

# GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM



## **GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM**

**Lecture Series**

**2015 - 2016**

[www.globalstrategyforum.org](http://www.globalstrategyforum.org)



Professor Margaret MacMillan and Lord Lothian



General Sir Peter Wall and Lord Lothian



Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Lord Lothian



Stephen Grey and Sir Malcolm Rifkind



Rob Wainwright and Lord West of Spithead



The 10th Anniversary Lecture: Lord Lothian and Lord Stirrup

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### President

**Johan Eliasch** is the President of Global Strategy Forum. He is Chairman and CEO of HEAD (the global sporting goods group), Chairman of Aman Resorts, Equity Partners, London Films and Co-Chairman of Cool Earth. He is an advisory board member of Brasilinvest, Societe du Louvre, Capstar, the Centre for Social Justice, Stockholm Resilience Centre, Foundation for Renewable Energy and Environment and a member of the Mayor of Rome's and Jerusalem's International Business Advisory Councils. He is a Patron of Stockholm University and a trustee of the Kew Foundation. He is the Founder of the Rainforest Trust which is conserving 400,000 acres of rainforest in the Amazonas. He was part of the Conservative Shadow Foreign Office team as Special Advisor on European Affairs (1999-2003) and responsible for foreign relations (2003-2005). He was Conservative Party Deputy Treasurer (2003-2007). He is the former Special Representative of the Prime Minister of the UK for Deforestation and Clean Energy (2007-2010).

### Chairman

**The Most Hon the Marquess of Lothian PC QC DL** is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum. He was first elected to Parliament as Michael Ancram in 1974. His political career included four years as the Political Minister in Northern Ireland responsible for the opening engagements with the IRA which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement, Chairman of the Conservative Party for three years, and four years as Shadow Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the Opposition. He continues to be involved in international conflict resolution. He co-founded Global Strategy Forum in 2006 and remains its Chairman. He was appointed to the House of Lords as a life peer in October 2010. He is a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

### Director

**Jacqueline Jinks** is the Director of Global Strategy Forum. She joined GSF as Research Director in June 2006 and became the Director in February 2008. From 1997-2005, she was Political Secretary and speechwriter to Lord Moynihan, a former Conservative Senior Spokesman on Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords. She worked for the Rt Hon Michael Howard QC MP and the Rt Hon Francis Maude MP, during their respective tenures as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Prior to that, she worked for the Democratic National Committee (1996-1997) and CMA Consultants (1994-1996).

### Treasurer

**Adrian de Ferranti** was the founder of Ferranti, an early stage venture capital business. He was also a founder and/or Chairman of Tantus PLC, Cambridge Computer Graphics, Chelford PLC, and PTG. He had an early career at European Banking Company, Murray Johnstone, followed by Montgomery Securities. He is currently the Chairman, Director or investor in NEST, Same Wave, SMB, Ampair, Plasmanet, Updata, Ziani's, Como Lario, Ferranti Farming, and Small Business Bureau. He was the Chairman and Trustee of the Royal Institution of Great Britain from 2007-2010. From 2007-2013 he was Chairman of the Foundation at Heriot Watt University. He was also a Treasurer of the Conservative Party from 1991-2004.



## **PRESIDENT'S FOREWORD**

2016 marked the tenth year of Global Strategy Forum's foundation, an achievement of no small merit. As I observed in the foreword to our 10th anniversary compendium published in May, the global landscape in which British foreign policy must operate remains as challenging as ever.

The June vote for Brexit following the EU referendum not only took the political and economic establishment largely by surprise, it added a new and complex dimension to those challenges. As the British Government continues to work out its strategy for exiting the European Union in accordance with that vote, the task of agreeing a new relationship with the EU looks set to absorb much government effort for the foreseeable future. The challenge will be to combine that with the emergence of an innovative, strategic approach to Britain's future foreign, defence and security policy in a post-EU landscape.

While the UK remains a member of key international institutions – the UN Security Council, NATO – the exact implications of Brexit for foreign and defence policy remain for the moment unclear, as does the development of a new working framework – or dare I say it, strategy – which must ultimately emerge for our responses to those global and multilateral challenges which confront us; the tragedy of Syria with its genuine potential for a wider global conflagration, the continuing migration crisis, the implications of an assertive Russia and the stirrings of China.

Agree or disagree with Brexit, there is no doubt that the referendum laid bare deep divisions amongst the British population about what sort of a country we are, and what sort of a country we want to be. For some, the referendum result is an exciting opportunity, pointing the way to an empowered UK finally taking once again its own sovereign decisions in accordance with its own interests and traditions. For others, it is the biggest foreign policy mistake since Suez. It is in the context of those conflicting views that Britain must now build a new consensus about our role in the world.

In these circumstances, I believe Global Strategy Forum's contribution to the international affairs debate to be more important than ever. After forty years of EU membership, the UK is now faced with an uncharted terrain and one which will undoubtedly require a fundamental reassessment of our existing foreign and security policy. A forum which provides an intellectual incubator for innovative ideas for how in future the UK should engage with the wider world is not simply a prolix talking shop, it is a policymaking necessity. I can assure you that GSF will be there to provide such a forum.

This is an unusual and challenging background for my introduction to the annual collection of GSF lectures, now in its tenth year. Together with a number of special events to mark our 10th anniversary, our programme over the year has sought to offer a wide snapshot of the areas where the UK faces its most intractable choices. The Middle East and the threat of terrorism continue to feature prominently, as do relations with Russia. Unsurprisingly, the lectures this year also covered Britain's relationship with the European Union and the future foreign policy of the United States, itself in an election year. We also looked at the role of UN; whether the history of the First World War offers any parallels for the leaders of today to consider; an assessment of Iran one year the nuclear deal; and an overview of the role of espionage in foreign policy.

As always, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to thank all our contributors. This year, as ever, our speakers have shown extraordinary generosity in their readiness to share their expertise, knowledge and understanding without which GSF simply could not exist. Nor indeed could we exist without the continued commitment and support of our membership, both long-standing and more recent. It is this membership-based participation which fulfils GSF's remit as a truly open forum for discussion and debate. In our anniversary year, I would particularly like to thank our Advisory Board members, a list of whom can be found at the back of this publication. GSF's success over the past decade is without a doubt a real tribute to their wise advice, skilful leadership and unparalleled expertise.

We aim to ensure that our 2016-2017 events programme is as dynamic, diverse and interesting as our past programmes, as we once again convene the exceptional network of policymakers, practitioners and international affairs experts who meet under our auspices. I look forward to seeing you all at GSF in the year to come.

**Johan Eliasch**  
**President, Global Strategy Forum**  
**October 2016**

## ABOUT GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM

GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM was founded by Lord Lothian (then the Rt Hon Michael Ancram MP) and Johan Eliasch in 2006 to generate open debate and discussion on key foreign affairs, defence and international security issues. As an independent, non-party political, non-ideological organisation, GSF provides a platform to explore some of the more challenging and contentious aspects of UK foreign policy and to stimulate imaginative ideas and innovative thinking in a rapidly changing global landscape.

In accordance with our founding remit, we aim to bring together those with a strong interest in international affairs and to offer them the opportunity to exchange opinions and ideas, and to engage in informed debate. Through our publications and our website, we enable their expertise to be disseminated widely.

GSF's core activity consists of a regular lunchtime lecture and debate series on topical issues. For more in-depth discussion of specific topics, we host seminars in the House of Lords. We also hold small roundtable lunches and dinners on key issues of the day. Separately, as well as our annual compendium of lectures and the publication of the proceedings of our seminars, we publish an occasional series of monographs as well as collections of essays and articles by distinguished experts.

We are supported by a committed and active Advisory Board of MPs, Peers and experienced foreign and defence policy practitioners. We are delighted that this year, the Advisory Board has been joined by **Professor Michael Clarke** and **Sir Iain Lobban KCMG CB**. We are also honoured that **Secretary Chuck Hagel** has agreed to re-join GSF's Advisory Board, following his tenure as US Secretary of Defense.

In 2015-2016, we hosted a total of 25 lunchtime events and seminars, comprising eleven lectures, ten debates, three seminars and the launch of the GSF/British Council publication, *'The Value Of Dialogue In Times Of Hostility And Insecurity'*, a collection of essays and personal reflections, at the National Liberal Club. We also celebrated our 10th anniversary in 2016 with a series of anniversary lectures and a special publication.

The following speakers addressed our lecture series: **Professor Margaret MacMillan**, Warden of St. Antony's College and a Professor of International History at the University of Oxford; **General Sir Peter Wall GCB CBE ADC Gen**, Chief of the General Staff (2010-2014); **Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG**, British Ambassador to the United Nations (1998-2003); **Stephen Grey**, Special Correspondent with Reuters in London; **Rob Wainwright**, Director of Europol; **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**, Founding Chairman of Global Strategy Forum; **His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal**; **Professor Michael Mandelbaum**, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC; **Professor Brendan Simms**, Professor of the History of European International Relations at the University of Cambridge; **His Excellency Mr. Matthew W. Barzun**, Ambassador of the United States of America to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and **Professor Ali Ansari**, Professor of Iranian History and Founding Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews.

We have held ten debates over the past year on a number of topics including: the UK-China

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relationship; Myanmar's transition to democracy; India's international relations; Egypt five years after Tahrir Square; prospects for the Middle East five years after the 'Arab Spring'; nuclear weapons and 21st century threats; the goals of British foreign policy; relations between Russia and the West; the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its legacy in the Middle East; and Britain and the EU.

Additionally, we have hosted or co-hosted three seminars, as follows:

- A seminar entitled '*Jihadi News Corp: The Online Battleground?*', which took place in the National Liberal Club on 2nd December 2015 and was co-hosted with the Oxford Media Network and co-chaired by **Lord Lothian** and **Deborah Pout**, Founder of the Oxford Media Network.
- A seminar entitled '*Iran, Saudi Arabia, Power Shifts And Sectarian Divides: The Challenging Geopolitics Of The Middle East*', which took place in Convocation Hall, Church House on 24th February 2016 and was chaired by **Lord Lothian**.
- A seminar held in collaboration with the House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee and entitled '*Europe In The World: Towards A More Effective EU Foreign And Security Strategy*', which took place in Convocation Hall, Church House on 9th March 2016 and was chaired by **Lord Lothian**.

As well as our annual compendium of lectures, we have produced two further publications.

- In March 2016, we co-published a collection of essays and personal reflections, '*The Value Of Dialogue In Times Of Hostility And Insecurity*', with the British Council. We held a launch event at the National Liberal Club on 15th March 2016, at which a number of the contributors spoke. The event was co-chaired by **Sir Ciarán Devane**, Chief Executive of the British Council and **Lord Lothian**.
- In May 2016, we published a pamphlet in celebration of GSF's decade in existence, entitled '*The 10th Anniversary Compendium 2006-2016: A Miscellany of Essays, Articles And Reflections By Members Of GSF's Advisory Board*'. It was launched by **Lord Lothian** at a 10th anniversary reception on Wednesday 11th May 2016. The publication contains essays by eleven GSF Advisory Board members, with a foreword by GSF President **Johan Eliasch**.

A full list of all our events during 2015-2016 can be found at page 99.

Further information on all our activities and events, including audio transcripts, as well as pdfs of all our publications can be found at our website, [www.globalstrategyforum.org](http://www.globalstrategyforum.org).

## THE LECTURES

### **How Peace Ends And How Wars Start: The Relevance Of The First World War Today?**

Professor Margaret MacMillan

### **The Utility Of British Defence In Today's Strategic Context**

General Sir Peter Wall GCB CBE ADC Gen

### **Seventy Years On: Is The UN Running Out Of Steam?**

Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG

### **The New Spymasters: Inside Espionage From The Cold War To Global Terror**

Stephen Grey

### **The Terrorist Threat In The EU: The View From Europol**

Rob Wainwright

### **The International Implications Of Half-Baked Foreign Policy**

Lord Lothian PC QC DL

### **Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants: Commemorating The First Arab Awakening**

His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal

### **The Past, Present And Future Of American Foreign Policy**

Professor Michael Mandelbaum

### **Britain's Europe: A Thousand Years Of Conflict And Cooperation**

Professor Brendan Simms

### **The Special Relationship 70 Years On: Is The Magic Still There?**

His Excellency Mr. Matthew W. Barzun

### **Iran One Year After The Nuclear Agreement: Challenges, Opportunities And Prospects?**

Professor Ali Ansari



## HOW PEACE ENDS AND HOW WARS START: THE RELEVANCE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR TODAY?

Transcript of a lecture given by Professor Margaret MacMillan

20th October 2015

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**Margaret MacMillan** is the Warden of St. Antony's College and a Professor of International History at the University of Oxford. Her books include 'Women of the Raj' (1988, 2007); 'Peacemakers: The Paris Conference Of 1919 And Its Attempt To End War' (2001); and 'Seize The Hour: Six Days That Changed The World' (2006) and 'The Uses and Abuses Of History' (2008). Her most recent book is 'The War That Ended Peace: The Road To 1914'. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature and an Officer of the Order of Canada.

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Thank you very much indeed for that very kind introduction, and thank you all for having what I hope will be the patience to listen to me. I thought perhaps I should talk about more topical things - the Canadian federal election - but perhaps, on reflection, 1914 is a bit more interesting, certainly to people here.

What I want to do is talk about how wars start and I think it is not just how they start, but how peace ends, because in any society, there is a balance between war and peace. One of the dangers in looking at how wars start is we tend to think they were predetermined - because they started, we tend to think they had to start. The trouble of course with the First World War is there are so many possible reasons why it might have started that we tend to overlook the reasons why it may not have started or should not have started.

We do not learn very clear lessons from history and I do not think we will get a blueprint for how to deal with the future, but I do think we are living in a world, which in certain key respects, is not unlike the world before 1914. A time of rapid change, whether technological or social, a time which had its tensions, challenges to governance structures, rapid movements of people around the world, rapid transmission of ideas, rapid transmission of finances, and also uneasy feelings that this might all be too fast, and I think an uneasy feeling which again is very reminiscent of today, that the international power structure is changing in ways that we are not yet entirely clear about.

As I say, I do not think history is going to help us predict what is going to happen in our own times, but I think it helps us to gain understanding and particularly in complicated and troubled times, we need as much understanding as we can get.

History helps us to understand others and I think this is very important.

One of the things that so clearly was happening as Europe moved towards the First World War was that people were failing to understand what those on the other side might be thinking. What they were doing was projecting onto others their own fears and their own assumptions, and so the Germans tended to assume they knew what the Russians were thinking, the Russians tended to assume they knew what Austria-Hungary was thinking. The British tended to assume that all the

foreigners were thinking strange things and they need not bother really to pay much attention to it.

I do think it is important to try and understand the cultural values, the biases, the assumptions that others are making so that we can at least have some sense of why they are behaving in certain ways. I think it also helps us to understand ourselves better. We all tell stories about others, but we also tell stories about ourselves and we persuade ourselves that our motives are always for the best and those of others are always for the worst and I think history will help us at least to look with a certain amount of analysis and a certain amount of necessary scepticism about ourselves and others.

The other way where history could help as we try to puzzle out the present is that it helps us to be aware of possibilities. It helps us to be aware that things are not fore-ordained (I do not believe they are in history), that there are alternatives, and it makes us aware of those alternatives.

We look back at the history, for example, of Russia and today I think we are tending to assume that Russia is inimical to the West, that it is intent on mischief, but of course there have been other Russias and other relationships that Russia has had with the West and it is useful at least to remember that there are those other possibilities.

History also helps us to formulate questions and if we cannot ask questions about the present, then we do not have any hope of trying to make any sense of it. So what history can do is help us think through by offering similar situations (not situations that are the same, but similar) so that at least we can say: are we in a situation as Europe was before 1914, where the war plans were increasingly offensive, where they were assuming that a general war was going to break out? I do not think we are in such a situation today, but it will help us at least to be aware of that possibility, to ask the questions. It is very important to be able to ask questions, to try and understand what sort of things we need to know.

A final way that history helps us is to distinguish between what is genuinely new and what only seems to be new, because we tend always, in every age, to assume that everything that is happening is happening for the first time and history helps to remind us that sometimes similar things have happened before, that not everything is absolutely new under the sun.

What I would like to do is just look a bit at 1914, then look at the First World War itself and then look at some of the consequences and suggest where there might be parallels with today, not to say that these are exact parallels, that we are living in anything like the world of 1914, but simply to say there are some instructive parallels.

One thing I would like to talk about is globalisation. We tend to assume that our age is the age of the greatest globalisation the world has ever seen, but if you look at the decade or so before 1914, it was a period of tremendous globalisation. The world was linked together economically through new forms of communication, through mass movements of people - as many people were moving around the world as have moved around the world since the end of 1990s.

Globalisation, so many of those at the time thought (and I think we have heard very much the same in the last decade or so), was going to knit the world closer together, it was going to iron out differences among people, was going to make us more dependent upon each other and therefore

was going to help make the world a more peaceful place.

If we look at the period of globalisation before 1914, we realise that that was not necessarily the case. Globalisation did not necessarily bring greater harmony between peoples. Germany and Great Britain were each other's greatest trading partners before 1914. That did not prevent them from developing very acute rivalry: colonial rivalry, of course naval rivalry, trade rivalry, and in the end, did not prevent them from going to war against each other.

We can see something similar today with China and the United States, that these two countries are linked together economically, there is enormous trade between the two of them, enormous investments by the Chinese in American Treasury bonds for example, big American investments in China, but this has not led to greater harmony and so I think we need to have a certain amount of scepticism about globalisation and its benefits.

What globalisation also brought before 1914 and I think we are seeing it again today, is a resistance by those were not benefitting from it and globalisation does not benefit everyone equally and there are losers. There were losers then and there are losers today. For example, in Europe, the spread of cheap agricultural goods undercut land prices, the big wheat fields that opened up in the Americas undercut the prices that landowners in Europe were getting for their wheat and for their other produce and there was a gradual movement of people having to sell their land, landowners being dispossessed. Many of them understandably turned to parties which seemed to protect them, and so you have got the rise of protectionist movements and in some cases, very right-wing movements.

In the cities, you got resistance to mass industrialisation, the mass production of cheap consumer goods again which was fostered by globalisation, you got resistance from the small shopkeepers, artisans whose livelihoods were being undercut and in some cases disappearing, and it was those sort of people who fuelled the right-wing and in many cases, anti-Semitic parties in cities such as Vienna or Berlin or the other great cities of Europe.

So globalisation can be, as we know, extraordinarily disruptive and can lead to a reaction: people seeking parties which seem to offer some sort of protection against the winds of globalisation. You also find before 1914, as today, people taking refuge in smaller identities and strong, nationalist movements throughout Europe before 1914 often based on smaller and smaller ethnicities. I think we are seeing something of the same today - this is part of the impetus between, for example, Basque nationalism, Catalan nationalism and of course, Scottish nationalism.

Of course, globalisation was not just about the movement of goods and peoples, it was also the spread of ideas and while many of those ideas helped to open doors for people, many of those ideas were also disruptive and so you saw the rapid transmission through print mainly and through the telegraph, through mass newspapers, of ideas such as terrorism. The period before 1914 was a period in which there was real concern about what people called anarchism. A tremendous number of terrorist activities: bombs thrown on the floor of the Paris Bourse for example, a number of leading figures were assassinated, including one of the Tsars of Russia, the Spanish Prime Minister, the French Foreign Minister. These were periods when people felt uneasy about what globalisation meant and uneasy about the ways in which disruptive ideas were travelling and so globalisation is one of the themes I would like to call your attention to. It does have very mixed impact and very mixed consequences.

The second thing is the very pace of change. People felt before 1914 that change was almost too quick. There was a lot of worry about what rapid transit was doing to people. When the French Metro opened, there were very worried articles in French newspapers saying that going on the Metro, people were going too fast and something would happen to their nervous systems, their nerves would get jangled. A new disease was actually invented called neurasthenia for people whose nerves were stretched too much by the modern world. And what the newspapers also pointed out when the French Metro opened was that it would be a very fertile field for pickpockets - in that at least they were right!

But there was a fear at the speed of change, at the ways in which society was being transformed and considerable worry - and I think we are beginning to get it again today - about what this meant to be human. What did the rapid changes in society, the advances in medical science and other sorts of science, the new sorts of activities that people were undertaking, what did this mean for society? What did it mean for human nature? What did it mean for human beings?

In 1914 and the years before, there was tremendous concern about degeneracy. Was the human race going downhill? Was it in some ways losing contact with nature? Real concern that far too many people were living too long and reproducing themselves, thanks to medical science.

It is by no coincidence that in this period, you get the first eugenics movement, an international movement which had adherents in many countries, the idea that you could somehow keep the race from becoming degenerate by breeding it and by weeding out the unfit. This was not just a fringe movement. The International Eugenics Congress held a meeting in London in the Royal Albert Hall in 1912 and its patrons included the President of Harvard University, Alexander Graham Bell and Winston Churchill, so this was something that spoke to a deep-rooted concern.

I do not think we are in danger of seeing another eugenics movement today, but I think we do have concerns about what science and technology are doing to what it is to be human. There is talk now about enhancing human capabilities through drugs or through nanotechnology. What is this going to do to us? Are we going to become partly computers and partly human in some as yet unforeseen way? And so I detect some sort of ripple of concern, very like what there was before 1914, that something is happening and we are not quite sure what it is and we are not quite sure what science is doing. There is in our own times, as there was before 1914, a reaction to science. There were those who said science cannot explain everything and is in fact leading us down a sterile and dangerous path. Before 1914, there was a very marked increase in spiritualism, people who believed they could get in touch with an unseen world, a deep interest in the things that could not be quantified, could not be measured and things such as the human spirit and I think we are seeing something of the same today. There are those who are now becoming very apprehensive about where science might be taking us and becoming very sceptical about the idea that science can explain or settle everything.

Another area where I think there are similarities between 1914 and today is in the importance of public opinion. It takes a different form today, of course. Increasingly politicians are looking at the Twittersphere or looking at blogs, increasingly aware of that whole electronic world, but I think they feel the same sense of bewilderment and sometimes frustration that politicians and political elites felt before 1914. There was this new and rather difficult force to deal with. How did you measure it? How did you manipulate it? They were increasingly thinking before 1914 about how to

manipulate public opinion. A number of foreign offices set up their own departments to deal with the press and governments increasingly were aware of the need to keep the mass media, mainly the press, on their side.

I think then as now, governments found public opinion sometimes contradictory, bewildering, and frankly, quite unhelpful. Lord Salisbury, the great Conservative Prime Minister said in 1890, *'I don't like this public opinion, I don't like the fact that my Government has to be aware of it.'* He said, *'It's like living in a gigantic lunatic asylum - but I have to live there.'* This was something that now had to be dealt with and I think we do have a similar feeling today that public opinion is unpredictable, frequently irrational, and will push political leaders in directions in which they may not necessarily want to go.

Before 1914 as well, you can see increasingly the importance of ideas. There is a tendency, perhaps particularly in prosperous democratic societies, to rule out or to downplay the importance of ideas, but before 1914, we see just how important the ways in which people thought about themselves and others were and the ways in which people thought about what sorts of societies they might want. I think this has been borne in on us again since 2001. No one or few in the 1990s would have predicted how important religiously-inspired visions of the future or visions of alternative societies would be and I think we are realising yet again, just the great power that ideas can have.

Before 1914, the great revolutionary and mobilising ideas were revolutionary socialism in all its various manifestations and nationalism. Both of them forces which were very difficult to control, which would persuade their adherents to, if necessary, give their lives for them, very difficult to predict where people would suddenly pop up.

You had before 1914 as you have today, young people radicalising themselves. The Young Bosnians, as they were known, who plotted to kill the Archduke at Sarajevo had read about Russian revolutionary terrorists, had read about French revolutionary terrorists and had radicalised themselves and had decided on their own that they would try and assassinate a leading figure from Austria-Hungary and fate, of course, sent them one of the most important figures of all in the shape of the Archduke.

I think we are seeing something very similar today. The mechanisms through which people radicalise themselves may be different, but the phenomenon is there. Of course, we still do see ethnic conflicts today, nationalist conflicts, and I think we are getting a fresh appreciation of just how difficult these are to contain and how difficult to manage.

Another parallel between then and now is the role that fear played and does play in our own times. Here was a very prosperous Europe, a Europe which had had a century of almost unbroken peace. There had been wars, of course, but they had almost entirely, except for the Crimean War, been between only two protagonists, they had been short and they had been decisive. So Europeans by 1914 had come to think that war was something that if it happened, would actually settle something and would not have a great cost to the rest of society, but increasingly, Europeans were starting to think that war would not come at all.

So on the one hand, you had this society that had a certain degree of complacency, certain types of assumptions about the future, but at the same time, it was a society that was wracked in some

ways by fears. Fears of degeneracy, fears of what the modern world was bringing, but also fears of one class about another class.

A number of the European governments before 1914 were very apprehensive about their own working classes, afraid that there would be revolution. You got in certain countries, Germany for one, those who argued that in fact, a war would be a very good thing, because it would mobilise the nation, bring people together, it would overcome the social and political divisions within the nation, and/or it might provide the excuse and the opportunity to crack down on things like unions, constitutions, Reichstags. Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, had a great deal of trouble in July 1914 as it became evident that Germany was going to war, persuading the militarists around the Kaiser and the Kaiser himself, that they should not immediately ban all trade unions, that they should not immediately treat all socialists as if they were traitors. He said rightly that, *'Germans and I can bring them along'* and of course, bring them along he did.

But this was a fear and I think it helps to contribute to the sense of an uneasy Europe, a Europe which on the one hand seems to have so many advantages before 1914, but is fearful about what those advantages might mean.

So I think there was that fear and there was also a fear of others. It is tied in, of course, with nationalism and the mass media, but increasingly you get peoples in one country (and this is a popular phenomenon, not just at the level of elites) concerned that peoples in another country are in some ways their hereditary enemies.

Social Darwinism which purported to divide up the human species into a number of antagonistic races, plays a very large part in this. You get French military attachés in Berlin writing back to their government in Paris, saying, *'Well, we don't expect anything of the Germans, they are planning to attack us, we know that, after all, they are our hereditary enemies,'* and that is, I think, extremely dangerous and that is exactly what of course the Germans were saying about the French at the same time, or the Germans were saying about the Russians, or the Russians were saying about the Germans.

There was a lot of talk before 1914 about how the Teutons and the Slavs were condemned by nature to fight each other. That was simply a fact of nature. We are getting something of the same today in some of the rhetoric around the relationship between the United States and China on both sides, that our peoples are so different in their cultures, in their interests, in their values, that it is understandable they will be at odds with each other. It is a very dangerous rhetoric because it tends to assume that something is inevitable, which most certainly is not. It is dangerous and that of course feeds in to the assumption that the other side is planning to do something. If your hereditary enemy is just over the border, well they are bound to be planning to do something to you.

So Germany or the German High Command became increasingly apprehensive of what the Russians were up to. The more the Russians built railways, the more the Germans became convinced that this was part of a coherent plan to invade Germany. I do not think Russian planning was that coherent, but certainly there were those in Russia who said, *'Sooner or later, we have to have a war with Germany.'* And where that fed in to creating greater instability in 1914 was that the German High Command put pressure on the Kaiser and on the civilian leadership saying, *'Look, if a war is coming, which is likely because we are bound to fight the Russians sooner or later, we must do*

*it now, we will not be able to do it in 1917, because Russia will be too strong.*’ Rather the same argument that the Japanese militarists used in 1941, just before Pearl Harbor.

The second thing that was happening with the fear, not just of the enemy, but there was also fear about your own allies and this is something which helped to add to the instability. Again, we can see parallels with today. Germany was worried about losing Austria-Hungary before 1914, because they did not really have anyone else and they knew they could not rely on Italy - the Italians had made it quite clear that they would think of their own interests first and I think this was a very sensible decision by the Italian government. So from the German point of view, if they did not back Austria-Hungary as it moved to confront Russia over Serbia, they might lose it and that meant (and we can see it again today) that the weaker ally actually pulled along the more powerful ally, because the more powerful ally did not dare admit that it could no longer support its weaker ally. Russia did the same with Serbia before 1914.

We see something the same today with, for example, the United States and Taiwan, the United States and Israel. I think you get a sense in which the weaker partner in fact has a tremendous amount of leverage over the patron and that can be dangerous.

The other sort of fear was the fear of simply not being able to go to war when it was necessary. There was a great fear about what this would mean for the honour of the nation and we got language before 1914 - it does not have an exact parallel today, but I think there is something similar - a talk of the honour of the nation, how if we back down, we will no longer hold our heads up. In July 1914, in St. Petersburg as they were trying to decide what to do about Serbia and about the growing threat from Austria-Hungary, there was a lot of talk about how Russia will never be able to hold its head up again as a great power if it does not back Serbia this time. Some of them said, *‘Better to perish bravely than not to fight.’* I am not sure we get exactly the same language today, but I think when nations talk about prestige and credibility, there is something of that notion there, that we cannot afford to back down because of what it might mean to us.

The final parallel I would like to draw is in the complacency which a long period of peace can engender. Europe was a tense continent. There were domestic difficulties within most countries. The British of course were preoccupied with the Irish question for most of July 1914, which is why they did not pay enough attention to what was happening far away in the Balkans.

I think the complacency was dangerous, because people tended to assume that the period of peace would go on. Because there had been a series of crises, people tended to assume that *‘we’ll get through them, you know, we’ve got through so many.’* There had been crises in 1908 over the annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary. There had been crises in 1911 over the Italian invasion of Tripoli and a Moroccan crisis. A crisis in 1912 with the First Balkan War, a crisis in 1913 with the Second Balkan War and on each occasion, there had been talk of a general war. People saying, *‘This is probably it, we might well have a general war,’* and some people saying, *‘Actually, it would be good to get it over with.’* That was also a dangerous sort of sentiment, that we are living in something like the time before a thunderstorm, it will be a great relief to us all if we get it over.

But what you got in 1914 was the sort of cumulative effect of these previous crises, where people said, *‘It’s just another crisis, we’ve just had two crises in the Balkans, we know how they’ll turn out.’* There will be a lot of talking, a lot of huffing and puffing, there will be mobilisation of troops,

there will be some preparations to put pressure on the other side, but that is all deterrence. And then there will be a conference of Ambassadors - that was Sir Edward Grey's solution to the two previous crises and his solution again in 1914: *'We'll call the powers together, we'll revive the concept of Europe, we'll put pressure on the two antagonists [who by the end of July 1914 were at this stage primarily Russia and Austria-Hungary] and we will tell them to make some sort of settlement.'* And that is what most Europeans thought would happen. It looked exactly or very much like the other crises and so of course, they failed to take it seriously until it was nearly too late.

It was not just the ordinary public who failed to take it seriously, it was those who were actually making the decisions. Theodor Wolff, who was the Editor of the *Berliner Zeitung*, a very important newspaper, always took his family to Ostend in Belgium for their summer holidays on the seashore and he was preparing to take his family on 27th July for their usual summer holiday and he said to the German Foreign Secretary, von Jagow, who was a friend, *'Look, things seem a bit tense, do you think I should really take my family to Belgium?'* And von Jagow said, *'Of course, this will settle itself like all the other crises, you are perfectly safe.'* And so off Wolff went with his family, deposited them with their buckets and umbrellas on the seashore, and went back to Berlin and had to go back the next day to get them and very nearly did not get them out in time.

A very, very dangerous complacency and I think we should be careful of that today. We have had, at least in the West (not the rest of the world, but in the West), an extraordinarily long period of peace and I think we have come to think that it will go on forever and that somehow we will muddle through. Finally, where the First World War should worry us is that we do not always muddle through as it shows very clearly, and human failings and accidents can play a very large part.

I think it is still possible, if Europe had had better leadership in July 1914, it would not have gone to war. The crisis that unfolded in the Balkans was a minor crisis by the standards of the time. It was, of course, a blow to Austria-Hungary. They had lost the heir to their throne, not that they mourned him much, he was not popular in Austria-Hungary, but they had lost their heir. It was really the decisions by individuals to make something of that crisis which turned the crisis into something much more serious.

In Vienna, they had been waiting for an excuse to deal with Serbia, which they saw as an existential threat to the future of Austria-Hungary. Serbia as the magnet for all the South Slavs living within Austria-Hungary (and the Serbs talked in such terms) was for Austria-Hungary a threat to its very existence. If the South Slavs began to get restive, then so would the Poles, so would the Ruthenians, so would the Italians, so would the Germans, so would the Czechs, so would the Slovaks, there would be nothing left. So for Austria-Hungary, Serbia had to be contained or destroyed and the assassination of the Archduke gave them the opportunity. And they were reckless, they knew that Russia might come in, but they tried to tell themselves (and I think our capacity to deceive ourselves is huge), they kept telling themselves, *'Yes, Russia could come in, it might have an excuse, but they won't, they don't really want war, they're not ready for war,'* and they projected into Russia what they hoped would be the case and Russia, of course, was ready for war. So I think the quality of leadership in 1914 was a very key factor and the decisions that were made.

The second fatal decision in my view is Germany's decision to back Austria-Hungary completely, knowing again that Russia might come in and again, that was a human decision. It was not inevitable. Germany had not backed Austria-Hungary on previous occasions. It could have done

the same this time, even at the risk of losing Austria-Hungary and that might have been best for Germany, because by allying itself to Austria-Hungary, it took on Austria-Hungary's quarrels with Russia in the Balkans. These were not Germany's quarrels, but they made them their quarrels by supporting Austria-Hungary to the hilt. So the decision was made in Berlin and I think it is a reflection of the way that the German constitution is constituted, that the Kaiser had far too much power. He had his own military cabinet. He was ultimately responsible for foreign policy and defence policy, military policy, and he was not someone who should have been entrusted with that power. I look at the crowned Heads of Europe in 1914 and I think it is a very strong argument against the hereditary principle.

The Tsar in Russia, who is the third piece in this awful chain of events (and it is a very short time, it is only five weeks from the assassination to the outbreak of general war; five weeks from a long period of peace to the catastrophic war of 1914-18) then took the decision that it would mobilise in support of Serbia and it would mobilise against Austria-Hungary. The Tsar, who was a weak man, a very decent man, very good to his family, but not again fitted to be the Tsar of All Russia, with all the sorts of pressures that were on him, was pressured by his generals to order a general mobilisation, and he said, *'Can we not mobilise just against Austria-Hungary?'* and he was told, *'No, our plans don't allow for it.'* I think that was not just a failure of the moment. That was a failure to look previously at what the military were planning. It is absolutely essential that you know what your military are planning, because otherwise you reach a crisis and they say, *'Sorry, we've only got one plan, we will have to follow that.'*

So the Tsar who had resisted the pressure, finally caved in and signed a general mobilisation. The Foreign Minister Sazonov went to get his signature (he was in his Palace outside St. Petersburg), phoned it through (the phone was just coming in at this point) to the general in charge of mobilisation and said, *'He's finally decided to authorise mobilisation, smash the phone, we don't want any changes of his mind.'* And so Russia mobilised and then Germany faced the same problem and again the same issue came up. It turned out the German military only had plans for two-front mobilisation and the Kaiser, who was not strong enough to stand up to them, said, *'Look, can't we just mobilise against Russia?'* And they said *'No, we've only got the one plan,'* and again he gave way. So I think if you look at the period before 1914, it is accident, it is a failure of leadership and we should be very, very worried that the same thing can happen again.

The structures in the end were not strong enough to deal with it. And of course, once the First World War started, it proved to be almost impossible to stop. Once you get war on that scale, which nobody really had imagined or very few people had imagined, it involved societies as a whole, it involved not just manpower, it involved the people in the factories, it involved the wives, the families at home and of course it involved the children because they were the future soldiers. And so you had to coin a new word as the French did and they called it 'total war' and war indeed was becoming increasingly total. But it became difficult to stop because once you had lost on that scale, it became very difficult to say, *'This was all a mistake.'* Now people have often asked me: why didn't they just stop at Christmas 1914 and say, *'Look, this was a mistake and we're all losing, let's just make peace.'* You cannot say it. You cannot say it to your publics when you have already lost 200,000 men, 300,000 men. Some of the greatest losses in the First World War were in those first few months of 1914.

The war went on and of course in its wake it absorbed more and more of the resources of society. It brought in more and more nations and it left a dreadful legacy for Europe and I think this is

something we should be conscious of. I do not see necessarily the same things happening today, but possibly you will think of parallels. War was extended in ways that people had not imagined before 1914. It was extended to civilians, it brought in science, it brought in resources, it brought mass psychological mobilisation and I think we are seeing something of an extension of war today in different ways. We are seeing extension of war to the cyber sphere, this is a whole new area of war; we are seeing, of course, as you saw in the First World War, the use of propaganda to mobilise your own side and to undermine the others. The Islamic State has been absolutely brilliant in its use of propaganda, it has been one of its great strengths.

I think what also happened as a result of the war was the brutalisation of society and a weakening of social structures. It is fair to say of social and political structures that without the First World War, we would not have had the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. The war made it possible.

And I think we would not have had the spread of revolutionary ideologies through Europe without the First World War. The war both brutalised society and shook the faith of Europeans in their own structures and in their own societies and it is very striking how much more violent politics became after 1918. A mass violence in the streets, a brutal sort of street theatre, the use of assassination, some 300 political assassinations in Germany in the first few years of the 1920s, and so you see what prolonged war can do. I think we are seeing the same, not in Europe of course, which has at least temporarily and we hope forever, moved beyond that, but we are certainly seeing it in parts of the world such as Afghanistan, Yemen, the Middle East. These wars, low-level as they may seem, are inflicting damage on society which I think will take a very long time to rebuild and to repair.

So where are we today? In some ways of course it is different. I think we have stronger international structures. We have far more state players than there were in 1914 and that may be a good or a bad thing. We do have something they did not have so much in 1914 and that is failed states which provide a haven for terrorists of various sorts and also provide a destabilising influence on their peripheries and that is something which we have not yet learnt to deal with.

We do still have the possibility of war on a number of levels and we tend to think that the future of war will be low-grade wars with high-grade weapons, with shifting sides as you are seeing in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq today, with people changing sides for temporary advantage, inflicting enormous amounts on the unfortunate civilians who happen to be in their way, but not necessarily destabilising the wider world or only causing a momentary concern to the wider world through terrorist acts. This is possible, but I think we still face the possibility of wars between organised states. This has not yet gone away. Again, possibly not in Europe, but if you look at the relationships between China and Japan or China and the United States, those relationships are tricky. They are as tricky as some of the relationships before the First World War and I think offer the possibility of state-to-state conflict.

I am not offering any very clear solutions. I am saying that I think we are in for a very difficult and turbulent time. The news in the past year has only confirmed that view, at least on my part, but I would be very interested to hear what you say and we still have the old problem that you had in 1914: how do you produce good leadership when you need it and how do you cope with accidents? I do not have an answer to either of those. Maybe you do.

Thank you.

## THE UTILITY OF BRITISH DEFENCE IN TODAY'S STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Transcript of a lecture given by General Sir Peter Wall GCB CBE ADC Gen

27th October 2015

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**General Sir Peter Wall** completed a 40-year career in the Army. He was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1974, and finished as Army Chief from 2010 to 2014. He has served all over the world, including operational command tours in Rhodesia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He has extensive experience of Whitehall and working at the top of Government. Following the 2010 Defence Review, he led the Army through its most significant restructuring for a generation to reduce costs and optimise operational effectiveness. He is now Director of Amicus, a strategic leadership consultancy, specialising in imparting his military command experience to the corporate world, with emphasis on strategic planning and execution, development of senior leaders, reputation, and resilience and trust. He has played his fair share of sport and follows it avidly.

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Thank you very much, Michael.

My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, as they say in the Antipodes, this is my 'deboo' at Global Strategy Forum. To ensure a bit of audience participation, I would like a show of hands on which of you thinks that the UK's standing as an international player on the world stage has been enhanced in the five years since our last Defence Review and who would take the opposite view.

Let's take the opposite view first [*overwhelming show of hands*]. Yes, I do not think we will worry about the rest! I really want to dissect some of this and understand the relevance of military capability in that context.

There was a National Security Strategy in 2010. Many of us thought it was actually quite a good document, but it did predict - conveniently - a relatively benign outlook for the UK in terms of threats to our national interest and to things we care about for the first half of the decade starting in 2010 (i.e. the five years that have just gone by) and that was a basis for feeling comfortable about some quite significant reductions in defence expenditure. It did have some lines in it and there were some proclamations from the Prime Minister in the House of Commons about the prospect of a need to re-invest in the latter part of the decade, that is, the period we are now facing.

Meanwhile, the strong message from the Foreign Office was: '*We are not going to have any strategic shrinkage on the back of this defence reduction,*' which is what you would say if you were about to do that, isn't it? And if you re-read the National Security Strategy, which is a well-constructed document, you conclude that it was probably as much tuned for the domestic audience in the UK in the context of the politics and the economic austerity of the time as it was to all the other people in the world who would have been reading it very avidly and perhaps drawing the opposite deductions from the ones that were implied for the home audience.

So there was an external message, perhaps unintentionally. The financial impact on defence was to

remove several billion pounds from the defence budget. There was all this stuff about, 'Well, we've got a £38 billion overhang,' but of course if you look at that objectively, that was less than 10% of the ten-year programme and it was essentially the unfunded aspiration that was removed and that has gradually been replaced by the new set of unfunded aspirations.

There were a number of cash raids on the defence budget in the time that I was CGS. In fact, at every financial event, whether it was the Autumn Statement or the Budget, somewhere between a third and half a billion was taken away. The combined effect of that is that the budget would have declined to well below 2 per cent of GDP, the NATO yardstick, by some time in the next year or so and I think we should be very grateful that that decline has been arrested.

Depending on how you interpret the numbers and what else gets stacked into the account, you cannot escape the fact that being a ring-fenced budget and being out of the melee that has got to find the sums of money that the Chancellor is looking for is a very good thing, a) because it probably means we will have more money; but b) actually one of the things that really does not help a defence budget is the uncertainty and instability you get from fluctuation which really damages your relationship with industry and all the people from whom we are trying to get best value for money.

There were significant cuts to all three Services and there was significant under-investment in key joint capabilities such as maritime patrol aircraft which work for all three Services. Twenty per cent cuts to the Army by way of manpower and money and probably - I do not actually know the numbers, but I guess cuts north of 10 per cent in each of the other two Services and they too are short of manpower. Perhaps in some ways more short than the Army, because they cannot man all of their equipment, whereas the Army just scales its activity in line with the people it has got. And if we need to, we run faster.

So there are big impacts in terms of capital ships, aircraft, scale and resilience in the Army and a number of niche capabilities that I put in the category of resilience, where we will not really know whether it hurts or not until we try and use it all. You do your best to ensure coherence, but until you roll the machinery out of the door, particularly in the case of the Army, you do not really know whether the contractorisation of function X or the absence or obsolescence of function Y is going to hurt you. You do not really know. You cannot put your hand on the heart as CGS and say, 'Do you know, Secretary of State, we've got a problem there, we need to plug that gap,' because you do not know with absolute conviction, in advance, where the gaps are going to appear.

The other thing about the 2010 Review was that a number of very significant capital programmes were retained which were not fully funded and which obviously have an opportunity cost for the rest of the budget. So it was not really balanced and in particular, looming certainly in this ten-year time frame (it was just out of the last ten-year time frame), there is the lack of clarity of the impact of renewing the nuclear deterrent which is a financial issue as well as a key political one, obviously.

And against the backdrop of an expectation of a more benign world, we have been a bit unlucky. We have had the Arab Spring with significant impacts for us, or our involvement, in Libya, Syria and then the caliphate astride the Syrian/Iraq border, the ISIL phenomenon.

We have had the ascent of Russian nationalism. We thought the Cold War had put all of that to bed,

but for reasons we now well understand, it does not seem to have done and it may be coming in our direction.

We have had a second order impact on our security through all the migrant flows that have emanated from the broad instability across North Africa and the Middle East and we have seen the sort of psychological impact of these - this is slightly conjecture, but I cannot help feeling that you make your own luck on these things. The Tunisian beach attack against what turned out to be our soft underbelly, literally, is something you have to wonder whether would have happened had we been taking a bolder posture on a number of these issues in the last few years. We will probably never know.

So there are flaws in assuming you can predict a more benign future. You bestow false credibility on the art of prediction. It always fails us. That is the one thing we know. It diminishes our deterrent message, so it makes us look vulnerable and as a former power that was in the past very much to be reckoned with, I think that effect is amplified. And it makes us look a little bit strategically inept. Whether that is justifiable and acceptable in the context of the economic challenge, you can judge.

I have been really talking so far about capability, although it is difficult not to stray into political aspects and strategy, but that is probably for most of you more a résumé than new news.

So picture the scene. We are all youngsters in the first British Corps and it is the early 1980s and we are staring across the Inner German Border at the 3rd Shock Army, the primary formation of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. A number of you will have been there at the same time in far more senior roles than I was, as a Royal Engineer Captain responsible for laying minefields and destroying bridges in the path of this potentially massive Soviet advance.

But we were taught then that threat is a combination of capability and intent and we could see the capability, but we were never quite clear on the intent. That is how we viewed the world, and all intelligence wonks would tell you: it's about capability and intent.

So perhaps we should look at ourselves now, not just through the lens of the capability that we have, but through the strategic acumen and strategic clarity with which we might be tempted to apply it. How well do we apply military force in pursuit of political goals? What are the legal, moral and practical implications of using those capabilities, those levels of force in a less than effective way? And what impact does that have on our will as a nation to sustain the utility of our military capability through appropriate levels of military expenditure that befit our sense of our role in the world as the United Kingdom (admittedly very much dependent on our alliances and the European Union and so on)?

And so perhaps there is a case for a Strategic Defence Review not only to be looking at balancing the books and coming out with all those excellent papers to convince us that things are not that bad, but actually to step back and say: How good are we at doing strategy? Are our strategic faculties fit for purpose? We will look at some examples in a minute, given where that strategic capability might have been found lacking, but we should also note some successes.

For example, the National Security Council introduced by Mr. Cameron's government around the time of the 2010 SDSR has undoubtedly been a major improvement on what went before. In the

final months of the previous administration I was the MoD's Director of Operations. We had two wars going on at the time, neither of which was going especially well and there was no such strategic apparatus for the Cabinet to get its brain around what we should do next. It was a very haphazard approach, so we need to take heart from the fact that we are in better shape now and the machinery does exist. I am not sure, though, that we always use it to its fullest potential or certainly in accordance with what I believe the strategic need ought to be. When I say its fullest potential, I think we may have lost the knack of strategic clarity and we might need to rebuild that into our thinking.

Let's just quickly trail through a few examples where things might have been done differently. Let's start with Iraq in 2003 - quite topical in light of what Mr. Blair has been saying and the potential for the Chilcot Inquiry to report at some stage.

Well, whether you think that the invasion of Iraq was the right thing to do strategically or was legal or not, the fact is that the aftermath of what we did there was an absolute shambles. The UK was committed to this campaign wholesale, without any leverage as far as I could see of how we were going to tune its performance and its behaviour in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam, which was interesting because we had gone into Afghanistan in 2001 after the Northern Alliance had been empowered by the American military to bring down the Taliban, to fill the void left because of the American policy of not doing nation-building which was their stated doctrine at that time. So armed with that information, we might have thought, *'Here is a potential risk and we need to deal with it.'*

And of course we compounded that problem with the de-Ba'athification strategy, which was going on when I was responsible for running Basra. The only levers I had left to exercise any sort of control over the city in terms of not only its people, but its utilities and administrative faculties were removed, because of their association, as relative moderates, with the Ba'ath Party. Of course the hard-core Ba'athists and the former Republican Guard are now, as we know, the core elements of ISIL, having hitherto been the core elements of al-Qaeda Iraq.

So that raises interesting questions about our strategic wisdom.

In a broader context, the Arab Spring was hailed as an opportunity because it was going to lead to the rapid onset of democracy in a lot of places where we had hitherto had awkward dealings, but without, I think, full cognizance of the risks, which we can now see in the rear-view mirror. It tripped up a number of longstanding and productive relationships with Middle Eastern rulers (not ideal in terms of our value set, but probably the least bad options) and it has constrained our strategies in what has followed. It is interesting that was all on the back of our tendency to remove the harsher regimes when it came to dealing with Islamic fundamentalism, which is why we have the voids that we are dealing with now.

### ***Libya***

One of those was Libya: the one significant foreign policy excursion of Mr. Cameron's last government in humanitarian response to a civil war that was breaking out very violently. Superficially very compelling to do the humanitarian piece when it is just across the water from Europe, but very little understanding of what that was going to mean and the impact of that on the wider region

where we certainly do not have many people who applaud our strategic wisdom, because they are dealing with the instabilities and the fallout, which in turn are fuelling some of these people flows I talked about earlier.

In terms of the lack of a plan for the aftermath, that feels very similar to Iraq. We had a minor foray while I was CGS into training militias from various tribes across Libya to be potential members of the Libyan army, but we did that in Cambridgeshire and it all came to an abrupt halt when they did not pay their bills and their behaviour was a bit extreme, so they left.

## ***Syria***

What would have been the objective if we had got involved in a significant way in Syria at the outset of the conflict? Would it have been to minimise humanitarian impact or would it indeed have been ultimately to try and remove Assad and his government?

We ended up with a sort of tentative effort (and again one wonders whether that was more for the domestic audience and for our relationship with our allies than in terms of decisive effect) in support of the moderate opposition who gradually found they were on the same side as ISIL. It now looks as if we may have to change horses and I absolutely recognise how awkward it would have been to be directly involved with Assad, but it is clear to me we were playing on the wrong side of that equation for rather too long and what we have probably done is exacerbate the humanitarian fallout we may have been trying to abate.

So when did we start to lose this strategic mojo? I think it has probably been creeping up on us for some time, maybe since the end of the Cold War.

More recently you can see it as a function of what happens when you have weak government. You can see the negative reaction and the social drag of the 9/11 campaigns, Iraq/Afghanistan, you can see this sense or era of 'moral disarmament' as one of my French colleagues called it, where we have the capability, but we peddle up front the fact that we are not prepared to use it because it does not meet with public opinion. Even when we did engage, in places like Libya, it was pretty tentative and did not appear to me to have any prospect of decisive outcomes of any strategic note. We have been in situations before where foreign policy has been driven by public opinion and it does not normally serve us very well.

The stated aversion to boots on the ground, where we tell our foes what we are not going to do right up front, just to make their decision-making easier, is an interesting idea, tuned very much for the domestic audience.

We have questions in our own mind, through the lens of public opinion, over the viability of Article 5 in the context of what is going on in Central and Eastern Europe, which is extraordinary really. Is it not our job to lead people to do the right thing, rather than following popular choices? Against that backdrop, if it had been done on a straw poll, I am not sure the United States would have entered the Second World War in 1941 in Europe.

I recognise none of this is easy. I have not sat in a political chair and things like the 24-hour news cycle make it very, very difficult for our political leaders to get ahead of the game, think clearly and

move fast enough to satisfy what is expected of them. But neither has making it up as we go along been demonstrated to have worked, and things like the lost Syria vote are clearly a decisive point in this discussion where, if you trumpet minimalist options, they quite rightly arouse suspicions. The idea to do something bold against the use of chemical weapons has to be right, but if you are describing it as *'a shot across the bows, they'll hardly feel a thing,'* then actually I question whether it is a legal method.

There will be lots of counter-arguments: *'Well, the country was suffering from campaign fatigue.'* *'We work in alliances, so consensus is too difficult.'* *'The public won't have it.'* And so forth. But on balance, I think we can get back on our horse if we take heed of this analysis.

We can play a more significant leadership role in alliances. We can use the national wisdom we have here in Whitehall to describe potential courses of action with more confidence and more clarity. We do have the economic, military and moral clout and actually we have a duty as a P5 member to use those things. So we need to tune our strategic senses and I do not think we can afford many more abortive enterprises.

It is generally accepted that our standing has faltered in the last few years and the next term of government is the period during which we have to reinstate it. We are in that situation where we are not sure whether this is structural or cyclical. A five-year blip you can be forgiven for if you pick up. Two of those on the trot - it starts to look structural.

We could for example (I will not go on about it now, you might want to ask about it in questions) use the incredibly challenging phenomenon of ISIL and what we do about that to prevent it being a multi-generational threat, as a start point for some strategic clarity and for us to take a leadership role.

I will pause there and await your questions. Thank you very much for listening.

## SEVENTY YEARS ON: IS THE UN RUNNING OUT OF STEAM?

Transcript of a lecture by Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG

3rd November 2015

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**Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG** has been Chairman of the UNA-UK Board of Directors since February 2011. He was educated at Harrow School and Worcester College, Oxford. From 1966-1969 he was an Assistant Master at Eton College. He joined HM Diplomatic Service in 1969 and served until 2004. During this time, he served in the British Embassies in Dubai, Washington DC, Saudi Arabia and Paris. He was British Ambassador to the United Nations from 1998-2003, attending over 150 meetings of the UN Security Council and serving as Chairman of the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee from October 2001 to April 2003. He participated in several Security Council missions to Africa to address peacekeeping issues there, including the work of the UN Missions in Sierra Leone and the DRC. From September 2003 to March 2004, Sir Jeremy served as the UK's Special Envoy for Iraq. He was then Director of The Ditchley Foundation (2004-2010) and a Special Adviser to BP plc in the same period. Currently, he is also Chairman of Gatehouse Advisory Partners Ltd (geopolitical specialists) and of Lambert Energy Advisory Ltd (upstream oil and gas). He is a special advisor to the International Rescue Committee-UK and to the NGO Forward Thinking.

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Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, good afternoon. Thank you for joining the Global Strategy Forum again.

I am going to talk about the UN, but I am going to talk about more than the UN, because what I want to say on the basis of this title, is what is running out of steam and why, what are the consequences, and what should we do about it.

To some extent, Chairman, I think I am following on from what Margaret MacMillan was saying to us a couple of weeks ago, about the echoes from the period leading up to the First World War. She was very gentle and nuanced - as the great expert historian on that period - in drawing direct links between what is happening now and that period from the late 19th century onwards, but she left in our minds a clear set of resonances that things that are happening now can be interpreted partly against history and partly against the completely new environment that we are in today. She was echoing perhaps that apocryphal quote from Mark Twain, that history does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme now and again. And I shall be getting into that.

It is strange to think, as we look back at the seventy years of the UN, that the fifty years from 1950 to 2000 seemed rather more stable and predictable in their historical evolution and in our experience of them if we go back that far, as I do, than the period between 2000 and 2015 and looking forwards. There is something gnawing away at global stability that we need to interpret. And this is the UN's era, invented as a remarkable concept in 1942 between particularly Roosevelt and Churchill, but with other world leaders feeding into the concept, and created in 1945 with the first General Assembly, of course, taking place in Central Hall, Westminster more or less seventy years ago now.

The UN has produced in those seventy years - quite remarkably if you look at the historical analogies of long periods of peace before this one - an equal, meritocratic, free world of sovereign states; a remarkable set of norms and principles, which add up (even for the younger generation coming into adulthood now, as I find talking as Chairman of UNA-UK to schools and universities) to a description of legitimacy in international affairs through the Charter, through the Declarations, through the Conventions, norms and principles of the UN; a forum for intergovernmental activity which never existed with this efficiency before, as a place to talk before you shoot, which has led to a remarkable lowering of incidents of interstate war in those seventy years (intrastate war and the breakdown of states is another matter), but interstate war, particularly between the bigger powers has been, under the influence of the UN Charter, something to discuss rather than something to pull the trigger on; and the set of services which do a huge and remarkable job for many hundreds of millions of people around the globe.

But I suppose we are more interested in what it has failed to produce, because that is what the media like to focus on and that is what worries old dinosaurs like myself, thinking that the world must have been better before this era (I am looking back from a number of decades of experience).

It has failed to produce a global system of enforcement of justice; any agreement on global leadership (all of you in your own careers and businesses know that a committee of anything more than eight has to have a subcommittee to actually do the proper work, so a committee of equal states at the level of 193 with no leadership in the General Assembly is never going to be an efficient mechanism); and thirdly, it has failed to produce a view of democracy globally as the best form of government.

I am bringing democracy into this because I am going to have something to say about it, but I would just note as we move on from a description of the UN to a description of what is happening in the world, that those states that are foremost in expressing their deep commitment to democracy domestically are not well known for expressing their deep commitment to democracy internationally or globally, and there is a tension there which we should take account of.

What I am saying, in other words, is that the 1945-created, post World War II-created framework for global security and global politics is running out of steam.

Why?

I am going to put in front of you three main reasons.

Firstly, institutions are bad at reforming themselves. I think that includes domestic institutions, but they have a better shot at it in a smaller context than international ones, but it really is true as a matter of my own observation that international institutions are very bad at reforming themselves and it is for an absolutely natural reason: that the world changes more quickly than institutions can change and the compromises that lay at the heart of the creation of an institution are not the compromises that affect or need to affect geopolitics today. What the UN suffers from more than anything else is its 1945 heritage. It has not changed the basis of the Charter - once China became an active permanent member of the Security Council, nothing much has changed, except a constant adding-on of new sovereign states - but in its Charter, its practices and its norms and principles of geopolitics, it has not kept up with the strong tides of global change which we will come to in a

moment. It has also inspired some of that change, but with unpredictable consequences that the founding fathers of the UN never really foresaw and I will mention two.

One, this equality that I am talking about - the freedom, equality and meritocracy of sovereign states in today's world - produces that number of states that have absolute legitimacy in deciding their own priorities and of course, their own priorities are likely to be national and domestic, and therefore competitive and different, and there is a problem in resolving the differences that get sharper. It allows every member state to have its own history, its own culture, its own set of resentments, and that word 'equality' - which is true, I think, in the workings of the United Nations and is a great achievement of the United Nations - nevertheless carries a sense for some member states of a recovery from the inequality of previous decades which they still very deeply resent and that resentment is still present in a lot of today's diplomacy.

The second thing the UN produced was self-determination as a principle that led to the freedom of peoples into sovereign states, but with two things missing. It is without a mechanism for resolving the disputes that arose when sovereign states wanted to form themselves in either the same or contiguous territory, and Palestine is a clear example of that, as is Cyprus and other things that have not been solved for fifty or seventy or 100 or 2,000 years. Secondly (and this something which we do not often think about in terms of the concept of self-determination), the UN never decided on a stopping point for self-determination. It is a bit like the sorcerer's apprentice: you divide a territory into its component parts and then those component parts want to divide again, because in an era of freedom and freedom of choice and relative capacity to implement your choices, the human default setting is tribal, it is not national. Where peoples with a certain identity want to form their own political arrangements, they ask to divide into a territory and a tribal (metaphorically or literally) arrangement for that people.

Out of those trends come the elements of a fragmenting world. Fragmentation comes out of freedom, unless at the same pace as freedom is created, the structures of order are created in parallel. We thought that the UN was there to create those structures of order, but the UN is a forum for its member states in geopolitics, it is not a leader or a controller of those member states, so we produce the ingredients of freedom without the ingredients of order.

The third reason is that enforcement is very weak at the global level. There is not an accepted policeman or set of courts or a supreme justice to deliver judgements under the law which must be obeyed or the police will come for you - the International Court of Justice in the Hague is not that. And yet we have not fully analysed the truth of this statement, that in effect the whole global structure of order is voluntary amongst member states.

Now, how do we analyse what is happening now? In all politics, including geopolitics, you have to look at the distribution of power and what happens around the holding of power. Who holds power and has the capacity to project it? What constraints are there on the holding or the use of power? To what use do those entities that have power put their capabilities and what constraints do they have on each other?

If the old global order is running out of steam, what is getting up a head of steam is a much more *ad hoc* set of competing powers filling the vacuum as the institutional framework post-Second World War begins to create that vacuum.

Now I could, if this were a two or three hour lecture, start to talk about the United States, Russia, China, the EU in that context, but if you think about the national behaviours of at least the first three of those - the US, Russia, China - in recent months and years, you will see what I am trying to talk about. And also, if you think about the composition, practice and effectiveness of the European Union at this moment, which is perhaps the big organisation in today's world that is punching seriously below its weight, you will see that some of the things that I am talking about in this lecture also have a bearing on the criteria by which we need to judge whether the EU is going towards a good place or not over the next decade. I am not just talking governments in what I am saying here, because in this freer, more open, more globalised, more communicative world, there is an anti-force, a counter force to globalisation, which is the polarisation of identity, culture and therefore politics, and a rise in the power of the voice of the people.

So there is a new power beyond governments which has a concrete force in politics, as the Arab Spring has shown us - and it is not just the Arab Spring. I would say that the forces acting there are in different circumstances at play in Scotland, in Catalonia, in parts of Africa. The Arab Spring is neither Arab, nor - as we have seen - necessarily a spring in the seasonal sense. The people are being released from a box, it is a 'jack-in-the-box' spring if you like, with a greater power to affect politics than they had in any previous era.

And that too is a fragmenting force, because although there are limits to hard power in today's world, soft power is a reality because persuasion is as effective a means of delivering policy as compulsion. Increasingly, compulsion - political, military, economic - does not work, as we have seen since 2000. So the old methods of the previous, rather more stable era of the second half of the 20th century have been shown in the first fifteen years of this century not really to work in producing the answers we need for our national interest and that goes as much for China and Russia and others whom we do not regard as part of our partnership and alliance as it does for the Western Alliance.

People power, social media, the open awareness of everyone of what is going on and the short term-ness of the media and of democratic political thinking are all fragmenting forces, because we have, I think, shown in the practice of democracies over the last few decades that democracies are wonderful in the moral authority of the people speaking and of the fairness of everyone having a vote eventually and of the freedom to express what they feel about their government and the freedom to remove that government if it is not living up to expectations, but it does not necessarily create a system that thinks strategically, that acts strategically or that plans the future with a long-term, strategic set of common-sense proposals.

In some ways, the greatest democracy of all, the United States, has a Constitution that is *least* attuned to strategic planning and to strategic execution; and yet it was the United States above all that created the freedom of the post-1990 world. There are paradoxes here that are not frequently enough or deeply enough explored in our political debate.

So I suppose I am making a proposition to you. And the proposition is this: that every long period of peace in history ended (tautologously) in a war. But that is more than a tautology. It ended in a war because the institutional framework of those periods of peace eventually broke down and then *ad hoc-ery* took over and political personalities and certain types of leadership or ambition or greed or resentment took over, and that period of peace ended.

But in this period of peace we cannot afford a war of the 20th century variety. Weapons are too big and too destructive. We cannot afford it. Therefore the proposition is that we have to do something unprecedented to preserve this long period of peace, because otherwise human affairs will take us back from competition into conflict into large conflict. That is the historical thing that rhymes unless we change the poetry.

But what is different in this era from the previous eras?

Nuclear weapons, certainly. They exist and they exist in numbers and power to destroy the planet.

We have a particularly powerful momentum in our science and technology which can solve many of the problems that bug states, that bug economies, that get in the way of our energy supply and other problems. A very powerful momentum in science.

There is a global communications network which, although it has its downsides in terms of creating order, is an immense resource and an immense tool for keeping people going in a certain direction, if the persuasion is there.

And fourthly, the United Nations exists. The United Nations is not running out of steam. It is there as an instrument to be used if member states of the United Nations want to use it. Something else is running out of steam, which is the counter force to fragmentation of culture, identity and politics.

And in this long period of peace, all sorts of things have changed in our environment geopolitically and geo-economically, but human DNA has not changed. Our default setting is tribal and our default setting is competitive. We have to do something to counter the natural tendency in our DNA. If anything unprecedented is to happen, then above all it has to be an understanding amongst the biggest powers that they have to work together to avoid a global conflict; that they have to allow each other the freedom to act in their own legitimate space. We have to respect one big power with another, that there is a legitimate sovereign space within which that power can operate and be very careful that we do not cross lines that are not mutually sustainable, otherwise that long period of peace is not itself sustainable.

One other thing. With these fragmenting forces, we have to remember that the case for collective action, the case for being a nation or a regional group or a European Union or a NATO or a global community or a Security Council (working together at fifteen, or maybe who knows, 24 at some stage, but not next year), the case for working collectively to keep a framework within which we enjoy our freedom, because freedom is valueless without that framework of security, has to be restated. Maybe it will be in the Brexit debate to come, maybe it was to some extent in the Scotland debate, maybe it is failing in the larger European Union at this moment, certainly it is failing in parts of Africa and other continents where territories are too big to hold together under one government, but the case for staying together in units larger than tribes has to be restated. I am stating it to you this afternoon, but I do not think that our politicians or other political leaders are at this moment thinking in these terms.

I am looking forward to reading the Foreign Affairs Committee's report on Syria and what they say about the need to work with Russia and Iran to solve the Syrian problem. We have just done something with Iran that has avoided war and given a chance for a resolution of the nuclear issue.

This is actually quite a crossroads opportunity for where the big powers go with each other on solving regional problems that could turn to global conflict. Some of the principles that I have gone over have to lie behind that conversation.

Thank you.

## THE NEW SPYMASTERS: INSIDE ESPIONAGE FROM THE COLD WAR TO GLOBAL TERROR

Transcript of a lecture given by Stephen Grey

14th December 2015

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**Stephen Grey** is Special Correspondent with Reuters in London, and a member of the agency's global investigative team. Best known for uncovering details of the CIA's secret rendition program, as well as covering the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and writing on counterterrorism, he is a former foreign correspondent at the Sunday Times as well as former editor of the paper's Insight investigations unit. He has also been a contributor to the New York Times, Guardian, Times, Independent, New Statesman and Newsweek. He has reported for Channel 4's Dispatches, BBC Newsnight, BBC Radio Four, the BBC World Service, ABC News and US public television. His book on the CIA rendition programme, 'Ghost Plane', was published in 2006, and his book on the military campaign in Helmand, 'Afghanistan, Operation Snakebite' was published in 2009. His most recent book, 'The New Spymasters: Inside Espionage From The Cold War To Global Terror' was published in 2015. He has been nominated for, and won, several major press awards.

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Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for coming today. It is a great honour to be here. There are so many such distinguished people here today and I know many of you have a great deal of knowledge about this subject too.

Let me start with a word from Captain George Hill who was a British Secret Service Officer in 1917 revolutionary Russia. '*Spies in the British Service commonly take up their dangerous duty out of sheer love of adventure,*' he said, and we often see spies as action men. But I found the real story to be a little more complex and interesting.

Hill, at one point under cover, running a Moscow antique shop, was among a generation of Secret Service officers who was a spy himself. But confronted by the zealous attentions of Soviet counter-intelligence, Hill found quickly that the love of adventure was not enough. Gifted as he was, he could not pass as a local and found himself '*again and again compelled to resort to the employment of nationals*' - that is, local agents. And that became the pattern.

So today, a real-life James Bond, the professional intelligence officer, is generally a spymaster, not a spy. He finds someone else, a local man or woman, to act as his agent, to go and steal secrets and to bear most of the risk. Bond is also a civil servant. He has, I was surprised to learn, performance indicators, and also people involved tell me they have to fill out risk assessment forms before they leave bases these days. So spying may be the second oldest profession, but what is new about the last century of spying is that we have created a permanent secret service, the permanent spy bureaucracy.

Let me quote Erskine May from 1863:

*'Nothing is more revolting to Englishmen than the espionage which forms part of the*

*administrative system of continental despotisms,*’ he writes.

But modern history has bequeathed us with a spy service and spymasters that we cannot and should not abolish, certainly not with the nuclear genie out of the bottle in the 20th century.

Permanent spying on the positive side has given us spymasters who are accountable, at least to senior politicians, and who are not for the most part out of control. But the spy world can be a little different than portrayed either in fiction or in propaganda. So, to contrast a speech in 2004 from the CIA’s James Pavitt, who was quoting lines from Rudyard Kipling’s *Kim* to describe the clandestine service that he was just retiring from:

*‘From time to time, God causes men to be born who have a lust to go abroad at the risk of their lives and discover news.’*

Well, up to a point.

Contrast that romantic picture with an anecdote from Afghanistan a little while ago. An officer in today’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was apologising to a Western commander because he could not join a helicopter ride planned for a couple of days’ time to a town newly liberated from the Taliban. *‘Sorry, I can’t get the business case through London by then,*’ he said.

So to be clear, there is plenty of adventure in the lives of our Secret Service and always skulduggery, but in the way I have tried to describe modern human intelligence (HUMINT), I have tried to give a flavour of what the spy game is really like and it is often a little less glamorous than portrayed and it is the agents our agencies employ - usually amateurs - who are the ones who live, to use the American phrase, in harm’s way.

But I do write as an outsider, obviously. I know just a fraction of the secret methods and operations that some, including some in this room know about, but in my research, I have been lucky to be informed by some of the best. People without any grudge or interest. I have interviewed people who together represent many decades of intelligence work. So I am going to try and quickly discuss what is different about spying today and we can pick up on any of the points later if you are interested in them. But let me first quickly share some home truths about the craft of spying that so many in the business who I have spoken to have emphasised to me and some of them are a little counter-intuitive.

So firstly: the fragility of human intelligence. It has been striking to me how many of the really top class spymasters I have met harbour such real doubts about whether they really had any value. Sometimes, as in Iraq recently, secret intelligence did no good because it was flimsy, untested by public scrutiny and by definition, hearsay. Reports of agents can easily be wrong, but even good, accurate intelligence fails too when it is irrelevant or is not believed. It is incredible and I have been amazed when I have found some of the people behind some of the great intelligence scoops of recent years to discover how often they will tell you that, for all the plaudits they received, how little they were believed at the time.

There are famous public cases of that. Kim Philby, the great master spy, the best of all liars, but yet widely disbelieved by his masters in Moscow. Ditto Richard Sorge predicting the German invasion of

Soviet Russia, the Soviet spy in Tokyo again disbelieved, and it has been the same on the western side. I have found many people who will describe their disappointments of such success, but so little impact.

The CIA for instance got all the plans down to unit level for the 1973 Yom Kippur attack by Egypt. The officer involved who pulled off that coup got a great medal afterwards and kudos, but the actual report was disbelieved and completely ignored. And there is no accident here, because by its nature, spy reports are necessarily second-hand and they come from anonymous people who by profession may be serial betrayers. It is no wonder that errors occur and why readers want to see corroboration.

It is natural too, as journalists know, that the bigger the scoop, the more shocking the revelation, the harder it is to persuade the reader. Understanding this grey, crumbly nature of spying is not to dismiss or to underplay the value of spying. But I think it is only when you realise its fragile nature that you can fully appreciate its function and come not to over-rely on secret intelligence or to wrongly blame it when you get surprises.

When it is corroborated, when the context is understood, a spy's report can be decisive and I have seen the consequences of missing HUMINT in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and I have seen the benefits of good secret HUMINT too.

The second lesson I think from the veterans of the business is that HUMINT is a niche operation. Thanks to Snowden, we know the CIA's annual budget is \$14 billion, more than the GDP of Iceland, but that covers a multitude of sins. For all the dollars, the actual numbers of people involved in running agents are comparatively small and those that are actually capable of recruiting a hard target - a few handfuls.

The skill involved and the attention required to these operations is just too scarce to be spread thinly. Britain's SIS is focused much more exclusively on agent running, but its resources are limited. So secret intelligence gathering, as I have learned, is a highly focused craft. The best operations demand huge concentration and often huge amounts of time and because they are so carefully directed, they generally offer a narrow 'drinking straw' field of view.

There was a recent European Chiefs of Station conference. It was not open to the public, but the Director of US Central Intelligence, John Brennan, was there, and according to someone I know present, was asked about the traditional definition of spying, stealing secrets and he said, *'I don't like to use the word 'steal', actually we gather information.'* Analysts, apparently, would in future rule and lead (the friend was a former analyst), but he is wrong, I think. Spying is very much about stealing secrets, but he is right that to direct spy craft and to interpret its product, you need a solid basis of analysis and understanding from much wider open sources. As a senior official of the Joint Intelligence Committee put it to me, *'Most so-called intelligence failures are really diplomatic failures.'* They are failures of tasking, of judging where to direct this precious resource of secret intelligence. Foreseeing where the really important secrets are that need stealing.

The third thing that people in the business remind you of is that secret intelligence is just one part of the work of a secret service. To call them 'intelligence agencies' is a little misleading, because they are there to do all of what a government needs doing in the shadows. So much of what passes

for spy work for example, possibly arguably far too much, is really liaison, picking up secret material from foreign states or secret diplomacy. One job of the SIS in Kabul until recently was to run the UK relationship with President Karzai. And as I describe in this book, another vital role of secret services is opening channels to talk to and understand our enemies in a discreet way and in a way that official diplomacy cannot do. So not all of the work of spymasters involves betrayal.

Those are the defining features of the business, but what has changed? Particularly since the Cold War, which is where spying has been much documented.

I would just like to highlight two things today. Firstly, the shifting target of espionage. How the secrets we need and thus the spies we need, have changed, and secondly the new techniques of spying, because spying is not redundant, it's adapted.

Firstly, the changing enemy. The key difference from the Cold War and post 9/11 is no doubt the overwhelming focus on counterterrorism.

Britain already had a substantial background in counterterrorism, particularly in the military in Northern Ireland. *'The IRA was defeated by penetration,'* I was told, a quite controversial and surprising statement, but it came from someone quite senior in SIS. But whether he is right or not, if HUMINT did not win the war, it did prevent the British army losing. I describe the story in the book about the British agent code-named Steak Knife in the IRA and some of the techniques learned in Ireland which are still valuable today, but al-Qaeda and ISIS are not the IRA.

Just after 9/11, there was a lot of talk about how different it could have been if we had got the intelligence right and if there had been a spy, sort of like Steak Knife, at the very top of al-Qaeda, a man sitting on a rock next to Osama bin Laden, to hear his plans and strategy. A very senior official in the CIA told me that if they had had someone there, they could have prevented the plot, but the problem was that al-Qaeda was never a sufficient priority in intelligence-tasking for long enough to ever have achieved that kind of agent. As Richard Dearlove, a former Chief of SIS pointed out (here in fact, and on other occasions) after 9/11, the chance was gone. Al-Qaeda became disparate, like a flock of birds.

The great recruitments of the past had taken years and involved working a spy up through the enemy hierarchy. That applied as much to terror groups like the IRA as it did to state adversaries, like the Soviet Union. But today's enemy no longer had such a hierarchy. They were in perpetual flux. He argued then that to beat the terrorist, what you needed more than spies was mass surveillance. You needed to watch travel plans and give the government access to data flows. Others have pointed out that not only are modern network terror groups harder to penetrate, their secrets may be of less value and certainly much more distributed than within a state adversary.

Groups like al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS have adopted something very close to what John Robb calls 'open source warfare'. A great deal of their intentions, strategies and even orders are public, and if you were sitting next to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi right now, you might find him on his Twitter account. Now they do send plenty of secret messages and they are worth intercepting and interpreting. But these enemies increasingly talk and adapt in the open and the real secrets of importance are often held at a much lower level, or if known at the top, are very tightly held and rarely written down. The result is that it is very hard to think of one well-placed agent who could find out all you need

to know. They might have known in Raqqa that something was going down in Paris or even in San Bernardino, but it is still unclear from public information so far that anyone would have known who was involved or what the plot was.

This diffusion of tactical secrets has not made human agents useless. It has just changed the way HUMINT needs to work and where it needs to be targeted. What has proved - in many cases that I know about - of decisive value in saving lives and where it has been possible to run agents, has been spying at a much lower tactical level, say, an insider close in with the jihadi brothers of Molenbeek preparing to bomb Paris. Such people are usually linked to the senior hierarchy. There is a spectrum of relationship between the operator who carries out an attack and if you like, the centre, and they may take orders - there are very few lone wolves around. They will likely know only about their own little group's plans, but penetrating that cell may be the only practical way to stop their plot.

How does this new landscape of threat change the nature of spying?

First, it is clear the spy has to operate within limits. Spying among people who are actively engaged in crime or killing is always going to present some problems. At what point do you pull the agent out? At what point do you intervene and stop the plot?

In Ireland, there were many good techniques developed to keep agents alive and to make use of intelligence to bring a terrorist to court or to seize a weapon or stop a plot, all without exposing an agent. Even so, what is hard, as it was in Ireland and is today in Raqqa or Birmingham, is when an agent finds out about an attack that is imminent. You have to act decisively to prevent a murder and no one disputes that. But this means you may have to retire your agent and end the spy mission.

In the 21st century, where terror has become the priority of intelligence work and the modern terrorist is so brutal and so fanatical, this limit on spying is indecisive. As one Western official put it, in counterterrorism, intelligence is subordinate to action. Acting to stop mass attacks can preempt long-term intelligence gathering and the need for action also trumps the process of bringing a terror group to justice.

I tell the story of a French agent in a jihadi cell in Barcelona for example, not so long ago, whose spying had to be terminated for the sake of halting a potential plot to bomb the subway system there. Spying then can be a much more short-lived activity in today's world. But what I was fascinated to learn was (and that is confounding some of the pessimism) that none of this has killed human intelligence. It has transformed it and broadly speaking, it is much less solitary, less paranoid and faster. At the same time, it has also become much more dangerous and more short-lived - and even more successful. That is why I compare the modern human agent to a butterfly, with a short, but beautiful life.

So the business has also become less solitary. As officers who lived through the transformation tell me, it's quite a different career. Not long ago our agents barely spoke to each other. The GCHQ were the country boys out in Cheltenham. MI5 or Box were a bunch of file collators who were scorned for their ability to run agents. And behind the jokes there was a reason for putting up walls. As the CIA traitor, Aldrich Ames, showed with all agents he got killed, 'need to know' was a life or death matter, but that has changed. The solitary, paranoid world has to a large extent been replaced by

teamwork. The big danger is less from an insider, but from missing the lead, for failing to connect the dots, and that was the stand-out failure that let 9/11 happen.

The game is also faster. Cold War spying could be incredibly tedious. Shadowing some Soviet diplomat for months or years to work out if he had a weak spot. It was also hopelessly inefficient - the pitches rarely worked. But now, according to people involved, it can be like a chess game on steroids. There is not time to spare. A potential source with doubts or weaknesses might, for example, be identified by surveillance of a terror group, monitored, and then within days, stopped as he passes through an airport and be pitched to become a secret agent. And then it can all end so quickly too. That happened with the carefully conceived operation when Britain sent an agent of Saudi origin to spy in the Yemen in 2012. It was halted when he got so close they handed him a bomb to smuggle on a transatlantic airline. The plot was stopped and with the help of a few leaks in Washington, the agent was blown.

Another point there in the Yemen case and more widely, was the sheer danger for the agent. We are sending people into very dangerous spaces at the moment, like Syria, like Waziristan, where rescue is nearly impossible. Some agents are being killed and that has proved tough psychologically for some of the case officers.

So in summary, here is the difference. Oleg Gordievsky was a mole inside the KGB for eleven years. Today's star agent may be recruited in a snapshot arrest at an airport, carry a tracking device, betray a bomb plot and then retire with a million pounds or end up being killed - all within the space of a few months or weeks.

The other big shift is technology. There is a real problem with technical obsession, with people who only really trust something that comes out of a computer, who adore its false certainty. I describe in the book some quite shocking examples of where the wrong people have been killed and conflicts have been exacerbated, because of the failure to go beyond technical means and because of this false certainty in technology.

But equally, the flip side is that HUMINT is of itself becoming more and more integrated with technology. This is an age of self-espionage where many of us devote huge amounts of energy and diligence, particularly young people, to effectively tracking down our own movements, describing our own network and recording our every thought and action digitally. This is not just material to hack and to intercept, but with intrusive surveillance, it provides a way of reaching into people's thoughts, spotting aberrant behaviour, mapping out a network and altogether providing many tools that help to identify a potential agent. All of which can - when it works well - transform the task of spotting a potential traitor within a terror group for example, from months or years to weeks, even days.

Technology has another key role that remedies one of the weaknesses of HUMINT. With the help of digital techniques, human stories can be verified. When someone says they were in Vienna last week in a coffee shop, you can see from the records that they were there. In short, human and technical methods of espionage are becoming inseparable.

So that is how things have changed.

By way of conclusion, I should just add a couple of things that I think have not changed.

First of all, there are old enemies too. I have talked about new spying and the new types of threats, the new types of secrets, but getting strategic information from major world powers that may use their strength to threaten us remains a priority and you cannot dis-invent spy craft when we have 1,800 nuclear warheads that remain on high alert in Russia and when nuclear weapons technology continues to spread.

Secondly and lastly, there is a need for patience. Good things come around. As I learned to my surprise, almost all key American agents in the Soviet Union were pure volunteers - they were not recruits at all. Equally now, there are times when we will have absolutely no sources, but not for long. In time, people get tired of conflict. They start to fall out. Some of the best recent sources for our agents in Britain have been young radical Muslims embroiled in jihadism, even reaching the camps, but recoiling at the extremes and depravity of what was on offer. People start to realise they are working for losers and all of sudden they are ready to shop their comrades. And you need people prepared to shop their husband and brother, but it does take time and that is one reason I questioned the US policy I witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, of assassination and of killing the leadership of all these terror groups, because it makes for constant rejuvenation.

Human intelligence has its limits. There is a limit on how fast we can get it and to what it achieves and how often it is right, but we would be in peril without it.

Thank you.



## THE TERRORIST THREAT IN THE EU: THE VIEW FROM EUROPOL

Transcript of a lecture by Rob Wainwright

8th February 2016

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**Rob Wainwright** was born in Carmarthen in 1967. He graduated in 1989 from the London School of Economics with a BSc and worked for the following ten years as an intelligence analyst in the UK in the fields of counterterrorism and organised crime. Between 2000-2003, Mr. Wainwright was the Head of the UK Liaison Bureau at Europol, and also responsible for the Europol National Unit in London. In 2003, he was promoted to the position of Director International of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), where he was responsible for its international operations and for developing and implementing the UK strategy against facilitated illegal immigration. He also managed the UK's National Central Bureau for Interpol and its Europol National Unit. Between 2006-2009, he was Chief of the International Department of the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Mr. Wainwright was appointed Director of Europol in April 2009. He was reappointed for a second term in 2013, having overseen Europol's transition from intergovernmental organisation to EU agency status in 2010, and secured the establishment of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at Europol in 2013. During his tenure, the number of cases initiated at Europol has more than doubled, to close on 35,000 in 2014, and Europol has significantly strengthened its portfolio of operational support tools and services, most recently via the creation of the EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU) and the reinforcement of Europol's work to tackle migrant smuggling. Mr. Wainwright has twice chaired the World Economic Forum's 'Global Agenda Council on Organised Crime' and was on the steering board of its 'Partnering for Cyber Resilience' project.

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Thank you very much.

I have been the Director of Europol for the last six years and I have seen the evolution - in fact, the globalisation - of security threats affecting the UK and other member states over that time and a mini transformation, I would say, in the nature of the international terrorist threat into one that today is a particularly aggressive new brand of international terrorism that threatens us at least as severely as anything we have seen since 9/11.

Over the next 25 minutes or so, I am going to talk you through how I think that that threat presents itself. For those of you who are not familiar with Europol, I would not blame you for that. We are not Interpol, we are something very different. We specialise much more in high-end analytical work and intelligence-sharing across borders in the European Union, in particular targeting the top end of crime, including terrorism.

And we are not a European FBI either. We have no police powers at all. Instead, to use a very modern business jargon analogy, we are part of what is effectively the platform economy, in the sense that if you think that Uber has become the largest taxi company in the world and it does

not own a single vehicle or Airbnb, the largest accommodation provider in the world and it does not own a single property, Europol has become a leading law enforcement institution in the world and we do not have a single police power and we do not own our own original intelligence at all. Instead, we provide a technology-enabled platform that now connects over 650 law enforcement agencies right across Europe and beyond and that is exchanging thousands of messages every day of a sensitive nature relating to ongoing casework against some of the most dangerous criminal and terrorist groups in Europe.

Critically, at our headquarters, at the hub of this vast information network, we apply the power of data analytics, as the Americans would call it. So we have large teams of analysts. They are interrogating those data flows every day to try and find the connections that are increasing in a cross-border nature between criminals and terrorists operating in different European jurisdictions.

There is increasing investment of the US in our agency. We have twelve federal agencies with attachés now in our community and they have seen that Europol can act as a very important pivot for Europe as a whole and they are investing large-scale in our institution because of that. Those Americans, by the way, are part of a 200-strong community of police attachés drawn from forty countries that take our analysis feeds every day, take our expertise and convert that into operational effect. So we do not have operational powers, but they are coordinating amongst themselves, using our capabilities, in around 35,000 to 40,000 cross-border cases a year, and therefore bringing about the disruptions and arrests of criminals and terrorists.

We channel our work in three top priority areas of migration, terrorism and cyber. And in each of those areas, we provide more specific, more operationally-focused versions of that platform.

Two years ago, we launched the European Cybercrime Centre which brings a task force of experts together, intensifies the information exchange and turns it around into investigations every day.

We have repeated the formula, or we are about to, on migration. We are about to launch European Migration Smuggling Centre and just two weeks ago, we have done the same on terrorism. So for the first time now in Europe, we have a dedicated European Counter Terrorism Centre in this most sensitive policy area. The ministers were convinced of the need to do that after the attacks that we saw last year, as you recall, starting with *Charlie Hebdo* and ending in even more spectacular terms in Paris at the end of the year.

So what ministers saw from that was an escalating nature of the threat and the need therefore - not to create a European FBI or a CIA, far from it - but to provide a better means by which we can exchange information, coordinate investigations and provide a higher level of expertise in the critical areas of tracking the flows of terrorist finance and of course, the way in which IS and other groups are operating online, using the Internet especially as a recruitment and propaganda instrument.

So: the threat I talked about earlier. We have, of course, had a significant threat from international terrorism for many years, you all know that already. Even before the events in November, Europol and others were talking about an enhanced threat, recognising that this phenomenon of travelling foreign fighters in particular was alarming; that we have 5,000 European nationals at least who have been radicalised, normally on the Internet and then by conflict experience in Syria and Iraq, many

of whom have since returned to Europe with the intent, if not the capability, to carry out the kind of attacks that we have seen.

And then a whole series of so-called 'lone actor' attacks, including at a Jewish centre in Brussels, on the Thalys train, *Charlie Hebdo* and so on. They had become a mainstay of the terrorist threat that we are currently facing in Europe as well.

A certain escalating rivalry between IS and al-Qaeda perhaps for some kind of Champions League battle of who can be the most damaging and effective international terrorist group.

The increasing radicalisation within some of the most vulnerable sections of our community.

And growing links between crime and terrorism, especially in relation to the provision of firearms, including AK-47s for example, from the criminal underworld seeping into the hands of terrorists.

These are all trends that we were seeing. So all of this has been known for some time and has been of major concern to us.

Paris though added a new dimension to that, because it was the first time that we saw a Mumbai-style of attack in Europe. At the time in 2008, the attack in India was something that shocked the world. Now, on the streets of Europe for the first time in that coordinated form, we had indiscriminate public shootings, suicide belts and something which was clearly a statement of intent by IS to go much more global, much more aggressive and more damaging in their international threat and really a shift away from the lone actor threat to something that we have seen in the past of course with al-Qaeda, which was the work of a well-planned, well-coordinated network of terrorists - some nine or ten carried out those attacks.

If you look at the videos that have been released before and since then, it is a clear statement of intent. If you also look at the actions that have been attributed to IS in Sinai with the Russian airliner, some other major attacks in Turkey, in the Lebanon for example, then it seems a marked shift by IS to go more global and that is something that concerns us.

In the wake of the Paris attacks, at Europol we convened some leading experts from many national administrations for a particular look at that question: how different is the threat from IS now? What does Paris really tell us about it? They came up with a very interesting report, a public version of which we released at the time we launched the new European Counter Terrorism Centre. It identified what was already known in the intelligence community, but not so well publicly known, that indeed IS have developed a Special Forces-style external command force that would specifically train and plan the kind of attacks that we saw in Paris.

It identified many other aspects about how IS are recruiting from our communities. Importantly, the band of foreign fighters that we are dealing with, including the suicide bombers, seem to be motivated less by religious zeal as we might have attributed to al-Qaeda in the past, and more by social elements such as role-modelling and peer pressure. And with the suicide bombers, they are seeing themselves less as religious martyrs and more as military heroes. That is a slightly different persona around the members of that organisation that we are dealing with and I think it is important for us to recognise it.

A lot of them have mental health problems - up to 20%. Many, many of them have criminal backgrounds and this is very important to understand in terms of evolving our response to this threat, in the sense that much more than ever before, information about the activities of these people will be found in more everyday, more traditional police databases, perhaps about their criminal background in the drug sector or acquiring firearms or something else.

It is therefore important for us to connect information exchange, intelligence exchange in a much wider environment than some of the traditional data sets of the intelligence world. That is a point that has been recognised by ministers in particular as a so-called lesson learned from Paris, which was perhaps that information exchange could still improve a bit further.

But even before the events in Paris and following *Charlie Hebdo* in particular, there was an escalation of political interest in this issue. A new dynamic was created in a way that we had not seen before at the European level and the EU Justice and Home Affairs ministers, who had decided on fairly far-reaching conclusions, including some that I will come onto in a minute, about how we are tackling the online threat.

Of course, that was intensified by what happened in Paris and then we switched to the rather immediate launch of this European Counter Terrorism Centre in January. Again, as I said, it does not provide in any way a replacement for what is still, I think, very well-functioning intelligence cooperation across Europe, but instead tries to provide a complementary platform, a complementary way, to coordinate a better police counter-terrorist response alongside what the Intelligence Agencies are doing themselves and critically, if we can get this right, a bridge across, particularly in terms of information exchange. Not automatic, not necessarily wholesale, but in those cases where it most needs it. Those are the discussions that I am having with the heads of those agencies right now, as to whether or not we can build that kind of system that gives confidence and trust to that community and the special and very important work that they do, but still gives them the need also to access a broader information terrain.

So we will be providing this platform essentially to increase information. That is the first priority really, to try and provide a better means for the national counter-terrorist police authorities especially to exchange better levels of information. For that, we are upgrading parts of our systems, so our SIENA platform which connects the 650 agencies around Europe now has a dedicated compartment just for terrorism, which is about to be upgraded to a more highly secure format. So we are trying to build better levels of security capability to give that trust and of course to allow us to deal with more sensitive information as well. Already 26 of the 28 member states have connected to that specific counter-terrorist data set that I talked about.

Of course, that information exchange should allow us to have a more powerful data analytical capability and that is very much the meat and drink of the work Europol does. We have a database that specifically holds information relating to suspected foreign fighters, so that we can compare the list between different countries, but perhaps more importantly, we can check if some of those names and suspects and their associates have any links into the more traditional police databases that I talked about.

The extent of Europol's capability and information access to data on drug trafficking, on people smuggling, on money laundering for example, is sizeable. Making sure that we can connect all of

that massive data with some terrorist suspects is of high priority. Encouraging member states to share with us their data on foreign fighters. And not just member states - many other international actors are sharing data with us. We have 18,000 names of suspected foreign fighters and their contacts and associates in that database, not all of whom are confirmed foreign fighters and certainly not all of whom are European nationals, but a significant body of them are.

A big push on trying to increase the amount of intelligence exchange on firearms suppliers from the criminal underworld as well, as I said earlier. There are around 600 cases live at the moment across the criminal sector in particular, not all of which will have criminal dimensions, but there is a significant increase in work in that area.

I will say a little about the structure of the Centre. I will talk a little bit later about some work we are doing on financing as well and on monitoring the Internet - that is the boring bit, I will not talk so much about that, suffice it to say we have no operational powers *per se*. We have a very experienced senior counter-terrorist officer from Spain who is leading that new Centre. We are having an uplift in our budgetary resources at a difficult time in the EU, but we still have only 40 or 50 people or so, which is likely to more or less double over the course of the next two years, we hope. So that is the kind of position we are in.

Those figures though, are a bit of a red herring, because the whole point of what we are doing as Europol is to leverage a much broader overall community response by operating as this platform so that we can connect hundreds, if not thousands, of other detectives around that hub and the way that it works.

There are, of course, many information systems available across Europe. I talked about the intelligence world. There are many in the EU like the Schengen Information System and other bespoke databases on visas, on fingerprints and so on and all of that is not joined up either. The reason for that is not necessarily that it has been technically difficult - it is actually designed that way. Lawmakers in Europe have on purpose ensured that these different data sets shall not be joined into a single superstate system because of data protection sensitivities.

The debate between privacy and security in other parts of Europe is very different to how it often is in the UK and in particular, the Parliament is quite a feisty guardian of data privacy issues and indeed justice issues and it fights its corner pretty well. I understand the very important dynamic of getting the balance right between security and justice and it is played out right now in every country, including in the UK in terms of the Investigatory Powers and the important legislation that will be debated, but very often in Europe, I think the balance is tilted a bit more to the other side.

There is a very simple reason for that. Security issues in the European debate are reserved at the national level and so there is not a locus, there is not a competence and therefore not a natural interest for European lawmakers to discuss that issue, whereas data protection issues and others are. I think over many, many years that has built up a different kind of culture around the understanding of these issues. Now events such as we saw in Paris, of course, have helped to shape the political dynamic in a certain way and then you see the same sort of pendulum swing that you see perhaps in any country, but at the moment I think that is a very important cultural and legal issue that we face in Europe.

Of course what Paris also showed was that there was a lot of work now to be done in investigating

what actually happened in the run-up to that attack and what lessons we can learn from that.

In what was a bit of sea-change step actually, Europol has been asked to provide a central role in helping to analyse that case in a way that we have never been given before. Never before has Europol been given such an important front-line role in helping to investigate such a major terrorist attack in Europe. The French authorities decided in this case to do that, because of certain support we could give immediately, particularly on the financial intelligence front. We seconded officers to their operation control room on day one or day two and the French prosecutor has since officially mandated Europol to analyse the whole criminal case and we have received enormous quantities of data and now have a 30-man and woman team investigating that case.

And again, it is likely to be a very important development in Europol's competence, growing up perhaps as a trusted partner in the EU community, because other member states may follow and at least it will store in Europol's database this very rich data set about these nine or ten suspects and their associates who were behind the Paris attacks and you can imagine how important that might be in the coming years as we face other threats as well.

Terrorist financing has always been a very important part of the work Europol has done and about five years ago in 2010, we were given a very specific mandate to help facilitate the implementation of a new EU/US terrorist financing tracking programme. Politically sensitive again, especially in the Parliament, nonetheless this has turned into what the Americans would describe as one of the most important counter-terrorist instruments that they use anywhere in their system. It has generated since 2010, some 18,000 or 19,000 specific financial intelligence leads relating to international terrorism, so the volume of this is significant, is impressive and often yields intelligence that is unique, that is, not coming from other sources.

So Europol's role is first of all, somehow a semi-legal role in validating the request that the US has to this sensitive, if not bulk, data in Europe and they are also acting as a central mechanism for coordinating European police interests in accessing this very rich database that is under the supervision of the US Department of Treasury. So lots of requests flowing to and from, generating those intelligence leads that I talked about, around 3,000 of which, by the way, specifically relate to the activities and movements of foreign fighters - a very, very important part of the work. And only in the context of the Paris investigation, we were able to provide the French with 1,600 financial intelligence leads in that case, so it is something that can be highly relevant and very timely.

Just as important, I think, is the work that we do in monitoring IS activity and other groups online. Of course, al-Qaeda has established an online presence for many years, but what we have seen through the development of IS is a shift away from the kind of broadcast model of al-Qaeda to something that is much more targeted as a recruitment tool, but also in terms of one message being multiplied many, many times across social media which is therefore able to penetrate a much bigger part of our community. I think it has been effective for them and it is one very challenging aspect of the work that we do.

Until recently, Europol's work had been to monitor the so-called jihadist websites which in itself has been and continues to be important, but really the response now is to try and deal with the fact that IS is so active across the social media domain. Of course there have been some very good national responses to this, including here in the UK where the Metropolitan Police has established an

Internet Referral Unit as some of you will be very familiar with. After *Charlie Hebdo* in particular, it crystallised the minds of ministers in Europe to establish a European equivalent of that and so on 1st July last year, we launched a six-month pilot project in Europe to try and create a European Internet Referral Unit, borrowing a lot of the best practice from the UK and one or two other countries.

We have put in place centralised arrangements on behalf of all 28 member states in terms of working with the social media platform providers in the monitoring and then the taking down of these websites. Important again to say that we were given no enforceable powers at all. All we are doing essentially is helping those social media companies enforce their own terms of service - that is all we are doing. The final decision always rests with them but of course, as Twitter announced just two days ago, they have a very firm policy around this and want to remove that terrorist content as much as possible. They published the fact that they had removed 125,000 accounts which can be attributed to IS within the last year, and that shows you the scale of response from Twitter which is commendable and indeed from many, many other social media platform providers, but it also tells you something about the scale of the threat that we are facing, because those are by no means the only ones that are still out there.

In particular what we are facing is something that is characterised by resilience because there are dispersed networks of accounts (not only on Twitter, of course), deliberately dispersed across the 20+ different social media platforms that we have. It works in a fairly organic way: it can kind of automatically reinvent itself in other places when you do take something down and that is extremely difficult to deal with. The speed of it - just how quickly the messages get out and how they sort of spread like wildfire. The first two hours after the Paris attacks for example, the hashtag 'ParisIsBurning' was tweeted and re-tweeted 7,500 times every 15 minutes and there were one million views of around 17 videos that we had identified online, which were celebrating effectively the attacks in Paris.

In May 2014, a video of an execution got 57,000 views within the first 24 hours and so on. So the speed of this and the scale of this is enormous, frankly, and of course particularly challenging to those of us who are trying to do something about it.

It is almost impossible to play the numbers game around this and instead what we are trying to do is to combine our knowledge of this space with the other intelligence that we have, to get a better understanding of how this so-called terrorist ecosystem online works and we have been able to identify some nodal accounts that have a particularly disproportionate impact on the problem. They could be automatic translation accounts so that the message gets translated into twelve other European languages automatically or they could be the way in which IS is increasingly using cybercrime techniques to propagate their messaging and their communication model, in particular the use of botnet technology which allows them to remotely infect and take control of host computers in very high numbers. So if we can identify those and take those out, then we will have more of a strategic impact on the problem.

We absolutely rely on cooperation with the social media companies and in that six month period, I think we identified some 2,000 or so, with an 88% hit rate. It would have been much higher, but in one particular area, where material is archived on the Internet, there is a different set of principles that is at play around the fact that something should be archived online for future research, so there is a different debate to be had specifically in that area. But in the other areas of Twitter and YouTube

and Facebook and so on, we are in the high 90% in terms of the success rate that we have.

So we can achieve close to 100% of what we think is dangerous and damaging without having any enforceable powers. I think it says something in this climate of a rather zero-sum game between privacy advocates on one side and security on the other, tech firms on the one side, police on the other, that actually there is still a lot to be gained from mutual cooperation and that is what we have effectively found in this space as well. I just wonder to what extent we have fully exhausted that in terms of the encryption debate as well - that is a much wider issue, of course.

Let me just conclude by saying that what we are seeing is:

A more globalised threat as I said earlier, particularly in the way in which these groups are using technology, particularly in the more rapid fire movement of this dispersed community across European borders, making some (if not yet systematic) use of the migration routes and crisis that befell Europe last year.

A deliberate strategy by IS to step up and go more global with a particular focus on attacking Europe as well.

The use of people who have some criminal antecedents, information about which is therefore held in a wider information environment.

Those are putting particular stresses on the more traditional ways of countering terrorism and therefore we all need to up our game and respond and we need to do more international police cooperation of course, but also more intelligence sharing. Very importantly, that has to be as much the case in the intelligence world as it is in the police world. Europol's role is not to replace the former, but to complement it and it is sometimes a sensitive, if not a febrile, debate, but one that is beginning to show signs of a more constructive atmosphere certainly since the events of November 13th.

I think this is still a very threatening time. The last video from IS you will have seen made particular references to the UK as well as to France. I think, as Andrew Parker and his equivalents around Europe and many others have said, the likelihood of another major attack in Europe is still high and the things that I have touched on today are part of Europe's response to dealing with it.

I think that is probably enough for now. Thank you.

## THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF HALF-BAKED FOREIGN POLICY

Text of GSF's 10th anniversary lecture given by Lord Lothian PC QC DL

4th May 2016

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**The Most Hon the Marquess of Lothian PC QC DL** (formerly the Rt Hon Michael Ancram MP) was first elected to Parliament in 1974 and served as a Conservative Member of Parliament until his retirement at the May 2010 General Election. Lord Lothian was subsequently appointed to the House of Lords as a Life Peer. He has held the posts of Deputy Leader, Shadow Foreign Secretary and Shadow Secretary of State for Defence. On stepping down from the Front Bench in 2005, he was appointed to the Intelligence and Security Committee, on which he continues to serve. In 1993, he was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Northern Ireland Office, and in January 1994 was appointed Minister of State at the same office. As such, he was responsible for the negotiations leading to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, and was the first British minister to meet with Sinn Fein and the IRA for 25 years. He continues to study peace processes and the practice of talking to terrorists today, with particular reference to the Middle East peace process. He maintains a keen interest in international affairs and he is the Chairman of Global Strategy Forum, which he co-founded in May 2006.

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Ten years ago I launched Global Strategy Forum with a critical analysis of the growing disparity in military terms between commitments and resources. Depressingly ten years later the same criticism can if anything even more strongly be made. Hardly surprising when we have for so long inhabited an apparently strategy-free zone, merely reacting to events as they have occurred with no real forward view of objectives and their resource requirements.

It has been almost surreal recently to watch Western commentators complaining about President Putin of Russia outmanoeuvring the West in his actions in Syria and Eastern Europe; almost complaining that it wasn't meant to be like this. Under the cosh of Western sanctions Russia was supposed to come to heel and mend her ways. Instead Putin is in danger of running rings around us; and we do not like it. I have even heard it suggested in hushed tones that he may have a strategy!

In the West we apparently no longer believe in strategy. Since the end of the Cold War we have by our own admission really only reacted to events. Our Cold War strategy had been simple and effective; containment and deterrence. We knew who we were containing and what we were deterring. Inevitably with the USSR collapse that strategy lost focus. We no longer knew who to contain or what to deter. Instead we became embroiled in *ad hoc* civil wars in the newly unfettered countries, the old Yugoslavia and the wider Balkans; with pretty mixed results. When in 2001 the US was attacked by al-Qaeda we rightly supported their self-defensive response in Afghanistan. Laudable in itself, but once again reacting to events with no overall guiding direction or purpose.

Through this period we have continued steadily to reduce resources in pursuit of the post-Cold War myth of the peace dividend in a new era of peace. It was a fundamental error. Predictably commitments began to rise again while resources continued to decrease. The gap widened and our

armed forces paid the price.

The British Army down from over 102,000 in 2010 to fewer than 82,000 in 2015. The Royal Navy's number of 'workhorse ships' halved since 1996 from 36 to 18 today. In the RAF the number of combat fighters dropped from 220 in 2006 to 149 last year.

At the same time our defence and foreign policy became increasingly incoherent. Take Afghanistan. Having by early 2002 achieved our objective in driving al-Qaeda out of the country and the Taliban out of Kabul we should have stopped. Instead inexplicably we sought new ill-defined objectives; 'nation building' whatever that meant in the Afghan context and the dismantling of the narcotics trade to name a few.

This was the beginning of what I call the era of 'half-baked' British foreign policy. Half-baked in the sense that while the first part was usually well planned or baked the second part was not only uncooked but often the necessary ingredients had not even been identified.

Thus in Afghanistan after the initial well-constructed action around Kabul we messed up on ill-judged poppy eradication (production now at record levels), and the unnecessary involvement in Helmand where we found ourselves in an unstructured and lethal conflict with the Taliban at the very time when strategically we should have been beginning to try to bring them in from the cold.

Now having withdrawn we have left behind a dangerous mess. The insurgent water we so boldly drove uphill is now predictably coming down again.

At the same time without any apparent robust strategic analysis we moved into Iraq. Our well baked military campaign to eradicate weapons of mass destruction in Saddam's hands came to nothing when it became apparent that there weren't any; requiring our military objective to be swiftly changed to technically illegal regime change. Even that was reasonably well baked and successful. But then what? Little or no further baking had been prepared.

Getting rid of Saddam's Ba'athist structures and institutions was a disaster, creating a vacuum into which al-Qaeda gratefully rode and fanning the embers of the underlying conflict between Sunni minority and majority Shia in that country. This was followed by constantly changing military plans with no identifiably consistent strategy.

In 2006 I called for us to get out of Iraq while we could still do so with a modicum of pride and dignity; I was accused of disloyalty. When we eventually departed some three years later we had gained nothing for the extra price we in the intervening years had to pay, and we left behind us continuing civil strife and a vacuum into which Daesh/IS swiftly and horrifyingly inserted itself.

Astonishingly the Arab Spring took us by surprise. Our response was not even half-baked. Without any substantial analysis we loudly proclaimed it as the birth of liberal democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, ignoring the visual evidence of the extent of fundamental Islamism within it and the previous role of western backed autocratic regimes in keeping it in check.

In Libya we did at least begin to bake the beginnings of a response to the uprisings although we were unsure of its purpose. Was it an ethical responsibility to protect threatened civilians or our old

friend, illegal regime change? In practice it morphed seamlessly from one to the other. Although no member's security was threatened we even recruited NATO to the cause.

And as either purpose required bombing we bombed anyway, and in the process wiped out Gaddafi without any real idea as to what to concoct next. In the event we just walked away from the metaphorical kitchen leaving violent chaos behind; and even now five years on we still do not seem fully to understand the realities on the ground.

In Syria once again we were inspired by a popular Arab Spring uprising which we immediately and uncritically supported. To begin with we did not even bother to bake a policy so convinced were we that the dictator Assad would fall within days. When predictably he did not, we belatedly began to make preparations although to what end we were and still are uncertain.

Backing, training and arming the so-called moderate rebels although we had no idea who or how moderate they were; encouraging the destabilisation of the country which opened the door to Daesh; boycotting Assad although he obviously had to be part of any solution; backing the northern Kurds to the irritation of our NATO ally Turkey; and eventually taking limited part in air strikes against Daesh which have proved more provocative than effective.

Once again our lack of strategy has helped to stoke still further a bitter civil war with no clear acceptable or feasible outcome.

So the first ten years of GSF have witnessed a mixture of foreign policy drift and military strategy vacuum, partly caused by the imbalance between resources and commitments but more largely by a failure of leadership to look forward with any sense of vision.

All of which brings me back to President Putin. Despite hard economic and financial economic sanctions in response to Russian aggression in Ukraine and the Crimea, the West arguably today is on the back foot with Putin driving the agenda.

At a time when soft power dialogue should be the main strategic response we are faced with a ratcheting up of almost Cold War style rhetoric against Russia, chilling when taken alongside Russian Prime Minister Medvedev's recent comment that this could be the beginning of a new Cold War. In responding to this we need to explore far more closely the reasons underlying it; starting with the end of the Cold War.

History teaches that in general, magnanimity in victory pays greater dividends than vindictiveness. The humiliating reparations imposed on a defeated but still proud Germany after the First World War created the environment for the rise of extremism in that country. The West's proud post cold war claim to have defeated the Soviet Union with an equally proud Russia at its core should have rung alarm bells about the strategic need to avoid humiliation.

On this occasion it was not so much vindictiveness as unthinking and often silent disdain for Russian sensitivities. In the apparent absence of strategic analysis the West thought little about Russia's historic fear of Western encroachment on its borders.

We encouraged the newly liberated countries not only to join the EU but also to become part of the

military alliance of NATO which had long been regarded by Russia as an existential threat. Western active interest in the so-called 'near abroad' awoke innate fears in the Russian psyche. Far from being sensitive to this the West instead expressed irritation at Russian reservations and objections.

European support for the pro-NATO administration in Georgia did little to reduce these tensions. We in the West value our historic ties and it was at best naïve not to consider that Russia might do the same.

And so today the Ukraine. I hold absolutely no candle for Putin's actions, but I seriously question why the West never foresaw them nor strategically planned to forestall them. Just like the Arab Spring, when the crowds gathered in Kiev's Maidan Square the West failed to analyse the real forces behind the protests.

We ignored the endemic corruption on all sides of the Ukrainian political system. We latched instead onto the *soi-disant* Europeanism and support of NATO of the protestors and contemptuously dismissed any pro-Russian reservations. We unthinkingly threw our weight behind the Maidan agenda. We ignored Russian fears of NATO effectively controlling her outlets to the Black Sea particularly through Crimea.

What Putin did was in no way justified, but we should have sought in advance to lessen those Russian fears that lent support to Putin's land grab. The same can be said for Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions may sting, but they will not diminish deep-rooted Russian sensitivities; and they will harden long-held prejudices.

Through dialogue at all levels we need to try to show that Russian sensitivities are finally understood and that we will have regard to them. While the Crimea annexation may now effectively be irreversible, clear strategic thinking could still do much to reduce tensions not only in Ukraine but also along the length and breadth of Eastern Europe.

There are some signs today that Russia is seeking a more balanced relationship with the West; we should encourage rather than insult it.

The same basically goes for Russian involvement in Syria. With no strategy of its own the West stumbled from non-baked policy to half-baked policy. There was no strategic analysis of Russia's interests in the conflict which would have made their intervention totally predictable. It has long been an imperative for Russia to combat Islamic extremism. Its Caucasian regions such as Chechnya and Dagestan demand as much, as does their no less sensitive interests in the vulnerable southern underbelly of Central Asian Muslim states.

Iran and to a growing extent Iraq are seen as vital bulwarks against such threats. Russia has long seen the stability of Assad in Syria as a key element of its strategy. Islamic fundamentalism stems from Wahhabism which in turn was born of Sunni radicalism. The main counter to Sunni extremism in the region are Shia forces including Assad's secular variety which itself includes many secular Sunnis.

For that reason Syria's uprising posed for Russia a real threat; the undermining of Assad's stability and the growth of a vicious fundamentalist and expansionist Islamic 'caliphate'. We in Britain

with our own Muslim population are alarmed enough by IS/Daesh. We should understand Russian concern at what is for them an even more deeply embedded threat.

As the Syrian fundamentalist threat developed, the West showed at best indecision, at worst lack of resolve and overall a lack of any comprehensive strategy to deal with it.

To our irritation, not least because it highlighted our irresolution, the Russians intervened somewhat forcibly from the air. To our even greater irritation they effectively attacked Assad's enemies on a wide front, IS and rebel groups generally, some of whom we had without much thought as to the depth of their Islamism been training and arming in their fight against Assad.

Of course we shouted foul. But could we not see that if it was Russian strategy to bolster Assad against his enemies that would ultimately include all his enemies, even those that we were somewhat uncertainly supporting?

And why were we taken so much by surprise? One embarrassing explanation is that while we had no overarching strategy we found it almost incomprehensible that another power could have one.

So that is where we are at the end of the first decade of GSF. I will continue as I did some seven years ago to make the case for a 'farewell to drift' and the development of serious strategic planning.

We cannot afford not to.

A robust strategy should never be a detailed plan or blueprint which can far too easily be derailed by events. It should be a mixture of criteria, parameters and intended outcomes. It must take account of resource reality. For a start our severely reduced military capabilities rule out a strategy in which we would play a major global policing role, but it should include distinctive options for Special Forces activity and the deployment of soft power.

It should encompass three distinct strategic geographical areas: the European theatre including Russia; the MENA region and beyond; and the Far East including China. Into these it will be necessary to factor the effect of our security alliances with the US and NATO and the growing importance of cyber warfare. It should, particularly in the context of soft power strategic planning build on our unique global relationships within the Commonwealth.

There are certain principles. Given our capabilities we should not become involved in international disputes unless we have a dog in the fight. That dog need not only be about security and defence, it could encompass international humanitarian crises which could in time affect our national interests. While such a principle would have allowed us into Afghanistan at the beginning, it would have kept us out of Iraq and Libya and away from Syria, saving us both sacrifice and expense. It is ironic that where now we are being invited to intervene in the humanitarian crises in Syria and Libya they have both been largely created by our half-baked interventions in the first place. If we have a dog in these particular fights, it is because we put it there.

We need to start asking fundamental questions. What is our strategic interest in the Middle East? Is oil still a factor; in which case how important is regional stability and what if any is our best role in

contributing to achieving it? In particular and more immediately in view of the pressure of displaced persons emanating from the conflict in Syria, how direct an interest do we have in helping to bring an end to that conflict and to re-establishing the stability which will allow many of these displaced people to return home? In realistic and practical terms what local elements including Assad need to be brought to bear to achieve that stability and have we any role in bringing that about?

Where do our long-term interests in relation to the growth of China lie? Have we a strategic interest in the current disputes in the South China Sea or should we leave them to others? How important in the future will China be to us and what do we need to do in the longer term to underwrite that relationship? What is the strategic balance between our interest in China and our interest in India? How best do we achieve that balance?

What interests do we have in finding an answer to the existential pressure being exerted on the West by Russia? What compromises might we have to make to achieve it and would the gains be worth the price? What ideological baggage about promoting western democracy might we have to lay to one side to create an environment more conducive to understanding?

These are just a few of the immediate strategic questions. There are many others, not least involving cyber, which will also need to be addressed. In the end they must all form part of a grand design in which resource capabilities must be fully taken into account. And although strategy as opposed to battle planning is more general, it is equally important that as we bake the strategy cake we bake it right the way through, from inception to what is finally needed to achieve a successful outcome.

It is surely time that we began seriously and urgently to develop answers to these difficult strategic questions. Time is not on our side.

## STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: COMMEMORATING THE FIRST ARAB AWAKENING

Transcript of a lecture by His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal

10th May 2016

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**His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal** is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan's Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. A pluralist and staunch campaigner for the rights of all to live in peace and dignity, HRH is a pioneer of Interfaith dialogue and understanding. Prince Hassan's international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prince Hassan has long had an active engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute.

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I would like to thank you, Michael, for your generous introduction and when it comes to old, I am not entirely sure whether you are referring to our age or the duration of our friendship, but I will attest to the fact that we are firm friends! And I would like to thank you for referring to another friend in the audience (I will not say 'old' again), to Sir Evelyn de Rothschild with whom I had the privilege, along with Prince Philip, in starting that particular phase of the St. George's House Consultations.

I came here to address the subject of '*Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants: Commemorating The First Arab Awakening*'. This year is the 100th year of the Arab Nahda or the Arab Awakening, and so we coincide with celebrations of different initiatives.

We are in the National Liberal Club and I came here to speak of the liberal ideas that actually contributed at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century to the manifesto of the Al-Fatat nationalist platform which might interest you to know read along the following lines:

*'You are Arabs before you are Muslims, before you are Christians and before you are Jews. The land is your land and the fatherland is your fatherland and we must join together to defend its independence.'*

The document ended with a detailed programme, the Arab Independence Programme [*banamaj al istiqlal al-'arabi*], which was to be the statement of their demand to the Allies at the Peace Conference in Paris. Of course, the meeting of Arab thought and thinkers included Jews, Christians and Muslims of Arab culture. Today you could talk about Arabs of Jewish culture possibly, if you

imagined the conversation between Ibn Khaldun and Maimonides.

But I do want to dispel the notion that in some way, we are not a direct descendant of a Semitic culture which we share. I would like to point out that the tolerance of that time, the mutual respect of that time, is what we seem to have lost. Maybe this is a blinding flash of the obvious and I will get into the management of savagery which is characteristic of today.

The other day I was talking to a group of friends (I thought) at a table in Switzerland, and a Swiss lady said to me, *'You will forgive me for asking, it's a very embarrassing question, are you really an Arab Muslim?'*

And I said, *'Yes, Madam, I am, but why all the embarrassment?'*

And she said, *'Because you are normal!'*

So I want to say a few words to dispel some of the stereotypes that seem to abound in this world and to start by saying that the Declaration called for the following:

*'In the liberated Arab countries, there will be established constitutional governments with internal independence above which shall be a general constitutional government headed by the King.'*

The reference, of course, was to King Faisal I, who met Chaim Weizmann in Paris in 1918 and the concept of federalism in those days at the time when the Jews occupied - forgive me - were resident in one fifth of fertile Palestine, was rather forward-thinking for the time.

And I wanted to point out the joint constitution which:

*'Shall guarantee the rights of all communities of various faiths and the general ties that shall exist between governments, shall be established by a general Parliament.'*

Today when we are patronised by those who want us to develop democracy and democratic institutions, this was an authentic cry and appeal from the peoples of the region.

The interest of states (this is the third point):

*'Economic relations with the country shall be honoured and Great Britain, the friend of the Arabs, shall enjoy a priority in this respect.'*

Now, I do not know if Ian Black is among us, but I just wanted to reassure him when he refers to Nicholas Pelham and the excellent review of pluralism in the Middle East, Pelham being an economist, that this is definitely a step towards recognising that ethnicity and sectarianism, our richness in diversity, or it could be the bridge between the Greens and the Blacks, and I turn to David Howell. I do not want to advertise your book, I am sure it has been very well circulated, Lord Howell, but I do want to say that the title of his book, *Empires In Collision - The Green versus Black Struggle For Our Energy Future*, reminds me immediately of Gertrude Bell's: *The Desert And The Sown*.

What we need to see in our part of the world, regardless of who is ruling in whichever particular

cabbage patch - that is terribly important to people in office; I was in office, so I know how important it is - but what is more important is how can we manage regional commons? These regional commons, I would like to emphasize once again, are based on a sharing of values.

The ideas behind the Arab Revolt as Suleyman al-Bustani, the Christian writer and scholar put it [*'Ibra wa thikra'*], a thought and a meaning (this was the late 1900s). Before any drop of blood was spilt, as well as throughout the war and the struggle which continued to the present day, it is essential to understanding the story of those ideas and the intellectual history behind them.

Of course people say: 'The Arab Revolt - T.E. Lawrence.' Well, I contemplated the photograph of T.E. Lawrence for a year as a visiting Fellow in All Souls and appreciate the tremendous qualities of T.E. Lawrence and of course I salute his integrity. But at the same time, if one thinks of Louis Massignon walking into Jerusalem with T.E. Lawrence after Allenby's successful march to Jerusalem, I wonder how he got there. Were we not instrumental in bringing about this victory? If we talk about orientalists and anthropologists (as they were in their early formation), what about Max von Oppenheim, for example, who was one of the outstanding orientalists of the day?

But I would like to say that from an Arab point of view, what is important is to have this idea of self-determination living on in the minds and the dreams of people, to inspire them to achieve their aspirations. Self-determination which is a right and not a gift to be bestowed by outside powers, however influential and however well meaning. However unfinished and imperfect the work is, it goes on, whether this is recognised by the wider world or not.

I recognise among you somewhere, Tony Klug from the Oxford Research Group, and I recognise his work in calling for an international protectorate for Palestinians, particularly at a time when we are being told that the one-state solution should be within some kind of federalism. I want to make it very clear that as far as the Palestinians are concerned, whether it is the Hashemite monarchy to the east or the State of Israel to the west, these two entities cannot blinker for much longer the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. After all, it was a right for which my great-grandfather, Sharif Hussein bin Ali, dedicated his life. He travelled to Cyprus (I was speaking to the High Commissioner a minute ago) in exile, largely because he said 'no' to the exploration of oil until these rights are recognised and so we go back of course to the Green and the Black. Maybe the Green and the Black were at the genesis of this whole conflict.

So once again I want to say that as our region is blighted by stereotypes and preconceived ideas and a failure to put the 'text' into the 'context', a plethora of disaster headlines comes to mind. I call it the 'alphabet soup' - the acronyms used to define Union for the Mediterranean (UfM); Partnership for Peace (PfP); METO (Middle East Treaty Organisation); WANA (West Asia North Africa); MENA (Middle East North Africa). Of course, from Japan, we are not Middle East at all, we are Middle West (in fact, I sometimes say 'Wild West!'), but the attempts to define and simplify not only seek to homogenise a gloriously diverse region, but to promulgate two tired notions, namely that any event in the Middle East is either habitual or unprecedented or both.

Even those who seek historical context miss the point. The story did not begin in 1916 nor has it ended in 2016. I hope that those of us who live to see 2018 or our children and our grandchildren, will one day see a re-visiting of a regional conference with international guarantees, but I do want to emphasise that the story is about self-determination and not diktat.

I will tell you a story of diktat, as I am approaching my anecdote. Mrs T. in a conversation with my late brother (God rest their souls) was lecturing him in magnificent Thatcherite manner and at one point he said to her, *'Madam Prime Minister, in everything that you have heard here today, is there the remotest possibility that you might have got it wrong?'*

And she said, *'Well, yes.'*

He said, *'Well, on that basis, maybe we can now have a conversation!'*

So I do believe that the noble art of conversation is a two-sided exercise of speaking and listening, and that is why I look forward to rabbiting through this and then listening to you and commenting. I just want to say that the last hundred years are certainly indicative of the continuity of the aspirations of the people of our region in their humanitarian - and I stress humanitarian - call for dignity.

So framing the deplorable violence that has ensued in the wake of the second Arab Awakening as habitual or routine, is, I fear, the lazy option or perhaps to be cynical, a by-product of past imperialisms. More importance should be given to instilling an acceptance that this opens the way to disaster and makes possible the risk of inhumanity triumphing.

So 2016 is the centennial anniversary year of the Arab Revolt or as some would call it, the Arab theatre of the Great War. While this was an important and heroic time, what really mattered then and now is not the bullets nor even the protests, but the idea.

Too often, militarised conflict is seen as the sole narrative in understanding the wider region, but the Revolt, the Nahda, Tahrir Square, Daraa, were - and are - not mere revolutions of arms, but of the mind.

For those of us attempting to predicate the future on the primacy of human dignity (and I certainly am one of them), I believe in waging peace. It is worth remembering that the struggle for human dignity, far from being unprecedented, is the story of civilisation.

Seen in this light, the first Arab Awakening represents a moment when giants of our shared human experience took up the torch of human dignity and, of course, I salute the memory of King Faisal I, my great-uncle, the founder of the Kingdom of Syria and subsequently the Kingdom of Iraq, my grandfather, Emir Abdullah, later King Abdullah of Transjordan.

I was particularly touched the other day by watching on YouTube, Princess Badia, the daughter of King Ali (who still resides in this great capital) addressing the Iraqi people. An old lady in her late 90s in a black gown of mourning saying to the Iraqi people: *'What have you achieved? What have you achieved by killing the boy King in the Square in 1958?'*

It saddens me that people simply do not seem to understand that there is a human interaction between the peoples of our part of the world, that the light of their ideas still shines and that these ideas will not be dimmed by the inevitability of realpolitik.

For Al-Fatat and freedom movements of the First Awakening in the early 19th century, as the Ottoman polity struggled with the new narrow definitions of the nation state on the one hand while finding itself pitted literally against the subtle and not so subtle battles between the great powers

that controlled resources on the other, the mood in the region was as conflicted as it is today, swithering between a desire to reform and modernise and to preserve and regenerate the ancient traditions that had sustained the Empire for so long. Gatherings that had been inspired initially by a shared love of our rich cultural literary history became suspect and subversive as the 20th century opened and Ottoman policy shifted towards greater Turkish primacy.

I am the grandson on my mother's side of a member of the Ottoman Parliament and when I went to a Parliamentary session some years ago Turkish Parliamentarians said to me, *'Why do the British always talk about our Empire and their Commonwealth? The millet system was a form of Commonwealth. When did representatives of India sit in the British Parliament?'* And I said, *'Well, maybe you have a point'*.

But the point today is that the Turkic, Turanian influence is growing. I had not predicted modern Turkey today as we see it, but I wanted to say that attempts to curtail Arab freedom and independence provoked anger and frustration, raising the question of other basic rights and liberties. There was a vacuum that had to be filled. Many of the nations that lived under the Ottoman state felt the time had come when in 1908 Yildiz Palace was occupied by the Young Turk movement.

If you are familiar with Al-Fatat, you may recall them as the main political and intellectual force in the short-lived Syrian state of Emir Faisal. As a political party however, though united in principles, they disagreed on tactics - a familiar theme. Some supported a balanced and practical policy while others called for action to achieve complete independence regardless of the cost.

My great-uncle on my mother's side raised the flag on the Serail in Beirut and was the last Governor of Hauran, southern Syria and he said to my grandfather after the Battle of Maysalun when the French inevitably broke the Arab lines: *'I will fight to the last soldier'*. And my grandfather said to him - well, I don't know exactly what he said to him, but basically he sent him the following stern message: *'If you are chased by the French out of Syria, there is no British guarantee that they will hold the line of [what today is] Ramtha or Daraa.'* Rather approximating the line that our soldiers are holding today with seven kilometres depth to prevent tunnelling and indiscriminate killing.

My grandfather, by the way, King Abdullah, Emir Abdullah was on the march towards Damascus, so when people talk to us about reaching Damascus or bringing normality to Baghdad, you will forgive us if it rings certain bells in our family history.

Anyway, a British officer was to describe their movement and the atmosphere in their capital, Damascus, as follows:

*'A small party, consisting mainly of fanatical Muslims and young Arab hotheads, desires a purely Sharifian government and displays a certain anti-European sentiment'*.

Dear, dear! So what did these young fanatics and hotheads of Al-Fatat and like-minded organisations like Al 'Ahd stand for? In brief, they called for political rights there for their communities, self-determination, intellectual and cultural freedom and for the protection of and respect for minority rights. If such policies appear to reflect current concerns, it is because they do.

Let me emphasise one crucial point about Al-Fatat: they reflected centuries of pluralist cultural

cohesion in the region and I am glad to say that in Amman, I have been able to re-publish the *Qibla* newspaper which was published in Mecca in 1916. So now you have an account, a recollection, of those early days.

But going back to *The Desert And The Sown*, I want to make it very clear in particular to my Saudi friends or their friends or maybe to people here in the audience, that there is absolutely no case to be made for antipathy between Hashemite and Saudi and I just want to say that once again, whoever rules that part of the world has to be aware of the fact of the basic lack of complementarities between neighbouring communities. In Benelux they call it 'intra-independence' and the call for Arab independence was a call for intra-independence, to recognise the importance of the Kurd and the Druze and all of these figures who came together to form the Al 'Ahd and the Al-Fatat of those days.

Nationalism is not a policy. It speaks of identity and giving effect to the sentimental quest of discovering and asserting who we are as peoples and groups and I think from the Shukri al-Quwatli and the Nasser period, the Ba'ath period, we have had examples of nationalism to the point of the two Ba'ath parties fighting each other.

I met Michel Aflaq years ago and we had this conversation. I said to him, '*Unity, freedom, socialism, what do you mean by it? Unity and freedom is what was called for by the Sharif Hussein bin Ali and socialism is a moveable feast in today's politics.*' And he said, '*Well, we were recognised for it.*'

A bit like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when I met him when he had just come into office. We sat for one hour together and I tried to dissuade him of the idea of Islamic socialism. Nasser had advertised Arab socialism. I said, '*Socialism is socialism, leave Arab and Islamic out of it.*' Anyway, the same answer - so many million people voted for it, of course.

It was the era of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, when like democratisation today, nationalism in a North Atlantic sense would be the sword that sliced the Gordian knot of the tangled world of empires to benefit free peoples everywhere.

To Al-Fatat, nationalism meant independence and self-determination, as such the foundation of all political and individual rights. In that tradition we continue today, taking satisfaction in including the right to respect in international law. To yearn for a day where a law of peace could be written into international humanitarian law. To yearn for a day when it is not only Henri Dunant's call for making war more humane that counts, but actually doing something about developing a new order, possibly a humanitarian order.

So I feel that for a hundred years, from 1916, Sharifian leadership has called for ideas of just and tolerant society. The explanation can be found in these shared ideas. The idea of independence has a strong legacy in the Middle East. The allegiance of the House of Banu Hashim to the centres of empire in Baghdad, Cairo and Istanbul through the ages has always been restless and grudging.

Successful world powers have sought to control the holy sites of Islam on the pretence that possession would equate legitimacy, but once again, I would like to say that the importance of the noble art of conversation, of consultation, should not be missed, not at this time. I have just flown in from Rome where in a meeting of the Pontifical Council, I had the privilege of leading a Shia-

Sunni delegation. So this is the universality that we seek and this was the third meeting of its kind.

For a time my grandfather lived in Istanbul where his father, the storied Sharif Hussein to whom I refer, had been to all intents and purposes exiled for opposing injustice and oppression in the Hejaz instigated from Istanbul by Ottoman policy. Despite the relationship with the High Porte and even greater friction with the Young Turks Committee of Union and Progress, the Hashemites had the duty incumbent from their position - they were and had always been responsible for the safety and security, physical and spiritual, of the millions of pilgrims from across the globe. Their interests and views were anything but parochial. How can you be parochial with a lineage of a thousand Sharifs of Mecca behind you?

Islam holds that differences among human beings are willed by God. The Holy Qur'an tells us:

*'Had your Lord pleased, he would have united all mankind.'*

So I would like to conclude by suggesting, in the words of the Prophet Muhammad, that all people are equal, there is no claim of merit of an Arab over a non-Arab, or of a white, or of a black person, or a male over a female. Only God-fearing people merit a preference with God. Now, interfaith conversations are not interfaith at all, because texts are not in dialogue. They are conversations between the adherents of faith and in that sense I also want to add, of no faith at all, so long as they are people of integrity.

Today is a continuation of a long one hundred years during which we have sought kindred spirits in patriotic movements and free societies and yet we are split between Islamism on the one side and extremism on the other.

Maybe Christianity is also aware of the rising power of the rapture crowd: extremist Christians, who believe their object in life is to expedite the arrival of the end of days. I do not know whether the deity to whom we all look would be best pleased by seeing those who are responsible for the killing of so many millions of people claiming special privileges, any more than they would be best pleased by the excesses of IS - or whatever the name is today, I hate to use the term 'Islamic State' because I do not see anything Islamic about it and I think that we are falling into their trap when we accept their brand name. But I do think that faced with extremists on all sides, it is very difficult to make the case for rationalism. Nationalism on one side. Extremism on the other.

So I would like to go back to the Damascus Protocol, which I would say constituted a meeting of minds and a first step towards the international and domestic recognition of Arab demands.

In conclusion, I have referred to part of the human story, not just the Arab experience and I would like to invite those of you with an emotional inclination to read the *Requiem For Arab Nationalism*, as in the 2003 work of Adeer Dawisha. But bear in mind that *qawmiyya* (tribal, ethnic, national) and *wataniya* (homeland or native country) are two different concepts. I think that we too often fall into the trap of forgetting that in 1870, Francis Marrash, the Syrian writer, placed special importance on the concept of homeland rather than nation when applied to Greater Syria.

We can be a rich region in our diversity, in our mutual respect and I wonder if the words of Chaim Weizmann, when he met my great-uncle in 1918 could be remembered - I paraphrase:

*'We should not do the Muslims a great injustice, because they received us with open arms when they and we were expelled from El Andaluz.'*

Thank you for your patience and I look forward to your questions.

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## THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

### Transcript of a lecture by Professor Michael Mandelbaum

7th June 2016

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**Michael Mandelbaum** is the Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC. He has also taught at Harvard and Columbia Universities and at the US Naval Academy in Annapolis and served as Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. A contributor to publications such as *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Time*, *Newsweek* and *The Observer*, Professor Mandelbaum served for 23 years as the associate director of the Aspen Institute Congressional Project on American Relations with the Former Communist World. He serves on the Board of Advisors of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Born in 1946, Professor Mandelbaum is a graduate of Yale College. He earned his Master's degree at King's College, Cambridge University and his doctorate at Harvard University. He is the author or co-author of numerous articles and essays and of fifteen books: *'The Nuclear Question: The United States And Nuclear Weapons 1946-1976'* (1979); *'The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before And After Hiroshima'* (1981); *'The Nuclear Future'* (1983); *'Reagan And Gorbachev'* (with Strobe Talbott, 1987); *'The Global Rivals'* (with Seweryn Bialer, 1988); *'The Fate Of Nations: The Search For National Security In The 19th And 20th Centuries'* (1988); *'The Dawn Of Peace In Europe'* (1996); *'The Ideas That Conquered The World: Peace, Democracy And Free Markets In The 21st Century'* (2002); *'The Meaning Of Sports: Why Americans Watch Baseball, Football And Basketball And What They See When They Do'* (2004); *'The Case For Goliath: How America Acts As The World's Government In The 21st Century'* (2006); *'Democracy's Good Name: The Rise And Risks Of The World's Most Popular Form Of Government'* (2007); *'The Frugal Superpower: America's Global Leadership In A Cash-Strapped Era'* (2010); *'That Used To Be Us: How America Fell Behind In The World We Invented And How We Can Come Back'* (with Thomas L. Friedman, 2011); *'The Road To Global Prosperity'* (2014); and *'Mission Failure: America And The World In The Post-Cold War Era'* (2016).

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Thank you for that introduction and thank you all for coming. It is a pleasure and privilege to address such a distinguished group. I am going to talk about the future of American foreign policy, but I am going to begin by talking about the recent past. As a playwright who once worked on this island once put it, the past is prologue. And the immediate past is the post-Cold War era, which I reckon ran from 1993 to 2014 and that is the subject of my book *Mission Failure*.

That period as I see it and the message of the book can be summarised in five points.

First, this was a distinctive, unusual, and conceivably even unique period in the history of American foreign policy and possibly in the history of all great powers, in that during this period (and terrorism notwithstanding), the United States faced no major security threats. There was no other great

power about which the United States had to worry, and therefore it was a period when the normal business of international relations and foreign policy dating all the way back to ancient Greece and Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, that is, great power rivalry or power politics or what political scientists now call 'security competition', disappeared. It turned out to be in abeyance, but for the better part of two decades, it really did not exist. And that meant that the United States had an unusually wide range of choice in formulating and carrying out its foreign policy. That is point one.

Point two is that what the United States chose to do or ended up doing whether it wanted to or not, was what is sometimes misleadingly called nation-building. In fact, the United States embarked around the world on two distinct, but closely related missions. One is nation-building, trying to create a sense of national community among disparate peoples. And the other is state-building, trying to establish the institutions of modern, western government where they do not exist. So the United States concentrated willy-nilly on missions of transformation.

Third, this approach to the world was common to the foreign policies of the three presidential administrations of this period: those of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama. They are a common theme, these missions of transformation, in American policy in this period, towards China, Russia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq and the wider Arab world.

Now, in few of these cases did the American government set out to carry out missions of transformation, but in every case (and this is one of the main themes of *Mission Failure*), America found itself ending up in the same place, trying to transform the societies with which it was dealing.

There is a fourth point here and an important one, and that is that all of these missions failed, hence the title of the book. They all failed for basically the same reason, which is that it is not within the power of the United States (or any other country) to bring about profound political and economic changes in other countries. At least, not without a long occupation and tutelage and governance, which is simply not feasible in the 21st century and which Americans do not want to take up anyway. One of the lessons is that if you want a democracy or a free market economy or both in countries that do not have them, whether or not these countries get these things, whether or not they get these western institutions depends ultimately almost entirely on the people themselves.

The fifth and final point is that this period is now over. It is over because its defining condition no longer obtains. Security competition, threats, power politics have returned and I will say more about that in a moment.

The bridge between the post-Cold War era and the era in which we find ourselves now is the Obama Administration, so let me make a few points about the Obama foreign policy. It seems to me that it has been distinguished by three features.

First and probably foremost, Barack Obama has been what the historian Stephen Sestanovich in his excellent book *Maximalist* calls a 'retrenchment' President.

He was elected with a mandate to get the United States out of Afghanistan and Iraq, the operations in both of which had become very unpopular. And he did so. He withdrew from Iraq completely and he has withdrawn almost all troops from Afghanistan. Now already, these policies have become

extremely controversial in the United States, because the aftermath in both countries has not been pretty. In Iraq, we saw the formation of the Islamic State; in Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban. And so there is a line of argument that if only Obama had not pulled out, if only the United States had remained, it would have been possible to avoid these unhappy and in some sense, dangerous consequences.

My own view - and this issue will be debated as long as anybody is interested in American foreign policy, I suppose - but my own view, and I am not a particular enthusiast for the President and have not voted for him, is that he made the right decisions.

He made the right decisions, I think, for two reasons.

First, in order to keep the lid on Afghanistan and Iraq, in order to prevent the kinds of things that have come to pass, there would have had to be a very substantial American military contingent on the ground. Not 10,000 troops, but closer to 100,000. And the American public would not support that - that was clear.

The second reason that I think that his decisions were right or at least defensible, is that despite all the blood and treasure that the United States has invested in Iraq and Afghanistan, from the point of view of American national interest, these countries really are not very important.

Afghanistan of course became the object of an American intervention because it was from there that the attacks of September 11th 2001 on Washington and New York were launched. But they were not launched by Afghans, they were launched by Arabs who were given shelter there. They have been turfed out. If the Taliban return to power, it is conceivable that al-Qaeda or some other similar group would return, but it is not all that important because these groups are present all round the world and so eradicating al-Qaeda from Afghanistan has not solved the problem of terrorism.

As for Iraq, although it is a not insignificant country, it really is of no consequence to the United States or to Europe I would think, whether there is one Iraq or two or three or none. Certainly not worth expending any effort to bring about one of those outcomes.

So that is the first feature of the Obama foreign policy.

The second feature is that he brought to the office some - I guess one could call them progressive - ideas that he sought to implement and failed.

He came into office proclaiming his wish to abolish all nuclear weapons everywhere. That got nowhere.

He made a speech in Cairo to what he regarded as the Muslim world - not clear there is such a thing, but he thought so - which was designed to improve America's image amongst the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. But it really has not had any effect in that direction.

And he held out the hand of friendship to governments that were hostile to the United States. Certainly Russia, North Korea, Iran and Cuba. Well, his outreach has made no difference with Russia

and North Korea. He has managed to score some diplomatic successes with Iran and Cuba: stitching up a deal on Iran's nuclear weapons, which, if it works, will hold back their nuclear programme for a number of years and coming close to normalising relations with Cuba and actually visiting the island. Maybe these initiatives will have some effect on the overall foreign policy and domestic politics of these two countries eventually, but there is no sign of that yet. Iran is no less hostile to the United States and no less aggressive in the Middle East, and Cuba marked the visit of President Obama by launching a pretty widespread political crackdown.

But ultimately under the eyes of eternity probably the most important feature of the Obama foreign policy is that he presided over the change from the post-Cold War era, the peaceful era, the era without security competition to the world in which we live now, to which security competition has returned. It has returned in East Asia because of China's aggressive maritime initiatives; it has returned in Eurasia because of Russia's assault on Ukraine; and it has returned in the Middle East because of Iran's aspirations, its nuclear weapons programme (now we hope at least sidetracked) and its use of proxy forces in a number of countries to expand its influence.

So we are back in a relatively familiar international order. Now this resembles the Cold War more than the post-Cold War era, but of course it is not a carbon copy of the Cold War. The challenges to the United States and the West more generally are regional; there is no global challenge like that of the Soviet Union and the challengers in general do not profess world historical ideologies that they seek to spread everywhere. Iran of course seeks to spread its brand of Islamic governance, but that is really aimed mostly at the Muslim world.

Still, we are in an era of security challenges again and if the main thrust of American foreign policy since 1945 is to be continued, there would be a re-focusing and an adaptation of the Cold War policy of deterrence for each of these three regions. As I say, the circumstances are not what they were in Europe between 1947 and 1989. Nonetheless, a policy of deterrence is really what is required to defend American and Western interests and those of America and the West's friends and allies in these three regions and there is of course a very high demand from the countries in each of these regions for a robust American role and even for a renewed policy of deterrence.

That would be the logical extension of what American foreign policy has been, basically, since 1945. But it is not entirely clear that the United States will adopt such a policy. Indeed, the current presidential campaign suggests that there are forces in opposition to continuity of this kind.

I would say that in this presidential campaign, we have seen stronger challenges to what have been the main lines of American of foreign policy than at any time since that policy began in 1945, or if you will, 1947, or even 1942.

The post-1945 American foreign policy has had two pillars. The United States was a mainstay of the global security order and the United States also played a leading role in supporting the international economic system. The instruments by which the United States carried out these policies, at least the main instruments, were in the security realm (the American system of alliances) and in the economic realm (an open trade policy).

Both of these policies, both of these approaches have come under severe criticism in the current political campaign. Donald Trump has denounced American alliances, although I must say that my

impression is that for Donald Trump, everything is some version of a real estate negotiation and so his real complaint is that the allies are not paying enough and of course he, being the supreme negotiator in his eyes, will soon set that right.

But even President Obama, who has been a relatively committed internationalist, in a rather indiscreet, widely-noted interview with the friendly journalist Jeffrey Goldberg in the *The Atlantic Monthly* complained publicly about allies as 'free riders'. Now this is a complaint that American presidents have had at least since 1952, but none of them has ever voiced it publicly. Obama felt free to do so and seemed genuinely annoyed by free-riding.

As for trade, well, Donald Trump again has said that the trade deals are terrible because they were badly negotiated, the implication being that he will renegotiate them and protect the interests of the United States, so if Mr. Trump becomes President, a possibility I regard as unlikely and catastrophic, you could expect that the Chinese for example, will immediately drop all practices that are offensive to the United States or at least to Donald Trump and get in line.

But on the other side of the aisle, Senator Bernie Sanders, who will be the runner-up in the Democratic nomination process, has also denounced trade agreements although on slightly different grounds, because they are bad for American workers. And even Hillary Clinton, who with her husband has always been a staunch supporter of free trade, has moved in a protectionist direction and has come out against the pending trade deal in the United States, the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Now opposition in presidential contests to the main lines of American foreign policy is not absolutely without precedent. In 1972, the Democrat George McGovern had as his campaign slogan 'Come Home America'. This was a response to the Vietnam War. In 1952, one of the two leading contenders for the Republican presidential nomination, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, who was the most powerful member of the Republican delegation in the United States Senate, was what used to be (and really inaccurately) called an isolationist. That is to say, he did not believe in the forward-looking, expansive foreign policy that Harry Truman had devised. In particular, he did not favour American membership in NATO. But McGovern was soundly trounced by the fervently internationalist Richard Nixon. Taft was defeated for the Republican nomination by General Dwight Eisenhower, who went on to serve two terms as President, continued Truman's policies and thereby gave the main lines of American foreign policy after World War II a bipartisan cast.

So what is different this time? Why might one regard the challenge now as potentially more serious?

For three reasons: first, both major features of post-1945 American foreign policy are under attack. Both the approach to security and the approach to the global economy have come in for serious criticism. That has not happened before.

Second, the opposition, at least in the primary season, has come from both parties, not one, and that is without precedent.

Third, with the very minor exception of a recent speech that Mrs Clinton gave, largely devoted to attacking Mr. Trump, no one is defending the post-1945 American foreign policy.

So, in conclusion, what can we conclude about this? Nothing is certain in politics, there is a long way to go. Serious discussion of foreign policy insofar as it takes place in American presidential campaigns tends to take place when there are only two candidates in the general election and that does not really begin until the fall. And anyway, American foreign policy is largely reactive. It can best be summarised by Prime Minister Macmillan's response to a question posed to him: what had had the greatest influence on his premiership? His response was, *'Events, dear boy, events.'*

Well, it is events that drive American foreign policy and events have caused a reversal by Presidents from the foreign policy that they initially promised. Woodrow Wilson was re-elected in 1916 on the slogan *'He kept us out of war'*. The next year, the United States was in World War I. Similarly, George W. Bush had campaigned in favour of a more modest foreign policy and one that eschewed nation-building. Then came the attacks of September 11th and suddenly he became one of the great, at least would-be nation-builders in American history.

So nothing is certain, this is not a done deal. The American retreat from the positions that it has occupied since 1945 is not certain, but the opposition to those positions, to the fundamental features of American foreign policy, at least at this stage of the campaign, seems more formidable than it has been before.

Thank you.

## BRITAIN'S EUROPE: A THOUSAND YEARS OF CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

Transcript of a lecture by Professor Brendan Simms

15th June 2016

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**Brendan Simms** is the author of *'Unfinest Hour'* (shortlisted for the Samuel Johnson Prize), *'Three Victories And A Defeat'*, *'Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy'* and *'The Longest Afternoon'*. He is Professor of the History of European International Relations at the University of Cambridge, and Director of the Forum on Geopolitics there. He is President of the Henry Jackson Society and President of the Project for Democratic Union.

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Thank you very much for the kind introduction and for this invitation and for coming to listen to me.

I should say at the outset that this book is not intended to tell you how to vote on the 23rd June. I have my own views, they might emerge, but that is not the purpose of the book. It is intended to provide some deep historical background on Britain's relationship with mainland Europe over the past few hundred years.

Now, it advances three propositions which I think are central in understanding Britain's role in Europe.

The first is that the European Union was designed to deal with the 'German Question' and the 'European Problem' or if you prefer, the 'German Problem' and the 'European Question'. The two are actually two sides of the same coin - basically the same thing.

The second proposition is that the European Union was not designed to deal with the 'British Problem'. By that I mean that nobody sits down after 1945 and says: *'The United Kingdom has been such a threat to European peace that it needs to be embedded in some kind of international, larger structure of governance.'* Nor does anybody say the United Kingdom is so incapable of defending itself in the world that it requires protection of such a political union.

But my third proposition, notwithstanding that fact, is that this is the principal driving force in English and later British history. I am going to say England and Britain fairly interchangeably (I am Irish, I can do that, I know that we have Welsh people in the audience), but in geostrategic terms it is actually a distinction without a difference most of the time. I argue that this is the driving force in British history, but that the answer to this problem, to this threat from Europe, is not the European Union, but the United Kingdom.

So those are my three propositions. Let me now illustrate them briefly.

First of all, that the European Union was designed to deal with the German Question and the European Problem. I understand this primarily in structural terms, not primarily in behavioural terms. We all know the history of the 20th century when the German Reich on two occasions disrupted the peace of the continent. But the German question has been central to European history going

back hundreds of years and it is primarily a structural issue, to do with the size of Germany, its central location, an area of contestation, the strength of its economy, its economic potential, its military potential when realised, which either destabilises Europe or in the hands of outside powers, destabilises Europe. One way or the other, Germany is absolutely central. And after 1945, you have added to the German question, the issue of Soviet expansionism and communism.

So the European project that emerges – this is the crucial bit for my argument – is a project of double containment and of single or multi-mobilisation. It is designed to contain Germany, as I have already said, and it is also designed to contain the Soviet Union. In order to contain the Soviet Union, it must not merely embed and contain Germany, it must also mobilise Germany and indeed the other western and central European countries against the Soviet Union. That is the reason why we have the European Union that we have today. Winston Churchill, as many of you will know, in September 1946 endorses that vision of European unification.

It does not happen quite in the way that it is envisaged, largely because there is a hiving off of political and military integration with the failure of the European Defence Community in the 1950s. And what then becomes the European Economic Community and later the European Union starts economically and then requires more and more political characteristics. But it is still the case that everything we see today in terms of common European projects, particularly the euro, the Single Market, Schengen, and so on, these were all originally designed to deal with this question of double containment. In the case of the euro, even more recently - this is not ancient history - when President Mitterand in the 1980s is contemplating the strength of the Deutschmark, which he describes as *'Germany's nuclear weapon,'* he says we must *'decommission this nuclear weapon through the euro.'* So a European currency to deal with Germany.

Now we come to the role of Europe in British history. First of all, this is a question of the principal source of threat. That is how Europe is generally perceived in political terms. Europe, as Winston Churchill, who of course was a man of the Empire, a man with enormous knowledge and experience of the global reach of the British Empire, nevertheless in 1913 states very clearly, *'Europe is where the weather comes from'* - that is where the main threat to these islands will come from, always has and always will.

I think we need to understand the security of these islands in terms of ever-extending circles.

In the Middle Ages, it is primarily focused on the Channel, but the Channel should not be conceived of primarily as a barrier. In the Middle Ages, as I am sure you all know, the seas do not separate, they connect. It is quicker to get from Calais to Dover than it is a comparable distance by foot within England. So securing the north coast of France and the Low Countries, Channel ports, becomes an absolute commonplace in English grand strategy; the *'Narrow Sea'*. Then you have the phenomenon of the *'Cinque Ports'*, which is not actually primarily a defensive service, but a ferry service, so it underlines the point that this is a connection between the south coast of England and the rest of Europe. And that remains the case. The importance of the Channel has come back again with the whole migrant crisis, and many of the same ports are now back in the frame in the discussion.

Then the next circle is the Low Countries (present-day Belgium and Holland), which by the 18th century is conceived of as a barrier. A barrier defended in the barrier of fortresses by Dutch troops, but with the British essentially as the backstop, so keeping what is then the French enemy out of

the Low Countries is absolutely central to British security.

Then, in the early 20th century, the principal reason why Britain joins in the First World War is again to defend the neutrality of Belgium, although of course, the general phenomenon of German power is also very important.

Then there is a wider circle. This is really where I have tried to make my own scholarly mark. The book was mentioned, *Three Victories And A Defeat*, which concentrated on the 18th century and that talks about the way in which in the 18th century, British grand strategy is very much focused on what is happening in Germany and the Holy Roman Empire.

It is a real sign of the political culture of the times that when Britons before 1760 speak of the Empire, the crisis in the Empire, they mean the Holy Roman Empire, they do not mean the British Empire. So that gives you a sense of their Euro-centricity, if you like. Defending the Holy Roman Empire was part of defending the Low Countries, which in turn is part of defending the south coast of England. So the argument always is: if Germany goes, then the Low Countries go, then they will be in our own country.

Finally of course, you have got the overall European balance, which by the end of the 17th century has become something of a commonplace in English strategic thinking: making sure that no single hegemon exercises a dominant power in Europe. That, I think, you are all familiar with. What needs to be added here only is that these geopolitical threats also acquire a very important ideological overlay, which interpenetrates with the strategic arguments.

In the course of the 16th century, you have got the Reformation, so what you have is an increasing sense in this country that the defence of Protestantism in Europe is a critical part of the defence of Protestantism here, again with geostrategic arguments: if Protestantism in Germany is defeated, the Dutch will be next and we will be next after that. The same argument is then secularised by the late 17th/early 18th century when in place of Protestantism, you increasingly hear reference to Parliamentary liberties, to the defence of Parliament and its liberties against continental absolutism. Then the 19th century, it is the defence of liberalism. And in the 20th century, you all know this, it is about the defence against tyranny, against Kaiser-ism, against Nazism, against Communism.

And so the argument about Europe then becomes a more extended security argument. It is not just about particular points on the map, although it also is, it is about a general ideological commitment to one's fellow thinkers or like-minded people within Europe. If you want to defend Protestantism in England, you must defend Protestantism everywhere; you want to defend liberalism in England, liberalism everywhere; democracy in England, democracy everywhere, you get the drift.

But it is not only the content of policy, the nature of grand strategy, that is determined by Europe. In the book, I very strongly make the argument that actually British high politics, the ordinary run of politics, is very often fundamentally shaped by the European context. For example, in the 17th century I argue the original *casus belli* between Parliament and the King is really the question of whether to intervene in the Thirty Years War. James I - it starts with him - really wants to pursue a more Spanish policy. He wishes to ally with the Habsburgs, he has got a mind really to some kind of alliance of 'Christendom' against the Turks. Parliamentary critics say, '*You've got it all wrong - what's happening is that counter-Reformation is on the march on the continent and when they*

*have crushed the German Protestants, they will come for the Dutch and then they will come for us.* And it is the perceived failure of the Stuart dynasty, first under James, then particularly under Charles, and then of course even later with regard to Louis XIV under James II, to get a handle, as critics see it, on English grand strategy, her interests in Europe, that really does in that dynasty.

In the 18th century we have a Europhile versus Eurosceptic debate, which is very similar to the one today, only much more scurrilous and vicious. Broadly speaking (I am simplifying here), you have got Tories who are the Eurosceptics of the time. They believe in Britain having a maritime identity, a colonial destiny, a purpose to expand in the world. They see the continent as a source of corruption, politically particularly, and they see money spent on continental alliances as a complete waste and actually bad for the political culture of the nation.

By contrast, the Whigs are continentalists. They say, *'No, the defence of liberties in this country, the defence of the south coast depend on the maintenance of the European balance. Therefore we should have an active policy in Europe, support European alliances and so on.'*

And that debate then continues. In the late 18th century, with Edmund Burke supporting intervention against the French Revolution, arguing that you cannot have an ideologically inimical project like the French Revolution in your immediate neighbourhood. He articulates – and I describe this in a chapter in the book – the doctrine of vicinage, which in today's language means neighbourhood. In other words, it is not simply a matter of allowing things to happen according to its own dynamic in Europe, you actually have to intervene to prevent your neighbour from *'the erection of a dangerous nuisance'* – that is the exact phrase he uses, so that there is a direct interest in what happens.

Likewise in the Napoleonic period, when Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger is a supporter of intervention on the land in Europe, supporting coalitions, Secretary of War Henry Dundas is a supporter of a more colonial and maritime policy.

The fact that Europe is absolutely central in the 20th century during appeasement, I do not need to tell you, you are all familiar with that. A great many of you here will remember the discussions of the 1990s. And nobody can escape the fact that over the last few months, we have been doing little else in British politics but talking about the European dimension.

But the impact of Europe goes even deeper still in a way that is not often realised. I am a fairly poor medieval historian, but I am told by those I trust that the formation of England in the period leading up to about 1000AD was fundamentally driven by the threat of Viking raids. England was made, as it were, by that European context.

But what I am absolutely certain of – I have studied this myself – is that the United Kingdom is a direct product of the European system. So when England and Scotland unite in 1707 in Parliamentary union, it is in the context of the War of the Spanish Succession, the threat of Louis XIV's France as an ideological project, of counter-Reformation Catholicism, of continental absolutism, as a territorial project to counter direct military threat to these islands. It is in that context, particularly from the vantage point of London, that the Act of Union is passed in 1707 and the United Kingdom is created. So, as I say in the book, Europe made us. No European state system – no United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom makes little sense originally outside its European context. I would almost add it

does not really make much sense currently outside its European context and we can talk about that later if you like. And that creates then a structure which is pretty much unique and distinctive within Europe at the time and I would say, even remains so. A structure which has enabled this country to mobilise in a very comprehensive way the energies of all its subjects – citizens if you prefer – and it has created an actor that, as Douglas Hurd put it (whom I do not always praise, but in this case got it right) *'punches about its weight'* in the world, even though its weight is actually very substantial. And it still is. I argue in the penultimate chapter of my book that the United Kingdom is actually the last major European power. So it could consequently, if it wanted to, leave, survive and possibly even prosper outside the European Union.

To sum up the historical part of the argument, on the continent, Europe and European instability was the problem, and the European Union was the answer. In Britain, Europe was also the problem, but the United Kingdom was the answer. And that is a very fundamentally different way of looking at European history and one's own history as between this island and the rest of Europe. That is a crucial distinction which I want to emphasise.

I think it helps us to understand the current situation – this is where I come to the present day. The European Union, certainly the eurozone, is an incomplete union. It has federal aspirations - it has the aspirations of a single state, that is to say, a common currency, a common travel zone, which would require a common border and the aspiration towards a common foreign and security policy. But it has only given itself really confederal or intergovernmental instruments to sustain it. So the absence of a proper Treasury, joined-up fiscal policy, lack of secure border, lack of a single army to sustain the foreign policy and so on.

And that is why we have the crisis we are in. That is why we have the euro crisis, that is why we have the migration crisis, that is why we have the crisis of European security, because if it were not for NATO, Europe would not be a credible actor, and it is struggling to contain Mr. Putin.

Now, all of this is not, I think, a problem for the United Kingdom in the narrow sense. If the European project were to fail, the UK could for the reasons I have given, defend itself, it could trade, it might very narrowly survive perfectly well, it might even do better in certain sectors, I do not know.

But what is clear is that the weather still comes from Europe. Leaving the European Union will not change that fact. Strategically, economically, demographically, the United Kingdom will be profoundly affected by the future of the European project. And Brexit clearly – and here I show my own cards – will make that worse. It will be a terrible blow to the confidence of the rest of Europe; it will probably encourage separatist tendencies in Europe or the desire of other states to leave. I do not myself think that any other state will leave for the reasons that I have given, because they have nowhere else to go, but it is certainly not going to help.

Let me turn briefly at the end towards the effect of Brexit, the two likely outcomes and how they would relate to the European project more generally.

I do not think Brexit will cause the UK to be adrift and irrelevant. That is the reason why I did not sign the Chancellor of the Exchequer's letter, signed by the vast majority of my colleagues, because I thought that was a complete exaggeration and very much underplayed the innate strength of this country. The UK is a major power and of course it will continue to coordinate European security

through NATO. The European Union by contrast, for all the reasons that I have given, lacks coherence and certainly does not have the organisation to punish the UK.

There is a benign scenario. It could encourage further European integration - the shock might galvanise it to do so. But we have just heard Mr. Schäuble saying that will not happen. More generally, it seems to me improbable that somehow European integration has been held up by the British. If that were the case, I would happily let them go.

But let me turn then to the effect of Remain. That, in fact, in the long run could be equally fatal to Europe, because in the context of a Remain vote, there will be a massive temptation not to rock the boat, both in this country, where any talk of further mainland European integration will be avoided in order not to frighten the horses, and likewise in mainland Europe there will be an avoidance of talk about further measures, because one does not want to restart the British debate. I think that would be a terrible mistake, because all a Remain vote on the 23rd June will achieve for mainland Europe - and that is really what this is about: you are fine, they are not - is a breathing space. All the issues I have described and that you are at least as familiar with as I am, will return after 23rd June. They are at the moment in some form of suspended animation. There has been almost a conspiracy to keep them from the agenda, but they will come back. If nobody has been talking much about the euro crisis, it is because other crises have been bigger in the last few years - migration, Russia. They may all come together and explode at one point, I do not know. But in any case, the issues will return because Europe will not be stable.

So there are only two ways of dealing with that.

Either you fail to settle it, in which case Europe comes back as a disaster zone and that makes the Brexit breeze to blow for a second referendum.

Or Europe integrates, becomes the superstate as it must become in my view - continental Europe - and that in turn will also make Brexit's breeze to blow. So we have the threat of a 'neverendum'.

So how do you deal with it?

My argument would be that the United Kingdom needs to break with the balance of power argument on the continent of Europe. It needs to embrace Churchill's vision of the Zurich speech, the anniversary of which is this year, and support mainland European political integration in confederation with the UK, so that continental Europe would have its 1707 moment.

And that leaves us - my two concluding thoughts - with a paradox. The paradox for Europhiles is that the best service they can render the European Union and themselves is to help to bring about a full eurozone political union of which the UK itself will not be a part. The paradox for the Brexiteers is that if they want to leave the European Union and do so safely, they must see mainland Europe sorted first. There is no safe Brexit without 'Euroexit'. And by that I mean there is no way of Britain leaving the European Union safely, without the European Union in its continental part having united, which in effect means that the eurozone would leave the European Union. It would not be Brexit as such, it would be Euroexit, which would, as it were, imply Brexit and that constitutionally, psychologically, politically is a completely different ball game and a more benign one. It is on those two thoughts and I think still within my allotted time that I leave you.

## THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP 70 YEARS ON: IS THE MAGIC STILL THERE?

Transcript of a lecture given by His Excellency Mr. Matthew W. Barzun

28th June 2016

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**Matthew W. Barzun** has been America's Ambassador to the UK since 2013. Previously he served as U.S. Ambassador to Sweden from 2009-2011. He was a pioneer in the early days of the Internet, becoming the fourth employee of CNET Networks in 1993 and working there until 2004 in a variety of roles including Chief Strategy Officer and Executive Vice President. Before the President's election in 2008, Ambassador Barzun was among the first to join Barack Obama's National Finance Committee where he produced the first \$25 per-person fundraiser and helped teach Obama University for campaign volunteers. President Obama selected him as National Finance Chair for his 2012 re-election campaign. Ambassador Barzun has served on the boards of many non-profits focused on education, public policy, and interfaith relations. He lives in London with his wife, three children and their dog, Lincoln, and Kentucky remains his home.

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Thank you, Sir Malcolm. I think you covered a lot of important ground in that introduction, so thank you for that. I had worked on a presentation for all of you and it was titled: *'The Special Relationship: Is The Magic Still There?'*

For those of us in marital relationships, I was going to do 'couples therapy' on the Special Relationship. I am the son of a therapist, I am married to a therapist, and so the plan was to do some group therapy on the Special Relationship, which may come up later. But I thought, given everything that happened on Thursday and Friday morning, that did not seem quite right. Thanks to Global Strategy Forum, we have got this great group - all of you, who know a lot about this country, you know a lot about Europe, you know a lot about the rest of the world, you know a lot about the United States, so I am hoping we can share. There is a therapy angle to what we are going to be doing, which I will tell you about in a moment, but it is a little bit different to what I had imagined.

I was yesterday with John Kerry, our Secretary of State, who was here in town to meet with Foreign Secretary Hammond and then later with the Prime Minister. So I will just catch you all up from the US Government's point of view and then open it up. Does that sound good?

You are probably well aware of what our position was before Thursday. We had one and we said it out loud to our friends. Now I heard from many people who wished we had not said it. My inbox was filled up - before President Obama came in April and after he came - with, *'Why don't you just keep your mouths shut?'* And we said, *'I don't think that is what best friends do.'* I think that you have to say what you think.

And so the refrain that President Obama said, that Secretary Kerry said, that I said time and time again was, *'Of course it's up to you and of course we care. How could we not care?'* And then we would say our formulation and I must have said it a thousand times: *'We value a strong UK in a strong EU.'*

Now obviously 52% of those who participated in the referendum voted Leave which is not the way we had hoped it would go and now I think you could summarise our priorities by just changing one word in that formulation and it is the little small word in the middle. Now we want a strong UK and a strong EU. That is how I would summarise it.

Sir Malcolm hit on a lot of the key issues – the strong UK part, which is the part of my job, working with the US, the United Nations Security Council, NATO, G7, G20, anti-ISIL coalition – all the places where the UK has been and remains an incredible leader around the world. So we will continue to engage on all of that. And we will continue to engage – not my job – with the rest of the European Union as an institution and the remaining 27 countries within it.

And what brings the two together is a shared belief in making the world more prosperous, more peaceful, more just. We mean the same things as you guys when we say those words and they are easy to say and they are hard to do, and you all actually do that work.

I just want to close with an image. My wife and children are going back to America before I am, so they will be over there six months ahead of me – I stay to the end, I hope, so long as President Obama wants me, until he steps down in January. So I was packing up my youngest son's belongings and I opened up this drawer beneath his Ikea bed - it is a big, giant trundle drawer and it is filled with lego, those tiny little plastic blocks. It occurred to me that we in diplomacy and President Obama often use this phrase and I really like it, which is: *'Let's build more bridges and fewer walls.'* I think that sounds right and we really believe that. We look around the world, the threats we face, the opportunities we have, and it is a lot about bridge-building and a lot less about building real or emotional walls between us.

But I was sitting there staring at this giant pile of plastic lego and I thought that if we were broken up into groups of ten and given a bunch of lego and we were told as a group, *'You have a choice, you can either build a bridge or build a wall,'* for those of us who did not do mechanical engineering or civil engineering, it is much easier to build a wall. Anyone can build a wall. Stand in one place and start stacking - it is just not that hard. Building bridges is hard. Easy to say. Hard to do. It requires you to explore the other shore and that is tricky. You have to know where you are, you have to know where the other side is, see it from that angle and then do this thing together.

You all have a vast amount of experience and knowledge in the world of bridge-building between nations and that is what we need a lot more of. If both sides in this debate as they look forward are committed to remaining open and inclusive and to revitalising this international rules-based order which the US and the UK have built together with others, we are going to need a heck of a lot more bridge-building, the language of bridge-building and making it seem worth the effort.

So with that, I would love to open it up, not only to any questions and suggestions, but I would also love to try something that I have tried with 17,000 British 18-year olds.

I have been to 146 sixth form colleges around the United Kingdom and I do not give them a lecture from an American Ambassador because I do not think they really want that (I think they are slightly relieved when they come in to find out they are not going to get one). Instead I give them an A5 card and on the top of it, it says 'Frustrate, Concern, Confuse' and I give them a pencil and I ask them, *'Can you please say something that frustrates, concerns or confuses you about the United*

*States and what we are up to.* That is what I ask the young people. Then we flip over the card and I say, *'Please write a word or draw a picture of something that gives you hope or that you like or that inspires you about the United States and what we are up to.'* So they do that.

And I have almost 17,000 of these cards now and we (our interns, I don't do any of this work!) compile them all and later I will share the results with you if you are interested: what all 17,000 of these students, if you add them all together, say are their big frustrations and what are their big hopes about what we are doing in the United States

I thought we would do a twist on that today and to start with asking, *'What are your frustrations and concerns around the Transatlantic Relationship?'*, given what happened on Thursday. So if you had to have one word – close your eyes for the moment – think of one word, to express your top frustration, concern or confusion around what this means for the Transatlantic Relationship and imagine you are writing it on an A5 card.

### **The Questions**

*Q1: What does this mean for the trade agreement (TTIP) that has been in negotiation with the EU for quite some time, and what does it mean now for the UK?*

*Q2: Could you tell me what the American policy is towards the Falkland Islands?*

*Q3: What if Donald Trump was elected President - how do you see his foreign policy evolving? Do you think America will become isolationist, reverting back to a period such as the 1930s, with President Calvin Coolidge and silent power. We know that Donald Trump isn't silent. There is a lot of concern - you're talking about building bridges, how do you see Donald Trump building bridges?*

*Q4: It was very interesting to see President Obama's comments regarding his visit to London. We already see the Special Relationship fading away - is that true?*

*Q5: My concern is that the US will interfere in our negotiations with Europe.*

*Q6: I am worried about the dissatisfaction with the status quo, both in the UK as we saw expressed in the vote last week and also what we are seeing in the US with the support for Trump. I recently interviewed Robert Gates, the former Defense Secretary for both Republicans and Democrats. He writes very strongly about the fact that America is dissatisfied with politics and I was wondering what thoughts you had being here, looking back towards the US.*

*Q7: Are we really at the 'back of the queue'?*

*Q8: My frustration is about the United States' one-sided support for Israel against Palestine, as witnessed by numerous vetoes of United Nations resolutions on such subjects as Palestinian statehood.*

*Q9: I have worked in Ukraine, where I have to say, I thought the US effort in engaging with the pre- and post-Maidan Ukrainian governments was somewhat better than the European Commission's efforts. Where do you see the new-style European Union's geopolitical skills developing or not*

developing in view of British influence declining? When I was in Kiev in April 2014, I asked a colleague from Latvia that if push really came to shove with Russian aggression in the Baltics States, which European countries he thought would come to their assistance and I thought his reply was very instructive – he said ‘the United States’ which suggests he didn’t have much faith in European Union states and I once met a European Commission political adviser in Moldova who wasn’t aware that Kiev had been under German occupation during the Second World War.

Q10. *The relationship will go on, of course – the P5, United Nations, all these things that have been discussed. But it is a tectonic shift for sure, a game changer – where will it hit the Transatlantic Relationship most?*

Q11. *What in your view does Brexit change in terms of the US attitude to defence and to NATO and what needs to be done?*

Q12. *This is more of a young person’s perspective. The issue I am frustrated with is how hard it is to obtain work visas in the United States, to go there and just to find a job and to work. It is not easy at all. That essentially is my frustration with the Transatlantic Relationship.*

Q13. *You asked for one word: my one word is fear. Fear of being at the back of the queue, as was mentioned; fear of rampant nationalism. Some of the things that Donald Trump comes out with sound very much like some of the things that Putin comes out with and why this crass decision has been taken to leave Europe, I do not know (I disagree with Sir Malcolm, it was not because of the people, it was because David Cameron held a referendum in a country where we are not used to having referendums and he didn’t have to). Who has welcomed this – Marine Le Pen has welcomed this! Fear that we are going to talk to each other less; fear of nationalism which I see here and there have been signs of less tolerance in our wonderful tolerant nation. The most googled question on Friday was ‘What is the EU?’ - why it was ever put to the nation, but that is another issue...My other question for America and looking at America from outside: gun control. Why, oh why, do you allow people to go around shooting each other in such a crazy way?*

Q14. *As you are in the therapy business, we need a lot of therapy in the UK, between the generations, between the Brexiteers and the Leavers, between north and south. What can the United States do to help build those bridges because at the moment, relations between both sides are very bad.*

Q15. *Does the US consider it a done deal that Brexit will happen or are you still holding out that, for example, Article 50 will not be invoked, that there might be a second referendum, a general election, a shift in the political landscape here? This is a rapidly evolving situation still in flux. You may not want to comment, because obviously just a comment in itself could be perhaps be construed as interference, but do you have a view of where you think actually things are?*

**Ambassador Barzun:** I will just answer that one quickly. No, we do not. We are watching it very carefully, we want to make sure there is stability and security and we are not going to jump into the middle of that. There are a lot of questions to be answered, the Prime Minister is over there [in Brussels] today, so we are letting that play out and we are not going to weigh in on that right now.

Q16. *My one word is ‘unserious’. I got the impression that before the referendum, quite a lot of the*

country was unserious. After the referendum, a lot of people suddenly woke up to the fact that it was serious. What are your views on whether it matters and whether you think that we are now taking the result seriously whereas we did not take the process seriously before?

Q17. My word is 'operations'. And I am looking ahead next week to the Chilcot Report. I would be interested in your views on how we implement practical lessons from the Chilcot Report and the lessons of Iraq and apply them to the likes of Libya and Syria.

Q18. To continue with the issue of fear and concern, how do you deal with the new realities with Russian aggression in its different forms, particularly towards Georgia and Ukraine?

**Ambassador Barzun:** Okay, that is a lot to chew on. They do sort themselves into groups. Maybe we will start with what you said, Ambassador [the Ambassador of Georgia – Q18], and then work our way back through. We have to save time at the end for the happy bit. With the 18-years olds, we spend almost all of the time talking about frustrations and concerns and just at the end we do 'hey, what's the hopeful thing', so I want to make sure we do not forget that.

If you remember back to this gentleman's question about Ukraine, Maidan Square, all of that. *The Economist* had a cover in March 2014. The image was of a shirtless Putin in a tank, knocking over a little traffic sign. And the small little traffic sign said, 'Stop or the West will put you on the naughty step.' They are very good at doing clever covers, our friends at *The Economist*, some very good friends right here in the front row.

Think about that: the implication of that provocative cover was that we had two choices to deal with Russia trying to redraw the borders of Europe at the barrel of the gun in 2014. You can put on a shirt or not and get in another tank and go get into a military confrontation with Russia over their aggression and disregard for the sovereignty of Ukraine. That's one option.

Or - this cover.

So it is either hand grenades, if you will, or hand-wringing - just a bunch of worried words from the West.

I just think that is unfair (and they were not trying to be fair, they were trying to be provocative), but our job is to point out that there was a choice between hand-wringing and hand grenades, in the form of economic sanctions, which the UK was a huge leader in and which the United States was a huge leader in. The UK played a very big role within the European Union to get those not only implemented, but rolled over every six months. That is an area that you have to look at in any honest accounting of what has happened. That British voice, we really value that voice. We are not in those EU discussions, we engage a lot with the EU, but having the UK voice at the table when we are not there is, from our point of view, a really valuable thing and the extent to which it is not going to be there, you know, that is less good. We always felt that the EU magnified the UK's voice; it did not diminish it.

But that is one example. There is a whole bunch of other ways. NATO, for example. Anyone who would underestimate the solidarity of NATO, anyone who thinks that NATO is not real, is not the strongest alliance that this world has known is misreading things. I think it would be a great

opportunity in early July for NATO leaders to re-emphasise that point and for the UK to play (as they have done) a hugely strong role in NATO, in meeting the world's threats.

The question around President Obama's intervention - a number of people said 'back of the queue'. I was sitting there when he said it. I was sitting in the front row in the Locarno Room at the Foreign Office. That phrase really stuck, didn't it - '*back of the queue*'? And the tone - it ended up being rewritten as if it was somehow punitive, like '*if you don't do what we want....*' - and there was none of that in there. The point was, you guys are right at the front of the queue now (I love talking to Brits about queuing, you all have PhDs in queuing) and we are working hard on this TTIP negotiation. We are still by the way, working hard and we are analysing what this UK decision means for TTIP. I do not have a lot to report on that, but it is still a big priority and we are going to try to get at least the negotiating done during President Obama's watch. It is unlikely that we could ever get it through the legislature - we are still waiting on the Pacific deal in our legislature back home.

So his point was that you are at the front of the queue as part of the EU on a big trade deal. If you step out of that, some on the Brexit side were saying, '*Oh, we'll go further ahead in the queue and we'll have a quick deal.*' But just look at our system - say what you will, we are not quick about getting legislative things done, especially as it relates to trade. The Democratic front runner and the Republican front runner both are publicly against the Pacific deal, so trade is really tricky on both sides of the aisle in our country right now, for a bunch of reasons that are not too dissimilar from what is going on here. So the idea that somehow you could get further in front of the queue by getting out of the EU, President Obama just said, '*Please, I just want to disabuse of you of that notion, it's not true.*' If you step out of the front of the queue, you are no longer in the front, you are somewhere further back, right, that was really the point. But the '*back of the queue*' part really stuck. I just want to say that it was not at all in some sort of punitive way. It was just a factual statement of: look at our recent trends of doing trade deals, they are big blocs at a time, they are not country by country.

A bunch of folks were talking about fear, one way or another. Fear. What is going on with the electorate here, what is going on with the electorate back home.

Trump is what these young people now increasingly want to talk about. I am not a Democratic Ambassador or a Republican one. We have a big tradition of not getting super party political. I have broken from that rule only once, which was when someone back home said that we were not going to let Muslims into America or we were going to get a database of Muslims who were in America. That is unconstitutional, un-American and just plain wrong. President Obama stood up in the State of Union and said that, former Vice President Dick Cheney (who does not necessarily agree with President Obama on lots of things) said words to that effect, the head of the Republican party stood up and said words to that effect. There was a chorus of voices standing up against that kind of divisive and hurtful language.

But other than that, let me tell you something about what I say when this comes up with the students. A lot of times these kids will be concerned about media. They are paying attention to the news by the way. They are paying attention to what is going on. They have really high standards about what their own country is up to, what the United States is up to, what we are doing together, what we are not doing together.

Of course we do not have a BBC in America, we have public broadcasting, but it is nothing like the BBC. So they ask about media and media bias. And I say, *'Well, what media have you heard of? We have cable network news – can you name them?'* Fox News, CNN, NBC. So the kids know Fox News. So I ask, *'Which do you think is the most popular of all of those?'* So Fox is the most popular of the cable news networks. So then I tell the 18-year olds, I say, *'Okay, there are 300 million people in America, roughly'* (320 million, but I want to keep the maths simple, they have enough maths during the day, they don't need me giving them more). So 300 million Americans. I'd say, *'How many do you think watch Fox News on a given night?'* I will tell you where the bidding begins - the bidding starts at 200 million and then someone will guess 100 million. The lowest anyone has ever guessed is 50 million. So I ask them, *'Okay, how many think it's between 300 and 200 million?'* So, let's say 20 per cent of the people raise their hand and then I say, *'How many people between 200 million and 100 million'*, and 40 per cent of their hands go up, and between 100 million and 50 million, the rest of their hands go up and under 50 million, two contrarians in the back, just for the heck of it.

And the answer is three million. Three million out of 300 million. That is the biggest one. And that is on a really good night. It just puts it in perspective in our country that both the lefts and the right, especially during our primary process, get a disproportionate share of microphone. That is how our system works and how it works here, fair enough, but when it comes to actually winning the Presidency, you have got to appeal to the big middle part of the bell curve, because then you get 160 million people showing up to vote and you have got to go get that. I think that is a point worth making.

On Donald Trump, my politics are not that hard to guess, based on who appointed me, but I cannot go beyond what I have already said, other than to make the point I did about the extremes. Just remember, both sides – Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump - let's keep the maths simple, notched up roughly 14 million votes each in the primaries, out of a country of 300 million, out of an electorate of 200 million. So - relatively small numbers. Now they have to go and appeal to the middle, if they are going to win and keep their bases strong.

Just on Monday, the FT referred to the 'shaky' Special Relationship. Sir Malcolm talked about Suez. Right when I got here, the Special Relationship was declared dead on the front page of *The Sun*. I had been here six days, it was the Syria vote, Cameron recalls Parliament. You remember that? I do. Six days into my tenure, front page of *The Sun*: *'Special Relationship dead, aged 67'* etc.,.

A friend of mine in New York had warned me, *'Don't bang on about the Special Relationship, it's a cliché, don't fall into that trap,'* and I think he is wrong. Then six days after I got here, he said, *'Well done, seven decades in the making and you've killed it in seven days. Well done, Matthew!'*

I did some research back then when I first got here (multiple source research, Google and Wikipedia!) and discovered all the times in our history – and it is ten pages long - all the headlines of when the Special Relationship was declared dead.

Suez is one of them in 1956, but you go back to 1946/7, with Brits giving jet engine technology to the Russians, so the Special Relationship was declared dead then. In the 1950s it was Suez, in 1964 it was Vietnam, in 1983 it was Grenada, in 1994 our country gave a visa to Gerry Adams - remember that one – and it was declared dead then. Five days before 9/11, on 6th September

2001, there was a headline: *'Special Relationship Over - America's New Best Friend Is Mexico,'* because George W. Bush had gone to Mexico before coming to London.

So there is this history of 'it's dead, it's dead, it's dead'. It is not dead. It is not dead just because people like me or you say so, it is because we are living it every single day and having honest conversations where we do not necessarily agree with each other all the time.

As Sir Malcolm pointed out, I am not a trained diplomat, but I have done it twice now. And one of these phrases - and I am looking at my fellow diplomats here - that we are often called upon to say, usually quite sternly, is: *'There is no daylight between us'*, and then you are supposed to pause for dramatic effect. Think about that for a moment. I think that is a ludicrous standard of cooperation and more than a ludicrous high standard, not true to our history and not true to what real strength is.

So picture two soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder, another favourite diplomatic expression (and a great one, one I love), two couples dancing, friends hand in hand, you name it, in all of those images, there is lots of daylight between them and if there were not, it would be kind of creepy. Daylight is not a bad thing. Daylight is a good thing. The space between us is real opportunities, especially as you look at what the US and the UK have led the world in facing down. Big monolithic things - Nazism, Soviet-style Communism - and we succeeded against them by networks. Networks of cooperation. Networks, if you map them and go on to Google images and search for 'visualisations of the Internet' or 'visualisations of Wikipedia', are really cool. These are beautiful shapes and there is plenty of daylight in powerful networks.

We have not talked about Chilcot. I am not going to get out in front of what comes out. Let's see what comes out. I think both of our systems differ, but we have a similar belief in trying to get information out. This spirit of transparency is important for both countries and at the same time, you want diplomats and others to be able to talk privately to try to build bridges. Think about the Iranian deal, whether you like it or don't like it. A lot of that was back channel early stuff before the official negotiations could begin. I think that is a really good thing. Sometimes, if everything is out in the open, it precludes that early bridge-building stage from happening. But I think both of our countries' commitment to transparency is a good and important thing, and certainly something President Obama takes seriously.

You guys have a fear of fear. I want to pass on something that really struck me about what is going on in America. I am not talking about Republican or Democrat.

Have any of you ever flown domestically in America? I want to share a story I learned from a guy who is a consultant to the airline that every single year wins best airline in America for the highest customer service - I don't think anyone is ever close, maybe jetBlue - but it is Southwest Airlines.

Have you ever flown Southwest airlines? It is like easyJet or Ryanair. It is really cheap and really friendly and everyone loves it. All the other airlines score hugely less high. And he said it all comes down to their personal interaction with customers when there is a problem.

Let's say you are in Chicago and you are trying to get to New York and there is a huge snowstorm (and those of you who know Chicago, Chicago is always shut down because there is either a big

snowstorm or a big lightning storm and there are about three weeks in the year that you can fly into Chicago when one of those two things is not happening - I used to commute up there for the Obama campaign!). It is no airline's fault: all the flights are cancelled in this hypothetical example.

Let's say Sir Evelyn comes up to me and he is trying to get back to New York and I am (and I will be diplomatic) not Southwest Airlines, so think an establishment airline if you will, we have got a bunch of them. You come up to me, Sir Evelyn, and you say, *'You've just cancelled my flight.'* I am trained at this other airline to say, *'I am so sorry, sir, we have no flights for you, they have all been cancelled because of the snowstorm.'*

Now think about what just happened: I told him the truth, I looked him in the eye, I called him 'sir' - check, check, check.

Here's what Southwest Airlines, the one that wins all the awards, is trained to do. Same thing, you come up to me, *'You've cancelled my flight to New York.'* They are trained to say, *'We've got to get you home. Now, here's our problem, cancel, cancel, New Jersey, Newark, cancel, cancel, Long Island, cancel, cancel.'*

Do you see what just happened in those two different scenarios? No more words, I didn't get all talky, in fact, I didn't even call him 'sir' and I didn't even say I am sorry - but I bet you felt better!

I sort of got it, but I did not really get it. And I said to the consultant, *'Well, tell me what that means.'* He said that, in executive coaching speak, what just happened was something really important (and I will connect this to fear and what is going on in both our countries in a moment). What many of us do, as policymakers or politicians or the heads of NGOs, whatever we might be, we instinctively internalise the bad news and the constraints. Notice the person at the establishment airline said, *'We have no flights for you.'* Think about it. Now I am standing between Sir Evelyn and getting back home to his lovely wife. I am the problem now, and I am just trying to be helpful, I tick all the boxes, and I am your problem. Southwest Airlines very cleverly externalised the issue. I am not the problem - I got to get you home. Now, if you like, I am on your side and here's our shared challenge - all these cancelled flights and all the red text on the screen.

In one way, you can say, *'Oh, that is just a gimmick'* and it is, but it is an effective gimmick. And if you think about the political debate back home in America, on both the right and the left, there were candidates who basically were saying, *'We've got to get you home'* and then they were pointing, saying, *'and this system sucks and it's rigged against you and we got to go do something about it.'* Some want to break it, some want to end it, some want to mend it, whatever, but they do that same thing. People - if you do not connect with them and say, *'We've got to get you home'* and acknowledge their fear, their uncertainty, their unease - are going to think that you are just standing between them and the life they want for their children and themselves.

That is why, without getting political, I think a lot of other candidates in our race on both sides, who know a lot about the system and how complicated it is and actually have some really good ideas about what you might do about it, end up sounding like the establishment airline - *'We've got no flights for you. It's complicated, we are working on it.'* So I pass that on in a non-political observation about my country that I think maybe would also apply to yours.

If we have a moment, can I share with you what the 18-year olds have shared with me, because it gets directly at this gentleman's question here. If you go to a university and you are an American Ambassador and you ask: *'What is concerning you?'*, you will get answers like 'Israel/Palestine', 'surveillance and drones' and all these important things (rarely the Falklands, but sometimes!). These are the issues that we are trained as Ambassadors to talk about.

This - [slide shown on screen] - is what we actually get when we talk to 18-years olds. So here is Israel/Palestine - it is on there. There is surveillance, GCHQ and NSA and the important partnership we have there. Military intervention. Terrorism. They are there. Climate change is there.

This 17,000 represents coming up on three years of asking this question. So Donald Trump obviously never used to show up, but he is now the fourth biggest word, just in the last five months.

You know how these work - the thing that is mentioned most appears as the biggest. Look at the giant one. Guns. Police brutality. Racism. Healthcare. Those are the biggies. Whether you are a career Foreign Service person or you are a political appointee like me, we are not trained to talk about guns, police brutality, racism and healthcare, but that is what these young people want to talk about. So we do and it is good. Strangely, it is easier to talk about racism and police violence and what we are doing about it in America, because we are doing things.

Up until recently, it was very frustrating to talk about guns or to try to explain guns, because it just looked like we were stuck. We still are to a large degree stuck on this issue, but President Obama did some executive orders to try to get things done, and after the horror of Orlando, you may see some things change. But until you get a group of people as passionate and as fired up and as organised as the really core pro-gun lobby folks are (if you don't agree with that, fine) but for them, it is 'issue 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5' and they show up and they care and they write and they organise. In our system, you have got to out-organise them. I think that is what is going to change it.

They want to talk about this. You will have read about what happened in Ferguson, what happened in Cleveland what happened in Baltimore, what happened in South Carolina, I could keep going. This is an American problem and we have to deal with that as a country - our police misconduct and police brutality. What you will never read about is all the cities where it is working - it just does not make for interesting news - but it is happening and we have good community policing models where the men and women who work in law enforcement wake up every day and protect the people they are sworn to protect and serve and it works very well. So how do you take the culture that works there and transplant it to the places where it has so tragically broken down? We are doing that and I am pretty confident that we will get that right, we will focus on it and we will get that in a better place.

We have a wonderful guy here who works for us at the Embassy, who used to work going into police departments in America and I have a briefing from him and I want to share with you an exercise he does. I have never done this before. It is trying to get at unconscious bias. I will shortcut it. Picture I wrote up there on the screen just one word and here's the game: you have to think about the first word that comes to mind (we are actually going to do this, you don't have to share it though, keep it to yourself) when I say the phrase 'housekeeper', like a maid. Housekeeper. Got it? What is your first association with 'housekeeper'?

Now, he said that if you have a random sample of people, you will get the following:

*'Housekeeper – my mother was one and did it as a second job to put me through university.'*

*'Housekeeper – I want to get a raise so that I can hire one and stop doing all this extra work after I get home from work and am tired.'*

*'Housekeeper – I used to do it for the summers to raise money to put myself through college.'*

And so on.

He said if you get a hundred police officers together, they all write down the exact same word: thief. I said, *'You are kidding me? Thief?!'* He said, *'The reason is, the only housekeepers we ever meet – we don't make enough to hire one – every single housekeeper we meet is either guilty of or accused of stealing something'*. Isn't that amazing? How many people here were thinking 'thief'? None of us. Except wonderful people, our fellow brothers and sisters in law enforcement, who are not mean people, that is just their experience.

My challenge to this amazing group at Global Strategy Forum is we have got those blind spots too, as policymakers, as diplomats (and this is back to the fear). We can talk about the 'international rules-based order' and we are instinctively picturing a wonderful network of cooperation, but other people are having a very different reaction to the words we use about how we work together globally. And something for us all just to think about: what are those places where we are writing our version of 'thief' when we hear about people; and both in the US and in this country, especially in the wake of Thursday, where do we need to watch out for over-reacting and pointing fingers at the other side and be aware of these blind spots of our own?

Let's do the happy bit. Just quickly, close your eyes and think of the first word that pops into mind if I say, *'What is one thing that gives you hope or inspires about the Transatlantic Relationship?'*. This isn't nearly as fun as the frustrations! Be thinking of yours and see if it matches what I am about to share with you that the 18-year old Brits say.

So what I expected was TV, movies, music. I was surprised by food! Food is really big, and it is burgers when you ask, because I do ask. It is high-end burgers – Shake Shack, Five Guys, it is not just McDonalds, although it includes McDonalds.

So there are these tangible things. But then there are these wonderful, less tangible, but very real values-driven things. Opportunities. Freedom. American dream. Then one that totally surprised me: NASA, by name. Not space, not Mars. These kids don't remember the moon landing in 1969. Someone joked, *'I think they meant NSA,'* but they meant NASA (both wonderful organisations)!

So that is what inspires me and if you think about that bottom one, 'Opportunities', that is obviously not something unique to the United States. It is something which is very much alive and well here and which I hope will be a source of cooperation between that generation and their American counterparts.

This is a good time to plug the exchange groups. Sir Malcolm, you were sharing with me that in 1976, you were sent on an exchange programme to visit America. Margaret Thatcher was sent during the 1960s. Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, Sir Malcolm, Sadiq Khan, the new mayor of London and many others all went. I am sure that some of you in this room were sent on these exchange

programmes and there is nothing better than that, because you learn things and you share things, just by being at the dinner table with Americans outside of Washington. You have done it in your career – the act of exploring the other shore. All of you have done that act of exploring other shores, whether physically other shores or emotionally and that is a required step for bridge-building.

I know that I did not have time to get to every single point raised here on your frustrations, but I will take this back and add it to the growing list of concerns.

I will close maybe with a thought from a great Briton – it is so great that I felt like Churchill should have said it, but it was said by a Brit who is my age, Stephen Frost, who was Head of Diversity and Inclusion for the London 2012 Olympics. He reminds us that *'Diversity is a fact, inclusion is a choice.'* I love that. The word 'diversity' is up there, it is pretty big, it is in green. I love diversity, I could talk a lot about diversity and there is such great diversity here in the United Kingdom. But that is just a fact. That just is. Then it is a question of what you do about it. And that is the inclusion part. Inclusion is a choice. It is choice to include that I hope we all make in these coming months and in these coming years.

I would just close with saying that it is not enough (joking about therapy) just to look into ourselves. It is not enough to see the diversity in others, although that is important. This final bit is crucial if we are going to build a bridge because we have to see ourselves in the other. That is the final bridge. Know yourself, see the diversity in others and then do that final bit of seeing yourself in somebody else on that other shore. That is building a bridge and in the turbulence that I know has been created by last Thursday's result, if we keep that in mind in our work lives and in our social lives, I think we will get the stability, the security and the growth that we need. Thank you.

## IRAN ONE YEAR AFTER THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS?

Transcript of a lecture given by Professor Ali Ansari

5th July 2016

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Thank you very much. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): where are we after nearly a year?

I should make a very clear admission here and that is that I have been a sceptic of the process as it has been worked out over the last three years and I will try to explain why. It is not because I think that the deal itself has been a bad deal. I think the deal as a transactional agreement has been a very good deal, in many ways a very good deal for the West in fact, inasmuch as it may delay Iran's acquisition of extensive nuclear energy or anything else for a period of ten or fifteen years. Yes, it is a limited agreement, but it is certainly something that is better than where we were.

Where I have stronger disagreements was with the way in which it was being sold. And I think it is this spin that has really bothered me. I am one of these people who was always haunted by the Oslo Peace Accords and that famous handshake on the White House lawn back in 1993. We were all told then that this was going to inaugurate a period of great peace in the Middle East - where are we now? I always used to say to people that we needed to get some of these broader issues worked out rather than announcing a great triumph before many of the details had been actually thrashed out.

I fear in some cases that some of the details here have not been thrashed out as well as they could have been. I think it is quite clear from the JCPOA that we had a lot of experts talking about centrifuges and the nuclear physics aspects, but we had less - and this is a quite striking omission and one that really surprised me - on the banking and financial side. People did not really have a clear idea of how long it would take for the sanctions to be lifted and what the mechanics of this would be.

So on the one hand, you had President Rouhani announcing this as a watershed moment, a seminal

moment, to his own people - and you can understand the politics of it by the way, it is very clear, you have to sell it in a very positive way, and say *'this is momentous, this is going to change and transform things, this is the key that is going to unlock everything.'*

On the other hand, in the White House, you had President Obama selling hope as only he knows how to sell it, and what he was basically saying was: you are going to get not only economic salvation, but also a political redemption out of this, and that this will be the key that unlocks everything else. You can understand the diplomatic mechanics of that too. I have had long talks with colleagues about this and I fully appreciate and understand that as a legitimate route - what you do is you go and solve that thing that you think you can solve and it will then unlock many other things.

My problem with that in a sense was twofold. Firstly, they had not prepared the political hinterland for what was coming, so what you had was a very specific agreement that risked being swamped by all sorts of bile that was continuing to emanate from the edges, be it from hardliners in Iran or hawks in the United States or elsewhere. It was there and it always had that potential. So what it meant was that if you were going to capitalise on this agreement in a really singular way, you were going to have to maintain momentum and move forward very quickly and move on to Syria for instance or to other things to show how this delivered. And I am afraid that has not happened.

It has not happened because I think people on both sides viewed this as a transactional agreement, particularly I would say in Iran in this respect, and Khamenei made his views very, very clear that there would be no subsequent agreements. I understand that people say, *'Well, he's full of hot air, he says one thing to his hardliners and another thing to keep things happy,'* but the main hardliner in Iran is him, so unless he is talking to himself repeatedly, he is the one making a number of these decisions.

In the 20-25 years that I have been looking at Iran and travelling to Iran (although I have not been recently for obvious reasons), every time I would talk to Iranian officials (many of whom know fully well what the issues are in Iran, by the way - Iran is not short of highly intelligent, sophisticated people who know exactly what the problem is), they would say, *'We have taken this plan to the Supreme Leader, to His Excellency, and we have said we need to resolve our problems with the United States and without even looking at it, he would veto it.'*

There was a lot of argument that he had changed his mind now, that what we were witnessing was heroic flexibility, if you will. But I have to say, I think it has been very, very reluctantly given, this heroic flexibility. I think he has been very specific about what he wants and he is basically happy in some ways with the result that he has.

One of the key elements of this, and I have always contrasted what Rouhani's administration has done with that of Khatami. Again, I am not as enthusiastic in some ways about the Rouhani administration and his political and economic reforms, for the reasons that I will tell you nearer to the end of the talk. But it is partly also because of the vision that they had. Rouhani is very good on rhetoric. His Foreign Minister is excellent by the way, he is a great, great player. He is basically an 'American' (having spent around 20 years in the US) in many ways. He speaks 'American' rather than 'European', if I can put it that way. He knows how to talk the lingo. He has, if I may say so, lied well for his country and he has done it brilliantly, and as Rouhani has said, he has charmed

the world. But what he has tried to sell in terms of economic growth and all the other things that he promised the Iranians, I think Khamenei himself has effectively put a dampener on. So one of the key areas, of course, contrasting with the Khatami period with which I am probably much more familiar, is access to the United States, the economy and the dollar.

One of the things that I have been very, very struck about (and I have checked this with people, because I thought that it was very, very strange) is that, as we know, we have all these issues now in terms of the sanctions being lifted over Iran's access to the dollar. One of the questions I would ask is, as I said: Was there not a full appreciation of what this meant in practice? The current understanding is that basically the Iranians were told that, throughout the negotiations. If you go to Washington or you talk to colleagues in London and others, they will say, *'Listen, we told the Iranians what the situation was, we told them which sanctions were coming off and which were not, they were fully cognizant of this, but for some reason they seemed to be quite chirpy about it all.'*

I have to say, to my mind, if that is the case, it is a cock-up of monumental proportions on the Iranian negotiating side. They must have considered – how can you not consider it in our globalised world today – that to be cut out of the American market and the dollar would not make life more difficult? But you see, Khamenei for his part, would be very happy with that and presumably when they went back to Iran to sell it to Khamenei, he was quite happy that Iran would be locked out of the United States.

But in the post-banking crisis of 2008, in our new age of compliance, in the new digital world where all you need is HSBC to have a server in New York, the idea that you can actually engage economically and reintegrate Iran into the global economy without it having access to the dollar strikes me as quite bizarre. Zarif in an article or an interview reported in *The New York Times*,<sup>1</sup> effectively said to the Americans: 'Please don't worry, we have no expectation nor desire to use the dollar' and I thought what a very bizarre thing that was to say. You are basically shooting yourself in the foot.<sup>2</sup>

Now if that is the case, it seems to me that the deal itself from an Iranian perspective was badly negotiated, because what you have done is you have hampered yourself and this is the price they are now paying in terms of the sanctions relief they may have.

I have said this in other talks: it seems to me the main problem with the JCPOA as it stands, as far as an Iranian perspective is concerned and as far as the economy is concerned, to use a metaphor, is that we have been sold a Porsche with a 2CV engine and the Iranians are getting into the car and they are striking up the ignition and it won't go anywhere. I have often said it would have been much better for them to have sold us a 2CV with a 2CV engine, because it would have been slow, but at least it would have got somewhere. But at the moment they are having real trouble getting the thing ignited. So it may go, but it will be slow. My argument even before the agreement was reached was: do not expect anything to happen rapidly, it will be slow.

What I did not realise last year was precisely this point about the lack of access to the dollar. And I think that is a serious, serious problem for them and they will need to get it resolved. I was at a

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-mohammad-javad-zarif.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-mohammad-javad-zarif.html?_r=1)

<sup>2</sup> Since the lecture was originally given in July 2016, the US Treasury has sought to offer further clarity on access to the dollar.

meeting about two months ago and I talked to the Iranians there and I said very clearly to them, *'Listen, I have nothing to gain, I am not travelling to Iran on a regular basis, I am just going to tell you as I see it - you have to resolve your relations with the United States, there is no 'if'. You don't have to love them, you don't even have to like them - lots of people don't. But the Russians, the Chinese, the others, they are all able to access this... so get it resolved, because if you don't, you are going to have at least one arm, if not one leg also, constantly tied behind your back.'*

There is another striking thing from the negotiations (others in the room may be able to correct me if I am wrong) when the sanctions were coming off Yugoslavia, either the IMF or the World Bank, had commissioned a report on the mechanics of lifting sanctions and what it would entail. As far as we are aware, no such report was done in this case. There was nothing done to assess that. I find that quite shocking in some ways. It is really quite depressing that nobody asked for it. And even if the Brits, the French and the Americans were telling the Iranians this and they did not believe it, where were the Russians and the Chinese? I suppose from the Russian point of view, of course, it suits their interests for the Iranians not to have a very engaging relationship with the Americans. The Russians are setting up a bank and they can deal in roubles - that will be very exciting for the Iranians! It is the sort of thing that I think is a problem.

Now, to give you two areas (as a case study, if you will - there are a number of examples) where I think in terms of the economy, there are worries. I am a bit more pessimistic today because we just heard the news about the IPC. Everyone knows that in terms of investment, this is the area they really need. I know they have produced quite a bit now and they are back to their pre-sanctions levels, but the fact is, they are not going to be able to maintain these at this level until they get some proper investment.

There was a lot of excitement about the International Petroleum Contract and people said, *'Yes, it's going to happen... there are delays, but nothing in Iran happens without a delay and a good discussion anyway, so that is not a problem.'* Nonetheless, we had some expectation that something more dramatic would happen and if you looked at the original IPC, it was actually pretty dramatic, I have to say, in terms of the implications. But I said to someone that *'this is going to cause problems in Iran'* because effectively what it was doing was allowing for the re-privatisation of the Iranian oil industry.

Now for those of us who are constantly reminded of Dr. Mossadegh and the oil nationalisation of 1953, you could see that it might be politically sensitive that Iran was about to re-privatise its oil industry in one way or another, albeit somewhat surreptitiously. So I always thought that was going to be a problem. What I did not expect was the announcement that we got yesterday that basically the IPC has been transformed into Buy-back 2. I have to tell you, Buy-back 2 will get nowhere. Most oil industry analysts recognise that there is a problem here, that most oil majors will not touch it, because they had huge difficulties in the 1990s over it. So it is a problem, and it indicates to me something that I have been arguing for some time, that the political landscape in Iran is still very fraught.

There is still a very strong division of opinion between what we may call the integrationists and the more isolationists, or if you prefer, the hardliners and the reformists, whatever term you want to use. The fact is, that has not been settled yet and it is a problem. It is a problem that the Revolutionary Guard are so pervasive in aspects of the economy, not as pervasive as some people

think, but they are still there, and of course, with all these aspects of 'due diligence'.

One of the things about the JCPOA - I always loved it with the Americans when they come out, they say, *'You are of course welcome to do business in Iran within the confines of the law and by the way, here is the 200-page manual to help you'* and you can see businesses sort of sighing deeply, because one of the aspects they emphasise is: 'Make sure you do your due diligence'. But how exactly do you do that in a country which has no Companies House? How exactly do you do that in a country which likes to keep things as opaque as possible, because it does not want people to know things and where people do not like paying tax, to be perfectly honest? It is a very, very difficult situation that you face.

The other one which has caused a huge amount of excitement, justifiably in some ways, but again for me is an indication of where even the Rouhani administration does not quite get it, is the airplane deals. They have caused huge interest.

I will just take the Airbus one to begin with (I do not know what is going to happen with Boeing, because now they are waffling about the Airbus one and turning towards Boeing). These are great deals and Iran needs to refurbish its airline fleet, there is no doubt about it. For those of you who have had the pleasure of flying IranAir, the 747s are marvellous because they are so old that there is legroom. It is wonderful - they are 1977 747s and it is not quite as cramped as you will get in modern jets. Nonetheless they are old. They are a wonderful metaphor for the Iranian economy in a way, that it manages to keep flying despite the fact that the technology is getting pretty old and they are having to fix bits on an *ad hoc* basis.

But how many planes does IranAir actually have in service? Twenty-seven.<sup>3</sup> And it is buying 118 planes from Airbus and another 100 from Boeing. So, certainly it is multiplying its fleet by umpteen times. It wanted to buy originally, although now it has backtracked on it, eight A380 Airbuses (those are the double-deckers). Now it was all very significant. Of course it was all very good for the factory lines in southern France and so on and so forth, but the fact is, even many Iranian analysts and airline pilots and others were saying, *'What on earth do we need so many planes for and where are we going to fly these A380s? We don't even have the facilities to actually land them in Iran.'* In Tehran there might be one gate.

Now what this tells us about is the wonderful, aspirational nature of Iranian economic planners, that they are thinking big and I have to say, it is marvellous. But on the other hand, it does tell me that they have not really learned that much from the Shah's period. The Shah bought three Concorde on a whim. He could do it in a way - he had the money. Okay, they never got delivered in the end, but he did have the money. This lot are doing almost the same thing and saying, *'We will transform our airline sector, we will build the airports'* and it is very enticing - the French get very excited and say, *'We'll go and build these airports for you'* - and then, and this is the key, *'We are going to turn Tehran into a regional hub.'* This is a great idea and Tehran should be the regional hub, as opposed to Dubai or Doha or wherever, but they operate on this notion that there is no competition for this business. And they also operate on the notion that people are naturally going to go to Tehran as a central hub when it is restricted in terms of its social and legal mores, which you do not have

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<sup>3</sup> The exact figure for the number of aircraft IranAir has actually flying at any one time is not publicly available. However, it is estimated that 27 planes out of the full fleet of 46 deemed to be 'in service' are actually flying, for reasons of lack of parts or safety issues.

necessarily in other parts of the Persian Gulf.

There are all sorts of things implicit in that plan which I do not think they have dealt with and I think it is emblematic of some of the issues. Fine, Iran may now say they have pledged \$43 billion for the purchase of the new planes.<sup>4</sup> It is \$43 billion I have to tell you that the Iranian government does not really have. I think that there will be many who say the money could be spent on something a little bit more productive for the people, so that they can see the results.

So I think these sorts of things indicate a certain lack of connection with reality. It is very, very grand projects and I am sorry to say that. As someone who is really a historian of the Pahlavi period, it is one of those things where I think certainly under Mohammad-Reza Shah, we had this fault that there were a lot of grand schemes and not enough dealing with the detail on the ground and I think this is one of the issues now.

So how do we see the period forward? I do not see the JCPOA collapsing in a dramatic way. I just do not see it that way. But I do see things gnawing at the edges. I do see things basically turning it into something that is effectively stunted. It should go somewhere more interesting and it may not.

A lot will depend, of course, on what happens on November 8th. We all know electorates are an interesting bunch, so let's see what happens in the United States. But I can guarantee you that whether it is President Trump or President Clinton, they will not be as nice to Iran as President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. There will be a different mood. I know the Saudis and the Israelis certainly are just holding their breath and waiting for the new White House to come in.

So they will have to adjust to new realities in that respect. That means there is going to be more focus and it is going to be interesting to see what happens. It may yield some more interesting developments in terms of regional issues if the Iranians feel they have got someone a bit tougher on the other side that they are handling. But I think in the immediate future, you would have to say that it will likely be a more confrontational relationship than the one we have now, although even now, if you go to the United States and you talk to people in the beltway and others, there remains a deep, deep suspicion. It is just that the White House has placed a veneer of cordiality over it and at the moment, that has not penetrated.

Anyone who travels to Iran and certainly anyone who goes to Tehran (let's forget the regions for the time being) will be quite struck by really how wealthy this country is and it is enormously wealthy in terms of private wealth. But do not confuse that with governmental finances. This is one of the great paradoxes of Iran and I think one thing we need to be aware of when we are looking at it. The government's finances are in a very, very poor shape. But the amount of money swilling around Tehran is frightening.

Just to give you an example of how perverse the whole thing is, one of the latest scandals to hit Iran is government salaries and I thought you would enjoy this, because it is really quite telling. It was one of the things that happened under Ahmadinejad, but Rouhani has to clear it up, although having been in office for nearly four years, they are saying, *'Well, why didn't you clear it up earlier?'* Thankfully the whole leak culture has reached Iran, so people were leaking salary cheques

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<sup>4</sup> The size of Iran's purchase of new aircraft has been widely reported in the press, for example: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/urgent-airbus-says-us-grants-license-for-planes-in-iran-deal>

online and a number of government officials working for the state insurance company and others, it transpired, had salaries of \$30,000 a month, and in some cases, more than \$30,000. And of course, they all said, *'Well, I am worth it.'* In Iran, it is shocking. I think it would be quite shocking here to be honest, but it is shocking amount and actually Rouhani has not handled it as well as he could have. I think they needed to deal with it fairly quickly.

But this shows how much money there is in terms of a rentier state in that sense. The amount of oil money that was raised during Ahmadinejad's period is of course swilling around in these private areas. It is a consumer-rich place and that is what attracts a lot of Europeans and others to do business there, but it is more sales than investment if I may put it that way. A lot of people want to sell things to Iran, they have good purchasing power, certainly in Tehran, but fewer people are interested in investing in Iran for the reasons that I have hinted at, and also because the investment environment is so weak. As one British colleague of mine always used to say, *'I am happy to invest in Iran when the Iranians invest in Iran'*. You will find that many Iranians do not invest in Iran, they actually like to invest in Dubai and other places, so there is a problem there.

One of the issues with Rouhani that I find quite worrying, because I think genuinely he is probably a decent man, if not a reformer at heart, is the state of the economy. I think he is much more pragmatic which has certain advantages, but I also think he is probably not a conviction politician in the way that we might like him to be. One of the things that I find very striking is he has lost the argument or lost the initiative on the economy, and the economy was always going to be his strong point because he inherited a real mess after Ahmadinejad.

Remember, under Ahmadinejad, the oil price was well over \$100/barrel. Now it has sunk very low and they have had to face this dramatic fall in the oil price, which has also affected Iran's ability to pull out of its sanctions constraints. But basically because Rouhani promised so much and has been unable to deliver, the tragedy is that now he is being blamed for the failures in the economy, which to be honest, are not his doing. He has inherited a mess. But he has not dealt with it as substantively and structurally as he should have. So Khamenei and the others have unleashed the dogs of war, so to speak, and they have gone out and they have just attacked him ad nauseam on the state of the economy. And he is struggling. He is struggling in part because even some of his own ministers are coming back and saying, *'Really, we need to make some proper structural changes'*.

Now you will hear the point that inflation in Iran has come down. It certainly has, but I suspect that is probably more to do with the fact that the country is in recession, and in prolonged recession, than with other things. Certainly they have managed the situation better than Ahmadinejad, but there are other factors that will influence that. So Rouhani faces a government in debt, ideologically he is under quite strong challenge, the oil price is weak which is not helping him, although people obviously recognise that as a problem and there are good people trying to manage it, I can guarantee you that.

But here is also his other weakness and something which I particularly have focused on, which is the security state. The security state in Iran remains strong. Now one might say that it is important, if there are economic difficulties, that the political and security apparatus remains strong. But of course when Rouhani came into office in 2013, he promised that the security state would be rolled back and in actual fact that has not happened. At the time, I had this little private bet amongst

colleagues because, having studied Rouhani's emergence, I was well aware that this was not quite the seminal election that people thought. Nonetheless there was a lot of enthusiasm at the time, we got all a bit carried away and I said, *'Okay, well, when do we think the Green Movement leaders will be released from house arrest?'* and they said, *'Yeah, within six months. Six months.'* Well, we are still waiting.

A number of dual nationals have been arrested. It is very clear what the point of that is, obviously to serve notice to any dual nationals: *'Don't think you are going to come here and make lots of money'*. I have sympathy for that to some extent, but I do not think imprisoning them in solitary confinement for ten months is the way to do it. It sends the wrong signal for many, many people and I stressed this to Iranian colleagues. I said, *'You know, your greatest strength in many ways is the diaspora. You should be building bridges with your diaspora, they have the money, they have the talent, they have the contacts, they have the networks. Get them in. Look what the Chinese do with the Chinese diaspora in the United States.'* They find it difficult to disagree. But if you are going to imprison dual nationals, it is not a great encouragement to be honest. It certainly does not encourage me.

Let me just use the recent election as a case study of how things are more opaque than we would like. I always say to my friends, *'Iran is a wonderful country. The trouble is, the Iranian authorities never like you to be happy for more than a few days at a time.'* So we all got slightly chirpy because the election result seemed to indicate (and I think it does indicate this by the way) that the popular mood is in a certain direction. Despite 2009, despite the repressions, you still had this mood in the country that was in some ways, certainly comparatively speaking in the Middle East, more liberal, cosmopolitan, wanting to open up to the world, and despite heavy, heavy rigging in the election (and elections in Iran are always heavily managed) so that you had these reformists or not reformists. I always used to say *'hardline reformists'* and *'liberal hardliners'*, take your pick.

The one that got me as the best example of how opaque this whole system is, is the Assembly of Experts. This goes to the heart of the Supreme Leader and who might succeed him, because that is the great unknown in the equation: what happens when the Supreme Leader goes? So there was a lot of focus on this Assembly of Experts, which is like a council of cardinals - there to elect the new Supreme Leader when this one pops his clogs. There was a lot of talk that *'if the reformists can seize it, this is a great sign, and Obama's policy will be proved correct'*. And lo and behold, these *'reformists'* in Tehran swept the board. It was dramatic and I have to say, nobody in a sense does PR quite the way the Iranians do - it was really sold in an exceptionally good way.

I should add this as a caveat by the way: do remember that Iran is one of the countries where very few foreign journalists are allowed in and where journalism is not exactly free, so when we get information from Iran, you have to be aware that a lot of things are mediated. Some people do these polling companies in Iran, they ring from US universities and you know, if you just ring people on their phones, you are not talking about a *'free society'* in that sense. You have to be very careful with these things.

But nonetheless, we had this great result and then you go through the lists of the candidates and because there are no political parties in Iran, what they basically do is they join lists. There was the *'reformist/liberal'* list and shall we say, the *'hardline'* list. I was going round saying, *'Why are both of them claiming victory?'* It turned out that eight of the sixteen people on the Tehran list

that had triumphed so dramatically were on both lists. It did not take much to work it out - all you have to do is go down the list and check to see what the affiliations are. I went through this and I have to say, some of our colleagues in the journalist's profession, forgive me for those of you who are, but did not actually do this. I have to tell you, even eight or nine of those there, I would not have considered liberals by any stretch of the imagination and they were not, they just happened to be allocated to a list.

So what you find is this absurdity, that after all this triumph, that Ayatollah Jannati, the great hardliner, the scourge of the reformists, somehow manages to get elected back as chairman of the Assembly of Experts after all that time, because he did not actually get in, he was number 16 and they had to squeeze him in at the last moment.

So again that is why I said caution. Caution. Caution. Caution. Look at the detail: the devil is in the detail. Look at that detail, check it out, see what is going on and see how that pans out. Because what you see is not always what you get and you have got to be very careful.

But what you see in Iran today, in very simple terms, is a tale of two cities. You see a state and a society that are quite at odds with each other. You see a society that in many ways in my view is much more liberal than its government. People often say that it is quite the opposite with Saudi Arabia, where the government is more liberal than its society. I will leave others to decide on that. But in Iran you have a push from the bottom and a reaction at the top. The question is: to what extent, looking forward, do we think society can make that push through and actually change the leadership at the top? At the moment, the problem is that those with the guns, if you will, are still very much in control and the economy at the moment, while fragile, will sustain them. It will sustain them. Khamenei and the Supreme Leader's office and others have got access to a lot of resources.

Ultimately, to end on a slightly optimistic note, something will have to give; they cannot maintain this forever and ever. I would have liked to have thought this would have happened earlier, that they would have realised this. People do appreciate it and certainly if you look at Rouhani's ministers, there are those who are fully aware of the situation.

But at the moment, with the JCPOA, one of the problems we have is that the level of disillusionment that will emerge in Iran will simply enhance Khamenei's position in the country, because he will have said, as he said last year: *'You can't trust the Americans'*. The fact that maybe his own negotiators negotiated a bad deal is neither here nor there. He will say, *'You can't trust the Americans. I was right'*, and that will enhance his position.

I am not going to predict Armageddon: the Israelis are not going to attack and that sort of thing. But this utopian vision that we had or the hopes that we had, I think are going to have to be postponed, because it is not going to happen in the immediate future. It may yet happen, it may yet develop, but it is a gamble that the Obama White House has made and which it will not see realised one way or the other until long after it has left office.



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## GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM EVENTS IN 2015-2016

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- 20th October 2015 Lecture on *'How Peace Ends And How Wars Start: The Relevance Of The First World War Today?'* by **Professor Margaret MacMillan**, Warden of St. Antony's College and a Professor of International History at the University of Oxford.
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- 21st October 2015 Debate on *'The UK-China Relationship: Should Britain And China 'Stick Together'?'* with **Sir Martin Davidson**, Chairman of the Great Britain-China Centre; **Richard Graham MP**, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary China Group; and **Professor Michel Hockx**, Professor of Chinese at SOAS, University of London and Founding Director of the SOAS China Institute.
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- 27th October 2015 Lecture on *'The Utility Of British Defence In Today's Strategic Context'* by **General Sir Peter Wall GCB CBE ADC Gen**, Chief of the General Staff (2010-2014).
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- 3rd November 2015 Lecture on *'Seventy Years On: Is The UN Running Out Of Steam?'* by **Sir Jeremy Greenstock GCMG**, British Ambassador to the United Nations (1998-2003).
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- 17th November 2015 Debate on *'From Dictatorship To Democracy: A New Era For Myanmar?'* with **Rushanara Ali MP**, Chair, All Party Parliamentary Group on Democracy in Burma; **Mark Canning CMG**, British Ambassador to Myanmar/Burma (2006-2009); and **Dr Richard Cockett**, *The Economist's* Southeast Asia correspondent (2010-2014) and author of *'Blood, Dreams And Gold: The Changing Face Of Burma'*.
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- 24th November 2015 Debate on *'India's International Relations Under Modi: Non-Aligned Or Re-Aligned?'* with **John Dubber**, Head of Policy & External Relations at the British Council and co-author of its *India Matters* report; **Shashank Joshi**, Senior Research Fellow at RUSI; and **Lance Price**, author of *'The Modi Effect: Inside Narendra Modi's Campaign To Transform India'*. **Dr Virander Paul**, Deputy High Commissioner of India in London, spoke in reply to the debate.
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- 2nd December 2015 Seminar on *'Jihadi News Corp: The Online Battleground?'* at the National Liberal Club, held in collaboration with the Oxford Media Network and co-chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL** and **Deborah Pout**, Founder of the Oxford Media Network. The following speakers took part: **Iman Abou Atta**, Deputy Director and Head of Middle East and North Africa Programmes at Faith Matters; **Peter Clarke CVO OBE QPM**, Education Commissioner, Birmingham (2014); Former UK National Coordinator of Terrorism Investigations and Head of Counter-terrorism Command, London Metropolitan Police; **Alex Krasodomski-Jones**, Researcher, Centre for the Analysis of Social Media, Demos; **Mina Al-Lami**, Media analyst and jihadist media expert, BBC Monitoring; **Professor Peter Neumann**, Director, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King's College London; and **Kevin Sutcliffe**, Head of News Programming EU, VICE News.
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14th December 2015 Lecture on *'The New Spymasters: Inside Espionage From The Cold War To Global Terror'* by **Stephen Grey**, Special Correspondent with Reuters in London, chaired by GSF Advisory Board member, the **Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC**.

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26th January 2016 Debate on *'Egypt – Five Years After Tahrir Square: What Next?'* with **Dr Hisham Hellyer**, Senior Fellow (non-resident) at the Rafik Hariri Centre for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council, and Associate Fellow in International Security Studies at RUSI; **Sir Gerald Howarth MP**, Chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Egypt; and **James Watt CVO**, UK Ambassador to Egypt (2011-2014).

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2nd February 2016 Debate on *'Five Years After The 'Arab Spring': Prospects For The Middle East?'* with **Alastair Croke**, Director and Founder of Conflicts Forum; **Jane Kinninmont**, Senior Research Fellow and Deputy Head of the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House; and **Tarek Osman**, political economist and author of *'Islamism: What It Means For The Middle East And The World'*.

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8th February 2016 Lecture on *'The Terrorist Threat In The EU: The View From Europol'* by **Rob Wainwright**, Director of Europol, chaired by GSF Advisory Board member, the **Rt Hon the Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC**.

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24th February 2016 Seminar on *'Iran, Saudi Arabia, Power Shifts And Sectarian Divides: The Challenging Geopolitics Of The Middle East'*. The seminar took place in Convocation Hall, Church House and was chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**. The following speakers took part: **Professor Michael Burleigh**, Journalist, Author and Historian; Research Professor, University of Buckingham; **Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb KBE CMG DSO**, Former Director of UK Special Forces and Commander of the British Field Army; **Sir Derek Plumbly KCMG**, Visiting Professor of Middle Eastern Studies, IMES; British Ambassador to Egypt (2003-2007) and Saudi Arabia (2000-2003); **Jonathan Rugman**, Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Channel 4 News; **Farouk Soussa**, Chief Economist Middle East, Citi Global Markets and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw**, Home Secretary (1997-2001); Foreign Secretary (2001-2006); Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and Secretary of State for Justice (2007-2010).

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9th March 2016 Seminar on *'Europe In The World: Towards A More Effective EU Foreign And Security Strategy'*. The seminar took place in Convocation Hall, Church House in collaboration with the House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee and was chaired by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**. The following members of the House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee took part: **Lord Tugendhat** (Chairman); **Lord Risby**; **Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**; and **Baroness Suttie**.

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- 10th March 2016 Debate on *'Nuclear Weapons And 21st Century Threats – Implications For Safety & Security'* with the **Rt Hon the Lord Browne of Ladyton**, Vice Chairman of the NTI, and **Eric Schlosser**, author of *'Command And Control: Nuclear Weapons, The Damascus Accident And The Illusion Of Safety'*.
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- 15th March 2016 Launch of the GSF/British Council publication, *'The Value Of Dialogue In Times Of Hostility And Insecurity'*, a collection of essays and personal reflections, at the National Liberal Club. The event was co-chaired by **Sir Ciarán Devane**, Chief Executive of the British Council and **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**. The following speakers took part: **Dr Scilla Elworthy**, Peace activist, Founder of the Oxford Research Group and Peace Direct; three times Nobel Peace Prize nominee; **Professor Rosemary Hollis**, Professor of Middle East Policy Studies and Director of the Olive Tree Scholarship Programme, City University; **Rt Hon the Lord Howell of Guildford**, Minister of State, Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2010-2012), Chair, House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power; **Dr James Ker-Lindsay**, Senior Research Fellow, European Institute, London School of Economics; **Oliver McTernan**, Director and Co-Founder, Forward Thinking; and the **Rt Revd Peter B. Price**, Chair of Conciliation Resources, former Bishop of Bath and Wells, a peace activist, writer and broadcaster.
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- 22nd March 2016 Discussion on *"'Investing For Influence": The Purpose Of British Foreign Policy?'* with **Professor Michael Cox**, Director of LSE IDEAS and Emeritus Professor at the International Relations Department at the LSE; and **Dr Nicholas Kitchen**, Assistant Professorial Research Fellow in the United States Centre of the London School for Economics, and Executive Director of the LSE Diplomacy Commission.
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- 26th April 2016 Debate on *'The Russia Enigma: Challenging The West?'* with **Sir Tony Brenton KCMG**, UK Ambassador to Russia (2004-2008); **Charles Clover**, *Financial Times* China correspondent, former FT Moscow bureau chief, and author of *'Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia's New Nationalism'*; and **Dr Samuel Greene**, Director of the Russia Institute at King's College London and senior lecturer in Russian politics.
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- 4th May 2016 GSF 10th Anniversary Lecture on *'The International Implications Of Half-Baked Foreign Policy'* by **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**, founding Chairman of GSF, chaired by GSF Advisory Board member, **Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**.
- 
- 10th May 2016 Lecture on *'Standing On The Shoulders Of Giants: Commemorating The First Arab Awakening'* by **His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal**, GSF Advisory Board member.
- 
- 17th May 2016 Debate on *'The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement And Its Legacy In The Middle East Today'* with **Peter Osborne**, former chief political commentator of *The Telegraph*; and **Professor Eugene Rogan**, Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History at the University of Oxford and Director of the Middle East Centre at St Antony's College.
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- 7th June 2016      Lecture on *'The Past, Present And Future Of American Foreign Policy'* with **Professor Michael Mandelbaum**, Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, chaired by the **Rt Hon the Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC PC**.
- 
- 14th June 2016      Debate on *'Britain And The EU: In Or Out?'* with the **Rt Hon Lord Lamont of Lerwick**; **Lord Lothian PC QC DL**; the **Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC**; and the **Rt Hon Jack Straw**, chaired by the **Rt Hon Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC**.
- 
- 15th June 2016      Lecture on *'Britain's Europe: A Thousand Years of Conflict and Cooperation'* by **Professor Brendan Simms**, Professor of the History of European International Relations at the University of Cambridge, chaired by **Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**.
- 
- 28th June 2016      Lecture on *'The Special Relationship 70 Years On: Is The Magic Still There?'* with **His Excellency Mr. Matthew W. Barzun**, Ambassador of the United States of America to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, chaired by the **Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC**.
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- 5th July 2016      Lecture on *'Iran One Year After The Nuclear Agreement: Challenges, Opportunities And Prospects?'* with **Professor Ali Ansari**, Professor of Iranian History and Founding Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies, University of St Andrews, chaired by **Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC**.
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## PARTICIPANTS IN GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM 2006-2016

Haider Al Abadi	Robert Brinkley CMG
Iman Abou Atta	Rt Hon Lord Browne of Ladyton
Mohammed Abu Srou	Jeremy Browne MP
Dr Arshin Adib-Moghaddam	Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Bruce MP
Lord Ahmed of Rotherham	Chris Bryant MP
Dr Shirin Akiner	Professor Michael Burleigh
Dr Chris Alden	Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Lord Alderdice	Sukey Cameron MBE
Rushanara Ali MP	Rt Hon the Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC
Afzal Amin	Mark Canning CMG
Dr Othon Anastasakis	Professor Richard Caplan
David Anderson QC	Dr Jack Caravelli
Rt Hon the Lord Anderson of Swansea	HE Mr. Ünal Çeviköz
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Michael Binyon OBE	Sir Ciarán Devane
Ian Black	Valery Dougan
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Ambassador John Bolton	John Dubber
Sir Tony Brenton KCMG	Professor John Dumbrell

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Johan Eliasch	Dr Hisham Hellyer
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Aidan Foster-Carter	Koby Huberman
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Bronwen Maddox	Sir Tom Phillips KCMG
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## GLOBAL STRATEGY FORUM ADVISORY BOARD

**The Rt Hon Lord Campbell of Pittenweem CH CBE PC QC** is one of the most respected and successful politicians of his generation. He grew up in Glasgow, was educated at Hillhead High School and went on to the University of Glasgow. As a successful university level athlete Ming ran the 200m for the GB team at the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and became captain of the UK Athletics Team 1965-66. He held the British 100m record from 1967 to 1974. He was called to the Scottish Bar as an Advocate in 1968 and appointed Queens Counsel in 1982. He became MP for North East Fife in 1987. In Parliament he was the Liberal Democrats Foreign Affairs Spokesman from 1997–2006. He has served on the Members’ Interests (1987–1990), Trade and Industry (1990-1992) and Defence (1992-1999) Select Committees. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats in 2003 and elected Leader in March 2006–October 2007. He was a Member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and of the Intelligence & Security Committee. He is a Member of the Delegation on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. In 2001 he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate by the University of Glasgow and was given a Knighthood in the 2004 New Years Honours List. He became Chancellor of St Andrews University in April 2006. He was made a Companion of Honour in 2013. He retired from the House of Commons at the May 2015 general election and was subsequently appointed to the House of Lords.

**Professor Michael Clarke** was Director General of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) from 2007 to 2015 when he retired from that role. Until 2001 he was Deputy Vice-Principal and Director for Research Development at King’s College London, where he remains a Visiting Professor of Defence Studies. From 1990 to 2001 he was the founding Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King’s. He was appointed Professor in 1995. He is now a Fellow of King’s College London and of the Universities of Aberystwyth and of Exeter, where he is also Associate Director of the Strategic Studies Institute. He has previously taught at the Universities of Aberystwyth, Manchester and Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and also at the University of New Brunswick and the Open University. He has been a Guest Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, and a Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in London. He has been a specialist adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee since 1997, having served previously with the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 1995-6, and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Bribery in 2009. In 2004 he was appointed as the UK’s member of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. In 2009 he was appointed to the Prime Minister’s National Security Forum and in 2010 to the Chief of Defence Staff’s Strategic Advisory Group. He also served on the Strategic Advisory Panel on Defence for UK Trade and Industry and in 2014 was Chairman of the Defence Communications Advisory panel for the Ministry of Defence. In March 2014 he was appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister to chair an Independent Surveillance Review at RUSI which reported in 2015. That report, *A Democratic Licence To Operate: The Report Of The Independent Surveillance Review*, was published as part of the public discussion around the Interception of Communications Bill, due to be enacted into law by December 2016. In January 2016 he was appointed a specialist adviser to the Joint National Committee on Security Strategy for the period of the current Parliament. In October 2016 he was also appointed to Chair the All-Party Parliamentary Group Commission on Drone Warfare.

**Secretary William S. Cohen** is Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a business consulting firm based in Washington, DC which provides business consulting and advice on tactical and strategic opportunities to clients in quickly changing markets around the world. He serves on the board

of CBS, and on the advisory boards of the US-India Business Council, the US-China Business Council and Barrick Gold International. He is a senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the weekly World Affairs Contributor for CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer. Secretary Cohen served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 to 2001, where he oversaw the largest organisation in the US with a budget of \$300 billion and three million military and civilian personnel. Under his leadership, the U.S. military conducted operations on every continent, including the largest aerial bombardment (Kosovo and Bosnia) since World War II. His term as Secretary of Defense marked the first time in modern US history that a President chose an elected official from the other party for his cabinet. Before his tenure at the Department of Defense, he served three terms in the US Senate and three terms in the US House of Representatives, where he served on the House Judiciary Committee during the 1974 impeachment proceedings and the 1987 Iran-Contra Committee. He also served as mayor of Bangor, Maine. Secretary Cohen was born in Bangor, Maine and received a B.A. in Latin from Bowdoin College, and a law degree from Boston University Law School. He has written or co-authored ten books – four non-fiction works, four novels, and two books of poetry.

**Sir Evelyn de Rothschild** is currently Chairman of E.L. Rothschild, a private investment company. He is Chairman of the ERANDA Foundation, a family foundation he founded in 1967 to support charities working in the fields of medical research, health and welfare, education and the arts. In addition, Sir Evelyn currently serves as a Governor Emeritus of the London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow of Imperial College London and is an Honorary Life President of Norwood and Ravenswood Children's Charity. From 1976 until 2003, Sir Evelyn was Chairman and CEO of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd, the international investment bank. From 1972 until 1989, Sir Evelyn also served as Chairman of the Economist Group, from 1977 to 1994 Chairman of United Racecourses Ltd and previously he served on the Board of Directors of De Beers and IBM UK as well as serving as Deputy Chairman of Milton Keynes Development Corporation, Chairman of St Mary's Hospital Medical School, Member of the Council of the Shakespeare Globe Trust and President of The Evelina Children's Hospital Appeal. He was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II in 1989 for services to banking and finance.

**Susan Eisenhower** is the CEO and Chairman of The Eisenhower Group, Inc. (EGI), a Washington DC based consulting company founded in 1985. For thirty years the company has provided strategic counsel on business development, public affairs and communications projects. EGI has advised Fortune 500 companies, on projects in the United States and Europe, but also in China, Russia, and Central Asia. In addition to her work through EGI, Susan Eisenhower has also had a distinguished career as a policy analyst. She is Chairman Emeritus of The Eisenhower Institute, where she served as president twice. At Gettysburg College, Eisenhower holds a yearlong seminar, *Strategy and Leadership in Transformational Times (SALTT)*, for competitively selected students at the Eisenhower Institute. She has also been a Fellow at Harvard's Institute of Politics and a Distinguished Fellow at the Nixon Center, now called the Center for National Interest. Over the years, she has served as a member of three blue ribbon commissions for the Department of Energy for three different secretaries: The Baker-Cutler Commission on US Funded Non-Proliferation Programs in Russia; The Sununu-Meserve Commission on Nuclear Energy; and the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, which released its findings on a comprehensive program for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in the winter of 2012. She was also appointed to the National Academy of Sciences Standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control, where she served eight years. After as many years on the NASA Advisory Council, she served as a commissioner

on the International Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation Task Force. She is currently a member of MIT's Energy Initiative Advisory Board and co-chairman of NEAC, the Secretary of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Board. In June 2016, she received the *Legion d'honneur* from the French Government, in recognition of her years of policy work, especially in US-Russian Relations. In addition, she has spoken in many corporate venues, as well as at such distinguished institutions as the United States Military Academy at West Point; the Foreign Policy Association of New York; the Army War College, Carlisle; Sandia National Laboratory, MIT and Australia's Science and Technology Organization, which is part of the Australian Ministry of Defence. Eisenhower has authored hundreds of op-eds for newspapers such as *The Washington Post* and *The LA Times*, appeared frequently on national television and radio, and her articles have appeared in such journals as the National Academy of Sciences' *Issues In Science And Technology* and the *Naval Institutes' Proceedings*. She has written four trade press books, two of which were on regional best seller lists, and she co-authored or co-edited four other books on international security issues.

**Rt Hon Frank Field MP** worked as Director of the Child Poverty Action Group from 1969-1979 during which time it became one of the premier pressure groups in the country. In 1974 he also became Director of the Low Pay Unit until 1980. In 1979, he was elected Member of Parliament for Birkenhead. Between 1980 and 1981 he served as Shadow Education and Social Security spokesman under the leadership of Michael Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship of the Social Security Select Committee and continued in this role up to 1997. From 1997-1998 he accepted the position of Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair's first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a member of the Public Accounts Committee between 2002 and 2005. Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy and committed. In 1999 he helped set up the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. The group has acted as an important independent think tank for the cause of a long-term, investment led reform to the pension system. Since 2001 he has also chaired the Church Conservation Trust and has helped develop the trust from being one primarily concerned with conserving the best architectural gems of the Church to one which tries to open up such places for alternative use. From 2005, he has also been chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics Commission which is the planning authority for English cathedrals.

**Secretary Chuck Hagel** was the 24th Secretary of Defense, serving from February 2013 to February 2015. He is the only Vietnam veteran and the first enlisted combat veteran to serve as Secretary of Defense. Hagel also served two terms in the United States Senate (1997-2009) representing the state of Nebraska. Some of Hagel's current commitments include serving on the Board of Trustees of RAND; Advisory Boards of Deutsche Bank America and Corsair Capital; Senior Advisor to Gallup and to the McCarthy Group; Distinguished Executive in Residence at Georgetown University; Distinguished Statesman at the Atlantic Council; and Board of Directors of the American Security Project. Previously, Secretary Hagel served on the Board of the Chevron Corporation and the Zurich Holding Company of America, was a Distinguished Professor at Georgetown University, Co-Chairman of the President's Intelligence Advisory Board, Chairman of the Atlantic Council, Chairman of the United States of America Vietnam War Commemoration Advisory Committee, and Co-Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund Corporate Council. He served as a member of the Secretary of Defense's Policy Board, Secretary of Energy's Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of Nuclear Power, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) Board of Directors and the Systemic Risk Council. Prior to his election to the US Senate, Hagel was president of McCarthy & Company, an investment banking firm in Omaha, Nebraska. In the mid-1980s, Hagel co-founded VANGUARD Cellular Systems, Inc., a publicly traded corporation. He was President and CEO of the World USO, Private Sector

Council (PSC), and Chief Operating Officer of the 1990 Economic Summit of Industrialized Nations (G-7 Summit). Hagel also served as Deputy Administrator of the Veterans Administration under President Ronald Reagan and Deputy Commissioner General of the 1982 World's Fair. He is the author of the book, *America: Our Next Chapter* and was the subject of a 2006 book by Charlyne Berens entitled, *Chuck Hagel: Moving Forward*. A graduate of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, Hagel and his wife, Lilibet, have a daughter (Allyn) and son (Ziller).

**Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield** is a British historian of government. Since 1992, he has been Professor of Contemporary British History at Queen Mary, University of London. Prior to that, he was a journalist for twenty years with spells on *The Times* as a leader writer and Whitehall Correspondent, *The Financial Times* as its Lobby Correspondent at Westminster and *The Economist*. He was a regular presenter of the BBC Radio 4 Analysis programme from 1987 to 1992. In 1986 he was a co-founder of the Institute of Contemporary British History and he was elected a fellow of the British Academy in 2003. In 2008, Lord Hennessy won *The Times* Higher Education's Lifetime Achievement Award. On 5th October 2010, the House of Lords Appointments Commission announced that he was to be appointed a non-political cross-bench Peer. He is a Member of the Chief of the Defence Staff's Strategic Advisory Panel. Lord Hennessy is author of several books, including *Cabinets And The Bomb* (2007), *The Secret State* (2010) and *The Silent Deep: The Royal Navy Submarine Service Since 1945* with James Jinks (2015).

**The Rt Hon Lord Howell of Guildford** acted as policy adviser to Edward Heath in the 1960s and was Director of the Conservative Political Centre. In the late 1970s he became head of Margaret Thatcher's speech-writing team. He served as Minister of State in Northern Ireland, under William Whitelaw, from 1972 to 1974, at the height of the troubles, before going on to serve as Secretary of State for Energy & Secretary of State for Transport in the first Thatcher Cabinet. In 2010 he was enrolled as Minister of State at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office with special responsibilities for the Commonwealth and for international energy issues. This made him not only the only person to have served in the three administrations of Heath, Thatcher and Cameron, but also the only Minister on record to have 'come back' after a 27-year break. Until 2002 he was Chairman of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group (the high level bilateral forum between leading UK & Japanese politicians, industrialists & academics), which was first set up by Margaret Thatcher & Yasuhiro Nakasone in 1984. Along with a multitude of other roles, he is currently President of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Chairman of the Windsor Energy Group and most recently, chairman of the newly set-up House of Lords Committee for International Relations. David Howell has something of a track record in forecasting developments long in advance, and helping to pioneer thinking on the major issues of our times. Thus, in the Heath era he was the first to call for a 'New Style of Government', which would begin to unwind the UK's swollen state activities and liberalise the corporatist state. In the emerging Thatcher era he introduced the privatisation concept to the UK political scene (as chronicled by both the late Lord Howe and by Lord Lawson in their memoirs). In the later 1990s and early 21st century he one of the first to draw political attention to what he called 'Easternisation' and the fast-rising role of Asia, as well as to importance to the UK of the new Commonwealth network. He has all along championed the importance of the UK-Japan relationship. In 2013 he chaired the ground-breaking Lords Report on soft power, called *Persuasion And Power In The Modern World*, seeking a new mindset amongst the UK's foreign policymakers. He is now persistently drawing attention to tomorrow's central significance in international affairs of platform, blockchain and big data technologies and their huge implications for the UK's whole future. He is the author of numerous political pamphlets with notable impact and six books, on energy,

politics, innovation and the Internet: *Freedom & Capital* (Blackwell 1982); *Blind Victory* (Hamish Hamilton 1986); *The Edge of Now* (Macmillan 2001); *Out of the Energy Labyrinth*, co-written with Carole Nakhle (I B Tauris 2008); *Old Links & New Ties: Power & Persuasion in an Age of Networks* (I B Tauris 2014); *Empires in Collision: The Green Versus Black Struggle For Our Energy Future* (Gilgamesh 2016). David Howell was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge.

**Rt Hon the Lord Lamont of Lerwick** was at the centre of British politics for many years. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990-93 and Chief Secretary to the Treasury under Margaret Thatcher. He was a member of the House of Commons for 25 years. He was also a Minister in the Departments of Energy, Defence and Industry. He is currently a director of or consultant to a number of companies in the financial sector, several with Middle East involvement. He is Chairman of the British Iranian Chamber of Commerce, President of the Economic Research Council and a former Chairman of Le Cercle (a foreign affairs think tank). He was made a Life Peer in July 1998. He is an Honorary Fellow of Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge.

**Sir Iain Lobban KCMG CB** was the Director of the British security and intelligence agency, Government Communications Headquarters, from 2008 to 2014, having previously served as its Director General for Operations. He pioneered an integrated service of intelligence and security in domains as varied as cyber defence; counterterrorism; military campaigns overseas; and the prevention and detection of serious crime. Cyber Security, both nationally and internationally, has been at the heart of his role in recent years: he set new direction for innovative government partnering with the private sector and with academia. As the GCHQ Director he attended the UK's National Security Council on a weekly basis from its very first meeting in May 2010 and was a Principal member of the Joint Intelligence Committee for over six years. Sir Iain is now engaged in three fields: the advocacy and demystification of Cyber Security, providing strategic advice and personal perspective, nationally and internationally, to governments and businesses; sharing lessons and insights on strategic and institutional leadership; and entrepreneurship, in the broadest sense of the word.

**Sir David Manning GCMG KCVO** was educated at Oriel College, Oxford and the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University before joining the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1972. He served in Warsaw, New Delhi, Paris and Moscow. From 1994-5 he was Head of Policy Planning; from 1995-8 Ambassador to Israel; and from 1998-2000 he was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence and Intelligence and a member of the Foreign Office Board. He was the UK Permanent Representative at NATO (Brussels) from 2000-2001 before returning to London as Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat (2001-2003). He was then Ambassador to the United States for four years from 2003-2007. Sir David is a Director of Gatehouse Advisory Partners. He is also a Member of the Council of Lloyd's of London.

**Rt Hon Sir Malcolm Rifkind QC** was elected as MP for Pentlands in 1974, which he represented until 1997. He became a member of the Cabinet in 1986 as Secretary of State for Scotland. In 1990 he became Secretary of State for Transport and in 1992, Secretary of State for Defence. From 1995-97 he was Foreign Secretary. In 1997 he was knighted in recognition of his public service. Sir Malcolm was re-elected as a MP in May 2005 for Kensington and Chelsea and he was elected as MP for Kensington in May 2010 until his retirement at the 2015 general election. He was Chairman of the Standards & Privileges Committee (2009-2010); UK representative on the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (2010-2011); and Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee

of Parliament (2010-2015). He was appointed in 2015 by the OSCE as member of their Eminent Persons Panel examining Russia-West relations and the crisis in Ukraine. He is a member of the Board of the Nuclear Threat Initiative chaired by Senator Sam Nunn and a Member of Madeleine Albright's Aspen Ministerial Forum.

**Marshal of the Royal Air Force The Lord Stirrup KG GCB AFC** was born in London, and educated at Merchant Taylors' School and the Royal Air Force College Cranwell. He was commissioned into the Royal Air Force in 1970, and after pilot training completed a number of tours in the instructor and fighter reconnaissance roles. This included two years on loan service with the Sultan of Oman's Air Force during the Dhofar War, and three years on exchange with the United States Air Force in Texas. In the 1980s Lord Stirrup commanded No 11 (AC) Squadron, flying Jaguar aircraft from RAF Laarbruch in Germany, and from 1990 to 1992 he was Officer Commanding RAF Marham in Norfolk, a period that covered the first Gulf War. After attending the Royal College of Defence Studies and the Higher Command and Staff Course, Lord Stirrup served as the Director of Air Force Plans and Programmes in the Ministry of Defence before becoming Air Officer Commanding No 1 Group in 1997. He was Assistant Chief of the Air Staff from 1998 to 2000, and then took up the post of Deputy Commander in Chief Royal Air Force Strike Command. In 2001 he was deployed to United States Central Command immediately following 9/11, and commanded British forces during Operation Veritas, the UK's contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Following a tour as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Equipment, he became Chief of the Air Staff in 2003, and was appointed as Chief of the Defence staff in 2006. Following retirement from the military, he was appointed to the House of Lords in 2011, where he is particularly involved in the areas of defence, security, foreign relations and the arts. He lives in Marylebone, is married with one son, a practising cardiologist, and maintains a keen interest in history, music and the theatre.

**Rt Hon Jack Straw** was the Member of Parliament for Blackburn from 1979 to 2015. From 2007 to 2010, he was the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain and the Secretary of State for Justice. He has served as Home Secretary from 1997 to 2001, Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006 and Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons from 2006 to 2007. Following the election in May 2010, he became the Shadow Lord Chancellor and Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, but announced his intention to step down from the front bench after the Labour Party Conference of that year. His autobiography, *Last Man Standing: Memoirs Of A Political Survivor* was published in September 2012. He retired as MP for Blackburn at the May 2015 general election. He continues to play a leading role in national politics, on home and foreign policy. He is co-Chairman of the British Turkish Forum; takes a close interest in Iran; is a member of the Independent Commission on the Freedom of Information Act; and Chairman of the Blackburn Youth Zone.

**His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal** is a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and is the brother of His late Majesty King Hussein and the uncle of HM King Abdullah II of Jordan, serving as Jordan's Crown Prince from 1965 until 1999. A pluralist and staunch campaigner for the rights of all to live in peace and dignity, HRH is a pioneer of Interfaith dialogue and understanding. Prince Hassan's international commitments have included co-chairing the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues and his current membership of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prince Hassan has long had an active engagement with environmental organisations, having recently served as the Chairman of the UN Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. Prince Hassan currently chairs the High Level Forum for the Blue Peace Middle East plan. HRH established the Arab Thought Forum, the Royal

Institute for Interfaith Studies, the Higher Council for Science and Technology, the Royal Scientific Society and the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) Institute.

**Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG** was Permanent Secretary at the UK Ministry of Defence from 1998-2005, following a short period as Director of GCHQ. His initial career was with the Ministry of Defence and subsequently, from 1979, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. His diplomatic postings overseas were: First Secretary, UK Delegation to NATO; Head of Chancery in the British Embassy at Ankara; Director of Cabinet to the NATO Secretary General, Lord Carrington; and Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington DC. Appointments at home covered defence policy and programmes, international economic relations and resource management. Sir Kevin is now engaged in business, academia and in advising Government. He is a Non-Executive Director of Smiths Group Plc, Chairs the Ascot Barclay Group and is the UK Executive Vice President (Defence and Government) for AECOM Corporation. He is a Visiting Professor at King's College London, a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, and serves on academic Advisory Boards.

**Admiral the Rt Hon Baron West of Spithead GCB DSC PC ADC** DUniv joined the Navy in 1965. He spent most of his naval career at sea, serving in 14 different ships and commanding three of them. In 1980 he took command of the frigate HMS ARDENT taking her south to the Falkland Islands in 1982 where she was sunk in their successful recapture. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the action. He was promoted to Admiral in November 2000 when he became Commander-in-Chief Fleet, NATO Commander-in-Chief East Atlantic and NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces North. He became First Sea Lord in September 2002 and the First and Principal Aide-de-Camp to HM The Queen. He retired as First Sea Lord on 7 February 2006 becoming Chairman of the QinetiQ Defence Advisory Board. He advised both Conservatives and Labour on defence and foreign policy before, in July 2007, being asked by Gordon Brown to join the Government as one of the GOATS (Government of All The Talents) responsible for national security and counterterrorism as well as cyber and Olympic security. He produced the United Kingdom's first ever National Security Strategy and Cyber Security strategy. He was Chairman of The National Security Forum. He left government in May 2010 and is currently a strategic advisor to a number of small companies, a motivational speaker, Chancellor of Southampton Solent University, plus a number of other appointments. Lord West was made a Knight Commander of the Order of The Bath in 2000, Knight Grand Cross in 2004, Baron in 2007 and a Privy Councillor in 2010.

**Christopher Wilkins** is currently chairman of North British Windpower, a privately owned company developing renewable energy in Scotland. Previously he was the architect and first chairman of Hakluyt & Co, an information gathering company. Before that he established and ran his own company in the paper industry, which he then sold. He was a member of the Scottish Economic Council for ten years. He has also worked in the newspaper industry and prior to that he served in the army for eight years - including some active service in the Middle East.



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Professor Ali Ansari and Lord Stirrup

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