THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY COMPENDIUM
2006 - 2016
A MISCELLANY OF ESSAYS, ARTICLES AND REFLECTIONS
BY MEMBERS OF GSF’S ADVISORY BOARD

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It is with the greatest of pleasure that I introduce this exceptional collection of essays contributed by members of Global Strategy Forum’s Advisory Board in celebration of our 10th anniversary. This remarkable publication further augments GSF’s now well-established reputation as a unique venue for truly independent, expert and fearless examination of the foreign policy questions facing our country.

Ten years ago, when Michael Lothian and I founded GSF in May 2006, we did so against a background of rapidly evolving foreign policy, security issues and defence challenges and a troubled time in Britain’s external position. The Iraq and Afghan campaigns had both run into major difficulties with the result that far-reaching questions were being asked of British policy. The discourse in London, however, was frustratingly circular and opportunities for open and constructive debate in short supply. There were too many entrenched positions and too much institutional deadweight. It was our belief that a platform for active, on-the-record debate, to stress test legacy opinions and to explore the very best in fresh thinking, in order to help to forge a new national consensus about Britain’s place in the world, was long overdue.

So began GSF’s life as an open, non-partisan forum, wholly independent of government funding, where all those with an interest in foreign affairs, intelligence and defence could meet to exchange views on the seminal questions facing the UK. Over the past decade, our aim has been to create an active and dynamic network where expertise and experience can combine to ‘shake the tree’ on the nation’s most intractable foreign policy issues, where long-held attitudes and preconceptions can be challenged and where new ways of thinking can be stimulated. To this end, GSF has actively sought out innovative, policy-relevant discussion and debate, thereby cementing its reputation as an intellectual incubator with no ideological bias other than a predilection for creative ideas and bold, high quality thinking.

Since that time, GSF has become firmly established as an important part of the foreign affairs conversation in London. We have an enviable track record as a diverse and influential network in the international affairs community and our substantive events programme has succeeded in attracting both high level and authoritative speakers and attendees. In the course of this, we have guarded our political independence and ideological openness fiercely – and we have had the courage to tackle contentious issues.

Over the past ten years, GSF has seen many and varied ideas disseminated under its auspices. Close to 400 speakers have addressed and debated a wide range of challenging issues – we are indebted to each and every one, both for their expert analysis, their generosity in sharing their extensive knowledge and understanding, and for the contribution to the policy formation process which their participation has allowed us to make. This is at the very heart of our success, together with the sustained interest and unstinting commitment of our growing membership. Their participation demonstrates that there is a strong demand for our trademark discursive approach and elevates GSF to a truly interactive forum, capable of exploring the reality rather than the rhetoric.

During this time, we have been joined by an Advisory Board of the highest calibre, whose composition reflects our broad and independent outlook. Their invaluable support, both in terms of their time and ideas, has done more than anything else to shape GSF into the organisation it is
today and I am delighted to have this opportunity to convey my heartfelt thanks to all those who sit on our Board. We continue to thrive and flourish under their wise oversight and astute leadership and we benefit immeasurably from their deep knowledge and wealth of experience. There is no better example of that than in this outstanding collection of candid and informed personal views on a wide range of the most pressing foreign policy, defence and security questions before our nation – and how they might be addressed.

Taken together, these thirteen compelling reflections offer a broad overview of the areas where the UK faces its most difficult choices. Despite success in Iran, these essays show that the UK continues to struggle mightily with a number of intractable policy issues, including IS, the Middle East, Russia, Afghanistan and our relationship with the EU. There are also the choices which our shrinking defence budget now dictates, including the future of our nuclear deterrent, and the need for a pragmatic reconciliation between British aspirations and resources. Other vital issues are explored, from the importance of energy security, and information and cyber security, to a US perspective on foreign policy and an assessment of the very fabric of the post-war international order itself. A deeper theme that runs through many of the essays is the absence of any discernible strategy and whether (and if so how) the UK should reassess its foreign and security policy in a fundamental way.

The unprecedented and difficult issues raised in this publication underline the real necessity for more, not less, robust debate and informed public discourse. If anything, the landscape has grown even more challenging for British foreign and defence policy since GSF’s foundation in 2006. Yet all too often, for reasons of today’s conventional wisdom or bureaucratic convenience, the answer has seemed to boil down to more of the same. The decisions on our membership of the EU and on our defence capabilities to be taken in the months and years ahead will shape the UK’s international stance for a generation. If we are to defend and assert our national interest, we will have to play our cards astutely.

A decade on, there is little doubt that the need for GSF as a neutral convenor of the best in innovative thinking, which widens the parameters of debate and of democratic accountability, has never been greater. Will the next decade be an easier one for British foreign policy? I do not know, but I can assure our members that if not, GSF will be present at the debate to ask the tough questions without fear or favour.

Johan Eliasch
President, Global Strategy Forum
May 2016
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The International Implications Of Half-Baked Foreign Policy
Lord Lothian PC QC DL

Understanding The Riddle
Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC

What Next For Iran After the Nuclear Deal?
Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick

The Arab Revolt A Hundred Years After
His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal

Tackling The Virus Of Islamist Jihadism
Rt Hon Jack Straw

Britain’s Continuing Need For The Deterrent And Maritime Power
Admiral the Rt Hon Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC DUniv

Britain And The Policy Challenges Of The New International Landscape
Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford

The Post-War International Order: Coming Apart At The Seams?
Sir David Manning GCMG KCVO

A Decade Of Changing Questions: An American Perspective
Susan Eisenhower

Electricity Generation: Can The UK Keep The Lights On?
Christopher Wilkins

The Kingfisher’s Wings
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Signals Intelligence And Information Security: The Virtuous Circle of Cyber Security
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THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF HALF-BAKED FOREIGN POLICY

Lord Lothian PC QC DL

Lord Lothian PC QC DL is the Chairman and Founder of Global Strategy Forum, which he founded in May 2006. He was first elected to Parliament in 1974 and served as a Conservative MP (as Michael Ancram) until his retirement at the May 2010 General Election. In 1993, he was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office and in January 1994 was appointed Minister of State at the same office. As such, he was responsible for the negotiations leading to the Northern Ireland Peace Process and was the first British minister to meet with Sinn Fein and the IRA for 25 years. He has held the posts of Deputy Leader, Shadow Foreign Secretary and Shadow Secretary of State for Defence. On leaving the Front Bench in 2005, he was appointed to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, on which he continues to serve. In 2010, he was appointed to the House of Lords as a Life Peer.

This May we are celebrating the 10th anniversary of the launch of Global Strategy Forum. We began with a highly critical analysis of the growing disparity in military terms between commitments and resources. Ten years later the same criticism can even more strongly be made. This is hardly surprising when for so long we have inhabited a strategy-free zone, reacting to events as they have occurred and with no real forward view of commitment-led resource requirements. This trend now threatens our future security and well-being.

It has been almost surreal to watch Western politicians, diplomats and commentators complaining about President Putin of Russia outmanoeuvring the West in his actions in Syria and Eastern Europe; almost a sense that it wasn’t meant to be like this. Under the cosh of Western sanctions, Russia was supposed to come to heel and mend her ways. Instead Putin is running rings around us; and we don’t like it. I’ve even heard it suggested that - horror of horrors - he seems not only to have a strategy but worse still, one that has a chance of working.

We in the West apparently no longer believe in strategy. Since the end of the Cold War we have avowedly only reacted to events. Our Cold War strategy had been simple and effective: containment and deterrence. We knew who we were containing and what we were deterring. Inevitably with the collapse of the Soviet Union that strategy lost focus. We no longer knew who to contain or what to deter. Instead we became embroiled in ad hoc civil wars in the newly unfettered countries, the old Yugoslavia and the wider Balkans; all with pretty mixed results. When in 2001 the US was attacked by al-Qaeda we rightly supported their self-defensive response in Afghanistan. We also helped quell a vicious civil war in Sierra Leone. All laudable, but all reacting without discernible pattern or direction to events on the ground with no overall guiding direction or purpose.

Through all this period we continued steadily and short-sightedly to reduce resources in pursuit of the post-Cold War myths of the dawn of a new era of peace and the ephemeral peace dividend which would follow. It was a fundamental error. Predictably commitments began to rise again
and our resources to meet them continued steadily to decrease; and our courageous armed forces paid the price. The British Army down from over 102,000 in 2010 to under 82,000 in 2015. The Royal Navy’s number of ‘workhorse ships’ halved since 1996 from 36 to 18 today. In the RAF the number of combat fighters dropped from 220 in 2006 to 149 last year.

At the same time in that strategy-free void, our defence and foreign policy fell apart. Take Afghanistan. Having in late 2001 and early 2002 achieved our objective in driving al-Qaeda out of the country and the Taliban out of Kabul we should have stopped there. Instead we sought new, insufficiently considered objectives; the sudden obsession with ‘nation building’ (whatever that meant), followed by undeliverable promises of narcotics eradication – all of which are now either failed or teetering on the brink of failure.

This was the beginning of what I call the era of ‘half-baked’ British foreign policy. Half-baked in the sense that while the first part was basically well planned or baked, the second part was not only uncooked but often the necessary ingredients had not even been identified. Thus in Afghanistan after the well-constructed and executed action around Kabul, we messed up on ill-judged poppy eradication (production now at record levels) and the totally unnecessary involvement in Helmand where we found ourselves in a messy and lethal conflict with the Taliban at the very time when strategically we should have been trying to bring them in from the cold. Now having withdrawn we have left behind a dangerous mess. The insurgent water we so boldly drove uphill is now predictably coming down again; and much of our military sacrifice is coming to nought.

At the same time, without apparently pause for strategic analysis, we moved into Iraq. Our well-baked military campaign to eradicate weapons of mass destruction in Saddam’s hands came to nothing when it became apparent that there weren’t any, requiring our military objective to be swiftly changed to illegal regime change. Even that was reasonably well baked and successful. But then what? Getting rid of Saddam’s Ba’athist structures and institutions was a Western disaster, creating a vacuum which in turn was an invitation to al-Qaeda to become involved against us and also fed the embers of the underlying conflict between Sunni minority and majority Shia. For some reason we thought we could hold the ring between them. In the event with the plans constantly changing, from ‘whack-a-mole’ to ‘inkspots’ to varied surges, all scarred with uncertainties about who were our friends and who our enemies, there was no hard baked or even remotely consistent strategy.

In 2006 I called for us to get out of Iraq while we could still do so with a modicum of pride and dignity; I was excoriated for disloyalty. When we eventually rather shamefacedly departed some three years later, we had gained nothing for the extra price we in the intervening years had to pay. For all our brave words we left behind us continuing civil strife and an aching vacuum into which Daesh/IS was swiftly and horrifyingly to insert itself.

The Arab Spring astonishingly took us by surprise. Once again we reacted to these events with little or no serious analysis, proclaiming them to be the birth of liberal democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. I would hesitate to call this response even half-baked. In a fit of exuberant enthusiasm we forgot the role played by autocrats often tacitly supported by us in controlling Islamic extremism. In Egypt we cheered when the demonstrators of Tahrir Square engineered the ousting of Hosni Mubarak while failing to notice that amongst the crowd were large numbers of
the Muslim Brotherhood who went on to win the subsequent election; only in their turn to be ousted by the new autocrat, el-Sisi, leaving Egyptians more oppressed than ever.

In Libya we did begin to bake the beginnings of a response although we were unsure of its purpose. Was it an ethical responsibility to protect threatened civilians or our old friend, illegal regime change? Although no member’s security was threatened, we recruited NATO to the cause. And as both purposes required bombing we bombed and in the process wiped out Gaddafi without the first idea as to what to make next. In fact we just walked away from the kitchen leaving violent chaos behind; and we still don’t seem to understand the realities on the ground.

In Syria once again we were inspired by a popular Arab Spring uprising which we immediately and uncritically supported. To begin with we didn’t even start to bake a policy, so convinced were we that the dictator Assad would fall within days. When predictably he didn’t, we belatedly began to make preparations although to what end we were uncertain. Backing, training and arming the so-called moderate rebels although we had no idea who or how moderate they were; encouraging the destabilisation of the country which opened the door to Daesh; boycotting Assad although he obviously had to be part of the solution; backing the northern Kurds to the irritation of our NATO ally Turkey; and eventually taking limited part in air strikes against Daesh which proved more provocative than effective. Once again our lack of strategy was helping to stoke still further a bitter civil war with no clear idea of an acceptable and feasible outcome. That was where we were heading when the Russians came in.

So the first ten years of GSF have witnessed a mixture of foreign policy drift and military strategy vacuum, partly caused by the imbalance between resources and commitments, but more largely by a failure of leadership to look forward with any sense of vision. Hardly a proud period in our great nation’s history.

All of which brings me back to President Putin. Despite hard economic and financial economic sanctions in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Crimea, the West is arguably on the back foot with Putin driving the agenda. At a time when soft power dialogue should be the response, we are faced with the ratcheting up of rhetoric against Russia. Echoes of old Cold War rhetoric are chilling, as is Russian Premier Medvedev’s recent comment that this could be the beginning of a new Cold War. We need urgently to respond to this but to do so we need to understand the reasons underlying it; starting with the end of the Cold War.

History teaches that magnanimity in victory pays greater dividends than vindictiveness. The West’s proud claim to have defeated the Soviet Union with an equally proud Russia at its core should have rung alarm bells about the need to avoid humiliating Russia.

On this occasion it was not so much vindictiveness as unthinking disdain for Russian sensitivities. In the apparent absence of strategic analysis the West in the flush of victor’s arrogance thought little about Russia’s historic fear of Western encroachment on its borders. We encouraged the liberated countries not only to join the EU but also to become part of the military alliance of NATO which had long been regarded by Russia as an existential threat.

European support for the pro-Nato administration in Georgia did little to reduce these tensions. We in the West value our historic ties and it was at best naive not to consider that Russia might do the same.
And now the Ukraine. I hold no candle for Putin’s actions in the region but I seriously question why the West never foresaw them nor strategically planned to forestall them. Just like the Arab Spring, when the crowds gathered in Kiev’s Maidan Square the West failed to analyse the real forces behind the protests. We ignored the endemic corruption on all sides of the Ukrainian political system. We latched instead onto the soi-disant Europeanism and support of NATO of the protestors and contemptuously dismissed any pro-Russian reservations. We unthinkingly threw our weight behind the Maidan agenda. We ignored Russian fears of NATO effectively controlling her outlets to the Black Sea particularly through Crimea. What Putin did was not justified, but we should have sought in advance to lessen Russian fears that would lend support to Putin’s land grab.

We should know that sanctions will not diminish Russian sensitivities. They will harden long held prejudices. Instead through conversations and reassurances we need to try to show that Russian sensitivities are finally understood. While the Crimea annexation may now effectively be irreversible, clear strategic thinking could still do much to reduce tensions not only in Ukraine but also along the length and breadth of Eastern Europe. Failure to do this will merely allow a deteriorating situation to get worse. There are some signs today that Russia is seeking a more balanced relationship with the West; we should encourage rather than insult it.

The same basically goes for Russian involvement in Syria. With no strategy of its own, the West stumbled from non-baked policy to half-baked policy. There was no strategic analysis of Russia’s interests in the conflict which could have made their intervention totally predictable. It has long been an imperative for Russia to combat Islamic extremism. Its Caucasian regions such as Chechnya and Dagestan demand that as does their no less sensitive interests in the vulnerable southern underbelly of Central Asian Muslim states. Assad’s Syria, Iran and to a growing extent Iraq are seen as vital bulwarks against such insidious movements and existential threats. Russia has long seen the stability of Assad in Syria as a key element of its strategy. Islamic fundamentalism stems from Wahhabism which in turn was born of Sunni radicalism. The main counter to Sunni extremism in the region are Shia forces including Assad’s secular variety which itself includes many secular Sunnis.

For that reason Syria’s uprising posed for Russia a real threat; the undermining of Assad’s stability and the growth of a vicious fundamentalist Islamic ‘caliphate’ with the stated intention to spread. We in Britain with our own Muslim population are alarmed enough by IS/Daesh. We should understand Russian concern at what is for them an even more deeply embedded threat.

Instead the West showed at best indecision, at worst lack of resolve and over all a lack of any comprehensive strategy to deal with the threat. To our irritation, not least because it highlighted our irresolution, the Russians intervened somewhat forcibly from the air. To our even greater irritation they effectively attacked Assad’s enemies on a wide front, IS and rebel groups generally, some of whom we had without much thought been training and arming in their fight against Assad.

Rather pathetically we shouted foul. But how could we not see that if it was Russian strategy to bolster Assad against his enemies that would ultimately include all his enemies even those whom we were somewhat uncertainly supporting?
So that is where we are at the end of the first decade of GSF. I will continue to make the case for a ‘farewell to drift’ and the development of serious strategic planning. We cannot afford not to. Russia and Putin have shown the power of strategy even against greater odds.

China is clearly developing a strategy which will impact quite considerably on the West and western interests. In that context it is imperative that we begin to understand those emerging strategies and their implications for our interests and then to begin to develop counter strategies of our own.

If at the end of the Cold War we had devised a strategy what would it have looked like? A robust strategy should never be a detailed plan or blueprint. It should be a mixture of criteria, parameters and intended outcomes. It must take account of resource reality. For a start our severely reduced military capabilities rule out a strategy in which we would play a major global policing role while leaving distinctive option for Special Forces activity and the deployment of soft power. It should encompass three distinct strategic geographical arenas; the European theatre including Russia, the MENA region and beyond and the Far East including China. Into these it will be necessary to factor the effect of our security alliances with the US and NATO and the growing importance of cyber warfare.

There is a simple principle. Given our capabilities we should not become involved in international disputes unless we have a dog in the fight. That dog need not only be about security and defence, it could encompass international humanitarian crises which could in time affect our national interests and way of life. While that would have allowed us into Afghanistan at the beginning, it would have kept us out of Iraq and Libya and away from Syria saving us both sacrifice and expense. It is ironic that where now we are being invited to intervene in the humanitarian crises in Syria and Libya, they have both been largely created by our half-baked interventions in the first place.

It is in my view extraordinary that we should now revisit them.

This essay is a shortened version of GSF’s 10th Anniversary Lecture, delivered by Lord Lothian at the National Liberal Club on Wednesday 4th May 2016.
Winston Churchill was not thinking of Vladimir Putin when he said that Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. He might have been.

It is significant that speaking in 1939 Churchill referred to Russia and not the Soviet Union. The reality was that the Soviet Union, regardless of its Communist ideology, was the old Russian Empire under a new name.

Churchill further emphasised the point when he suggested that the key to the riddle, the mystery and the enigma was Russia’s national interest.

That is also the key to Vladimir Putin. With one very important caveat it is his perception of Russia’s national interest that is his motivation and the explanation for many of his political initiatives.

Even before he became President he stated that the greatest geopolitical disaster of his lifetime had been the collapse of the Soviet Union. What he meant, when he said that, was not the Soviet Union that had existed since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 but the Russian Empire that had existed and had, remorselessly, extended its territory since Peter the Great in the 17th century.

Putin has had no nostalgia for the demise of Soviet Communism. It was the implosion of the Soviet state in 1991 and its replacement by 15 new states that he has never become reconciled to.

He is not naive. He knows that the Russian Empire as it existed throughout most of the 20th century and helped make the Soviet Union one of the world’s two superpowers, cannot be recreated. Russia does not have the military, economic or diplomatic strength to force the 14 states of its ‘near abroad’ back into a new Russian Union.
But he believes that Russia’s own security and its broader national interests justify using every opportunity that arises, as well as creating new opportunities, to draw these countries back into the Kremlin’s embrace, impose limits on their independence and thereby, to some degree, restore Russia’s influence and power in the wider world.

I said that there was one very important caveat to the view that Putin’s behaviour can be understood as having been determined by his perception of Russia’s national interest.

The other motivation is his overpowering determination to retain his own power base, his popularity with the Russian people and their willingness to accept that après moi le deluge.

There is nothing else that explains his annexation of Crimea, the worst example of aggression in Europe since 1945.

While Crimea does, indeed, have a large proportion of ethnic Russians in its population so does northern Kazakhstan, Latvia and Estonia.

Nor was the annexation of Crimea essential to Russia’s security. Crimea’s only geopolitical significance is the naval port of Sebastopol but that has been under uninterrupted Russian control since 1991 under a treaty with Ukraine. In all other respects Crimea is a liability not an asset. Economically, Crimea is very poor and its tourist industry has been destroyed by Russia’s occupation. It will require to be subsidised by Russia for years to come.

Putin annexed Crimea in order to restore his reputation with the Russian people. Instead of being the President who had ‘lost’ Ukraine after the fall of Yanukovych he became the President who ‘restored’ Crimea to the Russian motherland.

As a tactic it was very impressive but the damage it has done to Russia’s reputation and long-term interests has been severe. Crimea was not just part of Ukraine because of an arbitrary decision by Khrushcheyv years before. Its legal status as part of Ukraine had been recognised by the Russian Federation in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 under which Ukraine agreed to transfer the nuclear weapons on its soil to Russia in return for security assurances as to its territorial integrity. Putin’s annexation was a blatant violation of these assurances and has severely damaged future prospects for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons elsewhere.

Crimea is only one example, if the most serious, of Putin being a brilliant tactician but a very poor strategist.

He has an understandable desire to enhance respect for Russia and restore its greatness. Having presided over a return to economic stability after the chaos and rampant inflation of the Yeltsin years, he should have then made it his top priority to modernise the Russian economy and make it less dependent on oil, gas and natural resources. That was, and remains, essential if Russia is ever to be truly great again.

Countries such as China and Germany have become world leaders because of their economic success. That enhances their ability to deliver their national interests. The same applied to the United Kingdom when the Thatcher reforms ended our reputation as the sick man of Europe.
Thirty years ago, the Russian economy was stronger than the Chinese. Today it is a pale shadow. Russia's global role depends on its nuclear weapons, its oil and gas, its arms sales and its vast extent of Eurasian territory. Its modern economic infrastructure, selling to the world high-tech goods and services, is less than that of the Netherlands.

Putin has not only failed to modernise Russia’s economy. He has, unwisely, used Russia’s oil and gas exports as a political lever seeking to take advantage of the dependence of former Soviet republics and some former Warsaw Pact countries on Russia for their essential imports. In the short term that has given him some political benefit. But these countries are now slowly diversifying the sources of their gas and oil imports. Twenty years from now Russian petroleum exports to the West as well as Ukraine will be much less than they are now entirely because of Putin’s political interference.

Some of Putin’s criticism of NATO and the West is justified. NATO was indifferent to Russian anxieties during its period of absorbing new members from Central and Eastern Europe. The war against Serbia over Kosovo was pursued against Russian objections and without UN Security Council authority.

But while NATO and the West cannot be free from criticism, Putin cannot blame either the United States or Western European countries for the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

That had been no part of NATO strategy. Indeed before Ukraine declared its independence from Moscow the first President Bush addressed the Ukrainian Parliament and in his famous ‘Chicken Kiev’ speech tried to persuade the Ukrainians to remain in Union with the Russians.

He had done this because he did not wish to see Ukraine as a new nuclear weapons state and preferred Yeltsin and the liberal reformers then in power in Moscow to the Ukrainian nationalists likely to take over in Kiev.

Far from Putin being a brilliant strategist his destabilisation and aggression in Ukraine and overt hostility to the Baltic States has led to the exact opposite of what he wished.

NATO is today far more united than it has been for years. It has felt obliged to provide reassurance to Poland and the Baltic States by providing a NATO military presence in these countries; the exact opposite of Putin’s objective.

Russia also continues to suffer serious damage from American and European financial and banking sanctions despite Putin’s attempts to persuade Hungary, Greece and other countries to split NATO’s ranks.

Furthermore, in Ukraine most of its population outside Donetsk and Luhansk now see Russia as their enemy whereas in the past the Ukrainian population had been deeply divided between pro-Western and pro-Russian sectors of the population.

Putin’s military adventurism has been popular with many Russians but now, in Syria as in eastern Ukraine he is having to be more cautious recognising, as the United States has had to recognise,
that military strength does not, by itself, resolve complex political, social and diplomatic problems.

What should be Britain’s and the West’s policy towards Russia? I have no hesitation in saying that there needs to be a serious effort to restore a working relationship with Moscow.

That is in part because we still have major common interests. Islamic terrorism is as much a threat to Russia as to the rest of Europe, given Russia’s large Muslim population and political instability in Chechnya and neighbouring territories.

We worked well with the Russians in bringing Iran to the negotiating table and achieving a breakthrough on its nuclear programme. Likewise, Russia was instrumental in working with the Americans and ensuring the removal from Syria of virtually all of its massive stock of chemical weapons.

Most importantly, Russia and the United States, between them have 95% of the world’s 15,000 remaining nuclear warheads. We need to see the resumption of the close co-operation that existed when Gorbachev and Yeltsin were in power when we saw whole categories of unnecessary nuclear weapons being reduced and, in some cases, abolished.

There needs to be now a resumption of close and continuing dialogue between Putin and the leaders of the United States and Europe on the whole range of issues that currently divide them.

I am not naive. I would not expect such a dialogue to lead to an early breakthrough or a resumption of close co-operation with the Kremlin of a kind we saw in the early years after the end of the Cold War.

However, dialogue at the highest levels of government can do nothing but good. I was present when Margaret Thatcher met Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time at Chequers in the 1980s.

After several meetings the Iron Lady and the world’s leading Communist still agreed on very little. But, gradually, two things happened. They began to understand each other and where each was coming from. And, even more importantly, they began to trust each other.

Trust is crucial in international relations. Without it everything is poisoned as it is at present with Putin. With trust world leaders begin to look for solutions and not for problems. When Margaret Thatcher, of all people, concluded that Gorbachev was a man we could do business with, President Reagan sat up and listened. The three of them then started a process which changed the history of our times.
WHAT NEXT FOR IRAN AFTER THE NUCLEAR DEAL?

Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick

Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990–93 and Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Margaret Thatcher. He was a member of the House of Commons for 25 years. He was also a Minister in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector, several with Middle East involvement. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, President of the Economic Research Council and a former Chairman of Le Cercle (a foreign affairs think tank). He was made a Life Peer in July 1998. He is an Honorary Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge. Lord Lamont has been a member of GSF’s Advisory Board since 2006.

The flights from Frankfurt to Tehran are packed every day. Soon British Airways too, will start flights six days a week from London. This is a measure of the expectations at the opening up of Iran after the nuclear deal. Not for nothing, Iran has been described as the last great emerging market.

The nuclear agreement was rightly hailed as a massive diplomatic achievement by John Kerry and Cathy Ashton. No one believes the agreement will solve all political problems about Iran. But even if nothing else happens, the deal is worth having on its own terms. It makes the world a safer place and lessens the risks of proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Authority has confirmed that Iran complied with all the requirements of the agreement. What was remarkable was the speed at which Iran met all the conditions indicating clearly that it is committed to more interaction with the rest of the world.

Recent Parliamentary elections in Iran were hailed as a great victory for moderates and reformists. Expectations of an early great liberalisation may be exaggerated, but what is clear is that a broad coalition of different forces in Iranian politics have decided to back an economic opening to the rest of the world.

And yet, the nuclear agreement in some quarters of the world remains controversial. It is the subject of much debate in the US Presidential primaries and it is still the subject of complaint by Israel and Saudi Arabia.

In Iran too, controversy over the deal has not entirely disappeared. This was to some extent nullified by the parliamentary elections. However, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, continues to express doubts about the motives of the West and he still demands support for 'the resistance economy' (the self-sufficient economy).

From an Iranian viewpoint, there is a real danger that the benefits of the deal may be agonisingly slow to appear and that this will lead to disillusionment by the Iranian public, keen for economic improvement.
One problem is that while the nuclear deal lifted most EU and UN sanctions, the United States has maintained most of its sanctions, particularly those relating to the financial sector. As a result, EU banks, many of which suffered massive fines in recent years from US regulators are today, reluctant to finance trade with Iran for fear of, once again, falling foul of the same regulators.

Without finance it will be very difficult to see much increase in trade with Iran. Newspapers report orders for 118 Airbus aircraft, worth billions of dollars, but if Airbus cannot find a bank to process the down payments for the aircraft, will the order ever happen? In London, the Iranian banks cannot find any Western banks to act as correspondent banks. The Iranian Embassy in London is unable to find a bank through which it can pay its Council Tax or gas bill. All this may sound rather trivial, but unless it is sorted out by some understanding between US regulators and EU governments, it is difficult to see a great upward leap in Western Iranian trade.

This is why the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei has several times warned of the danger that the West, having persuaded Iran to abandon its nuclear programme, will not keep its part of the agreement and will persist with sanctions. Ayatollah Khamenei does have a point. If it appears that the West is maintaining sanctions despite having undertaken to lift them then it is difficult to overstate the potential bitterness. President Rouhani will be utterly discredited and the political ramifications could be extremely unpredictable. The situation would come to be seen as another chapter in the long history of 'treachery by the West', rivalling the coup against Mousaddegh.

It has to be hoped this situation does not develop. The opening up of Iran economically could be of huge benefit, not just to the people of Iran but also to the Gulf region and the world economy. Iran is the second largest economy in the MENA region, with a population of eighty million people. Sixty per cent of its population is below the age of thirty and like young people everywhere, are keen followers of the latest international brands. Iran has a more diversified economy than other oil producers such as the motor car industry which used to produce over seven hundred thousand cars a year and could be an exporter to the region. The potential of Iran is illustrated by the fact that, while it has the second largest gas reserves in the world, it accounts for only one per cent of international trade in gas. Eventually, it could supply gas to India, Pakistan, even Europe.

Despite all this, Iran’s neighbours remain highly nervous about the prospect of Iran reconnecting with the international community. The relationship with Israel will not improve in the foreseeable future and is a major obstacle to improvement in relations with the US. Unfortunately, it suits Iran in its appeal to ‘the Arab street’ to position itself as the most implacable of Israel’s enemies. Nonetheless, with a continuation of a government similar to the present Rouhani/Zarif one, a political settlement of the Israeli/Palestine dispute would not necessarily be opposed by Iran. Former President Khatami, when asked what would be his reaction to a 'two state solution' replied that if it was accepted by the Palestinians, how could he be ‘more Catholic than the Pope’?

Part of the Saudi and other Gulf States’ fears appear to be based on the prospect of the US pivoting to Asia, deserting the Gulf or that Iran will replace Saudi Arabia as the main ally of the West in the region. These fears are surely somewhat exaggerated. It is one thing for Iran to have better relations with the West but that does not mean that Iran is about to become the main ally of the West. There are certain interests in common like fighting ISIS. But for many in Iran, the Revolution is still defined by hostility to the US and that will only change slowly over the longer term. But none of this surely means it is not sensible to co-operate and develop better relations.
There is talk about Iran’s ‘expansionist ambitions’ and the growth of the so-called ‘Shia Crescent’. It is certainly the case that the balance between Shia and Sunni regimes has changed somewhat in recent years. This was not so much the result of any action by Iran as the toppling of Saddam Hussein by the US and his replacement by a Shia government. It is hardly surprising that Iran has sought influence in Iraq, once Saddam Hussein had gone. This is after all, the country which unprovoked, invaded Iran. Iran feels threatened by the presence in Iraq of ISIS which declared its intention of attacking Iran and marching to Mashhad to destroy ‘idolatrous monuments’.

It is impossible to understand Iran today without remembering the Iran-Iraq war. We in Britain remember the Second World War which ended 71 years ago. The Iraq War only ended 28 years ago and caused the death of at least 250,000 people, the same number that the UK lost in the Second World War.

Iran remains a relatively weak country militarily. It spends considerably less on defence than Saudi Arabia or Abu Dhabi which have been flooded with Western defence equipment. Iran’s air force is particularly weak and, according to General Petraeus, could be wiped out by the UAE in a morning. Is it so surprising that Iran seeks to maintain its influence in the region via proxies and with the Shia minorities in its neighbours. Its leverage with these minorities is much increased by the harsh discrimination the Shia experience. Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defence, when visiting Bahrain at a time of the Shia uprising, is reported as having told the King of Bahrain to stop blaming Iran for unrest and take measure to improve the lot of the Shia.

Iran also fears the Saudi funding of Wahhabi madrasas in the region - a funding that it cannot match.

The worsening of relations across the Gulf and the Saudi-Iran confrontation is a new worrying development. An Iranian diplomat described it to me in terms of Islamic attitudes to marriage. He said, ‘In Saudi Arabia you can have as many wives as you like. In Iran, in theory, you can have as many wives as you want but you have to have permission of the first wife to have a second wife and so very few people have more than one wife. In this instance, however, the Saudis are adopting towards international relations the Iranian attitude to marriage’. In other words, according to him, the Saudis believe that they should be the only allies of the United States.

Somehow the Saudis have to be persuaded that better relations between the West and Tehran, does not have to be and is not intended to be, at the expense of our traditional allies. Britain tends to see the Gulf through the eyes of the traditional monarchies and has a particular responsibility to explain this.

It should be pointed out that whatever the situation across the Gulf, Iran has perfectly normal relationships to the north, with other countries in the region like Pakistan, Armenia, Afghanistan, India, Azerbaijan and all the ‘stans’, including Kazakhstan. It is not inevitable that there should be bad relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. During the presidency of Rafsanjani, relations were much better. Both President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif have indicated they wish to see better relations.

From a Western point of view there have been many objectionable features of Iranian foreign policy in the past and our interests have clashed. But Iran is a country that has a capacity to
change. There does appear to be a struggle going on within the regime between those who favour better relations with the West and those who feel that the Revolution still has be consolidated and protected. The West, surely, should do all it can to see that President Rouhani succeeds in his domestic reforms. But good words are not enough and sincerity is subject to proof. Iran’s conduct in the region should be monitored. But the nuclear deal and all the consequences that could flow from it, remain the best possibility of opening up Iran and ushering in a new chapter.
THE ARAB REVOLT A HUNDRED YEARS AFTER

His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal

HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan’s Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. Prince Hassan’s international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. He has long had an active engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute. Prince Hassan joined GSF’s Advisory Board in 2007.

“We have indeed reached the fork in the road. I cannot believe we will take the minimalist route; that we will turn our backs on our history, our moral responsibilities, our duty to defend this realm and its people, and our historic destiny”. ¹

In the history of any nation there are always forks in the road, defining moments, which alter the trajectory followed. Today as we pay tribute to the remarkable contribution Global Strategy Forum has made to innovative thinking over the last ten years, I would like to reflect on a ‘fork in the road’ that dates back 100 years this June and that changed the history of my region forever, but the story did not begin in 1916, nor has it ended in 2016.

For better or for worse our story is also intimately connected with the history of this country and as with any story, perspective is all. From where I stand, the story is not one of skullduggery, treachery, treason, nor yet even of tragedy, but the start of something new whose memory has inspired succeeding generations.

It is clear that in 1916 my great grandfather, Sharif Hussein, and his contemporaries had a sense that the spirit of the age was changing. When he, together with my grandfather, Sharif Abdullah, left Mecca after one thousand years of Hashemite presence in the moral capital of Islam, they left for the sake of a dream of uniting the Arabs into a pluralist entity with an Arab identity; a United Arabia, encompassing the Jews, Muslims, Christians and others of Arab culture who had always dwelt in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula. It was an ambition which in the end was thwarted.

In His Memorandum to the Peace Conference (1st January 1919), Emir Faisal writes inclusively:

‘In our opinion, if our independence be conceded and our local competence established, the natural influences of race, language, and interest will soon draw us together into one people;

¹ ‘The Fork in the Road - Sorting Out the UK’s Defence Policy Debacle’ by Michael Ancram MP, GSF’s Founder Chairman, inaugural lecture on Tuesday 9th May 2006.
but for this the Great Powers will have to ensure us open frontiers, common railways and telegraphs, and uniform systems of education. To achieve this they must lay aside the thought of individual profits, and of their old jealousies. In a word, we ask you not to force your whole civilization upon us, but to help us to pick out what serves us from your experience. In return we can offer you little but gratitude.²

I would have added: ‘and stability’.

Emir Faisal saw the Hashemites as transcending petty divisions and responding to Arab aspirations for a pluralist Arab world:

‘My father has a privileged place among Arabs as the head of their greatest family and as Sharif of Mecca. He is convinced of the ultimate triumph of the ideal of unity, if no attempt is now to thwart it or to hinder it by dividing the area as spoils of war among the Great powers.’³

In 1910 an insightful British Resident Ambassador in Baghdad, Mr Lorimer, wrote in his Political Diary: ‘Iraq is not an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, but a foreign dependency’. The same could have been said about Yemen, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and most of the Arabian Peninsula itself. The so-called Ottoman Empire, even when truncated from most of its European branches, was a Commonwealth of peoples and lands. Sovereignty remained in Istanbul, but was exercised in the name of the Padishah and Caliph by the local governors.

This duality of polity was embodied in two Arabic words - the Watan and the Umma: the Watan is a shared space, the Umma, a shared community, of belief, language or however it defines itself. The Watan belongs to all who live on it, but not all these belong to the same Umma.

Some twelve years later (1922), Arnold Toynbee published ‘The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: a Study in the Contact of Civilizations’. At that time, Toynbee and other scholars framed their studies in terms of ‘contact’, rather than the currently fashionable and unfortunate idiom of ‘clash’ of civilisations.

Toynbee’s book implicitly reflected an understanding of the then prevailing tragic relationship of unequal strength between Great Powers and weaker national movements, as well as of conflicts between powers fought through proxy wars. He argued that the unraveling of ancient societies and systems of government, and the rise of nationalism, were forcing societies to define their identities in new and narrower terms. These precluded partnership with other groups, implied rigid standards of inclusion and exclusion, of superiority and inferiority and gave rise ultimately to many of the racist and extremist movements, and polarisations that plague us today.

The Ottoman polity did not fit this emerging definition of the Nation state. Additionally, the power and prestige of the Empire had been weakened by the loss of its Balkan and Libyan territories, thus strengthening the movement known as the Young Turks towards Turkification and the

adoption of a Nation state, to the considerable alarm of its non-Turkish peoples.

Its demise left a vacuum which the major powers seized on as giving them carte blanche to manipulate the peoples of the region as pawns in their power games as they took their proxy wars ever further afield, laying the seeds for the Balkanisation of Eurasia of today.

This was anything but a concerted attempt to divide and control our fledgling nations, rather it was an expression of the inbuilt contradictions within the European powers approaches, whose legacy is in part the cause of present troubles.

As T.E. Lawrence and Louis Massignon marched into Jerusalem with General Allenby, another towering Arabist, the German diplomat Max von Oppenheim, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s man in the Middle East, had noted:

‘The demographic strength of the Islamic lands will one day have a great significance for European states. We must not forget that everything taking place in a Mohammedan country sends waves across the entire world of Islam.’

Waves he intended to use.

Thus, in 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm II had vowed to ‘inflame the whole Mohammedan world against the British’, in the belief that a well-orchestrated propaganda campaign could stir up a mass Muslim uprising against Britain and France from within colonial territories such as India, Indo-China and north and west Africa.

The same Wilhelm also established a strong rapport with the Zionists to whose cause he had been converted during a visit to Istanbul (1889) where he met Theodor Herzl.

For their part, between November 1915 and March 1916, the British, French and Russians agreed to divide the Middle East into respective zones of interest.

Britain would later make other conflicting agreements with the leaders of the Arab Revolt, in particular the Sharif of Mecca.

The Sharif however, would not learn of the agreement known as ‘Sykes-Picot-Sazonov’ until the Bolsheviks exposed the agreement, after the Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 which shut down the Czar’s imperial aspirations.

That same year Picot and Sykes visited the Hijaz, to assure Sharif Hussein bin Ali that France and Britain would recognise and protect an independent Arab State, or a confederation of Arab States, under an Arab leader.

Sykes-Picot-Sazonov, the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the 1920 San Remo agreement, which allowed the western powers to determine State boundaries within the mandated territories, were

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4 Max von Oppenheim, consular dispatch Cairo to Berlin, 1906
5 2nd August 1914 secret treaty with the Ottoman Empire, already since 1908 effectively defunct, against the British.
in every way a ‘victor’s peace’. That said, the tragic conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis, could and should have been ended years ago. As has been said before, it doesn’t really belong in the 21st century which faces its own challenges.

There was a brief revival of hope with Obama (September 2010), but talks ended in acrimony. Nonetheless, perhaps it is time to revive the idea of an International Protectorate\textsuperscript{6} that called for a three to five year international protectorate or trusteeship over the West Bank and Gaza Strip pending full Palestinian independence, rather than seek further ersatz negotiations.

But to return to the Arab Awakening. Sir Halford Mackinder, who was more of a geopolitical figure than he was a geologist, said around the turn of the century:

‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.’\textsuperscript{7}

He had no inkling, on record, that the arid zone contained in his ‘Heartland’ held beneath it much of the world’s oil; however he was sure it would be geopolitically the key to world power. At one point, turning oil and energy into a rallying theme for peace, along the lines of Monnet and Schuman’s Community of coal and steel, might have been possible, but it was not to be.

The subtle and not-so-subtle battles, battles that continue to this day, between the great powers to control the ‘World-Island’, which controls the ‘Heartland’ and with it, over half of the world’s resources, were embedded in Mackinder’s work, and explain the significance of the Gulf.

The Ottoman state had no chance of defeating the industrialised superpowers of whichever persuasion. Thus, they failed to prevent the Europeans from occupying the Arabian Gulf, Aden, Tripoli, and Egypt, and as a result, the Empire lost its raison d’être.

It was within this context that the Al-Qibla newspaper\textsuperscript{8} amongst others was founded as the mouthpiece of the Arab Renaissance and that many of the leading literary, intellectual, academic and journalistic figures who were supporters of Sharif Hussein’s Arab revolt, flocked to Mecca. As Arab citizens of the Empire, they were actively resistant to ‘Turkification’ and fought against the suppression of the Arabic language, heritage and identity. Whilst as natives of the former component parts of the Ottoman state, seeking national recognition, their writings and poems, were an expression of the desire to communicate in Arabic and stirred a new consciousness among the youth of Hijaz.

And I appeal to our younger generations everywhere to make their contribution, building on the wisdom of their forebears. We need no rehashes of the same - there is little point in fighting one despotism for another - rather we need new talents with new ideas, a new creative Arab presence.

In 1925, nationalist uprisings were firmly quelled by the French mandatory power in Syria whose merchants fled to the safety offered by the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan, a key figure in the Arab

\textsuperscript{6} MEPIF and ORG, Jan 2003.
\textsuperscript{7} Sir Halford Mackinder 1919.
\textsuperscript{8} All issues of Al-Qibla newspaper are to be published this year in eight volumes in Amman.
Revolt and its unifying message. This was a now forgotten, not by them or by us, but by the rest of the world, first wave of Syrian refugees. Those merchants were welcomed and swiftly integrated into Jordan ninety years ago. Many of their descendants remain today.

In 2015 Europe watched aghast as refugees from Syria walked across their frontiers.

The strategic assessment of our region has changed little. Realpolitik dominates. Power and pipelines, not people, remain the key determinant of which the current Balkanisation of our region is in part an unforeseen consequence.

Today, as we confront the challenges that face our broader region, I believe it is vital to revive that nascent Arab Renaissance movement, quashed for almost a century, its sentiments forced to simmer under the surface of the Arab psyche and to boil over only intermittently in the interim. A reassertion of regional thinking and an appreciation of our interconnectedness is vital whether in terms of water and energy, trade, or refugees.

To give a concrete example, just minutes from our Za’atari camp, sheltering thousands:

‘...is an empty industrial zone, fully equipped with infrastructure. This could be a perfect haven of employment; the means by which Europe could incubate Syrian post-conflict recovery...the zone could house [displaced] Syrian businesses, as well as a cluster of global companies producing for the European market.’

Jordanians and Syrians could work together in gainful employment. This would in no way impede the right of return, but would enable people to return with a sense of self-worth and dignity and possibly new skills.

New thinking is badly needed to deal with the multiple crises facing the WANA region and now spilling over into Europe.

The pluralism, the politics and the ethics of the Arab Revolt and their contribution to Arab Renaissance are becoming increasingly important for a better understanding of the ‘present’; the sad ‘present’ in Iraq, Syria and the entire region. The point is not to yearn for redemption, but to ask whether together we can all seek a new kind of freedom as embodied in the unifying vision of the Arab Renaissance.

Like Adonis, I’m radically against violence – with Gandhi, not Guevara, and believe in gradual, incremental steps. Evolution, not revolution. Hence the difference between policy and politics. To really change anything we have to transcend the noise of politics. That may be controversial, but is essential.

We desperately need a pluralist, inclusive counter-narrative, yet analysts unfortunately continue to understand, or misunderstand, the present in terms of a Sunni-Shia divide.

The Arab Revolt was in essence a call for new thinking to manage post-Ottoman realities. It took on board the rights of ethnic and religious component communities, as well as of individuals. Its spirit was captured in the poetry of Constantine Petrou Cavafy. He writes of a Syrian in the

9 Sir Paul Collier, Spectator, 8 August 2015.
period of the Arab Revolt (Syrian as of the Levant, of Bilad al Sham) yearning to participate in the Renaissance of his country.

Across the region, a multitude of voices echo the agonies of that Syrian, yearning for that lost convivial world of pluralism and multiple identities. Their call can be positively answered on the basis of our traditions and cultural heritage.

The West recently commemorated the anniversary of what became the most destructive war human history had hitherto seen, for which many Levant and Mashraq Arabs, the only non-Commonwealth peoples to have fought alongside Britain and France in two World Wars, also gave their lives.

We in West Asia–North Africa equally should honour the hundredth anniversary of the Arab Renaissance by attempting to rekindle its original principles of cohesion, dignity, and unity. A way has to be found to reassert moral authority, to encourage public service for men and women and to develop policies that build on the strengths of existing institutions and traditions, such as Zakat and Waqf.

In conclusion, one could say that al Nahda, the Awakening or Renaissance, was a forerunner of the ‘Arab Spring’, which began not in 2011, but as mentioned before, much earlier – at the end of the 19th century and is not over yet. The Revolt provided leadership and a clear objective. It stood above factional fragmentation, and helped cement group loyalties beyond their divisions.

While the Arab Spring may have descended into chaos, we should not lose hope.

The Arab Renaissance to which Abdel Rahman Kawakibi and others gave expression coalesced with the enduring Hashemite vision of modernisation. This in no way implies rejection of the past or exclusion of the other, rather it derives its inspiration from our heritage giving modernity and modernisation an authentic identity from the region.

My great grandfather’s contemporaries, men and women, would have found something familiar in the calls for self-determination and empowerment, for bread and dignity, that our young people across the region and in the diaspora have been raising, and inspiration in their positive pragmatism.

Sharif Hussein never lost sight of his vision for the future of the Arab World. And now, a century on, I know that many people share a similar dream for our future. I think of the Arab renaissance of the 19th and 20th centuries as an ongoing process of continuity, innovation and change, through which Arabs aspired to go beyond the history of conflict and disillusionment to a future of aspirations and potential.

Today the peoples of the region, individually and collectively, need to review our future. We need to renew the thoughtful Arab discourse of the Renaissance, confronting the monopoly of the truth and the intellectual terrorism that it spawns with an inclusive cultural vision.

‘The challenges facing the Arab world and the Islamic world require not only reaction but also action; and the action in the present world is first and last the action of the mind.’

10 Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri, Arab Scholar.
TACKLING THE VIRUS OF ISLAMIST JIHADISM

Rt Hon Jack Straw

Rt Hon Jack Straw was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice. He has served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. His autobiography, ‘Last Man Standing: Memoirs of A Political Survivor’ was published in September 2012. He retired as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election. He continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. He is co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum; takes a close interest in Iran; is a member of the Independent Commission on the Freedom of Information Act; and Chairman of the Blackburn Youth Zone. He joined GSF’s Advisory Board in 2010.

Among the most pressing challenges of foreign policy today is how to tackle the causes of Islamist jihadism, to rid the world of this virus of the mind.

It’s first necessary to show a little self-awareness about this question.

Today, this virus, which causes fanatical, psychopathic behaviour, and tragedy and suffering to millions, is based upon a perverted interpretation of one specific school of thought in Sunni Islam – Wahhabism.

In past times, however, we have seen such behaviours carried out in the name of the dominant European religion, Christianity, and in the name of a secular ‘faith’, Nazism.

In the seventeenth century Europe was riven by religious wars between Catholic and Protestants - the ‘Thirty Years War’ of 1618-1648. Though the focus of the conflict was the German states, the conflict embroiled the entire continent. Whole areas were ravaged, with the most appalling, gratuitous atrocities carried out in the name of God. By the end of hostilities, it is estimated that German states had, on average, lost between 25-40% of their population, some individual states much more. The Czech lands lost at least one third of their people.

This conflict overlapped with the English Civil War of 1642-1651, in which religious zeal and intolerance added to the bitterness of the underlying conflict about how England should be governed.

The resolution of both conflicts – the 1648 Peace of Westphalia for the Thirty Years War, the 1688 ‘Glorious Revolution’, and the ‘Protestant Ascendancy’ in England – continues to influence the nature of European societies and government today.
The record of Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s is a further reminder to us that even the most apparently civilised and cultured of societies can plumb the depths of depravity and beyond if the conditions for this are right.

More people were killed across Europe in the name of a completely perverted ideology of racial supremacy than ever before, or since, in the history of human kind. In parts of Germany, and elsewhere in the Axis territories, some clerics were unbelievably courageous in standing up to the scourge of this virus. Too many others walked by on the other side.

Though at a terrible price, European-based societies have managed to come through these periods of terror. There is a wide understanding about how religious practice and devotion should best fit in with modern ideas of democracy, scientific progress, human rights and individual freedoms.

Instead, the wellspring of terror has moved to the Middle East. There is now a profound intellectual and theological struggle within the different branches of Islam to reconcile the original tenets of their beliefs, as found in the Quran and the Hadith (statements attributed to the Prophet, but not found in the Quran), to reconcile some aspects of their beliefs with the realities of life in the 21st century.

There are many explanations for this.

One is that Islam is a 'younger' religion than Christianity, or Judaism, founded as it was seven centuries after Christ.

A second is that as, in the belief of all Muslims, the Quran contains the revelations of God as directly revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, and recorded contemporaneously, there can be much less room for dispute about the teachings of Islam than there is for Christianity, given that all books of the New Testament were written some decades after Christ's death.

A third is that Islam has not gone through a 'reformation', that period of intense argument about the nature of God, and the sources of authority of the Church which from Luther and Calvin onwards led to major splits in the western Christian church, and to the development of Protestantism. In turn it is argued by some leading historians that capitalism and the Age of Enlightenment were closely linked to the intellectual 'space' created by this dilution of authoritarianism in thought. If Galileo's successors as scientists had continued to be persecuted as he was, the wonderful explosion in science, technology and philosophy which we call the Enlightenment could never have taken place.

Despite the absence of a 'reformation' in Islam, many societies and nations where Islam is the dominant religion have in practice managed to combine modernity with its beliefs. Turkey, Malaysia, and Iran are three of many which come to mind; so do the huge Muslim communities of India (where, for avoidance of doubt, Deobandism – the dominant school of thought there - is not Wahhabism).

But the more puritanical the school of thought that is followed by a society, the more obvious is the daily struggle to reconcile the aspirations and daily needs of that people with the prevailing theological dogma. The most acute example of this is Wahhabism.
There is nothing unusual in the history of religions about the attraction of the beliefs of Muhammad ibn Abel al-Wahhab (?1703-1792), the 18th century preacher who gave his name to this school of thought. His teaching – that true followers should eschew idolatry and the worship of shrines and saints – has many parallels in the developments of Christian theology too. There are sects in Christianity and Judaism which are exclusive, and consider those outside the sect to be non-believers, in some cases ‘unclean’. But they are not remotely, today, in the mainstream of these religions.

It’s at this point that I venture into dangerous territory. For Wahhabism is not a minor sect, but the dominant school of thought in Saudi Arabia.

The overwhelming majority of Saudis, like those elsewhere in the benighted Middle East, and across the globe, want for nothing more than to live in peace and get on with their lives. But there is also the uncomfortable, but incontrovertible fact, that the minds of those involved in the most awful terrorist organisations today – from al-Qaeda through to Daesh – have been informed by a perverted, distorted form of Wahhabism.

Whenever I have in the recent past made this point in discussion, I have faced what I’d describe as the ‘forked-tongue syndrome’. I’m criticised in public for apparently attacking Saudi Arabia (I’m not), but then the same people (often Saudis themselves) will come up to me privately and explain that in truth they agree with what I am saying.

The problem, however, will not go away just because people are not willing to confront it publicly. Indeed, in the history of extremist sects, we can see that one reason for their apparent success is their ability to intimidate others by claiming that they are staking out the path of ‘true believers’ and that those who move away from this path – by, for example, conceding rights to the Takfiri (the unbeliever) – are lesser adherents to the faith.

There is here a particular difficulty in the nature of Sunni’ism, which is that it does not have the same authority structure as for example is found in most branches of Christianity (the Roman, and Orthodox Churches, the Anglican Communion), or for example in Shi’ism. So it is easier for extremist charismatic leaders to assert that they are the holders of the true faith.

The immediate method for dealing with Daesh and associated Islamist terrorism has to be that of force – by military and police action. The Saudis are as aware of that as any, and have in the last decade devoted significant resources to tackling terrorism within their own soil.

But there remains, in my view, the need for a much more self-confident and assertive, intellectual and theological assault upon those who distort even the already puritanical message of the Wahhabs to justify their atrocities in the name of God.

I won’t be thanked for saying so, but I think I’m correct. And it will be the people of the Middle East – overwhelmingly Muslim – who will continue to be the greatest victims of this apostasy, this perversion of Islam, in the meantime.

Whilst thinking of victims, there is here a wider challenge. How better to understand the social and economic context in which terrorists breed. It would be easy to say it’s poverty which leads to terrorism; easy, but not accurate. (Osama Bin Laden came from a rich Saudi family).
None of the terrorist suspects arrested in Europe has been particularly poor; those for example responsible for the '7/7' outrages in the UK on 7th July 2005 were British born and reasonably well-educated. What is, however, the case is that these people – and those from whom they gain support, in the Middle East as well as Europe – have a strong sense of alienation from the prevailing mores of their societies, and of victimhood.

Nazism took hold in Germany in the mid-twenties and early thirties not out of the blue. It was the direct descendant of the pre-First World War Panhellenic League which preached the expulsion of Slavs, Poles and Jews from Germanic lands. Nazism then found fertile ground because of the way that ordinary Germans had genuinely become victim to the oppressive ‘peace’ terms imposed by the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.

Thankfully, the same mistake was not made after the Second War. Then, because of the imagination of the Allies, especially the United States, successful efforts were made to rebuild the German economy, and to re-craft German thought so as to eliminate the virus of extremism which had so infected it.

So that’s the challenge, albeit in a different theatre, for us today. And as in Germany after the last war, it is those within the Middle East, within the umma, who have to take the lead, and to recognise even more strongly that this is above all an infection of the mind which they have to cure.
At the end of the Second World War the Royal Navy had over 1,500 major combatants including 54 aircraft carriers. In the final analysis, it was the Navy (Royal and Merchant) that, as had been the case for centuries, was crucial to our national survival. Now, however, Britain was broke and a new world order was unfolding. By 1946, over 840 major warships had been scrapped and a further 727 (in various stages of construction) were cancelled.

Our few remaining ships were kept busy in the post-war years as the Navy became involved in withdrawal from empire and from the traditional roles of trade protection and security east of Suez.

The carriers provided all of the UK’s tactical air power in the Korean War and the majority of it during the Suez campaign. In the recapture of the Falkland Islands, the carriers again formed the core of the force.

So where are we today? What sort and scale of Navy do we require?

First, let us not forget that the UK remains a global power with 14 dependencies worldwide. It is the largest trading nation as a percentage of GDP in the world and, at present, the fifth richest. It is the largest European investor in South Asia and the Pacific Region and a Permanent Member of the Security Council. It has nuclear weapons.
We run world shipping from London and over 95% of UK imports by volume are carried by sea, as are 75% of exports. 35% of our energy requirement comes by sea; half the food we eat is imported. The maritime sector employs about 650,000 and contributes some £35bn to UK GDP. We have 10,500 miles of coastline and 600 ports (not counting the dependencies) and 5.5 million UK citizens live overseas.

And how big is today’s fleet to protect all these interests? It consists of 19 escorts (6 destroyers and 13 frigates), 10 nuclear submarines (4 ballistic and 6 fleet). We have one helicopter carrier, 2 landing platform docks, 15 mine counter measures vessels and 22 patrol craft plus miscellaneous boats and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary support fleet.

This is definitely not enough.

Our wealth, more than many other nations, depends on the maritime and on a stable world.

And what sort of world are we in?

We are entering a hyper-competitive age in which illiberal power is growing and liberal power declining. It is also a hybrid age in which co-operation and competition between states take place simultaneously; a world made dangerous by Europe’s retreat from power and its wilful refusal to invest in power.

There are real dangers of an even more chaotic and highly dangerous world developing over the next decades, not least within the context of possibly irreversible climate change and ever increasing competition for resources of all kinds among a rapidly expanding world population. The dramatic rise in numbers of migrants either fleeing war and persecution or economic hardship are a stark reflection of this. Important too are the implications of the changing geostrategic situation of new powers, notably China, India and, increasingly, countries like Iran, Brazil, South Africa.

Add in many other transnational issues: changing demographic patterns, imbalances in wealth, disease, the aggressive international wave of terrorism (starkly illustrated by the growth of Daesh), WMD, drugs and organised criminal activity. These affect both the international system and our national security and interests. With them comes the potential for big shocks in an increasingly interconnected world to overturn or radically modify existing assumptions about partners, vital interests and safeguards.

The Arab Spring was a manifestation of this unpredictability. As we have seen over the past fifteen years or so, even well-established alliances and partnerships have looked decidedly discretionary when pressure has come from either internal or external sources.

We cannot be sure how much longer the US will be willing, or able, to bear the burdens of being the protector of last resort for the ‘free world’ and, remain the ultimate guarantor of a rules-based international system. Nor can we assume that the idea of a multilateral, rules-based world for diplomacy and economics will necessarily survive the population and resource pressures of the early decades of the 21st century.

In terms of strategic hardware, it seems reasonable to assume that yet more countries will
continue to seek nuclear technology, both as a source of energy and for political/military purposes. It is also feasible that smaller weaponised devices may make their reappearance, especially among those nations aspiring to possess nuclear options.

Our record as human beings in circumstances of intense competition has not been good and I believe that it would be imprudent to be lulled into a false sense of security. Indeed the transition from a US-dominated world to a more multilateral world could be distinctly uneven and contain some unpleasant surprises. Keeping our armour bright, particularly those elements which provide assurance of our ultimate survival, may prevent, contain or mitigate the consequences of a uniquely threatening combination of global and strategic risks.

These relate particularly to the unquantifiable, unforeseen shocks, which so many people are unwilling to acknowledge, to the imbalance of population and resources and the actions of opportunistic, possibly desperate, regimes. Who can predict whether in the next fifty years there may be nations prepared to use nuclear weapons? What is certain is that their use is unlikely, if that use means self-destruction. It would be foolhardy for any British government of whatever hue to make us vulnerable to possible threats by giving up the power to retaliate.

To put it simply, I view these considerations and conclusions as compelling reasons why the UK must not elect to forego its independent nuclear deterrent or cut its defence forces any further.

Opponents to our possession of a deterrent ask why, in that case, do countries such as Germany, Canada, Australia and Japan not need the deterrent? The fact they lack one has no bearing on our decision. The reasons are historical and the cost of starting from scratch; they depend on alliances and satisfaction with the nuclear umbrella of others. Suffice it to say that all Permanent Members of the Security Council possess nuclear weapons as do a number of other countries.

The UK has led the world in reducing numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but I cannot say that our significant contribution to disarmament has had any discernable impact, particularly on those states we would hope to discourage from owning or expanding their arsenal of nuclear weapons. We should make no further reductions until we see a large shift in this direction by others whilst encouraging the US to lead in this area of negotiation.

Maintaining the present Trident ballistic missile system, which necessitates the replacement of the Vanguard class submarines, is the best option assuming the UK is to remain a nuclear weapon state.

Having looked at other options in detail, it is quite clear that none is as cheap or practical as their supporters claim (certainly not cruise missiles). The very invulnerability of the submarine from detection now and in the future and the assuredness of warhead delivery make it the ultimate post strike system. None of our deterrent submarines has ever been counter-detected notwithstanding claims that they are vulnerable by unqualified people with no knowledge of the oceans or anti submarine warfare.

Part of that certainty is that an undetectable Vanguard class submarine is on patrol 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, every week of every year. Although the missiles are currently un-targeted and at a low degree of readiness for firing, this posture can easily be changed. This may happen secretly or openly depending on the government’s reading of any situation.
Having a Vanguard successor with missiles but no warheads fitted is dangerous and nonsensical. There are real issues of training personnel but, more significantly, there is the time pressure of docking the submarine at the Explosives Handling Jetty in Loch Long to mate warheads with missiles. It would escalate tension dramatically, risk safe deployment and could result in a pre-emptive strike before the weapons are ready to fire.

I have intimate knowledge of the system, having been responsible to the Prime Minister for its readiness and effectiveness from 2002-2006. In addition, in 2009 when Security Minister, I was asked by the Prime Minister to confirm that the system was completely under UK control and that the US had no ability to intervene. I conducted a detailed and comprehensive investigation, which proved its independence.

In terms of cost: the present system, which will run on with the replacement of the Vanguard class, costs 0.2% of GDP each year, or 20 pence in every £100 the government spends, which seems reasonable for our ultimate insurance policy in a highly chaotic and unpredictable world. The cries from a few military figures and the argument of many people that dropping the deterrent will release funds for conventional forces is delusional; they clearly fail to understand the way Whitehall works. It is highly unlikely that any great sum of money would be released to defence; indeed there would be increased expenditure to the defence budget in the early years due to decommissioning costs.

Although it is not the driving factor, replacement of the submarines will ensure 12,000 plus engineers, scientists and designers are directly employed for the next 25 years in addition to a larger number of people in ancillary occupations.

The case for maintenance of our minimum credible deterrent by replacement of the ageing Vanguard class submarines is so self-evident that I expect the Labour party to keep its manifesto commitment.

In terms of defence hardware, the only two true strategic capabilities in our defence forces are the Deterrent and the Continuous Carrier Capability, with their special SSN support. Together with our close intelligence partnership the United States considers these as crucial to the special relationship.

Carriers have immense flexibility and political utility ensuring that they are always where the action is. It is not surprising that since WWII, all but one of the 26 enemy aircraft shot down in air-to-air combat by the UK have been by carrier-based aircraft.

However, we are under huge financial pressures. The agreement to meet the NATO target of 2% of GDP spent on defence is a move in the right direction, but there is insufficient money in the defence budget to fund the planned Force 2025. We must address the 30% reduction in military capability since 2010.

Professor Colin Gray got it right when he wrote: 'Britain is a maritime medium power whose security and prosperity requires unimpeded maritime access and transit. As a maritime trading country, Britain requires good order at sea. Britain’s maritime geography, indeed insularity, mandates primary economic and strategic significance for the country’s ability to use the seas. This is not discretionary. It is not an issue open for policy choice.'
And yet in SDSR 2015 there is not one mention of the fact we are an island nation.

As an island we certainly need a broadly maritime strategy: one that has sea control at its core but which enables power and influence to be projected inland. That calls for maritime forces, the composition of which will dictate the nature and degree of power and influence we can project. An island nation can only really do expeditionary warfare. All British military behaviour abroad must be enabled by secure enough overseas access and over two-thirds of the globe is covered by water.

Within the overall budget the government can decide what percentage to allocate to defence. On numerous occasions the Prime Minister and other cabinet ministers have repeated the mantra that the defence and security of our nation and people are the highest priority for any government i.e. above welfare, health, education etc. The facts belie this.

It is of interest to note that Britain’s GDP is 46% higher than it was in 1990, when it had a fleet of three aircraft carriers, 14 destroyers, 35 frigates and 33 submarines; its population has grown by about 6.5 million even as its military has shrunk.

Decline is a choice. It is not a choice we should make and maritime reach is still crucial to our nation.
Britain and the Policy Challenges of the New International Landscape

The Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford

The Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford was Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office with special responsibility for the Commonwealth and for international energy issues from 2010-2012. He was Chairman of the House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and British Overseas Influence, and is currently chairman of the Windsor Energy Group, President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, President of the Energy Industries Council and Advisor to the British Chambers of Commerce. Between 2002-2010, he was Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party in the Lords and Chief Opposition Spokesman in the House of Lords on Foreign Affairs. He was formerly Secretary of State both for Energy and for Transport in Margaret Thatcher’s Cabinet, and for ten years, Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (1987-1997). He served as a Member of Parliament for Guildford from 1966-1997, is a Privy Counsellor and was made a Peer in 1997. Lord Howell has been a journalist and banker, a consultant to several companies and funds in the UK. He is the author of a number of books, and his most recent, ‘Empires in Collision: The Green versus Black Struggle for Our Energy Future’, was published in 2016. Lord Howell re-joined GSF’s Advisory Board in 2013.

Politicians like to accuse each other of ‘losing the plot’. My view of Global Strategy Forum is that over its ten years of existence, under the leadership of Michael Lothian, it has found the plot, and not only found it but exposed it, explained it and drawn its consequences with courage and persistence.

By ‘plot’ in this context I mean three things:

One, the understanding that the nature of international relations has changed utterly and completely in recent decades, with new forces at work re-shaping the worlds of power projection, persuasion and diplomacy.

Two, the perception that this has changed the positioning, interests and priorities of Britain radically in the 21st century.

And Three, the realisation that in this new milieu the foreign, or outward-facing policy of the British nation needs to be conducted and managed with new skills and new methods, and put in a new framework

This has been a lot for the foreign policy establishment to swallow and clearly there has been some choking on parts of it.

Instances of where the old diplomacy has simply failed to digest the new forces at work are painful and plenty.
The Arab Spring stance is one vivid example. Pulling down Middle East tyrants and empowering the street was never going to mean the automatic enthronement of democracy. Military ‘solutions’ were never going to be available or be any more than a passing phase in the strategic pathway, in Iraq or Afghanistan or almost anywhere else.

Or, on another front, trying to be ‘at the heart of Europe’ was never going to suffice as an adequate foreign or security policy goal in the new network world. An Atlantic-centred 20th century view of world challenges was never going to endure with the rise of Asian power, both economic and political, and the realignment of events round the Indian and Pacific Oceans. And the old shibboleths of aid and development were never going to withstand the new ambitions of the so-called developing world.

These and other assumptions that the past would continue into the future have been the axioms, the ‘givens’ and the mantras of foreign policy in previous decades, which GSF has so successfully questioned and deconstructed over the last ten years – ahead, I would suggest, of some more sedate and groove-bound foreign policy institutions and think tanks.

If it is asked just where the roots lie of this upending of so many policy perceptions, my personal view is that we have to start with one very small but very powerful item. It is the microprocessor, with its hitherto unimaginable capacities for assembling and projecting information and creating continuous and intense connectivity across societies, regions and continents which has turned the world upside down.

It is as long ago as 1996 that Manuel Castells at Berkeley opened his magisterial work on the rise of the network age with the shattering words as follows:

‘Towards the end of the second millennium of the Christian era several events of historical significance have transformed the social landscape of human life. A technological revolution, centred round information technologies, is reshaping, at an accelerated pace, the material basis of society. Economies throughout the world have become globally interdependent, introducing a new form of relationship between economy state and society.’

It is a source of amusement, and sometimes despair, to watch how today, twenty years later, ‘experts’, policy researchers and commentators are discovering, as if for the first time, developments which Castells described with uncanny accuracy two decades ago in almost every area from personal behaviour and daily life up to the fundamentally changing nature of work, of business, of politics, of capitalism and of the entire international order.

Anarchic tendencies which he detected then, weakening authority and good governance and rapidly dispersing and fragmenting power into new and unstable hands, are a hundred times more apparent now. It was all predictable and indeed predicted.

Yet Western policy thinking (I include both sides of the Atlantic) has been deplorably slow to grasp the new realities, let alone to start adjusting attitudes and responses to them.

The implications for a mid-sized but creative and energetic nation like the United Kingdom are of course enormous and profound, both within and without. Yet there are very considerable
advantages ready to hand if a) it is understood that they exist and are relevant to the new international topography, and b) if the confidence and will to deploy them is there.

Examples are the colossal store of experience in working with, respecting and drawing from other cultures, the enduring, in fact growing, potential of the Commonwealth network of peoples, the ‘free gift’ of English as the globe’s working language, the good luck of our positioning in the world’s time zones, our resources of creativity and ingenuity which even the poorest periods of government have not suppressed, and much more.

Global Strategy Forum has played a significant part in opening the windows to this new landscape. It has helped remind us that the right strategies do not just come from endless research and assembly of data, but also from truly deep understanding, with a blending of instinct and intuition.

Confucius was once being praised for being so learned and well read. Not at all, he countered, ‘I have simply grasped one thread which links up the rest.’

Global Strategy Forum has grasped one thread too. Now we have to follow it and see more clearly where it leads us.
Michael Ancram, Lord Lothian, did us a great service when he identified the need for a Global Strategy Forum (GSF) ten years ago, so providing us with a new platform for the national conversation on foreign affairs and security policy. GSF quickly proved itself but even he must be surprised by how many urgent and protracted problems GSF has found itself analysing and illuminating over the past, troubling decade. The financial crash and the great recession; the interlocking and overlapping crises in the Middle East and North Africa from Iraq and Iran to Syria and Libya; the seemingly incurable ulcer of Israeli/Palestinian relations; the emergence of the barbarous ISIL; the re-emergence of an antagonistic Russia; the existential crises besetting the EU. The list goes on. We open our newspapers and our tablets bludgeoned by bad news, expecting the worst.

Not surprisingly Western publics are deeply worried, disorientated by economic and political problems that, because of their global scope, do not lend themselves to national solutions whatever some may pretend. The Chancellor, George Osborne, has said of the domestic sacrifices demanded by austerity that ‘we are all in this together’. The same can be said at the global level when it comes to tackling migration, climate change, terrorism and a host of other challenges.

But the crises of the past ten years, far from encouraging the idea of a common international approach, have too often prompted the opposite. We have witnessed a deepening suspicion of globalisation, and are now at risk from the resurgence of the sort of nationalism that we hoped had been tamed but which seems only to have been dormant. This is a period during which contacts on social media have exploded, ensuring that we communicate with interlocutors around the world. Yet this passion for global connectedness has paradoxically coincided with a widespread wish to stand aside from global problems. To many, virtual reality is preferable to the real thing.

Europeans and Americans have become much more reluctant to try to shape the international environment, or to make short-term sacrifices to affect long-term outcomes, persuaded in the shadow of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Libya that involvement can only lead to the risk or reality of unwanted and open-ended entanglement.

A common thread, so it seems to someone who left government service not long after GSF was founded, is the loss among the traditional Western partners of the reflexes and habits of close consultation and collective action that served us so well in the second half of the 20th century. There are still innumerable meetings at Heads of Government level and below, and in a multitude of different fora, but it is hard to detect a strong collective impulse at work, defining common policy through co-operation and compromise, agreeing action through an equitable division of labour.
This is more than a pity; more than nostalgic regret filtered through a rose-coloured lens. The lesson that the Western allies learned, and put into effect in the immediate years after the Second World War, was that it was essential to establish common financial, developmental, and security institutions to which all should contribute so that all could benefit. The UN functioned imperfectly, often paralysed by the politics of the Cold War, but those institutions that were designed to safeguard the security and promote the prosperity of the Western democracies in the face of the Soviet challenge served us extraordinarily well and pioneered a new level of cooperation between like-minded nations. The period of the Cold War was fraught and dangerous but it was also a period of common Western security and transformative economic growth, the keystone of which was US generosity and leadership.

The vigour with which governments and political leaders have championed these institutions has diminished sharply. The sense of a common vision based on common values has become hard to detect. Living memory of the Second World War is fast disappearing; and Angela Merkel is the only Western leader with direct experience and knowledge of the Cold War. This may be the reason that she has proved herself so much more convincing than her counterparts in dealing with the cynical and opportunistic Putin.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europeans comforted themselves with the idea that they had no natural enemies. Then Putin invaded Georgia, annexed Crimea, and infiltrated and destabilised Ukraine. Suddenly we were reminded that we were not immune from state-on-state aggression, suddenly analogies with the nineteen-thirties looked disconcertingly apt.

Even so, the last ten years has been a period when it has been hard to persuade NATO’s members to spend 2% of GDP on defence, despite the deteriorating security environment; a period when it has also been hard to agree a common approach to the problems afflicting Europe whether economic meltdown in Greece or the mass migration of refugees fleeing the murder and mayhem in the Middle East and North Africa. There has been too little evidence of Western leaders meeting to shape common strategies and implement common policies; too much evidence of leaders responding little and late to challenges that threaten the cohesion of Western co-operation and the effectiveness of international institutions. A damaging beggar-my-neighbour nationalism is back in vogue; populists have appeared to champion atavistic animosities; xenophobic and nativist political parties that trade on prejudice are on the rise.

To deplore this is not to deny that leaders must recognise and address the potent cocktail of problems that fuels popular domestic disaffection and the suspicion of ‘elites’. Unemployment is stubbornly high in some countries and weighs unfairly on the young; economic inequality yawns ever wider as a few super-rich have bank accounts bigger than nation states; there are legitimate fears about the effect of unregulated, or under-regulated, immigration and a corresponding loss of identity.

But in responding to these causes of public disquiet and alienation, Western leaders need to be bolder and more energetic in making the case for common action in pursuit of common solutions: hanging together not hanging separately. We need to recover the creative energy and cooperation that characterised the political visionaries in the decade after the Second World War. We need to reform and revitalise our institutions so that they are fit for purpose in what is now an unstable and threatening international environment.
My grandfather’s and father’s generations were those of the First and Second World Wars. They would certainly warn us against being casual about our security. They would warn us about being careless with institutions painstakingly built to contain the scourge of nationalism that so blighted their lives. They would urge us to promote the common good through institutions that have delivered almost three generations of peace in Europe. They would remind us that those institutions were established and sustained by constant diplomatic effort. Unless we show renewed engagement and commitment, the international system that has served and sustained us since the Second World War may come apart at the seams. The stability and security that we have built on the basis US leadership and European co-operation may crumble.

Effective re-engagement abroad needs effective leadership at home. The focus of UK diplomacy has become predominantly aid, trade (every incoming British government suffers from the illusion that it is the first to discover export promotion), and projecting our values and cultural achievements overseas. But none of this is possible unless the priority is building strong relationships and partnerships. It is these that provide the context, these that are the sine qua non, for every other diplomatic activity. This cannot be done on the cheap. It is time for us in the UK to stop talking about ‘punching above our weight’ and to abandon the conceit that, uniquely, we can somehow do more than others, and with less. We cannot. The question is rather whether we are ‘punching below our weight’. We need to give diplomacy renewed recognition and renewed priority; and we need to resource our diplomatic effort properly and make good the diplomatic deficit.

My hope is that in the next ten years the GSF will witness a recovery of Western self-confidence and sense of purpose, reinforced by a commitment to making our common institutions work for the benefit of all. I hope that for the Americans ‘pivot’ will become a noun not a verb, as the United States sustains the ungrateful role of being the key to a stable international order and rejects the seductive simplicities of neo-isolationism. Above all, I hope that we, in the UK, will increase our diplomatic effort with the aim of ensuring that we are part of a European Union of co-operating nations rather than a Europe of competing and corrosive nationalisms.
A DECADE OF CHANGING QUESTIONS: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Susan Eisenhower

Susan Eisenhower lives in Washington DC. She is Chairman and President of the Eisenhower Group, Inc. and Chairman Emeritus of the Eisenhower Institute of Gettysburg College. She joined GSF’s Advisory Board in 2014.

I once worked for a colourful man of great experience. He was a World War II veteran and a very successful businessman. Being rather elderly, I worried, at first, that he might be out of touch with contemporary affairs. But, on my first day of work it didn’t take long to figure out he could be a mentor and a friend. Behind his desk was a framed poster of a lethargic-looking chimpanzee. Under the picture and in quotes the chimp said, with evident fatigue: ‘Just when I figured out the answers to life, they changed the questions.’

These days, reading newspapers and policy briefs I am often reminded of that chimpanzee. The last ten years have been the kind of decade that should make all of us wonder if we have been asking the right questions and thinking about our challenges in new, open-minded ways.

Since 2006, many of the ‘givens’ of the post Cold War and 9/11 worlds have been discredited. In less than a decade we have seen a great recession - even though we believed we were in a period of expanding economic opportunity. There has been the rise of ISIS and increasing chaos in the Middle East, despite our conviction that we had stabilised Iraq and that ‘decapitating’ unwanted dictators was sure to bring throngs of emerging democrats to the fore. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated dangerously, even though we were convinced that Russia would swallow, willingly, a unipolar post-Cold War world that excluded them, even from their areas of vital interest. And, no one seemed to give much thought to the foundations on which the European Union rested, yet today the financial and security challenges facing the continent - including a refugee crisis in the heart of Europe - raise questions about the future of the EU’s current construct. New security threats in cyberspace and accelerating trends in climate change further complicate the security landscape.

And yet, as another great cliché goes, the more things change, the more they stay the same. Despite sensing public anger, the so-called elites are comfortable to double down on the standard assumptions of previous decades - without much thought to these significantly different circumstances and the new requirements for dealing with them. This time, however, the political atmosphere may be changing. The American electorate knows there is a paucity of new ideas and a striking absence of leadership in the face of rapidly unfolding developments and ever shrinking financial resources.

This has been evident in foreign policy. There is no long-term direction for at least two of the most pressing issues facing the United States and her allies: ISIS and Russia. The administration even admitted as much in August 2014. When asked about it, President Obama said that his ‘administration did not have a strategy yet for ISIS.’ When one finally emerged, it relied on many of the old mechanisms that have been utilised for almost two decades—namely air and drone strikes and a commitment to kill as many terrorists as possible, without much thought to the underlying causes of the problem.
No one is sure what we are trying accomplish, aside from the necessity to defeat ISIS. But that is a singular goal, not part of a strategy which places it in the context of other urgent matters. And from that perspective, there is no agreement about what should be done in the greater Middle East region. A recent letter to the editor of the Washington Post stood out. The writer asked if we should be defending borders in the Middle East that were established nearly a hundred years ago by a handful of people who drew lines on maps behind closed doors. Questions like that are rare.

Other questions are asked, but only by a persistent few. Are we trying to democratise the region? Restore stability? Pick a winner or loser in the religious war now underway? Fight a terrorism our presence seems to exacerbate? Find an honourable way to withdraw?

No one in authority has sufficiently answered these questions to the public’s satisfaction.

On Russia, an area of interest of mine for more than thirty years, I was surprised when on 25th February of this year, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Philip Breedlove declared at a Congressional hearing that Russia is an ‘existential threat’ to the United States and our allies.

‘To counter Russia, EUCOM, working with allies and partners, is deterring Russia now and preparing to fight and win if necessary.’

Fight and win? Win what? And at what cost? What is the plan for avoiding miscalculation or the potential for nuclear showdown? NATO has also asserted that ‘hybrid warfare’ - including cyberattacks and infiltration by unmarked troops - could be an Article 5 trigger. If so, it would establish new norms and bring us, perhaps, to the dangerous problem of verification and potential manipulation from all sides. It would also leave us vulnerable to those who would wish to counter our use of certain clandestine methods.

In the same Congressional hearing, Breedlove asserted that Russia and Assad are ‘deliberately weaponizing migration from Syria in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve.’ Where Russia is concerned these comments sound like the kind of talk that was once a mainstay of Cold War conspiracy theorists. Or are they meant to plus-up the budget and increase the US Defense establishment’s footprint in Europe? Breedlove’s assertions align with the Defense Department’s budget, released by Secretary Ashton Carter on 2nd February, naming Russia and China the United States’ greatest threats.

While the US’s commitment to Europe is rightly the cornerstone of whatever consensus we still have on foreign policy, Breedlove’s extravagant description of events is curious. Do we seek another Cold War? Are we willing to write off the progress made in last 25 years? Can we articulate a long-term goal aimed at positive outcomes rather than isolation and Cold War style containment? Are we doing enough to bring progress on the Ukraine issue, on Syria?

Breedlove and Carter have one approach. But ask ten people in Washington what our goal has been and should be for Russia and you will get ten different answers.

At the same time, our inability to connect the dots and look at national security in a more holistic way has come with enormous costs for my country.
From 1999-2011 the United States’ annual expenditures on defense rose from $360 billion to $537 billion in constant dollars. This did not include an additional total of $1.2 trillion spent on Iraq and Afghanistan over the same period, according to Andrew D. Krepinevich, Jr., Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment in Washington DC, in a 2012 piece for Foreign Affairs.

Time magazine, however, pointed out that: ‘The...wars’ total costs pegs them at between $4 trillion and $6 trillion.’ This fuller accounting includes ‘long-term medical care and disability compensation for service members, veterans and families, military replenishment and social and economic costs.’ The magazine cites the work of Harvard economist Linda Bilmes, who calculated these figures in 2013. Even at the lower figure Krepinevich argues that the costs are unsustainable. And that was before the acknowledged rise of ISIS and a ‘resurgent’ Russia, not to mention growing tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean peninsula.

Since strategy is about priorities and assuring that goals align with resources, a serious effort at engaging the public, as well as thought leaders, must occur - especially in light of an unhappy and angry electorate and a new administration arriving at the end of the year. We desperately need the right kind of leadership, though the temptation to do ‘more of the same’ is real.

Much thought has been given to diagnosing the problem of elite inertia in the face of these rapidly changing developments. All agree there is a leadership crisis, though some suggest that the 24-hour news cycle has transformed the day - along with social media and other platforms that are said to make it difficult to act decisively. Others blame structural changes in Congress that require members to speak primarily to the most extreme voters of their base. Still others worry that Washington is paralysed by domestic politics and that all international action is seen all-but-solely through this lens.

However, in a widely read article published by the American Scholar five years ago then Yale professor William Deresiewicz wrote about what he sees as the deeper roots of this leadership vacuum. He blames the educational system for failing to teach students to think for themselves and blames the elites for being exemplars of the problem. In his piece, ‘Solitude and Leadership,’ he wrote:

‘We have a crisis of leadership in America because our overwhelming power and wealth, earned under earlier generations of leaders, made us complacent, and for too long we have been training leaders who only know how to keep the routine going. Who can answer questions, but don’t know how to ask them. Who can fulfill goals, but don’t know how to set them. Who think about how to get things done, but not whether they’re worth doing in the first place. What we have now are the greatest technocrats the world has ever seen, people who have been trained to be incredibly good at one specific thing, but who have no interest in anything beyond their area of expertise. What we don’t have are leaders.’

I would also assert that we no longer have strategic leaders; people who can think through the challenges we face with a clear-eyed assessment of the key strategic elements that bear on any desirable goal. We need people who understand and are willing to base judgements on well-established principles of human nature, who are courageous enough to prioritise, and nimble enough and creative enough to ‘imagine the unimaginable.’
This is no longer an issue of casual concern. In addition to the limited financial and human resources we have at our disposal, the absence of strategic leadership is evident in our inability to find a national balance. Pollsters tell us that the American people have come to resent Washington for ignoring them at home and for failing our country abroad. They are tired of hearing about US efforts at building infrastructure in faraway countries when their own bridges and roads are crumbling.

Former United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Chas W. Freeman, Jr, is an outspoken critic of current policy. At a recent gathering he told his audience:

‘We need a peaceful international environment to rebuild our country. To achieve this, we must erase our strategy deficit. To do that, the next administration must fix the broken policymaking apparatus in Washington. It must rediscover the merits of measures short of war, learn how to use military power sparingly to support rather than supplant diplomacy, and cultivate the habit of asking ‘and then what?’ before beginning military campaigns.’

It is time, I would add, for us to fully acknowledge that the current ‘answers’ to our new questions may not be pertinent any more. America needs to have sustainable international engagement abroad and a sensible set of policies at home.

It may be difficult, it may be utterly fatiguing, but we simply have no other choice.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION: CAN THE UK KEEP THE LIGHTS ON?

Christopher Wilkins

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Discussions on foreign affairs, defence and security issues are of huge importance, and we certainly don’t want to be talking about them in the dark. Some of us worry about the UK’s ability to keep the lights on, as there are decisions to be made – rather urgently: there are a couple of suggestions at the end of the paper.

Up to 60GW of new generation and interconnection capacity will need to be built by 2030 to replace plant that is due for retirement as well as to meet increased demand. This compares with the 95GW of generation capacity in place now.

DECC has announced plans to phase out all remaining 18GW of coal-fired power stations by 2025. On top of this, all but one of the 9GW of existing nuclear plants operating in the UK will be retired by 2030.

The challenge for HMG is to ensure that UK electricity generation provides security and resilience. At the same time the country must meet its decarbonisation targets and electricity bills must be kept at an affordable level. This triple requirement creates a difficult balance to achieve. The plan is to replace the old power stations and to meet increased electricity demand by building new gas-fired, nuclear and renewable (wind and solar photo voltaic) power stations, in addition to increased power imports via new interconnectors.

The generation mix must be consistent with the UK’s obligations under the Climate Change Act, a UK law that requires a reduction in CO₂ emissions in the economy as a whole (from 1990 base levels) by 34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050. This means that the generation sector will probably have to fully decarbonise by 2050 as other sectors, including transport and heating, will be more difficult to decarbonise to the same extent. The costs are subject to the constraints of the customer bills. Recent projections showed that the LCF costs were forecast to be £11.2 billion in

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11 Plans to build a number of carbon capture and storage (CCS) plants based on coal and gas-fired power stations are now up in the air as the competition to build commercial scale prototypes has been suspended due to their very high cost (this is not unique to the UK; a number of proposed CCS projects in the US and Canada have been cancelled for the same reason).

12 Fundamental concerns have been expressed about the methodology of the LCF, which substantially overstates the impact of renewables on customers’ bills (by including the gross cost of subsidies but ignoring the compensating downward pressure on wholesale prices through the ‘Merit Order Effect’).
'Levy Control Framework' (LCF), which monitors the costs of Government low carbon policies on 2020/21. That is some 20% over the agreed cap and represents about £105 on top of the average £500 electricity bill for each household in 2020. Further increases to the LCF will be required for the period beyond 2020\textsuperscript{13}.

The UK must be flexible in the provision of new forms of generation. No one technology can deliver on all of the objectives. There are limitations of compatibility of different combinations of generation (i.e. not all generation can be intermittent wind/solar). There must be diversification of generation type to minimise risk and volatility, including the risk of fuel imported from overseas and subject to international markets. The absolute and relative costs of each type of generation will change over time and new innovations will emerge. So there needs to be a mix of generation, which can itself be replaced as new technologies emerge which can better deliver on the objectives.

The alternatives:

**Nuclear**

Large-scale nuclear of the type proposed by Electricité de France (EdF) at Hinkley Point C (3200MW nuclear project) is proving to be complicated, expensive and, because of its large scale, impossible to finance privately. This has delayed delivery of the project and, as at the date of this paper, EdF, despite having a state-owned Chinese partner on board, has been unable to conclude and obtain approval for its own (84.5\% French Government owned) funding arrangements.

Hinkley was originally scheduled to start operation in 2017, but it now appears it will not generate any electricity until 2025 at the earliest. The Areva European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) technology being used for Hinkley is not proven in operation, and other EPR projects being built in Finland, China and France, have each had severe cost and schedule overruns. The EdF unions are sensibly seeking to delay Hinkley until other EPR projects prove themselves in operation. Despite this, EdF has said it will soon confirm its decision to proceed. Its CFO has resigned in protest.

Other large-scale nuclear projects are being promoted by Nugen (Hitachi/GE Nuclear) and Horizon (Engie/Toshiba/Westinghouse). Both are proposing technologies which are proven in operation, and will hopefully be materially less expensive than Hinkley. An alternative commercial structure will be required which will probably involve greater participation by HMG. While the private sector can provide some of the capital, much of the risk will ultimately remain with HMG and the cost of capital should reflect this to minimise the cost to consumers.

Large scale nuclear power stations are incredibly capital intensive, even if they can be built on time and budget. Hinkley is projected to cost £18.5 billion, which will make it the most expensive power station ever built\textsuperscript{14}. It will require a very long term commitment from HMG (and therefore

\textsuperscript{13}This is partly the result of recent change in Government policy to channel available subsidy into the more expensive forms of low-carbon generation (e.g. nuclear and offshore wind), rather than the cheaper technologies (such as onshore wind) which could produce the same amount of electricity at significantly lower subsidy cost.

\textsuperscript{14}The Three Gorges hydro-electric project in China which, at 22.5 GW, is seven times the capacity of Hinkley cost ‘only’ $18 billion; Hinkley will cost more than the total of the 2012 London Olympics, Heathrow Terminal 5 and Crossrail combined.
consumers) to a Franco Chinese consortium for expensive fixed price electricity offtake: £92.5/MWh in 2012 prices, indexed by inflation for 35 years (vs current electricity prices of £35/MWh, so a subsidy of about £1.5 billion per annum and over £50 billion in total in 2012 prices), as well as £17 billion of HMG loan guarantees. Hinkley, if it does proceed, is likely to be one of the ‘last of a kind’ of very large scale, centralised generation plants in the UK, against the trend of smaller, decentralised and more flexible generation.

However there are nuclear alternatives. A number of companies are developing smaller scale modular nuclear plant which may be lower cost, lower risk and more deliverable than equivalent large scale plant. Production line manufacturing techniques and modular construction with manageable risks resulting from the smaller scale should make a modular plant more financeable and deliverable with much shorter construction periods. While each module is relatively small (between 25 and 300MW) they could be installed in groups to make up a larger single power station.

There are a number of relevant precedents for the successful delivery of smaller scale nuclear plants. The US Navy has commissioned and operated more than 500 reactors for use in propelling its ships and submarines, operating a total of 6,200 reactor-years without incident.

A number of small modular plants are in the process of development in Canada, the US, China as well as the UK. Some of these use updated technologies which have much less waste and are inherently safer than current designs, which itself will help to make them less expensive and easier to deliver. Both the US and UK Governments are now providing funding to further advance development of these. It would not be unrealistic for these projects to be in operation by the mid to late 2020’s and so within the same timeframe as the large UK projects.

Gas-fired Generation

The UK Government envisages that a number of gas-fired power stations will be built to ‘fill the gap’ as old power stations are retired. Gas-fired power stations will reduce the carbon intensity of generation vs coal and are well proven modular technology with well-defined construction costs. The capital intensity is much lower than nuclear (at £0.5m/MW vs £5.5m/MW for Hinkley), so the return on capital invested can be achieved in a much shorter timeframe, which increases the flexibility to use the plant on a non-base load basis and to replace it with other plant in due course. It is easily turned off and on and so is complementary to intermittent renewable generation. The gas required is, following the fracking revolution in the USA, abundantly available in the international markets as well as the North Sea and there may be substantial additional gas (fracking) reserves in the UK.

International gas prices can be volatile, but are currently very low due, in part, to the commencement of exports of US shale gas as well as low world oil prices. Gas-fired power stations can provide electricity for about £60-70/MWh, so much less than Hinkley, but still substantially more than current electricity prices.

Gas fired generation vs coal reduces carbon intensity from 900g CO₂/kWh to about 365g CO₂/kWh. While the DECC objective is to reduce carbon intensity of generation in the UK from about 440g CO₂/kWh to between 50-100g CO₂/kWh by 2030 and zero by 2050, gas can only be a transitional solution.
Wind and Solar

The UK has the best wind resource in Europe but perhaps not the best solar intensity. But wind and solar are intermittent and require some firm capacity backup. Wind, especially offshore wind, can be built to a meaningful scale that will make a material contribution to CO₂ and generation objectives.

Onshore wind has been politically sensitive due to concerns about visual impact. Although it has required a subsidy to justify investment to date, costs are continuing to fall and, on the best sites, is probably now competitive with gas-fired generation.

There is a vast amount of offshore wind potential, visual impact is reduced or not an issue, and capacity factors are higher than onshore wind. However it is more costly than onshore wind due to higher construction and operating costs, as well as the additional costs required to plug it into the onshore grid. But costs for offshore wind are also falling as construction and operation techniques are benefitting from learning curves and the size of individual turbines is being scaled up.

Solar photovoltaic (PV) costs are continuing to fall rapidly as production volumes and installation has increased exponentially worldwide. Both utility scale ground mounted solar and residential rooftop may contribute to decentralisation of generation in the UK.

Other

A number of other technologies have been proposed. These include tidal stream, wave, and tidal barrages. Each of these has its own technical issues and to date it does not appear that any of them will prove economically feasible.

A number of large-scale interconnection projects are under development to Norway, Iceland and the continent. These can take advantage of the different demand and generation supply mix as well as deliver potential baseload capacity. They can also provide low carbon energy from those markets which have existing hydro, geothermal and nuclear capacity.

The cost of battery energy storage is falling quickly and is now available on a commercial basis. New technologies are being developed which should lead to further breakthroughs. Demand and supply management, using technologies such as ‘smart meters’ as well as storage can have a material impact on using existing generation capacity more efficiently. All of these will be more important as intermittent renewable generation becomes a larger part of the generation base. Of course it is difficult to predict which innovations will ultimately prove to be technically and commercially viable, but the high rate of investment and potential for change reinforces the need to build in considerable flexibility in the generation base to take advantage of these as they arise.

Suggestions

The challenge for HMG is to ensure that UK electricity generation provides security and resilience with flexibility. At the same time the country must meet its decarbonisation targets at an affordable cost.
In essence, there may be no current solution that meets all three objectives. Hinkley certainly doesn’t and should be dropped. The other large-scale nuclear projects should only proceed if the costs can be materially reduced, and the number of large nuclear projects should be limited.

The best shorter term stopgaps are interconnections, gas-fired generation and onshore wind. Interconnections may be less secure on their own, and come with an unidentifiable carbon component, but should be part of a more efficient interconnected European grid. Gas and onshore wind are reasonably secure and economic and quickly deliverable. While gas can help reduce CO₂ levels from today’s levels, it does not help to meet the longer term objectives. It is less capital intensive, so creates flexibility to reduce usage or phase out in the medium term. It also creates an option to retrofit CCS should that become feasible. Onshore wind will have visual impact issues; this appears to be a less sensitive issue in Scotland where the wind resource is concentrated, and in any case can be removed once a better alternative is identified.

At the same time, we should be investing (prudently) to develop new technologies that can potentially help to meet all three objectives: offshore wind, solar PV and other renewables (provided the costs are reduced) and smaller-scale nuclear.
There comes a time in the life of a nation when it need to stand back, think hard, apply perspective, a dose of history, a dash of foresight plus a generous quantity of reality to the painting of a self-portrait that combines vividness with candour. Friday 24th June 2016 will be the moment for the United Kingdom and its people to begin such an endeavour in earnest. For whatever the outcome of the referendum on our membership of the European Union, a line will have been scored across the page of the UK’s history since 1945.

To my mind, we need two hard looks which are related to each other. First, at our place in the world, a question over which we have agonised at least since US pressure halted the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt during the Suez Crisis in the autumn of 1956. Secondly, at the very configuration and make-up of the United Kingdom and the inter-relationships of its constituent parts now that the Scotland Act 2016 is in place fulfilling the pledges the Westminster party leaders made in the last fraught days of the Scottish independence referendum campaign in September 2014.

The Queen’s subjects pride themselves on being a 59th-minute-of-the-11th-hour people. But we have not quite woken up yet to the levels of uncertainty hovering over our islands – the greatest since the end of the Second World War, in my judgement, if you exclude (and it’s a big ‘if’) the perils of the 40-year Cold War which could, once nuclear weapons had reached thermonuclear proportions in the 1950s, have wrecked a high proportion of our Kingdom in the course of a single afternoon.

I am among those who fear that an overall Brexit vote would see a majority in England for leaving and a majority in Scotland for remaining. Such an outcome would trigger demands for a further Edinburgh Agreement and another referendum on Scottish separation. With an SNP majority government in Holyrood, this would be conceded eventually by the Westminster Parliament with the Scottish people voting to forsake the Union in 2021 or 2022.

Should that turn out to be the national political and constitutional playbook to come, by 2025 the UK could be outside the EU and shorn of Scotland and in a very different strategic position from the one we now occupy. Yet there was no whiff of these linked possibilities in last November’s National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review. The document fluently laid out the various perils we face or might confront in the medium term. But there was no space for the threats we pose to ourselves.

This was not a surprise. Such things are all too difficult even for the guardians of our national security. Just as Whitehall had been forbidden by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to undertake...
any kind of contingency planning for a Scottish separation in the run-up to the 2014 referendum, so too has Whitehall been prohibited from mounting any such activity ahead of the 2016 Euro-referendum. Strange, some might think, for a country that likes to imagine itself a nation of natural strategists and prudent preparers for the expected and unexpected alike. Yet once the result is in on Friday 24 June, the state–currently-in-denial will have to convert itself into the state of foresight, candour and reality if it is to rise to the level of events, to borrow a phrase favoured by both Winston Churchill and Roy Jenkins.

Such a call to arms will not, I suspect, be greeted by with hosannas of approbation and joy inside 10 Downing Street. Many will be the Prime Minister’s preoccupations even if the referendum outcome is the one for which he wishes. His party’s metabolism will be in a state of agitation. As one seasoned Conservative backbencher put it to me just before Easter, the level of intra-party acrimony already generated by the European question will make what he called ‘the truth and reconciliation period’ of summer and autumn 2016 very difficult to handle. The woes of the world and the ever relentless demands of premiership will flow through Downing Street. Opening up a pair of inquiries on two more vexing questions is unlikely to appeal.

And yet the Prime Minister is quite a political historian. His old Oxford mentor, Professor Vernon Bogdanor (who taught him the politics bit of his PPE) praises to this day Mr Cameron’s gifts in that direction. Furthermore, like all top-flight political players he must carry within him a sliver of curiosity about how political historians will judge his stewardship. ‘Legacy’ is a word that will be buzzing around his frontal lobes post-referendum.

To be sure, long, hard looks are always subject to the doctrine of unripe time unless a near cataclysm compels them. But here is a counter-argument. How about this as an element in the Cameron legacy? The Prime Minister commissions that duo of inquiries on Britain without and Britain within. He would need to reach beyond the political class to people them. Might it be the moment to reach out and rediscover an ancient device – the Royal Commission?

If the two inquiries began work in the autumn of 2016 and were given an absolute deadline of two years to report, Mr Cameron would still be in Downing Street to receive them and to kindle still further the national conversation the inquiries’ existence and evidence-taking would have already fired up if he sticks to his plan to relinquish the premiership in time for a successor to play himself or herself in ahead of the May 2020 general election.

Summer 2016 will be a time for rising to the level of events. It will not be a time for business-as-usual. There is a passage from T.E Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom one occasionally hears inside the military staff colleges in which Lawrence of Arabia declares that: ‘Nine-tenths of tactics were certain enough to be teachable in schools; but the irrational tenth was like the kingfisher flashing across the pool and in it lay the test of generals.’

In terms of national need, it is the hour of the kingfisher – for the kingfisher plus if a sense of strategy is to rise beyond the ‘irrational tenth’. Not a shimmer of those beautiful wings is yet visible. But one lives in hope.
SECURITY IN A COMPLEX AND CHAOTIC WORLD

Marshal of The Royal Air Force the Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC

Lord Stirrup was commissioned into the Royal Air Force in 1970, and after pilot training completed a number of tours in the instructor and fighter reconnaissance roles. In the 1980s Lord Stirrup commanded No II (AC) Squadron, flying Jaguar aircraft from RAF Laarbruch in Germany, and from 1990 to 1992 he was Officer Commanding RAF Marham in Norfolk, a period that covered the first Gulf War. Lord Stirrup served as the Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes in the Ministry of Defence. He was Assistant Chief of the Air Staff from 1998-2000, and then took up the post of Deputy Commander in Chief Royal Air Force Strike Command. In 2001 he was deployed to US Central Command immediately following 9/11 and commanded British forces during Operation Veritas, the UK’s contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Following a tour as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Equipment, he became Chief of the Air Staff in 2003, and was appointed as Chief of the Defence staff in 2006. Following retirement from the military, he was appointed to the House of Lords in 2011, where he is very involved in the areas of defence, security, foreign relations and the arts. Lord Stirrup joined GSF’s Advisory Board in 2015.

On 28th March 2011, President Obama made a televised address to the American people about the attack on Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya which had begun nine days earlier. He said that the task of the US military was to protect the Libyan people from immediate danger and to establish a no-fly zone. He went on to assert that: ‘Broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake’. In other words, the operation, mounted under UN authority, exemplified the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and was restricted to that objective. The justification that the British and French governments advanced for the intervention followed similar lines. That seems to be a clear and limited proposition, but it is worth dwelling for a moment on the logical and ineluctable conclusions that flow from it.

If military intervention was justifiable – and some would say necessary – under R2P, then who was to be protected? The answer, of course, is the ordinary Libyan citizens, many of whom were certainly suffering for their pursuit of political change. Very well, but from whom were they to be protected? Once again the answer is clear: from the Gaddafi regime, which was attacking them. But what do we mean by protect; what are the geographical and, perhaps more important, temporal boundaries to that commitment? Do we agree to protect those under threat for just one month, or for two, or for six? That clearly would make no sense: if we are to give such an undertaking, we can only reasonably do so on the assumption that the protection would continue until the threat no longer existed. Was there, then, any possibility that Gaddafi might at some stage say: ‘Oops, sorry everybody; I’ve made a terrible mistake in attacking my own citizens – I’ll stop immediately and behave myself in future’? I think we can agree that such an outcome was unlikely in the extreme. The threat would therefore only disappear with the removal of the regime.

So, acknowledged or not, the end state of a military operation in Libya under R2P had to be
regime change; the logic simply does not take one anywhere else, and Obama’s claim to the contrary was either disingenuous or mistaken.

Does that mean that we were wrong to intervene in Libya? There are arguments on both sides, but I am not in this article concerned with the rights or wrongs of a particular case; I am, rather, interested in what it might tell us about the pursuit of security in a complex and often chaotic world. For example, one conclusion we might draw from the Libyan intervention – and it is by no means news – is that events and situations cannot be contained in neat packages: actions have consequences, those consequences have consequences of their own, and so on ad infinitum.

We are still living, not least in Libya, with the knock-on effects of the post-1918 efforts to tidy up the detritus of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War. Whether or not those efforts were misguided is open to debate. The order that they created in the Middle East did, after all, last for a fair number of years, and no human mind is capable of following for more than one or two steps all the potential outcomes of any given decision – the possible futures very soon branch along more paths than even the greatest chess Grand Master could comprehend. As far as international relations are concerned, our world owes more to Heisenberg than to Newton: uncertainty rules, and the application of an external influence in one area tends only to increase the uncertainty elsewhere.

That said, we cannot just throw up our hands and refuse ever to act because of the unknown consequences which might flow from that action. Paradoxically, declining to act is in itself an act with its own consequences. We affect the world around us by our mere existence, and the notion that we can somehow stand aside as neutrals is an illusion. So what principles might we apply in our pursuit of security? Are there any precepts that might serve to guide our actions in this complex world?

In trying to answer those questions, it is perhaps worth first stepping back some 2,500 years to the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Thucydides recounts how the strategically important island of Melos wished to remain neutral in the conflict, but the Athenians were concerned about the risk of the Melians entering the war at some future time on the side of Sparta. They therefore sent an embassy to the islanders to persuade them to support Athens, using arguments that were often little more than thinly-veiled threats. The Melians, a proud people, protested about such tactics, but the Athenians replied in words that have echoed down the centuries, and which form the basis of today’s realpolitik: ‘Who are you’, they said, ‘to tell us what we can and cannot do; the strong do what they can, the weak suffer what they must’. In the face of that, the Melians had no option but to accede to the Athenian demands. This may seem like a justification of the doctrine that might is right, but we should remember that the Athenians eventually lost the war, and never again rose to the heights from which they fell. That, though, was probably of little comfort to the Melians; they were weak, and they suffered for it.

Which brings me to my first precept: better not be weak.

This, however, only takes us a certain distance. Strength has many forms, and we need to know how to recognise, generate and use it in its various guises. If we are to do that, though, we have first to be clear about what it is we are trying to accomplish; why do we need strength of any kind? How would it have helped the Melians? To understand that, we have to strip our
foreign and security policy back to its bare essentials: in essence, it is about trying to persuade other international actors to do things they would not otherwise do, or to desist from doing what they otherwise would do. There are of course elements of our international relations that are characterised by harmony and accord, but even with our closest friends this happy state of affairs is far from guaranteed; the foreign and security policy challenge lies in diverting the course of events into more benign channels than it would otherwise follow. So we are talking about persuading others - or in extremis compelling them - to change their behaviour. Why would they do so?

Well, we might for example persuade them through force of argument alone. Our intellectual or moral case might be so compelling that our opponents find it irresistible. Unhappily, experience shows that this seldom happens, but even when it does not, the case still needs to be made, if only to justify the further steps we might take - because those steps will inevitably involve a degree of coercion, gentle though it might be in the first instance. We might employ economic carrots and sticks; we might offer some kind of political quid pro quo; we might pray in aid wider international opinion: in all cases, we are seeking to apply pressure by conferring benefits or inflicting pain. Then, if all else fails and the stakes are sufficiently high, we need the capability to impose an outcome through the use of physical force.

All of these different approaches have one common feature: they each require the possession and application of strength in one form or another.

On this basis we can now, I think, begin to identify the kinds of strength that are necessary for our security.

The first of them is intellectual and moral authority. We are trying to persuade or dissuade others - both those whose actions we seek to change and those we hope will support our position. Our words therefore need to carry weight, and that depends not just on the force of our logic but also on the confidence we inspire in our audience: do we carry through on our promises and threats; are we reliable partners or fair-weather friends; do we adhere to accepted principles or do we adjust them to suit the expediency of the moment; would anyone buy a used car from us?

The second requirement is economic muscle: this is the foundation of all other kinds of strength, including military, and is a sine qua non of our security. From sanctions to trade deals, from financial pressure to aid, from political exclusion to partnerships - all of these things rely fundamentally on economic power. If we are to be strong we must be economically successful. And thirdly of course we need, as our final recourse, sufficient modern, credible and effective military capabilities to enable us to compel the recalcitrant when the consequence of failure is sufficiently serious. My second precept, therefore, is that we need to possess and be able to apply strength across the full spectrum of power that I have described here.

It is, though, self evident that the UK on its own is unlikely ever to have sufficient power to be able to shape many international outcomes in the way that it wishes. We therefore need to form partnerships of strength - not just in the military sphere, but across all of the dimensions of power that I have identified. We need to engage in associations that have political and diplomatic heft, that enhance our economic weight, and that are based on shared values which underpin behaviour. Such partnerships inevitably involve a degree of compromise, including over our own foreign policy goals and the means by which these are pursued, but without them we become
relatively powerless. The choice is between modified success or none at all; between doing at least some of what we can or suffering what we must. The need for partnerships of strength is therefore my third precept.

That still, of course, leaves open the question of how our strength should be applied in this uncertain world and in the foreknowledge of unintended consequences. Here, I suggest, the answer is to keep a tight rein on our ambitions and aspirations. If we pursue a grand design, we are likely to end up by being bitterly disappointed. Even the most powerful international actors, including ourselves in days gone by, have been frustrated by their inability to shape outcomes on a large scale – in the long term, at least.

In much of the Middle East at the moment, all of the political cards are in the air, and we have little idea of how they will land and even less power to influence their final pattern. On the other hand, some developments within the region are reasonably benign while others are clearly malign, and we can do something to help influence these. We cannot hope for certainty, but we can increase the odds of the outcome being in some degree favourable to us. Which leads me to my final precept. We cannot dictate detailed ends, but we should watch carefully the kinds of patterns which emerge on the international scene and, acting in concert with others, seek to promote those which seem beneficial and suppress those we regard as most dangerous.

Such gradualism may seem unambitious to some, but our aims must be attuned to our ways and means if we are to have a strategic approach to our foreign and security policy. Our ways and means are inevitably constrained by many factors, some beyond our control; our aims must therefore be similarly constrained. My contention is that keeping ourselves safe in this complex and chaotic world requires intellectual, moral, economic and military strength created and applied in partnership with others, but that the level of uncertainty and the likelihood of unintended consequences mean that we should aim to influence the underlying pattern of international developments rather than to define their outcomes. To use a recent idiom, we should nudge (they can of course sometimes be quite big nudges) rather than seek to dictate. The former approach may not produce a world quite as we would wish it to be, but the latter is a recipe for failure and disappointment, and would leave us far worse off in the long run.

Given the dangers we face in the decades ahead, we cannot allow the chimera of an unachievable best to distract us from the determined pursuit of an eminently attainable better.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SECURITY: 
THE VIRTUOUS CIRCLE OF CYBER SECURITY

Sir Iain Lobban KCMG CB

Sir Iain Lobban was the Director of the British security and intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters, from 2008-2014, having previously served as its Director General for Operations. He pioneered an integrated service of intelligence and security in domains as varied as cyber defence; counter terrorism; military campaigns overseas; and the prevention and detection of serious crime. Cyber Security, both nationally and internationally, has been at the heart of his role in recent years: he set new direction for innovative government partnering with the private sector and with academia. As the GCHQ Director he attended the UK’s National Security Council on a weekly basis from its very first meeting in May 2010 and was a Principal member of the Joint Intelligence Committee for over six years. Sir Iain is now engaged in three fields: the advocacy and demystification of Cyber Security, providing strategic advice and personal perspective, nationally and internationally, to governments and businesses; sharing lessons and insights on strategic and institutional leadership; and entrepreneurship, in the broadest sense of the word. Sir Iain joined GSF’s Advisory Board in 2016.

Introduction

If you alight from the tube at the front end of the Bakerloo line platform at Piccadilly Circus underground station, you would do well to ‘Mind The Gap.’ There is an alarming gap of some 12 to 18 inches: just the right size hole down which a large boot might disappear.

The job of the United Kingdom’s intelligence and security agencies is to reduce the size of the gap between ignorance and knowledge, between unwittingness and readiness, between misapprehension and comprehension. They do so for our Prime Minister and other Secretaries of State; for our admirals, generals and air chief marshals, in fact for our military at all ranks as they conduct military operations; for our scientists and engineers researching our future weapons capabilities and anticipating those which might be deployed by potential adversaries; for our security professionals and law enforcement agencies countering terrorism and serious crime; for our foreign policy experts seeking to defuse international crises and to promote the principles and values in which we believe; for our government economists as they seek to chart a course through future uncertainties; for our cyber security gurus as they build and promote better protection and defence of our data networks whether governmental, industrial or commercial, academic or personal.

It would be straightforward to connect the existence of the intelligence and security agencies with statecraft, with regional influence, with the anticipation of and if possible avoidance of conflict, or - in the case of its realisation - with its rapid resolution, if necessary through actively supporting those engaged in violent military endeavour deemed to be ‘just.’
In 2009, the British intelligence community celebrated the centenary of its establishment in unbroken lineage to the current community. We at GCHQ had to wait a little longer until we were able to celebrate the centenary of the establishment of the first coherent Signals Intelligence organisations from which we were descended - 2014, a hundred years after the First Sea Lord, Winston Churchill, issued in November of 1914 a Charter.

That Charter prescribed the operating model in which Room 40, the section in the Admiralty which had started producing intelligence from intercepted and decrypted messages, would operate. Churchill oversaw the birth of British Sigint, and was instrumental in the creation in 1919 of GCHQ, under its former name of GC&CS, the Government Code and Cypher School.

The Intelligence Target Set

*a. Actual or potential aggressor Nation States …*

Actual or potential aggressor Nation States made up the bread and butter of the Sigint work of the Government Code and Cypher School and its predecessor organisations, and of GCHQ for much of the last century. So you will find accounts of the work against Germany and its allies during the first world war; the extraordinary story before and during World War Two on ENIGMA and in due course LORENZ is well told from the perspective of Bletchley Park and its outstations working against the Axis powers; and it is a fair assumption that the Warsaw Pact was the primary raison d’être of GCHQ in the post war years until the Soviet Union’s disintegration in the period after 1989.

At the same time it was in these years of prolonged or frozen conflict that the equally vital work of securing our own networks and communications of national importance came to the fore - a theme to which I shall return when I explore the modern-day concept of cyber security, for there is nothing new under the sun.

*b. … and the growth of Transnational targets*

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its allies, there was a peace dividend to be had: forward intelligence bases were dis-established and closed; the term ‘Rest of the World’ ceased to sound like the Cinderella mission; transnational target sets such as narcotics, financial crime, people trafficking, proliferation, terrorism took on prominence. 1991 was a doubly significant year for GCHQ: the Soviet Union fell apart, and the World Wide Web was established.

To be sure the military interventions of the first half of the 90s that we saw in Kuwait and Iraq under Operation GRANBY, and in the Balkans under UN mandate as UNPROFOR, fully engaged the intelligence apparatus. But there was nevertheless a balkanisation of intelligence collection and analysis, with no ‘main effort’ - no principal priority verging on the existential - clearly rippling through the fabric of our community.

*c. Blindsided*

That changed in 2001 with the horrific events of September the 11th and subsequent military campaigns in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Our American allies used a term that in retrospect at least appeared ill-chosen - the Global War on Terror - but these were years of concerted, sustained effort, of tight integration with our armed forces and organic support to military operations at all
levels. In my experience the closeness of that partnership was exceptional, carried out at tempo, scale and with precision.

Even then however, it was temptingly easy to think of counter-terrorism as an activity that took place ‘upstream’ from the UK, that played out in landscapes far away, where the fight had been taken to the adversary.

On the 7th July 2005 that too changed as we were struck on home soil in four concerted acts that wreaked death, maiming and horror on innocent citizens, visitors, tourists in London. Counter-terrorism became the main effort and a moral driver for the workforces of the security and intelligence community. Last year on the tenth anniversary, we marvelled at the fortitude and moral strength of survivors, of relatives and friends of those who died, of rescuers: inspiring, brave, forgiving and strong. That unifying strength, ten years on, finds parallels in the resolve felt across the intelligence and security community ten years ago.

It is a matter of great pride that as of the time of writing, in the years since 2005 only one terrorist murder has taken place on British soil, that of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013. It is not chance that this is the case, but the consequence of committed, assiduous, painstaking analysis, discovery and disruption of violent extremist planning, of online radicalisation, even of late stage preparations for attacks. It is a matter of public record that multiple plots have been thwarted. Investigative and operational work took place in MI5, in GCHQ and MI6, in the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre JTAC, in police forces across Britain. Assessments and interventions were founded upon fine-grain intelligence work which drove precision actions. Intelligence work is rarely straightforward and seldom at the easy end of the spectrum: even before our sources and methods are discussed in public, and picked apart under a microscope, this is metaphorically back-breaking work, chiselling away at an enormous quarry in pursuit of a potentially rewarding seam of ore that might illuminate suspicious activity, that might trigger a lead that can be followed up.

d. Then Cyber Security

The UK’s first National Cyber Security Strategy was published in June 2009; then the next government produced a new strategy in November 2011 and - in recognition of Cyber as a Tier One risk - created and resourced a cross-government programme with four objectives:

- to make the UK one of the most secure places in the world to do business in cyberspace
- to make the UK more resilient to cyber attack and better able to protect our interests in cyberspace
- to help shape an open, vibrant and stable cyberspace that supports open societies,
- and to build the UK’s cyber security knowledge, skills and capability.

I believe this was a national game changer, establishing the UK as an international thought-leader on cyber; generating the concept of a national ecosystem engaging government, industry and academia with shared responsibility for best practice and joint leadership; creating fora for sharing knowledge of attacks, compromises and mitigations. It was and is a subject that quite rightly engages Ministers and business leaders, and one where today’s best practice will inevitably face the charge of inadequacy tomorrow.

It has also been an institutional game changer for GCHQ, forcing us to forge qualitatively different
partnerships with specialist industry; to work with the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills and with Research Councils to establish academic centres of excellence for cyber security research; to develop new international partnerships beyond the traditional Five Eyes - American, Australian, British, Canadian and New Zealand cryptologic allies - in order to build coalitions to detect and defend in cyberspace.

e. Libya

In 2011 there was a short, sharp and highly successful military campaign in Libya, one where technical intelligence provided decisive support at tempo and with precision - not the first time I have used that description. This built on the hard-earned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan and was a model of intelligence support to the warfighter.

f. Aggression to the east of Europe

But in early 2014 military adventurism on the eastern borders of Europe reminded us that hard-won insights into the military capabilities, tactical manoeuvres and operational effectiveness of global powers are quickly lost if not sustained, that the saturation of intelligence sensors that existed some decades ago is not one which can be rebuilt overnight, and that the deep analytic expertise built up over decades is not a quality that can be mothballed and simply deployed when needed.

And the downing of MH17 reminded us that there are terrible mistakes made in the fog of war that shatter the lives of innocents who have no skin in conflicts. A moral imperative calls out: to engage in discovering what is happening, in identifying the attendant risks, in creating understanding and knowledge of situations so as to avert harm and mitigate damage.

g. Ungoverned space

Tourist attacks in June 2015 on the beaches of Tunisia and in November 2015 on the boulevards and in a concert hall in Paris - acts ironically both indiscriminate yet targeted - serve as reminders that we must now recognise that this intelligence and security community faces large-scale challenges that may be transnational or may be nation state-derived: double jeopardy. What they have in common is the capacity to create persistent, sustained instability as the backdrop to government’s duty to seek to protect its citizens and its interests at home and abroad.

Tempo

If we think about the journey from that deep expertise in understanding the highways and byways of a nation state’s communications during wars or conflicts, frozen or otherwise, to this Internet world, a new factor becomes evident - that of tempo. Tempo where actionable intelligence is required by an operational user in minutes or even seconds. Note my use of the word ‘actionable’ - much of the intelligence generated by Bletchley Park in World War Two was strategically useful and actionable in that sense, operationally valuable in the sense of being able to influence large-scale engagements, but tactically a non-starter for fear of jeopardising the source - the golden eggs and the geese which laid them, as Winston Churchill almost put it.

Perhaps at GCHQ we cut our teeth in generating actionable intelligence in our support to law enforcement, exercising our mandate to support the prevention and detection of serious crime.
We must surely give most credit for the transformation in the supply of actionable intelligence to the operational teams involved in supporting the operations of our armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: giving the critical advantage in real time to soldiers in conflict. And counter terrorist work depends on that same tradecraft and mentality. But actually the ethos of delivering intelligence which can be effective in preventing harm or forming the basis for positive action, at tempo and with precision, is a quality that permeates the work of the intelligence and security agencies across all missions, across the board. It has been and will continue to be a game changer.

And consider the defensive side of cyber security - it is no use providing delayed commentary on cyber attack - edited highlights after the event don't really work. This is a contest that has to be waged in real time where action to isolate and quarantine, or to validate and permit, needs to take place at net speed, not after the event.

The Cyber Dimension

Surely there is no more asymmetric phenomenon than cyber with its capacity for transnational effect; for deception, denial and disruption, and even destruction; for criminality and espionage; for protest and covert influence. Protection and defence are activities in a constant state of flux, with advantage passing back and forth between those who would exploit and those who detect, discover and counter. Skirmishing in cyberspace is constant. And it is the arena where muscles can be flexed covertly or ostentatiously, with a false flag or no attribution at all, with temporary or lasting effect.

There are few if any disputes or conflicts which do not play out in the parallel world of cyberspace, even while diplomatic or military manoeuvring may be the more public focus of attention.

It is a domain where smart adversaries have the advantage of seeking and securing hostile effect by acting against proxy targets - countries other than their primary target, because they are seen as an easier option; sectors other than national leadership, defence resources or the instruments of foreign policy - because (like the old Heineken advert) cyber reaches the parts that other weapons do not reach: it finds out the areas where strategic resilience is lacking.

Cyber maturity will define alliances and coalitions of the future - weaker, vulnerable players in cyberspace will be seen as liabilities not as assets: why would countries which represent a soft underbelly, a vector for penetration by an adversary, be tolerated within a greater international endeavour?

So the security mission has moved to centre stage - no longer secondary - alongside the intelligence mission, and at the apogee of intelligence work and of security work, there is a virtuous circle: mutually beneficial corollaries.

This essay was first delivered in a longer form as the Strand Group’s Fifth Sir Michael Quinlan memorial lecture on the 14th July 2015.
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