also a harbour and a wharf for ships that resupply the station and support science, so it is a busy place.

Rothera station is located on Adelaide Island, part of the Antarctic Peninsula region. It is situated on Rothera Point, a small island of rock exposed on the edge of glaciers (Figure 2). A current task is to modernise the buildings to become as energy-efficient as possible. Ship and aircraft are fuel-hungry so



*Figure 2. View across Adelaide Island, Antarctic Peninsula. Rothera research station is on the rocky point in the lower middle part of the picture (the runway is visible near the junction with the snow slopes). BAS image.*

reduction is planned for other uses of carbon-based fuels as much as possible by using renewable energy sources in the stations and autonomous vehicles, such as underwater robotics for marine research.



*Figure 3.  
Scientists at work  
measuring atmospheric  
conditions at Halley  
station on the Brunt Ice  
Shelf. The blue and red  
modules contain living  
quarters, science  
observations labs  
and life support systems.  
BAS image.*

Halley Station, on the Brunt Ice Shelf, is the most iconic British research station (Figure 3). In 2017 the whole station had to be moved across the ice shelf to avoid being stranded on an iceberg that threatened to form when a large crack appeared in the ice shelf. The modules were taken apart and pulled behind large vehicles across the ice shelf for 23 kms to a safer location. The station is now safe and occupied during the summer season. The cracks will probably break the ice shelf into icebergs (a natural process) but the station should hopefully remain safe in its current location for many years.

The science undertaken at Halley Station is to study the composition of the atmosphere and the ionosphere, and the sun and its solar flares. A major focus on space weather is part of BAS science; solar flares from the sun eject highly energetic particles that break through the Earth's magnetic field. These particles can damage satellites. BAS scientists work with the government to assess the risk of damage to satellites, which is very costly, and would have a huge impact on the function of GPS facilities, on stock markets, on the satellite industry and more, at huge cost.

Halley is a very different place to Rothera - there are no visible mountains, just the endless flat white landscape of the ice shelf. The long winter is dark and very cold, with temperatures often as low as minus 50°C. But it is a very special place with clear skies and dry air, ideal for atmospheric research. This is where the ozone hole was first discovered in 1985.

Now climate change is affecting Antarctica. Climate warming is being caused by humans living mostly in the mid- and low-latitudes of the planet but that change is affecting the remote polar regions in both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Antarctic is being affected by climate change which, in turn, will affect the rest of the world through changes to ocean circulation and sea level rise.

A satellite image of Antarctica (Figure 4) shows that most of the continent is covered by ice. Less than 1% rock is exposed. In places the ice sheet is up to 4 km thick, so there is a huge amount of water locked up in ice. Seventy per cent of the world's fresh water is frozen on Antarctica. If all the ice on Antarctica melted (which means that all Arctic and mountain ice would have also melted) global sea levels would be about 60 metres higher.



*Figure 4. Satellite image of the Antarctic continent showing the extensive ice cover. Areas of exposed rock (less than 1% area) can be found on nunataks (exposed mountain tops), sea cliffs and surrounding islands. In places the ice is 4km thick. NASA image.*


The fate of Antarctic ice is the topic of many research projects. As glaciers flow off the land the ice floats out on the ocean as ice shelves. The ice shelves will naturally break up (calve) as icebergs in time. But the ice shelves act as buttresses to the glaciers on land, slowing the flow of glacier ice into the ocean. Scientists are concerned that the ice shelves are now melting from below, caused by warm water that is able to flow beneath the ice shelves and ultimately detach the glacier from its grounding point, the critical point at which the glacier is frozen to the rock bed below. Once this happens the ice shelf will melt much faster and the glaciers on land will be free to flow faster into the ocean, causing sea level to rise when this glacier ice melts.

One important aim of glacier research is to establish its past history. That informs us about past glacier growth and decay in relation to climate and can help us predict future change. Glaciologists drill long cores of ice deep into the ice sheet (Figure 5). These cores contain layers of ice that formed from snow that fell on the continent as long as 800,000 years ago. Slices of the ice core contain tiny bubbles in which are trapped samples of the actual air from Antarctica from the time during which the snow fell.



*Figure 5. Glaciologists working on an Antarctic ice coring project. The ice core, obtained with the drill in the centre of the picture, is cut into short lengths for transit to the lab (see ice core on the bench on the right).*


Glaciologists can determine the temperature of Antarctica in the past from the chemical composition of the ice and the concentration of carbon dioxide from the air trapped in the bubbles (Figure 6). They discovered that the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere over the past 800,000 years has varied between about 180 and 280ppm (as climate cooled and warmed and glaciers waxed and waned within the ice ages) but never rose above about 300 ppm. Today the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is over 410ppm, way above the levels at which the climate and ice sheets were stable during the last 800,000 years.



*Figure 6. Slice of an ice core, showing the tiny bubbles trapped within ancient ice. The bubbles contain samples of the ancient Antarctic atmosphere from which past CO2 levels have been measured. BAS image.*

The start of the very rapid increase in carbon dioxide can be traced back to the time of the industrial revolution and the burning of coal. We now live in a world in which the high levels of carbon dioxide are not in sync with the presence of ice sheets, hence the rapid melting of ice that we are seeing in the polar regions, particularly the Arctic. Even if we stop increasing the level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere tomorrow, the global climate will continue to warm and the ice sheets will melt until they reach equilibrium with a 400ppm world. Our challenge is to stop carbon dioxide rising and then remove excess to maintain the climate to which we are accustomed.


To understand what is happening to ice sheets in our warming world, many scientists are working in the polar regions to collect new information about how the ice is responding. In Antarctica, in remote and difficult conditions, these projects are undertaken by large multinational teams of experts. UK scientists have worked with experts, from Germany and the US in particular, to understand the impact of warming on the ice sheets. One project involves the melting of a hole down through the ice using hot water, down which instruments are positioned so that conditions at the base of the ice can be measured for the next few years in order to understand the how fast the ice sheet is moving.



*Figure 7. International Thwaites Glacier Collaboration. This figure demonstrates the ways in which this major science project is investigating the impact of warm water reaching under the ice shelf.*

One of the most ambitious projects in Antarctica involves collaboration between UK and US scientists to study a glacier called the Thwaites Glacier on the western side of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) (Figure 7). The ice shelf at the front of the glacier is melting from below due to warm water flowing under the ice shelf. Scientists are investigating whether the warm water will eventually melt the ice that freezes the glacier to the bedrock, thus allowing the warm water to flow underneath the glacier and melt the interior of the WAIS ice sheet. Water from WAIS glaciers in Antarctica will cause global sea level to rise by as much as 5m, affecting millions of people and many major cities and industries that occupy coastal regions around the planet.

Such important science questions that require huge logistic effort in the remote and hostile Antarctic landscape are best achieved by nations working together. This is enabled by the Antarctic Treaty, which is the agreement by which Antarctica is governed. The Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1961, preserves the continent for peace and science for the 54 nations that have a presence in Antarctica today. Many nations work together to understand how climate change is affecting the landscape and the animals on land and in the ocean, and the impact that Antarctic change is consequently having on the rest of the planet.



The Antarctic Treaty is discussed during an international meeting every year, when all the Antarctic nations meet together and discuss, agree and sometimes disagree with actions. But at the end of two weeks, a report is produced that summarises discussions and agreed by everybody in attendance to ensure that the Antarctic Treaty, and the environmental protocol which protects Antarctica from mining and environmental damage, is still intact.

Figure 8. The global ocean conveyor belt with Antarctica at its core. (See BAS website for more information).

Understanding what is happening to the ice shelf also involves understanding the great Southern Ocean around Antarctica. The world's oceans are connected by a global conveyor belt of ocean currents that move heat around the planet (Figure 8).

Antarctica is a critical player in the global ocean circulation because it provides cold dense water that flows to the bottom of the oceans, driving ocean circulation.

Scientists now understand that the Southern Ocean in particular draws down heat and carbon into the ocean depths, keeping the planet cooler by as much as 36°C. There is still much more to learn about how the oceans operate as part of the Earth system and how increased carbon dioxide is making the ocean more acidic.



*Figure 9. The RRS Sir David Attenborough, the UK's new icebreaker. The ship contains state of the art scientific equipment to investigate the state of the polar oceans.  
(photo Simon Wright).*

The new icebreaker, the RRS Sir David Attenborough (Figure 9) has an important role to play in understanding how the polar oceans are changing as the climate warms, using many new autonomous instruments that can glide through the ocean collecting data that is relayed back to scientists via satellites.

One of the new marine vehicles is the long-range autosub called *Boaty McBoatface* (Figure 10) from the National Oceanography Centre (NOC) in Southampton.



*Figure 10.  
Boaty McBoatface  
autosub  
(photo NOC).*

Understanding change in the Southern Ocean is important for the animals that live there, such as penguins, sea birds including the iconic albatross (Figure 11), seals, whales and fish, and the marine creatures that live deep in the ocean. The food web depends on plankton in the ocean that feed krill, that in turn feed a large array of animals and birds.



*Figure 11.  
Albatrosses nest on the  
sub-Antarctic island of  
Bird Island, where they  
are studied by  
BAS scientists.  
BAS image.*

The Southern Ocean also supports a large fishing industry and scientific data about fish stocks are crucial in helping set fishing quotas, regulated through the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR.

Antarctica is a remote and very special continent on our planet, yet it is being affected by the impact of our warming climate. Its unique floras and faunas are threatened by changes to the polar ecosystem, and the icy landscape, so characteristic of Antarctica, is already on a road to major changes. There is urgent science to do now and in the future to understand the critical role that the continent plays in the Earth system and how changes there will have drastic impacts on the rest of the planet.

Further information about the science and facilities mentioned above can be found on the BAS website at [www.bas.ac.uk](http://www.bas.ac.uk).

## 300 YEARS OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS

Transcript of a lecture given by Sir Anthony Seldon

Tuesday 3rd March 2020

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**Sir Anthony Seldon** is one of Britain's leading contemporary historians, educationalists, commentators and political authors. He has been Vice-Chancellor of the University of Buckingham since 2015. He was a transformative head for 20 years, first of Brighton College and then Wellington College. He is author or editor of over forty books including the inside books on the last four Prime Ministers. He is the lead author on, and honorary historical advisor to, *Downing Street*. His books include 'Number 10: The Illustrated History'; 'Blair'; 'Blair Unbound'; 'Trust: How We Lost It And How To Get It Back'; 'Brown At 10' (with Guy Lodge); 'Cameron At 10' (with Peter Snowdon); and 'The Cabinet Office, 1916-2016: The Birth Of Modern Government'. He was the co-founder and first director of the Institute for Contemporary British History, is co-founder of Action for Happiness, UK Special Representative for Saudi Education, a member of the Government's First World War Culture Committee, a director of the RSC, the President of IPEN, Chair of the National Archives Trust, and founder of the Via Sacra Western Front Walk. He has three children; his wife of 34 years, Joanna, died of cancer in December 2016. His most recent book, 'May At 10', was published in November 2019.

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It is an enormous honour to be here and thank you very much indeed for asking me. We have got two essay title questions that I am going to try and answer in front of this very distinguished audience of Lords, Ladies and Excellencies, and very distinguished people indeed.

It is an incredible thrill to be able to talk about a book that I have not yet published. There is no point in me talking about *May At Ten*, because if

you come up with amazing points I am just going to want to go around every bookshop in the country, assuming that one can still do so, and write in postscripts. It is over, it is gone and indeed, the profits from that book are dedicated to Jeremy Heywood. I mention that because it is fashionable to attack the Civil Service at the moment, and they after all find it hard to answer back. He was Cabinet Secretary and the book, which was launched by his widow, is actually dedicated to the Civil Service.

The next book I am writing is on public schools and the Second World War, and how utterly and in every way the Second World War was shaped by the public schools. I am not talking about that one either, because I have finished it and I am just correcting the proofs, so I do not want to hear your views about that.

What I *do* want to hear your views on is three hundred years of prime ministers and the two essay questions we have got here today. I am going to have fifteen minutes roughly on each of them, I have my clock going here. This is a really interesting topic, I think.

So what are we talking about today (not least in the presence of a former Cabinet Secretary, Robin Butler, whom I expect to leap to his feet at the end of this and say, '*What about this?*')? Three hundred years of prime ministers. There are two questions that I have set for us:

- 1) Is it fact the same office now that it was in April 1721, when Robert Walpole became the first Prime Minister? Is it the same? Robert Walpole (very like Boris Johnson in so many ways) - Prime Minister no. 1; Boris Johnson - Prime Minister no. 55. 53 prime ministers in between them, do they do the same thing? So that is question number one.
- 2) How do we explain that the office of Prime Minister is the longest surviving office in the modern world, the longest surviving leadership position?

So those are the two questions, and you are going to tell me whether I have answered them and how successfully I have done so. We will find out - at the end all will be revealed!

So the first question: Is this still the same office?

I begin by saying that it is not the same name. This time next year, we are going to hear a lot about three hundred years of prime ministers. I have two books out about this, this one, and one on Number 10 itself, an illustrated history, so I will be saying it amongst others. But actually, it is not really fundamentally true that it is the same name at all, because Walpole was never called 'Prime Minister', he was called 'First Minister'. It was not for another hundred years that the name of prime minister began to come into more common usage.

Disraeli (modest man!) in **1868** was the first to call himself Prime Minister.

**1870:** Gladstone, the first Prime Minister to call a Cabinet without consulting the monarch.

**1881:** The first Prime Minister's Questions in Parliament/House of Commons.

**1885:** Hansard begins to talk about the 'Prime Minister'.

**1906:** The Imperial Calendar, known to some of you, starts referring to the 'Prime Minister'.

And in **1907** - and I am chair of the National Archive Trust, so this is of great interest to me - there is the first reference in the National Archives in Kew to the name 'the Prime Minister', referring to Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

So three hundred years of prime ministers? Yes, up to a point.

Are they doing the same job? Robert Walpole here, Boris Johnson here. They are so similar in so many ways: Boris Johnson has bits of Disraeli and bits of Lloyd George (I do not think I will go there, least of all in this, the David Lloyd George, Room!) - and bits of Churchill in him too, amongst others.

But what did Walpole do? Walpole really did five things.

His most important job by a mile was to have a majority in Parliament to allow the King's business and the Budget to pass. That was really what it

was about, and that was why George I wanted to have this person who would help to ensure that there would be a passage. And remember how fragile the emerging democracy was in the 18th century. The 17th century had seen a monarch lose his head, just less than 400 yards from here, had seen a civil war, had seen a protector, had seen a restoration in 1660, and then in 1688-89, another revolution. Instability rather than stability was the order of the day. And that was why having a First Minister to try and ensure that there could be a majority for the King's business in Parliament was essential.

Secondly, he was First Lord of the Treasury. Very significant. For much of the 18th century, the First Minister was also Chancellor, but not Pitt the Elder (Lord Chatham), who was in many ways certainly one of the most significant first ministers of the 18th century.

Thirdly, he was the intermediary between the monarch and the whole Parliamentary process.

Fourthly was patronage – ecclesiastical posts, some minor governmental posts, military posts, ambassadorial posts, shared with the monarch.

And fifth and finally: national leader – a sense that Walpole had a responsibility for protecting the nation from internal and external threats.

Now what does Boris Johnson do today? He does all these things.

Having a majority in Parliament, just like Walpole, but different - there is a party system that has developed, there is a whipping system that has developed. Since there have been general elections on a mass franchise, there is now a system of a majority guaranteed in Parliament with coherent parties, which of course Walpole never had. There were party factions in 1721 to 1742 (Walpole by the way is still the longest first minister/prime minister), but not political parties. There were not political parties for another hundred years.

And he is First Lord of the Treasury, and as we saw three weeks ago, trying to take over the Treasury also, as have many prime ministers –

Harold Wilson tried to do it, Tony Blair tried to do it, until he met a Brown repelling him.

Intermediary between the monarch and Parliament. Absolutely, between the executive and the legislature. That is still what happens, the weekly audiences, the visits up to Scotland.

What else does the Prime Minister do? Patronage, but patronage and the nature of patronage switching very much to the appointment of Cabinet and ministerial positions, which in many ways is the most significant power that a prime minister has today.

And then – national leader. Very much so, and the power to declare war passing from the monarch to the prime minister. When did that happen? It happened by the 18th century. The Napoleonic Wars were a prime ministerial decision; the wars of the early 18th century much more the monarch deciding when to do that, exercising authority through the Cabinet Council.

But Boris has now got additions to those five jobs, all of which have changed from what Walpole did. There are five new jobs altogether.

So what does Boris have to do additionally? Well, he is chief executive. Back in 1721, the monarch was chief executive, George I was the chief executive. And Boris is chief executive over a large Whitehall bureaucracy, a large system and network of officials and offices across the whole country, utterly unknown to anything that Walpole had to do.

And he is also head of the Cabinet. Walpole was not head of the Cabinet. The King's Council or Cabinet Council was presided over by the king in the 18th century. Not until 1782 – Rockingham when he took over from North - did all ministers resign at the same time with the first minister. Until then, it was the king's government, as indeed it is still Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Armed Forces today. So chief executive is the first new power.

Secondly: party chief. Political parties were emerging in the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s, the Tory Party, the Liberal Party. This is an altogether new power.

You cannot imagine the prime minister in the 20th century without being head of their political party and that gives them access to tremendous resources of power and prestige and connection to the nation.

The third new power is that Boris Johnson is the chief communicator. There was again no sense that Walpole had to come up with an answer: the King of France has died, what does Robert Walpole think? Well, no. There was no response when there were epidemics and panics, there were no communications coming out of Downing Street. By the way, the First Minister did not move into Downing Street until 1735. Walpole was invited to do it in 1732, and it took three years for the builders to make it sufficiently attractive and grand for him. So the chief communicator, the sense that out of the Downing Street communications hub comes a response to every internal and external crisis.

Then there is policy chief. Robert Walpole having a policy on fevers or having an education policy or a health policy or an immigration policy or a foreign policy or a colonial policy? No, no. This is not what the first minister did. It was by the late 19th century that the idea of a programmatic prime minister with a set of policies coming out was first developed.

So these are the new offices that Boris Johnson has accumulated.

And finally, a sense of being a world leader - and taking over progressively from the 1960s, the powers of the Foreign Secretary. What really killed the Foreign Office as an independent source of foreign policy advice were two main developments: world war and the growth of summitry attendant upon that, spurred then by the EU; and secondly, communications. Why do you need a Foreign Secretary when the prime minister can pick up his or her phone and talk to any leader or ambassador around the world?

Who was the last great Foreign Secretary? Ernest Bevin, I think, after 1945, with extraordinary influence and power. Anthony Eden from 1951 to 1955, also.

Who was the last independent-minded Foreign Secretary? Probably Douglas Hurd from 1990 to 1995. Why? Partly because his Prime

Minister, John Major, was entirely comfortable and secure enough to let him have his own foreign policy. Partly because Douglas Hurd was a former diplomat, from 1952 to 1966, and was - rare thing, this - a Foreign Secretary who understood foreign policy (what a ridiculous notion!). Those factors combined to make him influential. But now the PM is a world leader.

And let's just look at one or two other reasons to be a little bit sceptical about why 1721 should be this great breach. Was what Walpole doing really so different to what some of his predecessors had done? I do not know if any of you have bought Hilary Mantel's third volume, it is a magnificent volume, but you could say that Thomas Cromwell was Britain's first Prime Minister. Indeed, I have asked Diarmaid MacCulloch to talk about that topic and there are reasons for saying that. Or maybe Wolsey before, or maybe Cecil under Elizabeth or maybe Buckingham under James, or coming into the 18th century, Godolphin. Or Robert Harley. All these are people who could have some reasonable claim. Particularly when in 1721, again it was the king's administration even when Walpole was there, it was the King's Cabinet. They were the king's ministers not just in name, but in reality.

Then I think we have to say that the office has changed. We cannot think of Boris Johnson without being in No. 10 Downing Street, which by the way is a very odd place to have as the head of government, as some of you will know who have worked in government. I mean, it is utterly ridiculous and preposterous. Why would you want to have your head of government - who now in some ways has taken over many of the powers, not just of the Foreign Secretary, but of the Chancellor (dependent on that power balance) and in some ways the powers of the head of state also - down a cul-de-sac in an office that has no frontage at all and in a building that has no office for the prime minister. Conceive the White House without the Oval Office, you would think that was a barking idea. But there is no settled office for the prime minister in Downing Street.

Walpole had three to four staff in his retinue who moved there into Downing Street with him in 1735 to 1742. He had a lot of people on the pay, he was a sly old rake, was Robert Walpole. But then the office began slowly to expand, with Pitt the Younger bringing in some of the powers of

the Treasury. And then Peel in the 1830 and the 1840s: as the Conservative Party developed, he was using the office of the Conservative Party, the Whips, to bolster his own power.

Palmerston in the 1850s and the 1860s using the Foreign Office – come on, the idea of Palmerston working out of No. 10, out of that snivelling little terrace house, ridiculous! He worked out of the Foreign Office and as you know lived on Piccadilly.

Then Gladstone and Disraeli, the expansion of the Civil Service, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report, and then the big change on 9th December 1916, the foundation under Lloyd George of the Cabinet Secretariat and the first of the twelve (to date) Cabinet Secretaries in Maurice Hankey. A very significant moment indeed.

Then through the Second World War, the great expansions of the powers of the prime minister. Harold Wilson in 1964 bringing in a political secretary, in 1974 bringing in a Policy Unit in part to try to keep tabs on the Treasury. Thatcher centralising power and having shadows of the Treasury and the Foreign Office in No. 10.

And in 1997, a big change, the arrival of Tony Blair in many ways creating in all but name the sense of a prime minister's department - and this is interesting. Harold Laski who some of you will know, a very left-wing figure, chairman of the Labour Party in 1945-1946, LSE economist, theorist, said, *'It is inconceivable that if Labour is to win in 1945 [they won 393 seats against the Tories' 213] that the Civil Service, as well as the police and the military, can possibly enact a socialist government. We have to have a totally clean sweep.'*

What happened? Well, there were no resignations of permanent secretaries of the Home Office or Chancellor of the Exchequer, there was just a deep commitment from that administration, presided over by Edward Bridges and Norman Brook to carry out the will of that most radical domestic government that we have seen in our history. For better or worse, we will all have a view about that, but no government has done more, least of all in such little time, as the government of Clement Attlee, with the Civil Service totally supporting them.

So what do we say about this? Is it still the same office? Does it still have the same staff? Robert Walpole with three staff, Boris Johnson now with 400 staff. Different name: First Minister/Prime Minister. Five minor powers for Walpole, ten heavy powers for Johnson. And no clean break in 1721, but a build-up to the power of the first minister being created, with many forerunners who could claim that title and even after 1721, certainly up to 1782, this is very much a king's government.

So I think the answer to the first question here is no, it is not the same office. Does anyone agree with that? Good!

Now the second question, I will do it slightly more quickly. Does anybody remember what the second question is: how has the office survived?

We are saying that it is significantly different, but recognisable. Imagine seeing your great-great-grandfather or grandmother: recognisably you, but very different. But how has that bloodline continued? That is my question here. And I think we just have to reflect on what Britain has been through.

Politically, we have seen the decline of religion as a major force in this country, and a rise of ideological voting; we have seen a decline of the power of the monarch, and we have seen a rise in Cabinet; we have seen a decline in the influence of the aristocracy in the House of Lords, and a rise in influence of the House of Commons; we have seen fundamental changes across the nation; we have seen a rise of general elections – 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918, 1928; we have seen Britain rise and then fall as a world power. The extraordinary transitions that it has gone through make it all the more incredible that the office has survived.

And then plots. If any of these plots or threats had been successful: 1745-46: the Jacobite revolt would not just have swept the Hanoverians away, it would have swept away the First Minister at the same time.

The Gordon Riots in 1780 that saw protesters breaking into Downing Street.

1812: this was a fairly deadly plot. Spencer Perceval is the only prime minister to lose his life, out of 55. Not a bad record when you then look at US presidents: 44 different presidents since 1776 (45 presidencies, but only 44 different people), of which four have lost their life. Or according to Niall Ferguson, if we look at monarchs of the British Isles: 105, of whom 34 have lost their lives.

The Cato conspiracy in 1820 to sweep away not just the prime minister but the Cabinet almost came very close to being fatal. Peel - had there been photography developed in the 1840s, when it was just beginning to get developed and had the assassin had an image of Robert Peel, he would have been killed rather than his private secretary. That is all that saved him. All that the assassin had was a cartoon image of him. These are the potentially fatal threats.

Lloyd George in 1917 was very nearly killed in the famous Pear Tree incident. It would have been extraordinary if Lloyd George had died then, or indeed if the First World War had been lost, as at moments in 1917 and in 1918 it appeared that it might be. Had the war been lost, my own historian at the University of Buckingham, Jane Ridley, is convinced the monarchy would have fallen too and I think she has to be right, as it fell across Europe in those countries defeated. Had the monarchy fallen - George V was the sitting monarch in 1918 - it is very likely that the office would have gone too. See how contingent so many of these are.

In 1940-41, the bomb landing closer to Churchill than that second pillar there, and this is when Churchill had this intuition that the bomb was going to land, and he swept out his famous cook (there has now been a book written about her) and told all the staff to get away from the windows and the bomb landed on Treasury Green moments later.

And then 1984, Margaret Thatcher in Brighton, and indeed Lord Butler was with her at the time. In 1991, the mortar attack on John Major. Any of these would have been very significant events in ending the life of a prime minister, but also jeopardising, in the earlier days in particular, the still unstable position of the prime minister.

Look at the changes in transport. What have we overcome there? How did Walpole get around? Does Boris Johnson think about this? Do we ever think about it? Walpole got around on a horse, and a sedan chair. It took a long time. And for Walpole to get out to his country home in Norfolk, that was a major exercise. As it was for the Hanoverians to get back to Hanover. They would be out for three months, and when they came back across Europe, they might be holed up in the channel ports for two or three weeks, waiting for the winds to change to be able to bring them back.

It was not until the 1810s that we started getting hard roads – Telford, McAdam - able to move people at speed on secure roads, particularly in winter; and then in the 1820s, the coming of the railway. Liverpool (Lord Liverpool, 1812-1827) was the first PM who really understood what railways were. He was the first railway prime minister and the naming of Liverpool Street station was partly in honour of that fact. As you will all know, but lots of people do not, Liverpool Street station does not take you to Liverpool. But it was Peel who was the first one to understand the magnificent opportunities that the railway could give in transforming the PM's ability to visit Edinburgh in a day, and to be able to come back overnight.

The first PM to drive a car: Balfour in 1903 brings his De Dion-Bouton Voiturette into Downing Street. That was transformational. The first PM to fly was Chamberlain, Chamberlain going to see Hitler in 1938. The first PM to use a jet plane was Macmillan in 1958. Our first PM to use a helicopter, also Macmillan, when he was seeing Kennedy in 1962. The first PM by the way to travel abroad was Disraeli in 1878 when he was in Berlin. The first PM to visit the US: not until 1929, when Ramsay MacDonald addressed a special session of the House of Representatives, transforming utterly the ability of the PM to exercise their authority.

And communications. How did Walpole communicate? With a quill and paper. And when did that start changing? Well, Melbourne in 1840 was the first PM to use postage stamps. The 1880s, the first time a telephone comes into Downing Street. Think how radical that was in transforming the whole notion about what it means to be prime minister, when you can telephone people. Who was the first one to be on radio? Asquith, no longer prime minister (he

had not been for seven years) in the 1923 general election. The first PM to understand newsreels, which were the way to get out to people in the interwar period, was Baldwin, who was a far subtler understander of the public mood ever, I think, than Wilson, superb though he was, and Tony Blair after him. An extraordinary ability to understand how to communicate in a way that Lloyd George never did, and using newsreels.

The first PM to be interviewed on television was Chamberlain again in 1938. And the first TV prime minister was Macmillan, with Wilson then able to capitalise on that. The first social media prime minister was Cameron. The first email prime minister was John Major and I remember his Principal Private Secretary, Alex Allan (who was there at the launch of the National Archive Trust just three weeks ago) very proudly pointing out to me emails and his electronic diary in the Principal Private Secretary's office in Downing Street (this was when I was writing about Major) and I said, *'Well, I think it is a very nice idea, but you know, I do not think it is going to catch on.'*

So all these are transitions. Then in 2018, WhatsApp. How did we get the response to the Skripal/Salisbury poisoning, that international response? It was by the Cabinet Secretary (Cabinet Secretary no. 12) Mark Sedwill WhatsApping his opposite numbers on a secure network and able to get a speed of transition and mutual understanding with them all talking into a single WhatsApp channel. So technology transforming utterly the power of the prime minister.

Now, this is the point – and I am going to bring in Darwin here – how has the office survived through all these changes: political changes, the threats to the office, the transport changes, the communications changes? Remarkable. It has done it by bending and adapting itself. The only way I think that we can understand the prime minister is to see that they have come through a series of different phases.

1721 to 1830: This is the **'Emerging Prime Minister'**, the prime minister using the name more or less by the end recognisably, much more a modern prime minister now in charge of the government, clearly the PM's or first minister's government, resigning when it wants to, not yet able to call Cabinet (it was not until 1870 that that was done without the monarch),

but the government loyal to the first minister. That is really the first phase, beginning with Walpole and finishing after Liverpool.

The second phase is the **'Imperial Prime Minister'**, from 1830 to 1914. Now we have an enormous swelling of Britain's authority across the world. I was walking across the park just an hour ago, and coming past the Foreign Office and looking up at the office of the Secretary of State, which is the curved window. Grey was looking out of the corner window facing Horse Guards Parade when he saw the lamplighters in the park and said, *'The lamps are going out all over Europe, we will not see them lit again in our lifetime.'* The Secretary of State for India's office is the curved window; but that extraordinary Gilbert Scott building symbolic of the swelling of Britain's power and global ambitions and imperial ambitions in the 19th century, transforming the power of the monarch.

And then, the **'Total War Prime Minister'**, another phase altogether, another reinvention about what it means to be prime minister from 1914 with Asquith through to the end of Churchill in 1945. Now Britain is in the front line because of technological change in warfare, more so in the Second World War than it was in the First World War - there was some bombing of coastal towns from German naval vessels, but mainland Britain was not in the front line the way it was in the Second World War. A total transition in the power and the emergence of the prime minister as a global figure and as the figure who the nation looked to for security. And with the resources now in government, an ambition to oversee economic and social policy that would have been alien to all the prime ministers in the 18th century and many in the 19th century (of course, after progressive Gladstone and Disraeli, we have a retrenchment under Salisbury, holding back advance at the end of the 19th century).

And then another phase again after the Second World War, a **'Welfare State Prime Minister'**, from 1945 to 1970, adapting to now the new demands of a feminised electorate and a working-class electorate, and building a land fit for heroes after 1945 in a way that had not happened after 1918.

And finally, the **'European Prime Minister'** from 1970 - Britain did not go in until the 1st January 1973, obviously - but very significantly repivoting

the power of the prime minister again in that post-imperial era. In the words of Dean Acheson, *'Britain has lost an empire, but not yet found a role'*; well, it found a role in the EU, and the structure of support for the prime minister changing enormously in that period until 2021.

And then there will be a sixth period. But I think I would conclude by saying and I am going to rest my case here, that it was Darwin who said that the organisations, the organisms, the institutions which survive are not necessarily the most intelligent (and intelligence is not a trait that one would accuse many prime ministers of actually being guilty of), it is those that adapt. The answer to the second essay question: how has the office survived through all those extraordinary changes, not the least in the country, in the population, in industrialisation? It is because of its ability to adapt.

So the same office? Not really, but we will give it the benefit of the doubt. Think of your great-great-great grandparents, rather than you yourself. That is what it is like.

How has it survived? It has survived by being adaptive, which is precisely also how the Conservative Party has managed to be the longest surviving political party in the modern world, but we are not going to go there - that is another book!

Thank you very much.

## **THE INTEGRATED REVIEW OF SECURITY, DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE MOMENT FOR COMMON SENSE**

**Submission to the Government's Integrated Review of Security,  
Defence, Development & Foreign Policy by Lord Lothian PC QC DL  
Chairman of Global Strategy Forum**

**22nd July 2020**

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I very much welcome this Review, not least because I have high hopes that it will be robust and honest and even more, because it is urgently needed. As we face the uncertainties post-Brexit and post COVID-19, we desperately need a foreign policy. We almost certainly need a defence and security policy as well, but this submission concentrates on the foreign aspect.

The truth is that we have not had a foreign policy worth the name since we joined the then EEC in 1972 and probably for some time before that as well. We used the Cold War as a surrogate and relied on a pretty unsophisticated version of balanced aggression. We occasionally had short, sharp periods of diplomacy in reaction to crises such as the Falklands, but generally it was hard to avoid the impression that our foreign policy ran in neutral or as Churchill more pithily expressed it, *'adamant for drift.'*

In short, since I entered Parliament in 1974 we have been without a foreign policy. To begin with we seemed to think that just being in EEC/EU was a foreign policy in itself. If that was the case it was a pretty poor policy. We also seemed to think that in most cases (the Falklands excepted), as long as our responses were aligned to those of the United States, no further strategy was needed.

I have made this case for some time and have been met with ripostes such as to look at British foreign policy in Afghanistan, in Iraq or in Libya where in each case positive action pursued British policy objectives. Yet at the time there was little indication of any strategic or consistent policy ('nation-building' was ephemeral) and with the benefit of hindsight, if

there was a policy it was in each case a dismal failure. In the Middle East where, like it or not, we for historical reasons should have a moral imperative to participate, we have sat on the sidelines and wrung our hands.

As we have declined in terms of world stature, we seem almost to have become supine and directionless, as if it is no longer worth the effort. Yet even with a much-diminished Foreign Service we still have the means.

I hope that the key finding of the Review will be a firm call for a clear and unequivocal foreign policy based on core principles and objectives and tailored to our resources and capabilities. There will always be a tension between resources and objectives. This review has an almost unique capability to examine and influence the two. It is to be sincerely hoped that it will take this rare opportunity to do so.

The first objective of a foreign policy must be the defence of and promotion of the national interest. It is at least arguable that there is insufficient definition of 'the national interest' and it is to be hoped that this Review will look closely at this issue, particularly at the positive and negative aspects of it. Taking global humanitarian action can be more than simply altruistic, but can also protect against future problems that could damage the national interest.

We need more fully to understand what the limits of an acceptable national interest are. Presumably they must not be overtly partisan. This is not a simple debate and it is to be very much desired that this Review should address this question.

One simple test would be that where the 'national interest test' has been met theoretically, has that nation benefited? In the case of the US, following the Vietnam War where it undoubtedly did not, from then on it has been increasingly difficult to make that argument in the conflicts that followed. Effective retreat from Afghanistan, similarly from Iraq, helter-skelter from Libya, stymied in Syria and Venezuela, alongside patently failed initiatives in Ukraine and Israel - these all hardly place actual benefit in pole position as a test of national interest.

We were on the edge of all this and while the opprobrium is not as great as it is for the US, nevertheless the UK could not avoid being caught in some of the muck flying in the slipstream. This suggests that in future the UK should pursue its own foreign policy except where it has a direct input into the policy it is sharing, an input which overtly has impact and one which clearly reflects the principles of our foreign policy. By and large also it is a sound dictum only to become involved where we have a dog in the fight, or at least a dog whose interests we should protect.

We need, however, to try to identify the basic principles which should govern the formulation of a modern foreign policy, whether sole or shared. One which is self-evident but often honoured in the breach is: not to get involved in disputes where you cannot win, or even at best draw. That is not to say necessarily that foreign policy must be governed solely by counting money or tanks. Both economically and militarily, Davids can still be found to beat Goliaths. In a world where one of the objectives must be to create a more peaceful and harmonious society, there have to be some basic rules.

**First**, regime change should be illegal unless it is endorsed by acceptable measures of international opinion. The failure to follow that principle too often ends up in the anarchic scenes witnessed in Iraq and more recently on its borders with Syria. And for some time in Libya as well, an illegal regime change led effectively to civil war where the promoters of regime change (such as Britain) hastily and somewhat ignominiously left the field while others by proxy began to battle with each other for the spoils.

**Secondly**, nation-building in someone else's country may have been a standard practice of empire; it doesn't work in independent nations or failed states. Equally, talk of freedom and democracy has little appeal when it is delivered along with bombs from a great height or at gunpoint backed by heavy military hardware. Undoubtedly in today's world it has a role to play, but we need to find a way to deliver it that does not smack of neo-colonialism or of Chinese-style vicarious empire-building. Lessons can be learned from the British Council in this regard.

**Thirdly**, we need clear objectives compatible with resources, with real give-and-take with the Treasury on the latter. Those objectives as far as possible should encompass a timeline. There is too much of a feeling at the moment that once an operation has begun, it must be funded to its finish however long that might be. This is a recipe for policy inertia. Afghanistan is a prime example of this - constantly and fairly lazily seeking new objectives to justify the retention of troop levels, as the government's stock answers to the following questions used to demonstrate:

Q: *'When will we get out?'*

A: **'When the job is done.'**

Q: *'When will we know the job is done?'*

A: **'When we get out.'**

Result: a stomach-creasing steady drain on resources. We need to devise ways to enforce this discipline.

**Fourthly**, when embarking on a strategic initiative we need to be sure that the strategy has been 'red teamed' to ensure that it has been considered from all angles. There may be occasions viz. the Falklands when time does not permit. These should, it is suggested, be the exceptions.

**Fifthly**, any effective modern foreign policy should take as much account of soft power as hard. These are most effective when they work together towards a common objective. In the formulation of a foreign policy, there should always be a clear indication that this has been done. Often it will be covert rather than overt and it should be shared only on a need-to-know basis where it is sensitive.

This list is by no means exhaustive but it seeks to indicate to the Review what, in the view of the author, might essentially be taken into account in developing policy.

Of course none of this can be written in stone. The way the world works does not allow for it. Within each policy should be an inbuilt area of flexibility which should equally be explored from time to time. Nor should we be frightened from time to time to admit that we have got it all or at least some of it wrong. In the modern world of communications, we have built a culture of infallibility which in the end gains little advantage but

risks 'losing big'. It would be singularly refreshing to admit sometimes that we have got it wrong.

**Finally**, it will be clear from the foregoing that the sort of foreign policy being explored here will have little chance of success in an unregulated world. The last two decades could well be described as an 'age of the bullies' - of which there have been a number in history - none of them with happy endings. Looking back four years ago, we should not be living in an age where two bullies, the President of the United States and the leader of North Korea could have initiated a nuclear world war which could have engulfed us all - with the rest of the world shuttered in silence.

Nor should we accept a world where one power can annex a part of another country with no approval from the rest of the international community, whether that power is Russia in Crimea or Israel in the West Bank. In the face of such outrage the international community is silent because its means of rectification is curtailed by a United Nations whose ability to fulfil the widest ambitions of its founders is stymied by a mechanism designed to thwart it. It is not surprising when the rules were the epitome of 'victor's justice', designed to retain power firmly in the hands of the victors. Bad enough when the victors worked together, but once their interests diverged the power of the veto became an instrument of unaccountable tyranny.

And that is largely where we are today. We are desperately in need of a fundamental reform of the power of the UN, where a single member can veto a policy initiative and where a single member of the Security Council can again single-handedly prevent the advancement of a vital security issue, or even stand effectively in the way of two bullies hell-bent on creating nuclear holocaust.

In my view this should become a central pillar of British foreign policy, to press for a genuine and fundamental reform of the UN, to remove the patent injustices and unfairness in the system. Of course, in order to make it work there must be recognition of military and economic might, but it must be in a way that does not continue the unchallengeable power that the current right of veto creates. Equally it must be accepted that in

the modern world, 'one country, one vote' does not recognise the wider realities and brings the institution into disrepute.

There are too many vested interests at large for such proposals to have any chance of immediate success, but it is a worthy cause which needs pursuing. There is no reason that the UK should not pursue such reform.

As we emerge from the COVID-19 crisis, it is a good moment to seek such reforms. This is a global crisis in which there are no victors, just victims. Victor's justice no longer has an acceptable role to play. The moment for common sense may have arrived. Worth a try?

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## GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM EVENTS IN 2019-2020

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- 8th October 2019      Lecture on *'Look Where We're Going: Escaping The Prism Of Past Politics'* by the **Rt Hon. Lord Howell of Guildford**, Chairman, House of Lords International Relations Committee (2017-2019); Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2010-2012), and GSF Advisory Board member.
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- 16th October 2019      Lecture on *'The English Job: Understanding Iran And Why It Distrusts Britain'* by the **Rt Hon. Jack Straw**, Secretary of State for Justice (2007-2010); Foreign Secretary (2001-2006); Home Secretary (1997-2001), and GSF Advisory Board member.
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- 22nd October 2019      Lecture on *'A Changing World Order'* by **Secretary Chuck Hagel**, US Secretary of Defense (2013-2015), US Senator from Nebraska (1997-2009), and GSF Advisory Board member.
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- 29th October 2019      Debate on *'The Brexit Crisis: Do We Need A Written Constitution?'* with the **Rt Hon. the Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO PC**, Cabinet Secretary during the premierships of Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Tony Blair; **Professor Robert Hazell CBE**, Professor of Government and the Constitution at University College London and founder of the Constitution Unit; and **Ms. Bronwen Maddox**, Director of the Institute for Government.
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- 5th November 2019      Debate on *'China's Challenges: Is The Long Success Story Over?'* with **George Magnus**, economist and author of *'Red Flags: Why Xi's China Is In Jeopardy'* (YUP 2018), and **Charles Parton OBE**, former diplomat.
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12th November 2019 Lecture on *'Turkey's Foreign Policy And Current Affairs'* by **His Excellency Mr. Ümit Yalçın**, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

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4th December 2019 Lecture on *'The Contemporary Battlespace Of Great Power Confrontation'* by **Air Marshal (Rtd) Philip Osborn CBE**, Chief of Defence Intelligence (2015-2018).

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10th December 2019 Christmas Drinks and Lecture on *'Tipping Point: Britain, Brexit And Security In The 2020s'* by the authors **Professor Michael Clarke**, Distinguished Fellow, RUSI and GSF Advisory Board member; and **Helen Ramscar**, Associate Fellow, RUSI.

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22nd January 2020 Lecture on *'The Killing In The Consulate: Investigating The Life And Death Of Jamal Khashoggi'* by **Jonathan Rugman**, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Channel 4 News.

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28th January 2020 Lecture on *'Some Thoughts On The 'Biggest Review' Of Our Defence, Security And Foreign Policy Since The End Of The Cold War'* by **General The Lord Houghton of Richmond GCB CBE DL**, Constable of the Tower of London; and Chief of the Defence Staff (2013-2016).

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4th February 2020 Debate on *'Iran: Growing Threat Or Failing State?'* with **Professor Ali Ansari**, Professor of Iranian History & Founding Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies at the University of St Andrews, on secondment to the FCO as AHRC/ESRC FCO Research Fellow; and **Major General Jonathan Shaw CB CBE**, Chairman of Optima Group; Director of Special Forces (2003-2005); and Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (International Security Policy) from 2009-2012.

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25th February 2020 Lecture on '*Climate Change In Antarctica And Its Global Impact*' by **Professor Dame Jane Francis DCMG**, Director of the British Antarctic Survey.

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3rd March 2020 Lecture on '*300 Years Of British Prime Ministers*' by **Sir Anthony Seldon**, Contemporary Historian, Educationalist, Commentator and Political Author; Vice-Chancellor of the University of Buckingham.

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22nd July 2020 '*The Integrated Review Of Security, Defence, Development And Foreign Policy: The Moment For Common Sense*' - Submission to the Government's Integrated Review by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**, GSF's Chairman.

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## GSF IN PHOTOS 2019-2020



Lord Lothian and H.E. Mr. Ayman Al Safadi, Foreign Minister of Jordan, in Amman, September 2019



Lord Lothian speaking to Georgetown students, Washington DC, November 2019



Rt Hon. Philip Hammond joins GSF's Advisory Board, January 2020



Major-General Jonathan Shaw, Lord Lothian & Professor Ali Ansari, February 2020 Iran debate



GSF goes online - foreign policy 'roundtable' with Lord Lothian, Lord Campbell, Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Jack Straw



Lord Lothian in conversation with GSF Advisory Board member, Susan Eisenhower on her new book, 'How Ike Led'

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## PARTICIPANTS IN GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM 2006-2020

Haider Al Abadi	James Barr
Iman Abou Atta	Richard Barrett CMG OBE
Mohammed Abu Srour	General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE
Dr Arshin Adib-Moghaddam	José Manuel Barroso
Lord Ahmed of Rotherham	HE Mr. Matthew W. Barzun
Dr Shirin Akiner	John Bassett OBE
Dr Chris Alden	Rt Hon. the Lord Bates
Lord Alderdice	Ambassador Denis Bauchard
Rushanara Ali MP	Dr Edina Bećirević
Christiane Amanpour CBE	Adam Bennett
Afzal Amin	Owen Bennett-Jones
Dr Othon Anastasakis	HE Mr. Abdurrahman Bilgiç
Lord Anderson of Ipswich KBE QC (as David Anderson QC)	Michael Binyon OBE
Rt Hon. the Lord Anderson of Swansea	Ian Black
Professor Christopher Andrew	Rt Hon. Hazel Blears MP
His Grace Bishop Angaelos	Professor Vernon Bogdanor CBE
Professor Ali Ansari	Ambassador John Bolton
Oksana Antonenko	Mathieu Boulègue
Rt Hon. the Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (as James Arbuthnot QC MP)	Rt Hon. Tom Brake MP
Professor Bill Arnold	Sir Tony Brenton KCMG
Sir Michael Arthur KCMG	Robert Brinkley CMG
Rt Hon. the Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hambdon GCMG KBE PC	Commodore Neil Brown
Dr Afzal Ashraf	Rt Hon. the Lord Browne of Ladyton
Rt Hon. the Baroness Ashton of Upholland GCMG	Jeremy Browne MP
Sir Dominic Asquith KCMG	Rt Hon. the Lord Bruce of Bannachie (as Sir Malcolm Bruce MP)
Dr Vlado Azinović	Chris Bryant MP
Dr Maha Azzam	Professor Michael Burleigh
Mevan Babakar	Rt Hon. Alistair Burt MP
HE Mr. Egemen Bağış	Rt Hon. the Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO PC
Minister Falah Mustafa Bakir	Sukey Cameron MBE
Tony Baldry MP	Rt Hon. the Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC
Gadi Baltiansky	Mark Canning CMG
Dr Mustafa Barghouti	Professor Richard Caplan
William D. Barnard	Dr Jack Caravelli
John Baron MP	HE Mr. Ünal Çeviköz
	Professor Malcolm Chalmers

Alan Charlton CMG CVO	Dina Esfandiary
Rt Rev. and the Rt Hon. Lord Chartres KCVO	Professor the Hon. Gareth Evans AO QC
Professor Nic Cheeseman	Lord Evans of Weardale KCB DL
Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB PC	John Everard
Dr Knox Chitiyo	HE Mr. Euripides L. Evriviades
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**General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE** served as Commander Joint Forces Command, one of the six 'Chiefs of Staff' leading the UK Armed Forces until April 2016. He was responsible for 23,000 people worldwide and a budget of £4.3bn, delivering intelligence, Special Forces, operational command and control, all surveillance, reconnaissance and information systems and communications, operational logistics, medical support, and advanced education and training across the Armed Forces. An artillery officer, his military career included leadership from Captain to General on military operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan – often as part of US-led coalitions and in NATO. He is President and Colonel Commandant of the Honourable Artillery Company, a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, and a Visiting Senior Fellow at LSE IDEAS. His ambitions now are to be at forefront of applying disruptive technology as it revolutionises business, society, government and defence, to find a leading part in addressing the causes of instability, tension and conflict in a rapidly changing world, and to contribute to the continuing evolution of defence and security thinking worldwide. He provides board-level geostrategic insight, advice and influence, and supports senior corporate leadership development programmes. He advises and lectures regularly on defence and security policy, cyber risk and security to City, academic, parliament, military and commercial fora. In promoting the rapid development of combinations of the digital age technologies in the 4th Industrial Revolution, he is developing the principles and major capability bets that should guide the transformation of Western defence in particular.

**The Rt Hon. the Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC** is one of the most respected and successful politicians of his generation. He was educated at Hillhead High School and the University of Glasgow where he graduated MA and LLB and was President of the Union, and Stanford University, California, where he undertook post-graduate studies in international law. He competed in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and was captain of the UK Athletics Team in 1965 and 1966. He held the British 100m record from 1967 to 1974. He was called to the Scottish Bar as an advocate in 1968 and appointed Queens Counsel in 1982. He was elected MP for North East Fife in 1987. In Parliament, his particular interests were

foreign affairs and defence and he was his Party's principal spokesman on both. He has been a member of the Foreign Affairs, Defence, Members Interests, Trade and Industry, and Intelligence Committees. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 2003 and was the Leader of the Party between March 2006 and October 2007. He led the UK delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly between 2010 and 2015 and was later elected a Vice President of the Assembly. He was awarded the CBE in 1987, became a Privy Councillor in 1999, knighted in 2004 and appointed a Companion of Honour in 2013. He holds honorary degrees from three Scottish Universities, including St Andrews where he became Chancellor in 2006. He stood down from the House of Commons in 2015 and the same year was appointed to the House of Lords.

**The Rt Hon. Sir John Chilcot GCB PC Hon FBA** was educated at Brighton College (Lyon scholar) and Pembroke College, Cambridge (open scholar and research and teaching scholar, 1957-63). He joined the Home Office in 1963, and worked for the Head of the Civil Service, William Armstrong, and several Home Secretaries (Roy Jenkins, Merlyn Rees and Willie Whitelaw) as private secretary. Postings to the Cabinet Office, and as head of policing and national security policy at the Home Office followed. He then served as Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office from 1990 to the end of 1997. On retiring from Whitehall, he was appointed by the Prime Minister as Staff Counsellor to the Security and Intelligence Agencies, and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. Sir John led or chaired a number of government Inquiries and reviews including Royal and VIP security, the IRA penetration of the RUC's Special Branch HQ, the use of intercept evidence in criminal trials, the Butler Review of the intelligence on Iraq, and finally he chaired the Iraq War Inquiry from 2009 to 2016. Aside from government-related service, he was at various times a non-executive director of RTZ's industrial group, a seconded director at Schroders, Chair of the construction industry's pensions and benefit schemes, and Chair (now President) of the Police Foundation think tank.

**Professor Michael Clarke** was Director General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) from 2007 to 2015 when he retired from that role. Until 2001 he was Deputy Vice-Principal and Director for Research Development at King's College London, where he remains a Visiting Professor of Defence

Studies. From 1990 to 2001 he was the founding Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King's. He was appointed Professor in 1995. He is now a Fellow of King's College London and of the Universities of Aberystwyth and of Exeter, where he is also Associate Director of the Strategic Studies Institute. He has previously taught at the Universities of Aberystwyth, Manchester and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and also at the University of New Brunswick and the Open University. He has been a Guest Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, and a Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. He has been a specialist adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee since 1997, having served previously with the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 1995-6, and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Bribery in 2009. In 2004 he was appointed as the UK's member of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. In 2009 he was appointed to the Prime Minister's National Security Forum and in 2010 to the Chief of Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Group. He also served on the Strategic Advisory Panel on Defence for UK Trade and Industry and in 2014 was Chairman of the Defence Communications Advisory panel for the Ministry of Defence. In March 2014 he was appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister to chair an Independent Surveillance Review at RUSI which reported in 2015. That report, *A Democratic Licence To Operate: The Report Of The Independent Surveillance Review*, was published as part of the public discussion around the Interception of Communications Bill, enacted into law in December 2016. In January 2016 he was appointed a specialist adviser to the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy. In October 2016 he was also appointed to Chair the independent inquiry into drone warfare on behalf of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones. His most recent book, *Tipping Point: Britain, Brexit And Security In The 2020s*, co-authored with Helen Ramscar, was published in November 2019.

**Secretary William S. Cohen** is Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a business consulting firm based in Washington, DC which provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board of CBS, and on the advisory boards of the US-India Business Council, the US-China Business Council and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the

weekly World Affairs Contributor for CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organisation in the US with a budget of \$300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as Secretary of Defense marked the first time in modern US history that a President chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the US Senate and three terms in the US House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine and received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College, and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or co-authored ten books – four non-fiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

**Sir Evelyn de Rothschild** is currently Chairman of E.L. Rothschild, a private investment company. He is Chairman of the ERANDA Foundation, a family foundation he founded in 1967 to support charities working in the fields of medical research, health and welfare, education and the arts. In addition, Sir Evelyn currently serves as a Governor Emeritus of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow of Imperial College London and is an Honorary Life President of Norwood and Ravenswood Children's Charity. From 1976 until 2003, Sir Evelyn was Chairman and CEO of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd, the international investment bank. From 1972 until 1989, Sir Evelyn also served as Chairman of the Economist Group, from 1977 to 1994 Chairman of United Racecourses Ltd and previously he served on the Board of Directors of De Beers and IBM UK as well as serving as Deputy Chairman of Milton Keynes Development Corporation, Chairman of St Mary's Hospital Medical School, Member of the Council of the Shakespeare Globe Trust and President of The Evelina Children's Hospital Appeal. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1989 for services to banking and finance.

**Susan Eisenhower** is the CEO and Chairman of The Eisenhower Group, Inc. (EGI), a Washington DC based consulting company founded in 1985. For thirty years the company has provided strategic counsel on business

development, public affairs and communications projects. EGI has advised Fortune 500 companies, on projects in the United States and Europe, but also in China, Russia, and Central Asia. In addition to her work through EGI, Susan Eisenhower has also had a distinguished career as a policy analyst. She is Chairman Emeritus of The Eisenhower Institute, where she served as president twice. At Gettysburg College, Eisenhower holds a yearlong seminar, Strategy and Leadership in Transformational Times (SALTT), for competitively selected students at the Eisenhower Institute. She has also been a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics and a Distinguished Fellow at the Nixon Center, now called the Center for National Interest. Over the years, she has served as a member of three blue ribbon commissions for the Department of Energy for three different secretaries: The Baker-Cutler Commission on US Funded Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia; The Sununu-Meserve Commission on Nuclear Energy; and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which released its findings on a comprehensive program for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the winter of 2012. She was also appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control, where she served eight years. After as many years on the NASA Advisory Council, she served as a commissioner on the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. She is currently a member of MIT's Energy Initiative Advisory Board and co-chairman of NEAC, the Secretary of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Board. In June 2016, she received the Legion d'honneur from the French Government, in recognition of her years of policy work, especially in US-Russian Relations. In addition, she has spoken in many corporate venues, as well as at such distinguished institutions as the United States Military Academy at West Point; the Foreign Policy Association of New York; the Army War College, Carlisle; Sandia National Laboratory, MIT and Australia's Science and Technology Organization, which is part of the Australian Ministry of Defence. Eisenhower has authored hundreds of op-eds for newspapers such as the Washington Post and the LA Times, appeared frequently on national television and radio, and her articles have appeared in such journals as the National Academy of Sciences' Issues in Science and Technology and the Naval Institutes' Proceedings. She has written four trade press books, two of which were on regional best seller lists, and she co-authored or co-edited four other books on international security issues.

**Lord Field of Birkenhead DL** was Member of Parliament for Birkenhead from 1979 to 2019. He worked as Director of the Child Poverty Action Group from 1969-1979 during which time it became one of the premier pressure groups in the country. In 1974 he also became Director of the Low Pay Unit until 1980. In 1979, he was elected Member of Parliament for Birkenhead. Between 1980 and 1981 he served as Shadow Education and Social Security spokesman under the leadership of Michael Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Social Security Select Committee and continued in this role up to 1997. From 1997-1998 he served as Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair's first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a member of the Public Accounts Committee between 2002 and 2005. Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy and committed. In 1999 he helped set up the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. The group has acted as an important independent think tank for the cause of a long-term, investment led reform to the pension system. From 2005-2015, he served as chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics Commission for England, the planning authority for English cathedrals. He has sat in the House of Lords as a crossbench peer since 6th October 2020.

**Secretary Chuck Hagel** was the 24th Secretary of Defense, serving from February 2013 to February 2015. He is the only Vietnam veteran and the first enlisted combat veteran to serve as Secretary of Defense. Hagel also served two terms in the United States Senate (1997-2009) representing the state of Nebraska. Some of Hagel's current commitments include serving on the Board of Trustees of RAND; Advisory Boards of Deutsche Bank America and Corsair Capital; Senior Advisor to Gallup and to the McCarthy Group; Distinguished Executive in Residence at Georgetown University; Distinguished Statesman at the Atlantic Council; and Board of Directors of the American Security Project. Previously, Secretary Hagel served on the Board of the Chevron Corporation and the Zurich Holding Company of America, was a Distinguished Professor at Georgetown University, Co-Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, Chairman of the Atlantic Council, Chairman of the United States of America Vietnam War Commemoration Advisory Committee, and Co-Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Corporate Council. He served as a member of the Secretary of Defense's Policy Board, Secretary of Energy's Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of Nuclear Power, the Public Broadcasting

Service (PBS) Board of Directors and the Systemic Risk Council. Prior to his election to the US Senate, Hagel was president of McCarthy & Company, an investment banking firm in Omaha, Nebraska. In the mid-1980s, Hagel co-founded VANGUARD Cellular Systems, Inc., a publicly traded corporation. He was President and CEO of the World USO, Private Sector Council (PSC), and Chief Operating Officer of the 1990 Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations (G-7 Summit). Hagel also served as Deputy Administrator of the Veterans Administration under President Ronald Reagan and Deputy Commissioner General of the 1982 World's Fair. He is the author of the book, *America: Our Next Chapter* and was the subject of a 2006 book by Charlyne Berens entitled, *Chuck Hagel: Moving Forward*. A graduate of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, Hagel and his wife, Lilibet, have a daughter (Allyn) and son (Ziller).

**The Rt Hon. the Lord Hammond of Runnymede** was a UK Cabinet minister and key member of the British Government for almost a decade. Leading four departments over nine years, and rising to the second most powerful job in government, he is one of only three people to serve continuously in the UK cabinet from 2010 to 2019, serving under Prime Ministers David Cameron and Theresa May. Taking on the role of Chancellor of the Exchequer shortly after the 2016 Brexit Referendum, Hammond took charge of the UK economy at a time of unprecedented uncertainty. Philip Hammond has always believed that nobody voted for Brexit with a view to becoming poorer or less secure, and thus that the best way of delivering the result of the referendum is to negotiate a deal with the European Union that allows a continued close economic partnership, even after the UK leaves the EU. He fought strongly for this approach within the cabinet and has continued to do so since leaving government. He also focused on the needs of business and particularly the need to protect London's global financial markets. Hammond has been especially focused on the challenges faced by developed economies, specifically: the technological revolution and how it is already transforming the way we work and live our lives; climate change and how to harness the market economy to deliver decarbonisation; demographic shifts and the challenges of an ageing population, and particularly in the UK, the challenge of raising productivity. Through his roles as Chancellor and as Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond has considerable experience

of working with China, and clear views about how to manage the integration of China as a major economic and strategic power into the global system. He also has strong connections in the Gulf region. He was part of the 'E3+3' team that negotiated the JCPOA nuclear arms control deal with Iran in 2015. During his tenure as Defence and then Foreign Secretary, Hammond built strong links with the US and other allied counterparts, both civilian and military, and was a frequent visitor to Afghanistan during the campaign. Hammond's experience as Chancellor and as Foreign and Defence Secretary give him a strong grasp of the strategic issues facing the Western Alliance, as well as the economic and scientific and technological challenges. He grew up in Essex, and studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at University College, Oxford. Before entering Parliament in 1997, he had a wide-ranging business career across a number of sectors including healthcare, oil and gas and property, in the UK and in Europe. He stepped down as the Member of Parliament for Runnymede and Weybridge in November 2019 after 22 years serving the Surrey constituency. He has sat in the House of Lords as a Conservative peer since 30th September 2020.

**The Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield** is a British historian of government. Since 1992, he has been Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London. Prior to that, he was a journalist for twenty years with spells on *The Times* as a leader writer and Whitehall Correspondent, *The Financial Times* as its Lobby Correspondent at Westminster and *The Economist*. He was a regular presenter of the BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme from 1987 to 1992. In 1986 he was a co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary British History and he was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2003. In 2008, Lord Hennessy won The Times Higher Education's Lifetime Achievement Award. On 5th October 2010, the House of Lords Appointments Commission announced that he was to be appointed a non-political cross-bench Peer. He is a Member of the Chief of the Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Panel. He is an Honorary Captain in the Royal Naval Reserve. Lord Hennessy is author of several books, including *Cabinets And The Bomb* (2007), *The Secret State* (2010) and *The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service Since 1945* with James Jinks (2015).

**The Rt Hon. the Lord Howell of Guildford** acted as policy adviser to Edward Heath in the 1960s and was Director of the Conservative Political Centre. In the late 1970s he became head of Margaret Thatcher's speech-writing team. He served as Minister of State in Northern Ireland, under William Whitelaw, from 1972 to 1974, at the height of the troubles, before going on to serve as Secretary of State for Energy & Secretary of State for Transport in the first Thatcher Cabinet. In 2010 he was enrolled as Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office with special responsibilities for the Commonwealth and for international energy issues. This made him not only the only person to have served in the three administrations of Heath, Thatcher and Cameron, but also the only Minister on record to have 'come back' after a 27-year break. Until 2002 he was Chairman of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group (the high level bilateral forum between leading UK & Japanese politicians, industrialists & academics), which was first set up by Margaret Thatcher & Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1984. Along with a multitude of other roles, he is currently President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Chairman of the Windsor Energy Group and most recently, chairman of the newly set-up House of Lords Committee for International Relations. David Howell has something of a track record in forecasting developments long in advance and helping to pioneer thinking on the major issues of our times. Thus, in the Heath era he was the first to call for a 'New Style of Government', which would begin to unwind the UK's swollen state activities and liberalise the corporatist state. In the emerging Thatcher era he introduced the privatisation concept to the UK political scene (as chronicled by both the late Lord Howe and by Lord Lawson in their memoirs). In the later 1990s and early 21st century he one of the first to draw political attention to what he called 'Easternisation' and the fast-rising role of Asia, as well as to importance to the UK of the new Commonwealth network. He has all along championed the importance of the UK-Japan relationship. In 2013 he chaired the ground-breaking Lords Report on soft power, called *Persuasion And Power In The Modern World*, seeking a new mindset amongst the UK's foreign policymakers. He is the author of numerous political pamphlets with notable impact and seven books, on energy, politics, innovation and the Internet: *Freedom & Capital* (Blackwell 1982); *Blind Victory* (Hamish Hamilton 1986); *The Edge of Now* (Macmillan 2001); *Out of the Energy Labyrinth*, co-written with Carole Nakhle (I B Tauris 2008); *Old Links & New Ties: Power & Persuasion In*

*An Age of Networks* (I B Tauris 2014); *Empires In Collision: The Green Versus Black Struggle For Our Energy Future* (Gilgamesh 2016). His latest book, *Look Where We're Going: Escaping The Prism Of Past Politics* was published in September 2019. David Howell was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge.

**William Kerr** was educated at Ampleforth College and Oxford University. His career was spent in financial services initially in the City of London. He moved to Hong Kong in 1992 to establish Lloyd George Management, an investment advisory company specialising in investment in Asian and global Emerging Markets. He returned to the United Kingdom at the end of 2013 and remains on the boards of a number of investment companies, as well as serving as Trustee for charitable and other organisations.

**The Rt Hon. the Lord Lamont of Lerwick** was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990–1993 and Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Margaret Thatcher. He was a member of the House of Commons for 25 years. He was also a Minister in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector, several with Middle East involvement. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, President of the Economic Research Council and a former Chairman of Le Cercle (a foreign affairs think tank). He was made a Life Peer in July 1998. He is an Honorary Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.

**Sir Iain Lobban KCMG CB** was the Director of the British security and intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters, from 2008 to 2014, having previously served as its Director General for Operations. He pioneered an integrated service of intelligence and security in domains as varied as cyber defence; counterterrorism; military campaigns overseas; and the prevention and detection of serious crime. Cyber Security, both nationally and internationally, has been at the heart of his role in recent years: he set new direction for innovative government partnering with the private sector and with academia. As the GCHQ Director he attended the UK's National Security Council on a weekly basis from its very first meeting in May 2010 and was a Principal member of the Joint Intelligence Committee for over six years. Sir Iain is now engaged in three fields: the

advocacy and demystification of Cyber Security, providing strategic advice and personal perspective, nationally and internationally, to governments and businesses; sharing lessons and insights on strategic and institutional leadership; and entrepreneurship, in the broadest sense of the word.

**Sir David Manning GCMG KCVO** was educated at Oriel College, Oxford and the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University before joining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1972. He served in Warsaw, New Delhi, Paris and Moscow. From 1994-5 he was Head of Policy Planning; from 1995-8 Ambassador to Israel; and from 1998-2000 he was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence and Intelligence and a member of the Foreign Office Board. He was the UK Permanent Representative at NATO (Brussels) from 2000-2001 before returning to London as Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (2001-2003). He was then Ambassador to the United States for four years from 2003-2007. Sir David is a Director of Gatehouse Advisory Partners. He is also a Member of the Council of Lloyd's of London.

**The Rt Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC** was elected as MP for Pentlands in 1974, which he represented until 1997. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992, Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service. Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a MP in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea and he was elected as MP for Kensington in May 2010 until his retirement at the 2015 general election. He was UK representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (2010-2011); and Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (2010-2015). He was appointed in 2015 by the OSCE as member of their Eminent Persons Panel examining Russia-West relations and the crisis in Ukraine. He is a member of the Board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in Washington DC, chaired by Senator Sam Nunn, and a Member of Madeleine Albright's Aspen Ministerial Forum. He was appointed by the Government as the British Co-Chairman of the Belvedere British-Polish Forum in 2017. He is currently a Visiting Professor at the Department of War Studies at King's College, London and a Senior Associate Fellow of the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI).

**Marshal Of The Royal Air Force The Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC** was born in London, and educated at Merchant Taylors' School and the Royal Air Force College Cranwell. He was commissioned into the Royal Air Force in 1970, and after pilot training completed a number of tours in the instructor and fighter reconnaissance roles. This included two years on loan service with the Sultan of Oman's Air Force during the Dhofar War, and three years on exchange with the United States Air Force in Texas. In the 1980s Lord Stirrup commanded No 11 (AC) Squadron, flying Jaguar aircraft from RAF Laarbruch in Germany, and from 1990 to 1992 he was Officer Commanding RAF Marham in Norfolk, a period that covered the first Gulf War. After attending the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Higher Command and Staff Course, Lord Stirrup served as the Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes in the Ministry of Defence before becoming Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group in 1997. He was Assistant Chief of the Air Staff from 1998 to 2000, and then took up the post of Deputy Commander in Chief Royal Air Force Strike Command. In 2001 he was deployed to United States Central Command immediately following 9/11, and commanded British forces during Operation Veritas, the UK's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Following a tour as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Equipment, he became Chief of the Air Staff in 2003, and was appointed as Chief of the Defence staff in 2006. Following retirement from the military, he was appointed to the House of Lords in 2011, where he is particularly involved in the areas of defence, security, foreign relations and the arts. He lives in Marylebone, is married with one son, a practising cardiologist, and maintains a keen interest in history, music and the theatre.

**The Rt Hon. Jack Straw** was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice. He has served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. His autobiography, *Last Man Standing: Memoirs Of A Political Survivor*, was published in September 2012. He retired as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election. He continues to play

a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. He is co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum; takes a close interest in Iran; is a member of the Independent Commission on the Freedom of Information Act; and Chairman of the Blackburn Youth Zone. His most recent book, *The English Job: Understanding Iran And Why It Distrusts Britain*, was published in July 2019.

**The Rt Hon. the Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston** served as Labour MP for Birmingham Edgbaston from 1997-2017, when she decided to step down from Parliament. She was a health minister in the first Blair Government. From 2002 to 2003 she was the parliamentary representative on the Presidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe. One of her fellow Presidium members was the then French Commissioner Michael Barnier. The experience led her to question the direction of the European project. Her Fabian pamphlet *The Making of Europe's Constitution* summarises her concerns then and ultimately led her to Chair the successful Vote Leave campaign in the 2016 referendum. In parliament she served on the Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committees. In 2015 the Prime Minister appointed her to the Intelligence and Security Committee. Gisela is a founding member of the Henry Jackson Society and still one of its Directors. She is a trustee of Reading Force, a charity devoted to helping service families stay in touch by sharing books. For more than 10 years she edited the political weekly magazine *The House*. Since leaving parliament she chairs Change Britain, a cross party organisation committed to achieving a Brexit deal which is in the best interest of the UK and the EU. She also chairs the Legatum Effective Government Commission, and she became the Chair of Wilton Park on 1st October 2018.

**His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal** is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan's Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. A pluralist and staunch campaigner for the rights of all to live in peace and dignity, HRH is a pioneer of Interfaith dialogue and understanding. Prince Hassan's international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prince Hassan has long had an active

engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute.

**Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG** was Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence from 1998-2005, following a short period as Director of GCHQ. His initial career was with the Ministry of Defence and subsequently, from 1979, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His diplomatic postings overseas were: First Secretary, UK Delegation to NATO; Head of Chancery in the British Embassy at Ankara; Director of Cabinet to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington; and Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington DC. Appointments at home covered defence policy and programmes, international economic relations and resource management. Sir Kevin is now engaged in business and academia. He is Senior Independent Director of Smiths Group Plc; Executive Vice President, Government and Defence, for AECOM UK; Chairman of RISC (the UK security industries' trade association); Visiting Professor at King's College London; Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Association; and serves on other advisory boards and charitable trusts.

**Admiral the Rt Hon. Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC DUniv** joined the Navy in 1965. He spent most of his naval career at sea, serving in 14 different ships and commanding three of them. In 1980 he took command of the frigate HMS ARDENT taking her south to the Falkland Islands in 1982 where she was sunk in their successful recapture. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action. He was Chief of Defence from 1997-2000. He was promoted to Admiral in November 2000 when he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet, NATO Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic and NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces North. He became First Sea Lord in September 2002 and the First and Principal Aide-de-Camp to HM The Queen. He retired as First Sea Lord on 7th February 2006 becoming Chairman of the QinetiQ Defence Advisory Board. He advised both Conservatives and Labour on defence and foreign policy before, in July 2007, being asked by Gordon Brown to

join the Government as one of the GOATs (Government of All The Talents) responsible for national security and counterterrorism as well as cyber and Olympic security. He produced the United Kingdom's first ever National Security Strategy and Cyber Security strategy. He was Chairman of The National Security Forum. He left government in May 2010 and is currently a strategic advisor to a number of small companies, a motivational speaker, plus a number of other appointments. Lord West was made a Knight Commander of the Order of The Bath in 2000, Knight Grand Cross in 2004, Baron in 2007 and a Privy Councillor in 2010. He was appointed to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament on 14th July 2020.

**Christopher Wilkins** is chairman of North British Windpower, a privately-owned company developing renewable energy in Scotland; he is also on the board of a Canadian distillery and an internet venture. Previously he was the architect and first chairman of Hakluyt & Co, an information gathering company. Before that he established and ran his own company in the paper industry, which he then sold. He was a member of the Scottish Economic Council for ten years. He has also worked in the newspaper industry and prior to that he served in the army for eight years - including some active service in the Middle East.



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